Aaron Lim

Aaron Hughes
Modern Jewish Philosophy
11 May 2014
I and Thouand World?
A Critical Analysis of Buberian Socialism
Jewish thinker and philosophical giant Martin Buber developed and advanced a mode of
thought rooted in the interpersonal connections between people. It became widely endorsed by
Muslims, Christians, and Buddhists alike due to its all-inclusive themes and messages. Although
held in high esteem, Bubers ideology fails to live up to its reputation when assessing its
functionality as a model for society. Buber asserts that his own form of socialism, one that
replaces the concept of equality enforced by the state with spiritually guided personal
responsibility for the community, would ultimately strengthen and serve mankind better than any
social system developed thus far. However, there exist several issues surrounding the content and
application of Bubers social construct. Namely, Buber idealizes human nature left to its own
devices, significantly misrepresents the Hasidic texts (a cornerstone in his social theory), cannot
provide supportive examples of successful societies based on his ideas, and fails to consider the
lack of practicality of his ideas implemented on a large scale.
The foundation of Bubers form of socialism, and in fact his whole ideology, stems from
the tenets of Hasidism, a religious revival movement focusing on mysticism and charismatic
leaders. Buber spent five years reading and translating the Hasidic texts before constructing his
own ideology, adopting elements including the importance of spiritual enlightenment over
dexterity in textual studies, the connection to God through moral action over ritual, and the
Lim 2
legitimacy of individual representations of spiritualism and prayer. Bubers work resulted in his
iconic I and Thou, in which he lays down the concepts that will eventually fasten together his
ideal society.
Difficulties arise when first attempting to grasp the I-Thou relationship. It is best
understood by experiencing it, thus any explanation will leave the reader uncertain or unsettled.
The overarching idea is the difference between the I-It relationship and the I-Thou relationship.
The I-It relationship can happen with anyone and anything. It is a shallow observation that
someone or something exists before you, but the connection between the two never surmounts to
anything beyond the immediately observable. On the other hand, the I-Thou relationship sprouts
from the spontaneous, reciprocal encounter between people. It is a momentary glimpse at the
divine, a mutual caring for and loving of one another. Love is responsibility of an I for a
[Thou]: in this consists what cannot consist in any feeling the equality of all lovers (Buber,
I and Thou 66). Buber wishes to use this type of relationship to differentiate his form of
socialism from that of Karl Marx.
For Buber, there are two forms of eschatology: apocalyptic and prophetic. Marxism falls
under the apocalyptic category because its redemptive process is fixed. People are used, assigned
a function in order to reach a predetermined future in which economics and science become
utopic after a revolution. Buber denies the notion of determinism, allowing everyone within his
society to participate in decisions leading to redemption. His utopia forms pre-revolution. He
stresses the dangers of a society based on deterministic doctrine, quoting a letter written by
Proudhon to Marx, [L]et us not make ourselves the protagonists of a new intolerance, let us
not act like the apostles of a new religion, even if it be a religion of logic, a religion of reason
(Buber, Paths 12).
Lim 3
Marxism and Bubers socialism also differ in structure. Marx wants a society in which
everything falls under the power of the State, which ensures equality and sameness. Buber uses
the cell-tissue model for society, in which the society is made up of connections between
several smaller, unique communes. These communes come in two distinct varieties: the
consumer commune and the producer commune. Buber has a three-stage plan for the
construction of a self-sustaining socialist society using these two types of communes. The
members of the consumer society first consume from outside the society in ways that conserve
goods and resources. When enough has been saved a producer commune arises which can
produce goods both for the members of society as well as for export outside the society. When
consumer and producer communes begin cooperating they become a self-sustaining entity which
Buber calls the cooperative settlement. It is implemented, as Buber puts it, as soon as
practicable (Buber, Paths 63). However, doubts arise over whether it will ever become
practicable.
The difficulty in actualizing these communes comes from Bubers dependence on
purging society of selfishness (a trait some might argue is fundamental in human nature). Buber
requires that these communes become interdependent. Communes cannot be seen as the dairy
producing society or the fruit producing society; all societies need to have a part in each other to
create a true social organism (Buber, Paths 77). If one commune begins using other communes
for the goods they can offer instead of cooperating with them as people, then that commune is an
unfit cell for the communal structure. According to Buber, specialized society only develops
economic efficiency, whereas the development of society requires the development of social
relationships.
Lim 4
In addition, Bubers society requires the decentralization of authority while also
maintaining order between each communal cell. Herein lies a contradiction; Buber wants each
cell to be as connected as possible, while also being as autonomous as possible. As he puts it, A
nation is a community to the degree that it is a community of communities (Buber, Paths 136).
To make his system work Buber relies on the I-Thou relationship, that when challenged man
grows to his higher purpose (Buber, Paths 58). Once more Buber reveals the idealism behind
his thoughts on human nature, a form of naivet proven through history.
In 1825, Robert Owen attempted to create a Community of Equality in Indiana. Like
Buber would have wanted, the community began branching off into smaller communities in an
attempt to create an association between little societies. However Owen realized the attempt to
unite a number of strangers not previously educated for the purpose, who should live together as
a common family, was premature (Buber, Paths 75). The community failed because it lacked
Bubers concept of an organic bond between members.
In 1848, Etienne Cabet attempted to create a socialist settlement in America called
Icaria. A schism erupted between the younger and older members of the community. The
younger members wanted to abolish the communality of house gardens where people could
freely pick fruit. After the split, the community fell to capitalism when members began selling
their land to investors. One member wrote, We had a furious will to succeed, but the garment
we wore was too heavy for us and too long, it trailed at times in the mud; by which I mean to say
that the Old Adam in us, or the beast inadequately repressed, made a violent appearance (Buber,
Paths, 76). For Buber, the beast represents human egoism.
Buber writes about these failed social experiments to demonstrate that without his system
of organic relationships true socialism is not possible. However, is Bubers solution any more
Lim 5
realistic? Egoism and selfishness come from the very depths of the human condition. One cannot
simply eradicate them. Even the most righteous man recognizes his feelings of self-preservation,
his desires, and his aspirations. Buber writes, [T]he habits of the individual system die hard
(Buber, Paths 75). Do they need to die at all? Instead of striving for the death of individualism,
Buber should adapt his ideology to work with the inclination to serve the self.
For instance, French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas writes about a concept similar to
Bubers I-Thou relationship. For Levinas the equivalent to the I-Thou exists in the Face,
through which we obtain the same feelings of compassion, responsibility, and love. However, the
difference between the I-Thou relationship and the Face lies in the response of the other. In the I-
Thou relationship the encounter is completely reciprocal. When I encounter you, you encounter
me. With the idea of the Face, the relationship between people can be asymmetric. I can
encounter you, but you do not have to encounter me. This simple change strips away part of
Bubers idealistic vision, leaving a relation much more akin to those of the real world.
There should be no shock in response to the idealism found in Bubers social ideology
when considering how he approaches his research with significant bias. He claims that the core
of his beliefs comes from the writings of the early Hasidic communes, however Buber does not
stay true to how those communes actually operated. First, Buber relies predominantly on the
Hasidic tales while ignoring the theoretical texts. This greatly distorts how he presents the values
of Hasidism. The first recorded Hasidic tales appeared 50 years after the death of the Baal Shem
Tov (Katz 59), leaving a large historical gap between when Hasidism began and when Bubers
primary sources were written. Furthermore, one can interpret a legend in a variety of ways,
which allows Buber to push his ideology on the texts. The theoretical texts are much less
subjective, which gives Buber a motive for ignoring them.
Lim 6
For example, Buber paints Hasidism as the truth that rose out of the life of the Baal Shem
Tov (also known as the Besht), portraying him as a spiritual leader without a message. Buber
does this for two reasons. One, he opposes all forms of dogma. If the Besht preached a message
Hasidism would be confined to a set of fixed rules and practices. Two, Buber wants to
disassociate the Besht from mysticism. There exist several testimonies from followers of the
Besht stating that they came to him and stayed with him for his mystical and magical knowledge
over the cosmos. Buber bases Hasidism on the way of life of the Besht in an attempt to sweep
mysticism under the rug.
It follows that Bubers aversion to mysticism led him to separate Hasidism and Kabbalah.
However, Hasidism and Kabbalah are intrinsically linked. Both include meditation through the
use of divine names, ascents of the soul, and shells of impurity. This link also extends to prayer,
an act vital to Bubers dialogic ideology. For Buber prayer is not an attempt to change outcomes,
but rather a reflection upon ones character and purpose in life. Prayer acts as the gateway
through which one may bring his or her situation into dialogue with God. It allows for
reconciliation, a self-applied psychotherapy (Guilherme 375). It is no coincidence Buber fails
to mention that the author of the prayer book used by the Besht was a known Sabbatian (Katz
70).
The second issue with Bubers use of Hasidic sources comes from his analytical method.
Buber writes, I have not been concerned merely to narrate but to narrate something specific,
something that seemed to me of the utmost import (Katz 75). Was this importance based on
the true meaning of Hasidism or Bubers preconceived ideology? The way in which Buber
studies the Hasidic legends suggests the latter. For instance, Buber mixes materials from
different time periods, uses mostly second and third-hand accounts, and focuses on sources that
Lim 7
can be freely interpreted. It is not clear where the line between actual happenings and passed
down shards of imagination lies. Worst of all, Buber amends the tales of the Hasidic legends by
deleting elements that are at odds with his ideology without explicit notation or reason.
For example, in one story the Besht fasted hafsakah for a long time. When he wanted to
eat he put water and flour in a hole in the ground and baked it in the sun. In Bubers retelling of
the story he completely edits out fasting hafsakah, writing, When Israel was hungry he put
water and flour into a little pit, kneaded the dough and baked it in the sun (Katz 79). In several
sections of the Shivchei ha-Besht Buber deletes the mention of Kabbalah, Kavvanah, and the rite
of the red heifer. Here is a comparison:
Buber:
Once Rabbi Adams son asked the boy to conjure up the Prince of Torah with the
aid of the directions given in the writings, so that they might ask him to solve
certain difficult teachings. For a long time, Israel refused to undertake so great a
venture but in the end he let himself be persuaded.
Shivchei ha-Besht:
In the above mentioned manuscripts there was both Divine Kabbalah and
Practical Kabbalah. Once, Rabbi Adams son asked the Besht to bring down the
Prince of the Torah to explain something to them and the Besht refused him and
said If we err, God forbid, in our kavvanah it can be dangerous. We lack the
ashes of a red heifer. (Katz 85)
On top of deleting certain words or mystical practices, Buber also deletes whole tales. In
Post-Holocaust Dialogues, author Steven Katz mentions three of these stories. The first
describes a meeting between the Besht and a man who was reincarnated as a frog for a series of
Lim 8
sins. The frog must remain in a dark swamp away from people because whenever a Jew might
pass by or make some kind of blessing, or think some good thought, he could by that means
bring forth the precious out of the vile (Katz 81). In the second story a cart and horses get stuck
in a marsh and cannot be freed. However, the Besht is able to free them through touch. Lastly, in
the third story the Besht revealed his identity to Rabbi Gershon during the Sabbath after
magically detecting a defect in the rabbis mezuzah.
Buber possibly deleted these stories due to their above-average length, however he
includes other tales of similar length in his writings. Most likely, Buber deletes the story of the
frog for its mention of magic, reincarnation, and the presence of halachic teachings; the tale
about the horses for the Beshts magical power to remove the horses from the marsh; and the tale
about the Beshts revelation for the mention of the Sabbath (halachic) and the Beshts power to
detect a defective mezuzah. Buber feeds his audience an anti-kabbalistic, anti-halachic, and anti-
mystic form of Hasidism inconsistent with how it was actually practiced. If Buber wants to base
his ideology on Hasidism he should at least attempt to reconcile the theoretical texts with his
ideas instead of blatantly ignoring them. One might argue that since Bubers ultimate goal is to
create a new social structure, the theoretical texts, which contain real, practicable, and applicable
societal practices, take precedence over the legendary sources.
Despite the lack of practicality in Bubers social system, he insists that there exists a
society based on his vision of spiritual socialism that did not fail. That society comes from the
Kibbutz movement in Palestine. Buber writes, [T]here is only one all out effort to create a full
cooperative which justifies our speaking of success in the socialistic sense, and that is the Jewish
Village Commune in its various forms as found in Palestine (Buber, Paths 141). Buber
gravitates to the idea of the Jewish communes in Palestine because of their purity of purpose.
Lim 9
These village communes rose out of work instead of ideology, being comprised of settlers trying
to rebuild their lives. They had no plan or dogma to follow, only a vision of an ideal.
However, Buber realized that the Kibbutzim were far from perfect. He had four major
complaints regarding how they operated. First, the Kibbutzim were too political. They needed to
renounce politicization in order to tear down barriers between groups of people. Second, the
Kibbutzim need to preserve their role as an educating elite. For Buber, social education is the
antithesis of propaganda. It promotes spontaneity in human association, warding off conformity
while supporting the growth of the individual. For Buber, collectivism is the last barrier that
man has raised against his encounter with himself (Cohen 83). Third, the Kibbutzim must stay
receptive to the whole community, not just the majority. Lastly, each commune must give rise to
an elite that would serve the society over itself, and train and spiritually educate the next
generation to carry on its work.
This last complaint is surprising coming from Buber, because it fosters a system that
focuses on vying for the power held by the elites instead of focusing on helping the society. A
similar system developed in early Hasidic communes, where the dependence on the Zaddik led
to competition for power. This shift transformed the position of Zaddik from a spiritual leader to
a political leader. Again, Bubers ignorance of the theoretical texts blinds him to the reality that
people are not naturally attracted to righteousness, even among members of the Kibbutz
movement today. Many communes limit membership to non-gay, non-mentally challenged Jews.
Some have turned toward privatization of resources, charging a fee to use communal dining
areas. Most communes place a lot of emphasis on conformity, pressuring members of society to
follow strict guidelines in religious and academic studies. If the social experiment that did not
Lim 10
fail is failing (according to Bubers standards), then how does one expect a successful
implementation of Bubers ideology in todays vastly more complicated global society?
Four main conditions make Bubers form of socialism incompatible with todays world.
First, economic conditions are too complex to support a system purely based on cooperation.
Second, defense needs could not possibly be met or controlled among so many communes. There
would have to be an overarching authority in charge of defense, which would ultimately
undermine Bubers need for decentralization. Third, mass representation would become
inevitable. A system based on personal connections between groups cannot survive on a global
scale. Many today are not even friends with those who live in their own neighborhood. Fourth,
the rise of communications technologies ironically stifles the need to communicate face to face.
To realize Bubers vision society must limit its use and the progression of technology, an
unlikely scenario.
In conclusion, Buberian socialism is both unsound in its foundations and impractical as a
model for society. Bubers biased distortion of Hasidism makes his vision overly idealistic, and
relies too heavily on a relationship that even Buber admits rarely occurs between people. This is
not to say one should not respect Buber as an influential modern thinker and humanitarian.
Applied to individuals or small groups, Bubers ideology takes steps in a very positive direction.
Bubers thoughts and teachings have especially influenced the relations between Israel and
Palestine. At his funeral in Jerusalem members of an Arab student organization made a
surprising and profound gesture by placing a wreath on Bubers grave, symbolizing the need for
understanding that Buber came to represent (Gensler 36). The need for more dialogue between
members of humanity becomes more apparent every decade. Although Bubers social construct
cannot yet stand the test of human egoism, people should not give up the effort to promote peace
Lim 11
through dialogue and mutual understanding. Bubers ideas adapted to the reality of todays
global condition can bring about much needed social change. In essence, Bubers I-Thou needs a
little more consideration for the reality of the world.

Lim 12

Bibliography
Buber, Martin. I and Thou; a New Translation by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1970. Print.
Buber, Martin, R. F. C. Hull, and Ephraim Fischoff. Paths in Utopia. Boston: Beacon, 1958.
Print.
Cohen, Adir. The Educational Philosophy of Martin Buber. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson UP,
1983. Print.
Davis, Uri. "Martin Buber's Paths in Utopia. The Kibbutz: An Experiment That Didn't Fail?"
Peace News. Peace News, Spring 2002. Web. 01 Apr. 2014.
Friedman, Maurice S. Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1976. Print.
Gensler, Harry J., and Earl W. Spurgin. "Buber, Martin." The A to Z of Ethics. Lanham, MD:
Scarecrow, 2010. 36. Print.
Guilherme, Alexandre. "God as Thou and Prayer as Dialogue: Martin Bubers Tools for
Reconciliation." Springer Link. Springer, 3 Nov. 2011. Web. 14 Apr. 2014.
<http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11841-011-0282-0>.
Hartland-Swann, J. "Paths in Utopia by Martin Buber; A Review." Philosophy 25.95 (1950):
366-67. Http://www.jstor.org/stable/3747554. Cambridge University Press on Behalf of
the Royal Institute of Philosophy. Web. 11 Apr. 2014.
Katz, Steven T. "Martin Buber's Misuse of Hasidic Sources." Post-holocaust Dialogues: Critical
Studies in Modern Jewish Thought. New York: New York UP, 1983. 52-88. Print.
Lvinas, Emmanuel. "Philosophy, Justice, and Love." Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-other.
New York: Columbia UP, 1998. 103-22. Print.
Lim 13
"The Origins of Hasidism." PBS. PBS, n.d. Web. 01 Apr. 2014.
<http://www.pbs.org/alifeapart/intro_6.html>.