GRI-00/0232

Topical Report

Leak versus Rupture Considerations
for Steel Low-Stress Pipelines



Prepared by:

B. N. Leis
O. C. Chang
T. A. Bubenik
Battelle
505 King Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43201






for

Gas Research Institute
1700 S Mount Prospect Ave
Des Plaines, Illinois 60018-1804


Contract No. 5000-270-8194

January 2001


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ii


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J anuary 2001
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
draft topical - March 2000 to J anuary 2001
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Leak versus Rupture Considerations for Steel Low-Stress Pipelines
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
GRI contract no.
5000-270-8194

6. AUTHOR(S)
B. N. Leis, O. C. Chang and T. A. Bubenik


7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Battelle
505 King Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43201-2693
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER


9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Gas Research Institute
1700 S Mount Prospect Ave
Des Plaines, Illinois 60018-1804
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
GRI-00/0232

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES


12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
Pipeline codes and regulations worldwide have less stringent requirements for low-wall stress pipelines. Factors underlying
this include a reduced exposure zone as pipeline pressure decreases, and the expectation that leaks occur for lower wall stress.
This report evaluates leak versus rupture as a function of wall stress with a focus on pipelines operating between 20 to 40
percent of the specified minimum yield stress. Potential threats to the integrity of low-stress pipelines are identified and
worst-case scenarios for these threats evaluated to determine leak versus rupture as a function of wall stress. The evaluation is
based on an assessment of existing full-scale test data, incident experience in the United States, and mechanics and fracture
calculations.

For corrosion, these necessarily conservative thresholds were: 35 percent of SMYS based on full-scale testing, 35 percent of
SMYS for the OPS incident database, and 30 percent of SMYS for mechanics modeling. Were other than worst-case
circumstances evaluated, higher thresholds would be obtained. On this basis the leak to rupture transition for corrosion
defects can be taken as 30 percent of SMYS. The threshold for delayed mechanical damage was likewise evaluated. Full-
scale test data indicated this threshold was above that identified for rupture due to corrosion, whereas the steels represented in
reportable incident database indicated a threshold on order of 25 percent of SMYS. Analysis indicates that delayed
mechanical damage incidents reflect the combination of several unlikely circumstances. For this reason the mechanics-based
threshold is formulated in probabilistic terms. As yet this work is not complete. Thus, at present, the leak to rupture transition
for delayed mechanical damage is taken as 25 percent of SMYS.
15. NUMBER OF PAGES

14. SUBJ ECT TERMS
low-wall-stress pipelines, safety, integrity, leak versus rupture

16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF REPORT
Unclassified
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS PAGE
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19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF ABSTRACT
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20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT


N 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev.2-89)
iii

Executive Summary
This report evaluates leak versus rupture as a function of wall stress, with a focus on natural-
gas pipelines operating through high-consequence areas. The expectation that leaks occur in
lieu of ruptures in low-wall-stress systems has been evaluated in terms of operations and
maintenance, as opposed to design and construction, because the report addresses concerns
with existing pipelines.

Quantifying leak versus rupture as a function of wall-stress (pressure) level requires use of
line-pipe properties, as well as consideration of pipeline geometries and operating conditions.
These are defined for purposes of this evaluation. Thereafter, the threshold stress for the
transition from leak to rupture was evaluated primarily with reference to results of full-scale
testing and field failure experience, and what mechanics analysis and numerical failure models
predict. While the process used to evaluate the stress for the transition from leak to rupture is
comparable for prescriptive- and performance-based integrity management plans, the results in
this report only address prescriptive plans. Accordingly, this transition is evaluated with a
conservative basis made necessary to encompass the breadth of federally regulated low-wall
stress pipelines.

The lower-bound threshold for the transition from leak to rupture in the low-wall-stress
pipeline system was evaluated with reference to full-scale test data, incident data, and
mechanics and fracture analysis. For corrosion, these necessarily conservative thresholds
were:
35 percent of SMYS based on full-scale testing,
35 percent of SMYS for the OPS incident database, and,
30 percent of SMYS for mechanics modeling.
Were consideration given to other than the worst-case circumstances needed to reflect the
breadth of conditions covered by federally regulated pipelines, higher thresholds would be
obtained. Given the results generated, the leak to rupture transition for corrosion defects in the
low-wall-stress pipeline system can be taken as 30 percent of SMYS, a value that is
conservative in comparison with in-service incidents.

Thresholds for the transition from leak to rupture also were evaluated for immediate as well as
delayed mechanical damage incidents with reference to full-scale test data, incident data, and
mechanics and fracture analysis. Full-scale test data indicated this threshold was in excess of
30 percent of SMYS, the lowest threshold identified for rupture due to corrosion, whereas the
steels represented in reportable incidents possess toughness indicated a threshold on order of
25 percent of SMYS. Analysis indicated that rupture due to delayed mechanical damage
required the coincidence of many unlikely circumstances. Probabilistic calculations best
indicate the coupled likelihood of such events, and are currently being done. In the absence of
results from this continuing work, the threshold for rupture due to mechanical damage must be
taken as the lesser of the above-cited results, that is 25 percent of SMYS.

The main conclusion is that thresholds for the transition from leak to rupture are consistent
with the current regulatory provisions for low-wall-stress pipelines.
iv

Table of Contents
Page
Background................................................................................................................................1
Introduction................................................................................................................................2
Leak versus Rupture in Gas Pipelines.......................................................................................4
Pipeline Safety Threats..............................................................................................................6
Approach..................................................................................................................................10
Property Trends with Vintage and Grade................................................................................11
Typical Pipeline Geometries....................................................................................................16
Pipeline Service Conditions.....................................................................................................17
Leak versus Rupture Conditions..............................................................................................18
for the Two Typical Gas Pipelines...........................................................................................18
Results and Discussion............................................................................................................22
Code and Regulatory Implications.......................................................................................22
Corrosion and Metal Loss....................................................................................................22
Full-Scale Static Testing..................................................................................................22
Reportable In-Service Incidents.......................................................................................23
Mechanics Prediction.......................................................................................................24
Stress-Corrosion Cracking and Fatigue...............................................................................24
Mechanical Damage.............................................................................................................25
Full-Scale Static Testing..................................................................................................25
Reportable In-Service Incidents.......................................................................................27
Cyclic-Stable Tearing and Failure due to Delayed Mechanical Damage........................30
Summary and Conclusions......................................................................................................32
References................................................................................................................................33

v

Background
Improvements to federal pipeline design, construction, operation, and maintenance regulations
focus attention on enhanced pipeline safety in high-consequence areas (HCAs). A key
consideration in formulating provisions to ensure safety in HCAs is the volume and rate of
natural gas released if the line should fail for any reason. Leaks involve slow, controlled
releases with limited volume, whereas ruptures involve larger, higher-rate releases. For this
reason, much attention is centered on whether a natural-gas pipeline leaks or ruptures when an
incident occurs. This report evaluates leak versus rupture in reference to low-wall-stress
pipelines, to aid in formulating a rational basis for the pending prescriptive changes.
1

Introduction
Energy pipelines play a vital role in the safe and efficient transport of energy resources from
the supply basin to market, covering distances often in excess of a thousand miles. This report
deals with the portion of the energy pipeline system that moves natural gas focusing on the
portion of the natural gas system that operates at lower stresses.

Lower stress for present purposes is defined with reference to federal regulatory provisions
governing natural-gas pipelines in the US, which is CFR Title 49, Part 192. What Part 192
considers low versus high stress can be inferred from analysis of paragraphs that distinguish
design, construction, operation, and maintenance practices in terms of stress level, as follows.

With reference to 192.5, the regulations set the maximum hoop stress in the wall thickness at
72 percent of the specified minimum yield strength (stress)
1
. Class location provides for
thicker pipe as the perceived risk increases in terms of increasing population density. In the
worst case, the class-location concept sets the minimum allowable working stress at 40 percent
of the specified minimum yield stress (SMYS). Several other sections of the regulations
include requirements associated with stress levels greater than 20 percent, 30 percent, or 40
percent. Many of these paragraphs involve operation above 40 percent, reflecting conditions
dealt with by the class-location concept. The 30 percent bound involves up-rating, pressure
testing, unique construction features, and regional differentiation of distribution versus
transmission piping. The lowest bound on stress considered in Part 192 is 20 percent, which
involves concerns for secondary stresses due to external loading or pipe shape (dents), as well
as quality-control (QC) testing involving details such as welds. It follows that low stress
pipelines can be reasonably defined as pipelines operating at stresses between 20 and 40
percent of SMYS.

Clearly, it is reasonable to expect that failure of low-wall-stress pipelines will result in a leak
because the stress driving fracture in such cases is much lower as compared to that in cross-
country transmission pipelines. The consequences associated with a leak likewise are
reasonably expected to be less severe than where failure involves a rupture. This is because
leaks lead to limited volume, slow releases, as compared to longer duration, larger volume
releases from a rupture. The expected difference in consequences between pipelines operating
at higher stress and those running with a lower wall stress is recognized in the regulations
through provisions for the lower stress pipelines that are less stringent as compared to pipelines
governed by class-location provisions. For this reason the design, construction, operation, and
maintenance of such pipelines should ensure that if a failure occurs in such pipelines it is a
leak, not a rupture. Likewise, the primary safety concern for such systems is ensuring that
those provisions limit the likelihood of failure, and lead to a controlled limited-volume release
if failure occurs. Recognizing this, the present report quantifies conditions for which leaks
occur in lieu of ruptures as a function of decreasing wall stress.

Because this report deals with existing natural-gas pipelines through high-consequence areas,
the expectation that leaks occur in lieu of ruptures in low-wall-stress systems is evaluated in

1
Excluding lines operated to 80 percent under a grandfather clause.
2

terms of factors involved with operations and maintenance, as opposed to factors considered in
design and construction. The circumstances that underlie this evaluation are presented in terms
of line-pipe properties as a function of vintage, pipe geometry, and pipeline operating
conditions. The next several sections outline the approach taken and define the scope.
3

Leak versus Rupture in Gas Pipelines
Pipeline failures initiate when the wall of the pipe is breached by a crack or other defect. The
opening that forms in natural gas pipelines either leaks or ruptures, depending on the length
and type of defect, the line-pipe steel, the pipe geometry, and the pressure, temperature and
composition of the gas. A leak occurs when the opening that forms is stable, that is, the length
of the defect does not increase through unstable
2
crack extension when the wall is breached.
Because the length does not increase beyond that when the crack breaks through the wall, the
leak-path is tight, and the area through which the gas can pass is small. The limited length,
tight crack path, and limited area of the breach are characteristics of leaks. These traits
restrict the gas flow associated with a leak, so that a small volume and low release-rate are
also characteristics of a leak.

A rupture occurs when the length of the defect exceeds a critical value, which leads to unstable
extension of the breach. In some cases the unstable extension leads to a breach that is not
much longer than that for a leak. Even so, the slit formed as the unstable extension occurs
typically leads to local bulging, which increases the area of the slit and so also increases the
volume and rate of flow. Occasionally the unstable propagation extends the length of the
breach to the order of the pipe diameter. But, more typically, unstable propagation occurs over
several diameters, often to a length on the order of a pipe joint, and usually leads to a full-bore
opening. For this reason, unstable growth of the breach that occurs with a rupture leads to
potentially much larger openings, and a correspondingly larger volume and rate of gas
release.

Rupture can be predicted as a function of the pipeline diameter and wall thickness, the
pressure, temperature and composition of the gas, the inherent fracture toughness of the line-
pipe steel, and the length of the defect when the wall is breached. These predictions are based
on models that are validated by full-scale testing
(e.g., see 1,2)
, and by such testing proven accurate
for the range of conditions they are applied to. These predictions indicate that if the flaw is
long enough, or the inherent line pipe toughness is low enough, the defect will be unstable
when the pipe wall is breached and rupture will occur. How far it propagates unstably depends
on the pipe geometry, the driving pressure in the pipeline, and the properties of the gas. Short
ruptures occur when the energy driving crack growth is released, becoming too small to sustain
it. This happens because, once the wall is breached and the defect begins to grow (rupture), the
loading changes ahead of the crack tip. If the crack grows faster than the rate at which the
pipeline decompresses, growth continues. If the reverse occurs, the decompression wave
passes the crack tip, releasing the hoop stress that drives cracking before the crack arrives so
arrest occurs.

Higher toughness steels dissipate more energy than less tough steels. For this reason tougher
steels slow the speed of propagation. Slowing the fracture speed allows decompression wave

2
Unstable here has a technical meaning associated with effectively instantaneous axial crack
extension, which is referred to as running fracture. Unstable extension beyond the initial breach occurs
at speeds up to ~1300 feet-second
-1
. The term stable has a technical meaning that refers to a breach
that forms under quasi-static conditions, which does not extend beyond the length associated with the
leak.
4

to reach the crack tip in less time. As time equates to distance propagated, tough steels arrest
fracture sooner, meaning a shorter fracture length and the possibility of a leak. Lower pressure
also means less energy is available to drive propagation, and so the likelihood for a long
rupture is reduced. Lower pressures and reasonable toughness increase the likelihood for a
stable breach, which translates to an increased likelihood that a leak will occur, or that arrest
will be almost immediate. This technical basis underlies the expectation that lower-stress lines
will leak rather than rupture.
5

Pipeline Safety Threats
Because safety is the focus, leak versus rupture have been quantified in terms of the various
threats to pipeline safety. Companion projects
(e.g., see 3)
have evaluated these threats based on
analysis of the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) reportable
3
incident database in term of the
frequency of occurrence of a particular incident type. When evaluated in that format, these
results point to incidents associated with outside forces and corrosion as the primary threats in
cases where operational pressure and maintenance control failure. For this reason, analysis of
leak versus rupture began in terms of these threats.

Continuing growth of population centers means the proportion of mileage in the higher-
density-population classes will increase
(4)
. This points to a continuing dominance of incidents
associated with outside forces category unless action is taken to otherwise prevent such
incidents. Of particular concern are incidents due to outside-forces contact with the pipeline by
other than the pipeline owner or his contractors, which leads to third-party damage.

Risk exposure to outside forces and other threats depends on both likelihood and
consequences, which both increase as population density increases. The potential significance
of outside forces and corrosion can be simply evaluated in this context by way of the class-
location category in the OPS database. Risk referenced to the data available in the OPS
database is defined as the occurrence of an incident multiplied by the reported cost. The
resultant risk has been evaluated on a per-mile basis to remove the bias associated with the
significantly different mileages operating in each class location. This has been done based on
data
(5)
gathered in a survey representing about 50,000 miles of pipeline operated by six
transmission companies, a portion of which operates at less than 30 percent of SMYS. These
data are presented in Figure 1. Because the data are limited for low-wall-stress pipelines, the
incident database has been evaluated without regard to stress.

Figure 1 presents the resulting distribution of mileage grouped by geographic region, and
further subdivided by Class Location. This distribution of mileage is taken herein as
representative of the distribution of mileage in the US. Figure 1 further splits the mileage in
terms of population density in the counties through which the pipeline passes. Two categories
are included. One represents higher-density areas, such as cities, while the second represents
light- to medium-density areas, such as towns and small villages. The mileage in higher-
density areas represents about 20 percent of that in the light- to medium-density areas for this
database.

The results in Figure 1 indicate that the major difference between the more highly populated
areas and the light- to medium-density population areas lies in the Class 2 and Class 3 pipeline

3
Reportable incidents involve three types of event. The first involves release of gas from a pipeline or
of liquified natural gas (LNG) or gas from an LNG facility and i) a fatality or personal injury
necessitating in-hospitalization; or ii) estimated property damage, including costs of gas lost by the
operator or other, or both of $50,000 or more. The second involves an emergency shutdown of an
LNG facility. The third involves an event judged significant by the operator, even though it did not fit
1) or 2) above.
6

mileage. Very little mileage lies in Class 4 Locations for this survey based on almost 50,000
miles of gas-transmission pipeline. These trends can be rationally explained by noting that:
initial routing in design kept gas-transmission pipelines away from what were then the
urban areas, and,
urbanization is slowly encroaching on segments of pipeline right of way (RoW), which
should lead to gradual increases first in Class 2 mileage, then Class 3 mileage, and
eventually Class 4 mileage.

Figure 1 indicates that population encroachment has resulted in increases in Class 2 and Class
3 mileage, but as yet population has not sufficiently concentrated around the pipeline RoW to
lead to much Class 4 mileage. As a recent National Research Council study
(4)
notes, a steady
increase in the proportion of mileage in the higher density population classes is inevitable.
Because there is very little mileage in Class 4 locations, normalizing by mileage in these
locations also could lead to an erroneous bias in the results. Accordingly, data for Classes 3
and 4 have been combined for subsequent analysis involving the pipeline mileage.

Risk referenced to the data available in the OPS database and defined as the occurrence of an
incident multiplied by the reported cost in the database is shown in Figure 2. This incident
database categorizes incidents based on the four categories used on the OPS incident reporting
form. Figure 2 indicates the significant risk associated with outside-force incidents occurs in
areas of higher population density. This incident category comprises acts of God, which
typically result in widespread damage involving multiple pipe joints, and acts of man, which
involve mechanical damage to the pipeline. These results show that the risk of outside force
incidents, which are dominated by mechanical damage due to third-party contact, is five times
that of any other when evaluated in terms of monetary risk. When evaluated on a per-mile
Figure 1 Distribution in mileage for companies comprising the ~50,000
miles of US mainline gas-transmission pipelines
7

basis, the data show that the risk is greatest by far in Class 3 and 4 Locations, a situation that is
not expected to change since urban areas continue to expand
(4)
. This format orders threat
significance from most to least important category as outside forces, material and construction
defects, corrosion, and other. In contrast, threat significance ranked by frequency reverses the
order of the corrosion and material and construction categories, and emphasizes Class 1
Locations. Based on Figure 2 and the incident data reported in Reference 3, mechanical
damage and third-party contact comprise the greatest threat to natural-gas pipeline safety,
including low-wall-stress systems. Consideration also has to be given to active material and
construction defects and corrosion.

Figure 2 Monetary risk per year, by incident category
and class location, normalized by mileage
Kiefner et al
(6)
have suggested an alternative to the four categories used in Figure 2 in terms of
22 root-cause categories. These 22 root causes could be grouped as:
external forces and encroachments, which subdivides the OPS outside-forces category,
several forms of environmentally driven processes that currently comprise the OPS
corrosion category,
welds and materials related defects, which would fall into the OPS material and or
construction category,
other, which remains a catchall category including what are termed miscellaneous and
unknown, and,
equipment and operations, which breaks down incidents that typically fell into the other
category or material and construction categories on the current OPS form.

When the OPS incident data are re-categorized into the 22 root-cause categories suggested by
Kiefner, root causes involved with external forces and encroachments remain the dominant
risk, with a focus as anticipated in Class 3 and 4 locations. External and internal corrosion
likewise show up as significant root causes, as do root-causes associated with operations and
material and construction. The remaining root causes appear inconsequential relative to
8

external forces and encroachments, external and internal corrosion, operations, and material
and construction. The net effect of the breakdown into smaller groups is to spread the apparent
significance of one category across many root-causes, which occurs because there are 22 bins
to categorize into as opposed to four. But, regardless of how the causes are evaluated, the
conclusions reached above in reference to Figure 2 remain the same. That is, mechanical
damage and third-party contact comprise the greatest threat to natural-gas pipeline safety,
including low-wall-stress systems. Consideration also has to be given to deterioration by
corrosion, as well as active material and construction defects.

For low-wall-stress pipelines made from line pipe that was either mill-tested and/or cold
expanded, deleterious material defects should have been culled from the pipeline. Likewise,
for low-wall-stress pipelines subjected to regulatory-based pre-service hydrotesting, or
subsequent re-testing, all remaining material defects and construction defects that threaten
safety at much reduced allowable operating stress should have been removed prior to service.
Accordingly, concern for safety hereafter focuses specifically on corrosion and post-
construction mechanical damage, for both immediate and delayed mechanicaldamage
incidents.
9

Approach
Whether a leak or rupture occurs has been quantified as a function of wall stress, for a range of
parameters including line pipe properties and defect type and size. Several approaches have
been pursued to establish the dependence of failure behavior on pipeline service, pipe
geometry, and line pipe properties, to establish credibility of the results, which included:
what is inferred from code or regulatory provisions world-wide,
what the results of full-scale testing and field experience show, and,
what mechanics analysis and numerical failure models predict.

These approaches were implemented to evaluate the effects of:
operating conditions and failure scenarios,
blunt metal-loss defects such as corrosion, and,
sharp crack-like defects as occur in the wake of mechanical damage and/or grow in
service due by fatigue, stress-corrosion cracking, etc.

Where the approach evaluated leak versus rupture associated with mechanical damage and
corrosion through analysis and model predictions, use was made of pipeline geometries and
properties characteristic of the US pipeline system. Archival data have been analyzed to
establish trends as a function of line-pipe vintage and grade. Likewise, the OPS incident
database has been evaluated to identify commonly occurring pipeline geometries and grades.
On this basis, a set of generic pipeline geometries has been identified as the focus for this
investigation.

Results characterizing properties as a function of vintage and grade are presented first,
followed by generic geometries and the pipelines service conditions.
10

Property Trends with Vintage and Grade
Research over the past 30 years has led to significant advances that now lead to consistent
commercial production of higher-strength steels that also have high fracture toughness and are
weldable the necessary traits of modern line pipe steels. These desirable properties derive
primarily from the use microalloying, controlled rolling, and controlled accelerated cooling to
produce fine grain size in the steel plate. This approach to develop higher strength grades of
line-pipe steel is necessary because the traditional approach based on increasing carbon and
other alloying additions led to problems with hydrogen-embrittlement and decreased toughness
for grades beyond about X60.

The economic push underlying the desire to use grades with strength beyond X60 began the
evolution of modern line-pipe steel. This began in the 60s with the introduction of high-
strength low-alloy steel (HSLA) making practices, to avoid the potential toughness and
cracking problems that would be associated with the traditional strengthening mechanisms in
applications to higher-strength grades. The HSLA practices of the 60s transitioned through a
range of thermal-mechanical processing (TMP), including heavy rolling practices, beginning in
the 70s. Continued improvement in dynamic-ductile fracture resistance led to further
evolution, beginning in the 80s, which culminated in todays thermal-mechanical controlled
processed (TMCP) line-pipe steels. This class of steels makes use of a range of finishing
practices, including accelerated cooling and controlled rolling. It is noteworthy that steel- and
pipe-making practices are not standardized, and it is still possible to purchase line pipe today
made with steel processed as it was up through the 60s.

A companion report indicates the line pipe properties of concern in assessing whether a leak or
rupture occurs are those that characterize the two common limit states for pipeline failure
plastic collapse and fracture
(7)
.

Plastic collapse is characterized by the mechanical properties of the line pipe. The simplest
way to establish the mechanical property of function of properties controlling plastic collapse
is to correlate failure of defect-free line pipe with the related mechanical properties.
Reference 8 assembled such data and discussed a range of stressing conditions including stress
biaxiality. Figure 3 derived from those data shows that the ultimate tensile strength (UTS), a
parameter that historically has been measured within the pipeline industry, correlates very well
with plastic-collapse controlled failures in line pipe. The UTS is the largest stress measured in
a standard tension test of the line-pipe steel. A similar conclusion has recently been drawn by
the European Pipeline Research Group (EPRG). It follows that approaches accounting for the
effect of defects on pipeline fitness for service should use the UTS as the bounding value for
defect-free pipelines, as opposed to other properties such as the actual or specified-minimum
yield stress.

In addition to the UTS, it is appropriate to determine the yield stress of the steel, as this value
determines that the line pipe remains elastic in service. It likewise is useful to characterize the
variation in the ratio of yield stress to the UTS, denoted as Y/T, as this also is an important
parameter in satisfying requirements in Part 192. Figure 4 presents the trend in Y/T as a
11

12
Figure 4 Y/T as a function of actual yield stress
Figure 3 Illustrating the viability of UTS as a failure criterion
for plastic collapse in steel pipelines

function of grade for a wide variety of steels. This trend can be used to estimate the value of
UTS for a given grade of steel, in cases where the UTS has not been determined.

Fracture is characterized in terms of fracture toughness, measured according to established
standards whose roots lie in a technology known as fracture mechanics. The development of
this technology is quite recent compared to the origin of the pipeline industry. Thus, concern
for fracture resistance developed in the pipeline industry years before the birth of modern
fracture theories. For this reason, the pipeline industry adopted the then available Charpy-vee
notch (CVN) impact test as their measure of apparent toughness. The energy measured in the
CVN test remains the industrys standard measure of fracture resistance today. Use of the
modern fracture theories in pipeline applications has been facilitated through correlations
between CVN energy and parameters valid within fracture-mechanics theories. Such
correlations, which have been developed and demonstrated valid for a variety of line-pipe
steels, can be found in the literature
(e.g., see 9)
.

As may be expected from the discussion on the evolution of steels, archival Battelle data
indicate that apparent toughness characterized by CVN energy changed very little until the
early 70s. This is evident in Figure 5a, which presents results representing in excess of 600
joints of line pipe reflecting steel produced from about the 30s through the 80s. It is clear from
Figure 5a that toughness began to increase significantly, although somewhat inconsistently
starting in the early 70s.

Figure 5b, based on archival data for more than 300 pipe joints dominated by more recently
developed steels, indicates a weak dependence of apparent-toughness on grade. However, this
trend reflects a casual relationship, as changes that affected improvements in SMYS went hand
in hand with changes that positively effected toughness.

Because line-pipe steels have evolved as discussed earlier, there can be significant differences
in the values of the properties of that control whether a leak or rupture occurs. For this reason,
it is necessary to evaluate leak versus rupture under conditions that represent the line-pipe
used in the low-wall-stress pipeline system.

The trends in Figures 3 through 5, coupled with changes in steel chemistry, finishing, and
rolling practices that affected changes in strengthening mechanisms and cleanliness can be
identified by decade, to define combinations of grade and toughness typical of pipelines
constructed in that era. Table 1 summarizes such combinations, which are considered
representative of the line pipe in the ground in the US.

Table 1 Summary of property combinations by decade
Decade 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s
Grade X42/X52 X52/X60 X60/X65 X65/X70 X75
CVN, ft-lb 20 30 40 65 80

Table 1 suggests that Grade X52 line-pipe be coupled with a typical plateau toughness of 30 ft-
lb, to represent much of the pipeline-miles constructed through the late 60s. This combination
13

14
Figure 5 Some trends in CVN plateau energy
b) weak apparent tie between toughness and yield stress
a) as a function of year produced

could be paired with Grade X42 coupled with a typical plateau toughness of 20 ft-lb to
reasonably represent much of the construction through the late 50s. Consider now pipeline
geometries to tie to these properties, to define generic pipelines, which then will be evaluated
to quantify leak versus rupture behavior.
15

Typical Pipeline Geometries
As this reports focuses on safety considerations, the pipeline geometries considered are biased
toward circumstances that have posed problems in past. Accordingly, pipeline geometries
considered representative have been identified with reference to the OPS incident database,
which trends incidents as a function of many parameters, including pipe diameter and wall
thickness.

Typical geometries have been identified that reflect much different values of pipe diameter to
wall thickness, denoted hereafter as D/t. The OPS database and results archived at Battelle for
non-reportable incidents occurring between 1970 and 1984, when the reporting requirements
changed, have been used for this purpose. These results suggest the use of a 30-inch diameter
pipeline with 0.281 inch-thick wall to represent a high D/t case (D/t =106) and a 16-inch
diameter pipeline with 0.250 inch-thick wall to represent the a low D/t case (D/t =64).

Results in the literature
(e.g., 10)
indicate that diameter by itself has a second-order effect on
critical flaw length, all else being equal Likewise, these results indicate that wall thickness has
a second-order effect on the critical-flaw length, all else being equal. It follows that results for
the two geometries selected are suffice to address the range of line-pipe geometries in service
today.
16

Pipeline Service Conditions
Natural-gas transmission pipelines in the US have typically operated at near-capacity,
experiencing relatively small and infrequent pressure cycles. Because of their regulatory-based
minimum burial depth of 36 inches, thermal cycling likewise is neither frequent nor severe. In
contrast, lines operated at lower stresses tend to experience more frequent pressure cycles,
although their magnitude may be smaller because MAOP is much less. It follows that possible
in-service growth due to pressure cycling should be addressed. To this end, daily demand-
induced cycling from a maximum operating pressure (MOP), taken as 30 percent of SMYS, to
70 percent of MOP has been evaluated.

Given the focus on low-wall-stress pipelines, and the typical service of lower-stress lines as
links between higher pressure sources and city gates, there is limited need for added
compression. Accordingly, the average gas temperature along a typical natural-gas
transmission line can be adopted as representative, which for present purposes is taken as 60 F.

It is somewhat more difficult to represent the typical coating type and condition, and conditions
along the RoW. Experience indicates that soil and moisture conditions can vary along a RoW
for a given pipeline, which effectively precludes identifying a typical state. Coating condition
likewise can vary significantly along a pipeline, due to differences in soil stresses affected by
the variation in soil and moisture, which again precludes identifying typical circumstances for
purposes of this report. Fortunately, these difficulties can be circumvented through use of
degradation rates that conservatively represent corrosion, stress corrosion, or other such
mechanisms. Kinetics that reflect in-service failures
4
, or were derived from accelerated testing
that reflects worst-case field conditions, have been used for present purposes, as discussed
when they are utilized.

4
Early in-service failures reflect the combination of worst-case circumstances associated with the
operating environment, service conditions, and pipeline material, construction, and coating quality.
Kinetics under such circumstances tend toward the upper-bound of what occurs elsewhere on the
same and other similar systems.
17

Leak versus Rupture Conditions
for the Two Typical Gas Pipelines
Whether or not a leak or rupture occurs can be determined using Battelles model for pipeline
fracture initiation and instability
(11)
. This model has been extensively validated by close
comparison of predictions of the failure pressure for a wide range of full-scale and laboratory
testing
(e.g., 12,13)
, as well as accurate, blind predictions of actual field incidents and hydrotest
failures
(e.g., see 14, p135-9)
. It has also been proven valid in its ability to predict flaw growth
behavior under such conditions
(e.g., 15)
.

Whether leak or rupture occurs has been determined for the two typical combinations of
pipeline geometry and property identified above, for operation at 30 percent SMYS. The
results generated using Battelles model are shown in Figure 6 on coordinates of normalized
failure pressure on the y-axis, and critical flaw depth on the x-axis.

As the format of the charts in Figure 6 is unusual, some discussion of their content is
appropriate before continuing. Referring to Figure 6, the red and black contours on this chart
represent fracture initiation boundaries as a function of flaw depth normalized (i.e., divided)
by the wall thickness. Thus, a normalized flaw depth equal to 0.9 represents a flaw that is 90
percent through the wall. The contours on this chart start at a normalized depth of 0.9, which is
represented by the lowest trend. Each trend above that for 90 percent represents another step
reduction of depth equal to one-tenth of the wall thickness. Counting these red and black
contours indicates that Figure 6a has ten in total, which thus represent depths from 90 percent
through 10 percent of the wall thickness. In contrast, Figure 6a has only nine, which thus
represent depths from 90 percent through 20 percent of the wall thickness.

With the coordinate system used in Figure 6, a value of 0.72 on the y-axis corresponds to a line
pressure causing a wall stress equal to 72 percent of SMYS. Likewise, a value of 0.60
corresponds to Class 2, while values of 0.5 and 0.4 respectively reflect classes 3 and 4. Flaw
sizes causing failure at any one of these values are found by tracing a horizontal line across the
chart. Where that line intersects each of the depth contours defines the depth for failure at that
normalized pressure. The corresponding critical length is found by dropping a vertical line
from that intersection to the y-axis.

Results of the calculations presented in Figure 6 represent two different pipelines. Figure 6a
represents the situation for the earlier-introduced typical 16-inch diameter pipeline (0.250-
inch thick wall made of X42 grade line pipe with a 20 ft-lb CVN energy). Figure 6b shows the
corresponding results for the typical 30-inch diameter pipeline (0.281-inch thick wall X52
grade line pipe with a 30 ft-lb CVN energy). The solid blue line in these figures corresponds to
fracture propagation or crack instability. Thus, this line is the boundary between leak and
rupture, as a function of normalized pressure (wall stress) and defect length when the wall is
breached. Combinations of defect length and depth that lie above this boundary fail as
ruptures, whereas those below it fail as leaks. The green trend signals the onset of stable
tearing, which eventually culminates in rupture if the loading is sustained at the corresponding
wall-stress (equally pressure).
18

19
Figure 6 Conditions for fracture initiation and crack instability
b) the 30-inch diameter pipeline
a) the 16-inch diameter pipeline

The results in Figure 6a indicate instability in the typical 16 inch diameter pipeline occurs at
flaw lengths greater than ~9 inches. Figure 6b indicates that the typical 30-inch diameter
pipeline the critical length increases to ~13 inches. Such flaws are quite long as compared to
most sources of sharp defects, such as mechanical damage. The corresponding depth when
these flaws become critical is in excess of 80 percent of the wall thickness. Combinations of
this size are unusual in terms of metal-loss corrosion, which tends not to develop a consistent
depth over the area of the corrosion patch. Very few circumstances create nearly through-wall
defects with these rather large lengths. This indicates that operation at 30 percent SMYS is
unlikely to initiate rupture, unless this contact causes deep axial gouging along the length of
the pipe, over quite significant lengths. Note that the increased critical defect length between
the two cases represented in Figure 6 is largely due to the increased toughness associated
earlier in this report with the X52 steel as compared to that ascribed to the X42 steel.

The results presented in Figure 6 indicate that 30 percent SMYS cannot be viewed as a
threshold below which fracture initiation or propagation would not occur in the presence of
sharp crack-like defects. However, it is clear that failure leading to a rupture appears very
unlikely, because it requires a very long axially oriented defect (~ 9 to 13 inches), which also is
very deep (~80 percent of the wall) over its full length
5
. Lower wall stresses lead to the
transition from leak to rupture at longer and deeper features. For example, for the 16 inch-
diameter pipeline operating at 20 percent of SMYS, the transition from leak to rupture occurs
for an axially oriented defect increases from a length of 9 inches to a length of 16 inches, and
requires a depth in excess of 80 percent of the wall thickness over its full length. For the same
pipeline operating at 10 percent of SMYS, the transition from leak to rupture requires an
axially oriented defect that is many feet in length, with a depth in excess of 90 percent of the
wall thickness over its full length. For operation at a little less than 10 percent of SMYS, all
features leak, regardless of their length or depth. Higher toughness line pipe leads to an
increase in these threshold lengths and depths.

In the unlikely event that rupture initiates, propagate versus arrest calculations have been made
for the same circumstances to assess the extent of the rupture. These calculations were made
using Battelles model for dynamic-ductile fracture, which was first developed in the 70s
(16)

and recently extended
(17,18)
. This model also has been extensively validated by full-scale
testing
(e.g., 19)
, with its recent extension validated by successful blind predictions for full-scale
running fracture experiments
(e.g., 2)
.

Calculations made with the Battelle dynamic-ductile fracture model predict the required arrest
toughness, which by comparison with the toughness available from the line-pipe steel
determines if arrest occurs following initiation. These results indicate the arrest toughness is
about 6 ft-lb for the two typical pipeline geometries when operating at a wall stress of 30
percent SMYS. The required toughness is less at lower wall stresses. With reference to Figure
5a, this required arrest toughness is quite low in comparison to the historical plateau values.
This indicates that for such steels the fracture will arrest very quickly in the event that fracture
initiation occurs.

5
These sizes dont imply that all such features will fail as they reflect a specific combination of wall
stress and pipe properties, most importantly toughness. Lower operating pressure or higher toughness
cause the transition form leak to rupture to shift to significantly longer and still deeper flaws.
20


Calculations are made later in this report to evaluate the likelihood of fracture initiation as a
function of operating conditions.
21

Results and Discussion
Code and Regulatory Implications
Several natural-gas pipeline codes and regulations used worldwide were evaluated to identify
provisions that might distinguish between likely-leak versus rupture as a function of wall
stress. Documents reviewed included US ASME B31.8-95, Title 49 CFR Part 19298 US,
Z662-96 Canada, AS 2885-97 Australia, HSE 825-96-UK, IGE TD/1-93 UK, ISO CD 13623-
96 World, EN 1594-Europe, NEN 3650-91 Netherlands, SNIP Russia, Din 2413-93-German,
Algerian-91, French-70, and Norway-86. Many of these documents are patterned conceptually
after the ASME B31.8 code. Neither those like the B31.8 code nor the others contain explicit
stress-related leak versus rupture provisions, although most reflect less stringent provisions for
lower-stress pipelines. It follows that pipeline design codes and regulations offer little to
define a stress-based threshold below which failure will always result in a leak.
Corrosion and Metal Loss
Corrosion and metal loss failures include internal as well as external corrosion. Such defects
can be due to dissolution, the usual degradation process leading to corrosion. These features
also can be due to other mechanisms, such as microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC).
Experience through full-scale testing and mechanics analysis indicate that the failure behavior
of external metal loss is not too different from that for internal metal loss, all else being equal.
This is because the failure behavior of corrosion and metal-loss features is controlled primarily
by the defect and line-pipe geometry, and the properties of the line pipe. Because the
mechanism producing the metal loss is not a first-order factor, nor is its location inside or
outside of the pipe, the transition from failure by leak versus rupture occurs is evaluated
independent of these factors.

The threshold wall stress for the transition from leak to rupture is evaluated for corrosion and
metal loss in terms of available failure data and mechanics analysis. Available data generated
in full-scale testing are considered first. Thereafter, the transition is evaluated in terms of the
OPS incident database. Finally, mechanics analysis is used to determine the threshold wall
stress for this transition.
Full-Scale Static Testing
There is a large database of full-scale test results developed for metal loss and corrosion, which
was generated initially to calibrate B31G
(20)
. This database has expanded since to first
calibrate modified B31G
(21)
, and then RSTRENG
(22)
, and thereafter to validate other more
recent, general metal-loss failure criteria
(e.g., 8, 23)
. This database has been interrogated to
identify a threshold wall stress for the transition from leak to rupture, or failure, for metal loss
and corrosion defects.

The available full-scale database represents primarily pressure-to-failure experiments, for pipes
containing defects whose maximum depth exceeded 90 percent of the wall thickness, with
lengths that ranged to more than 100 inches. These defects represent actual corrosion features
as well as machined metal-loss features, which were evaluated in well over 100 experiments, in
line pipe from Grade B through X65. For these data, the lowest failure stress was 35 percent
22

of SMYS. Failures were said to occur by plastic collapse, and involved both leaks and
ruptures but none failing below 35 percent of SMYS.

Based on this database it can be stated that the threshold for failure of long and deep external
corrosion and metal-loss features is 35 percent of SMYS. This is so for several grades of line
pipe, including earlier-vintage grades. It follows that the rupture threshold for corrosion is 35
percent of SMYS for these data. Because the failure behavior of internal corrosion is not too
different from external corrosion, it likewise can be concluded that a similar threshold applies
for internal corrosion. Finally, because the failure behavior of corrosion and metal-loss
features depends on the geometry of the features and not the mechanism producing the feature,
this threshold applies for the usual dissolution-based corrosion, as well as other mechanisms
such as microbiologically influenced corrosion.
Reportable In-Service Incidents
The OPS incident database for corrosion failures contains information about pipe geometry,
SMYS, failure pressure, and an indication of leak versus rupture. This database also reports
many other parameters that reflect the nature of the failure, such as the length of the rupture,
and the consequences of the failure, such as the cost of the incident, the duration of
uncontrolled release. Failure stress has been calculated from the reported failure pressure and
pipe geometry and compared to SMYS. Then the results were sorted on leak versus rupture.

It became evident during the calculation of the wall stress at failure and the sorting process that
there are gaps in the data reported. More importantly, it is clear that there are embedded errors
in the data, as cases where the diameter is less than the wall thickness can be found, as well as
situations where SMYS is wrong, or the calculated stress is an order of magnitude greater than
the SMYS for any available steel grade. There apparently also is confusion regarding the
technical definitions of and resulting differences between a leak and a rupture.

The erroneous data entries coupled with the confusion in the technical definition of leak versus
rupture lead to some incidents being reported as ruptures at quite low levels of SMYS.
Incidents labeled as ruptures at low values of SMYS are tied to a small cost-consequence, a
very short to zero-length rupture, or a short time to control the release, all of which are
inconsistent with the technical definition of a rupture discussed earlier in this report. In spite of
this inconsistency, the data have been evaluated to identify circumstances that underlie leaks as
compared to ruptures. This has been done using incident cost as a filter for the just listed,
technically-based traits of ruptures, excluding cases where cost of the incident was <$10,000.
With this provision to identify events more consistent with technical definition of a rupture,
sorting of the incident database points to a threshold of 35 percent SMYS for the transition
from leak to rupture.
23

Mechanics Prediction
Analysis using the same extensively validated Battelle model for fracture initiation and
instability
(11)
introduced earlier has been used in conjunction with a strength of materials
type analysis to predict failure pressure associated with rupture of corrosion and metal-loss
defects. This analysis considered rupture due to a plastic-collapse limit state. However, the
length and the depth when the defect becomes critical have been determined under the very
conservative assumption that these corrosion and metal-loss features behave as sharp cracks, as
follows.

With reference to Figure 6, the maximum depth avoiding rupture is conservatively found to be
~0.75 for operation corresponding to 30 percent of SMYS. Thus, plastic collapse occurs
through a remaining wall thickness, t, equal to 25 percent of the initial (design) value of the
wall thickness. Thus, the thickness at the limit state, P
LIMIT
, is 25 percent of the initial
thickness, t
INITIAL
. Using this boundary condition, the pressure below which ruptures no
longer occur is evaluated, as follows. From Barlows equation the wall hoop stress, denoted ,
is equal to pressure, P, multiplied by the pipe radius, R, divided by the wall thickness, t. On
that basis, the limiting pressure, P
LIMIT
, is given by P
LIMIT
=(UTS x t
LIMIT
)/ R , while P
SMYS
=
(SMYS x t
INITIAL
)/ R, with t
LIMIT
0.25 t
INITIAL
for the transition from leak to rupture. Based
on the trends shown earlier in Figure 4, one can conservatively relate SMYS and UTS as 1.2 x
SMYS ~UTS for most grades so that P
LIMIT
/ P
SMYS
=1.2 x 0.25. Substituting into the above
leads to 30 percent of SMYS as the threshold for the onset of rupture. Thus, this conservative
analysis leads to a threshold stress of 30 percent of SMYS for corrosion. A probabilistic
formulation would lead to a potentially much greater threshold stress.

It follows that this conservative worst-case analysis leads to a threshold for rupture equal to
30 percent of SMYS, which is of the same magnitude indicated by analysis of the OPS
corrosion-related incident data, which reflect the lower tail of a field population and so too
reflect worst-case situations. In contrast, the result noted earlier in terms of full-scale testing
was about double these values.
Stress-Corrosion Cracking and Fatigue
Stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) and fatigue both could lead to failure at defects in pipelines
for certain combinations of right-of-way conditions and service loadings. As both mechanisms
potentially lead to sharp cracks that promote ruptures rather than leaks, this section evaluates
their possible influence on the transition threshold wall stress for service conditions that occur
in low-wall-stress pipelines. Fatigue is considered first, then SCC.

The literature indicates that the fatigue mechanism exhibits a threshold stress level below
which the kinetics slow to the point they no longer are a practically significant concern
(e.g., see 7)
.
This is apparent in the endurance- or fatigue-limit found for constant-amplitude cycling of non-
pre-cracked specimens. It is likewise evident in the threshold for crack propagation apparent
for pre-cracked specimens subjected to constant-amplitude cycling. From a pipeline
perspective, the threshold for fatigue is apparent in the very long lives of pre-flawed vessels
cycled under conditions relevant to high-stress pipelines
(e.g., see 24)
. It is also evident in
parametric sensitivity studies for high-stress pipelines
(e.g., see 25)
. As cycling leading to fatigue
failures under high-stress pipeline service conditions is relatively more severe than that for
24

low-wall-stress pipelines, the results of those studies are transferable conservatively to low-
wall-stress pipelines. This transferability is validated by the absence of fatigue as the root
cause of failures in gas pipelines, save for cases involving high-wall-stress transmission
pipelines where cracking had initiated along the long-seam weld prior to commissioning as a
result of cyclic loading caused by improper rail shipment.

The literature likewise indicates that SCC exhibits a threshold-stress below which the kinetics
slow to rate so low it is no longer practically significant. Such thresholds are clearly defined
for the high-pH SCC environment
(e.g., see 26)
. Comparable thresholds can be anticipated for the
low-pH SCC environment, as laboratory testing with this environment indicates that cracking
does not nucleate or grow under similar loading conditions
(27)
. The stress level in low-wall-
stress pipelines falls below thresholds known for pipeline steels and high-pH SCC
environments
(e.g., 26)
, indicating that such cracking is highly unlikely on these pipelines. The
kinetics of the high-pH SCC known to be active on US pipelines also slow significantly as
temperature decreases
(e.g., 26)
. Thus, the already benign low-wall-stress pipeline situation
becomes even less a concern, as such pipelines run at relatively lower temperatures absent the
significant work of compression needed in cross-country transmission pipelines to maintain
high-volume flow.

It follows that neither fatigue nor SCC is a practical concern for low-wall-stress pipelines, so
the effect of these mechanisms on the transition from leak to rupture is considered no further.
Mechanical Damage
Mechanical damage defects include smooth dents, gouges, and dents in gouges, which can fail
immediately when the damage is inflicted, or during re-rounding as the damaging implement
moves away from the pipeline. If immediate failure does not occur, these defects might fail
due to the effects of in-service loading, a situation termed a delayed failure. This section is
concerned with leak versus rupture for both immediate and delayed mechanicaldamage
incidents. As with corrosion, this section considers full-scale data, incident data, and
mechanics analysis to assess the transition from leak to rupture as a function of wall stress.
Full-Scale Static Testing
Figure 7a presents data for full-scale testing of simulated mechanical damage defects for
pressure to failure experiments reported by the EPRG
(28)
. These data include leaks and
ruptures for testing done for a wide range of pipe grades and toughness values, which are
biased toward steels used in early pipeline construction. Damage severity for smooth (plain)
dents is measured along the x-axis defects in terms of dent depth normalized by pipe diameter.
Damage severity for gouges is measured along the y-axis in terms gouge depth normalized by
pipe-wall thickness. Gouges in dents are represented by data that lay off either axis.

Figure 7a groups the failure data expressed in terms of wall stress, as a fraction of SMYS.
Data are presented for testing grouped in one of three wall-stress levels: at or below 30 percent
of SMYS, between 30 to 50 percent of SMYS, and between 50 and 72 percent of SMYS. The
figure also includes contours that represent a lower bound on the damage size corresponding to
each of the three failure-stress groups. As expected, the figure shows that higher wall stress is
required to fail less severe damage, which is evident in the relative
25

26
a) EPRG data report does not distinguish leak versus rupture
b) Battelle and Canmet data stable means leak, unstable means rupture
Figure 7 Full-scale test results for simulated mechanical-damage defects

frequency of tests causing failure for each of the three wall-stress groups. It is apparent from
Figure 7a that dents as shallow as 2 percent of the diameter combined with gouges ~10 percent
of the wall thickness fail between 30 percent and 50 percent of SMYS. These same data show
that dents as shallow as 3.5 percent of the diameter combined with gouges ~10 percent of the
wall thickness fail at pressures causing wall stress less than 30 percent of SMYS. These results
indicate that rather small features fail for operation at or above 30 percent of SMYS. As was
evident in regard to Figure 6, whether these data represent a leak or rupture depends on the
length of the damage when the wall is breached.

While the results presented in Figure 7a were not reported in a format that identified leak
versus rupture, a significant portion of the full-scale experiments involving simulated
mechanical damage does include this parameter. Such results are presented in Figure 7b, for
testing done at Canmet and Battelle
6
. The format of Figure 7b is like that of Figure 7a, except
for nominal differences in the scale of the axes. These results represent steels from grade X52
to X70 with full-size equivalent (FSE) CVN energies from 15 to 68 ft-lb. Dent lengths ranged
up to 90 inches, with gouge lengths up to about 25 inches. As with Figure 7a, Figure 7b
groups the failure pressure data expressed in terms of wall stress, as a fraction of SMYS. Data
are presented for testing grouped in one of three wall-stress levels: at or below 30 percent of
SMYS, between 30 and 72 percent of SMYS, and above 72 percent of SMYS.

Consistent with expectations and Figure 7a, Figure 7b shows that a higher wall stress is
required to fail less severe damage, which is evident in the relative frequency of tests causing
failure for each of the three wall-stress groups. While quite shallow dents and gouges are again
found to cause failure, Figure 7b shows that leaks occur for all testing done at a wall stress less
than 30 percent of SMYS. More importantly, even quite large damage can be seen to survive
stresss in excess of 72 percent of SMYS. This could be taken to mean that the trends shown in
Figure 6 are quite conservative. Equally, it could be taken to mean that the larger defects in
this database have been tested in steels more resistant to fracture initiation than those evaluated
using the lower-bound properties considered in Figure 6. This means that the distribution of
both line-pipe properties and service pressures can significantly affect the incidence of
mechanical damage failures, and the threshold for leak versus rupture in the low-wall-stress
pipeline system.
Reportable In-Service Incidents
The process used to evaluate the OPS database for corrosion was repeated for incidents
categorized as due to outside forces. As might be expected, the tabulated data for outside-
forces incidents was prone to the same gaps and embedded errors noted in regard to analysis of
the corrosion incidents. As noted there, cases where the diameter is less than the wall
thickness can be found, as can situations where SMYS is clearly wrong. Likewise, cases can
be found where the stress at failure calculated from the database represents an order of
magnitude greater than SMYS for any available line-pipe steel grade. There also was evidence
of confusion regarding the technical definitions of and resulting differences between a leak and
a rupture. For this reason, the database was filtered as it was for the corrosion data, excluding
cases where cost of the incident was <$10,000 to reflect the technical inconsistencies such as a

6
Appendix E of Reference 29 evaluates the available full-scale database for simulated mechanical
damage, and includes tabulations of the results presented in Figure 7b.
27

reported short or zero-length rupture, or a very short time to control the release. With this
provision to identify events consistent with technical definition of a rupture, the incident
database points to a threshold of 25 percent SMYS for the transition from leak to rupture. The
longest rupture evident in the OPS database for low-wall-stress pipelines (pressure less than
that causing a wall stress 30 percent of SMYS) is on the order of 10 feet, with most less than
5 feet, indicating the rupture length was short and contained in all cases.

Field failures archived at Battelle support the observations noted above, except for one rupture
at about 26 percent of SMYS. Two keys to the occurrence of this rupture on a low-wall-stress
pipeline lie in the very significant length and axial orientation of the mechanical damage.
Damage that couples these two unique characteristics reflects unusual circumstances in
comparison to the mechanical damage triggering immediate failures, which typically involve
puncture of the pipe wall. Puncture typically is due to contact normal to the pipe wall, which is
inflicted typically by the tooth of an excavator. As the term puncture suggests, the tooth or
other damage implement penetrates the pipe wall. Because the motion is into rather than along
the wall, the puncture often has planar dimensions that mirror the damage implement, such as
an excavator tooth. These teeth have planar dimensions that typically are smaller than the
critical lengths calculated in regard to Figure 6. For this reason, immediate failure due to
puncture often is stable, that is does not rupture, even in relatively low toughness line pipe.

In contrast to penetration, the damage leading to the above-cited archival failure ran along the
pipe, due to a scraping contact. While the length of such contact is theoretically controlled by
the reach of the backhoe, or unlimited in regard to contact by a bulldozer blade, axial contact
to a cylinder is inherently unstable as the normal force causes the contact to ride around the
pipe.
7
This instability in axial tracking is evident in Figure 8
8
, which shows the scar created in
the thin-film epoxy coating during scraping contact to generate acoustic signatures as part of a
project developing the capability to detect third-party contact in real time
(30)
. This scrape
remained axially stable for about 8 inches, prior to riding around this 24-inch diameter
pipeline. This type of instability occurred consistently, with its occurrence increasing as the
normal-contact force increased. It follows that severe damage that is axial and traverses a
significant distance along the pipe is unlikely based on our experience through many attempts
to generate axial scraping contact. This work indicated that such contact is more prone to
slide obliquely around the pipe. It also indicated that contact with a single corner on one tooth
was required to inflict significant mechanical damage due to scraping contact.

It follows that, while mechanical damage has caused incidents on low-wall-stress pipelines, the
required long axial contact for a rupture of such damage is likely not common. Battelles
archival data and the OPS database indicate that there is no evidence of ruptures with
consequential effects at pressures developing a wall stress less than 25 percent of SMYS.
Continuing work is evaluating the likelihood of incidents due to mechanical damage as a
function of operating conditions, line pipe properties, and the nature of sliding contact along a
pipeline.

7
An alternative case involves adjacent teeth on a backhoe riding along the crown of the pipe, which is
inherently stable. The use of teeth shields with rounded ends would ensure the unstable situation,
while the rounded ends would limit damage of this nature. Preventing contact is even better.
8
Figure 8 is an expanded view of part d of Figure C4 in Appendix C of Reference 29
28

Scraping direction
Point of Instability
9:00





Approximate
Clock
Position





12:00
Figure 8 Illustrating the unstable nature of axial scraping along
the length of a pipeline -- Scrape 5.01
Mechanics and Fracture Predictions
Mechanical damage occurs as smooth (plain) dents, gouges, and dents in gouges. Failure at a
plain smooth dent is virtually impossible unless the depth is very large compared to either the
affected length or circumference. In contrast, gouges or dents with gouges can fail
immediately when the damage is inflicted, or during re-rounding as the damaging implement
moves away from the pipeline. If immediate failure does not occur at these gouge or gouge-in-
dent defects, they might fail due to the effects of in-service loading, a situation termed a
delayed failure. This section first discusses the current formulation of a model of leak versus
rupture for immediate failures, and then addresses delayed mechanicaldamage incidents.

Analysis indicates that failure at mechanical damage can occur immediately, or be delayed in
time. Immediate failures can occur by plastic collapse, or be toughness controlled, whereas
delayed failures will be toughness controlled
(29)
. Because failure occurs at a lower stress when
controlled by toughness as compared to plastic collapse, it is necessary to evaluate the
possibility of leak versus rupture at mechanical damage under toughness-controlled conditions.
This is particularly the case when dealing with a toughness population such as that indicated in
Figure 5. For this reason, the continuing work is formulating a model of the leak versus
rupture threshold consistent with the approach and technology developed in Reference 29. The
deterministic formulation discussed in Reference 29 is being embedded in a numerical
probabilistic evaluation of the likelihood of failure. To this end, the model underlying Figure 6
is being coupled with distributions of operating pressure to generate probability-density
functions (PDFs) of critical flaw size as a function of mean line-pipe toughness, for the
distribution of pipe sizes and grades representative of the low-wall-stress pipeline system. The
effect of material properties will be used to assess their role in the likelihood for failure.
Consideration also will be given to the distribution of potential damage sizes developed from
the distribution of stable axial scaring lengths based on the results reported in Reference 29,
29

coupled with the distribution of excavator equipment sizes reported in the literature
(31)
. As this
work is just now beginning, results are not anticipated for some time.
Cyclic-Stable Tearing and Failure due to Delayed Mechanical
Damage
The several circumstances that are apparently necessary for mechanical damage to lead to a
delayed rupture indicate that the transition from leak to rupture cannot be simply characterized
in terms of a constant value of MOP. Rather, the chance of rupture depends on the MOP for
the pipeline, the likelihood of immediate failure, and other equally uncertain factors, such as
cyclic variation of MOP involving large swings approaching MOP. The mechanism for in-
service growth of cracking that forms at mechanical damage defects is cyclic-stable tearing
(29)

(CST). Cyclic stable tearing can occur in spite of the fact that such cycling in low-wall-stress
pipelines does not promote fatigue. This is because CST depends on time at stress, whereas
fatigue depends on the frequency and amplitude of the pressure cycles. Like both fatigue and
SCC, the CST mechanism exhibits a threshold, which is expressed in terms of nonlinear
fracture mechanics
(29)
, that can be correlated with CVN energy
(7, 9)
. CST is only active at
crack-like defects, so this mechanism will not lead to crack growth in any pipeline absent a
crack-like defect.

The threshold for CST is typically well above that for fatigue crack growth, except in very low-
toughness steels, and in situations where the ductility is locally reduced to a very low level due,
for example, to cold work
(29)
. Thus, where both crack-like defects are present and the
toughness local to the defect is low, CST can promote in-service growth. Mechanical damage
that involves sliding contact can affect significant cold work, and so can lead to locally reduced
toughness. Where cold work due to sliding contact runs axially a distance greater than the
critical length, CST can cause delayed failure at mechanical damage. Such situations require
the low-likelihood occurrence of sliding contact over an axial distance greater than the critical
length also be subjected to pressure cycling to a maximum stress that exceeds the local
threshold for CST for that specific line-pipe steel. It follows that the archival failure at 26
percent of SMYS discussed above in regard to in-service incidents represents a very unlikely
combination of circumstances. For that X42 pipeline cracking initiated occurred because of
sliding mechanical damage that created an axial gouge whose length was in excess of 14
inches. In-service growth nucleated at this gouge and grew due to CST, due to infrequent
pressure cycles whose peak pressure approached MOP.

Cyclic stable tearing driven by occasional pressure cycles whose peak pressure approaches
MOP gradually deepens and lengthens cracks nucleated when the pipe re-rounds in the wake of
the damage implement. Reference 29 indicates that if cracking does not initiate during contact,
or re-rounding in the wake of contact, subsequent crack initiation (or growth) from the damage
is unlikely by a fatigue or CST mechanism for the frequency and magnitude of pressure cycles
typically experienced on cross-country gas-transmission pipelines
9
. Accordingly, the presence
or absence of cracks immediately following outside-forces contact is a critical factor in the

9
This conclusion, based on historically typical operation, could change if gas pipelines experience
large demand-induced pressure swings, as would occur if a pipeline was the prime energy source for
distributed electrical-power generation operating in peak-shaving service.
30

subsequent fitness-for-service of the resultant mechanical damage. As evident in Figure 6,
rupture requires long, axial damage that is consistently quite deep along its length.

Damage that is axially long, and consistently deep, is unusual in comparison to the mechanical
damage triggering immediate failures, because axial contact, due for example to backhoes, is
prone to slide obliquely around the pipe
10
. It follows that while sliding mechanical contact has
caused damage leading to rupture on low-wall-stress pipelines, it is infrequent in practice and
indicated analytically to be very unlikely. Moreover, the OPS database, as well as analysis
done herein, indicates that such ruptures arrest quickly because of the low wall-stress, which
limits their consequences. On this basis, delayed failure due to mechanical damage can be
viewed as highly unlikely for operation of the low-wall-stress pipeline system. However, care
must be taken to avoid contact with pipelines to ensure this remains the case. Likewise, where
plausible care should be taken to limit the frequency of large-amplitude pressure swings, as
well as keep the peak pressure in such swings from exceeding historical values of MOP.

Control of potential mechanical-damage incidents by avoiding immediate failure and limiting
exposure to delayed failure of mechanical damage may be better achieved by measures other
than operational controls. Avoiding immediate failures requires avoiding potential contact,
whereas the potential for future delayed failures can be achieved by detecting contact when and
where it occurs. Technology improvements on both fronts offer near-term potential to manage
the extent of future sources for mechanical damage incidents
(30, 32)
. In regard to control of
delayed failures, direct-assessment technologies
(33)
that detect the effects of the coating damage
done during mechanical damage offer one means of locating potential sites of damage, as do
ILI tools under development to detect mechanical damage
(34)
for portions of the limited portion
of the low-wall-stress pipeline system that are piggable, given that pigs will be developed for
the diameters of concern.

10
Exceptions include contact due bulldozer and grader blades, ripper teeth, and some forms of
ditchers. While dozer and grader contact are unexpected for pipelines buried at code depth, rippers
and ditchers reach such depths.
31

Summary and Conclusions
Leak versus rupture was evaluated as a function of stress with a focus on operations and
maintenance issues in low-wall-stress natural-gas pipelines operating through high-
consequence areas.

Following some technical definitions and discussion of leak, rupture, and fracture arrest, the
work scope was presented, as was the approach. Data needed to quantify leak versus rupture
as a function of stress level are presented in terms of line-pipe properties as a function of
pipeline vintage, geometry, and operation. Thereafter, the threshold stress for the transition
from leak to rupture was evaluated primarily with reference to results of full-scale testing and
field failure experience, and what mechanics analysis and numerical failure models predict.
While the process used to evaluate the stress for the transition from leak to rupture is
comparable for prescriptive- and performance-based integrity management plans, the results in
this report only address prescriptive plans. Accordingly, this transition is evaluated with a
conservative basis made necessary to encompass the breadth of federally regulated low-wall
stress pipelines.

The lower-bound threshold for the transition from leak to rupture in the low-wall-stress
pipeline system was evaluated with reference to full-scale test data, incident data, and
mechanics and fracture analysis. For corrosion, these necessarily conservative thresholds
designed to reflect the breadth of conditions covered by federally regulated pipelines were:
35 percent of SMYS based on full-scale testing.
35 percent of SMYS for the OPS incident database.
30 percent of SMYS for mechanics modeling.
Were other than worst-case circumstances used in the evaluation, higher values would be
obtained. Given the results generated, the leak to rupture transition for corrosion defects in the
low-wall-stress pipeline system can be taken as 30 percent of SMYS, a value that is
conservative in comparison with in-service incidents.

Thresholds for the transition from leak to rupture also were evaluated for immediate as well as
delayed mechanical damage incidents with reference to full-scale test data, incident data, and
mechanics and fracture analysis. Full-scale test data indicated this threshold was in excess of
30 percent of SMYS, the lowest threshold identified for rupture due to corrosion, whereas the
steels represented in reportable incidents possess toughness indicated a threshold on order of
25 percent of SMYS. Analysis indicated that rupture due to a delayed mechanical damage
incident required the coincidence of several unlikely circumstances. These circumstances
included survival of the initial contact leading to the possibility of a delayed failure, the
creation of a long scar due to sliding contact that ran axially along the pipeline, and operation
of the pipeline at a pressure greater than when damage was inflicted. Probabilistic calculations
best indicate the coupled likelihood of such events, and are currently being done. In the
absence of results from this continuing work, the threshold for rupture due to mechanical
damage must be taken as the lower of the above-cited results, that is 25 percent of SMYS.

The main conclusion is that thresholds for the transition from leak to rupture are consistent
with the current regulatory provisions for low-wall-stress pipelines.
32

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34

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35