r' (

: ; ' f & -
. . . --'
. -'
xii lntroduction
which rhey soughtto ernulatc. 11allcwed us to identify embryonic
.hcorics and anucipatc putelltiallincs of devcloprncnt. It allowcd
us lo writc this book.
In rhe fullowing chaptcr s we scek to present our analytical
scherne and [Q use it to negotiare a way thr ough the literature on
social theor y and orgnnisational analysis. \Ve have airned to pre-
,. se nt il as clearly and directly as we can whilst avoiding the pitfalls
of oversirnplificati on. BUI the concepts of one paradigrn cannot
easily be interpreted in terms of (hose of another. To understand
a ncw paradigrn one has lO explore il from ihe inside , in terrns of
ir, own distinctive problematic. Thus , whilst we have made every
erfort ro prcscnt our accouru as plainly as possibJ e as far 35the use
of the English Ianguage is concerned, we have nccessarily had lO
draw upon concepts which rnay al limes be unfarniliar.
The rernaining chapter s in Part I define the nature of our two kcy
dimensions of analysis and the paradigrns which arise within their
bounds. In this analysrs we polarise a number of issues and make
rnuch use of rough dichorornisuuons as a means of presenting our
case. We do so not mereJ y for the purposes of classification, but to
forge a working tool. \VI! advccare our schcmc as a:1 euristic device
rather than as a set of rigid definitions.
In Par! 1[ we put our analytical frarnework into operation. For
each of our four paradigrns wc conduct an unalysis of rclevant
social thcory and then procccd to relate theories of organisation to
this widcr background. Each of the paradigrns is tr eate d in tcrrns
consisten: with its own distinctive frarne of rcfcrenee. No auernpt
is made to criticise and evalate from a perspective outside the
parudigrn. Such criticism is all toa easy but sclf-dcfcaung , since it
is usually directcd at the foundations of the paradigrn itsclf. 1\11
four parudigms can succcssfully be dcmolishcd in thcs e tcrms.
What we seek [O do is to dcvelop the perspcctive chuructcristic of
the paradigrn nnd draw out sornc of its implications for social
analysis. In so doing we have Iound that we are frequenrly able ro
strcngihen the conceptualisntions which each paradigrn generales
as far as the study of organisations is concerned. Our guiding rule
has been [O seek to offer sornething to each paradigrn wilhin the
terrns of its own problernauc. The chapiers in Part 11. thercfore.
are essentially expository in nature. They seek to provide a
detaiied Ir arnework upon which future debate might fruiuuily be
based.
Par! 111 prcscnts a short conchlsion whidl tOCtJ sc~ upon sume of
the principal issucs which Clllcrge from OUI" analysis,
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FART 1: IN SEARCH OF A FRA. NIE\VORK
1. Assumptions about the
Nature of Social Science
Central to our thesis is the idea that 'all theories of organisation are
based upon a philosophy of science and a thcory of society. In this
chapter we wish [o address ourselves lo the first aspe ct of this
thesis and {O examine some of the philosophical asvumpuons
which underwrite different approaches to social science. \Ve shall
argue that it is convenient to conceptualise social science in terrns
of four sets of assumptions related to oruology, episternology.
hurnan nature and methodology.
AII social scientists approach their subjcct via explicit or implicit
assurnprions about the nature of lhe social world anJ rhe way in
which il may be investigated. First, there are assurnptions of ;11:
ontological nature - assurnptions whieh concern the very essence
of [he phenomena under investigation. Social scienusts , for
exarnple , are fuced with a basic onroiogical question: whether the
'realiry' to be investigated is exrernal to rhc individual - irnposing
itself on individuarconsciousness from without - or the proJ uct of
individual consciousness: whether 'reality' is 01' an 'objective '
nature , or the product ofindividual cogniuon: whether 'realit v' is a
givcn 'out there ' in t~e world. or [he product of ones rnind.
Associatcd wi[H this ontological iSSlIC, is a secund set nI'
assumptions of un epistemological naturc. Thcsc are a:.,ulllprions
about the grounds of knowlcdge - about how one mighr bcuin 10
understand the world and cornrnunicatc this as knowlcdge ro
fellow human beings. These assumptions cntail ideas. for cxumple ,
about what forms of knowJ edge can be obtained: and how one can
sort out whar is to be regarded as 'true 'from what is ro be regarded
as 'fulse'. Indced, this dichotomy of 'true ' and 'false ' i[self pre-
supposes a certain episternological srance. It is predicated upon a
view of the nature of knowledge itscf: whether. for examp!e , il is
possible to identify and communicate rhe naturc of knowledge :h
heing hanl. re:ll and capanle of bei ng rIansmi tIcd i n I~\ n~iblc t'llr/ll.
or w(ether 'kllowlcdgc' is ofa softer, mOle subjectivc. 'ririru,J l'r
even transcemJ enlaJ kino, bascd n c.'<pcriellct! anu insigl11 uf :1
.
'-4--- -....."...---~-----:-----_
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. ./
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,
. . . . , . . . . . , . .
. . .
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2 Sociological Parudiurns and Urglllli,;:o.iollClI Analysis
unique and essentially personal nature. The episternological
assumptions in thcse instances determine extreme positions on the
issue of whethcr knowlcdgc is sornething which can be ucquircd on
the one hand, or is sorncthing which has to be personally exper-
icnced on rhe other.
Associared wilh the ontological and cpistcmological issucs , but
conceptually scparate from thern. is a third se! of assurnptions
concerning humun nature ando in particular. the relationship
betwccn human heings ano thcir environmcnt , AII social scicnce ,
clcarly, must be prcdicutcd UpOIl Ibis typc of assumption. sincc
human life is csscntially thc subject and objcct of enqu.ry. Thus,
wc can idcntify perspcctivcs in social scicnce which entail a vicw
ofhuman beings responding in a mechanistic or even deterministic
fashion to the situutions encountcrcd in their extcrnal world. This
view temls lo be one in which hurnan beings and thcir expericnces
are regarded as products of thc environrneut: une in which hurnans
are conditioncd by their cxtcrnnl circumstanccs. This extreme
perspcctive can be contrustcd with one which attributes lo human
beings a rnuch more crcarivc rule: \\ilh a perspcctivc . ncre 'free
w iJ l'occupies the centre of thc sl:Ige: whcrc mun is rcnardcd as rhe
creator of his cnviroruncnt. lile cuntrollcr as (1rri.l~icd to the con-
trotled, the master r.uher than thc murionctte. In thesc two
extreme vil.!ws uf the relnrionship between humnn beings and thcir
cnvironmeru wc are iucntil'ying a great rhilo<;ophiLal debate
bciwcen the advocates of dcrcrrninisrn 011 thc one hund aud
voluntnrisrn 011 the other. Whilsl thcre are social thcuries \,..hich
adhcr c ro cach of Ihc';e c xtrcrncs , ;IS we shall sce. thc assumptions
of man y social scicntixt :11e puchcd sorncwherc in 111(: rane\.'
betwccu.
., he ihrcc sct s of a~\IIn1rli(lIlS outli ncd abov e hav c dir cct
ifllplic;tlioll\ Ilr:1 II/Cft"tt""gi( .t] n.uurc. F:II.h OIlC h:I:: import. int
cun ...cqucnccx Ior the v..aY:1I vhich une :\tlcnlpl<; lo inv cxtiu.u c ;\lIt!
obtain 'k nowlcdge ' <lb\) 1I1 rh,; sp:i:r! wur ld. Diffcrcnt ontologics .
cpivternologics .unl 1ll0dL'i!' of hu man nuturc are likcl y IUincline
socia] scicntists t ow.ml s diffcrcnt rnethoduh-gies. Th e possible
range of choice is indccd so lurge that wh.u is rcgardc. as scicncc
by Ihe traditiounl 'natural s<:i!:'nlis,.covcr~ hUI J smnl! r.mgc of
oplions. 1I is po,,~ible. fur (;.~al1lrlc, III idcrlliry n:clhIlJ \llugics
t'rnployl'll in sucial s<:iCrlCC re~:carch which 111:al the: Sll'jal \, ollu
like Ihe natural \Vurlo. ;I~ III.:in1! haro. real :IIlU CXlt:rll,d lo lhc
indi\'idual, II\U l) lh(;I~: \\hich vicw il as h:.:illg Df a Illuch soflcr,
pe:rson;ll and nlOr\! ~;LJ h.ieclivc qllalily,
If 1111\': slIhsnihcs IU:1 vil:\\" \lr Ihe f\)f!m:r kintl. which treals the
e
.J 1~ _
' . -' A b I N ,rs' I e
- Assu mptt ans a out tne ature OJ octa Science J
social world as if it were a hard. external. objective reali ry , then Ihe
scientifc endeavour is likely lo focus upon an analysis of relation-
ships and regularities between the various elernents which it corn-
prises. The concern.therefore. is with the idenufication and defini-
tion of these elcrnents and with the discovery of ways in which
these relationships can be expressed. The methodological issues of
importance are thus the concepts thernselves , their rneasurernent
and the idcntification 01' underlying themes. This pcrspecrive
cxprcsses itsclf most forcefully in a search for universal laws
which cxplain and govern the reality which is bcing obscrvcd.
lf one subscribes lo rhc alternative view of social realiry. which
strcsses the importance of the subjective expericnce of indi viduals
in the crearion of thc social world, thcn the search Ior understaml-
ing Iocuses upon different issues and approachcs thern in different
ways. The principal coricern is with an understanding of the way in
which Ihe individual creates. modifies ano inrerprets the wortd in
which he or she finds himself. The ernphnsis in extreme cases tendx
ro be placed upon the explnnation and understunding of what is
unique and particular lO the individual rather [han of whut is
general and universal. This approach qucstions whcthcr thcrc
cxists an extcrnul realitv worthy of study. IlllllClhuJ l'lu!!ic:1l rcrm-
it is an approuch which crnphasises the rclativistic n.uurc ot 11e
social world lo such an ex tent thnt il may be perceiveu as 'unti-
scientifi c ' by rcfcrcnce io the ground mies c omrnonly applied in
the natural scieuces.
T~e subiective=objectve dimension
The subiec ttvis t
approach 10
social serene e
Th'l cbiecnvrst
apP'oJ ch to
s ocret screnc e
I NomlOalism 1-----
ontotocv
--- -1 Aoalism 1

I Anti positivism I CPjstomoI09Y-~ Positivism ]

[voluntarism 1- human n<llure ~ OOlcrm, nism I
[loeog, nPhIC I mcthodology I Nomothctic )
Fi!Urc 1'1 i\ <;I:hcme fm ;n;'y~intl,,~.~umplilln' ahuullhc nalurc or , !l(:i. d '. :ic:l<"~
~,.
4 Sociological Parudigms an d Org anisationa! Analysis
In Ihis brief sketch of various onrological, cpistcrnological.
human and merhodological srandpoints which charnct) ri~c
approachcs rosocial scicnccs , wc have sought lo illustratc !\VO
broad and sornewhat polarised perspectives. Figure 1.1 secks lO
depict thcsc in a more rigorous fashion in tcrms of what we shall
describe as the subjectivc-objective dimension. 11 idcntifies thc
\. four sets of assurnpuons relevan: to our undcrstanding of social
science, characterising each by the descriptive labels under which
they have been debated in the litcrature on social philosophy. In
(he foJ lowing section of this chapier we willreview each of (he four
debates in nccessarily brief but more systernatic terms.
"
The Strands of Debate
Nominalism-realism: the ont ological debate I
These terms have been (he subject of rnuch discussion in the
[iterature and thcrc are grcat ur eas of controve'rsy surrounding
thcrn. The nominalist posiiion revolves around tlie assurnption
that (he social world externa! to individual cognition is rnade IIp of
nothing more than narnes , concepts and labels which are used to
structure reality. The norninalist docs not admit 10 there bcing nny
'real' structure lo the world which thcse conccpts are uscd ro
describe. The 'narnes ' uscd are regardcd as artificial creations
whose utility is based upon thcir convenicnce as rools for dcscrib-
ing, rnaking sense ofancJ negotiating the cxternal world. Nominal-
ism is oftcn cquatcd with convcntionnlisrn, and wc will make no
distinction between thern.?
Rcalisrn. on the orher hand, postulatcs .11at thc social world
external to individual cognition is a real world mude up of hard,
tangible and rela tivel y i rnmu tahle sI ructu res. Whcthcr or not we
lahel and pcrceivc thesc structurcs , the rcalists maiutain, thcy still
exist as ernpirical entities. We mny not evcn he aware of the
exisrence of certain crucial siructures and thercfore have no
'names' or concepts to articulate thern. For the rcalist , the social
world exists independently of an individuals nppreciation of it.
The individual is secn as beinp horn inro und living within a socia!
world which has <1 rcality of iis 0\\"11. It is not sorncthing which the
individual crcates=-it cxists 'out ihcr c ': ontologically it is prior tu
the exislencc nd con<;c.:iollsness of any single human r.Cillg. F(lr
the realis!. the social worlLl has ;In cxislcnce whidl is as hard alld
concrele as Ihe natural \Vorld.'
~
J
Assumptio..: about 1 1 / (' Natur e of Social 5('il'I1('(' 5
Anti-posi tivlsm-positivism: the
cpist emological debate"
It has bcen maintained rhat 'the word "positivist " like rhe word
"bourgcois " has becorne more of a derogatory epithet than a
uscful descriptive concept".' We intend to use it here in the latter
sense , as a descriptive concept which can be used to characterise a
particular type of episternology. Most of the descriptions of
positivism in currcnt usage refer to one or more of the ontological,
epistemological and rnethodological dimensions of our scherne for
analysing assurnptions with rcgard to social science. lt is also
sornctirues rnistakenly equated with empiricisrn. Such conflations
cloud basic issues and contribute to the use of the term in a
derogatory sense.
We use 'positivist' here lO characterise episternologies which
scek to explain and predict what happens in the social world by
searching Ior regularities and causal relationships berween its con-
stituent elcrncnts. Positivist episternology is in essence hased upon
the rraditionn] approaches which dominate the natural scicnces.
Positivists rnay differ in terrns of dctailed upproach. Some would
cl.urn, for cxarnple , that hypothesised regularities can be verified
by <Inadequate experimental research prograrnrne. Others would
maintain th.u hypotheses can only be falsificd and never dcmon-
strared to be 'true '." However , both 'verificntionists ' and 'Ial-
sifi carionists 'would accept that Ihe growth of knowledge is essen-
tially a curnulative process in which new insights are added to the
existing stock of knowledge and Ialsc hypotheses elirninnted.
The cpistcmology of anti-positivisrn rnay take various Iorms but
is firmly sct :1;;inst the utility of a search for laws or underiying
recularities in the world ofsocial affairs. For the anti-positivist. thc
social world is esscntially relativistic and can only be uudersrood
from the point of view ofthe individuals whu are directly involved
in thc activiries which are to be stucJ iecJ . Arni-positivists reject the
standpoint of rhe 'obscrver". which churacterises positivist
episrcrnology. as a valid vantage point for understanding hurnan
acuvities. They rnaintain that one can only 'understand by
occupying thc frame of reference of the participant in aciion. One
has lo undersrand Irom the inside rather thun the ourside. Frorn
thi~ ruin! (lf vic\V socinl science is sec!! as heing esscnlially ;
slIhicctive ralher Ihan 3n ohjective ente"rri~c, !\Illi'rositi\"ists
tend lu re.ecl Ihe nOlion thal science can generute ohjecli\'c
hn(l\\,let.lge of <lny bn.'
------
J
/..J" ('
. . -~
~ F' _
6 Sociologica! Parn dig ms ami Org anisati onul Anaiy sis
Yoluntarism-det erminism: {he ' human nature'
debate
This debate rcvolves around the issue of what modcl of man i",
reflccted in uny given social-scientific theory. At one extreme we
can identify a detcrrninist vicw which regurds rnan and his
~ activitics as bcing cornpletcly dcterrnincd by ihe situation or
'cnvironment' in which he is locatcd. Al anothcr extreme we can
identify the voluntarist view Ihat man is complctely autonomous
and frce-willcd. Iusofnr as social scicncc theorics are concerncd 10
undcrstand hu man activi li es. thcy rnust incli ne irnplici ti y or
explicitly to une ur other of thcse points of view, or adopt an
intcrmediruc standpoint which allows for the influcnce of both
situutionul and voiuntary [actor s in nccounting Ior thc activitie of
human bcings. Sueh assumpuons are cssential clerncnts in social-
<cicntific thcorics , since thcy define in broad tcrrns the naturc of
the relauonships bciwcen man and lh\:! society in which he livcs."
l dcographic-nomoth ct!c th eory : th e metliod-
ological debate
Thc idcoprnphic appronch to social scicncc is hascd on the view
that one can onf y undcrsuuul lile sociul world by obtaining Iirst-
hand knowlcdge of the subjcct undcr investiguuun. 11 rhus pluces
considerable stress upon gelling close lo oues subjcct 1nd
exploring ils dciailcd background .uid lifc histor y. The idcugruphic
upproach cmphasises ihe analysis of the subjective accounrs
which one gcncr. ires by 'gelling inxide ' situ.uions and involving
oneself in the ev ervday 1'10\\1 of life - thc det.ulcd analy is uf the
insighl'\ gcuer.ucd hy such cncountcrs with ones subjcct arul thc
insighl<; rcveuled in imnressionistic accourus f'ound in diaries ,
hiugr:trhies and journulistic recurds. lhe idcographic melhllJ
strcsscs thc importancc of lellil!g OIll!'S subjcct unfolu its n.uure
and charncteristics during the proccss of investigauon. ~
Thc nomothctic nppro. rch t o sucinlscicncc 1:ly:; e:llphasi'; on thc
irnportancc uf hasing rcscarch UpOIl systematic prutucol and
lcchniqllc, lt is criwmiscJ illlhc approach and fIlclhuds clrlplorcJ
ill lhc lIalural scicnces, which fOl'lIs tlpon the proccss 01' It!Slillg
h ypt>lhl.'ses in accon./;}nce wi th lhe canons 01' scientific rigollr, 1I is
rrcoccupicu \Vilh lhe cDlIstructiollof scicnlific tests anu the use or
e
A.L,"plioIlS about the Naturc ni Social 050'("//('1' tf
quantitative techniques for the analysis of data. Survcvs,
questionnaires. personality tests and standardised research
instrurnents of al! kinds are prominent arnong the tools which
cornprise nomothctic methodology.!?
Analysing Assumptions about the Nature of
Social Science
Thcse four scts of assurnptions with rcgard lo the nature of social
scicncc provide an extremely powerful tool Ior the analysis De
Socin 1 theory, In much of the literature thcre is a tendcney to
conll.ue the issues which are nvolvcd. We wish to argue here lhat
considerable advantages accrue frorn treaung these four strnnds of
social-scientific debate as. analytically distinct, While in pructice
there is often a strong relntionship between the positions adopted
on each of thc fuur strands, assurnpuons about each can in Iact
vary quite considerably. lt is worth exurnining this point in more
detail.
The extreme positions on each of the Iour strands are rel1ectcJ in
the two rnajor intellectual traditions which huve dorninutcd social
science over the Iast two hundred years. The first of these is
usually descrihed as 'sociological positivisrn'. In essence this
r elccts thc attcmpt lo apply rnodels arul rncthods derivcd frorn llte
natural scicnces !O the study of hurnnn afluirs. It treats rhe social
world as if i I wcre lti e natural world, aJ llPling a 'reali st' al'rrllach
to ontology. This is tacked up by a 'positivist epis tcmolog y ,
rclutively 'deterministic' vicws of human nature und the use of
'noruothctic ' mclhmjo~) gics, The secund irucllecural trudirion,
that of'G erman idea/1sm', stands in comptcrc opposition IlIlhis, /11
cssence il is bnscd upon (he premise thut the ulrimarc re:llil~' of thc
universo lics in 'spirit or 'idea' r.uhcr than in [he uata of sensc
perccption. lt is essenjially 'norninalixt ' in its appr ouch lo s(lcial
reulity. In cuntrust 10 the nutural scicnccs , it slres.,C'i rne
csscntially subjcctive nature 01'human Ifrairs, denyinu rhe uulit y
.urd relevancc of the modcls and rnerhods of natural xcicncc lo
- studics in this realm. [1 is 'urui-positivist' in cpistvrnolouy.
'voluntnris' \\i[1I rcgurd lo human n.uure and ir. Iavours id~'ll-
gruphic mcthods as l Iourulation Ior social ;l11aly~is, SUl:iul(l!!ic/
Pll\itivislIl alld CJ l:rrnan itlcali,1I1 111IIS J dille the llbjC:Clivc ;111
sllhjecliv~ e,,<lrellles 01' our mode!.
rvhlll}: suciolugist.c; ami organis;J tiolll!icllrists have bt!cn hrllll!!hr
up wilhi" lhe Iratlilioll of sociult,lgical posilivism, Wilhlllll
!o
rr
"
1\ SoC"lIl(/g;('{/II'(/racl;gllls lilil Oru a nisntional ;1.1/111.1'.\;.\'
cxposurc lo thc basic tcncis of G crman idcalisrn. Social scicnce for
Ihem is seen as consonant wilh the configuration of assurnptions
which characrcrise rhe objcctivc extreme of our modcl. Huwevcr ,
over the last seventy ycars or so there has bcen ano increusing
inrcraction bctwccn thcsc two traditions. particularly nI l socio-
philosophical level. As a result interrncdiate points 01' view havc
erncrged , each with its own distinctive configurarion of
assurnptions about the nature of social scicnce. Thcy have all
spawned thcories, ideas and approaches characteristic of their
interrncdiate position, As wc shall argue in latcr chapters ,
developrnents in phenomenology, cthnorncthodology and the
action frame of reference are to be understood in these tcrrns.
These perspectivcs , whilst offering their wn special brand of
insight, have also often been uscd as launching pads for auacks on
sociological positivism ano have gcncrated a considerable arnount
of debate between rival schools of thought. J 'he nature of this
debate can only be fully understood by grasping and apprcciating
the ifferent assumptions which underwrite the cornpeting points
of view, . t
lt is our contention that the analyticul scbcrnc ofcred here
cnubles une 10 00 precise! y this. 1l is offcrcd not as a rncr c
classificatory dcvicc, but as an importa nt 1001 Ior ncgutinting
social thcory. 1Idraws attcntion lo key assumptious. 11allows onc
ro Iocus on precise isxucs which diffcrcuti.u c socio-scicnufic
approachcs. I1 UI'i1WS aucntiun lo Ihe dcgrce 01' congrucncy
betwecn the four scrs o!'axsumptions about social science which
characicrisc any givcn the orists point of vicw. Wc offcr il herc as
the first principal dimensin of our theoretical scherne for
analysing thcory in general and organisational theory in particular.
For the sakc of convcniencc we shall nonnally refcr to il as the
'subiccnve=-objecuve 'dimensin. two <.kscriplivc labels which
perhaps capture the points of commonality betwccn the four
analytical strands.
Notes and References
1. For a further discussion of thc nominalism-realism debate,
sce Kolakowski (197 2) , rp. 15-16.
2. Kolakowski (197 2) , pp. 158-9. In its most extreme Iorrn
norninalism does not rccognise thc cxistcnce of nny world
outside Ihe realm of individual consciousness. This is the
solipsist position, which wc discuss in more dctuil in Chaptcr
6.
~
.. 2
. \'
Assumpt, ..IJ about thr NO/11ft, of Sociol Scil'I/('(' y
3. For a cornprehensive review of 'realism, see Keat and Urry
(197 5) . pp. 27 -45. They make much of Ihe distincrion
bet wcen 'positivism' ano 'realism' bUI. as they admit , thcsc
terms are used in a sornewhat unconventional way.
4. For a furthcr discussion of the positivism=-anti-positivisrn
debate, see , for example , G iddens (197 4) and Walsh (197 2) .
5. G iddens (197 4) , p. 1.
6. See , for example, Popper (1963).
7 . For a good il/ustration of an anti-positivist view of science,
see Douglas (1970b), pp. 3-44.
8. The human nature debate in its widest sense involves rnany
other issues which we have nOI referred to here. The precise
model of rnan to be employed in any analytical scheme ,
however, is underwrinen by assurnptions which reflect the
voluntarism-determinism issue in one way or another. We
have isolared this elernent of the debate here as a way of
treating al its rnost basic level a neccssary assurnption of all
social-scientific theories which purport to account Ior human
activiiies. Detailed propositions with regard lo (he precise
explanation of human activities elaborate in one way or
unother this basic therne.
9. For an exccllcnt iscussion of the nature of (he idcographic
npproach to social scicnce , see Blurncr (19(9) . ch. l.
10. I1 is important to ernphasise hcre that both nornothetic and
idengraphic rncthodologies can he ernploycd in a deductive
and inductive sense. Whilst the indnctivc=-deducuve debate
in scicnce is a subjcct of considerable irucrest and
importance, we do not see it as being central lo the four
dimensions suggested here as a means of distinguishing
bet ween the nature of social science theories. That noiwith-
standing, it remains an irnportant methodological issue, of
relevance lo both sociology and organisational analysis ,
within the context of the assurnptions explored hcre.
~
-,
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r\ " .... ,\
, , ~
... ~c... '- .... : Q'\ \. ~
-'. ~
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. . . . . " .
e
t
2. Assumptions about the Nature
of Society
Al! approaches 10 the study of society are located in n Irarne of
refercncc 01' one kind or another. DifTerent the orics rend to rcllcct
diffcrcnt perspectives , issues and problerns worthy 01' stuuy. and
are gene.nlly bascd upon a whole sct of assurnpiions which reflect
a particular view 01' (he nature of the subjcct under inveslir.nlion.
The last twcnry ycars ur so have witnesscd a number of uuernpts
on the par! of sociolcgists to delineate the differcnccs which
separar various schools of thought and thc mcta-sociological
as sumptions which thcy rcflcct.
The Order=--Conflict Debate
Duhrendorf (1959) and Luck wond (195(1) . Ior cxamplc. hnvc
sought to distinguish bCI\H:::n those upproaclic lo sllc.:i\) I\lgy
which conccntrated upon cx plaini ng ihe nuturc of social ordcr and
cquilibriurn un thc one hund, and those which were more con-
cerned wuh nroblcms of changc. conflict and cucrciun in s\lci;!I
strucrurcs on rhc othcr. This distinction has rcceivcd a gr car ucal uf
attcnuon and has come ro be known as the 'order-i-conflict
debate.'. Thc 'ordcr thcorists 'havc greatly outnurnbered thc 'con-
tliel thcorists '. and as Dawc has observcd. 'thc thesis th.u socio-
logy is centrally cunccrncd with the problcm al'social ordcr has
hecorne one of thc disciplines few orthodoxies. II is cornmon ac; l
basic prcrnisc to rnany accourus of sociological thcory which
otherwise diffcr considerubly in pUrp0SC and perspcctive '(Da we ,
197 0. p. 207 ) .\
Many sociologisls now rcgard this debate as dcad or as having
bcen J . somewh.u spurious non-debate in lile tirsl place (Cohcn,
196H: Silverman. IlJ 7 0: van den Berghc. 1%<)). lnflucnccd by rhe
work of writcrs ~1I=hae Coser ( IlJ 5(1) . who pointcd to rhe funcrional
asrecIs of social conflict . sociflillgisls huve bccn ablc lo incorpor-
ale conflict as a variable wuhiu lhe bounus (lf !hcories wilich re
e

.::
As sumptions about tire Nature IJf Sudety II
primarily geared towards an explanation of social order. The
approach advocated by Cohen, for exarnple, clearly illustrates
this. He takes his point of departure from the work of Dahrendorf
and elaborates some of the central ideas in the order-conflicl
debate to present two mode/s of society , which are characteriscd
in terms of cornpeting sets of assumptions which attribute lo social
sysrerns the characteristics of commitment, cohesion. s olidarity.
consensus, rcciprocity, ea-operaran, int egration, stability and
persist enc e on [he one hand, and the characteristics of coercion,
division, hostilitv, dissensus, conflict, mali nt egration and chang e
on the other (Cohen, 1968, pp. 166-7 ) .
Cohen's central criticism is that Dahrendorf is rnistakcn in trear-
ing the ordcr and conflict models as being entirely separate. He in
effcct suggests lh.al it is possible for theories 10 involve elernents of
both rnodels and iat one necd nOI nccessarily incline to one or the
other. Frorn this point of view, the oruer and conflict vicws of
society are but [WO sides of the sarne coin: they are not mutually
exclusivo and thus do not need lo be reconciled. The force of Ihi~
sort of argument has been very powerful in diverting nttention
awuv from the ordcr-c-conflict debate. In rhe wake 01' iheso-callc.:
counter-culturc movernent of the late 1960s and the failure of the
1968 revolution in France , orthodox sociolocisrs have becornc
rnuch more interested in and concerncd with (he problcrns of the
'individual' as opposed lo those of the 'xtructurc ' of socicty in
general. The influence of 'subjcctivist ' movemerus such ;<
phenomenology, eltAlomethouology ano action thcory, which we
referred lo in passing in the previous chapter. llave tended ro
become much more auractive and more worrhv of attcntion. A<;;
result. nrerest in conrinuing the connict-oru'er deba re has sub-
sided under the influence of ;SSllCS relaung to the philosophy and
rnethods ofsocial scienee.
Our contenticn here is that if one reviews the intellectual sourcc
ano foundauons of the ordcr-vconflict debute, one is Iorccd lo
conclude that it has met a prcmuture dcath, Dahr endorf and
Lockwood sought to revitalise the work of Marx through their
writings and lo resrore it to a central place in sociological theory.
For the rnost part Marx had been largely ignorcd by leading
sociologists , the influence of theorists such as Durkheim. Weber
and Pur ero having been paramount. Interestingly enough. thesc
lauer three sociologists are all very much concerned with Ihe
problem of social order: it is Marx who is preoccupied \vith the rol e
of confliet as the driving force behind social change. Stated in lhis
way. therefore , the ordcr-vconflict debate is under writtcn by a
. ~.
:~
..-
e
1 2 Sociological Poradigms and Org anisiiiona! Analysis
t
dilferenee between the pcrspectives and eoneerns of leading social
theorists of the nincteenth and carly twentieth centurics. Modern
sociology has done liule more than articlate and develop thc basic
rhemes initiated by these pioncers of social analysis. To srare that
the order-conflict debate is 'dead' or a 'non-debate' is thus 10
underplay, if not ignore, substanriul diffcrences bet wecn the work
of Marx ando for cxample, Durkheirn, Weber and Pareto. Anyone
familiar with the work of these thcorists and aware of the decp
divisin which cxists betwcen Mar xisrn ano sociology is Iorced to
adrnit that there are fundamental J iffcrences, which are far frorn
bcing rcconciled.t In this chapter thercforc , we wish ro re-evnluatc
the onler-conflict issue with a view to iJ cntifying a k ey di rnen-
sion for analysing the assurnptions about the nature o society
reflected in different social theorics, In orucr lodo so.Ict us rcturn
10 the work of Dahrendorf'. who seeks to set out the opposing
issucs in the followrng tcrms: .--
The integration thcory of .<oci<.:ty.:!s displayed by the work of Parsons
and other structurai-J uncuoualis:s. is Ioundcd on a nurnbcr of assurnp-
iions of the Iollowing type:
(1) Every socieiy is a rclauvely persistcnr. stuble structure of ele-
rucnts.
(2) Evcry socicty is a wcl] intq:rated SII1H;turcof clcrncrus.
(3) Every elcrncnt in i\ socicty has a Iunction. i.e .. renucrs a con-
tribution to its rnaintcnancc as ; sysrcrn.
(4) Every functioning socia; structure is bascd on a conscnsus of
values among its mernhers ....
... What 1 havc callcd the cocrciou theory of socicry can also be
rcduced to a small numbcr of basic renets. although hcre again ihese
assurnptions oversirnp/ify and ovcrstatc the case:
(J ) Every society is at cvcry point subjcct to processes of change:
~odal changc i. ~ubiquirous.
(2) Every society displays al evcry point dissensus and conflict:
social contlict is ubiquitous ..
(J ) Evcry element in a society renders a contriburion to its disin-
Il';ration ano chango.
(4) Evcry society is based nn thc cocrcion of sorne ofts membcrs by
others. (Dahrcndorf. 1959, pp, iou -2)
Thc opposing adjcctives which Dahrendcrf's scherna suggcsts for
diSlnguishing approaches lo (he stut.ly of society can be cOl1ve-
nienlly broughl logclher in Ihe form of a table. as follows:
e
ASSUII/[lt;ol/S about tire Nature IIf SOcie/ yO)
Tahle 2.1
Two theorles of society: 'order' and 'conflict'
The ' or der' o, ' int egrationist'
vir w nI societ emphasis es:
Th e 'confict' o, ' coaci",,'
\.i~14 I of socirt ...empnnsi s es:
Stabilily
Integrotion
Funcuonal co-ordinanon
Conscnsus
Chlnge
Conilict
Divintegrauon
Ccercion
S Dahrendorf admits , this conceptualisation is sorncthing of an
ovcr simplification. and whilst providing a very useful tool Ior
coming lo grips with the differences bctween Ihe 1\'10 standpoints.
it is open to the possibihty of misinterpretauon. in thal the ditferent , . , , !
adjcctivcs mean difTerenl Ihings to differenr peop/e. Nowherc is .. ' -,
this more evident than in the way in which the norion of conflict "\ r-
has been treated in the sociological literaturc. Sincc Cosers .,
dcrnoustration of the functions of sociul conflict , for exumplc , the
role of conflict S an integrating mechanisrn has reccivcd a gre.u
deal 01'aucntion. In effeet, the wholc notion of 'ccrulict has often
been incorporated within the notion of integrarion. Dahrendorfs
irucgrauon/conflict dmcnsion has be en convcniently rclescoped
su that it i:; brought within the bounds 01'sociologys tr. ulitionui
conccrn for the cxplanation uf order. Thc fallacy of this position
becornes cleur ifbne considers certain extreme Iorrns lit" conflict ,
such as class conffict , revolution and war, which can cnly he
incorporntcd in the inrcgrationist model hy the wildext srrcrch of
ones imagination. Bxarnples such as these suggest thal it is mis-
lending to equute'jbis type of rnacrostructural conflict with thc
functional eont1iet idcntified by Coser. There is an irnportant
quesuon of dcgree i nvolved here, which ernphasiscs the dangers of
the dichotomisauors of integration and conflicr: rea/is:ica/ly the
distinction between the two is mueh more of aconunuum than {he
rnajority of writers havc recognised.
Another strand of the Dahrendorf scheme which can he
regardcd as somewhat problematic lies in the distinction bctwcen
consensus ano coercion _ Al first sigh I the distinction uppeurs
obvious and clear-cut. focusing upDn shared values on lhe one
halld and the imposition of some sort of force on Ihe other. On
closcr illspection !here is a cerlain ambiguity. Where uo Ihe sharctl
values come from? re lhey acquired autonomously or i mposc:J
on sorne mcmbers ofsociety by othcrs? This queslion identitics the
~o.
"0
~
1 4 Sociological Paradig ms (IIH! Orponisational Analysis
possibility that consensus rnay be the product of the use nf sorne
form of coercive force. For exarnple , as C. Wright Milis has
pointcd OUI, 'What Parsons and othcr grand thcorists cal'! "value
orientations " and "riorruativc structure " has rnainly 10 do with
master syrnbols of lcgitirn.uion' (1959, p. 46).
A norrnative structurc here - what Dahrendorf would view as
consensus - i~ trcatcd as a systcrn legitimising the power
siructure. From Millss poi nt of view, it reflccts the faet of
dornination. In othcr words , sharcd valucs rnay be rcgurdcd nOI so
much asan indcx of the degrcc of integrarion which charactcrises a
socicty as one which rcflccts the succcss of thc Iorces of
dornination in a socicry pronc 10 disintcgration. From onc point of
view, extant sharcd idcus , valu cs und nornls are something 10 be
preserved: from anothcr , the y represcnt ;\ mude of dornin.nion
from which man necds lo be relcased. The consensus/cocrcion
dimensin can thus be scen as (ocusing upon. the issue of social
control. Consensus - howcvcr it may ase - is identificc in
Dahrendorf's schcmc as somcthing indcpendcnt of coercin. This
we believe to be ;1 mistak cn vi ew since , aspsugpested above , it
ignores the possibihty of a Iorm of coercin waich ariscs through
the control ol'valuc systcms.
In distinguishinp bct wccn st abilit and ch ang e as respective
Ieaturcs of the ordcr and conflict modcls Duhrcndorf is again opcn
to rnisimcrprctation , evcn though he cxplicitly stuics that he docs
not iniend to irnply rhat thc thcory of arder assurncs that socictics
are static. His conccrn is t o show how functional thcorics are
esscntiully conccrncd with thovc processes which servc to
maintuin thc putrcrns of thc S~.':,I<.!1l1 as a wholc. In othcr word.
functionallheories are rcgurdcd ;1$ stutic in the scnse Ihall!tey ale
conccrned with cxpluininc (he st atus qu o. In this rcspcct conflict
thcories are clcarly of ;1 J , fk;CIlI nature: they are cornrniucd to,
and scck to cxplain. thc plOl'CSS and n.uure of dccp-xeatcd
structural chango in socicty ;!S opposcd 10 changc o a more
superficial and cphcrncral kind Thc Iact thal all functional ihcorics
recognisc changc, and that chall!!e is an obvious empirical rCLllily
in evcq:day life, has leo DahrCIllJ or['s calegnrisalioll in rclalil:; lo
stabiiily and ch:lnge lO IO~t: ilS ptential raical force allu influ-
ence. I1 can be argued thal J illerenllabds are requircJ lo ielllify
Dahrenuorrs two paramou nt conccrns: fi :SI. that the O\l.kr vic\\' o
saciet}' is primarily SIll1I/5 ,/110 oricntateJ ; second, Ihat il dcals
wilh change of a fundamenlally uitTerenl nalUre rorn Ihal wil!!
which eonOict rheorists re l'() OcerneJ .3
D;hrenuorfs nOlions of jill/c/iol/al co-ordillarion anu diJill-
~
-
J
Assumptions about lile Nature of Socictv 1 5
.
t egration can be seen as constituting one of the rnost powerful
strands of thought which distinguish the order and conflict per-
spcctivcs. Here again, however, there is room for rnisiruerpreta-
tion. The concept ofintegration in Dahrendorf's work derives Irorn
thc functionalists 'concern with the contribution which constituent
elernents of a systern make to the whole. In many respects this is an
oversirnplification. Merton (1948) introduced the idea of manifest
and latent functions, sorne of which rnay be dysfunctional Ior the
integration of society." Again, G ouldncr (1959), writing shortlv
after rhe publication ofthe G errnan cdition of Dahrendorf's work ,
suggests that various parts of a systern rnay have a high degrec of
autonorny ami may contribuic very littlc by way of integrauon to
the sysiem as a whole. Thc terrn 'functional co-ordinauon 'is thus
sornething of an oversimplification 301.1, given thc cxisrence of ihe
points of view expressed above' within the functionalist carnp
itself', il is not surprising that the concept of 'disintegrarion 'shoulJ
be seen as relevan; and capable of being used frorn a functiounl
standpoint. 'Disintcgration' can be very casily vie wcd as an intc-
grationist conccpt and, 3S with other aspccts of Dahrendorf s
scheme, this dimensin has often been telescoped and brouplu
within the bounds of the theories of order. For this rcason i rnay
well havc been clearer if the position of conflict thecry on this
dirnension had becn presented in more radical and distinctive
rerrns. Therc is much in Marxian thcory, for exarnple , which rccr.
to the notion of 'contradiction' and the basic incomputibility he
twcen differ eru elements of social structure. Conrradiction implics
heterouencit y, irnbalance and essenrially antngonistic and
divcrgent social Iorces. 1I thus stunds at rhc onposu e pule \ll IIH:
conccpt of 'functional co-ordination. which must pr esuppoxc ;1
basic cornpatibility betwcen the elemcnts of any given systcm. Tp
argue that Ine concept of contradiciion can be cmbrace d \\ J !;li I~
unction . 1 nnalysis requircs cither an act of Iaith or al k;I';'
considerable lcap of imagination:
Dahr endorfs work has clearly scrved ti ver}' uscful purpcse in
identifying a number ofimponant strands of thouglu isiinguiship~
thcorisls of order from thcorisrs of conflict. Ho\\'cvcr, ;J S \Vil! !'I:
apparen: from Ihe abo\'t: discussion, in /Il:lny respccls the ;"-
lincions whicn huye been drawn het \\Icen Ihe t\\'o meta-thcrie<. dl'
not go fa enough. In p<lrticlllar, the insi!~hl~of some Iw:nly j'l. ':I, . ,
(lf debate suggest Iha! the characlelisaliu:1 of Ihe Cl) f1[!J C:
pcrspeclive hi!s nut bccn sulliciently rndical 10 :void confusJ :~:o
with the 'inlcgrationist' pcrspeclive. This has allo\\'cd Iheorish \lC
order lo mcct the challenge which Dahrendons schcme prcsellts
J
---~ I
/.~~
#"~ f:..:~ .
":..,# e
~.
/ 6 Sociologicu! PumJi:/IIJ lI/:J Ur};uJ/i.l'c.<lIll/ill Anai ysis
lO their frarnc of reference within the coniext of their order-
orientated rnode of'thought. In ordcr to iilustrate this poinl,let us
return to the work of Cohcu (1968) rcferre lO carticr.
In advocating his viewpoint Cenen appears ro be misinrerprcting
the distinction betwecn the two models. His intcrpreiation of
concepts telescopes the differcnt variables into a form in which
they can be seen as consistent with each other. In cffcct his whole
analysis reflects an attcmpt to incorporate the conflict modcl
within the bounds of thc corucmporary theory of arder. He thus
loses the radical essence of (he conflict perspcctive and is able lo
conclude that the two rnodels are not mutually exclusive and do
not nced 10 be reconciled. He argues that the two rnodels are not
gcnuine alternativcs and in etfect suggests that each is no more
than the rcciprocal of the other. He is thercforc able lO [cave
Dahrendorf 's analysis with the central concern of his book - (he
problern of ordcr - largely intact. The incorporaticn of conflict
into thc bounds of thc rnodcl of cnlcr de-emphasiscr ils
importance. !
In lne with thc annlysis which we prcscntcd earlicr , we arrtue
!hat ihe auernpr to reduce the !\~o rnodcls loa common base ignores
tht: Iundauientul diffcrences which exist hetwcen thcrn. A cunlict
thcory bascd on dcep-seatcd structurni conflict and concerncd
with radical transformations of society is not cnnsistcut with a
functionali st perspcctivc. The diffcrcnces bet wccn thern ,
thcrcfore, are imporuuu and worthy of disunction in any :ItICI11P!
to analyse social theory. Wilh thc bcncfit ofhimlsight. i is possiblc
to see thal rnany of the rnisinterpretations which have ariscn have
done so bccause the rnodels in Dahrcndorf's unalysis were nut
sufficienrly diffcrcntiatcd. W'~ wish to proposc, thereforc. Iha
certain modications be made in order to nrticulutc the dilfcrenccs
in a more explici: and radical formo Since much of (he confusion
has arisen because of thc aiubiguity vi" ihe descriptions :.lssociatt:t1
wilh the lwo modds \C wish to suggesi {he usc of a sumcwha{
different !erminology.
'ReguJ ation' and 'RaJ icaJ Changc'
Qur analy~;is has shown that Ihc ordcr-conllict distinctioll is i
many senscs the most probler:!atic. \Ve suggcst, thercfore, (hal it
should be rcplaced as a central theme by lhe notians of 'regula!ion'
and 'railical changc'.
e
e
Assumptions about tlu: Nuture of Societ 1 7
We introduce the terrn ' sociology of regukuion' lo refer to thc
writings of theorists who are prirnarily concerned to provide
cxplanaticns of socicty in terms which emphasise its underlyinn
unity and cohcsivcness. It is a sociology which is essentiallv con-
cerned with (he need for regulation in hurnan affairs: thc basic
questions which ir asks tend to focus upon the need to understand
, . why society is maintaincd as an cntity. II atternpts to explain why
~ society icnds to hold togcther rather than tall apart. II is irucrested
in understanding the social forces which prevent the Hobbesian
. visin of 'war of al! aguinst all' becorning a reality. The work of
r Durkhcim wilh its crnphasis upon the nature of social cohesion J I1U
. solidarity. for cxamplc, provides a clear and cornprehensive
\ ilhrstration of n ccncern for the sociology of regulation.
Thc ' .wl"u/ o,l!) , of radical chang e ' stanus in stark conrrnst (O (he
'sociology of rcgulatiou'. in that its basic concern is la find
cxptunauons for the radical change , dccp-scate d strucrura: con-
Ili c t , modes of domina/ion and structurul contrudiction which il~
thcorists see as charactcrixing modero society. I( is a sociolog y
, whicl, is esscntiully conccrncu with mans crnuncip.uio fr om lhe
structurcs which !imil and stunt his potentiat Ior dcvclopmeur. Thc
ha,ic qucstions which it usks f'ocus upon rhe dcpriv.uiun () ( 111an,
buril rna [erial a ndps ychic. I t i~often visionary and U I opin n. in th.rt
ir looks iowards potcruiutity as rnuch as actualiry: it is cuncer ncd
with what is posxible rather [hall wirh wh.u is: with alternanvcs
rarhcr than wih ucccptance (lr(h~.Ir(//IH I{IIV. In these respccts ili.
as widcl y scparutc awd distant Irorn thc sociology of rcgulauun ;\~
i the sociolugy 'of Murx is scparatcd and disrant from th e sociology
\ of Durkheirn.
The distinction t.e!!..een thesc two sociologles can pcrhaps be
best illustratcd in schcmatic form; extreme points 01" vicw are
couruer-poscd in order to highlight the esscntial diffcrcnccs
bcrwecn rhem. Table 2.2 surnmariscs the ~ituation.
We ofTcr thls rcgtllalion-radical <.:hange uistim:tion as lhc
second principal dimension of our schcme for analysing so;ial
rhcorics. Along with lhe sllbjective-objective uimcnsil.!'l
(Icvclopcd in Ihe previolls dJ ap!cr. we prcscllt il as :lpoweriu!
mcalls for idclltifying amI analysing Ihe assumplions \'vhi;h uller~
lie social Ihellries in general.
The nOlions of 'regulation' and 'radical change' have (hus far
bccll prcselllcu in a ver y rough ami e.'(trcme formo The IWo 1l\0J cls
illustrated in Table 2.2 shouh.l be regarued as iJ t!al-lypical
formlllatiolls. Thc seven c1emenls which we have idenlified lenrl
themselves lo a much more rigorous and systematic treatmenl in
!8 Sociologicol Pora dig ms (1 1 / (/ Orgnnisatiann! alysis
t
which thcir overall form and nature is spelt out in dctail. Wc dclay
this task until lat er chaprcrs. Hcre , we wish lo addrcss oursclvcs lo
the br oad relarionships which cxist bcrwccn the sociclogies of
regulation and radical cliange. We maintnin that thcy pr cscnt
fundamcnrully dill~1 cut vj r wx illld illl~rf1II'rillinlls of Ihe lIillll!t' nI
liudt:I}-'. Thl~)'Icllcl'lltllld, llIll'lIlillly dinl'lelll flillllC~ ni I 1'Il'Il'II1 c.
'1IIc)' tI L:II;III 1";/lI:, ~ I\-'(. " ""1'./", 1. :, il;' ,/ 1 1 1 ' 1 / / ,/ / / 1 ' ( 11111. 11'1'. /111 1I1l~
, "II:I~\lj bl~inl I1I '111,"'::,
111111 L. :, L. I/i Iln, 111", "'1. , Ili IItI;, Il'l! ", litltll 1//1111111;1/1111111111, 11/1
hll"~ IIlllt. 1I I, , -, III. sI . i! 11, "11' 1ItI'III'~ \\1111, 1'111"~I"IIj"I', 111 IIldd
be sllgge~lctllhal Ihc IWI/"llHlcl~urc lile/t'd, , , ul'IIIs ulcuch othcr
- nu more than 1wo sities of th e sarne coin .and that relationships
Tahle 2,2
The rcgulation-railical change djmension
,
It \(l, ;"I,,!!I' ,,/ /lEGU/.A 1/0N
;.1 concrrnrd with:
Thr JI1C;O/O!!Y 01f.'AD/CAL CHANGE
is ~'lIIc(,fI/~d with:
(;) The~IJ III~quo
(h) Social ordcr
(e) Conscnsuv=
(d) Social inicgrauon and
cohcsion
(e) Solidariry
HJ Nccd satisfaction!
(~) Actuality
(a) Radica; eh:.ngc
(b] Strucrur. u conflict
(e) Mudes of dominnuon
(d) Contradiction
(e) Emancipation
er) Dcprivation
(g) Porcntiahty
Notes
* By 'conscnsus ' wc mea n voluntary and 'SpOIllJ nCOllS' agrcc-
rncnt ll( oninion. -,
t Thc rcrrn 'nccd satisfnciion' is llSCU10 rccr lo lile Iocus upon
satisfaction of individual or systcm 'nccds '. The sociology of
rcgulnrion tcnds lO presume that various social characrcristics can
be cxplaincd in rclnrion !I) these necds. It presumes Iha: it is
possible lO identify and satisfy human nccds within thc corucxt of
cxisting social systems, and Ihai socicty rcflccts thcse nccds. The
conccpt of 'dcprivauon'. un the other hand, is rootcd in thc notion
that the social 'systcrn' prevcnts human fulfilrnent: indccd tha:
'deprivation is creaied as the ICSUIt of thc status qu o , The social
'systcm' is not seen as satisfying needs but as eroding the
possibilitics for hurnan fulfilrncnt. It is rootcd in the notion lhal
socicty has resulted in dcprivation rather than in gain.
-
-:
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~
!\IIlP:;OIlJ abou! I},I' Nuturr o! SO(';I".,
hctwccn thc sub-elcmcuts of ench modcl need not be couumctu ,
thnt is , an analysis. muy pay uucurion ro clemcnts 01' hnth.
The answer lo borh criricisms Iollows our dcf'encc of
Dahrendorfs work , To conflarc the two rnodels and ncat thern as
vuriutiuns un n SillAk 11t('lIll' is ItI iJ \lIlllt'lIl' 111II'I\I 1tIIlIltl"lpLI\' ti"
I'IIIIIIIIII('IIIIII clilfcf('III'1'S whidll'xlsl hl'lWl'l'lIlltl'll1. \\'llIlslll 11\;1\
111' J lII:, . . lhk 11111:, 1: :IIII IIlIlIkl illllllillllnllllllll illld film 11111, ';111 \\ "
ill"lh . ~111 11r,' "lit/di. /111111111111'111111 tItjllllHIIIIIIII' I d' il 111111'1 .11" \
1111I "1I '!lrlllil, ;~tllllll"\ ~"I"IIIII, ,1I\1i 1-1111\ , lif, li"" diij!!f!!'PII':
IIII( 1I~1111I1I", il'lI' 1 'III~, 1111IVI' 11111'"jllll'lllillnl, ItI , jl'"I1~': If"
'Iunctiuns ' of !wdnl t. :1I11/l1c1/slo cununit olll:, dlllllhr '1l1l'llIf"I:Y
of regulation as opposcd io that of radical change. Howcvcr closc
one's position rnight be to thc rniddle ground, il would scern that
one must always be committed lo one side more than another. The
fundamental distinctions between the sociologies of regulation and
radical change will becorne clcar frorn our analysis of their
intellectual developrncnt and consiitueut schools of rhought in
laicr chapters. We conceptualise thcse two broad sociological
pcrspectives in the form of a polarised di rnension. r ecognising that
wnile variations within the coniext of cach are possible , the
pcrspectives are nccessarily separale and distinct frorn each othcr.
N ates and References
\. Arnong Ihe nurncrous thcorists prirnarily conccrncd with the
problcrn of ordcr , Dawe cites Parsons (1949) . Nisbct (1967 ) ,
Brarnson (I9(J 1), Cohcn (1%8), and Aren (1968).
2. For a discussion of the Marxisrn versus social scicnce
dcbat e , sce Shaw (197 5) . The divisin bet wccn Mar xis:
theorists and orthodox sociologists is now so decp Iha! Ih~;.
eithcr ignore cach other cornplctely, or indulge in an
exchunge of abuse and accusation regarding (he political
conservatisrn or subversiveness commonly associated with
their respective points of view. Debate ahout the intcllectua:
strengths and weaknesses of their opposing standpoims is
conspicuous by its abscnce:
3 Later in this chapter we suggest thal the de scriptions of
'conccrn with the status quo' and 'concern for radical
chang e' provide more accurate views of the issues involvcd
here.
J
, .-./. . ,
.,.~#.
~. .'
,
e
-. . . . '
20 Soriologca! P(lf(/Ji':IIIJ (11/(1Orgontsationol Anulysis
4 .
Dahrendorf acknowlcdgcs Mertori's distinction bctween
larcnt and rnanifest functions but docs not pursuc thc con-
sequcncc of 'dysfuncuons Ior thc conccpt of intcgrurion
(Dahrendorf. 1959, pp. 17 3-9).
Othcr 'orucr ' thcorisis who havc addrcsxcd rhcmsclvcs lo
Dahrcndorf's rnodcl tcnd tu follow a similar path in the
attcrnpt to ernbrace conflict rhcory within thcir perspcctive.
See, for cxarnple. van den Bcrghe (1969),
5 .
~.
e
e
3. Two Dimensions:
Four Paradigms
1n the prcvious two chapters we have focused upon sorne of the
key assumptions which characterise dfferent approaches to social
theory. We have argued that it is possible to analyse these
approaches in terrns of two key dimensions of analysis, each of
which subsurnes a series of related themes. II has been suggested
that assumptions about the nature of science can be thought of in
rerrns of what we cal/ the subjective-s-objective dimension. and
assurnpticns about the nature of society in tcrms of a regulation-
radical change dimension. In this chapter we wish to discuss the
relationships between the two dimensions and to develop a coher-
ent scheme for the analysis of socia/ theory.
\Ve have already noted how sociological debate since the late
1960s has tended to ignore the distinctions betwecn the two dirnen-
sions - in particular. how there has been a tendency lO focus upon
issucs concerned with thessubjectivc-e-objecuve dimension and lo
ignore those concerned with the regulaucn=-radicnl change
dimensin. lnterestingly ,nough. this focus of attention has
characterised sociological thought associated with both regulation
and radical change. The subjectivc--objective debate has been
conducted independently within both sociological carnps.
Within the sociolegy of r.egu/alion it has assumed the form of a
debate between interpretive sociology and functionalism. In the
wake of Berger and Luckmann 's treatise on the sociology of know-
ledge (1966) . G arfinkel's work on ethnomcthodology (1967) and a
general resurgence of intcrest in phenomenology, the questionable
status of the ontological and epistemological assurnptiens of the
functionalist perspective have bccome increasingly exposcd. The
debate has oftcn led to a poarisation between the two schools of
thought.
Sirnilarly, within the conicxt of the sociology of radical change
there has been l divisin between theorists subscribing lo 'subjec-
tive 'ami 'objective 'views of society. The debate in rnany rcspects
takes its lead from the publication in France in 1966 and Dritain in
J
-
~i~': ('
t
22 Sociological Paradigms and Orpanisas-onul Aualy sis
1969 of Louis Anhusser's work For Marx . This prescnted [he
nouon of an 'episternclogical break' in Marx's work and emphas-
scd thc polarisation of Marxist theorists into IWO carnps: those
ernphasising the 'subjective 'aspects of Marxisrn (Lukcs nnd the
Frankfurt School, for cxarnple) and those advocating more 'objec-
tive 'approaches, such as that associated with Althusseran struc-
iuralisrn.
Within the contcxt of the sociologies both of rcgulation and
radical change , therefore, the rniddle to late 19605 witnessed a
distinct switch in [he focus of nucnuon. The debute betwe en ihcsc
rwosociologies which had churnctcrised the carly 1960s disap-
peared and wns rcplaccd by an introvcrted J ialogue within [he
contcxt of each of the seprate 5d10015 of thought. Instead of
'speaking 'lo cach other they turucd inwards and addresscd their
remarks to thernsclves. Thc concern to son OUI thcir positicn wi th
rcgard 10 what we call the subjectiv&-objeclive dimensin. a
complicated proccss in view of all the interrclatcd strands , led to a
neglect of the regulation--ratlical change dirnerision.
As a consequence of rhesc J evelopmenls, recent debate has
oftcn becn confuscd. Sociological thought has tended to be charac-
teriscd by a narrow sectarianisrn, from which an overall perspec-
tivc and grasp of basic issues re conspicuously abscnt. The time is
ripc Ior considcrauon of the way nhcad, and we subrni t that the t wo
kcy dirncnsions ofan;"ysic; which we havc identificd define criticnl
parurncrcrs within which this can tukc place. \Ve prcscru ihcm as
THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE
r---------- ----------. . . ,
I I
I I
I I
I 'Radical 'Radical I
: hurnanist structuralist' I
I I
I I
SUBJ ECTIVE: IOBJ ECTIVE
I I
I I
I - I
I 'tnterpretive' 'Functicnolist' I
I I
I I
I I
I I
~ J
THE SOCIOLOGY Qf REGULA nON
Figure 3,1 Four paradigrns Ior l.'le an:lIysis of social rheory
('
Tu' o Dimensions: Four Puradiems e
two independent dimensions which rcsurrect the sociological
issues of the early 19605and place thern alongside those uf the late
1960s and early 197 0~. Taken together, they define four distinct
sociological paradigrns whieh can be utilised for the analysis of a
wide range of social theorics. The relauonship berween these
paradigms, which we label 'radical humanist, 'radical structural-
isr'. 'intcrpretive' and 'functionalist', is illustrated in Figure 3,1.
It will be clear from the diagram that each of the paradigms
shares a common ser of features with its neighbours on thc hori-
zontal and vertical axes in terrns of one ofthe two dirnensions bu t is
differentiated on the other dimensin. For this reason they should
be viewed as contiguous but separate - coruiguous because of the
shared characterisucs. but separate becnuse the ditfcrcnriauon is ,
J .S we shall dcmonstraie later , of sutficient import.mce tu warr.uu
trcatrncnt of the paradigrns.as four distinct entities. The our para-
digms define tundarnentally different perspccrives for the aual yvis
of social phenornena. They approach this endeavour Ir orn con-
trasting standpoints and generate quite diffcrent conccpts ;'lIld
analytical tools.
,
,
I
1

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f
,
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The Nature and Uses of the Four Paradigrns

,-
Ilcfore gong un lo discuss the substaruive nature of cach uf ihc
paradigrns , il will bs <15well ro pay some aucntion to lile '.Val' in
which we intend the /14.>tionof 'paradigrn' [O be uscd.' \Ve rcg:mJ
our four paradigrns as being defined by vcry bnsic rneta-theorcrical
assumptions which unqerwrite the frarne of reference. mode 01
theorisi ng and modus operandi of the social thcorists who operate
within them. It is a term which is intcndcd to ernphasise the
commonality of perspective which binds [he work of a group of
thcorists together in such a way that they can be usefully regardcd
as approaching soci . d" theory within the bounds of rhe sume
problematic.
This definition does not imply complete uniry of thought. II
allows for the fact that within the context of any given paradigrn
thcre will be much debate between thcorists who adopt .Iiffcrent
standpoints. The paradigrn does, howcver. have 'an underlying
unity in terms of its basic and often 'taken for granted' assurnp-
[iOIlS, whieh separate a group of theorists in a very fundamental
way from thcorists located in other paradigrns. The 'unitv 'of [he
paradigrn thus derives from reference to alternative views of real-
/'
'!
.
24 Sociolauica! Paradigms und Org anisuti onal Analysis
ity which lie outsidc its boundarics and which muy not nccessarily
evcn be rccogniscd as existing. ,
In idcnufying Iour paradigrns in social thcory wc are in esscnce
suggesting that it is rneaningul lO examine work in the subjcct arca
in tcrrns of four sets of basic assurnptions. Each sct idcntifies a
l. Quite seprate social-scieruific reality, Tu be Iocaicd in aparticular
. paradigrn is 10 view the world in a particular way. The four para-
digms thus define four views of the social world based upon diff'er-
enl meta-theoretical assumptions with regard to the nature of
scicnce and of society,
lt is our coruention that all social theorists can be located within
the comext of these four paradigrns according to the meta-
thcorctical assurnptions rcflcctcd in thcir work . Thc four rara-
digrns iaken iogcther providc a map for ncgotiaring the subjcct
area , which offers a convcnient means of idcntifying the basic
sirnilaritics and diffcrcnccs bct wccn thc work 9f various ihcorists
and, in particular, the underlying frame of refercncc which thcy
adopt. lt al so providcs a convcnient way of locating ones OWI1
personal frame of referencc with rcgard lo social theory. ano thus n
meuns of understanding why ccrtain thcories ar1'tl pcrspcctives
rnay havc more personal appcal than others. Likc any other-map , il
provides a 1001 for establishing where you are, where you havc
bcen and where it is possible ro go in the Iuture. 11provides a 1001
for mapping intcllcctual journcys in social thcory - OIlC'" own ano
Ihose of (he ihcorists who have contributed lo the subjcct aren.
In this work we intcnd 10 rnukc rnuch use of the rnap-likc qual-
ities of the Iour parudigrns. Each defines a rangc of intcllcctual
ICTTlory. G iven the ovcrall mcta-theorctical assurnptions which
distinguish one paradigm Irom another, thcrc is room Ior rnuch
variation within them. Within (he context .of thc 'functionalist'
paradigrn. for example , certain thcorists adopt more extreme posi-
tions in terms of one or both of the two dimcnsions than othcrs.
Such differcnces ofren accouni for the internal debate which goes
on bctwcen theorists cngaged in the activities of 'normal scicncc'
within the coniext of thc sarnc pnradigrn.? The rcrnaining chaptcrs
of this work examine each of the [our p;,!r:lUigl11l;in sorne detail and
attempt lo Illcale thcir principai Iheurisls in these Icrrm.
Our rcsearch sugge!;ls Ihat whilsllh:: aClivily wilhin tlle conlcxl
nf each paradigm is oflen considerable. inler-paradigmalic
'journeys' are ml/ch rarer. This is in I,ceping \Vilh Kuhn's (197 l')
nlion (.1f 'revolutionary sciem:e'. For a Iheorisl lO switch para-
digms calls for'l change in mela-Iheorelical assumplions. SOnlC-
Ihing wllich, allhough manik~lly rO$!>ible, is not uften achicvct! in
~ J
II
11'0 Dimcnsions: Four Paradi gms 25
practicc. As Keat and Urry put it , 'For individual scientists , thc
changc of allegiance from one paradigrn 10 another is often a
"conversion cxperience ", akin 10 Gesfalt-swilches or changos of
rcligious Iaith '(197 5, p. 55) . Whcn a theorist does shifl his position
in this way, it stands out very c1early as a major break with his
ntcllcctual tradition and is heralded as bcing so in the literaturc, in
tha: Ihe theorist is usuaJ ly welcorned by thosc whorn he has joined
and ofren disowned by his former 'paradigrn colleagues '. Thus we
witness what is known as Ihe 'epistcmological break berween the
work of the young Marx and the rnature Marx - what we would
idcntify as a shit from the radical humanist paradigm tu the radical
structuralist paradigrn. At the leve! of organisationul analysis , a
distinct paradigrn shift can be detectcd in the work of Silverrnan -
;1 shifl frorn the functionalist paradigm lo thc interpreti .... c para-
digrn. We \ViII analyse such intellectual journeys in more detail in
larer chaprers.
Bcfore we progress lo a revicw of the four parudigms , onc point
is worthy of furthcr ernphasis. This relates lo thc Iact that the four
paradigrns are mutuully exclusive. They offer altcrnative vicws of
social reality, ano lo understand the nature of all four is lo undcr-
stand four diffcrent vicws of society. They uffcr diffcreru ways of
sceing. A synthesis Is nOI possiblc, sincc in their pure forms Ihey
are contradicrory, bcing based on al leas: one set of opposing
rncta-the oretical assumptions. They are aliernatives , in thc sense
that une ('(", opcratc in differenl paradigms scquentially ovcr lime.
bUI rnutually exclusivo. in thc scnsc thal une cunnor opcraic in
more than une paradigru al any givcn point in lime. since in accept-
ing the assurnptions of one. we dcfy the assurnpuons of all thc
others.
We ofTer the four paradigms for consideration in these tcrrns. in
the hope that knowlcdge of Ihe cornpcting poinrs of vicw \ViII al
lcast make us aware of the boundaries within which WI! approuch
our subject.
The Functionalist Paradigm
Tllis paradi!!!!l h:IS pruvid~d Ihe uOlllinanr frarm'\\'ork [11/ :11;; Ct1P-
Ul!cr o academic sociologr nnu Ihe sllIoy of () qwnisalions. II
reprcsents a rClspcclivc which i~firmly roolcd in Ihe SOI"io/ilJ!Y of
r('!.!IIIt1fiof/ ami ;'l'prcaches ils sllhj;;ct maller frolll :\n If,;rC"ti,i.H
roin; alview. Funclionalisl theorisls have hcen "llhe ford, \lnl of
J
. -'. - . --'
. /'
~~'
. .
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e
~
2(, Sociological Pura dig ms and Or}:lIl1isllh_ ol Annlvsis
the ordcr-c-conflict debate, <lIIU the conccpts which we havc uscd
10 catcgorisc the sociology of regulation apply in varying degrces
10111schools of thought within Ihe paradigrn. 11is characteriscd by
a concern for providing cxplunarions of lile status quo, sucia!
arder, COIl.H'IIS/I.f. social int egration, solidarity. need sotisfaction
and actualit y , It approaches thcse general sociological concerns
Irom a standpoint which tends lo be reulist , positivist . determinist
and nomothetic .
The functionalist paradigm generales rcgulative sociology in its
most fully devcloped formo In its overall approach it secl ... s lo
provide essentially rational cxplanaticns of social afluirs. 1l is <1
perspectivc which is highly pragrnatic in orientation, concerncd lo
uudcrstand socicty in a way which generales knowlcdge which can
be put to use. 11 is often problern-oricntated in approach , con-
cerned to provide practical soIutions to practica! problcrns. 1t is
usually firmly comrnitted to a philosophy of social enginccring as a
basis of social chunge ano cmphasises thc irnportance of under-
standing order, equilibrium aud stability in society and thc wuy in
whieh these can be rnaintaincd. !t is conccrncd with thc cffcctivc
'regulatiou' and control of social afairs.
As will be apparcnt from our discussion in Chnptcr l thc
approach to social science charactcristic of rhe functionalist para-
digm is rooted in the tradition of sociological positivism. This
reflects the atternpt. par cxcellrnce , lo apply the rnodels nnd
mcthods of the natural scicnces lo the stuc.J y of hurnan af/;..irs.
Originatng in Frunce in (he early dccudes of thc uinctcenth
ccntury , its rnajor influenee upon thc paradigrn has been through
the work of social theorists such as Auguste Comtc, Hcrbcrt
Spenccr, Emile Durkhcirn and Vilfredo Parcro. Thc functionalist
approach to social scicnce tcnds to assume that the social world is
cornposed of relatively concrete cmpirical artcfacts and rclation-
ships which can be identificd, studicd and rneasurcd through
approaches derived from the natural sciences. The use of mecha n-
ical and biological analogies as a means of rnodelling and under-
standing [he social world is partieuJ arly Iavoured in many
Iunctionalist theories. By way of illustration consider , Ior exarn-
ple.the work of Durkheirn. Central to his position was the idea that
'sociaJ facts ' exist outside of men's eonsciousness and restrain
men in their everyday activities. The aim was to understand the
relationships between these 'objcctive' social facts and to articu-
late the sociology which cxplained lhe types of 'solidarity' provid-
ing the 'social cernent' which holds society together. The stability
ami onlered nature of the natural world was viewed as characteris-
--- .- ~ .. -~.
.i , ,. __ ..c,: !'..-~.~
e
T\I'() Dimensions: Four Par(/JiJ:fIIS
~
ing the world 01' hurnan uffairs. For Durkhcirn. thc task of
sociology wns lo undcrstand the nature of this regulated order.
Since thc carly decadcs of the twentieth ccntury, howevcr , the
functionnlist paradigrn has been increasingly influenced by cle- .
ments from the G crrnan idealist tradition cf social thought. As will
be rccalled from our discussion in Chapter l, (his appr oach reflecrs
assurnptions about the nature of social sciencc which stand in
opposition 10 those of sociological positivism. As a rcsult of the
work of such the orists as Max Weber. G eorgc Simrnel and G eorge
Herbert Mead, elements of this idealist approach nave bcen uul-
iscd wiihin the context of social thcorics which ha ve ntt ernptcd tu
bridge the gulf between the t wo traditions. In so doing rhey have
forged theoretical pcrspectives characterisuc otthc Ieast objcctiv-
iSI rcgion of rhe paradigm. at us junction with the inrerprctive
pnr auigrn. Such theories have rejected thc use of rnechanicul and
biological analogies for studying the social world illl<. 'ha ve
inrroduccd ideas which place ernphasis upun the imp ort.mce of
undcrstanding socicty frurn the point of view of thc acror s wh o are
actually engagcu in the performance uf social activitics.
Si ncc the 1940s thcre has bcen also an infusion 01' certai n j" Iarx isl
inlucnc es charactcristic of the sociology of r. ulicnl channc. Thcse
have bcen incorporatcd within the paracligm in an aucmpi lo
'radicalise 'funcuonalist theory and rebuff lhe general charge tha!
THE SOCIOlOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE
r----~----- ----------l
l. I
I
I I
, Malllisl l
I Ihsorv I
l' I
I I
I I
SU8J ECTIVE I ;OSJ ECTlVE
I
Germen \ \ I
I idealism
I
I
I
'------------
THE SOCIOLOGY OF
REGULATION
l
I
-1
J
Sociological
positiviam
Figure 3.2 Intellectual influences upon the Iunctionalist paradigm
la
,
:
'-
28 sociologicat Paradig ms arul Orpanis ati ona! a/ rsis
.
Iunctionalism is csscniially conscrvativc and unable lo providc
explanations for social changc. Thcse attcrnpts undcrwriie the
debate exarnined in the prcvious.chapter as to whcthcr a thcory of
'conflict' can be incorporared within the bounds of a thcory of
'order' lo provide adcquate explanations of social affairs.
Pul very crudely, thereforc, the forrnarion of the functionalist
paradigrn can be undcrstood in tcrms of the intcraction of thrce
sets of intellcctual forces, .1S illustruted in Figure 3,2. Of thcsc ,
sociological positivism has been the rnost influcnual, The cornpcr-
ing traditions have been sucked in and uscd within the context of
the functionalist problernatic , which ernphasises Ihe essentially
objectivist nature of the social world and a eoncern for explana-
tions which emphasise 'regulation' in sociaJ affairs. These cross-
currents of thought have givcn rise lo a nurnber of distinctive
schools of thought within the paradigm, which is characierised by
a wide range of rhcory and internal debate. By way of ovcrvicw.
again sornewharcrudely. Figures 3,3 arul 3.14illustrate the four
paradigrns in tcrms of Ihe constiruenr sehdols of sociological and
organisational theory which we shafl be cxploring latcr on. As will
be apparent, most organisation theorists, illdustrial sociologists ,
psychologists and industrial rclations thcorists'approach thcir sub-
ject from within the bounds of thc functionalist paradigrn.
The Interprctive Paradigrn
Theorists locatcd within Ihe conrcxt of thc inicrprctivc paradigrn
adopt an approach consonant with Ihe tcncts of what wc have
dcscribed as thc sociologv I~( rt.' !tltllilll/ , though its suhjcctivist
approach to the analysis of thc social world rnakes its iinks with
this sociology oftcn implicit rather Ihan explicit. The interpretive
laradigm is informcd by a conccrn ro urlcle/'slaml the world as il is,
10 understand the fundamental naturc of thc social world al the
level of subjective cxperience. II sceks explanation within the
rcalm of individual consciousness and subjectivity, within the
frame of ref erence of thc participant as opposed lo lhe obscrver of
action.
In its approach ro social sciencc ;1 tcuds 111 he nominalist . anti-
positivist, voluntarist anJ idc(lgrclphic. 11xccs the social world as
an cmergcnt social proccss which is crc.ucd by thc individuals
concerned. Social reali 1y, i Ilsofar a:; i I is rccogniscd lo llave an y
cxisicnce outsidc thc consciouxncxs of auy single individual, i~;
regarded as bcing litrle more thuu a nciwork of ussumptions ano
3
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Two Dimensions: Futir Paradig ms 31
iruersubjcctively shared meanings. The ontological status of the
social world is viewed as extremely qucstionable and problcrnatic
as far as theorists locatcd within the intcrpretive paradigrn are
concerncd. Everyday lifc is accorded the status of a miraculous
achicvcrncnt. Interpretive philosophers and sociologists scck (\1
understnnd the vcry basis and source of social reality. Thcy ofren
delve inio the depths of human consciousness and subjcctivitv in
their quest for the fundamental mcanings which underlie social
life.
G ivcn this vicw of social reality. it is hardly surprising rhat the
cornmitrnent o" rhe nterpretive socologists to the sociotog y of
rcgulation is implicit rather than explicir. Their onrological
assumptions rule out a direct interest in the issues involvcd in ihe
onJ cr-contlict debate as such. However , rheir standpoint is
underwriuen by (he assumption that the world of human atfairs is
cohesive, or der ed and intcgrated. The problerns of conllict ,
dorninauon. contradicticn. potentiality and change play no pan in
rhcir thcoreticnl framework. They are n. uch more oricntutcd
towards obtaining an undersranding 01' thc subjccuvely crcated
social world 'as it is' in tcrms of an ongoing process.
lntcrpretive sociology is concerned with undcrstanding the
esscncc of the evcryday world. In tcrrns of our nnalytical schcrna iI
is undcrwriuen by an involvcmeru with issucs relaung ro the
naturc of 11r('status quo.social arder. COII.H'I/SUS, social integra-
tion and cohesion, solidarity and actualiry.)
The interpretive pa~digm is the direct product of the G ermnn
ideafist tradition of social thought. Its Ioundarions were laid in the
work of Kunt ano renec~a social philosophy which emphasises Ihe
csscntially spiritual rrature of the social world. The idcalist rradi-
tion was paramount in G errnanic thought frorn the nud-eighteenth
ccnrury onwarJ s and wns closcly linkcd with ihe romantic rnove-
rncnt in litcraturc and I~ arts. Outsidc this reulm. however. it was
of limited interest , until revived in the late 1890s ami early ycars of
this century under the inluence of the so-callcd neo-idealist
movement. Theorists such as Dilthey, Weber, Husserl and Schutz
havc made a majar contribution towards establishing it ns a
framework for social analysis, though wirh varyiag degrces of
cornmitrnent lo its underlying problernatic.
figures 3.3and 3.4 illustrate the manner in which the puradigrn
has been explored as far as our prcsent intercst in social theory and
thc srudy of orgunisanons is concerned. Whilst there have been a
small nurnher of attcmpts to study org:'lnisalional conccpts and
silu;J tions from his IHlint of vicw. the paradigrn has nOI g~ne::racd

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32 Sociological Paradiptus and Orf.?alli'snj(}/wl' .sis
much organisation theory as such. As \ViII becorne clear from our
analysis. there are good r easons for this. The prerniscs of the
interprctive paradigm qucstion whcther orgunisntions exist in uny-
thing hUI a conceptual sense. lts significancc far the suidy of
organisations , therefore , is of the 01051 fundamental kind. 11
challcngcs the validity of the ontological assumptions whicb
undcrwritc functionalist appr oaches 10 sociology in general ano
the study of organisations in particular.
The Radical Hurnanist Paradigrn
The radical humanist paradigrn is defincd by it"c;conccrn ro dcvclop
a sociology of radical chnng c from a suhjectivist standpoint. 115
approach to social science has much in cornmon with thut of the
interprcrive par adigrn, in that il views the social world from a
pcrspcc tivc which tc nd s t () he nomi 11alis l. (/lIlj-ptJJj ti ,.;.1'/. "01111/ /(ir-
is/ and ;Jt' () i!raphic. Howcvcr, its frarne 01 refcrcnce is cornrniucd
to a vicw of socicty whichcmphasiscs lile importuncc of ovcr-
throwing or transcending the limitutions tof exisring social
arrangements.
One of thc rnost basic notions unrlcrlying the whole of ihis
naradigrn is th.u th e cuuxcinuvness of rnan i~domiuatcd by thc
idcological superstructurcs wilh which he int cr.icts . ami tbt tllL':-'C
drive a cogniiive wcduc hctwccu himsclf and Ili" rrue conscrous-
ness. This wedgc is Ihe \Vnlgc of 'ulic natiun 'or 'Iahe conxcious-
ncss '. which inhibit s or prevcnts uue IrUnJ ;W Iulfilmcnt. The rn.ijur
conccrn Ior thcorists approaching ihe hurnan prcdicarncnt in these
terms is with release Irom thc constraints which cxisting social
arrangcrncnts place upon human devclopincut. It is l brcnd o
social theorising dcsigncd to providc a critique oflhes/alll.1 qu o .It
icnds 10 vicw socicty as anti-hurnan amlrt i~conccrncd \O articu-
late \vays in which hurnan beill!!s can trnusccnd the spil itual boruls
anc.l fetters which tie thern inro existing social pauerns and thus
rcalise their full potentiul.
. In tcrrns of thc clements with which we 11:\\.'e sough: lo conccp-
tualise the sociology of radicul changc , thc radical humanisl places
010<;temphasis upon radi (' (/ 1 chnne, ' " odcs oJ c!omintl lioll, (' 1 1 1 (/ n-
cipn/iofl. deprivtllioll anJ PVl('llfitlliry. Tbe concepts of .I'/rtlct/lrct!
conflicr and COl/lr{lJictioll do nOI figure prominently within Ihis
perspective. since they are characlcrislic of more objectivisl vicws
of the social \Vorld, such as Ihose presented wilhin Ihe c0ntext of
Ihe radical structuralist paradigm.
a
-' 1 ' 0 Dimensions: Four Paradig ms 33
In keeping with its subjectivist approach to social scicnce , the
radica! humanist perspective places central ernphasis upon hurnan
consciousness. lts intellectual foundations can be traccd 10 the
sarne source as that of the imerpretive paradigm. It derives from
the G erman idealist tradition, particularly as expressed in the work
of Kant and Hegel (though as reinierpreted in the writings of.the
young Marx) . It is through Marx that the idealist tradition was first
utilised as a basis for a radica! social philosophy, and many radical
humanists have derived their inspiration from this source. In
essence Marx inverted the frame of reference reflected in Hcgelian
idealism and thus Iorged (he basis for radical humanismo The
paradigrn has also been much influenced by an infusion of lhe
phenomenological perspective deriving from Husserl.
As we shall illustrate in our detailed discussion of this paradigm,
apart from the early work of Marx , interest remained dormant until
the !920s. when Lukcs and G rarnsci revived interest in subjectiv-
iSI in erpretntions of Marxist theory. This inrercst was rakcn on hy
mernbcrs of the so-called Frankfurt School , which has generated a
great dcal of debate, particularly through the wri ti ngs of Haberrnas
and Marcuse. The existentialist philosophy of Sartre also belongs
lO this paradigrn, as do the writings ofa group ofsocia! thcorists as
widcly divcrse as Illich , Castancda and Laing. AII in their various
ways share a cornmon concern for Ihe release of conscionsness
and cxperience from dornination by vnrious nspccts of the idcolog-
ical supcrstructure of the social world within which men Iive OUI
tiicir lives. Thcy scek to changc Ihe social world through a change
in modes of cognition and consciousncss.
figures 3.3 ano 3.4 again provide a somcwhat rough and rcady
sumrnary ofthe manner in which this paradigrn has bcen explored
in tcrms ofsocial theory and the study of organisations. As we shal!
argue in Chapter 9. the writers who ha ve sornething 10 say on
orguuisations from this perspcctivc have laid the basis of a nascent
anti-organisation thcory. The radical hurnanist paradigm in
essence is based upon an inversin 01 ihe assumptions which
define the functionalist paradigrn. It should be no surprise , there-
Ior e, that anti-organisation theory inverts the problernatic which
defines functionalist organisation theory on alrnost every count.
The Radical Structuralist Paradigm
Theorists located wilhin !his paradigm advocate a sociology of
radical chanRf from an objecli\'isr standpoinl. Whilst sharing an
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34 Sociological PlIrnd:I1IJ and Org anisattonal Analysis
approach to science which has many sirnilaritics with that of func-
tionalst thcory, it is dircctcd at Iundarncntally L1iffercnt cnds.
Radical structuralism is cornmitted [O radical chang e, emancipa-
tion, and pot cntality, in an analysis which crnphasiscs structural
conflicto modes 01 domination, contradiction and deprlvntion, It
approaches thesc general conccrns from a standpoint wliich tends
ro be realist .positivist , dct erminist and I/OIl1()(/('/ic.
Whcrcas (he radical hurnanists Iorgc thcir pcrspcctivc by Iocus-
ing upon 'consciousness' as (he basis Ior a radical critique 01'
socicty, [he radical structuralists conccntrutc upon structural rcla
tionships within a realist social world. They emphasise the Iact that
radical change is built into the very nature and structure of con-
tcmporary society, and they scck to provide explanations 01' the
basic inrerrelationships within the contcxt of total social forma-
tions. There is a wide range of debate within the paradigm, and
differcnt thcorists stress thc role of differcnt social forces as ;1
rneans of explaining social change, Whilst sornc focus dirccily
upon the deep-seared internal contrndictions, others focus upon
thc structure and anulysis of power rclationships. Common to ,111
thcorists is rhe vicw that contcmporary SOCiClY is charncteriscd.by
fundamental conflicts which gcncratc radical change through
politicaJ and economic criscs. 1t is through such conlict and
. change that the emanciparion of men frcm the social structurcs in
which they live is seen as coming about.
This paradigm owcs its major intellcctual ucbt to rlle work of u.e
rnature Marx , alter the so-called 'cpisternological break' in his
work. lt is the paradigm to which Marx turncd aftcr a dccade of
active political involvcment antl as ilresult of his incrcasing intcr-
est in Darwinian thcorics of cvolution ami in poliucal cconomv.
Marx 's basic ideas have becn subject to a wide rungc of nucrpreru-
tions in lhe hands of thcorists who havc sought to Iollow lus lcad.
Arnong these Engels , Plekhanov .. Lenin and Bukharin havc bccn
parucularly influcntial, Among rhe Icading exponent. , of the rudi-
cal structuralist position outside the realrn of Russian social
theory, the narnes of Althusser, Poulantzas. Colleui nnd various
Marxist sociologists of the Ncw Left come ro rnind. Whilst the
influence of Murx upon the radical structuralist pnradigm IS
undoubtedly dominant, it is also possible to identify a srroilg
Wcbenan influence. As we shall :lrgue in later chaplcrs. in recenl
ycars a group of social theorists have soughl lO e,'<P1ore the inrer-
face betweenlhe Ihought of Marx an Wcber and have gencr~rctl a
distinctive rerspcctive which we uescribc as 'coni1ict lhcory. I t is
10 Ihis radical st/1J cturalist perspcctive that lhe work of Dahren-
----_ . . _----_.
r
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3~ Two Dim cnsi ans : Four Pnra dig m f
dorf belongs , along with that of othcr theorists such as Rcx and
Milibnnd.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 again provide l general ovcrview of the
schools of rhoughr locntcd within the paradigtn. which we shull be
cx.unining in sume detall in Chaptcrs /O und 11. In Britivh and
American sociology the radical structurulist vie w has r cceived
rc!:t.ivcly link aucnrion ourside the rcalm 01' conllict theor y This
p. lradiglll. loca.cd as ir i~wirhin a rcalist vicw of the so<. :i~J Iworld ,
11:1S rnuny signific.mt irnplications for the study of orgunis. uions ,
'Ullhcy llave only bccn dcvclopcd in the barcst Iorrns. In Chapter
II we review the work which has bcen done and the ernhryonic
radical org anisation theory which it reflects.
"
Explori ng Social Theory
So mucho rhen. for our overview of the four parndigms. Sub-
sequen: chaprers seck to place flesh upon the borres of this analyu-
cal scherne and auernpt to dernonstrate its power as a tcol for
exploring social thcory." Hopcfully. our discussion will do justice
to the essentiully cornplcx nature of the parndigrns and rhe nct work
of assurnptions which they reflect, and will establish the rclation-
ships and li nks bct ween the various perspectives dominati ng social
unalysis al thc prescnt rime. Whilst rhefocus in Chapters 5. 7 . 9and
i l is upan organisationa] analysis , the general principies and ideas
discussed in the work as :i wholc cleurly have relevancc for ihe
cxplorurion of J wide variety of othcr social scicnce disciplines.
The scopc Ior applyillg rhe analyncal scheme ro oiher ficlds of
study is enormous but unfortunatcly lics beyond rhe $1,;01'1.: 01' our
prescnt enquir y. Howcver, readcrs inierestcd in applying the
scherne in this way should find little difficulry in proceeding from
thc sociological anal yses I'rcsented in Chaptcrs -t. 6. 8. and t O to un
anal ysis of [he litcrature in their own spherc of specialised inrcrcst.
Notes and Refererices
l. For a fuI! discussion of rhe role of paradigms in scicnrific
develapmen!. see Kuhn (197 0) . In his analysis. paradigms are
dclined as 'universaJ ly recogniseu scienrific achievements
that fo~ a lime provide modd problcms and solutions lo a
.~;:.
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36 Sociologiral Paradigms aud Oreanisational AllLUysis
community of practitioners '(p. viii) . Paradigms are regarded
as governing the progress of what is called 'normal scicncc.
in which 'the scientisr's work is devotcd to the articlation
and wider application of the accepted paradigrn, which is not
itself questioned or criticised. Scicntific problerns are
regardcd as puzzlcs, as problcms which are known to have a
solution within the framework of assumptions irnplicitly or
explieitly embodied in the paradigm. Ifa puzzle is no! solved,
the fault les in the scicntist , and nOI in the paradigrn' (Keat
and Urry 197 5, p. 55) . 'Normal science 'contrasts with rela-
tively briefperiods of 'revolutionary science, in whieh 'the
scientist is eonfronted by increasingly perplexing anomalies,
which ea" into question the paradigrn itse1f. Scientifie revol-
tion occurs when a new paradigrn ernerges, and becomes
accepted by the scientific communiry' (ibid. p. 55) .
We are using the terrn 'paradigrn' in a broader scnsc than
that intended by Kuhn. Wilhin the cortrext of the prescnt
work we are arguing thal social theory can be convcnicntly
understood in terms of (he co-exisiencc Qf four distinct and
rival paradigrns defined by very basic mcta-theoretical
assumptions in reJ ation to thc naturc of scicnce ami socicty,
'Paradigms", 'problematcs', 'altcrnative realities ', 'frarnes
of reference', 'forrns of life' ami 'universe of discourse are
all related conccptualisations although of course they are not
synonyrnous.
2, Some inler-p:lr:ldigm debate is also possible. G iddcns rnni n-
tains 'that all paradigrns ... are rnediatcd by othcrs 'and that
within 'normal science 'scientists are aware of other para-
digrns. He posts thut: "Ihe proccss of lcarning a para-
digrn ... is also the process of learning what that paradigrn is
nor' (1976, pp. 142-4) . -,
Inrcrcstingly, he confines his discussion lO the mcdiation
of one paradigm by anothcr one. We believe that a rnodel of
[our conflicting paradigrns within sociology is more accurate
and thar acadernics ' knowlcdge of 'scicntists ' within the
other three paradigrns is likely to be vcry skctchy in sorne
cases. Rclations bctweeri paradigrns are perhaps better
described in terrns of 'disinterested hostiliry' rather than
'debate' .
3, Thc notion of need satisfaction derives from the use of a
biological analogy of an organism and plays no part in
imerpretive sociology.
4. The sociological concerns of recent ycars llave resulted in a
3
J
.'0 Dimensions: Four Para digms 37
nurnber of works which have aimed lo chart a path through
the social science literaturc by reducing the variablesof
sociological analysis to a nurnbcr of kcy dimensions. Those
of Dahrendorf (1959), Wallace (1969), G ouldner (1970),
Friedrichs (1970), Dawe (1970), Robertson (1974), Keat and
Urry (1975). Sirasscr (1976) and Benton (1977) all readil y
come 10 mind.ln a sense our work adds to this literature. Had
space permitted , we would have liked lO demonstrate the
precise way in which the schemes proposed by thesc various
au thors all fall, in a partial way, within the bou nds of the
scherne devcloped here.
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