Sei sulla pagina 1di 5

1

Effect on the period to file a responsive pleading


Secs. 5 & 6, Rule 12

G.R. No. L-47574 January 29, 1988
FILIPINAS FABRICATORS & SALES INC., FELIPE
V. PESTANO, and BENITO
UNCHUAN, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
CELSO L. MAGSINO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL AND ATLAS COPCO
(PHILIPPINES), INC.

Background:
Filipinas had a dealership agreement with Atlas, to
which they purchased several products on credit,
which accumulated to P620,266.70. To settle that
account, Filipinas, with Pestano and Unchuan as
sureties, entered into an agreement with Atlas,
assigning with recourse in favor of the latter, some of
its accounts receivables from personal debtors
amounting to P361,745.98, to be deducted from their
outstanding balance. They further agreed to settle
the balance in equal monthly instalments and the
total outstanding balance will earn 14% interest per
annum, plus attorneys fees, expenses and costs in
case of litigation.

Facts:
Atlas commenced a collection suit against Filipinas
and its sureties for failure to pay the outstanding
balance of P139,295.95.

Filipinas and Pestano were duly served with
summons WHILE that issued to Unchuan were
returned UNSERVED.

Counsel for Filipinas, et al. requested a 10-day
extension to file Answer. However, before the CFI
could act on said motion, the petitioners filed a
motion for bill of particulars alleging insufficiency
of the complaint and requested for a more precise
statement of the matters alleged therein.

On March 15, 1977, the lower court issued an order
granting the 10-day extension period to file answer
(until March 14, 1977).

Another order was issued on April 6, 1977, requiring
the petitioners to set the motion for bill of particulars
for hearing with notice to adverse party, otherwise
said motion will be treated as a mere scrap of
paper.

On April 21, 1977, summons was served to
Unchuan, and on the same day, Atlas filed an ex-
parte motion to declare Filipinas and Pestano in
default, with prayer to present its evidence ex-
parte.

The petitioners filed a Manifestation in compliance
with the order, setting the hearing of the motion for
bill of particulars on May 15, 1977 (a Sunday).

The court held in abeyance the resolution of Atas
ex-parte motion pending expiration of Unchuans
period to file answer.

Another ex-parte motion was filed by Atlas to declare
all defendants in default since Unchuans period had
already expired.

The trial court issued an omnibus order denying the
motion for bill of particulars for lack of merit,
considering that the matters sought to be alleged in
the complaint are evidentiary in nature which may be
presented in the trial; and declaring all petitioners in
default, authorizing Atlas to present evidence ex-
parte.

The petitioners subsequent motion to set aside the
omnibus order was denied by the trial court, holding
that when the defendants (Filipinas, et al)
attempted to cure their motion for bill of
particulars by setting said motion for hearing,
Atlas had already filed a motion to declare them
in default, and the period granted to them to file
their responsive pleading had already expired on
March 14, 1977 without them having filed any
responsive pleading, the court denies the
aforesaid motion to set aside the order of default
for lack of merit.

Hence, the present petition seeking to set aside and
annul both orders.

Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the motion for bill of
particulars suspended the period within which to file
their answer

2
Ruling:
YES. Section 1 (b) Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:

Stay of period to file responsive pleading.- After
service of the bill of particulars or of a more
definite pleading, or after notice of denial of his
motion, the moving party shall have the same
time to serve his responsive pleading, if any is
permitted by these rules, as that to which he
was entitled at the time of serving his motion,
but not less than five (5) days in any event.

We agree with the petitioners' premise that a filed
motion for bill of particulars renders the running of
the reglementary period to answer, suspended. This
statement is, of course, accurate only if the filed
motion is sufficient in form and substance,
meaning, it complies with the general requirements
of motions under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which explicitly require a
motion to accompanied by a notice of hearing, to be
served by the movant on the adverse parties
concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing,
and to state therein the exact time and place of
hearing. Section 6 of the same Rule further
commands that "no motion shall be acted upon by
the court, without proof of service of the notice
thereof except when the court is satisfied that the
rights of the adverse party or parties are not
affected." These requirements under Rule 15, as we
have often held, are mandatory, and the failure of
the movant to comply with them renders his
motion fatal.

Significantly, the fact that the court had taken
cognizance of the defective motion first, by requiring
the parties to set it for hearing and second, when it
denied the same for lack of merit in its omnibus
motion, did not cure the defect nor alter the nature of
the defective motion. In Andrada v. Court of
Appeals (60 SCRA 379, 382), we held: "[T]he
subsequent action of the court hereon does not cure
the flaw, for a motion with a notice fatally defective is
a "useless piece of paper."

Even on the assumption that the respondent court's
omnibus order was irregular for denying the
petitioners' defective motion and at the same time
declaring them in default, still, we find the default
order valid. The petitioners, who admit in paragraph
6 of their petition that a copy of the omnibus order
denying the motion for bill of particulars was
received on August 30, 1977, again failed to file their
answer within five (5) days from receipt thereof.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for
certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
questioned orders are AFFIRMED.

Motion to dismiss Rule 16

G.R. No. L-48315 February 27, 1979
ATTY. DOMINADOR B. BORJE petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH II, VIOLETA
GALICINAO MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL WATER
DISTRICT, and THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
BOARD, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner is allegedly the counsel of the water
consuming public of Ozamiz City who resorted to
court action for redress and/or remedy against the
respondent water district on account of the increase
in water rates imposed by the respondent. Due to
consequent representation of the consumers in
debates and discussions in the air, he allegedly
received blank water bills (without indication of
the meter readings, number of cubic meters
consumed and the amounts to be paid) from the
respondent. So he refused to pay the "blank bills."
For such failure, petitioner's water service was cut
on February 6, 1978.

By reason of these acts of "harassment" of private
respondents resulting in his "humiliation" as well as
unlawful deprivation of a life's necessity, petitioner
brought an action for damages with mandatory
injunction, before the CFI.

The court issued an order enjoining the respondents
from disconnecting the water service of petitioner,
but upon learning that the same was already cut, the
court issued another order directing to reconnect it
immediately.

Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on two grounds, namely: a lack of
3
jurisdiction of respondent Court allegedly because
the "Main thrust of the subject and nature of the
action or suit appearing in the complaint is clearly
within the field of special civil action or suit action or
special proceeding
1
and (b) there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same
cause, referring to Special Civil Case No. 0390.

On February 27, 1978, petitioner filed an opposition
thereto stating that the issues raised are justiciable
and a court of general jurisdiction has the authority
to try the case. He further contended that Special
Civil Case No. 0390, which questioned the increased
water rates unilaterally imposed by the Misamis
Occidental Water District, the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 198 and the selection of the
members of the Board of Directors, is entirely
different from Civil Case No. OZ-686, which is an
action for damages due to the harassment
committed by private respondents on petitioner.

Surprisingly though, respondent Court, through Hon.
Melecio A. Genato, a temporary judge issued an
order dated March 9, 1978 dismissing the case
not on the basis of the grounds alleged by
private respondents in their motion to dismiss
but on the grounds that there was no malice or
bad faith in the severance of the water coon of
petitioner and that private respondent had
already reconnected the same.

A motion for reconsideration was filed assailing the
order for having been rendered in violation of
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Court;
and that the order is denominated to be as
midnight order because on March 9, 1978, "the
Clerk of Court officially showed Hon. Melecio A.
Genato the telegram of Hon. Bienvenido A. Ebarle to
schedule trials from March 10, 1978 to March 17,
1978 indicating that he has already and previously
taken his oath. An opposition thereto was also filed
disputing only the claim of petitioner that the order
was a midnight order. A rejoinder was also filed by
the petitioner reiterating that it is a midnight order.

The CFI through Judge Ebarle, denied the MR,
considering that the MR is mainly anchored on the
lack of authority of Judge Genato in dismissing the
complaint. Hence, the present petition

Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds not alleged in the motion to dismiss or not in
accordance with the grounds specifically provided
under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court is
proper.

Ruling:
NO. For the respondent Court to make a finding of
lack of malice or bad faith on the part of private
respondents from those controverted facts and then
decreed the dismissal of the case is, therefore,
violative of due process. In view of the doubtful
question of facts presented herein, respondent court,
in the exercise of sound discretion, should have
refused to consider and decide in a summary
manner and should have allowed the parties to
present proof in support of their respective stand.
This is because the right to a hearing, which is the
right of the parties interested or affected to present
their respective cases and submit evidence in
support thereof, is one of the primary cardinal rights
of litigants.

To all intents and purposes, respondent Court
decreed the dismissal on its own initiative. The SC
ruled in the case of De Leon vs. Henson, that the
dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss
constitutes a denial of due process, if, from a
consideration of the pleadings, it appears that
there are issues of fact which cannot be decided
without trial on the merits.

Similarly, the SC ruled in other cases, as follows:

... Summary or outright dismissals of actions are
not proper where there are factual matters in
dispute which need presentation and
appreciation of evidence. The demands of a fair
and wise administration of justice call for faithful
adherence to legal precepts on procedure which
ensure to litigants the opportunity to present
their evidence and secure a ruling on all the
issues presented in their respective pleadings.
'Short cuts in judicial processes are to be
avoided where they impede rather than promote
a judicious dispensation of justice.

Petition granted, ordering CFI to try the case on the
merits after conducting pre-trial conference.
4
Grounds Sec. 1, Rule 16

DR. MELANIO MALICDEM and
ROY C. FERRER vs. ROMEO FLORES
G.R. No. 151001 - SEPTEMBER 8, 2006

Background:
Respondent Flores and a certain Lotivio entered into
a contract of agreement for a 6-year term subject to
extension by agreement, with former dean Dr.
Bautista as PSUs (Pangasinan State University)
representative, allowing the former to lease the
canteen building and general merchandise store for
a monthly rental of P1,200, and obligating them to
shoulder in advance the cost of the required
repair/renovation of the said building, to be deducted
from the monthly rental until the amount they spent
was paid.

Respondent and Lotivio repaired and renovated the
building and started its canteen operation. Lotivio
withdrew from his partnership with respondent.

Before the expiration of the contract, PSU assured
the respondent that the contract would be renewed
for another 6 years to enable him to recover the
expenses incurred in the repair. However, when
respondent formally informed the new dean, Dr.
Malicdem, of his intention to renew the contract, he
received a letter from the latter notifying him that
PSU President Dr. Asanion will not going to renew
the contract, and that the extension of the contract is
only up to October 31, 1999 only (contract: Sept. 16,
1993 to Sept. 15, 1999). A reply-letter was also sent
by the respondent but to no avail.

Facts:
Respondent Flores instituted an action for specific
performance and damages with prayer for TRO
against PSU represented by Dr. Asanion, Dr.
Malicdem and Roy Ferrer (Special Director for
Administrative Services)

During the hearing on TRO, the petitioners asked to
be represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), consequently, the hearing was reset on
another date.

Dr. Asanion, as PSU representative filed an answer
alleging that the contract was unauthorized for it was
never approved by the PSU President. This move
was meant to comply with COAs recommendation
to nullify the contract of lease for being defective (no
public bidding, 6-yr term is violative of the 2-yr limit
allowed by GAAM (Gen. Acctg. and Auditing
Manual).

Respondent filed a motion for issuance of TRO
asserting that despite the status quo, petitioners
started the construction of a new canteen near the
disputed premises.

On the same date, petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss (w/ opposition to prayer for TRO) for the
respondent had no cause of action against them as
they were not legally bound to renew the contract of
lease, allegedly for violation of several provisions of
the lease (failing to pay rentals and to settle the
water and electric bills, using the canteen as
dwelling place, and making improvements without
prior approval).

A comment and/or opposition was filed maintaining
the assurances made to him that the contract would
be renewed.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court which mandates the filing of the motion to
dismiss BEFORE the filing of an answer.

The petitioner moved for a reconsideration but the
same was denied.

The CA also dismissed the special civil action for
certiorari filed by the petitioners and likewise denied
the MR. Hence, this petition for review

Issue:
Whether or not the denial of the motion to dismiss is
proper

Ruling:
YES. The motion to dismiss was clearly dismissible
because petitioners had already filed an answer
before they filed the motion to dismiss. Section 1,
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides that the
motion to dismiss must be filed within the time
5
for but before filing the answer to the complaint
or pleading asserting a claim. The records
undeniably show that petitioners, through
Dr. Asanion, filed an answer dated December 20,
1999, a month before they filed the motion to
dismiss on January 21, 2000. The answer filed by
Dr. Asanion as PSUs representative was binding on
petitioners because they were not sued in their
personal capacities but as PSU officials.

Petition is denied.

Grounds: (j) that a condition precedent for filing
the claim has not been complied with

G.R. No. L-23102 April 24, 1967
CECILIO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and
LUISA DE LA ROSA MENDOZA, respondents.

Facts:
Luisa was married to Cecilio and lived together as
husband and wife until he departed for US to further
his studies and practice his profession. That since
then, without justifiable cause or reason, Cecilio
abandoned and neglected her despite repeated
demands, and refused to provide for maintenance
and support to Luisa, who was allegedly pregnant
and sickly, and without any source of revenue.

Luisa then instituted a case against Cecilio. Cecilio
moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue. The motion having
been denied, he filed an answer with counterclaim,
putting in issue the validity of his marriage to Luisa,
which was duly replied by the plaintiff.

A second motion to dismiss was filed predicated on
the complaints failure to state a cause of action,
because it contained no allegation that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made
before the filing of the suit.

The CFI refused to entertain the 2
nd
motion to
dismiss. Cecilio filed a petition for writ of prohibition
with prelim. injunction before the CA to stop the CFI
for further proceeding with the case. The CA issued
the writ prayed for but dissolved the injunction after
hearing and consideration on the merits.
The MR having been denied, the filing of the instant
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not earnest efforts toward a compromise
is a condition precedent to the existence of the
cause of action

Ruling:
YES. Petitioner argues that Article 222 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines (jam. quot.) requires that
before a suit between members of the same family
(in this case between husband and wife) is filed or
maintained, it must appear that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, and the only
way to make it so appear when the suit is filed is by
a proper averment to that effect in the complaint.
Since the law forbids a suit being initiated (filed) or
maintained unless such efforts at compromise
appear, the showing that efforts in question were
made is a condition precedent to the existence of the
cause of action. It follows that the failure of the
complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in
earnest to reach a settlement out of court renders it
assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be
so attacked at any stage of the case even on appeal.

While we agree that petitioner's position represents
a correct statement of the general rule on the matter,
we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the
Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance
committed no error in refusing to dismiss the
complaint, for on its face, the same involved a
claim for future support that under Article 2035
of the Civil Code of the Philippines cannot be
subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore,
outside the sphere of application of Article 222
of the Code upon which petitioner relies.

Since no valid compromise is possible on these
issues, a showing of previous efforts to compromise
them would be superfluous.

It may be that the complaint asks for both future
support and support in arrears, as petitioner
contends. But, the possibility of compromise on the
latter does not negate the existence of a valid cause
of action for future support, to which Article 222 can
not apply. CA affirmed.

Potrebbero piacerti anche