Omega 37 (2009) 1100-- 1108

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Omega
journal homepage: www. el sevi er . com/ l ocat e/ omega
Modelling complex ethical decision problems with operations research

P.L. Kunsch
a,
, I. Kavathatzopoulos
b
, F. Rauschmayer
c
a
MOSI Department, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, BE-1050 Brussels, Belgium
b
Department of IT-HCI, Uppsala University, Box 337, SE-751 05 Uppsala, Sweden
c
Helmholtz Centre for Environmental ResearchUFZ, OEKUS-Division of Social Sciences, Permoserstrae 15 04318 Leipzig, Germany
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
Article history:
Received 24 September 2007
Accepted 1 November 2008
Available online 8 January 2009
Keywords:
Philosophy of OR
Decision-making process
Group decisions
Systems
This paper discusses the practical contribution of operations research (OR) techniques to
modelling decision-making problems with ethical dimensions. Such problems are frequent
in the global world: they frequently appear today in sustainability issues, e.g., in conflicts
in the triangle of society, economy and environment. We show that the prerequisites for
ethical problem-modelling are: the definition of moral principles, the evaluation of the
decision context, the participation of stakeholders, the multidisciplinary collection of data,
and the understanding of systemic interconnections. Classical OR instruments, mainly used
in logistics and optimisation problems, are not entirely satisfactory for coping with the
new ethical dimensions of sustainability. It is recommended to use and to develop more
advanced, or combined instruments from the multi-criteria/multi-stakeholder and systemic
streams of OR. It is argued that an important added value of using OR techniques for
modelling today ethical issues lies at least as much in the discovery of open questions as
in finding closed-form solutions.
2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In previous papers published in this special issue [13],
different aspects of promoting ethics in operations research
(OR) practice have been developed. [1] is the umbrella in-
troduction to all four papers. In [2] it is shown that good
practice of OR, with the primary objective of quality con-
trol regarding the analyst's work already includes ethical
considerations. The idea that good practice is necessary, but
not sufficient is developed in [3]. Other dimensions of the

This fourth and last paper in a row published in this issue is a reworked
part of the results of a working group session in the workshop Promoting
Ethics in OR practice, in April 2003 at INSEAD, Fontainebleau. Participants
of the workshop were: Joo Clmaco, Iordanis Kavathatzopoulos, Pierre
Kunsch, Marc Le Menestrel, Felix Rauschmayer and Warren Walker.
Processed by Editor B. Lev

Corresponding author. Tel./fax: +3226483550.

E-mail addresses: pkunsch@vub.ac.be (P.L. Kunsch), Iordanis@it.uu.se
(I. Kavathatzopoulos), Felix.Rauschmayer@ufz.de (F. Rauschmayer).
0305-0483/$ - see front matter 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.omega.2008.11.006
ethical process in OR are discussed, evidencing difficulties
and ambiguities in the relationships to be established be-
tween the OR practitioners and his/her clients, decision-
makers or stakeholders. It shows that neither the analysis
and modelling work nor the choice of analytical tools are
entirely ethically neutral; incomparability, incommensura-
bility and uncertainties must be dealt with, and contribute
to the existence of ethical values.
Both articles [2,3] are centred on ethical dimensions to be
found in the work and interaction of analysts and decision-
makers in solving problems. This article concentrates on
if, and how, OR instruments can significantly contribute to
solving ethical problems in modern human societies. Put
shortly, `ethics in OR modelling' addressed in [2,3] is com-
pleted by the reverse point of view, i.e., `OR modelling for
ethics', in the present article. This paper primarily discusses
how much, and by which techniques, OR may contribute to
solving ethical challenges of our time. Many of them are lo-
cated in the issues of `sustainable development', i.e., accord-
ing to [4]: `sustainable development is development that
P.L. Kunsch et al. / Omega 37 (2009) 1100-- 1108 1101
meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs'.
The idea that OR techniques can provide a useful con-
tribution to important community issues is certainly not
new. The British mathematician Lewis Fry Richardson [5]
built the very first mathematical model of conflicts between
nationsthe arms racein the thirties of the last century.
This model is comparable to the well-known predatorprey
model of LotkaVolterra [6], developed at about the same
time with a similar purpose of gaining insight into complex
systems.
The founding fathers of OR during WWII were also very
much conscious of the social and ethical issues to be ad-
dressed by OR techniques and models [7,8]. In the 1970s and
early 1980s in the aftermath of the first oil crisis in 1973
many OR papers were produced on energy issues (see [9]
with many references on energy planning studies in this pe-
riod). Although not yet coming under the label of sustainable
development, this work has to be understood as a desire to
contribute to a crucial issue in modern industrial societies.
Later on, there were significant debates about the social
and ethical role of OR (see for example [1012]), also as part
of the agenda of the Critical Systems Thinking movement
(see [1317]). An important contribution to OR modelling is
the collection of papers in [18], of which several are men-
tioned in [2]. A recent paper [19] reviews contributions of OR
to ethics, and discusses recent attempts to revive the ethical
debate within EURO from 2000 on.
With the present article we hope to present a modest
contribution pursuing similar lines of thought of our prede-
cessors to better address important societal challenges with
quantitative OR techniques.
The article is organised as follows:
Section 2 discusses several analyses that are prerequisites
for modelling complex society problems with OR techniques.
These preliminary tasks are made in interaction between OR
practitioners and decision-makers, according to the princi-
ple of ethics in modelling detailed in [2,3]. In these steps sev-
eral of the complex dimensions of ethical problems should
be accounted for: the identification of moral principles; the
societal context of the decision; the multidisciplinary and
multiple-stakeholders aspects; and the systemic dimension
of the problem.
Section 3 characterises OR techniques that are useful in
evaluating decision-making problems, and how they may
contribute in modelling problems with ethical dimensions.
Section 4 gives conclusions.
2. Prerequisites for modelling ethical decision problems
Much information and data must be made available prior
to modelling with OR techniques. This is true in general for
any problem. In the case of `ethical problems'several exam-
ple of such problems will be provided in our textadditional
analyses are needed, however.
Most of the time OR analysts are called in to provide assis-
tance to decision-makers, or policy-makers, in solving `well-
defined problems', generally optimisation problems, like in
supply-chain management, transportation logistics, location
problems, etc. The moral values, or opinions, of different
stakeholders are neglected, or of minor importance. Mod-
els are mainly, or entirely static, and only loosely, or not at
all, connected to other problems, like the availability of raw
material, the CO
2
emissions, etc. To solve these problems
mathematical technicalities and skills are mainly required. In
ethical problems new dimensions are present. Many prob-
lems of this kind appear in conflicts between economic, soci-
etal, and environmental aspects, as set out in [3]. An example
of such conflicts would be the decision to extend a local air-
port on which low-cost airplane companies would operate.
The conflict is between employment, travellers' enjoyment,
etc., on one hand, and increased CO
2
, fuel consumption, noise
pollution, etc., on the other hand. In such problems the moral
values and opinions of decision-makers and stakeholders'
are central. In addition many connections exist with other
aspects, which cannot be ignored in the modelling, because
they may induce consequences on the society as a whole
during a long time frame.
Thus ethical problems are much harder to address than
logistical problems, and different skills and techniques are
needed. The main issues are not primarily the technicalities
or heuristics. The definition of the human context, the identi-
fication of stakeholders and their moral values, the systemic
analysis of all connections and entanglement with society
impose in-depth recurrent analyses. Table 1 gives a sum-
mary of these analyses and the sub-sections in which they
are addressed.
2.1. Defining moral principles
Analysts and decision-makers must agree on moral prin-
ciples, which lead the decision-making process. First let us
define what is understood under moral principles. Morale
and ethics are practically synonymous words. Ethics refers
to the search of `good' and `fair' attitudes in human conducts,
while the science of Morale details the set of principles re-
quired for a `moral' behaviour. All the adjectives between
quotes may actually have different meanings in space and
time as will be further explained in Section 2.2 (see refer-
ences in [6]). The discovery process of moral principles is
most of the time quite tedious and difficult. The main reason
is that moral principles in a given context are too general
in character to deduce right courses of action in particular
real life situations. Knowing what is `right' and `wrong' at
a general level is not that useful in solving concrete ethical
dilemmas. Even if we knewwhat the morally right principles
actually are, it would not be enough to guide our decisions.
Moreover, stable conditions are necessary for the construc-
tion of functioning moral principles, even at a general level.
This is not the case in the world today, given the high pace
of change.
Under such conditions, individual decision-makers, as
well as groups and organisations, must acquire high ethi-
cal competence and confidence in handling significant moral
problems that may arise in professional activities. That is
necessary in order to solve moral problems, and to make
moral decisions in accordance with relevant values, princi-
ples and interests. Spontaneous subjective reactions to moral
1102 P.L. Kunsch et al. / Omega 37 (2009) 1100-- 1108
Table 1
The in-depth recurrent tasks to modelling ethical problems with OR techniques.
Step Definition Sub-section in text
Defining moral principles Elaborating moral principles and ethical values in the
decision-making process
Section 2.1
Evaluating the decision context Taking into account the context aspects in time and
space for elaborating the moral principles and ethical
values
Section 2.2
Associating stakeholders Dialoguing with all stakeholders in order to learn about
their values, commitments and interests in the decision-
making process
Section 2.3
Collecting inter-disciplinary knowledge Taking into account all available knowledge, including
uncertainties and ignorance gaps, in all disciplines re-
lated to the decision-making process
Section 2.4
Understanding the systemic interconnections Taking into account the systemic aspects in any human
organisation, or society, and accounting for existing links
with their environment
Section 2.5
issues may give solutions to problems, which probably sat-
isfy one's moral feelings. However, with such more or less
emotional reactions only, the relevant factors of the particu-
lar moral problem are certainly not fully taken into account.
For example, empathy is not a good strategy to achieve sat-
isfying solutions in negotiations compared to the cognitive
capacity of perspective taking [20].
What is needed is a psychological approach to ethical
competence implying high ethical awareness, adaptive prob-
lem solving and decision-making abilities at personal and
organisational levels, effective ethical argumentation skills,
and high ethical confidence. It appears then that to know
how to handle moral conflicts and to acquire ethical com-
petence is what really matters. Certainly making decisions
concerning technical problems or issues of nature is not easy
either. There is a lot of evidence in psychological research
describing people's deficient rationality in handling techni-
cal, logical or mathematical problems. However, rational, or
autonomous ethical decision-making (in the sense defined
in [3]), is difficult, much more difficult than autonomous
thinking on technical problems [21] due to the following
conditions [22,23]:
(1) In moral problems it is difficult to agree on the context-
dependent and controversial definition of `right' and
`wrong'. Persons or groups that benefit from some moral
principle often find it morally right, whereas those who
do not benefit from it regard the same principle as be-
ing morally wrong. Facing a personal ethical dilemma
implies that arguments for and against a certain moral
principle can be concurrently valid in the thoughts of
one and the same individual. This is an illustration of
the non-universality of ethical values to be discussed in
Section 2.2.
(2) Solutions to moral problems may be in conflict with
other moral values pertaining to the same situation.
Then a decision-maker has to choose one principle over
the other. Moreover, under certain conditions, double
standards and hypocrisy may be morally necessary.
(3) Real-life moral problems are often accompanied by
strong emotions, not present in technical problems. If
a decision-maker cannot distance him/her from emo-
tions, there is a great risk that his/her decision-making
process may be biased [24]. Distancing from emotions
is not easy since decision-making is associated with the
activity of emotional centres in the brain, as confirmed
by NMR (nuclear-magnetic resonance) measurements
[25,26]. Furthermore, emotions are necessary in achiev-
ing rational decisions and they should not be excluded
from the decision-making process [27]. A problem-
solving process loaded with too many strong feelings
will have difficulties in finding the right emotional bal-
ance, and in being objective and rational, however. See
[2831] for a discussion on emotions and multi-criteria
analysis.
(4) Authority significantly affects ethical problem solving
and decision-making. Obedience to authority implies
non-rational or heteronomous thinking (this concept is
defined in [3]), and our proneness towards obedience
is so strong that we can even do things that we find
morally wrong [32].
(5) Individuals in groups or in organisations conform easily
to the majority [33], and they adopt more extreme posi-
tions when they are in a group together with other like-
minded people [34]. Decision-making in authoritarian,
insulated, cohesive and stressful groups suspends crit-
ical and systematic thinking, the so-called groupthink
phenomenon [35].
(6) The contents of moral statements dominate our moral
perception, and inhibit further investigations on the way
they were established in the first place. Usually people
would spontaneously react to the content of a moral
statement by accepting, or rejecting it; but they would
find it very difficult to focus on the thought process at
the origin of the proposed moral solution, as would be
implied by discourse ethics [36]. The situation is reverse
in technical processes in which more focus is given to
the methodological approach to the problem than to the
technical conclusion.
All the above conditions heighten the complexity of moral
problem solving. The way humans solve everyday problems
with ethical content is far from being fully rational. Adopt-
ing a purely philosophical rational/utilitarian/calculating
view on the way people are acting when confronted to real
life ethical dilemmas is extremely reductive [26]. The way
P.L. Kunsch et al. / Omega 37 (2009) 1100-- 1108 1103
people make decisions is as well-impregnated by rules of
thumb [37], as by deontological or virtue ethics.
We will investigate in Section 3 in which way OR tech-
niques can ease the evaluation of moral principles.
2.2. Evaluating the decision context
Ethical values, understood as synonymous to moral prin-
ciples discussed in Section 2.1, will be very dependent on
the prevailing geographical, ecological, economic, historical,
religious, etc. context. This aspect has been addressed in [3]
as part of the difficulties in the social relationships between
decision-maker, practitioner, and the wider society. This is
the reason why it is impossible to define a universal and
definitive code of ethical values.
Basic problems of modern societies are the exhaustion
of resources, the global change (e.g., of climate), and the so-
cial and economic inequalities around the planet. Long-term
survival of mankind seems to be only possible if the ethical
values at the base of sustainable development are adopted
(see [6] for a more detailed discussion). For example, solving
truck transportation logistics problems are very important
sustainability issues in both Europe and Africa, but different
priorities will be given. In Europe, congestion, accident risks,
pollution, etc. are on top of the agenda. In Africa, bringing
food or medical care to isolated villages will be the most
prominent issues. The identification of what is important for
the human beings should come first. Finding out what goes
wrong in a particular society is a prerequisite to any ethi-
cally caring decision process.
2.3. Associating stakeholders
The identification of moral principles discussed in Sec-
tions 2.1 and 2.2 clearly requires that all involved parties be
consulted and allowed to participate in a decision-making
process with ethical content, e.g., the establishment of a
high-level nuclear waste repository, a fast-speed train track,
a high-security prison, etc.
Participation is understood here as `forums for exchange
that are organised for the purpose of facilitating communi-
cation between government, citizens, stakeholders and in-
terest groups, and businesses regarding a specific decision or
problem' [38]. There are three main arguments for partici-
pation of those affected by a decision in the decision-making
process: (1) instrumental reasons, (2) substantive reasons
and (3) ethical-normative reasons [39,40].
(1) The growing demand for participation translates into
legislation and jurisdiction, with the consequence that
stakeholders increasingly have the formal and informal
right to block decisions. There are doubts whether tra-
ditional decision-making procedures can include these
new demands for the recognition and inclusion of inter-
ests in such a way that decisions can be implemented
easily. Participatory decision-making strengthens the
probability of the successful implementation of a
decision.
(2) The substantive argument for participation mainly lies
in the ability of participatory processes to deal with in-
certitude and ambiguity (see [3] for a thorough discus-
sion of incertitude in the decision process) through the
inclusion of idiosyncratic or local knowledge. Indeed,
two different types of information to improve the qual-
ity of decisions can be distinguished. The first is scien-
tific or technical knowledge of the processes involved
and of the probabilities of certain outcomes. This infor-
mation comes from different scientific disciplines and
needs to be integrated (see Section 2.4); trade-offs and
interactions need to be assessed (see Section 2.5). The
second type is location-specific or idiosyncratic knowl-
edge, based on the experience users have acquired with
a specific situation in a specific location. Again, this type
of knowledge can be held by different groups of people,
often stakeholders in the decision, but others as well.
Depending on the kind of decision, the relative impor-
tance and availability of these two types of information
vary. Modelling is often used to integrate information
from natural or social sciences, but it may prove insuf-
ficient in integrating knowledge from both groups of
sciences, and, even more, in integrating research- and
experience-based knowledge. Furthermore, in each of
these areas, the type and amount of risk, incertitude,
and ignorance is different [3], which makes integration
even more difficult. Participation of lay people in the
decision-making process is the only way to link these
two types of information.
(3) Ethical-normative reasons for participation focus on
popular sovereignty, equity and political equality. Di-
rect participation is considered a necessary condition
for good decision-making in discourse ethics [36]. The
recognition of interests of those concerned by the
decision is necessary for all modern ethics [41].
A high degree of transparency seems to be the most
promising measure to achieve effective and legitimate
decision-making procedures [42]. One effective way to
achieve transparency is to include stakeholders or the gen-
eral public in the decision process [43]. Using a structured
process that is understandable to both participants and non-
participants can further augment transparency. But it is not
easy to conceive who will be concerned by a decision and
who should therefore participate in the process. Globalisa-
tion and the inter-connectedness of modern societies lead
to a higher degree of complexity of the impacts of decisions.
More and more, decisions have impacts on people living in
other societies, and on future generations. Ethically, there is
hardly any reason why one should consider their interests
less than those of present people living in the same society.
Participants in the decision-making process need to take
these `distant' interests of future generations into account.
Another argument for dialogue and participation with
an instrumental, substantive, and normative aspect is the
building-up of competence. Those participating in a deci-
sion will learn the others' points of view, restrictions on the
space of alternatives, dependencies within and between the
different systems, and therefore build up competence. This
1104 P.L. Kunsch et al. / Omega 37 (2009) 1100-- 1108
gain can be useful for the implementation of the decision,
for its acceptance, and for seeking new alternatives opened
up by the combination of the new competences of the par-
ticipating persons and the `old' knowledge.
Participation can be undertaken in different forms with
different foci, e.g., focus groups, citizens juries, consensus
conferences, cooperative discourse, dialogue groups, stake-
holder workshops, participatory expert workshops, reflec-
tion forums, deliberative interviews, voluntary agreements,
eco-audits, policy simulation exercises, deliberative fore-
sights, concerted environmental management, mediation,
regulatory negotiation, consultative forums, deliberative
conflict resolution processes, environmental negotiations,
etc. (see [38,4345]). No special form can be recommended
without consideration of the specific elements of the deci-
sion situation. [46,47] discuss the use of OR instruments in
the resolution of environmental conflicts (see also [3]).
2.4. Collecting inter-disciplinary knowledge
Because any ethical decision-making process involves
multiple stakeholders, multiple aspects, and also complex
systemic interconnections, as will be discussed in Section
2.5, it will draw knowledge from different disciplines, or
scientific fields, relevant for the decision problem [48].
As an example, a nuclear plant allocation problem might
use information coming from economics, sociology, socio-
psychology, political sciences, hydrology, geology, etc. Many
times decision criteria in the decision problem will have
incommensurable unitslike for example generating elec-
tricity costs, expressed in EUR/kWh, and CO
2
-emissions,
expressed in tons/kWh. These criteria will therefore be
evaluated within different disciplines, in this example
economics, and power plant technology. Translating CO
2
-
emissions into monetary values, using, e.g., prices of carbon
emission trading systems as done in economic cost-benefit
analyses, biases the view on the problem, and may lead
to bad solutions, or deviances from the pursued reduction
objectives. The problematic of incommensurability between
criteria is discussed in [3]. This example makes clear that
multi-disciplinary knowledge cannot be conceived of as a
mere concatenation of information from several disciplines.
Symbiosis of several disciplines in one model can aug-
ment clarity, and reduce model incommensurability. Group
model building techniques [49,50], and problem structuring
methods [51], may be used for easing the preparation of a
new interdisciplinary model. Also such models should be
designed in a modular way so that the incorporation of a
new corpus of knowledge can be made easy when suitable.
2.5. Understanding the systemic interconnections
Important sources of complexity related to the ambi-
guities of defining ethical values have been discussed in
Sections 2.12.4. An additional complexity layer to be dis-
cussed in this sub-section originates from the many systems
interconnections relevant for problem solving. Systematic
analysis is thus another requirement particularly important
in a global economy and environment. Moreover, systems
relevant for economic decision-making affecting the envi-
ronment [3] are characterised by incertitude or ignorance
in the far-remote future, often covering several generations.
This may induce unexpected long-term detrimental conse-
quences of some apparently attractive current decisions. The
German philosopher Hans Jonas has discussed the responsi-
bility of present generation in future negative consequences
of technological decisions in his celebrated book `The Imper-
ative of Responsibility' [52]. This way of thinking lies at the
basis of the precautionary principle for anticipating long-
term effects unforeseen at the current decision time. The
Rio declaration on environment and development [53] gives
the following precautionary recommendation: `Where there
are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage,
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost effective measures to prevent environ-
mental degradation'.
Regarding systemic analysis, it cannot be ignored that
human societies and organisations, from families to multi-
national companies and states, have common structural and
dynamic properties with living systems in general, despite
the human freedom. Recent research has identified the ex-
istence of global properties of living systems, which can be
classified under the heading `emergence' (see e.g., [5456]).
Emergence means that the global behaviour of a system
constituted by many individuals, called `agents', is not de-
ducible from the mere addition of individual behaviours. In-
fluencing emergent properties by managing is particularly
difficult, and thus it requires specific skills. An important
emergent property is resilience, i.e., the resistance to any
change due the existing non-linear influences between the
agents in the system. This has the consequence that the
system gets trapped in some stable states, called attractors,
with more or less desirable properties. Moving the system
to more favourable attractors requires considerable energy
and repeated, long-lasting efforts. Every company manager,
or politician, is aware of the difficulties of defeating well-
established routines, changing consumer's habits in order
to protect the environment, promoting `responsible' driving
attitudes, etc.
Managing complex living systems with emergent prop-
erties, and long-term consequences of present actions, thus
proves to be much more difficult than controlling engineered
systems. It requires a lot of understanding of the way com-
plex systems react to external influences. Human liberty and
psychological dimensionsstressed in Section 2.1make the
challenge for managers even harder. In [57] it is argued that
good managers best cope with resilience in the system they
manage by giving adequate considerations to the psycho-
logical attitudes of the system agents. Often the managers'
intuition is not enough to be successful, however. Complex
systems behave in counter-intuitive ways, because of non-
linear causal relationships and feedback loops at the origin
of emergent properties [58].
Systemic modelling can considerably strengthen and
improve the understanding of complex-system dynamic
behaviour for managing them better, and for anticipating
long-termconsequences. This point will be further discussed
in Section 3.
P.L. Kunsch et al. / Omega 37 (2009) 1100-- 1108 1105
3. Modelling ethical problems with OR techniques
Section 2 has evidenced various prerequisites for mod-
elling ethical problems. We have insisted on the multidi-
mensionality aspects related to multiple decision-makers
and stakeholders with different ethical values, multiple dis-
ciplines, and multiple evaluation criteria. Also the systemic
interconnections within and between complex human sys-
tems were pinpointed. These considerations make clear that
OR techniques used exclusively for well-defined, static and
scalar optimisation are not really matching the new needs.
It is why more adapted techniques must be used, developed,
or revived, when necessary, separately, or in combination.
Let us consider multi-criteria decision analysis to address
the multidimensionality issues discussed in Section 2. This
technique, and its further developments to group model
building, group decision support systems, negotiation tools
[47,49,50], etc., lies somewhat outside the main optimis-
ing OR streams [59,60]. One reason is that these techniques
have weak mathematical foundations, and they address ill-
defined vector-optimisation problems.
As an example for a systemic approach of problems con-
sider system dynamics (SD) [61,62]. This technique is still
not very popular among OR researchers. Perhaps the con-
troversial Club of Rome report [63], issued in 1972, just
before the first oil crisis, has some responsibility. The ap-
proximations it may have contained regarding its data and
modelling equations do not condemn the approach as a
whole, however. Forrester [64] gives a strong advocacy of
the usefulness of SD. He claims that the origin of many, if not
all, `problems' in any human organisation, or society, must
be sought for in the internal systemic structure, in which
feedback loops play a major role. This corresponds to what is
known today about emergent living systems [58], discussed
in Section 2.5. Unfortunately, systems and network thinking
have been, and still are in our opinion, too much ignored
by analysts and decision-makers altogether. This may have
caused or aggravated the bad consequences of many deci-
sions in the past [6,65,66] because many complex intercon-
nections in time and space were ignored, in opposition to
the requirements exposed in Section 2.5.
It is why we strongly feel that systemic disciplines like
SD [6,61,62], soft system modelling [67], non-linear dynamic
biological systems [68], agent-based modelling (ABM) [69],
evolutionary computing algorithms [70], small world the-
ory [71], adaptive policies [72], etc., should be promoted for
modelling the difficult problems with ethical dimensions.
Let us consider in particular `ABM', extensively developed
at the Santa Fe Institute [73] as a relatively new, but im-
portant, systemic technique. ABM is based on the assump-
tion that the behaviour of interacting agents in face of some
events or decisions can be simulated by a set of rules (see
the definition of agents in Section 2.5). As underlined in
[73], ABM is different from the common approaches in sci-
ence, which are based on induction or deduction. Rather
the purpose of ABM modelling is to analyse by simulation
largely unpredictable and counterintuitive behaviours in or-
der to observe the emergence of collective behavioural pat-
terns, and to analyse how they can possibly be influenced or
changed (see the definition of the concept of emergence in
Section 2.5).
As an example for ABM use let us consider the urban con-
gestion problem developed in [74]. This is a crucial sustain-
ability issue in large cities, and it may therefore be labelled
as `ethical problem'. It gives an illustration of the ubiquitous
`tragedy of the commons' observed in conflicting and non-
co-operative societies [3,6,75]. This systemic mechanism is
often held responsible for the collapse of many ancient soci-
eties (Mayas, Eastern-Island Civilisation, etc.) and for many
existing or pending unsustainable evolution in modern so-
cieties [6,66].
The purpose of ABMsimulations, in such examples of sus-
tainability analysis, is not forecasting as in econometrics, or
optimising as in classical OR. Rather simulations are useful
for a better understanding of how car drivers collectively be-
have, and how things could change, to improve the present
situation. At the initial time in the simulation the car-driving
community is deeply trapped in an unfavourable system at-
tractor, i.e., no or unsatisfactory alternatives to car driving
are available in the urban environment. Understanding the
systemic implications of these conditions is a first step to
designing long-term solutions, as advocated in Section 2.5.
This gaining of insight into complex systemic structures
is the main incentive for using ABM. In the same line of
thought Danielson [76] proposes ABM as a powerful tool
for achieving insight into ethical values and behaviours (see
Section 2.1). The `Center for Applied Ethics' of the British
Columbia University (Canada), aims at enlarging the scope
of traditional game theory with ABM. It compares the be-
haviours of `rational agents', with those of `ethical agents'
acting in a co-operative way. The hope is to understand the
rules to be developed for guiding peoples' behaviours with
the objective of improving society. Quoting [76]: `The ob-
jective is not to discover eternal truths of human nature,
but to construct mechanisms (some new, some familiar) to
support mutually beneficial and fair ways of interacting '.
Axelrod [73] and many other authors [77] also insist on
mechanisms of co-operative behaviours, proven to be essen-
tial in the survival of living systems in general, of which hu-
man organisations, or societies, are particular cases. The idea
is first to find out why there are problems in those systems,
and how they might get cured.
Another interesting approach for combining methodolo-
gies for solving complex sustainability problems has been
proposed in [7880]. The methodological framework is
called adaptive control methodology (ACM). ACM combines
SD, multi-criteria decision aid (MCDA), and control tech-
niques. The main steps are shown in Fig. 1 (adapted from
[80]). The methodology is adaptive in the sense that at each
step in the flowchart backtracking to any upstream step is
possible.
The first stage (I) of system modelling contains the iden-
tification and boundary definition of the analysed problem.
It is mainly a development phase producing a mental model
shared by analysts and decision-makers, and providing a
consensus on objectives to be achieved in the long-term.
The second stage (II) starts with the generation of
representative sets of useful and believable policies for
1106 P.L. Kunsch et al. / Omega 37 (2009) 1100-- 1108
STAGE I
STAGE II
STAGE III
Mental Model
System Dynamics
Modelling
Policy Making
MCDA Selection
Policy Implementation
Monitoring and Control
Fig. 1. The adaptive control methodology provides a framework for com-
bining system dynamics, multi-criteria decision aid (MCDA), and control
theory for modelling complex systems in the long term (adapted from
[80]).
controlling the complex system. A long-term test sets the
precautionary principle in practice. Simulated policies,
which awake the suspicion of being unfavourable in the
long-term, do not pass the test, and they are discarded from
the set of candidate strategies. A `good' strategy is finally
selected by means of MCDA techniques from among the
acceptable strategies.
The third stage (III) in Fig. 1 is dedicated to monitor-
ing and real-time control of the selected policy. Watchdog
variables are monitored on a real-time basis, during the
often-long periods representative of issues with an ethical
content. Regular updating of the policy is foreseen, e.g.,
every five years. Watchdogs may signal urgent short-term
interventions. Use is made of the multiple branching op-
portunities in the ACM flowchart of Fig. 1 when revisiting
policies, the model, or both, as appropriate.
The methodological framework insists very much on
stage III, i.e., on the obligation for policy-makers to verify on
a permanent basis that no deviance, or undesirable system
evolution occurs, with respect to the consensus objectives
decided in the planning phase of stages I and II (Fig. 1). This
is of course an important requirement of ethical respon-
sibility that things should not just be left going without
control, after a decision has be made. The ACM framework
has been applied to several case studies on sustainable
energy management in [8185]. It provides an example of
multi-methodology advocated in [86].
These examples of possible approaches are of course not
exhaustive. We plead for continuing effort to update OR
techniques, to develop new ones, or to combine them. The
aim is improving the modelling capabilities when it comes
to solving problems with ethical implications, instead of op-
timising ethically not so relevant situations.
4. Conclusions
The aspects of `ethics for OR modelling', of good practice
and beyond, the validation and legitimacy of the analysts'
work, the ethical ambiguities in the relationship between
the analysts, the OR model, the decision-makers, and the
stakeholders have been thoroughly discussed in [2,3]. In the
present paper the authors discuss the reverse issue of `OR
modelling for ethics'. As they have argued today's ethical
problems get centred on the global problems of mankind
encompassed in the broad concept of sustainable devel-
opment. It is why the authors are pleading for increased
modelling efforts in solving sustainability issues, as a ma-
jor contribution of OR to ethics. To achieve this ambitious
aim, a number of prerequisites for ethical OR modelling
have been discussed in detail. A central issue is here to be
able to apprehend the moral principles to be respected in
approaching ethical problems in complex human systems.
These problems have multidisciplinary facets; they involve
multiple decision-makers, stakeholders and criteria, and
they imply complex systemic interconnections in space and
time. The authors argue that less conventional or sometimes
innovative OR tools, should be increasingly used, developed,
and/or combined. Many efforts in this direction are certainly
already made today in excellent OR articles, like [8789];
but this effort must be continued and amplified. Though
the new sustainability problems may be from an analytical
point of view less attractive, but also often more difficult,
than well-defined mainstream OR problems, they must be
placed at the top of the priority agenda. The tools needed
for modelling these oft ill-defined problems are centred
on systems thinking, and multi-criteria/multi-stakeholder
techniques.
An important incentive for reviving, developing, or com-
bining less conventional OR practices, is that today the an-
alytical process of mainstream OR would tend to reduce
any complex problem to a structured and solvable form. In
such approaches ethical concerns are either ignored, or ab-
stracted, so that many dimensions are indeed missing in
the analysis. The intention behind the proposed increased
use of systemic and multi-criteria decision-aiding tools is to
P.L. Kunsch et al. / Omega 37 (2009) 1100-- 1108 1107
reintroduce into models otherwise hidden and value-loaded
moral principles.
The main purpose of OR modelling is, in the authors' opin-
ion, to conduct an extensive and exhaustive ethical process
with all decision-makers and stakeholders, placed within a
multidisciplinary framework. An essential result of this pro-
cess is to discover what was left out, rather than what was
covered with traditional quantitative instruments.
References
[1] Le Menestrel M, Van Wassenhove L. Ethics in operations research and
management sciences: a never-ending effort to combine rigor and
passion, Omega, 2009, this issue, doi:10.1016/j.omega.2008.12.009.
[2] Walker WE. Does the best practice of rational style model-based
policy analysis already include ethical considerations? Omega, 2009,
this issue, doi:10.1016/j.omega.2008.12.006.
[3] Rauschmayer F, Kavathatzopoulos I, Kunsch PL, Le Menestrel
M. Why good practice of OR is not enoughethical challenges
for the OR practitioner, Omega, 2009, this issue, doi:10.1016/
j.omega.2008.12.005.
[4] World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). Our
common future. Oxford University Press; 1987. p. 43.
[5] Richardson LF. The collected papers of Lewis Fry Richardson. In:
Sutherland I, editor. Quantitative psychology and studies of conflict,
vol. 2. Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge;
1993.
[6] Kunsch PL, Theys M, Brans JP. The importance of system thinking in
ethical and sustainable decision-making. Central European Journal of
Operations Research (CEJOR) 2007;15/3:25369.
[7] Rosenhead J. Operational research at the crossroads: Cecil Gordon and
the development of post-war OR. Journal of the Operational Research
Society 1989;40:328.
[8] Horner P. History in the making, OR/MS today, October 2002. p. 309.
[9] In: Lev B, editor. Energy models and studies, studies in management
science and systems. Amsterdam: North-Holland; 1983.
[10] Ackoff R. The social responsibility of operational research. Operational
Research Quarterly 1974;25:36171.
[11] Mingers J. Towards an appropriate social theory for applied systems
thinking: critical theory and soft systems methodology. Journal of
Applied Systems Analysis 1980;7:4150.
[12] Jackson M. The nature of soft systems thinking: the work of
Churchman, Ackoff, and Checkland. Journal of Applied Systems
Analysis 1982;9:1727.
[13] Jackson M. Social systems theory and practice: the need for a critical
approach. International Journal of General Systems 1985;10:13551.
[14] Jackson M. The origins and nature of critical systems thinking.
Systems Practice 1991;4:13149.
[15] Mingers J. Subjectivism and soft systems methodologya critique.
Journal of Applied Systems Analysis 1984;11:85103.
[16] Mingers J. Towards critical pluralism. In: Mingers J, Gill A, editors.
Multimethodology: theory and practice of combining management
science methodologies. Chichester: Wiley; 1997. p. 40740.
[17] Mingers J. What is it to be critical? Teaching a critical approach
to management undergraduates. Management Learning 2000;31:
21937.
[18] Wallace WA. Ethics in modeling. New York: Pergamon; 1994.
[19] Brans JP, Gallo G. Ethics in OR/MS: past, present and future. 4OR
2004;2:95110.
[20] Galinsky AD, Maddux W, Gilin D, White JB. Why it pays to
get inside the head of your opponent: the differential effects of
perspective taking and empathy in negotiations. Psychological Science
2008;19:37884.
[21] Sunstein CR. Moral heuristics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences
2005;28:53173.
[22] Kavathatzopoulos I. The use of information and communication
technology in the training for ethical competence in business. Journal
of Business Ethics 2003;48:4351.
[23] Kavathatzopoulos I. Making ethical decisions in professional life. In:
Montgomery H, Lipshitz R, Brehmer B, editors. How professionals
make decisions. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; 2004.
p. 27788.
[24] Glucksburg S. The influence of strength of drive on functional
fixedness and perceptual recognition. Journal of Experimental
Psychology 1962;63:3641.
[25] De Martino B, Kumaran D, Seymour B, Dolan JR. Frames, biases,
and rational decision-making in the human brain. Science 2006;313:
6847.
[26] Greene JD, Nystrom LE, Engell AD, Darey JM, Cohen JD. The neural
bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron
2004;44:389400.
[27] Koenings M, Tranel D. Irrational economic decision-making after
ventromedial prefrontal damage: evidence from the ultimatum game.
The Journal of Neuroscience 2007;27:9516.
[28] WenstBp F. Mindsets, rationality and emotion in multi-criteria
decision analysis. Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
2005;13:16172.
[29] Le Menestrel M. A Comment on rationality, ethical values and emotion
in MCDA. Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis 2005;13:17982.
[30] Rauschmayer F. Linking emotions to needs. A comment to Fred
WenstBp's article Mindsets, rationality and emotion in multi-
criteria decision analysis. Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
2005;13:18790.
[31] WenstBp F. Some viewpoints on emotion, consequentialism and
multicriteria decision making. Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision
Analysis 2005;13:1918.
[32] Milgram S. Obedience to authority. New York: Harper and Row; 1974.
[33] Asch SE. Studies of independence and conformity: a minority
of one against a unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs
1956;70:416.
[34] Sia CL, Tan BCY, Wei KK. Group polarization and computer mediated
communication: effects of communication cues, social presence, and
anonymity. Information Systems Research 2002;13:7090.
[35] Janis L. Groupthink: psychological studies of policy decisions and
fiascos. 2nd ed., Houghton Mifflin: Boston; 1982.
[36] Habermas J. Erl auterungen zur Diskursethik (Notes on discourse
ethics). Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp; 1991.
[37] Gigerenzer G, Todd PM, Group AR. Simple heuristics that make us
smart. Oxford: University Press; 1999.
[38] In: Renn O, Webler T, Wiedemann P, editors. Fairness and competence
in citizen participation, evaluating models for environmental
discourse (risk, governance and society). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publisher; 1995.
[39] Fiorino D. Citizen participation and environmental risk: a survey of
institutional mechanisms. Science, Technology and Human Values
1990;15:22643.
[40] Stirling A. Analysis, participation and power: justification and closure
in participatory multi-criteria analysis. Land Use Policy, Special issue
Resolving Environmental Conflicts: Combining Participation & Multi-
Criteria Analysis 2006;23(1):95107.
[41] Webler T, Renn O. A brief primer on participation: philosophy and
practice. In: Renn O, Webler T, Wiedemann P, editors. Fairness
and competence in citizen participation. Dordrecht: Kluwer; 1995.
p. 1734.
[42] O'Neill J. Representing people, representing nature, representing
the world. Environment and planning Cgovernment and policy
2001;19:483500.
[43] Lafferty WM, Meadowcroft J. Democracy and the environment:
problems and prospects. Aldershot: E. Elgar; 1996.
[44] van den Hove S. Participatory approaches to environmental policy-
making: the European commission climate policy process as a case
study. Ecological Economics 2000;33:45772.
[45] de Marchi B, Ravetz J. Participatory approaches to environmental
policy, policy research brief N

10, EVE concerted action. Cambridge

(UK): Cambridge Research for the Environment; 2001.
[46] Wittmer H, Rauschmayer F, Klauer B. How to select instruments for
the resolution of environmental conflicts. Land Use Policy, Special
issue Resolving Environmental Conflicts: Combining Participation &
Multi-Criteria Analysis (2006);23(1):19.
[47] Rauschmayer F, Wittmer H. Evaluating participatory and multi-
criteria methods for the resolution of environmental conflicts.
Land Use Policy, Special issue Resolving Environmental Conflicts:
Combining Participation & Multi-Criteria Analysis 2006;23(1):
10822.
[48] M uller-Merbach H. The interdisciplinary generalist. Omega 2009;
37/3:4956.
[49] Rouwette E, Vennix J, Mullekom T. Group model building
effectiveness: a review of assessment studies. System Dynamics
Review 2002;18/1:545.
[50] van den Belt M. Mediated modeling. A system dynamics approach to
environmental consensus building. Covelo: Island Press; 2004.
[51] In: Rosenhead J, Mingers J, editors. Rational analysis for a problematic
world revisited: problem structuring methods for complexity,
uncertainty and conflict. 2nd ed., Chichester, England: Wiley; 2001.
1108 P.L. Kunsch et al. / Omega 37 (2009) 1100-- 1108
[52] Jonas H. The imperative of responsibility. In search of an ethics for
the technological age. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1984.
[53] Rio declaration on environment and development, made at UNCED
1992, ISBN 9 21 100509 4, http://www.unep.org/Documents/
Default.asp?DocumentID = 78&ArticleID = 1163.
[54] Holland JH. Emergencefrom chaos to order. Cambridge, MA: The
Perseus Books Group; 1999.
[55] Kauffman S. At home in the universethe search for laws of self-
organization and complexity. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press;
1995.
[56] Prigogine, Stengers I. La nouvelle alliance (The new alliance). Paris:
Folio Essais, Gallimard; 1986.
[57] Theys M, Kunsch PL. New Paradigms for decision-making in complex
living network systems. In: EURO XII conference, Prague, Czech
Republic, 2007.
[58] Thomas R, Kaufman M. Multistationarity, the basis of cell
differentiation and memory. Chaos Review 2001;11/1:17095.
[59] Roy B. Mthodologie multicritre d'aide la decision. Paris:
Economica; 2000.
[60] Bouyssou D, Marchant T, Pirlot M, Perny P, Tsoukias A, Vincke Ph.
Evaluation and decision models: a critical perspective. Dordrecht:
Kluwer; 2000.
[61] Randers J. Guidelines for model conceptualisation. In: Randers J,
editor. Elements of the system dynamics method. Cambridge, MA:
Productivity Press; 1980. p. 11738 [chapter 6].
[62] Sterman JD. Business dynamics, systems thinking and modeling for
a complex world. Boston: McGraw-Hill; 2000.
[63] Meadows DH, Meadows DL, Randers J, Behrens III WW. The limits
to growth (Club of Rome report). New York: Universe Books; 1972.
[64] Forrester JW. Policies, decisions and information sources for
modeling. In: Morecroft JDW, Sterman JD, editors. European Journal
of Operational Research, Special Issue Modelling for Learning
1992;59:4263.
[65] D orner D. Die Logik des Misslingens. Strategisches Denken in
komplexen Situationen. (The logic of failurestrategic thinking in
complex situations). Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch
Verlag; 2004.
[66] Diamond J. Collapse. How societies choose to fail or to survive.
London: Penguin Books; 2005.
[67] Checkland P. Systems thinking, systems practice. Chichester: Wiley;
1993.
[68] Murray JD. Mathematical biology. 2nd ed., New York: Springer; 1993.
[69] Ferber J. Multiagents systems: an introduction to distributed artificial
intelligence. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley; 1999.
[70] Goldberg DE. Genetic algorithm in search, optimization and machine
learning. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley; 1989.
[71] Watts DJ, Strogatz SH. Collective dynamics of `small-world' networks.
Nature 1998;39:4402.
[72] Walker WE, Rahman SA, Cave J. Adaptive policies, policy analysis,
and policymaking. European Journal of Operational Research
2001;128/2:2829.
[73] Axelrod R. The complexity of cooperation. Princeton: Princeton
University Press; 1997.
[74] De Smet Y, Springael J, Kunsch PL. Towards statistical multicriteria
decision modelling: a model and its application. Journal of
Multicriteria Decision Aid 2002;11/6:30513.
[75] Hardin G. The tragedy of the commons. Science 1968;16:12438.
[76] Danielson D. Modeling ethical mechanisms. Center for Applied Ethics,
University of British Columbia, Canada; 2002 www.ethics.ubc.ca.
[77] Theys M, Kunsch PL. The importance of co-operation for ethical
decision-making with OR. European Journal of Operational Research
2004;153:4858.
[78] Brans JP, Macharis C, Kunsch PL, Chevalier A, Schwaninger M.
Combining multicriteria decision aid and system dynamics for the
control of socioeconomic processes. An iterative real-time procedure.
European Journal of Operational Research 1998;109:42841.
[79] Brans JP, Kunsch PL, Mareschal B. Management of the future. In:
Bouyssou, Jacquet-Lagrze, Perny, Slowinski, Vanderpooten, Vincke,
editors. Aiding decisions with multiple criteria, essays in honor
of Bernard Roy. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers; 2002.
p. 483502.
[80] Kunsch PL. Adaptive control methodology and some applications
in environmental modelling. In: Findley PN, editor. Environmental
modelling new research. Nova Science Publishers; 2008. (4th quarter,
still formatting).
[81] Kunsch PL, Springael J, Brans JP. An adaptive multicriteria control
methodology in sustainable developmentcase study: a CO
2
ecotax,
In: Colorni A, Parrucini M, Roy B, editors. Advances in multicriteria
decision aid. Report of the Commission of the European Communities,
Joint Research Center, Ispra, Italy: EUR-report 19808, 2001. p. 14561.
[82] Kunsch PL, Springael J, Brans JP. The zero-emission certificates: a
novel CO
2
-pollution reduction instrument applied to the electricity
market. European Journal of Operational Research 2004;153/2:
38699.
[83] Kunsch PL, Springael J. A fuzzy methodology for evaluating a market
of tradable CO
2
-permits. In: Loulou R, Waaub J-Ph, Zaccour G, editors.
Energy and Environment. Gerad 25th Anniversary Series. New York:
Springer Science+Business Media; 2005. p. 14973 [chapter 6].
[84] Kunsch PL, Springael J. Simulation with system dynamics and fuzzy
control of the reduction of CO
2
-emissions in the residential sector.
European Journal of Operational Research 2008;185:128599.
[85] Ben Maalla EM, Kunsch PL. Simulation of micro-CHP diffusion by
means of system dynamics. In: Antunes CH, Gomes A, editors. Energy
Policy. Special section: operational research models and methods in
the energy sector 2008; 36(7): 230819.
[86] In: Mingers J, Gill A, editors. Multimethodology. The theory and
practice of combining management science methodologies. New York:
Wiley; 1997.
[87] Govindaraj T. Characterizing performance in socio-technical systems:
a modeling framework in the domain of nuclear power. Omega
2008;36/1:1021.
[88] Wiecek MM, Ehrgott M, Fadel G, Figueira JR, editors, Special issue
on multiple criteria decision making for engineering. Omega 2008;
36(3): 337504.
[89] Papadopoulos A, Karagiannidis A. Application of the multi-criteria
analysis method Electre III for the optimisation of decentralised
energy systems. Omega 2008;36/5:76676.