PROPERTY 7

th
WEEK
Si v Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA 653 FACTS:
Escolastica conveyed a parcel of land to her three sons. This is evidenced by three deeds of sale. One of
the sons then sold a part of the land to spouses Si. Jose and his wife then sought to annul the sale
alleging the co-ownership over the land.
HELD: After the physical division of the lot among the co-owners, the community ownership is
terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each other was no longer available. There is
no co-ownership when the different portions owned by the different people are already concretely
determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.
Sering v Plazo, 166 SCRA 84
Anyone of the co-owners of an immovable may bring an action in ejectment.
FACTS: Sering won an ejectment suit against Spouses Plazo and Suan. On appeal with the CFI,
respondents learned that Sering is not the sole owner of the property and they moved to implead the
other co-owners because they think that they are indispensable parties to the case. Court granted and
ordered Sering to amend complaint. Due to the failure of the petitioner to amend the complaint, the
case was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether the other co-owners are indispensable to the ejecment case
HELD: No, according to Art 478 Anyone of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment (whether
the action is forcible entry or unlawful detainer). The matter to be determined is the prior physical
possession of the plaintiff which was correctly alleged.
Adlawan v Adlawan, G.R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006
A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is allowed to bring an action without necessity of including all the co-
owners as plaintiffs for it is presumed to be for the benefit of all BUT if the action of the plaintiff
alone, the action should be dismissed.
FACTS: A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of
(petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who is
claiming that he is the sole heir. He then adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to himself and
out of generosity allowed the siblings of his father to occupy the property provided that they vacate
when asked. Time came when he demanded that they vacate and when they refused he filed an
ejectment suit against them.
His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming
that the said lot was registered in their parents name and they had been living in the said house and lot
since birth. The only reason why the said house and lot was transferred in Dominadors name was
when their parents were in need of money for renovating their house, their parents were not qualified to
obtain a loan and since Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they executed a
simulated deed of sale in favor of Dominador.
The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelitos filiation and the settlement of the estate are
conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit. And since Dominador was survived by his wife,
Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to
turn over the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the motion of execution which was
opposed by the nephew and nieces of Graciana who claim that they have a share in the lot.
The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are co-heirs
thus he cannot eject them from the property via unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit
HELD: NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole heir of
Dominador. Since he was survived was his wife, upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became co-
owners of the lot. Upon her death, her share passed on to her relatives by consanguinity thus making
them co-owners as well.
Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the co-
owners may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o
necessity of joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs because it is presumed to be instituted for the benefit
of all BUT if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed. Since
petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his repudiation of the ownership of
the other heirs, the instant petition should be dismissed.
Plasabas v CA, G.R. No. 166519, March 31, 2009
Paulmitan v Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 866
When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent from the other co-owners, only his pro
indiviso share on the property is transferred to the buyer.
FACTS: The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were owned by Agatona Paulmitan.
She had 2 children, Pascual and Donato. Pascuals (7) children (Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita,
Baking, Anito) are the respondents and Donato and his daughter and son-in-law are petitioners.
Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, adjudicating to himself Lot 757 claiming that
he is the sole surviving heir thus the OCT of Agatona was cancelled and a TCT was issued in his name.
He executed a deed of sale of Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter, Juliana. For non-payment of taxes, the
lot was forfeited and sole at a public to the Provincial Govt of Negros Occidental, however, Juliana
was able to redeem the property. Upon learning these, the children of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a
complaint against petitioners to partition the land plus damages. Petitioners defense was that the action
has already prescribed for it was filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the TCT and that Juliana
has acquired exclusive ownership thru the Deed of Sale and by redeeming the said property.
The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and executory. With respect to Lot 1091, the court
decided in favor of respondents. They are entitled to of Lot 1091, pro indiviso. The redemption did
not in anyway prejudice their rights. The land was ordered to be partitioned and the petitioners were
ordered to pay the respondents their share of the fruits and the respondents to pay their share in the
redemption of the land. The CA affirmed the decision thus the case at bar.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Pascuals children and Donato and Juliana were co-owners of their
mothers lot (2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by redeeming the property
HELD: (1) YES: When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Art. 1078 states that Where
there are 2 or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by
such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. Since Pascual and Donato were still alive
when she died, they are co-owners of the estate. When Pascual died, his children succeeded him in the
co-ownership of the property.
When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner of the same thus he can only sell his
undivided portion of the property. Art. 493 states that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the buyer (Juliana) a co-owner.
(2) NO: When she redeemed the property, it did not end the co-ownership. The right of repurchase may
be exercised by a co-owner w/ respect to his/her share alone as stated in Art. 1612. But she may compel
them to reimburse her for half of the repurchase price for a co-owner has the right to compel other co-
owners to contribute to the expenses for the preservation of the thing and to taxes.
Cruz v Leis, 327 SCRA 570
Redemption by a co-owner doesn't terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the whole property
subject of the co-ownership FACTS: Leis and Isidro married each other in 1923. Isidro subsequently
acquired from the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources a parcel of land, which was titled
in her name, with the description that she was a widow. Leis only passed away in 1973 without
executing a will.
Isidro then secured a loan from Cruz (PhP 15,000, with 5% interest) secured by a mortgage on the land
from DANR, but failed to pay on due date. Isidro executed 2 contracts in favor of Cruz: an Deed of
Absolute Sale and a Contract indicating a pacto de retro sale. Isidro still failed to repurchase the
property within 1 year, so she consolidated the ownership of the land in favor of Cruz.
When Isidro died, Cruz demanded her heirs to vacate the premises. The heirs then filed a complaint
with the RTC averring that the land was conjugal property having been purchased during their
marriage. The RTC found in favor of the heirs. The case was appealed to the CA, but the CA merely
affirmed the ruling because Cruz failed to get a judicial order to have the land consolidated in his name
after failure of Isidro to comply with the requirements of the right to repurchase (Art. 1607).
ISSUE: Whether or not the land in question is conjugal property, and therefore subject to the rules on
co-ownership?
HELD: Although the land was purchased during the marriage, upon Leis death, the conjugal property
regime ceased, and gave Isidro an equal portion of Leis half of the property to be divided among his
legitimes. Co-ownership of the land then began.
However, upon failure of Isidro the heirs to exercise the right to repurchase, the ownership of the land
transferred to Cruz. Despite the TCT being void for non-compliance with 1607, the ownership did not
transfer back to the heirs, for compliance with 1607 is merely for purposes of registering the title in the
Torrens System.
Villanueva v Florendo, 139 SCRA 329 (read dissent)
The third party contemplated in Art. 1620 refers to those who are not heirs in succession, either
contemplated by will or by law to succeed the deceased.
FACTS: Spouses Villanueva and Garcia, parents of the petitioners, were owners of a land in Cagayan.
Garcia died intestate, leaving her husband and children as sole and only legitimate heirs. The spouse,
without having the land partitioned, sold the western portion of the lot to the wife of one of his
children. Upon learning of the sale, the petitioners signified their intention to redeem the lot, but
respondent refused, stating that as wife of one of the legal heirs, redemption will not lie against her.
RTC found in favor of respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is a third party against whom redemption can be exercised
against, pursuant to Art. 1620?
HELD: Within the meaning of Art. 1620, the term "third person" or "stranger" refers to all persons who
are not heirs in succession, and by heirs are meant only those who are called either by will or the law to
succeed the deceased and who actually succeeds. In short, a third person is any one who is not a co-
owner. Respondent seller Villanueva, as co-owner and before partition, has the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest or his Ideal share but not a divided part and one with boundaries as
what was done in the case at bar.
DISSENT (Aquino): The third person term contemplated in Art. 1620, basing on the Spanish origin
of the Code, means stranger, and not merely one who is not an heir by succession.
In fact, the redemption should not run against the respondent for the reason that the land that
respondent bought formed part of the conjugal property, of which her husband, who is a legitimate
heir, also owns. Therefore, the land never transferred to the ownership or possession of third parties.
Mariano v Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 736
Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner within the redemption period does not terminate the
co-ownership and does not vest in him sole ownership.
FACTS: Francisco Gosiengfaio is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao. In his
lifetime, he mortgaged the land to Rural Bank of Tuguegarao to secure payment of a loan. Francisco
died in without paying the debt. His intestate heirs were: his wife Antonia and children Amparo,
Carlos, Severo, Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina, and Jacinto.
The bank foreclosed on the mortgage but before the redemption period expired, Antonia, Emma, Lina,
Norma, Lina, Carlos and Severo executed a deed of assignment of the right of redemption in favor of
Amparo. Amparo later on sold the land to Spouses Mariano.
Grace Gosengfiao, and the other heirs excuded in the deed of assignment filed a complaint for recovery
and legal redemption with damages against spouses Mariano.
RTC decided in favor of spouses Mariano. CA for Grace Gosiengfia, et. al.
ISSUE: Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her own personal funds
becomes the sole owner of said property and terminates the existing state of co-ownership?
HELD: No. Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the decedent, a co-ownership
existed among the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption
of the whole property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will
inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it will not end to the existing state of co-
ownership. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale
by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.
Tan v Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 660
Consolidation of ownership by mortgagee after expiration of redemption period terminates co-
ownership. A co-owner who redeems a property with her own funds after such consolidation becomes
the sole owner thereof.
FACTS: Tan Tiong Tick, married to Tan Ong Hun was the registered owner of a parcel of land and its
improvements in Binondo Manila. They had six children George Laurel, Teodora, Rosa, Rosita, Mauro
Umali, and D. Annie Tan.
The land was mortgaged to China Bank to secure payment for several obligations. Tan Tiong Tick and
Tan Ong Hun died without paying their obligations.
China Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Two weeks before the redemption period expired, China Bank
and the Heirs of Tan Tiong Tick entered into a settlement. It provided that the heirs were given right to
repurchase even after the redemption period but before August 3, 1973.
The heirs failed to redeem before the legal redemption period so China Bank consolidated its
ownership and was issued a new TCT. However, D. Annie Tan exercised the right to repurchase
pursuant to the settlement using her personal funds. But the title to the land was registered in the name
of all the heirs.
D. Annie Tan filed an action to reconvey the property to her and damages. RTC ruled that the property
was co-owned by the heirs. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not co-ownership among the heirs was dissolved by the foreclosure and
consolidation of title by the bank after the redemption period has expired?
HELD: Yes. Since the lot and its improvement were mortgaged by the deceased parents, there can be
no question that a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the
foreclosed property. Redemption by one during this period would have inured to the benefit of all. The
records show, however, that when the petitioner purchased the disputed property on August 30, 1974,
any co-ownership among the brothers and sisters no longer existed. The period to redeem had expired
more than one year earlier, on July 6, 1973. The respondent China Bank consolidated its ownership and
a new title was issued in the bank's name. When the heirs allowed the one year redemption period to
expire without redeeming their parents' former property and permitted the consolidation of ownership
and the issuance of a new title, the co-ownership was extinguished. Since D. Annie Tan used her
personal fund to repurchase the property, she is the lawful sole owner. The respondent China Banking
Corporation is ordered to execute the deed of sale over the disputed property in favor of the petitioner
alone.
Delima v Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 641
Cancellation of old title and issuance of new one constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust
or co-ownership which would start the running of prescription.
FACTS: This case is another story of sibling war over a Friar Land Estate inherited from their parent
who had acquired said land from the Government. When the parents died, Respondent Galileo
allegedly paid the remaining balance of the purchase price, and the estate tax. Later on, he executed an
affidavit declaring himself as sole owner and acquired TCT over it. 10 years after the TCT was issued,
the other heirs instituted this action for reconveyance claiming their part as co-owners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the other heirs are still entitled to the land or are they barred by prescription.
RULING: The other heirs are barred by prescription. How did this happen? Galileo was able to prove
the 4 requirements: (1) clear and convincing evidence of repudiation (2) made known to the other
owners (3) adverse possession and open repudiation (4) for over 10 years.
What is important in this case is that the Court ruled that registration of the land would be sufficient
compliance with the notice requirement above.
Adille v Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 455
Registration is not equivalent to notice of repudiation when it is done to defraud the others. Torrens
title cannot be used as shield for fraud.
FACTS: There was a woman who had two husband. With the first husband, she produced the
Petitioner. The second husband, the Respondents. Meanwhile, this woman owned a land and sold the
same to a third person with right of repurchase. However, when the woman died, it was Petitioner who
by himself repurchased the land and later on he executed an affidavit of sole ownership and registered
the land unto himself alone. Eventually, the other heirs (Respondent) learned of the registration so they
filed an action to cancel the title.
Now Petitioner claims prescription almost on similar grounds with the previous case, i.e. the
registration constituted constructive notice to the other heirs, if not to the world.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is correct.
RULING: NO! First of all, the redemption by Petitioner benefited all so that the ownership did not
transfer to him alone. The other heirs only need to reimburse him.
As to the notice, the registration by Petitioner cannot be considered as notice of the repudiation because
they were done in bad faith to deprive the other co-heirs. In fact, they were done clandestinely. One of
the co-heir in fact was in possession of the land and yet he was not informed of the pending registration
nor ousted by Petitioner. Hence, should there have been any notice, it would be during litigation when
the heirs finally learned of the registration. In that case, there is no prescription yet. Registration is not
equivalent to notice of repudiation when it is done to defraud the others. Torrens title cannot be used as
shield for fraud.
FACTS: There was a woman who had two husband. With the first husband, she produced the
Petitioner. The second husband, the Respondents. Meanwhile, this woman owned a land and sold the
same to a third person with right of repurchase. However, when the woman died, it was Petitioner who
by himself repurchased the land and later on he executed an affidavit of sole ownership and registered
the land unto himself alone. Eventually, the other heirs (Respondent) learned of the registration so they
filed an action to cancel the title.
Now Petitioner claims prescription almost on similar grounds with the previous case, i.e. the
registration constituted constructive notice to the other heirs, if not to the world.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is correct.
RULING: NO! First of all, the redemption by Petitioner benefited all so that the ownership did not
transfer to him alone. The other heirs only need to reimburse him.
As to the notice, the registration by Petitioner cannot be considered as notice of the repudiation because
they were done in bad faith to deprive the other co-heirs. In fact, they were done clandestinely. One of
the co-heir in fact was in possession of the land and yet he was not informed of the pending registration
nor ousted by Petitioner. Hence, should there have been any notice, it would be during litigation when
the heirs finally learned of the registration. In that case, there is no prescription yet.
Mariategui v Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 337
Prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated
by the co-owner. Petitioners registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a
valid repudiation of co-ownership, especially since there was fraud involved.
FACTS:
Lupo Mariateguie died without a will on June 15, 1953. During his lifetime, Lupo contracted 3
marriages. He had 8 children all in all: 4 with his first wife, Eusebia; 1 daughter with his second wife,
Flaviana; and 3 with his third wife, Felipe.
Lupo left four properties which he acquired while he was still unmarried. On December 2, 1967,
Lupos descendants by his 1st and 2nd marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby
they adjudicated one of the lots unto themselves. An OCT was issued in the names of these heirs.
Subsequently, this lot was subdivided into two, for which separate TCTs were issued to the respective
parties.
Lupos children with the third wife, who were claiming continuous enjoyment and possession of the
land, protested. They went to court saying that when the court adjudicated one of the four lots to their
co-heirs, they were deprived of their respective shares in the lot. They prayed for the partition of the
entire estate (all 4 lots) and the annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition. The defendants (other
heirs) filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription. The trial
court dismissed the case while the CA declared that all the heirs were entitled to equal shares in the
estate. CA directed the heirs who had acquired TCTs to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor of the
heirs with the third wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription barred private respondents right to demand partition of the estate [The
court established that the heirs had successional rights as their father had, during his lifetime,
repeatedly acknowledged them as his children; that they enjoyed that status since birth legitimate
children & heirs indeed]
RULING: No. Prescription does not run against private respondents wrt the filing of the action for
partition so long as the heirs/co-owners for whose benefit the prescription is invoked have not
expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership.
The registration was not a valid act of repudiation because it was not clearly made known to the other
heirs. For prescription to run, the act of repudiation is subject to certain conditions:
1. a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership 2. such act is clearly made known to the other co-owners 3.
the evidence is clear and conclusive 4. OCEN possession of the property
Assuming that it was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when the
respondents filed the action for partition. The reason is because there was fraud involved in obtaining
registration. Earlier the respondent heirs were assured by the petitioner-heirs no to worry about their
share in their inheritance; their existence as co-owners was recognized and in fact, they constructed a
house on the registered lot without objection from the petitioner-heirs. In as much as petitioners
registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs, prescription can only be deemed to
have commenced from the time respondents discovered the fraud. In this case, respondents
immediately commenced an action two months after they learned of the fraud.
Heirs of Segunda Maningding v Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601
While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership exercised are vague
and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not
evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners.
FACTS:
This case involved 2 parcels of land: a riceland and sugarland in Pangasinan. The heirs of Segunda
claim that they own the disputed lands together with the Buazons.
The Buazons aver that: 1. Their father, Roque Buazon, acquired the land by virtue of a deed of
donation propter nuptias. 2. Segunda Maningding, Maria Maningding, Juan Maningding and Roque
Bauzon co-owned the lands as heirs of Ramon Roque. Roque Buazon allegedly repudiated the co-
ownership of the sugarland in 1965 and repudiated it to himself and later on, Juan and Maria
Maningding renounced and quitclaimed their shares in the Riceland in favor of R. Buazon. 3.
Subsequently, Roque Bauzon transferred the riceland to his son Luis Bauzon and the sugarland to his
daughter Eriberta Bauzon (the respondents in this case), both transactions being evidenced by deeds of
sale.
On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly discovered the transfers made by
Roque Bauzon in favor of his children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition of the
properties as well as the accounting of the produce but were unsuccessful.
The trial court awarded both parcels to Segunda Maningding and Roque Bauzon as co-owners in equal
shares after finding that Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding had already executed an Affidavit of
Quitclaim and Renunciation. It rejected the deed of donation for failure to prove its due execution and
authenticity and nullified the deed of sale by Roque Buazon to his children. It concluded that Roque
Bauzon could not have validly conveyed both parcels as one-half (1/2) of each parcel rightfully
belonged to Segunda Maningding and her heirs.
The CA reversed the ruling, declaring the donation and sales valid. Later on, the court reversed itself
by declaring the donation void for failure to comply with the necessary requirements. However, it ruled
that the properties belonged to Roque Bauzon by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not Roque Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive
prescription
RULING: Yes. While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership
exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of
ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners.
In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the concept of owner by
virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who
personally tilled and cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were manifest
and visible to all. These acts were made more pronounced and public considering that the parcels of
land are located in a municipality wherein ownership and possession are particularly and normally
known to the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was never ousted therefrom
nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His possession was uninterrupted and in good faith because of
his well-founded belief that the donation propter nuptias was properly executed and the grantors were
legally allowed to convey their respective shares in his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the
whole produce of the parcels of land to the exclusion of all others.
As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to
the exclusion of petitioners who were never given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which
reason they demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their shares.
Unfortunately they slept on their rights and allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse before
attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction.
Note: The donation propter nuptias was effected as early as 21 April 1926. It was only in 1986 when
the heirs of Segunda Maningding demanded partition of the properties and conveyance of the produce.
Sixty (60) years have already elapsed. Even granting that Roque Bauzon possessed the properties only
upon the death of his father in 1948, more than thirty (30) years have already passed. In either case,
acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of Roque Bauzon.
Aguilar v Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 472
Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object
to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their
respective interests.
FACTS:
Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in Paraaque where their father could
spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed that Vergilio
will get 2/3 and Senen will get 1/3; but later they agreed on equal shares. Senen was left in the said lot
to take care of their father since Vergilios family was in Cebu. After their fathers death petitioner
demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and
proceeds thereof divided among them but the latter refused. Petitioner then filed to compel the sale of
the property. The chunk of the issue tackled by the courts was regarding the pre-trial. Respondent filed
a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the counsel had to accompany his wife in Dumaguete City where she
would be a principal sponsor in a wedding. CFI denied the motion; and the pre-trial proceeded on the
scheduled date. The respondents did not appear thus they were declared in default. The trial went on ex
parte without the respondent and held that the property should be sold to a third party and that the
proceeds be distributed to the parties; in addition respondent was made to pay rent from the time the
action was filed. Respondents appealed this and the decision was reversed by the CA saying that the
TC erred in declaring respondents in default; the case was then remanded to the trial court. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE:
A) W/N CA erred (1) in holding that the motion of respondent through counsel to cancel the pre-trial
was dilatory in character and
(2) in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial? ISSUE RELEVANT TO PROPERTY:
B) W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and rent?
RULING: A) YES, CA erred in granting the respondents motion and remanding the case. The law is
clear that the appearance of parties at the pretrial is mandatory. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial
conference may be non-suited or considered as in default. It is the discretion of the court to grant the
motion if it sees that the reason for the cancelation of the same would be reasonable. SC found that the
reason for the cancelation of the pre-trial was insufficient and that the trial court was not in grave abuse
of discretion when they denied it.
B) YES, with a few modification. Petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in
equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other
cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to
their respective interests. BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code
states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed.
SC held that of the proceeds should go to the petitioner and the remainder to the respondent (1,200
each.) Also rent was awarded 1,200 pesos per month with legal interest from the time the trial court
ordered the respondent to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property. BASIS:
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition
and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to
enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.
Benjamin Coronel v Florentino Constantino, 397 SCRA 128
Sale of an undivided interest of a property only binds the co-owner only up to the portion of his/her
interest; consequently he/she can only transfer ownership over the same to other parties.
FACTS:
The disputed property was originally owned by Honoria Aguinaldo. One half was inherited by Emilia
Coronel together with her sons Benjamin, Catalino and Cerefino, all surnamed Coronel. The other half
was inherited by Florentino Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso. Emilia sold her share of the lot to Jess
C Santos and Priscilla Bernardo as evidenced by the KASULATAN NG BILIHANG PATULUYAN.
Santos and Bernardo then sold it to the respondents. Petitioners built several constructions and
improvements on the disputed lot. Respondents then filed a complaint for declaration of ownership,
quieting of title and damages with prayer for writ of mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction with the
trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale was valid? If yes, up to what extent?
RULING: YES, only up to share of the land inherited by Emilia and her sons. Emilia signed only in
her behalf and not in representation of her three children thus the sale is only binding to her share. The
subject property was co-owned, pro-indiviso by petitioner Emilia together with her petitioner sons. No
proof was presented to show that the co-ownership that existed among the heirs of Ceferino and
Catalino and herein petitioners as never been terminated. No evidence was presented to show that the
three brothers were aware of the sale made by their mother. Since there was no partition made, Emilia
is deemed to have sold only her share of the lot which is thereof. Consequently SC declared
respondents as owner of undivided portion of the original lot which they inherited plus share (of
their ) of petitioner Emilia Coronel.