DOMESTIC AND INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION

RULE 99 ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS

RULE 100 RESCISSION AND REVOCATION OF ADOPTION


1. ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred
to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003
(re: development of Philippine adoption laws; nature of adoption proceedings;
exception to rule on the non-applicability of dura lex sed lex)

Facts:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their
own. The trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil
Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.

Years later, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption, in which she averred, that, despite her pleas and that of her
husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and
continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities and that respondent
was indifferent towards petitioner and would only come to see her once a
year.

Prior to the institution of the case, RA No. 8552, the Domestic Adoption Act,
went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters
to rescind a decree of adoption. Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552
now reads: "Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be
subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code."

The trial court dismissed the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject adoption may still be revoked or rescinded by
an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 and whether or not the
adopters action had prescribed.

Ruling
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the
light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it
was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law had
already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil
Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the action for
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA
8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of R A8552, an action to set aside the
adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of
Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the
right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in
the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a
right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by
the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the
withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are
subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a
statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.

However, an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption,
can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits
otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime,
and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share
in the disposable portion of his estate.

2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ZENAIDA ELEPANO,
Presiding Judge of RTC Kalookan, Branch 128 and CORAZON SANTOS
PUNSALAN, G.R. No. 92542, October 15, 1991
(re: nature and purpose of adoption)

Facts:
The private respondent Corazon Santos Punsalan filed a verified petition
for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch
CXXVIII praying that after due notice and hearing, the minors Pinky
Gonzales Punsalan, the daughter of her full blood brother, and Ellyn Mae
Punsalan Urbano, the daughter of her full blood sister, be declared her
daughters by adoption for all intents and purposes. However, private
respondent filed a "MOTION FOR TAKING OF DEPOSITION" on the ground
that she received an urgent call from the United Nations Office in Geneva,
Switzerland requiring her to report for work, so much so that she will not
be able to testify at the hearing of her petition yet to be scheduled by the
respondent judge. The respondent judge granted the motion and ordered
that notice of the taking of the deposition be furnished to the OSG (the only
known oppositor in the case). The private respondent's deposition was
taken. Despite notice, no representative from the OSG appeared to oppose
the taking of the deposition.

The OSG, however, subsequently filed an "Opposition to the Deposition",
averring that Section 1 of Rule 24 of the Rules of Court allows deposition by
leave of Court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or
property subject of the action. Since the jurisdictional requirement of
publication has not been complied with, the OSG goes on to argue, the lower
court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. The respondent
judge denied the said Opposition. The respondent judge granted the
petition for adoption

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the jurisdictional requirement of publication should be
complied first to allow the deposition taking in adoption proceedings?

Ruling:
The petition has no merit.

While it is true that in an action in personam, personal service of summons
within the forum or voluntary appearance in the case is essential for the
court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, in an
adoption case which involves the status of a person, there is no particular
defendant to speak of since the action is one in rem. In such case,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is a non-essential condition
for the taking of a deposition for the jurisdiction of the court is based on its
power over the res, to render judgment with respect to such "thing" (or
status, as in this case) so as to bar indifferently all who might be minded to
make an objection against the right so established. (Banco Espanol Filipino
vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Greg Alba vs. de la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49).

Indeed, publication of the scheduled hearing for the petition for adoption is
necessary for the validity of a decree of adoption but not for the purpose
merely of taking a deposition. In taking a deposition, no substantial rights
are affected since depositions may or may not be presented or may even be
objected to when formally offered as evidence at the trial of the main case
later on.

In the instant case, We find no abuse of discretion committed by the
respondent judge in allowing the taking of private respondent's deposition.
Due to urgent and compelling reasons beyond her control, private
respondent could not be present to testify at the trial of the main case for
adoption. The OSG, however, was notified of the scheduled taking of the
deposition, as well as of all the hearings of the petition for adoption, but the
OSG chose not to attendALL the said hearings, without explanation. The
OSG, therefore, has no reason to invoke lack of procedural due process.

Finally, it must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind adoption
statutes is to promote the welfare of the child and every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote that objective. (Santos et al. vs.
Aranzanso, et al. 16 SCRA 353). In the instant case, the record shows that
private respondent's adoption of the minors shall redound to the best
interests of the latter.

3. ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN and MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (Branch X) PRESIDED OVER
BY HON. JUDGE HERMINIO C. MARIANO, G.R. No. L-30576, February 10,
1976
(re: construction of adoption laws; applicability of dura lex sed lex)

Facts:
a) Sometime in May, 1967, a child, less than a week old (only 3 days
old)
7
was given to petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and his wife
Maria Lucy Christensen, for them to adopt, by Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez. The child was later on baptized as Colin Berry Christensen
Duncan with the aforementioned espouses appearing in the records of said
baptism as the parents of said child;
8

b) Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez on the other hand, received the infant
from the child's unwed mother who told the former never to reveal her (the
mother's) identity because she wanted to get married and did not want to
destroy her future. The mother instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez
to look for a suitable couple who will adopt the child. The mother did not
provide for the maintenance and support of her child;
9

c) In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners in September, 1967, Atty.
Corazon de Leon Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or loco parentis of the
child subject of the adoption petition, gave the written consent required by
law;
10

d) Learning, from the testimony of witness Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez
that the natural mother of the child sought to be adopted was still alive, the
court then pressed upon the witness to reveal the identity of said mother.
The witness refused to divulge the same on the ground that there existed an
attorney and client relationship between them. She had been instructed by
her client not to reveal the latter's identity. She could not now violate such
privilege communication.

Petition was dismissed by the trial court;
The principal reason given for the dismissal of the petition was that ... the
consent given in this petition Exhibit "J" is improper and falls short of the
express requirement of the law.
3


Rationalizing its action respondent Judge said:

Art. 340 (of the Civil Code) provides that the written consent of the
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
2. The guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted.

"Under the law aforementioned, it will be noted that the law is couched in
mandatory terms by the word SHALL be necessary, and it enumerates the
persons who will give the consent to the adoption in the order as follows:
parents, guardian, or the person in charge of the person to be adopted.

It is admitted by witness Velasquez that she knew the identity of the mother
who gave her the child. This being the case, the proper person who is
supposed to give the parental consent to the adoption should first be, in the
order of preference, the parent or the mother herself.
4

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent court, dated
June 27, 1968, dismissing petitioners' petition to adopt the minor, Colin
Berry Christensen Duncan.

Issues:
1.whether or not the person who gave the consent for adoption, which in
this case is Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the proper person required
by law to give such consent.

2.whether or not Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the undisputed
custodian of the abandoned waif may be considered as the guardian under
Art. 340 or the person standing in loco parentis of said infant contemplated
in Art. 349 of the Civil Code

Ruling:
1.) Going by the set of facts in this case, only one of two persons
particularly described by law may be considered here as legally capable of
giving the required written consent. They are:

Under Art. 340 of the Civil 'Code, the "parent, guardian or person in charge
of the person to be adopted" while the other one is that mentioned in Section
3, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, describing it as each of the known living
parents "who has not abandoned such child." The father's consent here is out
of the question as the child is illegitimate and unrecognized.

Since the person whose written consent to the adoption (Atty: Corazon de
Leon Velasquez) is assailed by the trial court as being unauthorized and had
consequently caused the rejection of the petition, this Tribunal will now
look into her alleged authority or lack thereof to give the controverted
consent.

Sometime in May of 1967, the child subject of this adoption petition,
undisputedly declared as only three days old then, was turned over by its
mother to witness Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The natural and
unwedded mother, from that date on to the time of the adoption
proceedings in court which started in mid- year of said 1967, and up to the
present, has not bothered to inquire into the condition of the child, much
less to contribute to the livelihood, maintenance and care of the same. In
short, this parent is the antithesis of that described in the law as "known
living parent who is not insane Or hopelessly intemperate or has not
abandoned such child." We are convinced that in fact said mother had
completely and absolutely abandoned her child. This Court has previously
declared that abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent
which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental claims to the
child.
12
Applying this legal yardstick, the unidentified mother of the child in
this case can be declared, as she is hereby declared, as having abandoned
her child with all legal consequences attached thereto.

Having declared that the child was an abandoned one by an unknown
parent, there appears to be no more legal need to require the written
consent of such parent of the child to the adoption.

2. It seems to Us that when the 3-day old baby was left to and placed in the
hands of Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the helpless infant was in dire
need of someone who could give it protection and sustain its delicate and
fragile life. Atty. Velasquez was under no legal compulsion to accept the
child and to extend to it the protection and care it badly needed. Since there
had been no showing that the identity of the natural mother was made
known to the trial court or to the herein petitioners, nor had said mother
seen fit to present herself before the court despite the public notice given to
the proceedings as required by law, there clearly appears only one person
who could be considered as the guardian exercising patria potestas over
such abandoned child. Since there was no guardian ad litem appointed by
the court and the child not being in the custody of an orphan asylum,
children's home or any benevolent society, there could not have been
anyone other than Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could, with reason,
be called the guardian of said infant.

Dura lex sed lex

The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient Roman legal
maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh decision
it rendered. While this old adage generally finds apt application in many
other legal cases, in adoption of children, however, this should be softened
so as to apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane
understanding, for adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children,
particularly those born out of wedlock, than for those born with a silver
spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide homes, love,
care and education for unfortunate children, who otherwise may grow from
cynical street urchins to hardened criminal offenders and become serious
social problems, should be given the widest attitude of sympathy,
encouragement and assistance. The law is not, and should not be made, an
instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy. As
often as is legally and lawfully possible, their texts and intendments should
be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to exist with a
modicum promise of a useful and constructive existence.
If we are now to sustain the decision of the court below, this Tribunal will
be doing a graver injustice to all concerned particularly to said spouses, and
worse, it will be imposing a cruel sanction on this innocent child and on all
other children who might be similarly situated. It is Our view that it is in
consonance with the true spirit and purpose of the law, and with the policy
of the State, to uphold, encourage and give life and meaning to the existence
of family relations.

4. HERBERT CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V.
CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, G.R. No. 105308, September
25, 1998
(re: construction of adoption laws; substantial compliance rule; parental
consent in adoption proceedings; meaning of abandonment)

Facts:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her
husband's extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the petition.
Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court
granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of
visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor
children. Herbert contest the adoption, but the petition was already granted
by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the
FC requires the written consent of the natural parents of the children to be
adopted, but the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not
necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children.
Herbert elevated the case to the Court.
Issue: Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the
written consent of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has
abandoned them.
Ruling:Yes.
Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the
written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a
requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written
consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its known
living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not
abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural
parent for the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has
abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or hopelessly
intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to
the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."
In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would
forego his parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone,
without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and
legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. The Court find
pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular
communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone,
and send them packages catered to their whims.
Meaning of Abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to
forego parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, or the
neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations which
parents owe their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the
withholding of the parents presence, his care and the opportunity to
display voluntary affection.




5. MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA
BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, G.R. No. 105625,
January 24, 1994
(re: effect of non-observance or non-conduct of adoption proceedings)

Case:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29, 1992.

Facts:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties
especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in
the grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.

The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24,
1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez
Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) instituted a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of
private respondent Aguilar before the RTC of San Pablo City. They alleged
that,
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they
ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally
adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary, petitioners can
well and truly establish, given the chance to do so, that said decedent and
his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-deceased him, and whose estate had
earlier been settled extra-judicial, were without issue and/or without
descendants whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was
raised and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by
blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir.

On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she
is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of
administering his estate.

The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship
to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only
legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She
submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live
Birth; (2) Baptismal Certificate; (3) Income Tax Returns and Information
Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his
daughter; and (4) School Records. She also testified that the said spouses
reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the
other hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial
evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage;
that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to
Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment.
Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late
Vicente, then 77 years of age, categorically declared that petitioner was not
the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically
procreate.

On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It
dismissed the private respondents petition for letters and administration
and declared petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the
spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.

On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29,
1992 by the Court of Appeals declaring that Marissa Benitez is not the
biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O.
Benitez. Her opposition to the petition for the appointment of an
administrator of the intestate of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez is,
consequently, denied; said petition and the proceedings already conducted
therein reinstated; and the lower court is directed to proceed with the
hearing of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration in
accordance with law and the Rules. In juxtaposition, the appellate court
held that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family
Code.

Issue:
Whether the appellate court erred in finding that Marissa Benitez is not the
biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O.
Benitez.

Ruling:
No. The petitioners evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her
biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence
on record is strong and convincing that she is not, but that said couple being
childless and desirous as they were of having a child, the late Vicente O.
Benitez took Marissa from somewhere while still a baby, and without he
and his wife's legally adopting her treated, cared for, reared, considered,
and loved her as their own true child, giving her the status as not so, such
that she herself had believed that she was really their daughter and entitled
to inherit from them as such.

The evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never became
pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child. Isabel's own only brother
and sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already been
married for ten years and was already about 36 years old and still she has
not begotten or still could not bear a child, so that he even had to refer her
to the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent
obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of his mother and wife, who treated
his sister for a number of years. There is likewise the testimony of the elder
sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez, Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then,
being a teacher, helped him (he being the only boy and the youngest of the
children of their widowed mother) through law school, and whom Vicente
and his wife highly respected and consulted on family matters, that her
brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being childless, they wanted to adopt
her youngest daughter and when she refused, they looked for a baby to
adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys but Isabel wanted a
baby girl as she feared a boy might grow up unruly and uncontrollable, and
that Vicente finally brought home a baby girl and told his elder sister
Victoria he would register the baby as his and his wife's child. Victoria
Benitez Lirio was already 77 years old and too weak to travel and come to
court in San Pablo City, so that the taking of her testimony by the presiding
judge of the lower court had to be held at her residence in Paraaque, MM.
Considering, her advanced age and weak physical condition at the time she
testified in this case, Victoria Benitez Lirio's testimony is highly trustworthy
and credible, for as one who may be called by her Creator at any time, she
would hardly be interested in material things anymore and can be expected
not to lie, especially under her oath as a witness. There were also several
disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and
Benjamin C. Asendido) who testified in this case and declared that they
used to see Isabel almost everyday especially as she had drugstore in the
ground floor of her house, but they never saw her to have been pregnant, in
1954 (the year appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born, according to
her birth certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at all, and that it is also true
with the rest of their townmates. Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's
personal beautician who used to set her hair once a week at her (Isabel's)
residence, likewise declared that she did not see Isabel ever become
pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when
she saw the baby Marissa in her crib one day she went to Isabel's house to
set the latter's hair, she was surprised and asked the latter where the baby
came from, and "she told me that the child was brought by Atty. Benitez and
told me not to tell about it".

The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with child, as
well as her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be hidden from the
public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never became pregnant and
could not have, therefore, delivered a baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly
seen mothering and caring for a baby as if it were her own, especially at the
rather late age of 36 (the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa
Benitez was allegedly born), we can be sure that she is not the true mother
of that baby.

Petitioners birth certificate with the late Vicente O. Benitez appearing as
the informant is highly questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente's wife
Isabel, who was already 36 years old at the time of the child's supposed
birth, was truly the mother of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth
certificate, should the child not have been born in a hospital under the
experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist
Dr. Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel
would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and even life? How
come, then, that as appearing in appellee's birth certificate, Marissa was
supposedly born at the Benitez home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna,
with no physician or even a midwife attending?

At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a practice in
recent times for people who want to avoid the expense and trouble of a
judicial adoption to simply register the child as their supposed child in the
civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that
he could avoid the trouble if not the expense of adopting the child Marissa
through court proceedings by merely putting himself and his wife as the
parents of the child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to
legally adopt the child when she grew a little older but did not come around
doing so either because he was too busy or for some other reason. But
definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as
the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer
upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such
child, and even amounts of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of
his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.

6. RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA vs. HONORABLE JUDGE
JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON, BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE
DE LEON and IRMA L. VELOSO, G.R. No. L-43955-56, July 30, 1979
(re: how to prove adoption; applicability of the rule on evidence of pedigree)

Facts:
Dr. Mariano Lazatin died intestate, he was survived by his wife, Margarita
de Asis and his two adopted twin daughters, Nora de Leon and Irma
Lazatin. One month after Mariano's death, Margarita de Asis, commenced an
intestate proceeding. Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne, claiming to be
admitted illegitimate children of Dr. Lazatin with one Helen Munoz,
intervened. Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be
another admitted illegitimate (not natural) child. Two months after or on
April 11, 1974, the widow, Margarita de Asis, also died, leaving a &
holographic will executed on May 29, 1970, providing, among others, for a
legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a
granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late
sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner
Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara. During her lifetime, Margarita de
Asis kept a safety deposit box at the People's Bank and Trust Company
which either she or respondent Nora L. de Leon could open. Five days after
Margarita's death, respondent Nora L. de Leon, accompanied by her
husband, respondent Bernardo de Leon, opened the safety deposit box and
removed its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers and those
of her sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry belonging to her
and to her mother. Respondent Nora L. de Leon claims that she opened the
safety deposit box in good faith, believing that it was held jointly by her and
her deceased mother. Her sole reason for opening the box was to get her
stock certificates and other small items deposited therein. When she was to
close the deposit box, the bank personnel informed her that she needed an
authority from the court to do so, in view of her mother's death. Private
respondents then filed a petition to probate the will of the late Margarita de
Asis. Days after having learned that respondent Nora L. de Leon had opened
this safety deposit box, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a motion in
the probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed a will
subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its production. He
likewise prayed for the opening of the safety deposit box. Respondent Nora
L. de Leon admitted that she opened the box but there was no will or any
document resembling a will therein. Upon the order of the probate court,
the safety deposit box was opened, at which time it was found to be empty,
because prior thereto respondent Nora L. de Leon had already removed its
contents. Seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis, petitioner
intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of the
late Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin as an admitted illegitimate child. Under the
same date, Ramon filed a petition in the estate proceedings of Margarita de
Asis to examine private respondents on the contents of the safety deposit
box, Whereupon, the probate court ordered respondent Nora L. de Leon to
deliver the properties taken from the safety deposit box to the Clerk of
Court. Subsequently, however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano
Lazatin, and 2341-P, Margarita de Asis) were transferred to the sala of
respondent Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr. Petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias
Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de
Asis, as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin
Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, the petitioner was
an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This
affidavit was later modified on August 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was
adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis.

Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son
in the estate of Margarita de Asis at which hearings petitioner presented no
decree of adoption in his, favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over
private respondents' objections, that he had recognized the deceased
spouses as his parents; he had been supported by them until their death;
formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was compelled to change
his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to give
consent to his marriage to his present wife; that at first, he and his wife
stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita, but a few
months later, they transferred to the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila,
owned by the deceased spouses, where they continuously resided up to the
present. Photographs were also intended to be presented by petitioner, e.g.,
photograph of Irma Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of
petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis and petitioner when
he was a boy; document showing that petitioners real name is "Renato
Lazatin."

Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private respondents'
objections to the admission of petitioner's evidence but when petitioner
could not present evidence on the issue of his alleged legal adoption,
respondent court discontinued the hearing on the ground that Renato and
Ramon Sta. Clara do not prove or have no tendency to prove the existence
of any judicial proceeding where the adoption of the parties above named
were taken up by any court. Neither do the evidence tend to establish the
presence of any record of a proceeding in court where the adoption of the
above named persons was held. The evidence, however, tends to prove a
status of a recognized natural child which, however, is not the legal basis for
which Renato and Ramon seek to intervene in this proceedings.

Issue:
WON Renatos petition successfully established his status and WON his
evidence is admissible to prove his pedigree.

Ruling:
Court ruled in the negative. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem
which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which
results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made
through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural
law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the
statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption
is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The destruction
by fire of a public building in which the adoption papers would have been
filed if existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is the
destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be presumed. On
the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a
presumption of its non-existence. Where, under the provisions of the
statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court
constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established.
Petitioners evidences fail to show that at one time or another a specific
court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding
initiated by the late spouses an order approving his adoption as a child of
the latter. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are
presented or attempted to be presented. Petitioner merely proceeds from a
nebulous assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years
1928 and 1932. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court,
as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a
child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child
to establish such adoption.
9
Even evidence of declaration of the deceased,
made in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that
he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased,
as a member of his family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not
sufficient to establish the fact of adoption.
10
Nor does the fact that the
deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred to one
like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of the
child.

The court further ruled that pedigree testimonies, although hearsay, are
admitted on the principle that they are natural expression of persons who
must know the truth but before a declaration of a deceased person can be
admitted to prove pedigree, or ancestry, the relationship of the declarant,
by either of blood or affinity to the family in question, or a branch thereof,
must ordinarily be established by competent evidence.

Secondary evidence may also be admissible where the adoption
proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction
of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former
existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows:
Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if
necessary in the discretion of the court. Secondary proof may only be
introduced if it has first established that such adoption paper really existed
and was lost. This is indispensable. Petitioner's supposed adoption was only
testified to by him and is allegedly to be testified to a brother of the
deceased Mariano M. Lazatin or others who have witnessed that the
deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child. If adoption was really
made, the records thereof should have existed and the same presented at
the hearing or subsequent thereto or a reasonable explanation of loss or
destruction thereof, if that be the case, adduced.

Thus, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot properly
intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis, as an adopted
child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate
proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either as
one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the
estate like a creditor.

7. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE RODOLFO
TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES
ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994
(re: joint adoption by husband and wife)

Facts:
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and
Evelyn Clouse, a former Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen on
August 19, 1988, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a twelve (12) year
old minor who is Evelyn's youngest brother. They got married on June 4,
1981. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present,
Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of
private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother,
Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty
and inability to support and educate her son.

Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home
and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for
adoption.

Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law and that the adoption will redound to the
best interest and welfare of the minor, the trial court granted the petition.
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed contending
that the lower court erred in granting the petition for the spouses are not
qualified to adopt under Philippine Law.

Issue:
Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt;

Ruling:
No. Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise known as "The Family Code of the
Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from
adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly
enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or
her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt
Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-
country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not
qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases
in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino
citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the
second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity
nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place,
when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt
Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, privaterespondent Evelyn A.
Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship
when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to
qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a
former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother.
Unfortunately, the petition foradoption cannot be granted in her favor alone
without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the
husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
the other.

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together with Article 184.

Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory.

This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child, which is the ideal situation.

As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.

We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and
every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that
objective. 11 Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare
of the child and enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy
life. 12 It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of the child
that should be the principal criterion in adoption cases. 13 Executive Order
209 likewise upholds that the interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted should be the paramount consideration. These considerations
notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince any fact as would
justify us in allowing the adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by
private respondents who are aliens.
Petition is GRANTED.

8. ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN and MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (Branch X) PRESIDED OVER
BY HON. JUDGE HERMINIO C. MARIANO, G.R. No. L-30576, February 10,
1976
(re: parental consent in adoption proceedings)

Facts:
A child, less than a week old (only 3 days old)
7
was given to petitioners
Robin Francis Radley Duncan and his wife Maria Lucy Christensen, for them
to adopt, by Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The child was later on
baptized as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan.

Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez on the other hand, received the infant
from the child's unwed mother who told the former never to reveal her (the
mother's) identity because she wanted to get married and did not want to
destroy her future. The mother instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez
to look for a suitable couple who will adopt the child. The mother did not
provide for the maintenance and support of her child.

In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners in September, 1967, Atty.
Corazon de Leon Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or loco parentis of the
child subject of the adoption petition, gave the written consent required by
law.

The Court dismissed the petition due to the fact that it fell short of the
express requirement of the law that the written consent of the parents,
guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted shall be obtained.
Since it is admitted by Atty. Velasquez that she knew the identity of the
mother who gave her the child, the proper person who is supposed to give
the parental consent to the adoption should first be, in order of preference,
the parent or the mother herself. However, Atty. Velasquez could not reveal
the identity of the mother because it would violate the privileged
communications between attorney and the client.

Issue:
Whether or not the person who gave the consent for adoption, which in this
case is Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the proper person required by
law to give such consent.

Ruling:
Yes. When the 3-day old baby was left to and placed in the hands of Atty.
Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the helpless infant was in dire need of someone
who could give it protection and sustain its delicate and fragile life. Atty.
Velasquez was under no legal compulsion to accept the child and to extend
to it the protection and care it badly needed. Since there had been no
showing that the identity of the natural mother was made known to the
trial court or to the herein petitioners, nor had said mother seen fit to
present herself before the court despite the public notice given to the
proceedings as required by law, there clearly appears only one person who
could be considered as the guardian exercising patria potestas over such
abandoned child. Since there was no guardian ad litem appointed by the
court and the child not being in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's
home or any benevolent society, there could not have been anyone other
than Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could, with reason, be called the
guardian of said infant. It was she who had actual. physical custody of the
infant and who, out of compassion and motherly instinct, extended the
mantle of protection over the hapless and helpless infant which otherwise
could have suffered a tragic fate, like being thrown into some garbage heap
as had often happened to some unwanted illegitimate babies. The least this
Court could do to recognize and acknowledge her good Samaritan deed is to
extend, as it hereby extends, to her the recognition that she was a de facto
guardian exercising patria potestas over the abandoned child.

The Court is convinced that, in fact, said mother had completely and
absolutely abandoned her child. This Court has previously declared that
abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces
a settled purpose to forego all parental claims to the child.

The ancient Roman legal maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the
hard and harsh decision it rendered. While this old adage generally finds
apt application in many other legal cases, in adoption of children, however,
this should be softened so as to apply the law with less severity and with
compassion and humane understanding, for adoption is more for the
benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock, than
for those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts
designed to provide homes, love, care and education for unfortunate
children, who otherwise may grow from cynical street urchins to hardened
criminal offenders and become serious social problems, should be given the
widest attitude of sympathy, encouragement and assistance. The law is not,
and should not be made, an instrument to impede the achievement of a
salutary humane policy.

9. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR ROSSANA E.
CRUZ.
ROSALINA E. CRUZ vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. L-
20927, July 26, 1966
(re: jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption)

Facts:
The petitioner, Rosalina E. Cruz, of 39 years of age, is the childless wife of
Francisco de la Cruz and is a resident of Zamboanga. Francisco de la Cruz
gave his consent to the adoption by his wife, in an affidavit attached to the
petition, and also testified thereabout. The minor child sought to be
adopted was born on 26 December 1959 and recorded in the local civil
registrar's office as Rossana Esperat Bucoy ; but said child was baptized on
19 September 1960 as Rossana E. Cruz , already following the surname of
the would-be adopting parent, who reared and took care of the girl since
birth, and who has developed a strong maternal love for her. The child's
parents by nature, Lucilo Bucoy and Ana E. Bucoy, that aside from their
written consent, they testified in court on their consent to the adoption.

The court, in an order on 11 January 1962, set the petition for hearing and
directed the publication of the order once a week for three consecutive
weeks in the "Zamboanga Times".

The child's name in the petition for adoption, and as published in the
newspaper, is Rossana E. Cruz, her baptismal name, instead of Rossana E.
Bucoy her name in the record of birth; thus oppositor-appellant Republic of
the Philippines claims that "the lower court erred in taking cognizance of
the instant petition for adoption despite the fact that it did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by reason of a substantial defect in the petition
and the published order of hearing".

Issue:
WON jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption has been
complied with.

Ruling: No.

The name of a person as recorded in the civil register, and not his baptismal
name, is, for legal purposes, his real name, baptismal names having never
been legally recognized, nor the practice of using baptismal names
sanctioned by the law (Chomi vs. Local Civil Register of Manila, 99 Phil.
1004). It follows, therefore, that the use of the baptismal name of the child
to be adopted, instead of its name in the civil register, would countenance
or permit that which has always been frowned upon.

A proceeding in adopting is a proceeding in rem (Ellis, et al. vs. Republic, L-
16922, 30 April 1963; Van Matre vs. Sankey 148 III. 536; 36 NE 628) in
which notice is made through publication (Sec. 4 of former Rule 100, now
Section 4 of Rule 99) to protect the interests of all persons concerned (3
Moran 534, 1963 Ed.). Said interests will not be protected if the notice by
publication does not carry the true name of the child to be adopted because
the persons to be served by the notice have the right to expect the use of the
child's officially recorded name. The defect, in the present case, amounts to
a failure of service by publication, and the court a quo acquired no
jurisdiction over the case (Cf. Yuseco vs. Republic, L-13441, 30 June 1960).

For the foregoing reasons, the appealed decision is hereby reversed; and
the petition for adoption dismissed, but without prejudice to reinstituting
the proceedings in conformity with law

10. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME
B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, G.R. No. 103695, March 15,
1996
(re: jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption)

Facts:
On September 21 1988, spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto
filed a petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old,
who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was
seven years old. When private respondents were married on January 19,
1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and
custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered: declaring
the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and
purpose, dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child;
and that the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the
petitioners and that the first name which was mistakenly registered as
"MIDAEL" be corrected to "MICHAEL."

The case was heard during which private respondent Zenaida Caranto,
Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the minor testified.
Also presented was Carlina Perez, social worker of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, who endorsed the adoption of the minor, being
of the opinion that the same was in the best interest of the child.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the
correction of the name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued
that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous
error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for
adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals
reiterating his contention that the correction of names cannot be effected in
the same proceeding for adoption. As additional ground for his appeal, he
argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for adoption
because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was
"Michael," instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his
Certificate of Live Birth.

Issue:
Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption even if the
notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor child?

Ruling:
Yes. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over the petition for adoption. The
present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of
the child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves merely
the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as
"Midael" as given name would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor General
admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child
from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any
confusion, because both names "can be read and pronounced with the same
rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The purpose of the
publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any
objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose
has been served by publication of notice in this case.

11. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992
(re: jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption)

Facts:
Dissatisfied with the decision of CA on February 20, 1990 which affirmed in
toto the decision of RTC of Legaspi City granting the petition of private
respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the reversal
thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari.

On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason
Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since
he was four (4) months old, before the RTC of Legaspi City.

The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on
March 28, 1988. The order was duly published, with copies thereof
seasonably served on the Solicitor General, of Albay; Salvador Condat,
father of the child; and the social worker assigned to the court. A copy of
said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other
places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the
petition.

Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the
hearing, the testimonies of herein private respondent, together with that of
her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted in
the proceedings.

On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the minor
child, JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and
purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the
surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the
petitioner.

Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, Regional Office, Region V, Legaspi City, and the
Local Civil Registrar of Tiwi, Albay, with copies of this decision.

Issues:
WON
1. CA erred in ruling that the Family Code cannot be applied
retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles; and

2 CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted the
petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Bobiles.

Rulling:
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C.
Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential
Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a
petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of
them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case
was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the
Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint
adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.

On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for
adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private
respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the
Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the
Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs.
Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by
the mere filing of her petition for adoption. We are not persuaded.

Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-
inclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect,
hence its prayer for an outright dismissal on that score. It could not be
taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since petitioner must be
aware that non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a
special proceeding. We further apprehend that this objection has been
raised for the first time on appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we
shall clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated
assignment of errors.

Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate
relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such
retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses
the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just
and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent
and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. Vested rights include not
only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.

Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right
to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband
therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit
and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to
file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication,
in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and
cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the
governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. We do not
find in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an exception to
the rule.

The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local
and foreign jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that
Article 185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are
ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the sense that they may
be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future actions.
However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps
completed before their enactment.

Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and
procedural statutes are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending
proceedings and are not confined to those begun after their enactment
although, with respect to such pending proceedings, they affect only
procedural steps taken after their enactment.

The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending
actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from
its operation, is not so extensive that it may be used to validate or invalidate
proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since procedure must be
governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure
arises.

The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a
case is substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A
petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law
which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for
adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in
governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and
retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in
criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family
Code should not apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have
modified the trial court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of
private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a
petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly,
reject the same.

Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the
petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to
the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof,
shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The
pertinent parts of his written consent read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually
desire to adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a minor
being six (6) years old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi
City, Albay, also in the Philippines;

3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of said
minor child, JASON CONDAT, before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
court, now the Regional Trial Court in Legaspi City, Albay in the Philippines;

4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am giving my
lawful consent to this adoption of said minor child, JASON CONDAT;

5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES, and I have
continuously reared and cared for this minor child, JASON CONDAT since
birth;

6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a kind of
maternal and paternal love for the boy as our very own, exercising therein
the care, concern and diligence of a good father toward him;

7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT for
whatever it is worth in the premises as to the matter of adoption of this
minor child, JASON CONDAT, by my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES
and by me, DIOSCORO C. BOBILES, in any court of justice; (Emphasis
supplied.) 18

xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in
open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he
must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part
sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of
his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal
requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations
of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be
compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules
on the form of pleadings.

We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not
apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule
therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to
adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes
of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and
privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. The modern tendency of
the courts is to hold that there need not be more than a substantial
compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the
proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and technical
construction of the statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial results or
to invalidate proceedings where every material requirement of the statute
was complied with.

In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring
the judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order that every slight
defect may be enlarged and magnified so that a reason may be found for
declaring invalid an act consummated years before, but rather to approach
the case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found that there was
a substantial compliance with the statute. The technical rules of pleading
should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed
more important that the petition should contain facts relating to the child
and its parents, which may give information to those interested, than that it
should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held
that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the
adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction.

In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the
interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount
consideration. The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in
proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by
another, and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is
charged with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring
those interests fully before it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish
that end. Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound
discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance
with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the
parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of
grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will not
be disturbed.

In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of
adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the
consent of his natural parents. The representative of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval
of the petition for adoption 26 and the trial court dispensed with the trial
custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had
been living with the adopting parents since infancy. Further, the said
petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.

The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition
for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly
stated by respondent court: "Given the facts and circumstances of the case
and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, We are of the opinion
and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a
long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement
of his opportunities for a useful and happy life."

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the
person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the
person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

12. MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge,
Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC,
G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992
(re: parental authority during trial period)

Facts:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age,
shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in
her death. Accordingly, a complaint for damages was filed against
respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents
with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Rapisura had
filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for
adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had
shot and killed Jennifer.

Respondent spouses Bundoc, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for
adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, the
spouses Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been
relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.

The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent
natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action. The CA dismissed the appeal having been filed out of time. Hence,
this petition

Issue:
WON the natural parents of Adelberto are liable for the damages sustained
by Jennifer Tamargo.

Ruling:
This principle of parental liability is a specie of vicarious liability or the
doctrine of imputed negligence where a person is not only liable for torts
committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he
has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental
liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents their parental authority which includes the
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.

The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its
parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child
who is in their custody and control. The parental dereliction is, of course,
only presumed and the presumption can be overturned under Article 2180
of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle
occurred when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow
that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as
to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted
child. To hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that
they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented
would be unfair and unconscionable.

Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's
natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought
by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners'
complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court,
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

13. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONOR VALENCIA, as Natural
mother and guardian of her minor children, BERNARDO GO and
JESSICA GO; and THE HON. AGAPITO HONTANOSAS, Judge of the
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Branch XI, G.R. No. L-32181,
March 5, 1986
(re: adoption strictly personal between adopter and adoptee)

Facts:
Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children,
Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a
petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of
Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. The
Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition
for correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere
clerical errors, those harmless and innocuous changes such as the
correction of a name that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc.,
and not changes or corrections involving civil status, nationality, or
citizenship which are substantial and controversial. Finding the petition to
be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing
the publication of the petition. Leonor also filed her reply to the opposition
admitting the present petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil
status and nationality or citizenship of respondents, but alleged that
substantial changes in the civil registry records involving the civil status of
parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed if- (1) the proper
suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations
of the petition or to disprove the same; that respondents have complied
with these requirements by filing the present special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court and that they have caused reasonable
notice to be given to the persons named in the petition and have also
caused the order for the hearings of their petition to be published for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu also filed its motion to dismiss averring
that the petition seeks to change substantial corrections and not merely
clerical ones as they do involve citizenship and status of the minors and
their mother. Lower court denied their motions and ordered the lower
court to make the necessary correction. The Republic of the Philippines
appealed by way of petition for review.

Issue:
WON the lower court erred in ordering the correction the petitioners
citizenship and civil status of her minor children.

Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative. Corrections involving matters such as civil
status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed
provided the proper suit is filed. The persons who must be made parties to
a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register are- (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the
petition, it becomes the duty of the court to- (l) issue an order fixing the
time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for
hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise
entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed
and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer
be described as "summary". The fact that the Civil Registrar opposed the
petition sought to be corrected and was actively prosecuted, such
proceedings became adversary in nature. The court was of the opinion that
the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a special
proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register
with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that
actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper
suit or appropriate action. To follow the Solicitor Gens argument that Rule
109 is not the appropriate proceeding without any advice as to what the
correct proceeding is or if such proceeding exist at all would result in
manifest injustice.

14. PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS vs. GREGORIA ARANZANSO
and DEMETRIA VENTURA, G.R. No. L-23828, February 28, 1966
(re: adopted child as intestate heir of adopter)

Facts:
A petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years
old, was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI of Manila. It
was alleged that both parents of the minors have long been unheard from
and could not be found in spite of diligent efforts to locate them; that since
the war said minors have been abandoned; and that for years since their
infancy, said children have been continuously been in petitioners care and
custody. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad
litem appointed by the Court. After due publication and hearing, the
adoption court granted the petition for the adoption.

Subsequently eight years later Juliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicio
Santos filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
former, stating among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased
are: he, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked that he be
appointed administrator of the estate.

Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased, filed an
opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator, asserting
among others that the adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos is void ab
initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living
and had not abandoned them.

Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be the first cousin of the deceased
and mother of Paulina opposed also the petition of Simplicio and adopted
the pleadings filed by Aranzanso.

The Court of Appeals sustained respondent-oppositors right to make a
collateral attack against the adoption decree on the ground of failure to
obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect
rendering the adoption void ab initio.

Issue:
WON a decree of adoption could be assailed collaterally in a settlement
proceeding.

Ruling:
No. Firstly, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was
abandoned, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.

Second, in adoption proceedings, abandonment imports any conduct on
the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support
which parents owe to their children.

Third, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior
tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be established before it, the
determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a
collateral attack upon its order. Hence, the CA erred in reviewing under a
collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of
the adopted children had abandoned them


15. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MAXIMO WONG, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992
(re: name of the adopted child)

Facts:
Private respondent, at two and a half years old was together with his sister
was adopted by Spouses Wong, naturalized Filipinos. Private Respondent
sought to have his Chinese surname changed to that of his natural Filipino
parents upon reaching the age of twenty-two. He alleged that the use of the
surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and
friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact
he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to
erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being
ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and
social life. The lower courts decision granting the petition was affirmed by
the appellate court.

Before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General argued that the reversion of
petitioner to his old name violates Arts.341and 365 of the Civil Code which
require an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter, and would
identify him with his parents by nature, thus giving the impression that he
has severed his relationship with his adoptive parents.

Private Respondent contended that he did as the law required, I.e, upon
adoption he used the surname of the adopter. However, being already
emancipated, he can now decide what is best for and by himself. His
adoptive mother consented to the petition for change of name and made it
clear that it would not affect the legal adoption.

Issue:
Whether an adopted child can change his surname from that of his adopter
to that of his natural parents.

Ruling:
YES. While it is true that under Art. 365 of the Civil Code, an adopted child
shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in
mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an
incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings. The act of adoption
fixes a status, which is, that of parent and child. The purpose of an adoption
proceeding is to effect this new status of relationship between the child and
his/her adoptive parents, the change of name which frequently
accompanies adoption being more an incident than an object of the
proceeding.

The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the determination
of an application for adoption. Under the circumstances, there could be no
possible confusion as to the Private Respondents legal status or adoptive
paternity and his successional right.