LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD [G.R. No. 127198.

May 16, 2005]

SECOND DIVISION
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J .:
This is a Petition for Review
[1]
dated December 6, 1996 assailing the Decision
[2]
of the Regional Trial Court
[3]
dated
July 5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land
Bank) to pay private respondents the amount of P30.00 per square meter as just compensation for the States acquisition
of private respondents properties under the land reform program.
The facts follow.
On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation
for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition
was amended to implead as co-respondents the registered tenants of the land.
After trial, the court rendered the assailed Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents,
particularly, respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned
by petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY
PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same lands of petitioners located at
San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.
Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[4]

DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the trial court in
its Order
[5]
dated July 30, 1996 for being pro forma as the same did not contain a notice of hearing. Thus, the prescriptive
period for filing an appeal was not tolled. Land Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal and the
assailed Decision became final and executory.
Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996,
[6]
citing excusable negligence as its ground
for relief. Attached to the petition for relief were two affidavits of merit claiming that the failure to include in the motion for
reconsideration a notice of hearing was due to accident and/or mistake.
[7]
The affidavit of Land Banks counsel of record
notably states that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional
Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing
[8]
due to his heavy
workload.
The trial court, in its Order
[9]
of November 18, 1996, denied the petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in
law due to its own negligence.
In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel to include a notice of hearing due to
pressure of work constitutes excusable negligence and does not make the motion for reconsideration pro
forma considering its allegedly meritorious defenses. Hence, the denial of its petition for relief from judgment was
erroneous.
According to Land Bank, private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation of their
properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the
determination of just compensation directly with the trial court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring
that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in
relying on private respondents evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on
Land Banks evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.
Private respondents filed a Comment
[10]
dated February 22, 1997, averring that Land Banks failure to include a
notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration due merely to counsels heavy workload, which resulted in the motion
being declared pro forma, does not constitute excusable negligence, especially in light of the admission of Land Banks
counsel that he has been a lawyer since 1973 and has mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading.
Land Bank filed a Reply
[11]
dated March 12, 1997 insisting that equity considerations demand that it be heard on
substantive issues raised in its motion for reconsideration.
The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
[12]
Both
parties complied.
[13]

The petition is unmeritorious.
At issue is whether counsels failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes excusable negligence entitling Land
Bank to a relief from judgment.
Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.When a judgment or final order is entered, or any
other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be
set aside.
As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on
grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.
[14]

Measured against this standard, the reason profferred by Land Banks counsel, i.e., that his heavy workload
prevented him from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a notice of hearing, was by no means
excusable.
Indeed, counsels admission that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case
No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing
speaks volumes of his arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable negligence.
The failure to attach a notice of hearing would have been less odious if committed by a greenhorn but not by a lawyer
who claims to have mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading.
[15]

Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk
of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge.
[16]
The trial
court therefore correctly considered the motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it cannot be faulted for denying Land
Banks motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.
It should be emphasized at this point that procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts
and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the
application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal
interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party
litigants and their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the path
of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.
[17]

Aside from ruling on this procedural issue, the Court shall also resolve the other issues presented by Land Bank,
specifically as regards private respondents alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the question of just
compensation.
Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation instead of
filing a petition to fix just compensation with the trial court.
The records reveal that Land Banks contention is not entirely true. In fact, private respondents did write a letter
[18]
to
the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and
requesting a conference for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered prompting
private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court.
At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,
[19]
we declared that there is nothing contradictory
between the DARs primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions
of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial
proceedings.
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a
preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination
is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian
reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.
[20]

Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function
addressed to the courts of justice.
Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time
of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at
the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of
Appeals,
[21]
we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would
take effect on the payment of just compensation.
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation
to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA
6657)
[22]
before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded
under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect,
conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.
[23]

Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just
compensation, reads as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the
current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations,
and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed
by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine
its valuation.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO
228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative
considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
[24]

In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into
account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessors value and the volume and value
of its produce. This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due
private respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.



JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA vs LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 170220 November 20, 2006 First Division

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:


This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October 27, 2005 Amended
Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530, which vacated its May 26, 2004 Decision affirming (a) the
Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court, in
Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, dated March 31, 2003 directing respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD); (b) the
May 26, 2003 Resolution denying LBPs motion for reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order requiring Teresita V.
Tengco, LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee
[2]
of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land
located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326)
[3]
of the Registry of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, a portion of the said property
with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27
(1972)
[4]
and Executive Order No. 228 (1987).
[5]
The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer
beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which
amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.

On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a
parcel of agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro covered by TCT No. T-128
[6]
of the
Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2
containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under the coverage of P.D.
No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at P1,512,575.05.

Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for determination of just compensation. On January 29, 2003,
the PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation at P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-31) and
P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares (TCT No. T-128).
[7]


Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17, 2003, two separate petitions
[8]
for judicial determination of
just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, acting as a Special Agrarian Court,
docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT No. T-128, and raffled
to Branch 46 thereof.

Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary Valuation Under Section 16(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657 (1988)
[9]
and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that LBP deposit the preliminary compensation
determined by the PARAD.

On March 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order
[10]
granting petitioners motion, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of the Land Compensation Department I (LCD I), Land
Bank of the Philippines, is hereby ordered pursuant to Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 in relation to Section 2,
Administrative Order No. 8, Series of 1991, to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the
PARAD in cash and bonds, as follows:

1. In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount of P 51,800,286.43, minus the amount received by the
Landowner;
2. In Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount of P 21,608,215.28, less the amount of P 1,512,575.16,
the amount already deposited.

Such deposit must be made with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Manila within five (5) days from
receipt of a copy of this order and to notify this court of her compliance within such period.

Let this order be served by the Sheriff of this Court at the expense of the movants.

SO ORDERED.
[11]


LBPs motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
[12]
dated May 26, 2003. The following day, May 27,
2003, the trial court issued an Order
[13]
directing Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land Compensation Department
Manager, to deposit the amounts.

Thus, on June 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77530.
[14]


On June 27, 2003, the appellate court issued a 60-day temporary restraining order
[15]
and on October 6, 2003, a
writ of preliminary injunction.
[16]


On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
[17]
in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the instant
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Order dated March 31, 2003,
Resolution dated May 26, 2003, and Order dated May 27, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED. The preliminary
injunction We previously issued is hereby LIFTED and DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.
[18]


The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered LBP to deposit the amounts provisionally determined
by the PARAD as there is no law which prohibits LBP to make a deposit pending the fixing of the final amount of just
compensation. It also noted that there is no reason for LBP to further delay the deposit considering that the DAR already
took possession of the properties and distributed the same to farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972.

LBP moved for reconsideration which was granted. On October 27, 2005, the appellate court rendered the assailed
Amended Decision,
[19]
the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, in view of the prescription of a different formula in the case of Gabatin which We hold
as cogent and compelling justification necessitating Us to effect the reversal of Our judgment herein
sought to be reconsidered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED, and Our May 26, 2004
Decision is hereby VACATED and ABANDONED with the end in view of giving way to and acting in
harmony and in congruence with the tenor of the ruling in the case of Gabatin. Accordingly, the assailed
rulings of the Special Agrarian Court is (sic) commanded to compute and fix the just compensation for the
expropriated agricultural lands strictly in accordance with the mode of computation prescribed (sic) Our
May 26, 2004 judgment in the case of Gabatin.

SO ORDERED.
[20]


In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the immediate deposit of the preliminary value of the
expropriated properties is improper because it was erroneously computed. Citing Gabatin v. Land Bank of the
Philippines,
[21]
it held that the formula to compute the just compensation should be: Land Value = 2.5 x Average Gross
Production x Government Support Price. Specifically, it held that the value of the government support price for the
corresponding agricultural produce (rice and corn) should be computed at the time of the legal taking of the subject
agricultural land, that is, on October 21, 1972 when landowners were effectively deprived of ownership over their
properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27. According to the Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the amounts of P500
and P300 which are the prevailing government support price for palay and corn, respectively, at the time of payment,
instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing government support price at the time of the taking in
1972.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

A. THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
LATEST DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, ET AL., G.R. NO. 127198, PROM. MAY 16, 2005;
and
[22]


B. THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH GRAVE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, SO FAR
DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, DECIDING
ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
SUPERVISION.
[23]


Petitioners insist that the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated
properties at the time of payment. Respondent LBP, on the other hand, claims that the value of the realties should be
computed as of October 21, 1972 when P.D. No. 27 took effect.
The petition is impressed with merit.

In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,
[24]
the Court ruled thus:

Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on
October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the
value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous.
In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the
landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of
just compensation.

The Natividad case reiterated the Courts ruling in Office of the President v. Court of Appeals
[25]
that the
expropriation of the landholding did not take place on the effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21, 1972 but seizure would
take effect on the payment of just compensation judicially determined.

Likewise, in the recent case of Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,
[26]
we held that
expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988, but
on the payment of just compensation.

In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of their properties in 1972 but have yet to receive the just
compensation therefor. The parcels of land were already subdivided and distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries thereby
immediately depriving petitioners of their use. Under the circumstances, it would be highly inequitable on the part of the
petitioners to compute the just compensation using the values at the time of the taking in 1972, and not at the time of the
payment, considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land although
ownership thereof have not yet been transferred in their names. Petitioners were deprived of their properties without
payment of just compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away from its
owners.
[27]
The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by
the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until
then, title remains with the landowner.
[28]


Our ruling in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
[29]
is
instructive, thus:

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21,
1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized
farm except that no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he
had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative. It was understood,
however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the
constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21,
1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27 (Emphasis
supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-
fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. x x x

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.

We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the instant case was initiated under P.D. No. 27 but the
agrarian reform process is still incomplete considering that the just compensation to be paid to petitioners has yet to be
settled. Considering the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation should
be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is the applicable law, with P.D. No.
27 and E.O. No. 228 having only suppletory effect.
[30]


In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
[31]
we held that:

RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute
to the landless. And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act
should be adhered to.

Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be
agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be finally determined by the court as the just
compensation for the land. In determining just compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land, the current value of
like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.
[32]


Corollarily, we held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada
[33]
that the above provision was converted into a
formula by the DAR through Administrative Order No. 05, S. 1998, to wit:

Land Value (LV) = (Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable Sales x 0.3) + (Market Value per Tax
Declaration x 0.1)

Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet received just
compensation. Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by
P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of
time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No.
228, is important considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
[34]


WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated October
27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26,
2004 of the Court of Appeals affirming (a) the March 31, 2003 Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the
respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit the just compensation provisionally determined by the PARAD; (b) the
May 26, 2003 Resolution denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing
Teresita V. Tengco, respondents Land Compensation Department Manager to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order,
is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian
Court is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, and to compute the
final valuation of the subject properties based on the aforementioned formula.

SO ORDERED.


LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP [G.R. No. 118712. July 5,
1996]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP[G.R. No. 118745. July 5, 1996]
THIRD DIVISION
R E S O L U T I O N
FRANCISCO, J .:
Consequent to the denial of their petitions for review on certiorari by this Court on October 6, 1995
[1]
, petitioners
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), filed their respective motions for
reconsideration contending mainly that, contrary to the Court's conclusion, the opening of trust accounts in favor of the
rejecting landowners is sufficient compliance with the mandate of Republic Act 6657. Moreover, it is argued that there is
no legal basis for allowing the withdrawal of the money deposited in trust for the rejecting landowners pending the
determination of the final valuation of their properties.
Petitioner DAR maintains that "the deposit contemplated by Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657, absent any specific
indication, may either be general or special, regular or irregular, voluntary or involuntary (necessary) or other forms known
in law, and any thereof should be, as it is the general rule, deemed complying."
[2]

We reject this contention. Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be
made as compensation for the rejecting landowners, that is in "cash" or in "LBP bonds", to wit:
"Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x" (Italics
supplied)
The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction that would
include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit. Accordingly, we must adhere to the well-
settled rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application.
[3]
Thus, recourse to any rule which allows the opening of trust accounts as a mode of
deposit under Section 16(e) of R.A. 6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore impermissible. As
we have previously declared, the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements
or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
[4]
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the
provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic
law.
[5]

The validity of constituting trust accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landowners and withholding immediate
payment to them is further premised on the latter's refusal to accept the offered compensation thereby making it
necessary that the amount remains in the custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventual payment to the
landowners.
[6]
Additionally, it is argued that the release of the amount deposited in trust prior to the final determination of
the just compensation would be premature and expose the government to unnecessary risks and disadvantages, citing
the possibility that the government may subsequently decide to abandon or withdraw from the coverage of the CARP
certain portions of the properties that it has already acquired, through supervening administrative determination that the
subject land falls under the exempt category, or by subsequent legislation allowing additional exemptions from the
coverage, or even the total scrapping of the program itself. Force majeure is also contemplated in view of the devastation
suffered by Central Luzon de to lahar. Petitioner DAR maintains that under these conditions, the government will be
forced to institute numerous actions for the recovery of the amounts that it has already paid in advance to the rejecting
landowners.
[7]

We are not persuaded. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private property under the CARP puts
the landowner, and not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against his favor. He has no
recourse but to allow it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the
expropriated property. As expected, the landowner will exercise this right to the hilt, but subject however to the limitation
that he can only be entitled to a "just compensation." Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of the
DAR, the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation. If we are to affirm the withholding of the
release of the offered compensation despite depriving the landowner of the possession and use of his property, we are in
effect penalizing the latter for simply exercising a right afforded to him by law.
Obviously, this would render the right to seek a fair and just compensation illusory as it would discourage owners of
private lands from contesting the offered valuation of the DAR even if they find it unacceptable, for fear of the hardships
that could result from long delays in the resolution of their cases. This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the
concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the
land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his
loss.
[8]
It is significant to note that despite petitioner's objections to the immediate release of the rejected compensation,
petitioner LBP, taking into account the plight of the rejecting landowners, has nevertheless allowed partial withdrawal
through LBP Executive Order No. 003,
[9]
limited to fifty (50) per cent of the net cash proceeds. This is a clear confirmation
that petitioners themselves realize the overriding need of the landowners' immediate access to the offered compensation
despite rejecting its valuation. But the effort, though laudable, still falls short because the release of the amount was
unexplainably limited to only fifty per cent instead of the total amount of the rejected offer, notwithstanding that the
rejecting landowner's property is taken in its entirety. The apprehension against the total release of the rejected
compensation is discounted since the government's interest is amply protected under the aforementioned payment
scheme because among the conditions already imposed is that the landowner must execute a Deed of Conditional
Transfer for the subject property.
[10]

Anent the aforecited risks and disadvantages to which the government allegedly will be unnecessarily exposed if
immediate withdrawal of the rejected compensation is allowed, suffice it to say that in the absence of any substantial
evidence to support the same, the contemplated scenarios are at the moment nothing but speculations. To allow the
taking of the landowners' properties, and in the meantime leave them empty handed by withholding payment of
compensation while the government speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse for government to
subsequently decide to abandon the property and return it to the landowner when it has already been rendered useless
by force majeure, is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must never be sanctioned. Legislations
in pursuit of the agrarian reform program are not mere overnight creations but were the result of long exhaustive studies
and even heated debates. In implementation of the program, much is therefore expected from the government. Unduly
burdening the property owners from the resulting flaws in the implementation of the CARP which was supposed to have
been a carefully crafted legislation is plainly unfair and unacceptable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.













SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO VS DAR and HACIENDA MARIA
G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006 FIRST DIVISION

D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the review and reversal of
the Resolutions
[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2003 and 28 August 2003, respectively.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land
located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their respective Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and EP
numbers presented below:
Petitioners TCT/EP Nos. Areas
(has.)
1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675 1.7833
2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814
TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293
2.0000
0.1565
3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295 3.1441
4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296 4.2405
5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809 3.3082
6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676 3.1437
7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658 4.0128
8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836 2.3087
9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844 2.0950
10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873 1.5737
11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348 2.2670
12. HILARION V. LANTIZA TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674
TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825
4.5526
0.4579
13. ANSELMO LOPEZ TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840 4.4939
14. TERESITA NACION TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849 2.2140
15. CHARIE E. NASTOR TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829 3.9291
16. NELSON L. NULLAS TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826 2.7491
17. CARLITO S. OLIA TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673 1.7954
18. ROBERTO T.PATIO TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860 6.4266
19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830 2.2143





The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patio, are the surviving spouses of deceased recipients of
EPs over parcels of land also located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their corresponding TCT and
EP numbers identified as follows:
(Deceased) Registered Owners TCT/EP Nos. Areas
(has.)
1. MANUEL S. GONZAGA TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832 4.1953
2. RAFAEL PATIO TCT No. T-929/EP No. A-037861 3.0078
[3]

The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested area
which have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners,
together with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same were public lands. HMI never
disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof.
HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by
virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of land with a total area of 527.8308
hectares, to wit:
Lot No. Area
(in hectares)
Lot No. 1620, Pls 4 28.52
Lot No. 1621, Pls 4 11.64
Lot No. 1622, Pls 4 487.47
TOTAL 527.83
[4]


On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27
[5]
was issued mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be
brought under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.
HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed
under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other
occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.
In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a parcellary mapping of the entire landholdings of
527.8308 hectares covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and 1976, the DAR approved the Parcellary Map
Sketching (PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the entire landholdings.
HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all relevant proceedings, including the determination of
the Average Gross Production per hectare at the BarangayCommittee on Land Production, and was a signatory of an
undated Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA), covering the 527.8308 hectares. The LTPA was
submitted to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in 1977.
Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners, among other persons, which
was registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of OCT No. P-3077-1661. The annotation in the
OCT showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of the Deed of Assignment.
20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848 4.5322
21. PATERNO P. SAIN TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813 4.3223
22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880 3.7151
23. JOEMARIE VIBO TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827 1.3185
[2]

In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the
corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons.
In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region XIII,
17 petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its
former landholdings covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn,
that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. The 17 petitions, which were later
consolidated, sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares which had been awarded to
petitioners. HMI did not question the coverage of the other 250.3300 hectares under Presidential Decree No. 27 despite
claiming that the entire landholdings were untenanted and not devoted to rice and corn.
On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD rendered a Decision
declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn,
and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners when Presidential Decree No. 27
took effect on 21 October 1972. The Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the Hacienda Maria
Action Team. Petitioners TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the
same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which
affirmed the RARAD Decision.
After the DARAB denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals
with their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals issued the following assailed Resolution:
A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was
executed by Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power of
Attorneys executed by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and necessarily DISMISSED.
[6]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the
Admission of Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-Petitioners. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion by issuing the following assailed Resolution:
Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution promulgated on January 27, 2003 which dismissed
the petition for certiorari.
We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution sought to be reconsidered, since
petitioners have failed to show that their belated submission of the special power of attorney can be
justified as against the unequivocal requirements set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special circumstances that justify the
relaxation of the rules on non-forum shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in the case
at bar.
More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the Supreme Courts ruling
in Loquias vs. Ombudsman, 338 SCRA 62, which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in a
matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification [on] non-
forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.
Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping was executed without the proper
authorization from all the petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist thereby
rendering the petition fatally defective.
Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended states:
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice x x x

It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no legal basis to support it and should be
dismissed forthwith. Moreover, granting arguendo that a special power of attorney belatedly filed could
cure the petitions defect, the requirement of personal knowledge of all the petitioners still has not been
met since some of the other petitioners failed to sign the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
[7]

Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which become
indefeasible one year after their registration.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners have sufficiently complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure concerning the
CertificationAgainst Forum shopping
Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular No. 28-91 and
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum shopping to avoid the filing of multiple
petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other tribunals and
agencies. Stated differently, the rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals and agencies would
have to resolve the same issues. Rule 7, Section 5, now provides:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to
the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter
learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-
compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal
with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
Revised Circular No. 28-91 was designed x x x to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal
of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
[8]
Technical rules of
procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice.
[9]
The same guidelines should still apply in interpreting what
is now Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within
the phrase plaintiff or principal party who is required to certify under oath the matters mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Such was given emphasis by this Court when we held
in Mendigorin v.Cabantog
[10]
and Escorpizo v. University of Baguio
[11]
that the certification of non-forum shopping must be
signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel. In Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission,
[12]
we likewise held that:
The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the external legal counsel of petitioner. For a
certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the principal parties and not by
counsel unless clothed with a special power of attorney to do so. This procedural lapse on the part of
petitioner is also a cause for the dismissal of this action. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly conflicting case of Loquias v. Office of the
Ombudsman,
[13]
where this Court ruled that:
At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one
of the petitioners in the instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is
defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify
under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc. Only
petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification. There is no
showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter and to sign the certification. It
cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-
petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. We find that substantial compliance
will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the
certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the
same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter
disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
(Emphasis supplied)
Loquias, however, was a case involving only five petitioners seeking relief from the Resolution of the Ombudsman
charging them with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, where the above declaration at the outset was made together
with a determination on the lack of jurisdiction on our part to decide the Petition.
[14]
There being only five petitioners
in Loquias, the unreasonableness of the failure to obtain the signatures of Antonio Din, Jr.s four co-accused is
immediately apparent, hence the remark by this Court that [p]etitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to
personally sign the certification. In the present petition, petitioners allege that they are farmer-beneficiaries who reside in
a very remote barangay in Agusan del Sur. While they reside in the same barangay, they allegedly have to walk for hours
on rough terrain to reach their neighbors due to the absence of convenient means of transportation. Their houses are
located far apart from each other and the mode of transportation, habal-habal, is scarce and difficult. Majority of them are
also nearing old age. On the other hand, their lawyers (who are members of a non-government organization engaged in
development work) are based inQuezon City who started assisting them at the latter part of the RARAD level litigation in
1998, and became their counsel of record only at the DARAB level. The petitioner who signed the initiatory pleading,
Samuel Estribillo, was the only petitioner who was able to travel to Manila at the time of the preparation of the Petition due
to very meager resources of their farmers organization, the Kahiusahan sa Malahutayong mga Mag-
uugma Para sa Ekonomikanhong Kalambuan (KAMMPE). When the Petition a quo was dismissed, petitioners counsel
went to Agusan del Sur and tried earnestly to secure all the signatures for the SPA. In fact, when the SPA was being
circulated for their signatures, 24 of the named petitioners therein failed to sign for various reasons some could not be
found within the area and were said to be temporarily residing in other towns, while some already died because of old
age.
[15]
Be that as it may, those who did not sign the SPA did not participate, and are not parties to this petition.
The Court of Appeals merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court that justify the
relaxation of the rules on the certification against forum shopping are not present in the case at bar,
[16]
without discussing
the circumstances adduced by the petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for the sake of
argument that the actuation of petitioners was not strictly in consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, it should still be determined whether there are special circumstances that would justify the suspension or
relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification against forum shopping, such as those which we appreciated
in the ensuing cases.
In General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
[17]
the appeal to the Court of Appeals had
a certificate against forum shopping, but was dismissed as it did not contain a board resolution authorizing the signatory of
the Certificate. Petitioners therein attached the board resolution in their Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of
Appeals, as in this case, denied the same. In granting the Petition therein, we explained that:
[P]etitioner complied with this procedural requirement except that it was not accompanied by a board
resolution or a secretarys certificate that the person who signed it was duly authorized by petitioner to
represent it in the case. It would appear that the signatory of the certification was, in fact, duly authorized
as so evidenced by a board resolution attached to petitioners motion for reconsideration before the
appellate court. It could thus be said that there was at least substantial compliance with, and that there
was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural requirements.
The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than frustrate, the ends of justice, and
while the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be met at the
expense of substantial justice. Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not
suppress, the cause of justice and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to
attain that prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of
courts. [Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corp. vs. Court of Appeals;BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, 336 SCRA
484].
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,
[18]
the authority of petitioners resident manager to sign the
certification against forum shopping was submitted to the Court of Appeals only after the latter dismissed the Petition. It
turned out, in the Motion for Reconsideration, that he already had board authority ten days before the filing of the Petition.
We ratiocinated therein that:
On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the
submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the
petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a
corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf
of the corporation.
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the
certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing
of the certification one day after the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the
requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court
allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. Landbank,
supra, the Court had dismissed Uys petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum
shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit
certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or
compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-
forum shopping.
In the instant case, the merits of petitioners case should be considered special circumstances or
compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the
requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant
petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof
that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretarys
certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates
this oversight.
It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the
objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping. Lastly, technical rules of procedure
should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable
objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.
In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
[19]
we, likewise, considered the apparent merits of the substantive aspect of
the case as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the reinstatement of the case, and invoked our power to
suspend our rules to serve the ends of justice. Thus:
The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is not
unprecedented. In those cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the requirements, there
were special circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly
unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case should be
deemed as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the reinstatement of the petition. x x x
There were even cases where we held that there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification
against forum shopping, but we still proceeded to decide the case on the merits. In De Guia v. De Guia,
[20]
petitioners
raised in their Petition for Review the allowance of respondents Appeal Brief which did not contain a certificate against
forum shopping. We held therein that:
With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping, substantial justice behooves
us to agree with the disquisition of the appellate court. We do not condone the shortcomings of
respondents counsel, but we simply cannot ignore the merits of their claim. Indeed, it has been held that
[i]t is within the inherent power of the Court to suspend its own rules in a particular case in order to do
justice.
In Damasco v. National Labor Relations Commission,
[21]
the non-compliance was disregarded because of the
principle of social justice, which is equally applicable to the case at bar:
We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on certification against forum
shopping. The certifications in their respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is not
correct. The certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner or a principal party and not the
attorney. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioners could have warranted the outright dismissal of
their actions.
But, the court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on their merits as a matter of
social justice involving labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way
of equitably and completely resolving herein the rights and obligations of these parties. Moreover, we
must stress that technical rules of procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result would
be detrimental to the working woman.
The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume for the sake of argument that there was violation of Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would be justified for two compelling reasons:
social justice considerations and the apparent merit of the Petition, as shall be heretofore discussed.
Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as
indefeasible as TCTs issued in registration proceedings.
Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of its
issuance. The DARAB, however, ruled that the EP is a title issued through the agrarian reform program of the
government. Its issuance, correction and cancellation is governed by the rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Hence, it is not the same as or in the same category of a Torrens title.
The DARAB is grossly mistaken.
Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
[22]
provides that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings
are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:
It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding
pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued
under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable
public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.
There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land
Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public land
patent is open to review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now
Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of title with
indefeasibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited cases clearly reveal that
Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was applied by implication by this
Court to the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources,
under the signature of the President of the Philippines in accordance with law. The date of issuance of
the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases
because the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent
issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the land applied for to the
applicant. This, to our mind, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e.
conservation of a family home, and to encourage the settlement, residence and cultivation and
improvement of the lands of the public domain. If the title to the land grant in favor of the homesteader
would be subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given by the Government through
the process of proceedings in accordance with the Public Land Law, there would arise uncertainty,
confusion and suspicion on the governments system of distributing public agricultural lands pursuant to
the Land for the Landless policy of the State.
The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to the landless
would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest, just because his certificate of title
was issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles
issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented:
Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law, regarding the titles
granted thereunder, such silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who
come into the possession of his homestead after complying with the requirements thereof. Section 38 of
the Land Registration Law should be interpreted to apply by implication to the patent issued by the
Director of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of Natural Resources, under the signature of
the President of the Philippines, in accordance with law.
[23]

After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting
an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27),
[24]
the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant
to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent,
x x x. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to
another person.
[25]

As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr.
[26]
:
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of
title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private
individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to
the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land
Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in
Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the
certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a
registration proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property
Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX
[27]
on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in
themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.
The only defense of respondents, that the issue of indefeasibility of title was raised for the first time on appeal with
the DARAB, does not hold water because said issue was already raised before the RARAD.
[28]

The recommendation of the Hacienda Maria Action Team to have the EPs cancelled and the lots covered under
the Republic Act No. 6657,
[29]
with the farmer-beneficiaries later on being issued with CLOAs, would only delay the
application of agrarian reform laws to the disputed 277.5008 hectares, leading to the expenditure of more time and
resources of the government.
The unreasonable delay of HMI in filing the Petition for cancellation more than 20 years after the alleged wrongful
annotation of the Deed of Assignment in OCT No. P-3077-1661, and more than ten years after the issuance of
the TCTs to the farmers, is apparently motivated by its desire to receive a substantially higher valuation and just
compensation should the disputed 277.5008 hectares be covered under Republic Act No. 6657 instead of Presidential
Decree No. 27.
[30]
This is further proved by the following uncontested allegations by petitioners:
(i) HMI neither asked for rentals nor brought any action to oust petitioners from the farm they were
cultivating;
(ii) HMI had not paid realty taxes on the disputed property from 1972 onwards and never protested
petitioners act of declaring the same for realty taxation;
(iii) HMI, represented by a certain Angela Colmenares, signed the LTPA covering the entire landholdings or
the area of 527.8308 hectares, which was then represented to be rice and corn lands;
(iv) HMI abandoned the entire landholdings after executing the Deed of Assignment of Rights in 1977.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73902 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The following EPs and the corresponding TCTsissued to petitioners or to their successors-in-interest are hereby
declared VALID and SUBSISTING:


Original Grantees TCT/EP Nos.
1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675
2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814
TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293
3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295
4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296
5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809
6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676
7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658
8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836
9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844
10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873
11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348
12. HILARION V. LANTIZA TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674
TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825
13. ANSELMO LOPEZ TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840
14. TERESITA NACION TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849
15. CHARIE E. NASTOR TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829
16. NELSON L. NULLAS TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826
17. CARLITO S. OLIA TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673
18. ROBERTO T.PATIO TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860
19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830
20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848
21. PATERNO P. SAIN TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813
22. CLAUSIO S. SAYSON TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880
23. JOEMARIE VIBO TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827
24. MANUEL S. GONZAGA TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832
25. RAFAEL PATIO TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037861


Costs against respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc.

SO ORDERED.



RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB vs. COURT OF APPEALS
[UDK No. 9864 : December 3, 1990.] FIRST DIVISION
D E C I S I O N
NARVASA, J .:
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, acting as a special agrarian court, in the light of Executive Orders Numbered
129-A and 229 and Republic Act No. 6657, is what is at issue in the proceeding at bar.
Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in March,
1988, "an agrarian case for damages by reason of the(ir) unlawful dispossession . . .was tenants from the landholding"
owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil. 1 Several persons were also impleaded as defendants, including the
Philippine National Bank, it being alleged by the plaintiff spouses that said bank, holder of a mortgage on the land
involved, had caused foreclosure thereof, resulting in the acquisition of the property by the bank as the highest bidder at
the foreclosure sale, and in the sale by the latter, some time later, of portions of the land to the other persons named as its
co-defendants (all employees of the National Steel Corporation), and it being prayed that mortgage and the transactions
thereafter made in relation thereto be annulled and voided. 2
In an Order rendered on August 24, 1988, respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint. 3 He opined
that by virtue of Executive Order No. 229 "providing the mechanisms for the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program approved on July 24, 1987" Executive No. 129-A approved on July 26, 1987, as well as the
Rules of the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform, jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over
agrarian cases had been transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform.:-cralaw
The Tangub Spouses filed a petition for Certiorari with this Court, docketed as UDK-8867, assigned to the Second
Division. Discerning however no special and important reason for taking cognizance of the action, this Court referred the
same to the Court of Appeals, that tribunal having concurrent jurisdiction to act thereon.: nad
The Court of Appeals, by Decision promulgated on October 23, 1989, 4 dismissed the petition, finding that the
jurisdictional question had been correctly resolved by the Trial Court. The Court of Appeals, adverted to a case earlier
decided by it, on August 30, 1989, Estanislao Casinillo v. Hon. Felipe G. Javier, Jr., et al., in which it was "emphatically
ruled that agrarian cases no longer fall under the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts but rather under the jurisdiction of
the DAR Adjudication Board." 5 The ruling was grounded on the provisions of Executive Orders Numbered 229, approved
on July 22, 1987, and 129-A, issued on July 26, 1987, in relation to Republic Act No. 6657, effective on June 15, 1988.
Said executive orders, it was pointed out, were issued by President Corazon C. Aquino undoubtedly in the exercise of her
revolutionary powers in accordance with Section 6, Article XVIII [Transitory Provisions] of the 1986 Constitution providing
that the "incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened."
The petitioner Rufina Vda. de Tangub, now widowed, is once again before this Court, contending that the Trial Court's
"order of dismissal of August 26, 1988, and the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals affirming it, are patently illegal
and unconstitutional" because they deprive "a poor tenant access to courts and directly violate R.A. 6657, PD 946, and
Batas Bilang 129."
The petition is without merit.
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). It
states that the program
". . . shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produce, all public and private agricultural
land as provided in Proclamation No. 131 dated July 22, 1987, including whenever applicable in accordance with
law, other lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture."
Section 17 thereof.
1) vested the Department of Agrarian Reform with "quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters," and
2) granted it "jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture [DA], as well as "powers to
punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or decisions."
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 129-A made the Department of Agrarian Reform "responsible for implementing the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and, for such purpose," authorized it, among others, to
"(g) Provide free legal services to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian conflicts and land tenure problems; . .
(and)
x x x
(j) Approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses: . ."
And Section 5 of the same Executive Order No. 129-A specified the powers and functions of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, including the following::- nad
"(b) Implement all agrarian laws, and for this purpose, punish for contempt and issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum,
writ of execution of its decision, and other legal processes to ensure successful and expeditious program implementation;
the decisions of the Department may in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but shall be immediately
executory notwithstanding such appeal;
x x x
(h) Provide free legal service to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian conflicts and land tenure related
problems as may be provided for by laws;
(i) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial,
industrial, and other land uses as may be provided . . ."
The jurisdiction thus conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform, i.e.:
(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;
(b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and
(c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential,
commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses,
is evidently quite as extensive as that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Court by Presidential Decree No. 946, which
extended to the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land, and other matters affecting
tenant-farmers, agricultural lessees, settlers, owner-cultivators, farms' cooperatives or organizations under laws,
Presidential Decrees, Orders, instructions, Rules and Regulations in relation to the agrarian reform program. 6 Clearly,
the latter must be deemed to have been eliminated by its being subsumed in the broad jurisdiction conferred on the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian
Reform, a proposition stressed by the rules formulated and promulgated by the Department for the implementation of the
executive orders just quoted. 7 The rules included the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board designed to
exercise the adjudicatory functions of the Department, and the allocation to it of
". . . original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter vested upon it by law, and all cases, disputes, controversies
and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Executive
Order No. 229, Executive Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6289, Presidential
Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations."
The implementing rules also declare that "(s)pecifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to . . (that
theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Courts, i.e.) (c)ases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the
cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other
agrarian laws . . ."
The matter has since been further and definitively clarified by Republic Act No. 6657, which was signed into law by
President Aquino on June 10, 1988 and became effective immediately after its "publication in two (2) national newspapers
of general circulation" on June 15, 1988. The Act makes references to and explicitly recognizes the effectivity and
applicability of Presidential Decree No. 229. 8 More particularly, the Act echoes the provisions of Section 17 of
Presidential Decree No. 229, supra, investing the Department of Agrarian Reform with original jurisdiction, generally, over
all cases involving agrarian laws, although, as shall shortly be pointed out, it restores to the Regional Trial Court, limited
jurisdiction over two groups of cases. Section 50 reads as follows:
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
[DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases,
disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every
case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of
procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it.
It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports, compel the
production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and
to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise have the power to punish direct and
indirect contempts in the same manner and subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.
x x x
Notwithstanding an appeal to the court of appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory." 9
The Regional Trial Courts have not, however, been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters.
Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand, confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional
Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court at least one (1) branch within each province to act as such. These
Regional Trial Courts qua Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57 of the same law, original and exclusive
jurisdiction over:
1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners," and
2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . [the] Act."
In these cases, "(t)he Rules of Court shall apply . . unless modified by . . . (the) Act."
It is relevant to mention in this connection that
(1) appeals from decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts "may be taken by filing a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of the decision, . ." 10 and
(2) appeals from any "decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter
pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on
agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by Certiorari 11 except as otherwise provided . . . within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof," the "findings of fact of the DAR [being] final and conclusive if
based on substantial evidence." 12
The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was therefore correct in dismissing Agrarian Case No. 1094. It being a case
concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving the "special jurisdiction" of said Trial
Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield the
adjudicatory powers of the Department, supra.
The petitioner had not bothered to substantiate her contention that she has been denied access to the courts, which is just
as well. The contention is on its face utterly without merit. It may profit her and her counsel to realize that apart from
granting all concerned parties access to a quasi-judicial forum (the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian
Reform), the law strives to make resolution of controversies therein more expeditious and inexpensive, by providing not
only that the Board "shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence," supra, but also that, as explicitly
stated by the penultimate paragraph of Section 50 of the Act::-cralaw
"Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers, or their organizations in any
proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, That when there are two or more representatives for any individual or
group, the representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent such party or group before any DAR
proceedings."
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No.
16725 dated October 23, 1989, AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, J J ., concur.


STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. JUAN B. AMANTE etal [G.R. No. 112526.
March 16, 2005]
JUAN B. AMANTE etal, vs. LUIS YULO etal [G.R. No. 118838. March 16, 2005]
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
A M E N D E D D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
By virtue of the En Banc Resolution issued on January 13, 2004, the Court authorized the Special First Division to
suspend the Rules so as to allow it to consider and resolve the second Motion for Reconsideration of respondents,[1] after
the motion was heard on oral arguments on August 13, 2003. On July 9, 2004,[2] the Court resolved to submit for
resolution the second Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 112526 together with G.R. No. 118338 in view of the
Resolution of the Court dated January 15, 2001 issued in G.R. No. 118838,[3] consolidating the latter case with G.R. No.
112526, the issues therein being interrelated.[4] Hence, the herein Amended Decision.
The factual background of the two cases is as follows:
The Canlubang Estate in Laguna is a vast landholding previously titled in the name of the late Speaker and Chief Justice
Jose Yulo, Sr. Within this estate are two parcels of land (hereinafter referred to as the subject property) covered by
TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891 measuring 254.766 hectares and part of Barangay Casile, subsequently titled in the name of
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (SRRDC), the majority stockholder of which is C.J. Yulo and Sons, Inc.
The subject property was involved in civil suits and administrative proceedings that led to the filing of G.R. Nos. 112526
and 118838, thus:
Injunction Case Filed by Amante, et al.
On December 6, 1985, Amante, et al., who are the private respondents in G.R. No. 112526 and petitioners in G.R. No.
118838, instituted an action for injunction with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Laguna (Branch 24) against Luis
Yulo, SRRDC, and several SRRDC security personnel, docketed as Civil Case No. B-2333. Amante, et al. alleged that:
they are residents of Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna, which covers an area of around 300 hectares; in 1910, their
ancestors started occupying the area, built their houses and planted fruit-bearing trees thereon, and since then, have
been peacefully occupying the land; some time in June 3, 1985, SRRDCs security people illegally entered Bgy. Casile
and fenced the area; SRRDCs men also entered the barangay on November 4, 1985, cut down the trees, burned their
huts, and barred the lone jeepney from entering the Canlubang Sugar Estate; as a result of these acts, Amante, et al.
were deprived of possession and cultivation of their lands. Thus, they claimed damages, sought the issuance of
permanent injunction and proposed that a right of way be declared.[5]
In their Answer, the defendants denied the allegations and disclaimed any control and supervision over its security
personnel. Defendant SRRDC also alleged that as the real owner of the property, it was the one that suffered damages
due to the encroachment on the property.[6]
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on August 17, 1987,[7] but this was subsequently dissolved by
the Court of Appeals (CA) on April 22, 1988 in its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 13908.[8]
After trial on the merits, the trial court, on January 20, 1992, rendered a decision ordering Amante, et al. to vacate the
property, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs
hereby dismissing the complaint and amended complaint.
The plaintiffs are hereby ordered to vacate the parcels of land belonging to the defendants Luis Yulo and Sta. Rosa
Realty. They are likewise enjoined from entering the subject parcels of land.
Although attorneys fees and expenses of litigation are recoverable in case of a clearly unfounded civil action against the
plaintiff (Enervida vs. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 339), this Court resolves not to award attorneys fees etc. in favor of the
defendants because the plaintiffs appear to have acted in good faith in filing the present civil action (Salao vs. Salao, 70
SCRA 65) and that it would not be just and equitable to award the same in the case at bar. (Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals,
121 SCRA 354) Accordingly, the other reliefs prayed for by the defendants are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Amante, et al. appealed the aforesaid decision to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 38182.
On June 28, 1994, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court in the injunction case. The dispositive
portion of the appellate courts decision[10] reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment herein appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the defendants-
appellees are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs-appellants nominal damages in the amount of
P5,000.00 per plaintiff. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Nominal damages were awarded by the CA because it found that SRRDC violated Amante, et al.s rights as possessors
of the subject property.[12]
Amante, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, pointing out the DARABs decision placing the property under
compulsory acquisition, and the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 27234, affirming the same.[13] The CA, however, denied
the motion, with the modification that only SRRDC and the defendants-security guards should be held jointly and severally
liable for the nominal damages awarded. It also made the clarification that the decision should not preempt any judgment
or prejudice the right of any party in the agrarian reform case pending before the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 112526).[14]
Thus, Amante, et al. filed on March 2, 1995, herein petition, docketed as G.R. No. 118838 on the following grounds:
4.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED THE CASE CONTRARY TO LAW OR APPLICABLE SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS BECAUSE:
4.1.1 FIRST, PETITIONERS MAY NOT BE LAWFULLY EVICTED FROM THEIR
LANDHOLDINGS CONSIDERING THAT:
-- (A) PETITIONERS ARE ALREADY THE REGISTERED OWNERS UNDER
THE TORRENS SYSTEM OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION SINCE FEBRUARY 26,
1992 BY VIRTUE OF RA 6657 OR THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW;
-- (B) THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS AFFIRMED THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF LAGUNAS DISMISSAL OF THE EJECTMENT CASES FILED BY
RESPONDENT SRRDC AGAINST PETITIONERS; AND
-- (C) ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT ONLY THAT PETITIONERS
ARE NOT YET THE REGISTERED OWNERS OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION,
RESPONDENTS MAY NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP IN THIS CASE FOR
INJUNCTION WITH DAMAGES, THE SAME TO BE VENTILATED IN A SEPARATE
ACTION, NOT IN THIS CASE BROUGHT TO PREVENT RESPONDENTS FROM
COMMITTING FURTHER ACTS OF DISPOSSESSION [BACAR V. DEL ROSARIO ET AL.,
171 SCRA 451 (1989)].
4.1.2 SECOND, PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO MORAL, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS FEES, INSTEAD OF MERE NOMINAL DAMAGES, CONSIDERING THAT THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOUND RESPONDENTS TO HAVE UNLAWFULLY AND ILLEGALLY
DISTURBED PETITIONERS PEACEFUL AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION.[15]
Ejectment Cases Filed by SRRDC
Between October 1986 and August 1987, after the injunction case was filed by Amante, et al., SRRDC filed with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna, several complaints for forcible entry with preliminary injunction and
damages against Amante, et al., docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 250, 258, 260, 262 and 266. SRRDC alleged that some
time in July 1987, they learned that Amante, et al., without their authority and through stealth and strategy, were clearing,
cultivating and planting on the subject property; and that despite requests from SRRDCs counsel, Amante, et al. refused
to vacate the property, prompting them to file the ejectment cases.[16] Amante, et al. denied that SRRDC are the absolute
owners of the property, stating that they have been in peaceful possession thereof, through their predecessors-in-interest,
since 1910.[17]
On May 24, 1991, the MTC-Cabuyao rendered its decision in favor of SRRDC. Amante, et al. were ordered to surrender
possession and vacate the subject property. The decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna
(Assisting Court).
On February 18, 1992, the RTC dismissed the ejectment cases on the ground that the subject property is an agricultural
land being tilled by Amante, et al., hence it is the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), which has jurisdiction over the
dispute.[18] The RTCs dismissal of the complaints was brought to the CA via a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 33382.[19] In turn, the CA dismissed the petition per its Decision dated January 17, 1995 on the ground that
SRRDC failed to show any prior physical possession of the subject property that would have justified the filing of the
ejectment cases.[20] Also, the CA did not sustain the RTCs finding that the subject properties are agricultural lands and
Amante, et al. are tenant/farmers thereof, as the evidence on record does not support such finding. The parties did not
file any motion for reconsideration from the Court of Appeals dismissal, hence, it became final and executory.[21]
Administrative Proceedings
While the injunction and ejectment cases were still in process, it appears that in August, 1989, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage to SRRDC, informing petitioners that the property covered by TCT
Nos. T-81949, T-84891 and T-92014 is scheduled for compulsory acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP).[22] SRRDC filed its Protest and Objection with the MARO on the grounds that the area was not
appropriate for agricultural purposes, as it was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above, and that the occupants of
the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries.[23] Thereafter, as narrated in the Decision of
the Court dated October 12, 2001 in G.R. No. 112526, the following proceedings ensued:
On August 29, 1989, the farmer beneficiaries together with the BARC chairman answered the protest and objection
stating that the slope of the land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and economically viable for
agricultural purposes, as evidenced by the Certification of the Department of Agriculture, municipality of Cabuyao,
Laguna.
On September 8, 1989, MARO Belen dela Torre made a summary investigation report and forwarded the Compulsory
Acquisition Folder Indorsement (CAFI) to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (hereafter, PARO).
On September 21, 1989, PARO Durante Ubeda forwarded his endorsement of the compulsory acquisition to the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
On November 23, 1989, Acting Director Eduardo C. Visperas of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Development, DAR
forwarded two (2) Compulsory Acquisition Claim Folders covering the landholding of SRRDC, covered by TCT Nos. T-
81949 and T-84891 to the President, Land Bank of the Philippines for further review and evaluation.
On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of
acquisition to petitioner, stating that petitioners landholdings covered by TCT Nos. T-81949 and T-84891,
containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively,
had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
On February 6, 1990, petitioner SRRDC in two letters separately addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad and the
Director, Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, sent its formal protest, protesting not only the amount of
compensation offered by DAR for the property but also the two (2) notices of acquisition.
On March 17, 1990, Secretary Abad referred the case to the DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just
compensation under R.A. No. 6657, Section 16.
On March 23, 1990, the LBP returned the two (2) claim folders previously referred for review and evaluation to the
Director of BLAD mentioning its inability to value the SRRDC landholding due to some deficiencies.
On March 28, 1990, Executive Director Emmanuel S. Galvez wrote the Land Bank President Deogracias Vistan to
forward the two (2) claim folders involving the property of SRRDC to the DARAB for it to conduct summary
proceedings to determine the just compensation for the land.
On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines stating that its property under the aforesaid
land titles were exempt from CARP coverage because they had been classified as watershed area and were the subject
of a pending petition for land conversion.
On May 10, 1990, Director Narciso Villapando of BLAD turned over the two (2) claim folders (CACFs) to the Executive
Director of the DAR Adjudication Board for proper administrative valuation. Acting on the CACFs, on September 10,
1990, the Board promulgated a resolution asking the office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to first
resolve two (2) issues before it proceeds with the summary land valuation proceedings.
The issues that need to be threshed out were as follows: (1) whether the subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of
the Compulsory Acquisition Program of the CARP; and (2) whether the petition for land conversion of the parcels of land
may be granted.
On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR, through the Undersecretary for Operations (Assistant
Secretary for Luzon Operations) and the Regional Director of Region IV, submitted a report answering the two
issues raised. According to them, firstly, by virtue of the issuance of the notice of coverage on August 11, 1989,
and notice of acquisition on December 12, 1989, the property is covered under compulsory acquisition.
Secondly, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, Section IV D also supports the DAR position on the
coverage of the said property. During the consideration of the case by the Board, there was no pending petition
for land conversion specifically concerning the parcels of land in question.
On February 19, 1991, the Board sent a notice of hearing to all the parties interested, setting the hearing for the
administrative valuation of the subject parcels of land on March 6, 1991. However, on February 22, 1991, Atty. Ma. Elena
P. Hernandez-Cueva, counsel for SRRDC, wrote the Board requesting for its assistance in the reconstruction of the
records of the case because the records could not be found as her co-counsel, Atty. Ricardo Blancaflor, who originally
handled the case for SRRDC and had possession of all the records of the case was on indefinite leave and could not be
contacted. The Board granted counsels request and moved the hearing on April 4, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition to the Board for the latter to resolve SRRDCs petition for
exemption from CARP coverage before any administrative valuation of their landholding could be had by the
Board.
On April 4, 1991, the initial DARAB hearing of the case was held and subsequently, different dates of hearing were set
without objection from counsel of SRRDC. During the April 15, 1991 hearing, the subdivision plan of subject property at
Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna was submitted and marked as Exhibit 5 for SRRDC. At the hearing on April 23, 1991, the
Land Bank asked for a period of one month to value the land in dispute.
At the hearing on April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy Zoning Administrator Generoso B. Opina was presented. The
certification issued on September 8, 1989, stated that the parcels of land subject of the case were classified as Industrial
Park per Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 45-89 dated March 29, 1989.
To avert any opportunity that the DARAB might distribute the lands to the farmer beneficiaries, on April 30, 1991,
petitioner filed a petition with DARAB to disqualify private respondents as beneficiaries. However, DARAB refused to
address the issue of beneficiaries.[24]. . .
On December 19, 1991, the DARAB promulgated a decision, affirming the dismissal of the protest of SRRDC against the
compulsory coverage of the property covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Board hereby orders:
1. The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the compulsory coverage of the landholdings of Sta.
Rosa Realty Development Corporation (Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 81949 and 84891 with an area of
254.766 hectares) in Barangay Casile, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is hereby affirmed;
2. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation the amount of
Seven Million Eight Hundred Forty-One Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and Sixty-Four
centavos (P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered by the two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title mentioned
above. Should there be a rejection of the payment tendered, to open, if none has yet been made, a trust
account for said amount in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation;
3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to cancel with dispatch Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
84891 and 81949 and new one be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, free from liens and
encumbrances;
4. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources either through its Provincial Office in Laguna or the
Regional Office, Region IV, to conduct a final segregation survey on the lands covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 so the same can be transferred by the Register of Deeds to the
name of the Republic of the Philippines;
5. The Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Agrarian
Reform Office to take immediate possession on the said landholding after Title shall have been transferred to
the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and distribute the same to the immediate issuance of
Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of
Cabuyao, Laguna.[25]
On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a memorandum directing the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) to open a trust account in favor of SRRDC, for P5,637,965.55, as valuation for the SRRDC property.
The titles in the name of SRRDC were cancelled and corresponding TCTs were issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines on February 11, 1992,[26] after which Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
were issued in the name of the farmers-beneficiaries on February 26, 1992.[27]
In the meantime, SRRDC had filed with the CA a petition for review of the DARABs decision, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 27234.
On November 5, 1993, the CA affirmed the decision of DARAB, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB decision dated December 19, 1991 is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to
petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation ventilating its case with the Special Agrarian Court on the issue of
just compensation.[28]
Hence, SRRDC filed on November 24, 1993, herein petition, docketed as G.R. No. 112526 on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF ITS JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THE SRRDC PROPERTIES, DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT OF THEIR
NON-AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATION PRIOR TO RA 6657, ARE COVERED BY THE CARP CONTRARY TO THE
NATALIA REALTY DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
i. The SRRDC properties have been zoned and approved as PARK since 1979.
ii. The SRRDC properties form part of a watershed area.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF ITS JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING ECOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AS MANDATED BY LAW.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF ITS JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SRRDC PROPERTIES TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE BEEN JUDICIALLY DECLARED AS SQUATTERS AND THEREFORE ARE NOT
QUALIFIED BENEFICIARIES PURSUANT TO THE CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY DECISION OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT.
i. The acquisition of the SRRDC properties cannot be valid for future beneficiaries.
ii. Section 22 of RA 6657 insofar as it expands the coverage of the CARP to landless residents is
unconstitutional.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF ITS JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DARAB HAS JURISDICTION TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER THE SRRDC PROPERTIES ARE SUBJECT TO CARP COVERAGE.[29]
On October 12, 2001, the Court rendered its Decision in G.R. No. 112526 only, setting aside the decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 27234 and ordering the remand of the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the
nature of the land. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27234.
In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the
parcels of land involved to resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.
In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be
stayed by the temporary restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final decision
on the case.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[30]
It is the opinion of the Court in G.R. No. 112526, that the property is part of a watershed, and that during the hearing at
the DARAB, there was proof that the land may be excluded from the coverage of the CARP because of its high
slopes.[31] Thus, the Court concluded that a remand of the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation of the issue of coverage
is appropriate in order to resolve the true nature of the subject property.[32]
In their Memorandum, Amante, et al. argues that there exist compelling reasons to grant the second motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision of the Court, to wit:
2.1 Only QUESTIONS OF LAW are admittedly and undeniably at issue; yet the Honorable Court reviewed the findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals and the DARAB although the case does not fall into any of the well-recognized
exceptions to conduct a factual review. Worse, the 12 October 2001 Decision assumed facts not proven before any
administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial bodies;
2.2 The DARAB and the Court of Appeals already found the land to be CARPable; yet the Honorable Court remanded
the case to DARAB to re-evaluate if the land is CARPable;
2.3 The Decision did not express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based;
2.4 The Decision renewed the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 15 December 1993, issuance of which is barred
by Sec. 55 of R.A. 6657; and
2.5 This Honorable Court denied private respondents Motion for Reconsideration although issues raised therein were
never passed upon in the 12 October 2001 Decision or elsewhere.[33]
The DAR and the DARAB, through the Office of the Solicitor General, did not interpose any objection to the second
motion for reconsideration. It also maintained that if SRRDCs claim that the property is watershed is true, then it is the
DENR that should exercise control and supervision in the disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation
of the property.[34]
SRRDC meanwhile insists that there are no compelling reasons to give due course to the second motion for
reconsideration.[35]
At the outset, the Court notes that petitioner designated its petition in G.R. No. 112526 as one for review on certiorari of
the decision of the CA. In the same breath, it likewise averred that it was also being filed as a special civil action for
certiorari as public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion.[36] Petitioner should not have been allowed, in the
first place, to pursue such remedies simultaneously as these are mutually exclusive.[37]
It is SRRDCs claim that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the subject property is agricultural in
nature. In support of its contention, it argued, among others, that the subject property had already been classified as
park since 1979 under the Zoning Ordinance of Cabuyao, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB); that it forms part of a watershed; and that the CA disregarded ecological considerations.[38] SRRDC also
claimed that Amante, et al. are not qualified beneficiaries.[39]
Clearly, these issues are factual in nature, which the Court, as a rule, should not have considered in this case. However,
there are recognized exceptions, e.g., when the factual inferences of the appellate court are manifestly mistaken; the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; or the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts
that, if properly considered, would justify a different legal conclusion.[40] The present cases fall under the above
exceptions.
Thus, in order to finally set these cases to rest, the Court shall resolve the substantive matters raised, which in effect
comes down to the issue of the validity of the acquisition of the subject property by the Government under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL).
As noted earlier, the DARAB made its finding regarding the nature of the property in question, i.e., the parcels of land are
agricultural and may be the subject of compulsory acquisition for distribution to farmer-beneficiaries, thus:
Ocular inspections conducted by the Board show that the subject landholdings have been under the possession and
tillage of the DAR identified potential beneficiaries which they inherited from their forebears (workers of the Yulo Estate).
They are bonafide residents and registered voters (DARAB Exhibits C and J) of Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna.
There is a barangay road leading toward the barangay school and sites and the settlement has a barangay hall, church,
elementary school buildings (DARAB Exhibit Q), Comelec precincts (DARAB Exhibits J-1 and J-2), and other
structures extant in progressive communities. The barangay progressive development agencies, like the DECS, DA,
COMELEC, DAR and Support Services of Land Bank, DPWH, DTI and the Cooperative Development Authority have
extended support services to the community (DARAB Exhibits I, K to K-3, L, M, N, O, P to P-6). More
importantly, subject landholdings are suitable for agriculture. Their topography is flat to undulating 3-15% slope.
(Testimony of Rosalina Jumaquio, Agricultural Engineer, DAR, TSN, June 21, 1991, DARAB Exhibits F and
H). Though some portions are over 18% slope, nevertheless, clearly visible thereat are fruit-bearing trees, like
coconut, coffee, and pineapple plantations, etc. (see Petitioners Exhibits A to YYY and DARAB Exhibits A
to S, Records). In other words, they are already productive and fully developed.
. . .
As the landholdings of SRRDC subject of the instant proceedings are already developed not only as a community
but also as an agricultural farm capable of sustaining daily existence and growth, We find no infirmity in placing
said parcels of land under compulsory coverage. They do not belong to the exempt class of lands. The claim
that the landholding of SRRDC is a watershed; hence, belonging to the exempt class of lands is literally
throwing punches at the moon because the DENR certified that the only declared watershed in Laguna
Province and San Pablo City is the Caliraya-Lumot Rivers (Petitioners Exhibit A). A sensu contrario, the
landholdings subject herein are not.[41] (Emphasis supplied)
The evidence on record supports these findings, to wit:
1. Certification dated January 16, 1989 by the OIC Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office of
Laguna that the only declared watershed in the Laguna province and San Pablo City is the Caliraya-Lumot
Rivers No. 1570 dated September 1, 1976;[42]
2. Map prepared by Agricultural Engineer Rosalina H. Jumaquio showing that: a) the topography of the property
covered by TCT No. T-84891 topography is flat to undulating with a 5 to 10% slope; (b) it is suitable to
agricultural crops; and (c) the land is presently planted with diversified crops;[43]
3. Certification dated August 28, 1989 by APT Felicito Buban of the Department of Agriculture of Laguna that,
per his ocular inspection, the subject property is an agricultural area, and that the inhabitants main
occupation is farming;[44]
4. Pictures taken by MARO Belen La Torre of Cabuyao, Laguna, showing that the property is cultivated and
inhabited by the farmer-beneficiaries;[45]
SRRDC however, insists that the property has already been classified as a municipal park and beyond the scope of
CARP. To prove this, SRRDC submitted the following:
1. Certification dated March 1, 1991 by the Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna that the entire barangay of Casile
is delineated as Municipal Park;[46]
2. Certification dated March 11, 1991 by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board that the parcels of land
located in Barangay Casile are within the Municipal Park, based on the municipalitys approved General
Land Use Plan ratified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board as per Resolution No. 38-2 dated
June 25, 1980;[47]
3. Photocopies of pictures taken by Mr. Ernesto Garcia, Officer-in-Charge of the Special Project Section of CJ
Yulo and Sons, Inc., of portions of Barangay Casile;[48]
The Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert lands through local ordinance, especially
if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB.[49] Municipal Ordinance No. 110-54 dated November 3, 1979, enacted by
the Municipality of Cabuyao, divided the municipality into residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural and institutional
districts, and districts and parks for open spaces.[50] It did not convert, however, existing agricultural lands into
residential, commercial, industrial, or institutional. While it classified Barangay Casile into a municipal park, as shown in
its permitted uses of land map, the ordinance did not provide for the retroactivity of its classification. In Co vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,[51] it was held that an ordinance converting agricultural lands into residential or light industrial should be
given prospective application only, and should not change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal
relationships existing over such lands. Thus, it was stated:
A reading of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, series of 1981, does not disclose any provision converting
existing agricultural lands in the covered area into residential or light industrial. While it declared that after the passage of
the measure, the subject area shall be used only for residential or light industrial purposes, it is not provided therein that it
shall have retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands located within the zone which
are neither residential nor light industrial in nature. This simply means that, if we apply the general rule, as we must,
the ordinance should be given prospective operation only. The further implication is that it should not change
the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such lands [52]
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, agricultural land is defined as land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified
as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Section 3 (b) meanwhile defines agricultural activity as the
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of
such products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations
done by persons whether natural or juridical.
Before Barangay Casile was classified into a municipal park by the local government of Cabuyao, Laguna in November
1979, it was part of a vast property popularly known as the Canlubang Sugar Estate. SRRDC claimed that in May 1979,
the late Miguel Yulo allowed the employees of the Yulo group of companies to cultivate a maximum area of one
hectare each subject to the condition that they should not plant crops being grown by the Canlubang Sugar Estate, like
coconuts and coffee, to avoid confusion as to ownership of crops.[53] The consolidation and subdivision plan surveyed
for SRRDC on March 10-15, 1984[54] also show that the subject property is sugar land. Evidently, the subject property is
already agricultural at the time the municipality of Cabuyao enacted the zoning ordinance, and such ordinance should not
affect the nature of the land. More so since the municipality of Cabuyao did not even take any step to utilize the
property as a park.
SRRDC cites the case of Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. DAR,[55] wherein it was ruled that lands not devoted to agricultural
activity and not classified as mineral or forest by the DENR and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans
and zoning ordinances as approved by the HLURB and its preceding competent authorities prior to the enactment of R.A.
No. 6657 on June 15, 1988, are outside the coverage of the CARP. Said ruling, however, finds no application in the
present case. As previously stated, Municipal Ordinance No. 110-54 of the Municipality of Cabuyao did not provide for
any retroactive application nor did it convert existing agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, or
institutional. Consequently, the subject property remains agricultural in nature and therefore within the coverage of the
CARP.
Only on March 9, 2004, SRRDC filed with the Court a Manifestation pointing out DAR Order No. (E)4-03-507-309 dated
February 17, 2004, exempting from CARP coverage two parcels of land owned by SRRDC and covered by TCT Nos. T-
85573 and T-92014.[56] The DAR found that these properties have been re-classified into Municipal Parks by the
Municipal Ordinance of Cabuyao, Laguna, and are part of the Kabangaan-Casile watershed, as certified by the DENR.[57]
The Court notes however that the said DAR Order has absolutely no bearing on these cases. The herein subject property
is covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 34891, totally different, although adjacent, from the property referred to in said DAR
Order.
SRRDC also contends that the property has an 18% slope and over and therefore exempt from acquisition and
distribution under Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657. What SRRDC opted to ignore is that Section 10, as implemented by DAR
Administrative Order No. 13 dated August 30, 1990, also provides that those with 18% slope and over but already
developed for agricultural purposes as of June 15, 1988, may be allocated to qualified occupants.[58] Hence, even
assuming that the property has an 18% slope and above, since it is already developed for agricultural purposes, then it
cannot be exempt from acquisition and distribution. Moreover, the topography maps prepared by Agricultural Engineer
Rosalina H. Jumaquio show that the property to be acquired has a 5-10% flat to undulating scope;[59] that it is suitable to
agricultural crops;[60] and it is in fact already planted with diversified crops.[61]
Also, the Certification dated July 1, 1991 by Geodetic Engineer Conrado R. Rigor that the top portion of Barangay Casile
has a 0 to 18% slope while the side of the hill has a 19 to 75% slope,[62] was presented by SRRDC only during the
proceedings before the CA which had no probative value in a petition for review proceedings. The Court notes that
SRRDC had been given ample time and opportunity by the DARAB to prove the grounds for its protest and objection but
miserably failed to take advantage of such time and opportunity[63] in the DARAB proceedings.
SRRDC also contends that the property is part of a watershed, citing as evidence, the Certification dated June 26, 1991
by the Laguna Lake Development Authority that Barangay Casile is part of the watershed area of the Laguna Lake
Basin,[64] and the Final Report for Watershed Area Assessment Study for the Canlubang Estate dated July 1991
undertaken by the Engineering & Development Corporation of the Philippines.[65] It must be noted, however, that these
pieces of evidence were likewise brought to record only when petitioner filed its petition for review with the CA. The
DARAB never had the opportunity to assess these pieces of evidence.
The DARAB stated:
Noting the absence of evidence which, in the nature of things, should have been submitted by landowner SRRDC and to
avoid any claim of deprivation of its right to prove its claim to just compensation (Uy v. Genato, 57 SCRA 123). We
practically directed its counsel in not only one instance, during the series of hearings conducted, to do so. We even
granted continuances to give it enough time to prepare and be ready with the proof and documents. To Our dismay, none
was submitted and this constrained Us to take the failure/refusal of SRRDC to present evidence as a waiver or, at least,
an implied acceptance of the valuation made by the DAR.[66]
The same goes with the CA, which did not have the discretion to consider evidence in a petition for certiorari or petition for
review on certiorari outside than that submitted before the DARAB. The CA noted petitioners failure to present evidence
in behalf of its arguments, thus:
. . . It must be recalled that petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty itself had asked the DARAB in a petition dated March 18, 1991 to
allow it to adduce evidence in support of its position that the subject parcels of land are not covered by the CARP
beginning on the scheduled hearing dated April 4, 1991. And DARAB obliged as in fact the petitioner commenced to
introduce evidence. If petitioner failed to complete the presentation of evidence to support its claim of exemption from
CARP coverage, it has only itself to blame for which DARAB cannot be accused of not being impartial.[67]
Consequently, there is no need to order the remand of the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the
nature of the parcels of land involved. It runs contrary to orderly administration of justice and would give petitioner undue
opportunity to present evidence in support of its stance, an opportunity it already had during the DARAB proceedings, and
which opportunity it regrettably failed to take advantage of.
More significantly however, it is the DAR Secretary that originally declared the subject property as falling under
the coverage of the CARP.
Moreover, DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1990 (Rules and Procedure Governing Exemption of Lands from
CARP Coverage under Section 10, R.A. No. 6657) provides:
I. LEGAL MANDATE
The general policy under CARP is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as possible. However, Section 10, RA
6657 excludes and exempts certain types of lands from the coverage of CARP, to wit:
A. Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school
sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational
purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant
thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereof, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal
colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine
centers; and
. . .
II. POLICIES
In the application of the aforecited provision of law, the following guidelines shall be observed:
A. For an area in I.A to be exempted from CARP coverage, it must be actually, directly and exclusively used
and found to be necessary for the purpose so stated.
. . .
C. Lands which have been classified or proclaimed, and/or actually directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, and watersheds and mangroves
shall be exempted from the coverage of CARP until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of public domain, as provided for under Sec. 4(a) of RA
6657, and a reclassification of the said areas or portions thereof as alienable and disposable has been approved.
(Emphasis supplied)
In order to be exempt from coverage, the land must have been classified or proclaimed and actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for watershed purposes.[68] In this case, at the time the DAR issued the
Notices of Coverage up to the time the DARAB rendered its decision on the dispute, the subject property is yet to be
officially classified or proclaimed as a watershed and has in fact long been used for agricultural purposes. SRRDC relies
on the case of Central Mindanao University (CMU) vs. DARAB,[69] wherein the Court ruled that CMU is in the best
position to determine what property is found necessary for its use. SRRDC claims that it is in the best position to
determine whether its properties are necessary for development as park and watershed area.[70]
But SRRDCs reliance on the CMU case is flawed. In the CMU case, the subject property from the very beginning was
not alienable and disposable because Proclamation No. 476 issued by the late President Carlos P. Garcia already
reserved the property for the use of the school. Besides, the subject property in the CMU case was actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for educational purposes.
In the present case, the property is agricultural and was not actually and exclusively used for watershed purposes. As
records show, the subject property was first utilized for the purposes of the Canlubang Sugar Estate.[71] Later, petitioner
claimed that the occupants were allowed to cultivate the area so long as they do not plant crops being grown by the
Canlubang Sugar Estate in order to avoid confusion as to ownership thereof.[72] Thus, based on its own assertions, it
appears that it had benefited from the fruits of the land as agricultural land. Now, in a complete turnaround, it is claiming
that the property is part of a watershed.
Furthermore, in a belated attempt to prove that the subject property is part of a watershed that must be environmentally
protected, SRRDC submitted before the Court a Final Report dated February 1994 undertaken by the Ecosystems
Research and Development Bureau (ERDB) of the DENR entitled, Environmental Assessment of the Casile and
Kabanga-an River Watersheds.[73] The study, according to SRRDC, was made pursuant to a handwritten instruction
issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. The study noted that, the continuing threat of widespread deforestation and
unwise land use practices have resulted in the deteriorating condition of the watersheds.[74] But the Court also notes the
Memorandum for the President dated September 1993 by then DENR Secretary Angel C. Alcala that, after a field
inspection conducted by the DENRs Regional Executive Director and the Provincial and Community Natural Resource
Officers, it was found that:
. . .
2. Many bankal trees were found growing in the watershed/CARP areas, including some which have been
coppiced, and that water conduits for domestic and industrial uses were found installed at the watershed
area claimed by the Yulos. Records further show that in the 1970s, a Private Land Timber Permit was
issued to Canlubang Sugar Estate thru its marketing arm, the Sta. Rosa Realty Devpt. Corp.
3. Resident farmers denied that they have been cutting bankal trees and volunteered the information that one of
the Estates security guards was dismissed for cutting and transporting bankal trees. The trees cut by the
dismissed security guard were found stacked adjacent to the Canlubang Security Agencys
headquarters.[75]
Evidently, SRRDC had a hand in the degradation of the area, and now wants to put the entire blame on the farmer-
beneficiaries. It is reasonable to conclude that SRRDC is merely using ecological considerations to avert any disposition
of the property adverse to it.
SRRDC also objects to the identification of Amante, et al. as beneficiaries of the subject property. Suffice it to say that
under Section 15 of R.A. No. 6657, the identification of beneficiaries is a matter involving strictly the administrative
implementation of the CARP, a matter which is exclusively vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, through its
authorized offices. Section 15 reads:
SECTION 15. Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be
beneficiaries of the CARP. These potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall provide the
following data:
(a) names and members of their immediate farm household;
(b) owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of tenurial relationship;
(c) location and area of the land they work;
(d) crops planted; and
(e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.
A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be posted in the barangay hall,
school or other public buildings in the barangay where it shall be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.
Meanwhile, Administrative Order No. 10 (Rules and Procedures Governing the Registration of Beneficiaries), Series of
1989, provides:
SUBJECT: I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, the DAR, in coordination with
the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), as organized pursuant to RA 6657, shall register all agricultural
lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. This Administrative Order provides the
Implementing Rules and Procedures for the said registration.
. . .
B. Specific
1. Identify the actual and potential farmer-beneficiaries of the CARP.
In Lercana vs. Jalandoni,[76] the Court categorically stated that:
the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of
the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and beyond the
jurisdiction of the DARAB.[77]
The farmer-beneficiaries have already been identified in this case. Also, the DAR Secretary has already issued Notices of
Coverage and Notices of Acquisition pertaining to the subject property. It behooves the courts to exercise great caution in
substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative
agency,[78] which in these cases the Court finds none.
SRRDC questions the constitutionality of Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657, which reads in part:
SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to
landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the
following order of priority.
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.
. . .
SRRDC argues that Section 22 sweepingly declares landless residents as beneficiaries of the CARP (to mean also
squatters), in violation of Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution, which aims to benefit only the landless farmers and
regular farmworkers.[79]
The Court cannot entertain such constitutional challenge. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well-delineated, viz.:
(1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[80] (Emphasis supplied)
Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should have been immediately
raised in the proceedings in the court below,[81] in this case, the DAR Secretary. It must be pointed out that all
controversies on the implementation of the CARP fall under the jurisdiction of the DAR, even though they raise
questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature.[82] The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to
raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if it is not raised in the pleadings,
it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.[83] Records
show that SRRDC raised such constitutional challenge only before this Court despite the fact that it had the opportunity to
do so before the DAR Secretary. The DARAB correctly refused to deal on this issue as it is the DAR Secretary who,
under the law, has the authority to determine the beneficiaries of the CARP. This Court will not entertain questions on the
invalidity of a statute where that issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued[84] in the DAR.
Likewise, the constitutional question raised by SRRDC is not the very lis mota in the present case. Basic is the rule that
every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.[85] The controversy at
hand is principally anchored on the coverage of the subject property under the CARP, an issue that can be determined
without delving into the constitutionality of Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657. While the identification of Amante, et al. as
farmer-beneficiaries is a corollary matter, yet, the same may be resolved by the DAR.
SRRDC questions the DARABs jurisdiction to entertain the question of whether the subject property is subject to CARP
coverage.
According to SRRDC, such authority is vested with the DAR Secretary who has the exclusive prerogative to resolve
matters involving the administrative implementation of the CARP and agrarian laws and regulations.[86]
There is no question that the power to determine whether a property is subject to CARP coverage lies with the DAR
Secretary. Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
. . .
The DARs jurisdiction under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 is two-fold. The first is essentially executive and pertains to the
enforcement and administration of the laws, carrying them into practical operation and enforcing their due observance,
while the second is judicial and involves the determination of rights and obligations of the parties.[87]
Pursuant to its judicial mandate of achieving a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding before it,[88] the DAR adopted the DARAB Revised Rules, Rule II (Jurisdiction of the Adjudication Board) of
which provides:
SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and
matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No.
6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389,
Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:
a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered
by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws;
b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of
lease rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the
Land Bank;
c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of orders or decisions of DAR officials other than the Secretary, lease
contracts or deeds of sale or their amendments under the administration and disposition of the DAR and LBP;
d) Cases arising from, or connected with membership or representation in compact farms, farmers cooperatives and
other registered farmers associations or organizations, related to land covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;
e) Cases involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, pre-emption and redemption of agricultural lands under
the coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws;
f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
and Emancipation Patent (EP) and the administrative correction thereof;
g) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
Provided, however, that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP and other
agrarian laws and regulations, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 06-00,[89] which provides for the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law
Implementation (ALI) Cases, govern the administrative function of the DAR. Under said Rules of Procedure, the DAR
Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the CARP,
including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage. Section 2 of the said Rules specifically
provides, inter alia, that:
SECTION 2. Cases Covered. - These Rules shall govern cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary which shall include the following:
(a) Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP), including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage;
(b) Identification, qualification or disqualification of potential farmer-beneficiaries;
(c) Subdivision surveys of lands under CARP;
(d) Issuance, recall or cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in
cases outside the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the issuance, recall or cancellation of
Emancipation Patents (EPs) or Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) not yet registered with the Register of
Deeds;
(e) Exercise of the right of retention by landowner; . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the power to determine whether a property is agricultural and subject to CARP coverage together with the
identification, qualification or disqualification of farmer-beneficiaries lies with the DAR Secretary.[90]
Significantly, the DAR had already determined that the properties are subject to expropriation under the CARP
and has distributed the same to the farmer-beneficiaries.
Initially, the LBP forwarded the two Compulsory Acquisition Claim Folders (CACF) covering the subject properties to the
DARAB for summary proceedings for the sole purpose of determining just compensation. SRRDC then sent a letter to the
LBP claiming that the subject properties were exempt from CARP coverage and subject of a pending petition for land
conversion. As a consequence, the DARAB asked the DAR Secretary to first resolve the issues raised by SRRDC before
it can proceed with the land valuation proceedings. In response, the DAR, through the Undersecretary for Operations
and the Regional Director of Region IV, submitted its report stating that: (1) the property is subject to compulsory
acquisition by virtue of the Notice of Coverage issued on August 11, 1989, and Notice of Acquisition issued on December
12, 1989, and that it was subject to CARP coverage per Section IV D of DAR Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990;
and (2) there was no pending petition for land conversion involving the subject property. When SRRDC petitioned the
DARAB to resolve the issue of exemption from coverage, it was only then that the DARAB took cognizance of said
issue.[91]
As the DARAB succinctly pointed out, it was SRRDC that initiated and invoked the DARABs jurisdiction to pass upon the
question of CARP coverage. As stated by the DARAB:
4.5.2.2. The ISSUE ON CARP COVERAGE was initiated and incorporated in said proceeding, at the instance of
petitioner itself, by filing a petition dated March 18, 1991, Prayed therein were that DARAB:
1. Take cognizance and assume jurisdiction over the question of CARP coverage of the subject parcels of land;
2. Defer or hold in abeyance the proceedings for administrative valuation of the subject properties pending
determination of the question of CARP coverage;
3. Allow respondent SRRDC to adduce evidence in support of its position that the subject parcels of land are not
covered by the CARP beginning on the scheduled hearing date of April 4, 1991 (p.3; emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
Upon persistent request of petitioner SRRDC, it was accommodated by DARAB and a counsel of SRRDC even took the
witness stand. Its lawyers were always in attendance during the scheduled hearings until it was time for SRRDC to
present its own evidence.
4.5.2.3. But, as earlier stated, despite the open session proddings by DARAB for SRRDC to submit evidence and the
rescheduling for, allegedly, they are still collating the evidence, nay, the request that it be allowed to adduce evidence,
none was adduced and this constrained public respondent to declare SRRDC as having waived its right to present
evidence. And, after the remaining parties were heard, the hearing was formally terminated.
. . .
4.5.3. Needless to state, the jurisdictional objection (CARP coverage), now being raised herein was not one of the
original matters in issue. Principally, DARAB was called upon under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657 to
resolve a land valuation case. But SRRDC itself insisted that DARAB should take cognizance thereof in the same
land valuation proceeding. And, SRRDC, through its lawyers, actively participated in the hearings conducted.
4.5.4. It was only when an adverse decision was rendered by DARAB that the jurisdictional issue was raised in
the petition for review it filed with the Honorable Court of Appeals. It was also only then that petitioner presented
proof/evidence.
. . .
4.5.6. Public respondents (DAR/DARAB) are not unmindful of the rule that matter of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceeding. But for two serious considerations, the applicability thereof in the case at bar should not be
allowed.
4.5.6.1. The fact [part (municipal/industrial) and/or watershed] upon which the jurisdictional issue interchangeably hinges
were not established during the hearing of the case. No proof was adduced. That the matter of CARP coverage is strictly
administrative implementation of CARP and, therefore, beyond the competence of DARAB, belonging, as it does, to the
DAR Secretary, was not even alleged, either before DARAB or the Honorable Court of Appeals, the numerous
petitions/incidents filed notwithstanding. Be it that as it may, the records of the case show that initially DARAB refused to
take cognizance thereof and, in fact, forwarded the issue of CARP coverage to the office of the DAR Secretary. It was
only when it was returned to DARAB by said office that proceedings thereon commenced pursuant to Section 1(g) of Rule
II of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure.
4.5.6.2. Petitioner is now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of DARAB. First, it expressly acknowledged the
same, in fact invoked it, when it filed its petition (Annex 4); and, second, during the scheduled hearings,
SRRDC, through its counsel, actively participated, one of its counsel (sic) even testifying. It may not now be
allowed to impugn the jurisdiction of public respondent [92] (Emphasis supplied)
In CA-G.R. SP No. 27234, the CA likewise found that it was SRRDC that called upon the DARAB to determine the issue
and it, in fact, actively participated in the proceedings before it.[93] It was SRRDCs own act of summoning the DARABs
authority that cured whatever jurisdictional defect it now raises. It is elementary that the active participation of a party in a
case pending against him before a court or a quasi-judicial body, is tantamount to a recognition of that courts or bodys
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the
courts or bodys jurisdiction.[94]
Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction was raised by SRRDC only before the CA. It was never presented or discussed before
the DARAB for obvious reasons, i.e., it was SRRDC itself that invoked the latters jurisdiction. As a rule, when a party
adopts a certain theory, and the case is tried and decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to
change his theory on appeal.[95] Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at
such late stage.[96] To permit SRRDC to change its theory on appeal would not only be unfair to Amante, et al. but
would also be offensive to the basic scales of fair play, justice and due process.[97]
Finally, the Court notes that then DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a Memorandum on July 11, 1991, ordering
the opening of a trust account in favor of SRRDC. In Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, this Court struck
down as void DAR Administrative Circular No. 9, Series of 1990, providing for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of the
deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in Section 16 (e) of R.A. No. 6657. As a result, the DAR issued Administrative
Order No. 2, Series of 1996, converting trust accounts in the name of landowners into deposit accounts.[98] Thus, the
trust account opened by the LBP per instructions of DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong should be converted to a deposit
account, to be retroactive in application in order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a trust account and
to grant the landowners the benefits concomitant to payment in cash or LBP bonds prior to the ruling of the Court in Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals. The account shall earn a 12% interest per annum from the time the LBP
opened a trust account up to the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts.
Given the foregoing conclusions, the petition filed in G.R. No. 118838, which primarily rests on G.R. No. 112526, should
be granted.
The judgments of the trial court in the injunction case (Civil Case No. B-2333) and the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 38182 were
premised on SRRDCs transfer certificates of title over the subject property. The trial court and the CA cannot be faulted
for denying the writ of injunction prayed for by Amante, et al. since at the time the trial court rendered its decision in the
injunction case on January 20, 1992, SRRDC was still the holder of the titles covering the subject property. The titles in
its name were cancelled and corresponding TCTs were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines on February
11, 1992, and CLOAs were issued to the farmer-beneficiaries on February 26, 1992. When Amante, et al., in their motion
for reconsideration filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 38182, brought to the CAs attention the issuance of the CLOAs, the CA, per
Resolution dated January 19, 1995, reiterated its ruling that whether or not the subject property is covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657) is the subject matter of a separate case, and we cannot interfere
with the same at the present time. The CA further stated that (O)ur present decision is, therefore, not intended to
preempt any judgment or prejudice the right of any party in the said case.[99] It must be noted that at that juncture, the
DARAB Decision and the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 27234, finding the subject property covered by the CARP Law,
is yet to be finally resolved by this Court in G.R. No. 112526 and in fact, a temporary restraining order was issued by the
Court on December 15, 1993, enjoining the DARAB from enforcing the effects of the CLOAs. Amante, et al. was likewise
restrained from further clearing the subject property.[100] Hence, the decision of the trial court and the CA denying the
writ of injunction was warranted.
Nevertheless, considering that the subject property is agricultural and may be acquired for distribution to farmer-
beneficiaries identified by the DAR under the CARP, the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines and the CLOAs issued by the DAR in the names of Amante, et al.,[101] are valid titles and therefore must
be upheld. By virtue thereof, Amante, et al. who have been issued CLOAs are now the owners of the subject
property. Consequently, the decisions of the trial court in the injunction case and the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 38182 must
now be set aside, insofar as it orders Amante, et al. to vacate and/or enjoins them from entering the subject property.
The Court, however, agrees with the CA that Amante, et al. is not entitled to actual, moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorneys fees. SRRDCs right of possession over the subject property was predicated on its claim of ownership,
and it cannot be sanctioned in exercising its rights or protecting its interests thereon. As was ruled by the CA, Amante, et
al. is merely entitled to nominal damages as a result of SRRDCs acts.[102]
All is not lost in this case. In its Memorandum dated September 29, 1993, to the DAR Secretary, the DENR manifested
that:
. . . the farmers themselves could be tapped to undertake watershed management and protection. This community-based
approach in natural resource management, is in fact, being used in numerous watershed management projects
nationwide. Adopting the same approach in the area is deemed the best possible solution to the case since it will not
prejudice the CLOAs issued to the farmer-beneficiaries. They should, however, be required to undertake the necessary
reforestation and other watershed management/rehabilitation measures in the area.
In view of the foregoing, we recommend that a watershed management plan for the area espousing the community-based
approach be drawn-up jointly by the DAR and DENR. . . .[103]
If SRRDC sincerely wants to preserve the property for ecological considerations, it can be done regardless of who owns
it. After all, we are all stewards of this earth, and it rests on all of us to tend to it.
WHEREFORE, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Courts Decision dated October 12, 2001 in
G.R. No. 112526 is SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 5, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No.
27234 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that the Land Bank of the Philippines is ordered to convert the trust account
in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation to a deposit account, subject to a 12% interest per annum from
the time the LBP opened a trust account up to the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP bonds
deposit accounts. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on December 15, 1993, is LIFTED.
The petition filed by Amante, et al. in G.R. No. 118838 is GRANTED in that Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation is
hereby ENJOINED from disturbing the peaceful possession of the farmer-beneficiaries with CLOAs. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated June 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 38182 is AFFIRMED insofar as the award of nominal damages
is concerned.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Department of Agrarian Reform, in coordination with the
farmer-beneficiaries identified by the DAR, are URGED to formulate a community-based watershed plan for the
management and rehabilitation of Barangay Casile.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.