CADC AUF SOL CONSTI 1

Powers as commander-in-chief
* Powers as Commander-in-Chief:
a. He may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (calibrated
response)
b. He may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, (explain to the court the reason for detention, 3
days, either you file a formal charge or release him)
c. He may proclaim martial law over the entire Philippines
or any part thereof.
> Subject to judicial review to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction (par. 2, Sec 1, Art VIII)
a. Call out the AFP to prevent lawless violence - This is
merely a police measure meant to quell disorder. As such,
the Constitution does not regulate its exercise radically
b. Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus - A
"writ of habeas corpus" is an order from the court
commanding a detaining officer to inform the court
(i) if he has the person in custody, and
(ii) what his basis in detaining that person.
The "privilege of the writ" is that portion of the writ
requiring the detaining officer to show cause why he should
not be tested. Note that it is the privilege that is suspended,
not the writ itself.
Requisites:
1) There must be an invasion or rebellion, and
2) The public safety requires the suspension.
Effects of the suspension of the privilege:
1) The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to
persons "judicially charged" for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion (Art. VII, Sec.
18, par. 5).
>Such persons suspected of the above crimes can be
arrested and detained without a warrant of arrest.
> The suspension of the privilege does not make the arrest
without warrant legal. But the military is, in effect, enabled
to make the arrest, anyway since, with the suspension of
the privilege, there is no remedy available against such
unlawful arrest (arbitrary detention).
>The arrest without warrant is justified by the emergency
situation and the difficulty in applying for a warrant
considering the time and the number of persons to be
arrested.
>the crime for which he is arrested must be one related to
rebellion or the invasion. As to other crimes, the suspension
of the privilege does not apply.
2) During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within 3 days, or otherwise he shall be released. (Art. VII,
Sec. 18, par. 6).
> The effect of the suspension of the privilege, therefore, is
only to extend the periods during which he can be detained
with- out a warrant. When the privilege is suspended, the
period is extended to 72 hours.
> What happens if he is not judicially charged nor released
after 72 hours? The public officer becomes liable under Art.
125 for "delay in the delivery of detained persons."
3) The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. (Art. III,
Sec. 13)
c. Proclaim Martial Law
Requisites:
1) There must be an invasion or rebellion, and
2) Public safety requires the proclamation of martial law all
over the Philippines or any part thereof.
Effects of the proclamation of martial law:
The President can:
1) Legislate
2) Order the arrest of people who obstruct the war
effort.
But the following cannot be done (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 4)
a. Suspend the operation of the Constitution.
b. Supplant the functioning of the civil courts and the
legislative assemblies. > martial law is proclaimed
only because the courts and other civil institutions
like Congress have been shut down. It should not
happen that martial law is declared in order to shut
down the civil institutions.
c. Confer jurisdiction upon military courts and agencies
over civilians, where civil courts are able to
function.
"open court" doctrine holds that civilians cannot be tried
holds that civilians cannot be tried by military courts if the
civil courts are open and functioning.
if the civil courts are not functioning, then civilians can be
tried by the military courts.
Martial laws usually contemplates a case where the courts
are already closed and the civil institutions have already
crumbled, that is a expressly.
"theater of war." If the courts are still open, the President
can just suspend the privilege and achieve the same effect.
Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
> The President must suspend the privilege
The Role of Congress
a. Congress may revoke the proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
before the lapse of 60 days from the date of suspension or
proclamation
b. Upon such proclamation or suspension, Congress shall
convene at once. If it is not in session, it shall convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call within 24
hours following the proclamation or suspension.
c. Within 48 hours from the proclamation or the
suspension, the President shall submit a report, in person or
in writing, to the Congress (meeting in joint session of the
action he has taken).
d. The Congress shall then vote jointly, by an absolute
majority. It has two options:
(i) To revoke such proclamation or suspension.
>When it so revokes, the President cannot set aside (or
veto) the revocation as he normally would do in the case of
bills.
(ii) To extend it beyond the 60-day period of its validity.
Congress can only so extend the proclamation or
suspension upon the initiative of the President. The period
need not be 60 days; it could be more, as Con- gress would
determine, based on the persistence of the emergency. If
Congress fails to act before the measure expires, it can no
longer extend it until the President again redeclares the
measure.
* Congress cannot "validate" the proclamation or
suspension, because it is already valid. * If Congress
extends the measure, but before the period of extension
lapses, the requirements for the proclamation or sus-
pension no longer exist, Congress can lift the extension,
since the power to confer implies the power to take back.
* If Congress does not review or lift the order, this can be
reviewed by the Supreme Court pursuant to the next
section.
The Role of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filled by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of:
(a) the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ, or
(b) the extension thereof. It must promulgate its decision
thereon within 30 days from its filing. (Sec 18 (3), Art. VII)
* The jurisdiction of the SC may be invoked in a proper case.
> A petition for habeas corpus
- When a person is arrested without a warrant for
complicity in the rebellion or invasion, he or someone else
in his behalf has the standing to question the validity of the
proclamation or suspension.
- before the SC can decide on the legality of his detention, it
must first pass upon the validity of the proclamation or
suspension.
* Test of Artbitrariness: >test to be used by the Supreme
Court in so reviewing the act of the President in proclaiming
or suspending, or the act of Congress in extending
seeks to determine the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the measure.
The question is not whether the President or
Congress acted correctly, but whether he acted
arbitrarily in that the action had no basis in fact.
amounts to a determination of whether or not
there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction Sec 1(2) Art. VIII.
IBP VS ZAMORA
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18,
CADC AUF SOL CONSTI 3

Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal
directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned
the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines
to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity
of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on
civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the
Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal
and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is
the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to
direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to
the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In
view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian
authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist
the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of
the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of
Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

SANLAKAS VS EXEC SEC
FACTS: July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny -Pres GMA
issued Proclamation no 47 declaring a "state of
rebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP
to supress the rebellion. -by evening, soldiers agreed
to return to barracks. GMA, however, did not
immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion,
only doing so on August 1, 2003 thru Proc NO. 435.

Petitioners:
1. Sanlakas & PM; standing as "petitioners committed
to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the
rights, interests, and welfare of the people, especially
the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of
Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend
and assert human rights, including political and civil
rights, of the citizens freedom of speech and of
expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their
grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize
public opinion to support the same; assert that S18,
Art7 of the Consti does not require the declaration of
state of rebellion to call out AFP;assert further that
there exists no factual basis for the declaration, mutiny
having ceased.
2. SJS; standing as "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law
profs & bar reviewers"; assert that S18, Art7 of the
Consti does not require the declaration of the state of
rebellion, declaration a "constitutional anomaly" that
misleads because "overzealous public officers, acting
pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are
liable to violate the constitutional right of private
citizens"; proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same S18, Art7, commanding
the President to submit a report to Congress within 48
hours from the proclamation of martial law; presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any
such power to the President
3. members of House; standing as citizens and as
Members of the House of Representatives whose
rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by
the declaration of a state of rebellion; the declaration of
a state of rebellion is a "superfluity," and is actually an
exercise of emergency powers, such exercise, it is
contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of
Congress granted by S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution
4. Pimentel; standing as Senator; assails the subject
presidential issuances as "an unwarranted, illegal and
abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no
basis under the Constitution; petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests"
for the crime of rebellion

Respondents: SolGen; petitions have been rendered
moot by the lifitng of the proclamation; questions
standing of petitioners

ISSUES:
1. whether or not petitioners have standing
2. whether or not case has been rendered moot by the
lifting of the proclamation 3. whether or not the
proclamation calling the state of rebellion is proper

RULING: 1. NOT EVERY PETITIONER. only members
of the House and Sen Pimentel have standing.
Sanlakas & PM have no standing by analogy with LDP
in Lacson v Perez " petitioner has not demonstrated
any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the
Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to
arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a
warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders,
members, and supporters are being threatened with
warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of
rebellion." At best they seek for declaratory relief,
which is not in the original jurisdiction of SC. Even
assuming that Sanlakas & PM are "people's
organizations" in the language of Ss15-16, Art13 of the
Consti, they are still not endowed with standing for as
in Kilosbayan v Morato "These provisions have not
changed the traditional rule that only real parties in
interest or those with standing, as the case may be,
may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this
Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions,
is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of
S5,Art8. This requirement lies at the very heart of the
judicial function." SJS, though alleging to be taxpayers,
is not endowed with standing since "A taxpayer may
bring suit where the act complained of directly involves
the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation.No such illegal disbursement is alleged." Court
has ruled out the doctrine of "transcendental
importance" regarding constitutional questions in this
particular case. Only members of Congress, who's (?)
powers as provided in the Consti on giving the Pres
emergency powers are allegedly being impaired, can
question the legality of the proclamation of the state of
rebellion.

2. YES. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases,
judicial power being limited to the determination of
"actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decide
a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition
yet evading review."19 The case at bar is one such
case, since prior events (the May 1, 2001 incident
when the Pres also declared a state of rebellion) prove
that it can be repeated. 3. YES. S18, Art 7 grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of
"graduated power[s]." From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the
latter two powers, the Constitution requires the
concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual
invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the
exercise of such power. However, as we observed in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese
conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling
out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it
becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed
forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.'"Nevertheless, it is equally true
that S18, Art7 does not expressly prohibit the President
from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the
Constitution vests the President not only with
Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost,
with Executive powers. The ponencia then traced the
evolution of executive power in the US (Jackson and
the South Carolina situation, Lincoln and teh 'war
powers', Cleveland in In re: Eugene Debs) in an effort
to show that "the Commander-in-Chief powers are
broad enough as it is and become more so when taken
together with the provision on executive power and the
presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the
powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the
means to address exigencies or threats which
undermine the very existence of government or the
integrity of the State." This, plus Marcos v Manglapus
on residual powers, the Rev Admin Code S4, Ch2, Bk3
on the executive power of the Pres to declare a certain
status, argue towards the validity of the proclamation.
However, the Court maintains that the declaration is
devoid of any legal significance for being superflous.
Also, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot
diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. if a
state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus,61 then it is with more
reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion
could not bring about these conditions. Apprehensions
that the military and police authorities may resort to
warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson
vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that "[i]n
quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities
may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstances
so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners
is, thus, not based on the declaration of a 'state of
rebellion.'"64 In other words, a person may be
subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of
rebellion whether or not the President has declared a
state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid
warrantless arrest are present. The argument that the
declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a
declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a
circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of
logic. There is no illustration that the President has
attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law
powers. Finally, Nor by any stretch of the imagination
can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of
emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a
grant of Congress pursuant to S23 (2), Art6 of the
Constitution. The petitions do not cite a specific
instance where the President has attempted to or has
exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief
Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in
declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her
Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers.
These are purely executive powers, vested on the
CADC AUF SOL CONSTI 5

President by S1 & 18, Art7, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section
23 (2), Article VI.

OLAQUEER VS MC NO 4
Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34 The Aquino vs.
Military Commission No. 2 decision was reversed. (In that
case, the SC upheld the power of the President to create
military tribunals authorized to try not only military
personnel but civilians even if civil courts were open).
According to the SC, civilians who are placed on trial for civil
offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial
process. Since we are not enemy- occupied territory nor are
we under a military govt. and even on the premise that
martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot
try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses
committed by them which are properly cognizable by the
civil courts that have remained open and have been
regularly function- ing. The assertion of military authority
over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as
Commander in Chief or on any theory of martial law. As
long as civil courts remain open and are regularly
functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them
and which are properly cognizable by civil courts. To hold
otherwise is a violation of the right to due process.
IT DEPENDS WHAT WILL BE CHARGED, IF REBELLION
MILITARY IF CRIMINAL RTC.


NAVALES VS ABAYA
n G.R. No. 162341, Roberto Rafael Pulido, a
lawyer, filed with this Court a Petition for Habeas
Corpus seeking the release of his clients, junior officers
and enlisted men of the AFP, who are allegedly being
unlawfully detained by virtue of the Commitment
Order[1] dated August 2, 2003 issued by General
Narciso L. Abaya, Chief of Staff of the AFP, pursuant to
Article 70 of the Articles of War. Under the said
commitment order, all the Major Service Commanders
and the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) were directed to take
custodial responsibility of all the military personnel
involved in the 27 July 2003 mutiny belonging to their
respective commands. This included all the junior
officers and enlisted men (hereinafter referred to as
Capt. Reaso,[2] et al.) who are subject of the instant
petition for habeas corpus. The commitment order,
however, expressly stated that LtSG. Antonio F.
Trillanes, LtSG. James A. Layug, Capt. Garry C.
Alejano, Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, Capt. Gerardo
O. Gambala, and Capt. Nicanor E. Faeldon would
remain under the custody of the Chief of the ISAFP.
The writs of prohibition (G.R. No. 162318) and
habeas corpus (G.R. No. 162341) prayed for by the
petitioners must perforce fail. As a general rule, the
writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under a process issued by the court which
has jurisdiction to do so.[33] Further, the writ of habeas
corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to
be released had been charged before any court or
quasi-judicial body.[34] The term court necessarily
includes the General Court-Martial. These rules apply
to Capt. Reaso, et al., as they are under detention
pursuant to the Commitment Order dated August 2,
2003 issued by respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP
pursuant to Article 70[35] of the Articles of War.
On the other hand, the office of the writ of
prohibition is to prevent inferior courts, corporations,
boards or persons from usurping or exercising a
jurisdiction or power with which they have not been
vested by law.[36] As earlier discussed, the General
Court-Martial has jurisdiction over the charges filed
against petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. under Rep. Act
No. 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to
prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petitions are here


LANSANG VS GARCIA
> The issue there raised was whether in suspending the
privilege of the writ in 1971, Marcos had a basis for doing
so. The SC, in considering the fact that the President based
his decision on (a) the Senate report on the condition in
Central Luzon and (b) a closed door briefing by the military
showing the extent of subversion, concluded that the
President did not act arbitrarily. One may disagree with his
appreciation of the facts, but one cannot say that it is
without basis.
>2 conditions must concur for the valid exercise of authority
to suspend the privilege:
a) there must be an actual invasion, insurrection, rebellion
or imminent danger and
(b) public safety must require the suspension of the
privilege. This holding of the SC is now found in Art. VII, Sec.
18, par. 3.] The function of the court is to check and not
supplant the executive or to ascertain merely whether he
has gone beyond the constitutional limits of jurisdiction.
The proper standard is not correctness but arbitrariness.
There are 4 ways, then, for the proclamation or suspension
to be lifted: 1) Lifting by the President himself 2)
Revocation by Congress
3) Nullification by the Supreme Court 4) Operation of law
after 60 days


IN RE DE VILLA
Lacking the requisites set by Feria, petition for
writ of habeas corpus unavailing as a collateral attack
to a final judgment.

Aileen Mendoza, 12, was raped by her uncle,
Reynaldo de Villa in her home in Pasig. Her pregnancy
prompted the filing of charges by her parents against
de Villa.

De Villa:
1. sickness, old age of 67 rendered me
incapable of erection
2. Mendozas bear a grudge against me
3. Alibi: in hometown of San Luis, Laguna at
time of crime

RTC: de Villa guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of qualified rape, sentenced to death.

Case automatically elevated to SC for
automatic review due to penalty imposed.

SC: affirmed RTC decision, modified by
awarding moral damages. SC found date of birth of
Aileens child, Leahlyn medically consistent with time of
rape.

June de Villa, son of accused, alleged that
defense counsel only learned of DNA testing to resolve
paternity issue at time of pendency of SC automatic
review. His 2 MRs of the case praying for DNA tests to
be conducted were denied. DNA tests obtained from
Billy de Villa, grandson of Reynaldo, and Leahlyn
showed that de Villa could not have sired the latter.

June thus filed petition for writ of habeas
corpus for his father.

Issue: WON writ of habeas corpus a proper
remedy in the instant case.

Held: No.

Ratio of the Court.

1. On the issue of writ of habeas corpus as
proper remedy:
a. individual is illegally deprived of his
freedom of movement or placed
under some form of illegal restraint
b. however, cannot be used to
directly assail a judgment rendered
by a competent court or tribunal
which, having duly acquired
jurisdiction, was not deprived or
ousted of this jurisdiction
c. It is the nullity of an assailed
judgment of conviction due to said
lack of jurisdiction which makes it
susceptible to collateral attack
through HC
d. Feria v. CA doctrine allowed HC
as post-conviction remedy only
when there exists:
i. deprivation of a
constitutional right
resulting in the restraint
ii. court had no jurisdiction
iii. penalty being excessive, is
voided
e. June did not allege any of the
three conditions in Feria to avail of
HC
2. Proper remedy should have been certiorari
or appeal
3. *On the issue of denial of de Villas
effective aid of counsel who left for the US
in the middle of appeal
a. SC did not find negligence
amounting to denial of
constitutional right
4. *On the issue of the relevance of the DNA
test as to de Villas guilt
a. Pregnancy not an essential
element of crime of rape
b. Results of DNA test could not
conclusively determine de Villas
guilt for the crime of rape
5. *On the issue of remedy of motion for new
trial
a. Rule 121 of Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure:
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.The court
shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:
(a) That errors of law or
irregularities prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material
evidence has been discovered
which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered
and produced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment.
b. Requisites for motion for new trial:
CADC AUF SOL CONSTI 7

(a) that the evidence was
discovered after trial;
(b) that said evidence could
not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) that it is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative
or impeaching; and
(d) that the evidence is of such
weight that that, if admitted, it
would probably change the
judgment
c. Lack of knowledge of DNA testing
attributable to negligence of
counsel, and the same is binding
upon de Villa
d. Other means to determine
paternity were previously available
to de Villa anyway.

Dispositive. Petition for habeas corpus and
motion for new trial dismissed.


DAVID VS ARROYO
ruary 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members
and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate
the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and
is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The
said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate
EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for
rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded
to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is
the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and
confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,
another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided
and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was
also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant
of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state
of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some
opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be
validly declared by the president for such power is reposed
in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration
of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the
emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of
natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners
claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued
that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of
the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the
presidents calling out power, take care power and take over
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly
constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by
reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact
operative because there are parties still affected due to the
alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take
cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions
of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following
way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no
factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the
Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports
forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-
Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine
Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and
the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such
events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of
the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her
arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty
must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical
tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free
speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not
primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of
PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or
even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the
AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for
testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless
violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful
and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of
facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words
and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have
been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA
declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents
calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised
in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC
ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the
Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the
Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al
averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the
Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the
President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the
clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such
provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to
promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within
the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure,
neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power
by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the
carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private
corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune
without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the
word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not
limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes
rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can
declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of
emergency powers does not come automatically after it for
such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority
from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial
Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration
and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling
out power of the president by the president
1. calling out power
2. take care power
3. emergency power


Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans
Requisites for contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans:
1. With the concurrence of the monetary board (Sec 20, Art
VII)
2. subject to limitations as may be provided by law (Sec 21,
Art XII)
3. information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed
shall be made available to the public (sec 21, Art XII)
> Cf Republic Act 4860
>> An Act Authorizing The President Of The Philippines To
Obtain Such Foreign Loans And Credits, Or To Incur Such
Foreign Indebtedness, As May Be Necessary To Finance
Approved Economic Development Purposes Or Projects,
And To Guarantee, In Behalf Of The Republic Of The
Philippines, Foreign Loans Obtained Or Bonds Issued By
Corporations Owned Or Controlled By The Government Of
The Philippines For Economic Development Purposes
Including Those Incurred For Purposes Of Re-Lending To The
Private Sector, Appropriating The Necessary Funds
Therefore, And For Other Purposes
>> Approved, September 8, 1966.
Role of Congress:
1.The President does not need prior approval by the
Congress
Because the Constitution places the power to
check the Presidents power on the monetary
Board
Congress may provide guidelines and have them
enforced through the Monetary Board
CONSTANTINO VS CUISIA
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a
scheme to reduce the countrys external debt. The solution
resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring
programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign
CADC AUF SOL CONSTI 9

debts they are basically buyback programs & bond-
conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in
behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens,
together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-
conversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute
the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20,
Art. 7 of the Constitution. And assuming that the President
has such power unlike other powers which may be validly
delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts
is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the
President. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise
of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the
President alone must exercise this power. They argue that
the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically
named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces
the submission that not respondents but the President alone
and personally can validly bind the country. Hence, they
would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate
her debt power to the respondents.
HELD: There is no question that the president has
borrowing powers and that the president may contract or
guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction
whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous
is irrelevant. On the other hand, the president can delegate
this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency
of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of
the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made
manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and
executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is
deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of
Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of
funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any
other sovereign debt management goals. If the President
were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign
borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running
the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-
consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of
incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among
the many methods that may be taken toward this end,
meeting countless times with creditor representatives to
negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board,
explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public,
and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of
execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional
interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet
positions and the respective expertise which the holders
thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the
Presidents effectivity in running the government. The act of
the respondents are not unconstitutional.

Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be
validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the
President. There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which
must be exercised by him in person and no amount of
approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of
those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim
martial law and the exercise by him of the benign
prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve
the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for
the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those
exercised by co-equal branches of government. The
declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the
accused, all fall within this special class that demands the
exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally
vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there
must be a showing that the executive power in question is of
similar gravitas and exceptional import.

Powers over foreign affairs
(a) Treaty-making power
* No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate. (Sec 21, Art VII)
Treaty distinguished from executive agreements
a. Executive agreements
entered into by the President
need no concurrence.
Nature of Executive Agreements :
There are 2 classes :
(1) agreements made purely as executive acts affecting
external relations and independent of or without legislative
authorization, which may be termed as presidential
agreements, and
(2) agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of
Congress, or Congressional-Executive Agreements.

NICOLAS VS ROMULO
On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the
crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the said
crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment.
Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a crime against our
penal laws and the crime was committed within the
countrys jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty
between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was
granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together with the other
petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of
the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified
by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the
VFA.
ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or
not it is self-executing.
HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the
parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely
because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and
undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a
matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed,
with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to
produce Smith before the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch
as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that
executive agreements registered under this Act within 60
days from their ratification be immediately implemented.
The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need
implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As
regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and
this can only be done through implementing legislation. The
VFA itself is another form of implementation of its
provisions.


VINUYA VS ROMULO
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the Office of the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA,
the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA
LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the
purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape
by Japanese military forces in the Philippines
during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have
approached the Executive Department through
the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance
in filing a claim against the Japanese officials
and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the comfort women stations
in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive
Department declined to assist the petitioners,
and took the position that the individual claims
of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japans
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for
this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against
them; and (b) compel the respondents to
espouse their claims for official apology and
other forms of reparations against Japan before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the
Philippines and its nationals relative to the war
were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace
Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund
and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and
welfare support programs for former comfort
women. Over the next five years, these were
implemented by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed
grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners claims for official apology and other
forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law
Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to
espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality
of a particular measure.
One type of case of political questions involves
questions of foreign relations. It is well-
established that the conduct of the foreign
CADC AUF SOL CONSTI 11

relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative
the politicaldepartments of the government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate,
complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy. They are and should be undertaken
only by those directly responsible to the people
whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations
present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate
treaties and executive agreements. However,
the question whether the Philippine government
should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts
but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that
it is to the best interest of the country to waive
all claims of its nationals for reparations against
Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question.
The President, not Congress, has the better
opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is
this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the
form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that
taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to
our countrys foreign policy interests, and could
disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby
creating serious implications for stability in this
region. For the to overturn the Executive
Departments determination would mean an
assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to
make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will
not lie. As a general principle, where such an
extraordinary length of time has lapsed between
the treatys conclusion and our consideration
the Executive must be given ample discretion to
assess the foreign policy considerations of
espousing a claim against Japan, from the
standpoint of both the interests of the
petitioners and those of the Republic, and
decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient,
and whether further steps are appropriate or
necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the
only means available for individuals to bring a
claim within the international legal system has
been when the individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the individuals
behalf. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf,
a State is in reality asserting its own right to
ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for
the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law,
a State may exercise diplomatic protection by
whatever means and to whatever extent it
thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is
asserting. Should the natural or legal person on
whose behalf it is acting consider that their
rights are not adequately protected, they have
no remedy in international law. All they can do
is resort to national law, if means are available,
with a view to furthering their cause or
obtaining redress. All these questions remain
within the province of municipal law and do not
affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and
erga omnes obligations will not alter this
analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the
crimes committed by the Japanese army
violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the
Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to
prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is
an erga omnes obligation or has attained the
status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to
everyone) in international law has been used as
a legal term describing obligations owed by
States towards the community of states as a
whole. Essential distinction should be drawn
between the obligations of a State towards the
international community as a whole, and those
arising vis--vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the
former are the concern of all States. In view of
the importance of the rights involved, all States
can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling
law) refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting
treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
considered peremptory in the sense that they
are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and
can be modified only by general international
norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

PEOPLES MOVEMENT FOR PRESS FREEDOM VS HON
RAUL MANGLAPUS
he privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been
recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid
limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez
v. PCGG held that information on inter-government
exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the
sake of national interest.[23] Even earlier, the same
privilege was upheld in Peoples Movement for Press
Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus[24] wherein the Court
discussed the reasons for the privilege in more precise terms.

In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were
seeking information from the Presidents representatives on
the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement.[25] The Court denied the
petition, stressing that secrecy of negotiations with
foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional
provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the
freedom of access to information. The Resolution went
on to state, thus:

The nature of diplomacy
requires centralization of
authority and expedition of
decision which are inherent in
executive action. Another
essential characteristic of
diplomacy is its confidential
nature. Although much has been
said about open and secret
diplomacy, with disparagement of
the latter, Secretaries of State
Hughes and Stimson have clearly
analyzed and justified the
practice. In the words of Mr.
Stimson:

A
complicated
negotiation .
. . cannot be
carried
through
without
many, many
private
talks and
discussion,
man to
man; many
tentative
suggestions
and
proposals.
Delegates
from other
countries
come and
tell you in
confidence
of their
troubles at
home and of
their
differences
with other
countries
and with
other
delegates;
they tell you
of what they
would do
under
certain
circumstanc
es and
would not
do under
other
circumstanc
es. . . If
these
reports . . .
should
become
public . . .
who would
ever trust
American
Delegations
in another
conference?
(United
States
Department
of State,
Press
Releases,
June 7, 1930,
CADC AUF SOL CONSTI 13

pp. 282-
284.).

x x x x

There is frequent criticism
of the secrecy in which negotiation
with foreign powers on nearly all
subjects is concerned. This, it is
claimed, is incompatible with the
substance of democracy. As
expressed by one writer, It can be
said that there is no more rigid
system of silence anywhere in the
world. (E.J. Young, Looking
Behind the Censorship, J. B.
Lippincott Co., 1938) President
Wilson in starting his efforts for the
conclusion of the World War
declared that we must have open
covenants, openly arrived at. He
quickly abandoned his thought.

No one who has studied the
question believes that such a method
of publicity is possible. In the
moment that negotiations are
started, pressure groups attempt
to muscle in. An ill-timed
speech by one of the parties or a
frank declaration of the concession
which are exacted or offered on
both sides would quickly lead to
widespread propaganda to block
the negotiations. After a treaty
has been drafted and its terms are
fully published, there is ample
opportunity for discussion before
it is approved. (The New American
Government and Its Works, James T.
Young, 4
th
Edition, p.
194) (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)


Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted
the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.[26] that
the President is the sole organ of the nation in its
negotiations with foreign countries, viz:

x x x In this vast external
realm, with its important,
complicated, delicate and manifold
problems, the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation. He
makes treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate; but he alone
negotiates. Into the field of
negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude; and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it. As Marshall
said in his great argument of March
7, 1800, in the House of
Representatives, The President is
the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign
nations. Annals, 6
th
Cong., col.
613. . . (Emphasis supplied;
underscoring in the original)


Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v.
Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA
may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should
be ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is
approved the offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA
is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese
representatives submitted their offers with the understanding
that historic confidentiality[27] would govern the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other
foreign governments in future negotiations.

A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations
should now be open to public scrutiny would discourage
future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing
their views during negotiations. While, on first impression,
it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from
entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty
negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally
involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes
negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an
area of lesser importance in order to obtain more
favorable terms in an area of greater national
interest. Apropos are the following observations of
Benjamin S. Duval, Jr.:

x x x [T]hose involved in
the practice of negotiations appear
to be in agreement that publicity
leads to grandstanding, tends to
freeze negotiating positions, and
inhibits the give-and-take essential
to successful negotiation. As
Sissela Bok points out, if
negotiators have more to gain from
being approved by their own sides
than by making a reasoned
agreement with competitors or
adversaries, then they are inclined to
'play to the gallery . . .'' In fact, the
public reaction may leave them
little option. It would be a brave, or
foolish, Arab leader who expressed
publicly a willingness for peace with
Israel that did not involve the return
of the entire West Bank, or Israeli
leader who stated publicly a
willingness to remove Israel's
existing settlements from Judea and
Samaria in return for peace.[28]
(Emphasis supplied)


Indeed, by hampering the ability of our
representatives to compromise, we may be jeopardizing
higher national goals for the sake of securing less critical
ones.
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as
privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations
constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that
such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita
holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does
not mean that it will be considered privileged in all
instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which
the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public
interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired
information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally
privileged status.

Whether petitioners have established the presence of
such a public interest shall be discussed later. For now, the
Court shall first pass upon the arguments raised by
petitioners against the application of PMPF v. Manglapus to
the present case.

Arguments proffered by petitioners against the
application of PMPF v. Manglapus


Petitioners argue that PMPF v. Manglapus cannot be
applied in toto to the present case, there being substantial
factual distinctions between the two.

To petitioners, the first and most fundamental
distinction lies in the nature of the treaty involved. They
stress that PMPF v. Manglapus involved the Military Bases
Agreement which necessarily pertained to matters affecting
national security; whereas the present case involves an
economic treaty that seeks to regulate trade and commerce
between the Philippines and Japan, matters which, unlike
those covered by the Military Bases Agreement, are not so
vital to national security to disallow their disclosure.

Petitioners argument betrays a faulty assumption that
information, to be considered privileged, must involve
national security. The recognition in Senate v. Ermita[29]
that executive privilege has encompassed claims of varying
kinds, such that it may even be more accurate to speak of
executive privileges, cautions against such generalization.

While there certainly are privileges grounded on the
necessity of safeguarding national security such as those
involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One
example is the informers privilege, or the privilege of
the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or
persons who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with the enforcement of that law.[30] The
suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat to
national security for this privilege to apply in any given
instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable in
all but the most high-profile cases, in which case not only
would this be contrary to long-standing practice. It would
also be highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in
general.

Also illustrative is the privilege accorded to
presidential communications, which are presumed
privileged without distinguishing between those which
involve matters of national security and those which do not,
the rationale for the privilege being that

x x x [a] frank exchange of
exploratory ideas and assessments,
free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is
essential to protect the
independence of decision-making
of those tasked to exercise
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial
power. x x x[31] (Emphasis
supplied)


In the same way that the privilege for judicial
deliberations does not depend on the nature of the case
deliberated upon, so presidential communications are
privileged whether they involve matters of national security.
It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded
to presidential communications is not absolute, one
significant qualification being that the Executive cannot,
any more than the other branches of government, invoke a
general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and
employees from investigations by the proper governmental
institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing.

[32] This
qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked
in the context of a judicial trial or a congressional
investigation conducted in aid of legislation.[33]

Closely related to the presidential communications
privilege is the deliberative process privilege recognized in
the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court
in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co,[34] deliberative process
covers documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such
documents rests, not on the need to protect national
security but, on the obvious realization that officials will
not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark
is a potential item of discovery and front page news, the
objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of
agency decisions. [35]
CADC AUF SOL CONSTI 15


The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close
resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential
communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that
the rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic
negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential
communications is similar, if not identical.
The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus[36]
shows that the privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant
to encourage a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between
the negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from
public view. Similar to the privilege for presidential
communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks,
through the same means, to protect the independence in
decision-making of the President, particularly in its capacity
as the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and
its sole representative with foreign nations. And, as with
the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to
diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content
of the information per se, but because the information is part
of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public
interest, must be presumed confidential.



COMM OF CUSTOMS VS EASTERN TRADING
Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which
imports from Japan onion and garlic into the Philippines. In
1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and
forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to
comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said
circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other
hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and
Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into
between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive
agreement states, among others, that all import transactions
between Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in
dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from
Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the
executive agreement that the EO was implementing was
never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated
to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of
EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject
to the concurrence by the Senate.
HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties
which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the
members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the
President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred
to as executive agreements and are no less common in our
scheme of government than are the more formal instruments
treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form
of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated agreements or protocols.
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and
other governments ends and agreements whether
denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or
otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss
here the large variety of executive agreements as such,
concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive
agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-
agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign
governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to
show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not
anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that
they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to
certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the
Executive without the approval of the Senate.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels,
navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the
admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial
relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the
registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of
them were concluded not by specific congressional
authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts
of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such
as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with
respect to the settlement of claims against foreign
governments, were concluded independently of any
legislation.



GO TEK VS DEPORTATION BOARD
1. The Deportation Board can entertain deportation based
on grounds not specified in Sec 37 of the Immigration Law.
The Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek even if he
had not been convicted yet.
2. The Presidents power to deport aliens and to investigate
them subject to deportation are provided in the Revised
Admin Code.
3. The State has inherent power to deport undesirable
aliens. This power is exercised by the Pres. There is no legal
nor constitutional provision defining the power to deport
aliens because the intention of the law is to grant the Chief
Executive the full discretion to determine whether an aliens
residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect the
security, welfare or interest of the state. The Chief
Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of
facts which would warrant the deportation of aliens.

Power over legislation
(a) Message to Congress
>The President shall address the Congress at the opening of
its regular session. He may also appear before it at any
other time. (Sec 23, Art VII)
> Every 4th Monday of July, the President delivers the State
of the Nation Address, which contains his proposals for
legislation. Through this speech, he can influence the course
of legislation that Congress can take during the regular
session.
(b) Prepare and submit the budget
The President shall submit to Congress within thirty days
from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of
the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures
and sources of financing, including receipts from existing
and proposed revenue measures. (Sec 22, Art VII)
*The budget is the plan indicating the (a) expenditures of
the government, (b) sources of financing, and (c) receipts
from revenue-raising measures.
This budget is the upper limit of the appropriations bill to be
passed by Congress. Through the budget, therefore, the
President reveals the priorities of the government.
(c) Veto power
As a general rule, all bills must be approved by the President
before they become law, except when (i) the veto of the
President is overridden by 2/3 vote, and (ii) the bill passed
is the special law to elect the President and Vice- President.
This gives the President an actual hand in legislation.
However, his course of action is only to approve it or veto it
as a whole. (See Legislative Power of Congress)
(d) Emergency Power
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress, may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period, and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe,
to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon
the next adjournment thereof. (Sec 23, Art VI see discussion
above)
Immunity from suit
BELTRAN VS MACASIAR
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He,
together with others, was charged with libel by the then
president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-
affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory
cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat
her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the
principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a
president would sue then the president would allow herself
to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she
would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the
functions of a president, the president may not be able to
appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be
liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by
Beltran, a person other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of
the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of
the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a
criminal case in which the President is the complainant
cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent
the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent
the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded
the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice
of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely
the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.
The SC held that the privilege of immunity from suit,
pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other
person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a
criminal case where the President is a complainant cannot
raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the
case from proceeding against the accused. Moreover, there
is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President
from waiving the privilege. The President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the
court's jurisdiction.
The Presidents immunity from suit extends beyond his
term so long as the act in question was done during his
term.


VICE PRESIDENT
(1) Qualifications, election, term and oath
a. Qualifications Sec. 3, Art VII.
* natural-born citizen of the Philippines * a registered voter
* able to read and write * at least forty years of age on the
day of the election * a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
* The candidate must be qualified on the day of the
elections.
TERMS AND ELECTION
CADC AUF SOL CONSTI 17

* elected by direct vote of the people
* unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May.
* term of six years beginning at noon on the 30
th
day of
June next following the day of the election and ending at
noon of the same date six years after
* no vice-president shall serve for more than two successive
terms
Privilege and salary
* The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be
determined by law and shall not be decreased during their
tenure.
>No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during
which such increase was approved.
> xxx the Vice-President, xxx P240,000 (Sec 17, Art XVIII)
Prohibitions Art. VII, Sec. 13.
* Prohibited acts:
1. unless Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure.
2. directly or indirectly practice any other profession
business
3. directly or indirectly participate in any
4. be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.
5. spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within
the fourth civil degree of the President shall not be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries.
* Xxx The Vice-President may be appointed as member of
the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.
(Sec 3, Art VII)
Succession
Art. VI, Sec. 9.
Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-
President during the term for which he was elected,
> the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among
the members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives
> candidate shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of all the members of both houses, voting
separately.
(5) Removal Impeachment Process Art. XI, Sec. 3. (1) Who
may initiate:
The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) Verified Complaint a. A verified complaint for
impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof b. Verified Complaint
shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. c. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. d. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) Number of votes necessary A vote of at least one-third
of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one
year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but
the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(6) Functions
(a) Right of succession
The Vice-President shall assume the functions of the
president in case of 1. death, permanent disability, removal
from office, or resignation of the President(Sec 8, Art VII)
2. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to
them a written declaration to the contrary (Sec 11, Art VII)
3. Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office
(b) Membership in Cabinet
xxx The Vice-President may be appointed as member of the
Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation. (sec 3,
Art VII)