April Cho

Assignment 4
April 18, 2014
Political Economy of Development

State Failure as a Result of Four Key Variables
Many theories use war as a proxy for state failure because violent conflicts
definitively mark the moment when bargaining breaks down between the state and
its citizens. However, the real process of state failure elides the simplicity of such a
model. This model neglects the rigorous examination of the causality involved in the
question of which came first- the violence or the failed state? Violent conflict itself is
a result of failed state institutions. Therefore war is a proxy for, and not
synonymous with state failure. The use of violent action simply marks the division
between citizens passive comprehension of state failure and their active efforts to
change the status quo. Thus, I define state failure more holistically as the process
spanning from the failure of state institutions up until the point when the state loses
its monopoly on violence.
In my analysis of state failure, I assume that leaders and citizens are rational
beings who act according to close cost-benefit analyses of economic and political
variables. According to Bates, who studies state failure from a top-down
perspective, the state fails when leaders feel that the benefits of kleptocratic rule
over time are greater than maintaining political order, while citizens feel that the
economic costs of being ruled by the state outweigh the benefits it offers, such as
safety or stability. Among the diverse explanations for the failure of states, there are
two conclusive, overarching ideas: first is the idea that the creation of states is path-
dependent upon persistent historical decisions made at critical junctures
(Mahoney). Secondly, the untimely convergence of geographic and economic
variables in the context of persistent historical circumstances catalyzed state failure.
I argue that the colonial legacies of weak political and economic institutions and
artificial statehood set the stage for state failure, easily attainable resources make
extended violent conflict viable and attractive, and the rigid institutions of
kleptocratic rule ultimately propagate violent conflict between the state and its
citizens.
The origins of state failure in Africa are founded in one of most persistent
legacies of colonialism- weak institutions that gave rise to political and economic
inequality. Practices of indirect colonial rule dismantled a preexisting set of
sociopolitical checks and balances between traditional and administrative chiefs in
the African state. The combination of colonial institutions with the traditional
African governance structures resulted in decentralized despotism, which fused
judicial, political and social power in the hands of the local administrative chiefs. In
effect, colonial interventions, fortifying practices of neopatrimonialism, corruption
and clientelism, created an institutional system that married economic and political
power in the hands of predatory political leaders (Van De Walle). As political power
increasingly also meant economic power, the political leadership held both de jure
and de facto power leaving citizens powerless to change governing institutions
through peaceful bargaining.
Artificial statehood, which discontinued the processes of organic state
development for many African countries after WWII, further undermined state
stability by obstructing the process of state consolidation. The political geography of
African states does not reflect natural ethnic boundaries and patterns of population
distribution (Herbst). Instead, the externally determined, arbitrary borders of
African states reflect the economic motivations of its colonizers. Conflict between
Africas delineated political geography and its real demographic characteristics
raised the costs of state-expansion and made state consolidation much more
difficult for African leaders. State consolidation ensures state stability by making the
maintenance of a monopoly of violence over an area much easier. Severely limited
state capacity naturally resulted in a division between the urban political centers
and the hinterlands. Political power was disproportionately concentrated in urban
centers and state dissenters could escape to these hinterland areas, where they
could steadily build a force against a state incapacitated by its own political
geography. Thus the birth of the artificial state also conditioned the creation of a
central space from which the violent opposition of state dissenters could effectively
be planned, mobilized and executed to further weaken the central state system.
The abundance and accessibility of extractable resources most directly
catalyzed civil conflict that so definitively confirms state failure. The availability of
this resource is an important variable in the cost-benefit analysis of bargaining
parties as they determine the likelihood of emerging victoriously from violent
conflict. In order to protect economic and political power through war, both the
state and its opposition must have easily attainable resources to fund its high costs.
Given the assumption of rational behavior, resource accessibility inspired either an
apathetic reaction or collective action in response to political and economic
inequality. Natural resources and external aid were ideal for violent conflict because
they were both easily attainable and did not require taxation. In Africa, the
abundance of extractable natural resources and the accessibility of high external aid
revenue made violent conflict a realistic solution to perceived state failure. In the
short- run, valuable resources like diamonds or oil served to incentivize increased
participation in violent solutions to conflicts. Donors often preferred the
unscrupulous practices of autocratic rulers to war, so aid revenue funded corrupt
governments, undermining political institutions in the long- run (Moss et al.). Thus
the existence of resources greatly influenced both the decision to take up arms as
well as the form that state failure took after civil wars.
Conflicts of interest inevitably exist within every state. In fact, the
redistribution of political and economic power through an ongoing bargaining
process propagates state evolution. The key difference between strong states and
failed states is that the flexible institutions of successful states reconfigure
themselves constructively according to these conflicts whereas the rigid institutions
of failed states perpetuate deleterious practices (Engermann and Sokoloff). Political
leaders who have benefited economically from corrupt political practices are
unwilling to concede to institutional change. They have an invested interest in
maintaining the institutions that maximize their political rights and economic
resources (Bates). Threats to the central political system are personal threats to
their economic profit, political power and physical well-being. Thus the only option
for these leaders is to take an unyielding bargaining stance. In turn, their support of
rigid institutions exclude the possibility of the redistribution of power through
formal, non- violent bargaining procedures.
When analyzing the process of state failure it is necessary to examine both
historical precedents as well as economic, political and geographic variables at the
time of violent conflict. Although the autocratic, extractive rule in some African
states undeniably accelerated state failure, no single variable caused it. Kleptocratic
rule would be unsustainable without the colonial legacy of weak institutions.
Similarly, without economic incentives to engage in civil conflict, predatory political
practices would only result in the indefinite perpetuation of deleterious institutions.
Conclusively, it becomes clear that the formation of ineffective governance in Africa
was not fortuitous: rather, a colonial legacy shaped subsequent political and
economic decision-making, ultimately leading to state failure racked by violent
conflict in the 1900s.