Phronesis

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Phronesis
For the academic journal, see Phronesis (journal).
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[1]
Phronesis (AncientGreek: , phronsis) is a Greek word for a type of wisdom or intelligence, which is a
common topic of discussion in philosophy. In Aristotelian ethics, for example in the Nicomachean Ethics, it is
distinguished from other words for wisdom and intellectual virtues such as episteme and techne as the virtue of
practical thought. For this reason, when it is not simply translated by words meaning wisdom or intelligence, it is
often translated as "practical wisdom", and sometimes (more traditionally) as "prudence", from Latin prudentia.
Related concepts
Intellectual
In Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes between two intellectual virtues which are sometimes
translated as "wisdom": sophia and phronesis. Sophia (sometimes translated as "theoretical wisdom") is a
combination of nous, the ability to discern reality, and epistm, a type of knowledge which is logically built up, and
teachable, and which is sometimes equated with science. Phronesis, in other words, involves reasoning concerning
universal truths. Phronesis also combines a capability of rational thinking, with a type of knowledge. On the one
hand it requires the capability to rationally consider actions which can deliver desired effects. Aristotle says that
phronesis is not simply a skill (techn), however, as it involves not only the ability to decide how to achieve a certain
end, but also the ability to reflect upon and determine good ends consistent with the aim of living well overall.
Aristotle points out that although sophia is higher and more serious than phronesis, the highest pursuit of wisdom
and happiness requires both, because phronesis facilitates sophia. He also associates phronesis with political ability.
Phronesis
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Ethical
According to Aristotle's theory on rhetoric, phronesis is one of the three types of appeal to character (ethos). The
other two are respectively appeals to arete (virtue) and eunoia (goodwill).
Gaining phronesis requires experience, according to Aristotle who wrote that:
...although the young may be experts in geometry and mathematics and similar branches of knowledge
[sophoi], we do not consider that a young man can have Prudence [phronimos]. The reason is that
Prudence [phronesis] includes a knowledge of particular facts, and this is derived from experience,
which a young man does not a possess; for experience is the fruit of years.
[2]
Phronesis is concerned with particulars, because it is concerned with how to act in particular situations. One can
learn the principles of action, but applying them in the real world, in situations one could not have foreseen, requires
experience of the world. For example, if one knows that one should be honest, one might act in certain situations in
ways that cause pain and offense; knowing how to apply honesty in balance with other considerations and in specific
contexts requires experience.
Aristotle holds that having phronesis is both necessary and sufficient for being virtuous; because phronesis is
practical, it is impossible to be both phronetic and akratic; i.e., prudent persons cannot act against their "better
judgement."
Influence
Heidegger
In light of his fundamental ontology, Martin Heidegger interprets Aristotle in such a way that phronesis (and
practical philosophy as such) is the original form of knowledge and thus primary to sophia (and theoretical
philosophy).
[3]
Heidegger interprets the Nicomachean Ethics as an ontology of Human Existence. The practical
philosophy of Aristotle is a guiding thread in his Analysis of Existence according to which facticity names our
unique mode of being in the world. Through his existential analytic, Heidegger recognises that Aristotelian
phenomenology suggests three fundamental movements of life including piesis, prxis, theora and that these have
three corresponding dispositions: tchne, phrnesis and sopha. Heidegger considers these as modalities of Being
inherent in the structure of Dasein as being-in-the-world that is situated within the context of concern and care.
According to Heidegger phronesis in Aristotles work discloses the right and proper way to be Dasein. Heidegger
sees phronesis as a mode of comportment in and toward the world, a way of orienting oneself and thus of
caring-seeing-knowing and enabling a particular way of being concerned. While techne is a way of being concerned
with things and principles of production and theoria a way of being concerned with eternal principles, phronesis is a
way of being concerned with ones life (qua action) and with the lives of others and all particular circumstances as
purview of praxis. Phronesis is a disposition or habit, which reveals the being of the action while deliberation is the
mode of bringing about the disclosive appropriation of that action. In other words, deliberation is the way in which
the phronetic nature of Daseins insight is made manifest. Phronesis is a form of circumspection, connected to
conscience and resolutness respectively being-resolved in action of human existence (Dasein) as prxis. As such it
discloses the concrete possibilities of being in a situation, as the starting point of meaningful action, processed with
resolution, while facing the contingencies of life. However Heideggers ontologisation has been criticised as closing
prxis within a horizon of solipsistic decision that deforms its political sense that is its practico-political
configuration (Volpi, 2007).
[4]
Phronesis
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Phronesis in the social sciences
In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre makes a similar callWikipedia:Please clarify for a phronetic social science,
combined with criticism of attempts by social scientists to emulate natural science. He points out that for every
prediction made by a social scientific theory there are usually counter-examples. Hence the unpredictability of
human beings and human life requires a focus on practical experiences.
Bent Flyvbjerg also called for the development of Phronesis in the social sciences in response to the science wars
which arose following the publication of Alan Sokal's hoax article in Social Text.
References
[1] http:/ / en. wikipedia. org/ w/ index. php?title=Template:Aristotelianism& action=edit
[2] Nicomachean Ethics 1142a (http:/ / www.perseus.tufts. edu/ hopper/ text?doc=Perseus:text:1999. 01. 0054:bekker+ page=1142a), Rackham
translation with Greek key terms inserted in square brackets.
[3] Gnter Figal, Martin Heidegger zur Einfhrung, Hamburg 2003, p. 58.
[4] Franco Volpi (2007) 'In Whose Name?: Heidegger and "Practical Philosophy"', European Journal of Political Theory 6:1, 31-51,
Sources and further reading
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics trans. Terence Irwin (2nd edition; Hackett, 1999) ISBN 0-87220-464-2
Robert Bernasconi, Heideggers Destruction of Phronesis, Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 supp. (1989):
12747.
Clifford Geertz, "Empowering Aristotle." Science, vol. 293, July 6, 2001, p.53. (http:/ / www. iwp. uni-linz.ac.
at/ lxe/ sektktf/ gg/ GeertzTexts/ Empowering_Aristotle. htm)
Martin Heidegger, Plato's Sophist (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).
Gerard J. Hughes, Aristotle on Ethics (Routledge, 2001) ISBN 0-415-22187-0
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Duckworth, 1985) ISBN 0-7156-1663-3
William McNeill, The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1999).
Ikujiro Nonaka, Managing Flow: A Process Theory of the Knowledge-Based Firm (Palgrave Macmillan, New
York, 2008).
Amlie Oksenberg Rorty [ed.], Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (University of California Press, 1980) ISBN
0-520-04041-4
Richard Sorabji, "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74,
19731974; pp 107129. Reprinted in Rorty)
David Wiggins, "Deliberation and Practical Reason" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76, 19751976; pp
2951. Reprinted in Rorty)
External links
The dictionary definition of phronesis at Wiktionary
Article Sources and Contributors
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Phronesis Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=615158434 Contributors: 2help, Ad.minster, Adavidb, Ahoerstemeier, Aletheist, Amit A., Andrew Lancaster, Andycjp,
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