Bengzon v.

Drilon
208 SCRA 133 Political Law Veto Power of the President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were repealed during the time of
former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and
members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement
benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the
ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their
pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those
unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non
publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congressallotted
additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following
manner: Congress made an item entitled: General Fund Adjustment; included therein are allotments to unavoidable
obligations in different brances of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired
justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the
judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the constitutionality of the veto
made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to
Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the
Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors
much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any
item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others.
This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an
entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general
adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other
items covering obligations to the other departments of the government.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent.
E. M. Banzali for petitioner.
Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marcelo L. Mallari for respondent.

TUASON, J.:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he
had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace
court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses
in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion
was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First Instance in support of his
motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the
peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not
guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be
examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected,
invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his
intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first
instance.
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present evidence, and by reason of that
waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent judge
did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the
record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated,
in which case the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the
complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the
justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the
peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the
preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to
pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in
his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We called
attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not
apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront
witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority and denied even any
discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant
and his witnesses to testify anew.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.


DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
Posted by kaye lee on 12:18 PM
GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982

FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the
Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP
129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it
being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the
Constitution.

RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their services. What is
important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle
that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1

First Lepanto Ceramics vs. CA [G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994]
Post under case digests, Political Law at Thursday, February 23, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended provided that appeals from decisions of the Board
of Investments(BOI) shall be the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a few months after the 1987 Constitution took effect
(July 17, 1987), the OmnibusInvestments Code of 1987 (EO 226) was promulgated which provided in Art 82 thereof that
such appeals be directly filed with the SC. The SC later promulgated, under its rule-making power, CircularNo. 1-91 which
confirmed that jurisdiction of the CA over appealsfrom the decisions of the BOI. SCs Second Division, relying on
saidCircular, accordingly sustained the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in this present case. Petitioner now move to
reconsider and question the Second Divisions ruling which provided:

.although the right to appeal granted by Art 82 of EO 226 is a substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule of
procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what manner the appeal can be brought are only matters of
procedure which this Court hast he power to regulate.

They contend that Circular No. 191 (a rule of procedure) cannot be deemed to have superseded Art 82 of EO 226 (a
legislation).

Issue: Was the Court correct in sustaining the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in decisions from the Board of Investments?

Held: Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitutiontook effect February 2, 1987. Thus, Art 82 of EO 226,
which provides for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is invalid and therefore never became effective for the
concurrence of the Court was no sought in its enactment. Thus, the OmnibusInvestments Code of 1981 as amended still
stands. The exclusive jurisdiction on appeals from decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA.



In Re: Rodolfo Manzano
Posted on December 8, 2012
Facts:
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the
member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his
membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge
of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.
Issue:
What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned?
Ruling:
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any agency performing
Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any
Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals for
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.
Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments executive machinery and its performance of
governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they
administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence we can readily see that membership in
the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative
functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the
administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases
particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the
members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to
legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.


LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and
NATIONAL BOOK STORE, respondents.
(guys refer nalang to the digest in the polifile for the issues regarding the contract etc kinuha ko lang yung regarding sa
manner of sitting and votes required)
Facts:
On June 23, 1988, Pedro Revilla, Jr., a licensed real estatebroker was given formal authority by BPI to sell the lot for
P1,000.00 per square meter. The owners of the Philippine Remnants concurred this arrangement. Broker Revilla
contacted Alfonso Lim of petitioner company who agreed to buy the land.
On July 9, 1988, Revilla formally informed BPI that he had procured a buyer, herein petitioner.
On July 11, 1988, petitioner's officials, Alfonso Lim and Albino Limketkai, went to BPI to confirm the sale. Vice-President
Merlin Albano and Asst. Vice-President Aromin entertained them. The parties agreed that the lot would be sold at
P1,000.00 persquare meter to be paid in cash. The authority to sell was on a first come, first served and non-exclusive
basis; there is no dispute over petitioner's being the first comer and the buyer to be first served. Alfonso Lim then asked if
it was possible to pay on terms. The bank officials stated that there was no harm in trying to ask for payment on terms
because in previous transactions, the same had been allowed. It was the understanding, however, that should the term
payment be disapproved, then the price shall be paid in cash.
Two or three days later, petitioner learned that its offer to pay on terms had been frozen. Alfonso Lim went to BPI on July
18, 1988 and tendered the full payment of P33,056,000.00 to Albano. The payment was refused because Albano stated
that the authority to sell that particular piece of property in Pasig had been withdrawn from his unit. The same check was
tendered to BPI Vice-President Nelson Bona who also refused to receive payment.
An action for specific performance with damages was thereupon filed on August 25, 1988 by petitioner against BPI. In the
course of the trial, BPI informed the trial court that it had sold the property under litigation to NBS on July 14, 1989.
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed and the complaint
dismissed on 12 August 1994. It was held that no contract of sale was perfected because there was no concurrence of the
three requisites enumerated in Article 1318 of the Civil Code.
On its decision in Dec. 1, 1995, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the questioned judgment of the Court of
Appeals, and reinstated the 10 June 1991 judgment of Branch 151 of the RTC of The National Capital Judicial Region
stationed in Pasig, Metro Manila except for the award of P10,000,000.00 damages, which was deleted.
On March 26, 1996, Motion for Reconsideration was granted. Petitioners opposition to the MR was denied. The SC sets
aside Dec. 1, 1995 decision and affirmed in toto the decision of CA.
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration by Petitioner.
Issue:
WoN the case should be referred to the court en banc
Held:
The Petitioner is contending that the case should be referred to the court en banc because as the doctrines laid down in
Abrenica v. Gonda and De Gracia, 34 Phil. 739, Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba, 43 SCRA 473, and Villonco Realty Co. v.
Bormaheco, Inc., et. al., 65 SCRA 352, have been modified or reversed.
The court held that a more circumspect analysis of these cases vis-a-vis the case at bench would inevitably lead petitioner
to the conclusion that there was neither reversal nor modification of the doctrines laid down in the Abrenica, Talosig and
Villonco cases. In fact, the inapplicability of the principle enunciated in Abrenica and Talosig to this case has already
been extensively discussed in the Courts resolution, hence the same will not be addressed anew. As regards the case of
Villonco, petitioner mistakenly assumes that its case has a similar factual milieu with the former. The Court finds no
further need to elaborate on the issue, but will simply point out the significant fact that the offer of the buyer in Villonco,
unlike in this case, was accepted by the seller, Bormaheco, Inc.; andVillonco involves a perfected contract, a factor
crucially absent in the instant case as there was no meeting of the minds between the parties.
What petitioner bewails the most is the present composition of the Third Division which deliberated on private
respondents motions for reconsideration and by a majority vote reversed the unanimous decision of December 1, 1995.
More specifically, petitioner questions the assumption of Chief Justice Narvasa of the chairmanship of the Third Division
and arrogantly rams its idea on how each Division should be chaired, i.e., the First Division should have been chaired by
Chief Justice Narvasa, the Second Division by Mr. Justice Padilla, the next senior Justice and the Third Division by Mr.
Justice Regalado, the third in line. We need only to stress that the change in the membership of the three divisions of the
Court was inevitable by reason of Mr. Justice Felicianos retirement. Such reorganization is purely an internal matter of
the Court to which petitioner certainly has no business at all. In fact, the current staggered set-up in the chairmanships
of the Divisions is similar to that adopted in 1988. In that year, the Courts Third Division was likewise chaired by then
Chief Justice Fernan, while the First and Second Divisions were headed by the next senior Justices--Justices Narvasa
and Melencio-Herrera, respectively.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners motion for reconsideration and motion to refer the case to the Court En Banc are hereby
DENIED WITH FINALITY, without prejudice to any and all appropriate actions that the Court may take not only against
counsel on record for the petitioner for his irresponsible remarks, but also against other persons responsible for the
reckless publicity anent this case calculated to maliciously erode the peoples faith and confidence in the integrity of this
Court.



Maceda vs. Vasquez (G.R. No. 102781)
Posted: August 24, 2011 in Case Digests
Tags: Judicial Department 0
Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by
certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been
determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision
had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that
petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs constitutional
duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under
Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious
act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over
all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is
only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or
court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
]

Mendoza v. CFI
Facts: Our resolution of January 26, 1973 dismissing these petitions for habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus for lack
of merit is sought to be reconsidered. It was our ruling that petitioner failed to sustain the burden of showing that his
confinement was marked by illegality or that the order cancelling the bail previously issued was tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. It is to credit of his able counsel, former Senator Estanislao Fernandez, that his fight for provisional liberty is
carried on with a further manifestation of skilled scholarly effort, but such valiant attempt to secure his release is doomed
to fail. The law, as will hereafter be set forth, points to the contrary. Deference to its command precludes a
reconsideration. This resolution will likewise briefly touch upon the question of why the issuance of a brief dismissal order
does not in any wise offend against the constitutional provision requiring that no decision "shall be rendered by any court
of record without on which it is based."
Held: 3. That brings us to the point raised in the motion for reconsideration objecting to our dismissing the petition through
a minute resolution. It is his contention that there should be an extended decision. As noted at the outset, reliance is had
on the constitutional provision requiring a decision by a court of record to contain "clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based." According to a recent decision, Jose v. Santos, 17what is expected of the judiciary "is that the
decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor is there
any regid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion
of the particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words
which he must use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs." 18What must
then be stressed is that under such a provision as held in the early case of Soncuya v. National Investment Board, 19the
decision spoken of is the judgment rendered after the previous presentation of the proof in an ordinary civil or criminal
case upon a stipulation of facts upon which its disposition is to be based. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Henares,
20the above decision was cited with approval, with the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes containing the following. "Plaintiff-
appellant assigns as another error that the order appealed from does not contain any statement of the facts and the law
on which it is based. Obviously, this is based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, and Section 12, Article VIII of
the Constitution. The contention is untenable, since these provisions have been held to refer only to decisions of the merit
and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar." 21chanrobles virtual law library

It is thus not self-evident that petitioner could justly lay claim to a grievance. For if the situation is subjected, to searching
analysis, it cannot be denied that what is really involved is just a mere incident in the prosecution of petitioner Had he
prevailed, he would have been entitled to provisionary liberty. Under the circumstances, as the facts of the clearly
demonstrate, with the plea for habeas corpus be unavailing, we felt that a minute resolution which certainly would require
less time than a full-blown decision, was not inappropriate. Precisely, the leniency shown the parties dwell at length on
their respective contentions should disprove any suspicion that the decision arrived at was reached without according the
parties the fundamental fairness to which they are entitled under the Constitution. Since, at the most, the relief sought by
petitioner will not, in any way, foreclose the ultimate outcome of the cases against him one way or the other, we deemed
that the constitutional provision invoked did not strictly call for application. In that sense, a minimum resolution certainly
cannot be stigmatized as in any wise failing to abide by a constitutional command.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied


NITAFAN VS CIR
152 SCRA 284 Political Law Constitutional Law The Judicial Department Judicial Autonomy Income Tax
Payment By The Judiciary
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to prohibit theCommissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such
would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the
Court en banc had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice which directs the continued withholding of taxes of
the justices and the judges of the judiciary but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue once
and for all.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax.
HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations, was NOT to exempt justices
and judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just like members of the other branches of the government,
are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased
during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress.
But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased?
Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the judiciary and such increase will
immediately take effect thus the incumbent members of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the law increasing their
salary) shall benefit immediately.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary but such will only be applicable to
members of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER the effectivity of such law.
Note: This case abandoned the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and in Endencia vs David.



Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs CA

For those who did not take up arbitration: Big commercial contracts, particularly international commercial contracts now
usually have a provision to submit all disputes to arbitration. In arbitration, the parties are free to choose who the
arbitrators who will render the award. An award in an arbitration proceeding is equivalent to a ruling or decision of a court.
After parties present their arguments and evidence, the arbitrators render the award. The winning party goes to court to
have the award confirmed by a judge or magistrate. Once confirmed by the court, the party can have it enforced. In this
case, the parties agreed on an arbitrator and the arbitration proceedings were held in India. The award of the arbitrator
was then confirmed or adopted by a court in India. It was the Indian courts ruling which was being sought to be enforced
here in the Philippines. They did this by filing a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment in the RTC of Pasig.

FACTS
Oil and Natural Gas Commission is a foreign corporation, owned and controlled by the Government of India.
Pacific Cement Co is a Philippine corporation.
Pacific was supposed to deliver more than 4,000 metric tons of oil well cement to Bombay and Calcutta but
because of a dispute with the carrier, the shipment never reached the destination. Despite payment by Oil and Natural, as
well as repeated demands, Pacific does not deliver the oil well cement.
During negotiations, the parties agreed that the Pacific will replace the oil well cement with Class G cement.
Pacific did deliver the Class G cement but they were not according to specifications. Oil and Natural informed Pacific
that they will submit the dispute to arbitration as provided for in their contract.
The dispute was therefore submitted to arbitration, the arbitrator was Shri Malhotra, an employee of Oil and
Natural Gas. The decision of the arbitrator was in favour of Oil and Natural Gas. The arbitral decision was confirmed by an
Indian court.
Oil and Natural Gas filed a complaint in Pasig RTC for the enforcement of the foreign judgment. This was
opposed by Pacific for being bereft of any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner was
based. The judgment of the Indian court apparently simply adopted the award of the arbitrator without stating anything by
way of support for its judgment.
The Pasig RTC dismissed the complaint. The RTC said that the contract provided for some disputes to be settled
by the regular court and some to be submitted to arbitration. This type, the RTC said, was for the courts. Consequently,
the proceedings had before the arbitrator were null and void and the foreign court had therefore, adopted no legal award
which could be the source of an enforceable right.
The CA affirmed the dismissal by the RTC. Aside from agreeing with the RTC that the arbitral award was void, the
CA also said that the full text of the judgment of the foreign court contains the dispositive portion only and indicates no
findings of fact and law as basis for the award. Hence, the said judgment cannot be enforced by any Philippine court as it
would violate the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

ISSUE
Whether or not the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this jurisdiction in view of the private respondent's
allegation that it is bereft of any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner was based.

RULING
Yes, it is enforceable in this jurisdiction. The SC said that even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if
only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the
higher court. This is particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of
the facts and conclusions arrived at, as in this case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of eighteen (18) single spaced
pages.. In effect, the SC was saying that we also do in this country what the Indian court did and it was okay for as long
as the award or decision adopted was complete in terms of the discussion of the facts and conclusions. The 18 pages of
single spaced award by the arbitrator was, according to the SC, complete enough. The short decision of the Indian court
which merely adopted the award was acceptable in our jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure
in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the
judgment is relied on. This Court has held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the
internal law of the forum. Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may
be rendered by adopting the arbitrators findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if the
procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the
necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because
our rules provide otherwise.
Finally, we reiterate hereunder our pronouncement in the case of Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that:
"A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It
is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.
"Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country
having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-
in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of
the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has
regularly performed its official duty."
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment (Pacific Cement) had the burden of overcoming the presumption of
its validity which it failed to do in the instant case.
The foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to be done than to order its enforcement, despite the fact that
Oil and Natural Gas merely prays for, the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. As this Court has ruled
on the validity and enforceability of the said foreign judgment in this jurisdiction, further proceedings in the RTC for the
reception of evidence to prove otherwise are no longer necessary.


People v. Gacott
G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995
Bidin, J.

Facts:

On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed by Asst. City
Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the
criminal case contending that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic
Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an
opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series
of 1972. Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter Of
Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the law contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can
repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994 held that the City
Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute the case and ordered that the case be quashed.

Issue:

whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his discretion as to warrant the
issuance of a writ of certiorari

Held:

Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1,
LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been
expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite
P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately
apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI
No. 2 reads:

Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23, 1972, Reorganizing the Executive Branch of the National
Government, the following agencies of the Department of Justice are herebyreorganized or activated in accordance with
the applicable provisions of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the following instructions: . . . (emphasis supplied).

General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial law
powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case
of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated,
issued, or done by the former President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective,
unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by former President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers
to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly revised, revoked, or
repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law.

Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly ordains:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.