ISSN 0(M9.

2310
THE SOVIET SPRING OFFENSIVE
12 MAY TO 21 MAY 1942
2
S&T nr. 88, publl, hed Mey/ Jun.1978
In this issue page
StraQy
8(!5tICS KHARKOV 4
The Magazine of Conflict Simulation
.,;,,,,,10>1,,,,: . 000
The Soviet Spring Offensive
12 May t021 May 1942
Editor/ Publisher
James F. Dunnigan
Art Director/ Co-Editor
Redmond A. Simonsen
Stephen B, Patrick
Simulation: R1
EdilorM/; Joe 8alkoeki, Howard 8..-asch. Richard Berg. Eric: Goldberg.
Marty Goidt.>erver. Mart. Harman, Sf..:! Hessel, Oavid C.lsby, Tony MIII' -
ridy. Slept>en B. Pallid<., StlMN1 Rou, RobertJ . RYl!<. Sid Sack..,n, linde
Sapin, Thomas Walczyk, Oavid Werd8f1. Graphic Production; Larry
Ce'liano. Kate HIgIII.... Manfred Mllkuhn, Stepllen PlrI(In . Ad
minI,/ral;"": Theul ... Canto. Ida ChianoeM\e, Tom Domenech, Eugene
Harty, Sidnev Irgang, Carl Jacobsen, Jotm Undem&rm, Anna lomb/l.do.
George Murisoo, Bridge' Murphy. Sarba,. Winiam O'COOnof,
Kathy Tenn'f8O'l. G_ Eullhn60n and RIS8MCh Aui$tlmce: Martin
Campion, Omar DeWitt, 51_List, LeoNiehomer, Joe SBli;a.
KHARKOV
The Soviet Spring Offensive
12 Mey to 21 May 1942
AGINCOURT
Stephen B. Patrick
Redmond A. Simonsen
25
Original EditOland FoundM; Christopher WIIlIn&f
PriMinglJ 8inding: American p,_. Inc .. Gordonsville, V .
Die Currirtg: Fl'Mdmllln Oie-Cuttert, NswYork, N.Y.
The Triumph of Archery Over Armor
STRATEGY & TACTICS Magazine Is cOpyrlgl\t CI 1978 by Simuiatiool
PubliutioN. Inc. Printed in USA. A. rights .--.ed. All fldilorilll lind
geneflll m&II should be Hnt to Simulalic>nl Publiclltio ... Inc . 44 East 23<d
Slr1Iet New Yol'1<. N.Y. 10010. STRATEGY & TACTICS is published bi-
monthly. One vee. (.uc iuulliaubtcriptio .. a ... '4,00. PIeeM MAd checks
or money Ofde<s only. easic ed fill is .',5!iO PI< plglI for g.a ....... " '.,1I0<I
p.Qducts.
25 October 1415 AI Nofi
GREAT BRITAIN & EUROPE: British and Europeen customers should
place thIII. Ofde<s for SPI products or aubKriplic>nl with SIMULATIONS
PUBLICATIONS. UNITEO KINGDOM, C.own Passages, HII&, Altrinchem,
.. , WA 15 9SP, UoitOlod Kingdom. Billie aubscription tlte for SPUK
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should pIaca orden with MILITARY SI MULATIONS PlY LTO., 18 Fonceca
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Simulalic>nl Publicatlo .. , Inc. does notuaue!ly consid .. lor publication un
1IOIicit0<l g.amw IOld lI<Iiclet aubmitled fa S9T or Slmulationa S .. ies
Games. Freqlillfltty, however, unsolicited metnl dNling with g.arne
or will find publication in MOVES Magazine. In 1111 eases.
SPI cannot-.me f8I4)OIlSibiIity f or such unsolicited melerial ,
OUTGOING MAIL
BRIEFINGS
FOR YOUR EYES ONLY
DATAFILEOO4
FEEDBACK
S&T nr. 6B ENCLOSURES:
The Editors 2
15
21
38
Vox Populi, Vox Dei 42
The publication 01 paid lIdvwtisements In SPI publications does nol <;on-
.titutl an by SPI of the goods Of services oIferad. SPI does,
however, allllmPt 10 prevenl fff\Jdulent Of misleadiny paid advertisements
from Ippearing In its publicallorw. SPI.-- thll nghtlo .ajtlct any paid
it consideni misleadl!'9 0. hermful. 01 oIfensivelo the Hn
aIbIIiti8J 01 the edilOlS or the .tIIIde<shlp.
1. Kharkov Playing Piece. 3. Business Reply Order Form
2. Kharkov Game Map 4. Special Offar/ Feedback Forms
Ad\l8flisements 01 SPI products e .. becked by a guatlnt$$d c.edit Of ctlsh
refund lupon prompt Ullum of the productl if the buyer is dissatisfied 0'
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SIMULATIONS PUBLICATIONS, INC.
Looking Ahead to Next Time
The game will be Tllnnenburg, an
level simulation of the Russian offensive into
eastern Prl,I ssla in the autumn of 1914. Oeve Isby is
the designer. An overview of the First World Waf
in the eallt written by Richard Spence will also
appear. A second article wrinen by Charles Kampt
will analyze another Russian offensive to the West
- the one that could begin tomorrow (or anytime
in the next few yeara) in Europe. Plu. our regular
features. Domestic Subscribers: If you have not
received your copy of S&T69 by 12 September
1978, notify our Customer Service Department.
Please include your Customer Code and issue of
expiratiotl, both of which may be found on this
issue's maiting label. Just above your name.
Foreign Subscribers: Add eight weeks to the
above to allow for the snaif-like pace of inter-
national mail .
44 Ealt 23rd Street. New York, N.Y. 10010 Telephone (2121673-4103
Outgoing Mail
1I-I1I'*lIling TtfIfIds, p. 2
Won in Progf8SS, p. 19
FeedbIIcl:, p. 19
8ig Tsimmi$. p. ' 9
NOI6S from Undergroond. p. 19
GO$Si(J, p. 20
Marketing Trends
I could write an eyeful 01 marketing trends
every month. but the changes seem more drastic If
we do it less frequentlY. One of the most dramatic
changes is nOt really a change at all, but the
Culmination of a long-present demand: the de-
mand for information in games. All the games
con tam mformation. That's what makes an
historical game an historical game. But while there
is a discernable minimum of information, the max-
imum is way out there somewhere. Somewhere in
the neighborhood of the larger games. Bigger may
not always be bener, but it can ohen mean more
mformation. which explaIns a lot of the popularity
of the larger games. We have found that they are
not played as much assmaller games, not so much
because of their SIze, but more because people
want them primarily for mformatlon. Those of you
more inclined to playing the g.ames la mmOflty
among those who conscIously buy the gamesl are
getting fewer "playe." games. prlmarllv because
the demand is for more informational games. And
presently these a.e only .ecognlzed as being the
larger games.
People should not look at things thIS way, and
in o.de. to rectify thasitua\lon, we ara
a number of ma.ketmg changes. Fi.st, we have
already begun publishing additional hIStorical
material with all Inearly alii new games. The sec
ond change is a b,t more dramatIc. We are raIsIng
the prices of new games thst have a lower thsn
average proiected sales. ThIS will mean more
gsmes flom "obscure" peflods and situatIons.
Previously such games SImply dId not get pub-
lished. because to do so would put us out of
busmess. All elements of this operatIon are based
on selling games in certain QuantiheS at a certaIn
price while Incurring certain COSIS. The
of thIS formula had to remain fairly fi)(ed in order

AGINCOURT
The Triumph of Archery Over Armor
Ranged Artillery Fire Innovative Morale and Fugitive Rules
Leader to Leader Personal Combat Rules
The Captain 01 the West County archers
turned to face hiS live CDntOn.ars and
shou ted "Ten scorel" ThnlY' 8lght yards 10
hiS rear. and to the left lind right, Ihe Cap-
tain's Ilvo Centenars wheeled. each to face
hiS own respecbv8 live Vlnte"ars, and
repeated the command "Ten scorel" CriSp-
ly, the order passed to the eighteen Of so ar-
chers who were deployed In three hies behind
each V,IHanar maSIDr archer. The Vlntenars
fle.ed their long bows and angled them sky-
ward \0 bring t heir clolhvard sh.a/ts \0 the
ground some 200 yards away The Captain,
who had resumed the lasle 01 tracing the
enemy advance, now turned again to shout
the awaited command: "loose]" Within
seconds, nearlv 500 steel-tipped arrows
streaked through the air in 8 deadly parabola.
Two hundred yards across a muddy flek:l. the
charging body of the Cornte de Vendome's
5CKl armored horsemen shuddered al the Im-
pact of the heil of destructIOn Dozens of
horses went down, most 01 their flders m-
jured and effectlvaly eliminated from the b<It -
,.
Ten seconds latel. anolhe!' volley of ar-
rOWSSlfuck And fmally. anothe!' By the time
the horsemen had crossed the held, nearly
half theIr numbel' - the f,nest chIvalry 01
15th Century France - lay broken on the
ground. 01 those who escaped the deat hly
hall. many Impaled themselves on the sharp
wooden Slakes behind whICh lhe archers had
retrealed. Ihe remaInder retrealed Ig-
nomInIOUsly The Battle 01 AglncOUrt had
begun 85 It WOUld end, WIth English longbow
lire slaughtermg French Ch,valry .
Agmcourt was a uniqlle bat Ue, and a
unique game has been deSIgned 10 simulale
It HIstorically. the English wele heavily out-
numbered. Yflt they won handIly Thel! VIC
tory was allrlbutable both 10 the'f own Inlrln-
SIC advantages over the French, and 10 the
way In whIch the English eKploued land the
French played intol these advantages. II was
necessary 10 Slmulata the dynamICS 01 the
battle. whIle Illuslfat,ng the ellects 01 seem-
Ingly Instgnlhcant alternallWl possiblhllBS
whose ellects could mushroom Into
decISIveness
The Agincourt deSIgn has broken new
glound In several areas. For eKample, the sIze
01100 counters IS related to the actual SIze 01
lhe unIt Hence, while nOfmal -Slzed 1%- by
~ -, counters are used 10 represent the small ,
lIeKlble English formatrons. double-sLZe U-
by Y, 0) counters are used lor lhe massIve and
clumsy French "baUles "
Morale is criticalm Agincourt After any
combat loss, there IS a chance that fugI tIves
may stream towards the rear, affectIng lhe
morale 01 any oncomIng troops There are
count ers which represent the actual
casualtIeS whICh, on the restriCted Aglncourt
bailie/laid, literally piled up 10 further affect
the morale of troops attempting to advance
Archery fire is covered In detail, wi th
rules l or range 8UenuatiOn, affect on r ~
mared an.cl ur'IIIrmored targets, rates of fire,
and arrow supply The English can lire al a
del/aSIa!lng fate, but the supply 01 arrows IS
l iMIte, and IhO\lgh some shafts can be
"retr ieved". they must be employed
JudicIOusly.
One of the more interesting aspects 01
tho game IS the IndIVidual hand-to-hand com-
bat system used lor leaders VICIOIY IS
measured 10 some extent by the numbel" of
enemy leaders capll.n ed Iwhlch were Subject
to ransoml and kIlled. and each side utiliZes
leaders and theIr household retaIners 10 roam
about the batUelreld In search of opposmg
leaders.
SpecIal rules Include the SUICide squad
bent on kIlling Kmg Henry, lhe French
Burgundl8n and ArmanJOC ContIngents, the
u-ansport and deploymenl 01 the archers'
Slakes, and the constraIntS 01 "decorum"
thaI restrICted Ihe Ulctical alternatIves 01 the
French.
Palnstakmgly researched down 10 lhe
heraldry 01 the IndIVIdual lamlhes Involved.
AglflCOUn IS not merely another collectIon 01
WWII mechanICS dressed up with Medieval
names But despIte lIS novelty, the game
system is playable and clean.
Agincourt will sell for $10. Available 30 June 1978.
3
4
THE SOVIET SPRING OFFENSIVE
The war between Germany and the Soviet Union was such a monumental war that many battles which, in
other wars, would be considered major conflicts, pale to relative insignificance. Relative to the battles
before Moscow in 1941 or the drive on Stalingrad. the fighting which took place in May 1942 around
Khark.ov was a small battle. Yet six Soviet armies and parts of three German armies were involved.
In the spring of 1942, both the Germans and the Soviets began to think of going on the offenSive. The
Soviets had made major gains In their winter offensive in 1941 and felt that they were ready to take advan-
tage of the good summer weather, once the spring muds were gone. The Germans, by contrast, Viewed the
winter fighting as a temporary set-back and a fluke brought about by German over-confidence and Soviet
good luck. The German high command saw no reason why they could not, by repeating their 1941 suc-
cesses, wrap up the war in 1942.
Formation of Izyum Pocket:
Winler 1942
.....

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0. 199

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v ..... 2.53
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8alaklea 0.
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Karlovka
lzyum
K rasnograd
m
<-.; 210
2.5.5 341
71h 8de
3J5 333
....
...
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1821
Dniepropetrovosk
Kon$tantmorka
by Stephen B.Patrick
Fall B/au
The German plan was Cillied r(JH Blav (Case
Blue! Hitler had actually planned \0 call II Fall
Sl6gfried ICase Slegfriedl, but when he con-
templated the defeats which marked the end of
the 1941 BarbaroSSB offenSIVe. he decoded that he
would Stay away from calling OPerations names
whICh were drawn !rom German herOIC ltadJlJOOS
He I'Iad become SUpelStJllOUS about those thingS,
In the same way he renamed the pocket battleship
Deutset/mOO 85 Lutzow, to .!Vold having defeat at-
tached \0 things which werll central \0 the Ger-
manIC myth he was wOI'km9 on.
1'811 8lauwould be a Plnan operauon aimed al
pocketing the SOVMlIS between the Donets and the
Don, followed by II dove \0 secure the 011 fields In
the CauCilSlJs. Aher Ihal, II lhe SOYlelS had any
light lelt, the Germans would swing up the Volga
Rivet hne and take Moscow /rom lhal direction
PrOYlded the campaign came off 85 planned,
Hitler calculated that the SOViets would realty be
finIShed - probablv not an Invalid assumption
The lirst step would be a minor opefatlOfl tin
relationship to the whole campalgnllOvolvlng the
redUCtion of the bulge south of Khalkov, located
around Izyum and BafVenkovo. ThiS preliminary
operation was to be called FrideficuS. The plan
was to reduce the bulge, secure the Donets rNer
IlOe, regroup, and then Jump 011 IOf FaN BlBu
The German attack was scheduled to begin
18 Mav 1942. However, In one 01 hlstorv's ,ronIeS,
the SOVl8ts locused on the same bulge for thell
planned operation Khe/kov was an Important (;Ity
in the Ukraine, second onlV to Kiev In prestige
value, nOt to mention real value. Recapturing
Kharkov would set the tone for the whole year's
operallonsand, hopelulty, mark the beginning 01 a
successful cleallng of the Ukraine bV the Red
Army.
The opPOSIng commanders were the com
mander 01 Heeresgruppe Sud (Army Group
Soviet Kharkov Offensive
and Operation Fridericus
(Axis Counter-Offensive):
Kev:
South!, Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock,
and the commander of a combined force from
Southwest and South Fronts, Mal$hal S K Tlmo-
shenko. Tlmoshenko had made hIS mark ,n the
reorganization which followed the 1940 war
against Finland That reorganization was stilt in
complete when the Germans attacked In 1941, but
It was ne<lrlV finished bV the spring of 1942 Under
von Bock were Ihe61h Armv-commanded bV the
newly Installed GeneraloberSI Flledllch Paulus.
holdong the northern s,de 01 the bulge-and the
17th Army, commanded by GeneraloberSI RIChard
Ruoll on the sou thern Side 01 the bulge, FIISI
Panzer Army under GeneralObefst Ewald von
Kleist was to the south 01 17th Army. limo-
shenkos command compllsed the 28th Armv
under lieutenant General Ryabrshev and 38th Ar
mV under lieutenant General Maslov to the 28th
Army's south_ On the left of 38th ArmV and
holding the northern flank 01 the bulge was 6th Ar
my under ll8Ulenant General A M Gorodnvanskv
Spring 1942
==> German Counterattack
__ Soviet A !tack
"..,..,,- R ivar
Note that German units are indicated In italic type;
Soviet units are indicated in bold type.
11.11

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Po/lava
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UP: Khllrkov

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108 I, 61 '-
25J
: 411
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151 Sfc" : 39J
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2 Rum lP
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'96
81 295 .... 29!
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........ L.H.J. Kl1lImatQrSkava II. 94 2111
fOOf, 97k 76 . :
101 k L.L.J
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II/
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....
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5
6
while the SOUthern flank was held, In its western
part, by 57th Army under Ll&Utenan\ General K P
Podlas find 9th Army under Major General F_M:
Khantonov The southernmost corner of the
bulge, which was dos1Jned 10 be a rather inactIVe
S8Ct()l", was held by the 37th Army.
The Soviet Plan
The SOViet plan enviSIoned a two-pronged at-
tack toward Kharkoy. ThIS would put the main
wetght on Paulus' 6th Army Maslov would lake
28th Army Irom the VICinity of Volchansk and 81-
tack westward, while Gorodnyansky would attack
out of the bulge with 6th Army to meet around
Krasnograd and pocket the German 6th Army If IT
chose to defend Khalkov They would then swing
wast, adding 57th Army 10 the IIHack. to take
OniepropetrQvsk and Unul 28th and
6th Armies Imked up, 57th and 9th Armies were to
probe and I'k the German !OIces SOUth of the
bulge but nOtlsalty be too aggr6SSlve When II be-
fashIOnable to Stalin's leadership.
Khrushchev contended that Statin had pul too
many troops screening Moscow whon he shoutd
halle put them tnto IhlS operation.
tn fairness to Stalin. the Germanssull kept the
mass of lhelr troops In front of Moscow. and II
Moscow was the goal in 1941 . thore was no reason
to assume it would not be a major oblectlve for
1942. As it was. 28th Army had 13nfteandcallatry
dllllSlOnS. two lank bngades, and a motorized nile
bndgade, whde 6th Army had 12 tlfle and callalry
dllliSlOns and SJx tank brigades Defending against
them were eight Infantry dillisions. 01"18 tight dilli-
Slon and two German Panzer dlllisions. The 57th
Army and 9th Army between lhem mustered 25 ri-
fle and callatry dIVISions and 11 tank brigades. as
well as another motonzed title bngade They Wilre
facing a somewhat lighter force. On the west end
of Ihe bulge was the German 11 th Corps. control-
ling three German infantry dlllISIOnS and three
RumanJan infantry dllllSions under therr own 6th
Corps. ThIS force was actually grouped together
under the name Gruppe lion Kortzllelsch. lion
Korullelsch being the 1111'1 Corps commander
With control Oller both force! . The southern flank
01 the bulge was held by fIve Inlantry dlIlISlonS. a
mountain d11l1510n. three bght dlll1510ns, two
PanZef dllllSlons and a motoriZed Infantry dIIlISlOO.
One final curiOSity was the presence 01 the 454th
Security Dillision In the front _ This organization.
normatty charged wah rear area secUflty, found
llsellln the thick of the battle
IntngUltlQly, neither side seems to have been
aware thaI the other was planning an attack The
Germans IIlfJWed the reduction 01 the POCket as a
rather baSIC exercise. Their two armies would
SImply crush the bulge between them Their start
time was set lor Mav 18. The SOIIl8ts set their Start
for May 12 and, consequently. achieved surprise
Early Going
IOilially. the SOl/lOts poured through the Ger-
man 1100$. The Germans wore able to allOld a rout
In front of KharkOll ooly by forming up the same
type 01 strong POints which had broken the back of
the So ... oet Winter offensives. Ha ... ing these forces
in the rear forced the SOIIiets to detalt forces to
reduce them_ or aliesst hold them in place-and
those W1lfe forces no longer a ... allable for the main
attaCk. The So ... iet 6th Army, In the midst 01
genaral SOlllOt successes. literally tore open the
German front In snuatJon maps published as the
batlls Wilnt on. the German! showed large gaps In
thelf where there wINa simply no UOltS 8y 15
May, Krasnograd had fallen and Tarano ... ka was
also in SO"'lEIt hands. By 16 May. SOlliet recon
elements had come to wnhln 40 km of HG Sud
heaclQuartersat PoIta ... a. the scene of the defeatol
an earllOf WOUld-be conqueror 01 RUSSia, Charles
XII 01 Sweden in tha S8IIenteenth century
By a rapid mo ... ement of the 3d and 23d
Panzer dl ... ISlons into the breach, Paulus was able
to halt the dlllle of 28th Army twelve miles Irom
Kharkov. Von Bock was In a quandary as 10 what
to do, Paulus could barely keep himself afloat.
much less launch a counterattack. The onlv thlOg
a ... allable 10 him was the element whICh would be
the southern wmg 01 Fridericvs. lhe 17th Army.
However. 11 was apparentthet they would have to
be relnfOfced Von KleISt was sent up Wllh
elements Irom 1st Panzar Army to command the
coun terattack force TimOShenko was plaYing IntO
the Germans' hands 10 thiS regard He had been
slow to commit hiS re!lefVe5 Instead 01 pushing
Ihem out as soon as he opened a gap 10 the Ger-
man lines. as the Germans would ha ... e done had
they been making the anack, he committed them
Pl8Cemeal. One of the alHoms 10 USing a reserve IS
that It must not be comml1led too soon nor too
late. and the declSlVO moment I! the point al whICh
the entire w8lght of Ihe reserve can 'lIlter the
course of the battle. By sending them In driblets
they had linleimpacl. At lhesame time. by merely
probing on the SOUlh, the SOIIl8tS failed to restrICt
German plans for countefat1aCk As 11 was, by 16
May Tlmoshenko was recellling reports that In-
dicated the strength of the lorce wailing to the
south. He realized that he was In a lIap JUSt waiting
TO be sprung, and his main body was well to the
west . The Germans launched Thoor attack Irom the
south on 17 May
Counterattack
By nightlall on the 17th. the Germans had
reached the Donets, and the next day they took
their northerly obtectllle, BogorodlChnoye They
then dispatched the 16th Panzer diviSion 10f
Izyum. a commUOIcaTlon center for the whole
bulge. By noon of the 18th. the 1611'1 Panzer cen-
trolled the maIn road across the Donets at Oonet-
sklv and had entered the suburbs of Izyum
The main attack was camed out by the 3d
Panzer Corps under lion Mackenson. Thev drove
northward, and on 22 May they secured Berek, on
the Donets_ On lhe other side was the 44th Inlan-
tty DIVISion-the SovielS had been pocketed In
the meanume, Tlm05henko had been telling STaim
to call off the attack, reporllng to Stalin The force
which was CUlling Into his southern lIank. Stalin
would not hear 01 a change of plan and. asa result.
the SOIIlets were unable to Stop the Germans from
closIng off theIr rear Once CUt of I. though,
Tlmoshenko began 10 dillen lorees to reopen a
path across the Donels. The SOlll8tS deployed
forces from the 38th and 37th ArmIes In a lIne to
keep the Germans from expandlOg their ring 10 the
east. and Tlfnoshenko planned to ha ... e them at -
tack Inward as he attacked OUt .
The situation was hl9hly lIuld at thiS time as
Ihe Germans had lillia time to prepare strong
defensille pOSitions. Tha SOlliets Ihrew everything
they could get into thIS effon_ They broke the f,rst
German defensive 1100$ The mUTilation of the Ger.
man dead discovered after the bailie attested to
the fierceness 01 the attack . In the end. Ihe local
point of the SOIIlet attack fell on lhe German 101st
Light Infantry or ... ision- the only unit that stood
between Tlmoshenko and breakmg the German
flng Again, Tlmoshenko had no reserves 10 add 10
thJ1; cfltlCal bailie SImply because they could nOI
disengage and mOlle rapidly enough to prollide the
weight needed to break out 01 the DOCket.
The result was a blood bath, but by the third
day 01 lhe Soviet ellort, the 101st still held. and
the 50"'181 allack ran out of steam The pressure
on the German 6th Army was. by then. relieved.
and they were able to add their weight to the aT.
tack from the south to keep the remainder of the
SOIIl8t forces engaged The rest of the battle was
reduced to a mopping up opera\lOn as the pockel
was destroyed When the lighting was over, the
Germ8ns had bagged 22 inlantry and seven
ca ... alry dlVISIO/lS The SOIIl8ts lost 239.CXX> men.
1250 tanks. and 2026 guns As ItlUrned out It was
the last pocket the Germans would make in the
war, though neither Side would ha ... e prediCted
thaI at the tIme For the Germans there was the
great otfeosrve coming up. For the SO"'l8lS, they
had to scrape together a defense out 01 what was
lelt after Kharko ... Certainly they would miss those
men and during the coming summer. as they
must ha ... e known e ... en then.
The 6th, 9th, and 57th SO ... l8t Arml8S Wille
desuoved and thel! commanders killed, wllh the
excepllon 01 Khantono .... 01 the 9th Army. who
was flownOUlatthe laSt mInute Theseweregood
generals who were lost Looking back.
Khrushchev laId full blame for the defeat at
Sta"n's door.
Afl t rmath
There were a number 01 lessons which thiS
battle taught. but few were !earned The Sovl8tS
had worked on the assumptIon thai the Germans
were spent and that the SO"'l8t sucoesses of the
wlOter would be repeated In the summer They did
learn the lesson that they could not \'81 stand toe
to toe With the Germans and slug it out Un.
doubtedly this was leflected In the tacllCS the
50111815 developed While retreating to the Volga
and InlO the Caucasus: Il9htlong enough to force
the Germans to stOP and deploy. then break off
and mo ... e. Don't stand and lIght. The lesson they
failed to learn was how to execute an armored
penetratIOn They were never very successlul In
executing one throughout the war. The German
technIQue of roiling up the flanks while the tanks
penetrated deep 1010 the enemy rear was never
mastered The SOIIiets perSlsted- In the lew tunes
they tfled such operations-in Simply drl ... lng
straJght forward Less than a vesr later, With the
Germans In retleat. the SOVlI!ts tried a SImilar tank
lhrust and Wefe chopped up and thrown back OUt
01 KharkOll .
One lesson the Germans should have learned
concerned Paulus He lacked the ImagInation
needed 10 contJnue the successes 01 the paSI He
was a stall officer pnor to taking command of the
6th Army. and he displayed the traits which make
for a good stall officer, but not so good a com
mander he was loyal to hIS superlOrs- to the
poInl 01 leulng them make deaSJons and InOeed
wailing on them to make decISIOns whICh he was
In the best positIon 10 make-hewas thorough but
not o ... erly imaginatllle. and he heSitated before
acting ThaI he was caught flat-footed was Simply
a lallure of intelligence With air superiority on the
German SIde. he should have been able to delect
the signs of bUild-up that forewarned of an attack
The 6th Army report on the SO ... let order of bailie.
publ ished for 12 May. was qUite accurate. vat he
seemed to ieel that the SOlllOts Wilf8 there only lor
defenSIve purposes. waiting lor the Germans to
make the flft;! move At the least such an attITude
bespeaks oller"COnlidence. and perhaps an ar
rogance. that the SOllietS were so lacking In im.
agination that they would Sit qUlEltty and let the
Germ8ns force the ISSUe The fighting," thewlOter
should have warned Paulus.
The second lesson the Germans Should have
learned was thaI this Red Army was not the one
which had dISintegrated In the summer of 1941
The army was benar trained and belter led. In
good weather. WhICh the German! regarded as
thell sole property. lhe SOII181S had exened sur.
pflsing pressure. It might halle been assumed that
the SOIIl8tS would learn something hom thiS about
the force rallo needed to deleat a strong German
force. Events proved that the SOYlets (lid leam thiS
lesson
In Ihe great sweep of events In 1942. this was
It minor baule It is so insignilocant t hat there is no
agreement even 85 to Its name The Germans call-
ed II FnderlCtls Of t he Bailie althe Izvum Bulge or
the Second 88111e of Kharkov The SOVl9ts called
it the Bau le of the Barenkoyo Bulge. Yet the loss
was sagleat to the Sovl(!tS lhalthey suppressed it
fight through to the Khrushchev Bfa The first
word they released indICated IMISOOO wef8 dead,
THE STRONG POINT
The German Army was trained, almost
from tna stan of its r9llival under tna Nazi
government, as an offensive force. Any mili
tal'( theorist knows thet gening the initiative
and keeping it is the prime ingredient for vic
tory, and attacking lhe bMt way to keep the 11)+
itialive. As a resuh, defansive doctrine was not
emphaslzed, aspecially one in\lolving giving up
ground. Attacking and holding ground were
the only lechniques emphasized. For this
reason, the German defensive operations of
World War II were a lribute to the abWity of the
Army. Untrained in tna technique which was
forced 00 them in e\ler lncreasing amounts,
the G8fmllns Improvised a highly successful
doctrine.
The winter of 1941-42 forced this new
concept upon the Germans for tna f irst lime.
The initial Soviet offensive In front of Moscow
threw the Germans back rapidly. Then came
Hitler's order to stand and hold, and the Army
had to fWld a means to do this. At this stage the
mere notion of having to yield ground was
much harder to swallow all down the line than
il would be later on, when the SO\liet Army's
sheer size made it the tactic of choice. The
reauh of this need was the hedoehog or strong-
point defense.
Improvisii"lg as lhey want , the Germans
developed a technique which turned on the
use 01 natural and man made obstacles. Ohen
these were hasty defanHI since the Germans
had to move into them on anon notice, with lit
tle time 10 prepare them. One of the most
pop-ular obstacles was the lImall town. This
gave concealment for the Germans even if the
houses were made out of wood, and if they
were mora substantial. they would afford the
coYer needed 10 accomplish the mission. Of
course, In the winter the towns provided the
added benef it of giving shetter to the defender
while the attacker had to move across the open
CQUntrysidoa in the cold and .now.
Once in such a position, the Germans
would try to improva It with whalever was at
hand- O\ler turned carts, knocked down walll
- anything which would make it hard to o\ler
run. From these positionl they would launch
limited anacks. The net effect wa. thet the
Soviets would hesitate 10 limply by-pass las
the Germans might ha\le donel for fear that an
acti\le force would later gal Iree In their rear.
The Soviets would either try to storm tna posi.
tion with their first attack or, if thet Wilre
unsuccessful, try to by pass with tna main
force and detall second echelon elements to
reduce Ihe strong point . However, if the force
in the strong poInl were large enough, the first
echelon forces would try to reduce It. All of this
sapped Itrength from the drive - which was
one of the desired effects.
Ideally Ihe strong point would be so
located and so reinforced that it could not be
70,000 mISSIng To those accustomed to roadlng
between the lines, 8 defeat of mllior prOPOnion
could be soon
Yet. nad the battle never been foughl, It
whole 8r/ltV of pos5IbllillEtS present themselves
The SOViets mlQht stili have mISread the Germans
as bamg weak, tned 10 hold the line, and hillen VIC-
lim to the pocket Hitler had concElived between
lhe Donets and the Don . Or they might have had
the f orce to f&$lS I SO well thatlhe Germans would
never reach Stallngrad or the Caucasus The bat
overcome by a rapid assault . The Soviets
would have 10 stop, deploy and make a
deliberate attack, primarily led by infantry. This
took time to accomplish and afforded tlma to
the Germans to shift forces to deal with the
penetration. Of course, it wit not seriously e_
peeted that all of these would hold. If possible,
the defenders would puY OUI and try to form a
new strong point elsewhere, all with the goal
of slowing Ihe Soviets and forcing them to
grind out the anack.
In many ways, the slrongpoint technique
IMde U58 of the German Army's strongest
facet : a highly developed coocept of mobility.
A IIrong point would be organi2:ed for all
around delenses but probably could not be
manned with equal strength at all E\lery
man or unit would not only have I prjrnel'( flJ
ing position, situated to deal with the most
likely enemy a\lenues of apprO&Ch, but would
also ha\le what are called In the U.S. Army
alternate and supplemental'( positions, the
first being positions which would permit f ira on
the same sector as the primal'( position, the
latter affording fire on a secondal'( aV811ue of
approach. Tha IIfongpoint would then work
so that if the Soviets launChed their first anack
from the n'IOYtI, they could be expeeted to
come down the most likely avenue of ap-
proach. Hopelully they would be repelled.
Then, when it was determined where the
SO\liets would make their second tl'( from, the
units would redeploy to mass their fires in that
sector, and so on either the Soviets wera
able to ov_helm one position because the
defenders were spread 100 thin or, as often oc
curred, the defender1l were able 10 hold off tha
Soviets and keep their position. Some of the
key pockets such as Oemyansk and Cholm
Germsn inflmtry defending Iff II srrongpoirrr.
tie, Ihough small 1M companson to what loIlowed,
was 1M lacl a mIIJor one, where almost a quarter 01
a mi llion men wel e lost . 8'11 way of compali son,
the Falal58 Pocket 01 1944 cost the Germans only
5O,(XX) men, and the Ruhr Pocket of Apnl 1945,
the biggest podet In the west, caught somewhat
1M e_cess of :IXl,OOO members of the defeated
Weh/macht . The comparison reflects that the
Second Battle of Kharkov deserves gleater
recognition than history has 8CCOfded II - usually
a few lines pnor 10 the Sialingrad campaign
were formed this way and held out success-
fully until relieved months later.
The ultimate problem for Hitler was that
he saw this tactic as succesaful tactic for
the eastern front. All the units had to do is
hedgehog and they could hold the line indefil)+
itely, as he saw it. However, a strongpoint,
9IIen one reinlorced through engineering ef
forts, can only hold out againsl a force as long
as there Is something near parity in odds. An
attacker sl_ limes stronger than the delender
can be beaten off; when the atUlcker is t811 Of
twenty times strong9f he may not be able to
storm lhe strong point on the first 8ssauh but
will probably overwhelm it eventuelly, if the
commander is willing to lake the losses. More-
over, lhe firsl shock agalnsl one of these
strong points is the most critical. If the defel)+
denr can stop the atlKkers' momentum, their
chances of lasting get a linle better- how
much better, which depends on how many at
tackerslhere are, cannol be readily reduced to
a formula lince, again, willingness 10 take
losses can have a major impact. The Soviets
grew stronger and stronger as the war wenl on
and as a result, this tactic was less and less
successful. Hitler saw fit to blame It 00 lack of
nerve on the part of the defenders. ACl\lally,
the strong point was then and remains today
an effective means for the defender to stop a
much larger force. In their recent r9llision of
defensi\la taclics, the U.S. Army is empha
sizing this tactic as an effecli\le means of slow
ing - and hopefully slopping - Warsew Pact
attacks. The chances of success remain the
same as always: giv811 a large enough force,
lhe attacker will overwhelm the position. But it
buys time and in the wlntarof 1941-42Ihal was
what tna Germans needed most.
7
8
COMMAND CONTROL or
Why Things Don' t Always
Work Oul
Tilil battle pitted two very different mili-
tary agalns' Neh omer. Yet. their very
differenc .. tended toward similar results. The
neleffectwutnatlneachcase, theover-alef
fect of their systems' Ihoncomings produced
the same impact.
The Soviets nad developed II system of
Yery strict contra. PMhaps thil was to be 8)1;-
peeled in light of the Communist Party struc-
ture, which gave little latitudalo lower ranking
figures once I decision had been made in the
higher echelon Certainly Ihedisasleraof 1941
had shown that It therll WII to be any chance
01 succeu, the control had to be centralized so
IhIIl there could be no buck passing and the
responsible person could be Identified and
dealt with. The ability of the Junior com-
manders to handle 8 situation on the lPOt WIS
limply not trulted. Then, 100, tMfe Is some-
thing to be said lor Iha traditional Russian way
of doing things. The practice Will alw8VS
against decentralization. The Tsarist regime
had found itself with revolt on iu hands when it
let too much power 100M. and mil Iessoo had
been cerried oyer unGer the Communists.
Whatever lne telllson, the planning was done
at a yery high echelon, and planswara
ed prior to as much as possible
through the lower levels untll every one was as
familiar al possible with the plan. Since the
raolution of any contingencial depended on
the balie plan being folowed, deviation was
discouraged. Even deviation which was suc-
cessful WItS frowned upon, becaule,
aven if suce_ful this time, a pertOn who took
this sort of initiative might find himsaH too
ready to deviate at another time when it would
be <iflngeroul to permit him to do SO. Initiative
at the Iowflt level wal ancouraged. This was
for two rllllsoot. First, awarding heroat at this
leyel didn't put any ona out of }oint at higher
leyels -one cen alwaysappiaud awards to the
troops they do most of the fighting and
dying. Second, it helped enlure their suppon.
They knew who did the good work and who
shirked,and when one of their number did well
and was recognized by higher headquanelll,
that certainly camented thalr suppon.
The point wa. that a commander who
deviated from the plan in tha Red Army was
not ralieYfld If his deviation COlt tha
Soviet. some pan of thair plan: as a minimum
he could expect a penal banalion. Ha could
teIIIlistkally anticipata being lOot, eapecially if
ha ware one of the more junior leaders. This
draconian .tandard tended to maka com-
pliance much more enthusiastic since people
might also be removed if fBit they
were not trying their best. The net effect, in
thill banJe, was that any deviation from the
plan required approval from Moscow. This
operation Willi conceived 'n Moacow; changes
would heye 10 be approved from there.
Although Timoshenko had command of a joint
force from two Fronts !the equlvalenl of Army
Groupa), he could 1'101 rNct 10 lhe situation as
he saw it. Instead, he had to have approval
from Moscow and Iheir approyal tumed on
how they perceived the .ituatioo. In fact, this
prablem persisted throughout the war. The
ability to deviate from a pian In rNction to the
actual altul tlon was always limited by the
perception of the controlling headquartel1l as
to what was going on. Almost never was the
local commander's yiew considered conlfoi-
ling or aven especially weighty. If Moscow
lhought that Tmoshenko should preA on,
then TImoshenko would press on or lose his
"""'.
The rul impact was that when Tirno-
shenko got reports back that there were
elements of both the 17th and 1st Panzer Ar-
mies on his fLank, he was told to keep pressing
onward. So, when the attack was launched by
the Germans. the forces he might haye used to
repel the attack were fer to the west and
unable to do anything.
On the German side, the problems with
command control were rather more difficult.
The Germans always allowed more latitude
thlln the SOyiets to subordinate commanders.
Hitler was not concerned, In the eany yeara of
the war, with the literal e_ecutlan of orders
down to the last man. He had general direc-
tiyes and them followed . It waa only
lifter Stalingrlld, when retreat became the
norm, thclt Hitter began to interfere with eyen
lower levels of command. Tha critlcel deci-
sions at Izyum were not made by Hitler, but
were made within the army hierarchy.
One of the individuals who had a par-
ticular impact on this banI!! was GeneraloberSt
Friedrich Paulus. He had assumed commend
of 6th Army upon YOn Reichenau's promotion
to command of HG Sud. IWhen Reicl'leneu
was kijled in a plane crash, von Bock assumed
the HG Sud command.) Paulus had been a
staff man fot the whole of the war up to that
point. In France he had bean Chief of Staff of
the 6th Army, a position he carried over to the
Russian campaign. Now, without even a divi-
sion command during peacetime, he found
himself in command of an army. Paukl.wasoo
fool. and he undoubtedly had good men work-
ing around him, but he was to show, both here
and during the drive on Stalingrad, that the
task of moying an army til t he commander was
really somewhat beyond him. Here the SOyiets
opened a large gap In his lines, and he simply
did not seem to know what to do about it.
Later, in the moye eastward, he refu58d to
recognile that his force could nOt keep pace
with the withdrawing Sovieu. Hed he had a
l.-


larger tank force, he might haye out -
maneuvered the SOyiets. He apparently never
complained. This is a good ataff officer action.
The staff officer should make 81 of the pros
and cone available to his commander, but once
the military decision is m&de, he should bend
every effort to the plan, keeping the
commander posted as 10 what is going on but
nOI trying to undermine the plan. The c0m-
mander, by contrast, has the need to be
decisive. He must be ready to make a decision
to clwlnge lhepian, if the needarises. Heil also
the man who must bring to the anention of his
superiol1l problems during the execution.
Paukls simply did not do these things. He
kept trying to make it all won.: while the world
was falling apan around him. Moreoyer, he
seemed to have no definite sense of whet
strategy to take. Was he to defend Klwln.:ov at
all costs? Was I.e to keep thl Soviets from
penetr8ling in his rear and cuning him off? He
seems to have done the former but not the lat-
ter. He took Hitler's stand-and-fight directives
literally lind, given II choice as to where to
allocate his troope, seems to haye accepted
penelrations in his rear rather than losing
ground in the front. The soundness of this was
Questionable. MOte Impottantly, one canoot
but wonder whether the SOyiets did I'IOt &88
Paulus' conduct here as a faYOl'llbie portent
when they launched their attack at StRlingrad.
There, 100, he held the 88$ternmost positions
but allowed the Soviets to run free in his rear.
The second problem the Germans en-
countered was a flaw in their basic $taff
system. They had a plan to attack on 18 May.
The Soviets had pr.empted them by attacking
on 12 May. They were caught in a quandary III
to whet to do. Should they deviate from their
plan? Or, since they were in position and vir-
tually ready for the anack, should they rush
through to completion and send the southem
jaw of the pincen fOfWard as soon III possible.
It was obyious that 6th Army had its hands full
and could scarcely attack: It was
finding it difficult to defend. The Iongel they
waited, the more difficult the 6th Army's posi-
tion became. It was becoming lIpparent that
unless t hey took pressure off 6th Army, the
Soyiets might get enough leyerage againSt
them 10 accomplish their goal in that sector
RU$SilJninfantry advancing behind T-34 tanks.
dnpite any gainl lchleved by the German 17th
Army.
As it was, the aitu8tion had deteriorilted to
the polnt where they were forced to add
elements of the 1st Panzer A.rmy to the 17th
Army'. forces in orde, to put sufficient
pressure on the Soviets 10 call off their offen-
tive. Of course, thaI the Soviets would mis-
rllltd lhe situation and perM, in their attack
despite their own imminent disaster is. course
01 action which the German, cen be pardoned
lor dilCounting as. po .. ible Soviet choice.
Stili , as anyone could see, if Ihe 6th Army
continued to fall apart, there would be a point
when I major defeat would be inflicted on 6th
Army despite whIIt might be dooe to limo-
wnko', attack. Certainly this WIll one of the
flClori which forced MOCIing elements of 151
Perue, Army to reinfOl'ca 17th Army' s lUiCk,
once the decision was made to go ahead.
Therl are confusing f,pora to the effect
that Helder, Chief of Staff of the Army. had
wanted to delay the counterattack until the
Soviets IJOt a. close II. poaible to Kharitov in
OI'def that they would hev, committed 01
their available fOfCes and not be able to
counter the German attack. Allegedly against
him WII von Bock who wanted to attack a,
soon as It became spparentthat6th Army WIS
in troubla. The truth of the mailer may lie
lOmewhere In between. It certainly was ob-
vious thai the IInack had caught the Germans
by surprise. Halder woold then have u, believe
that he suddenly IcqUil'ed sufficient know
ledge of Soviet capabilities that he knew eXlct
Iy I'OW close he could ulaly Illow them to
come without hiving the maner get com-
pletely out of hlfld in the 6th Army area. The
other lide of the "gument would contend that
they were ready to attack It any time and
waited only for the word. If they wara schedul
ed to attack on 18 Mly, the logistical syppon
would have been geared to bring them up to
IIfangth at that time. Undoubtedly they were
not fully fueled. Their ammunition, while pro-
bably not low, had been expended in the
routine .xchanges of firing going on afld that
would have been worked Into the figures. In all
probability preparations would have Deen vit-
tually complete aroufld 16 May, had plans
gone II scheduled. By the ume token, the
emergency resupply which might be needed
could be carried oot QUickly- no mora than a
day 01' two would be Therefore, in all
between planning afld preparation,
the Germans could ha ..... attacked on the 14th.
Altel III, Patton'l r8lleBBI of direction in 24
hooll WI' leQ8rded II a mlsterpiece, and it is
unlikely that the Germans would ha ..... done
much bener. This, then, reducn the time left
to dither to three daya. One can ISlIUme that
the fillt day the Germans did not believe that
the attack would serioully Itflin Paulu,. lt was
only, perhaps, on the lIICond day that PIUI!J,
began to show signs of not being Ible to hold.
Thl situation would have worsened on the
third day Ind that, alone, would have pro-
grammed In the deIIIy which could Iccount for
vinulJIy.U of the time apent, Thus, there wal,
perhap', only one day of r_llndecision befOl'e
the Germans decided to go lhead. If that were
the case, they could not know that Paulul
would atop the drille on Kharitov ftom the east
nOl' that the advance elements woold get
within 40 km of Poltava when the basic plan
ning would have been set in operation to at
tick on the 17th. at the latest . Still, there was
Ifldeci,ion which almoll COlt the Germans the
6th Army. That they were able to pull victory
Irom this apparent defeat il due to more far
ringing errors.
The command control problem was reaMy
manifested on two levell. The most obvioul
one was In the Ictual conduct of the bettie.
This would be called, in German parlance, the
operational level. However, both sides made
IlIlteglc errors which caused the battle to oc
cur In the first place.
The Soviets had concluded that the blow
they dealt the Germani during the winter was
indicative that the tide hed turned end that the
Germans had spent themselves. To some ex,
tent they were right . Never agaio would the
Germans attack atonv a whole front . They
l imply didn't have the manpower and materiel
to do it . Still, the Germani _re given the
respite of the spring muds to make good their
10lI8l. Compared to the size of the "my they
were fielding in tne USSR. amounting to
2.800,000 at this tima, the loss of the previous
year was not a serioul I8tback. Of course, as
were to lhow, it WII not the size 01 the
German Irmy oot the lize of the Soviet "my
which ultimately decided matters. The Soviet
"my was scarcely recovered from the eHecli
of 1941's defeall. Their luccess in the winter
could be attributed more to German over-
extension and lack of supply than to any in
herent weakf18Sll in the Wehrmacht. But the
Soviets chose to read the signs differently. In
addition, they chose to ignore the information
they Oed to have been receiving from the par
tisan, of the Germen reinlOl'cement. There are
lOme basic techniqun for finding out the
enemy strength. Paltols are sent out to capture
the enemy and find out what they know about
future plans and what ha, happened in their
unit . Certainly adequate patrolling mathodl
Ihould have alerted the Soviets to the fact that
the \oases I'I&d been made good. Moreover,
there are signs which an attentive commander
can interpret to discem what the enemy'l
plans are. Certainly the Soviets found f_
signs that thl! Germani were building the per.
manent type of defensiva positions whiCh
would Imply that they were digging in for the
duration. They .110 ahould ha ..... known that
there were reinforcements coming in. al of
which pointed mostllrongly toward an attack.
AD of this infOl'mation must have been
Ivailable at the Iront . The Question is whether
Inyone recognized it lor what it was 01' fOl'-
warded it up the chain 01 command to I level
where they coold react to it. Whate ..... r the
case, the Soviets seemed more guided by their
p(lrceprion of what the situltion was than ill
reality. AI a result, they attac:ked not an
ticipating a German Ittack in the making. They
felt they were attacking a weakened foe which
would collapse when they hit hard and they
Illumed th8t the summar would be theirs lor
campaigning in 1942. All 01 these assumptions
limply had no basil in fact. From them came
the horrendous IoIIn suffered. The conse-
Quences of these IosaeI on the ensuing cam
paign can only be ntimated,oot the impact
was there.
The Germans, 101' their pan, had leal
realOll than the Soviell to be caught off
guard. They had Ilr superiority 8fld should
have been able not only to detect the Soviet
buildup but to interdict it. They did neither.
This has to rank as one of the law tilTl8l that
the Germans were caught completely off their
guard in intelligence matters. In III fairness,
Reinhard Gehlen had JUII taken over at Fremda
Haeres Ost [Foreign Armies. East) and In fact
had mede the fint 01 hil detailed analyan of
the situltion. AI a result, he had deduced thet
an offensive WII coming. By 1 May he had
issued a report fixing the IlV\Im Bulge II ooe of
the places where In Impending Soviet attack
WII developing. How8ller, he had not yet
achieved his reputetlon lor reliability. Prior to
Gehlen, Fremde HeerH all W8S not panicular-
Iy better It deducing enemy intentions than
any other intelligence-gathering ileadqulners.
Consequently, his warnings were ignored.
Here, however. it would appear that the
lower echelonl - the Army GrouP. Army,
Corps and 8\l8n divisional units- ignored the
logical impact 01 what the Soviell were plan-
ning. One mull, lor example. assume they had
the same order 01 battle information Gehlen
had since the principallOUrce of his informa
tion was from the collection agenclel of these
subordinate unill. He had supplemental infOl'-
mation, afld one can Irgue that it was thilsup-
plemental material which really fleshed out the
picture. The Irgument, howell8l. really is not
vllid . It iI standard prlctice- or It leall it
,hould be- to send out combat patrols to tlke
prilOners Ind allo to sefld out recon patrols to
'" what the enemy II doing. Thil iI npecially
true in I fairly ltable situation where the
chances of getting back are fairly good and
where inaction will normally cause com
manders to become edgy about what the
enemy is doing. These patrols should have
returned with information reflecting that the
Soviets were not digging in es if they were
planning I long defense. They ahould 1110
hava revealed when the word W8S put down to
the troops. In OI'der to ensure compliance. the
Soviets woold have had to send orders for the
lonhcoming operations relatively far in ad-
vance of the actual plan. With the notm8l abllt-
ty of the troops to know information which
headQulnell believes is atill not widely known.
rumors. aI least, woold have been rife In the
days before the attack. This. coupled with
overflighll, should hava revealed the extent of
attack preparatiol1l.
The most conclusion is thet this in
formation was In Germen hands, but that they
fell into the most common trap of the In
telligence game: they used the information
received to bollter pre-concaived notionl, ig.
noring as misleading that infOf1T\8tion which
did not suppon these ideal. Sending trOOPI up
may mean preparing fOf an attack. It may allO
mean reinfOl'cing fOl' defense in depth. The
rlllding of the lignl ilthe Intelligence In, and
sometimes it takas on elements of In EtrulCln
heruspex rMCIing entraill. Certainly, this WI.
not the last time the Germans were to misread
Soviet signl- Stalingrad and Kursk were two
more instancllll . The Americans proved they
could 00 the same trick In the Ardennes In
1944.
Wnatevet the reason, the Germans flOt
away relatively lightly. They took more IoIIn
than they should have, oot the Soviet offen
sive did not seriously Upt8t final plans fOf Fd
8Jau. StiM, from the Germen point of view, thill
Soviet offensive ahould never have caught
them off gUlrd.
9
10
THE SOVIET PHOENIX
In the lete summer of 1941, Hitler consid-
ered the wet in the Soviet Union vinually over.
Pode! ah'r pocket I'Iad been 10fI'n8d; thou-
sand. upon thousands of Soviet pn.oners had
been taken, Inc! tnere w81 nothing which
could Mit the advenceof the Wehrmacht . Gar-
many WII well aware of Ihe manpower polen-
tial of the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet
101181 during the summer had gutted 1M
trained manpower pool. TM Ger-rn.ns could
foresee more troops being pressed into _ .
vice, but theM lfoops would be neither trained
nor well led. Then came the mud end In. bitter
cold WlnlM, fOfWhich the German. _r. une,
Iy unPfIPllred. Aher that came the Soviet
wintef counter-offensive, throwing the Ger-
manti back from the Soviet capital. Vel the
Germani took 8V1Irything the Soviets threw at
them and did oot break; in facl, once the initial
.hock Will over, the Germans held well, lind
Soviet advances in the latllr phases of the
operation were made only 8t great cost. With
the lPI'inog would come 8 MW German offen-
sive Ind, .. flit liS IInyone could for_, new
pockets, more Soviet prisonefll, Ind probable
German victory.
On the Soviet side, lpan from the men-
power reserve, they hid introduced the T34
tank during the summer months, and it was
obviollaly IUpeOOr to whit the GenTllntl hid in
the wly of tlnks. The KV I Ind KV-2 helVY
tlnkl were In added problem, since the only
thing the Germln, had which cooid Slop them
was the B8mm Inti'lircfllft gun. From the Ger-
man polnt of view, 81ch WIS I cause of con-
cern, oot neither WIS I critical problem. The
Soviets had showfl that they did not know how
to use their tanks. They committed the heavy
tank. alone or in paifll Ind the T34s in small
units. The Germans, on the other twlnd, twld I
tested Ind lliable doctrine lor using their tank .
They had been able to Idvlnce aglinst the
Soviet tanks during the summer, Ind only the
bad weather _mad to reduce Germln capa-
bilities.
At the Slme time, the Germen, cooid look
to their own highly trlined forces . They twld
IUffered losses during the 1941 campaign-
OIIIIr JOO,()(X) - oot saw no serious reduction in
their capabilities. The degree of training which
hid them to opefllte 110 succ.ufully
up to that point Wli not changed; offICer and
NCO qUllity WlS lbout the lime, Iithough
calUll!ieI It both 1eveIs fT1Nnt that leA e){-
perienc::ed people were now in these positions.
However, promotion llone would haye forced
younger men Into these Slme positions.
The Soviets twld fought one low comedy
wlr In Flnllnd end hid lost the cream of their
pre,wlr Irmy In th-e debecie of the 1941 sum
mer. Their leaders hid been l8yerely depleted
by the 1938 PIIf{JfI, II'Id the IUmmer 1941
operltionl twld not demonstrated that those
who twld IUrvilied the purge _re Inything
more than poIiticllly retieble. They certainly
demonstf1lted no reason for optimism in fuwre
operations. Finally, there was virwatly no lir
force to cont .. t the skies with the luftwlffe. It
had been vinuilly destroyed on the ground in
the first daY' of the war. Without IIOme lliable
Ilr force, the Germans would be eble to anlck
Soviet coIumos a. they moved up, destroying
them before they evlf fired I shot .
To Iny rllional observer, the thought of
Soviet IUrviYll, much leu victory, lllflmad lit -
tle more IUbstantlal thin the smoke from Un-
cle Joe Stillin's ubiquitoos pipe. Yet. before
Inother yellr was out. the Soviets had not only
managed to IYoid destruction, but had actual
Iy launched a crulhing offensive and were
never really to lose the initiative Iglin. This
was pemaps the greatest Iccomplishment of
WoOd Wlr II .
The first Itep WI. to initiate the flow of
soldiers from tha NIt. TI'Ie Soviets did have
some trained divisions Ill11ioned along the
border of Manchuria, now occupied bv the
Japanese. Whether there WIS some informal
understanding or the SOyiel!l simply feh they
had to chose between losing the 81st or losing
the west, they did strip forces from the east to
send into the offensive in front of Moscow.
HowlIYer, there were Ilso the polyglot people
of the Soviet Union to draw upon. While most
of the peoples In tl'le Germanoccupied sector
spoke Russian or a dieiect of it which could be
undeflilood by a Rusaian-speaklf, the Asiatic
elements of the Soviet Union S90ke Turkish
Ind other oriental dialects. This posed I
serious problem in terms of le&dership as the
more senior officers spoke Russien and were
generally either Russian or Ukrlinian in back-
ground. Nonetheless, these problems had to
be overcome, becaUI8 withoot th-e manpower
pool, th-e Soviets cooid not risk the losses of
life which wooid be nec8llllry to drive the Ger-
mans beck.
Almost simultaneously, a change had to
be made in the leaders. It is a credit to Staiin
that he took this step once I'Ie realixed its
necessity. He had Installed offICers who _re
politically comICt but without partic\Jlar
IIry skm. Thev hid oblliou$ly fliled, and
now hid to tum towlrd military skill and ac-
cept e tower leyel of political acceptability
(which is not to Illy that I'Ie wanted politicil
I'Ieretics as the price for victory). Some of the
military formalities were reinsllted, such I.
renk, saluting, and 110 forth. The most imper-
lin! step WIIS to eal8 out the hacl<land replace
them with .killed g_rals and offICers of lower
rank.. Oblliou$ly some graca had to be used
here, sincfI the hacks had been put in for their
political suitability. To calhier them because
that 5<lme trait was Insufficient for command
was not Stalin'. style. So he simply transferred
them where they could do no damage.
In their place came I crop of young offi-
cers, headed by Georgi Zhukoy, the g81l8ral
who nevI!" lost a banla for the Soviet.. New
names, such lIS Vlllutin, Rokossovsky, Yere-
menko, Chuikoy, Malinovsky, and the like
began to appear. They were chosen based pri-
marily on one criterion: their ability to win.
At the lime time, Stalin accomplished
one of the most critical feats of the war: he
managed 10 mustlf J>OP(Jlar opinion behind the
government. Th-e Communist government
was not popular at the time. Many
simply endured it. Others, I' showfl by the
IUppon the Germans received on initially
entering the Ukra Ina, acwally opposed the
Communists. Stalin, however, wei able to
point to the German Itrocitie. Ind the
speeches made by the Nni hierarchy to show
what the fuwre had in Itora for the people of
tl'le Soviet Union es Unttlfmf1nSCMn in the
twlnds of the Reich. Fortunately for him, Hitler
made no effon to conceal his contempt for the
Slayic peoples and the other peoples who
composed the Soviet Union. His actionl In
Poland Ihowed what he would do, given the
chance. Stalin WOA:ed on this and cOfl\linced
the people that this was not simply a mattlf of
which IVStem of government would prevd: it
would be manl!" of actual IJUrvivlt. losing
the Wlr would fT1Nn losing their liv ... His
thesiI Will that no SlcriflCe wa. too great as
long III it led to victory.
By the Slme token, I'Ie ICCepted nothing
which did not proceed directly towerd that
goal. He was therefore eble to conYlnce the
people that he WI' IS demanding on those It
the top III he Will of them. And 110 they sup-
poned the Soviet affon with pemal)' unparal
leIed dll\'Otion. The tales of what some soldiers
endured to clrry out their mission - hiding for
days in a destroyed tank, with roning corpses,
Jull to get a snol It another German;
fighting to the last man just 10 delay the Ger
mans lnother minute - cannot siml)lybelnri
buted to the fear of being shot lSI slacklf. The
Russians tried lhe Slme thing during World
War I Ind oot I new government for their
pains, eyen though the Germans were not hall
lIS successful against the Rllssiln Army.
The new crop of military leaders toiereted
nothing Ie" than IJUccess. A skillful retreat Will
accepted - if it were Igreed by the high com
mend that such I retreat WlS needed. This, In
effect, WlS what happened during the IUmmer
of 1942 to prevent the Germllns from making
that one last pocket . But there wes tinle mercy
for a comrnInc:Iar who deviated from instruc
tions. The Soviets deyeloped I tectmlque
which Will to hold them in good stead
throughoul the war and in fect
their operations today. They adopted a .ystem
of meticulous rehearllli of ell operatlo"" prior
to launching them, of wOA:ing out detliled
plans down to almost the lowest IeYeland then
Insisting that they be carried out . The SOyiets
may have erred 81 times in developing plans
which were not realistic. Yet the conse-
quences of not carrying out plans to the best of
one' s were 110 severe that ohen plan.
were made to work when they shouldn' l have.
II wa. not al all uncommon for banalion com-
manders who failed to ellen what their supan-
0t1 felt to be the effort to find them-
selves court-manialed and Ihot Of sent to I
penal battilion. Nor were generll officers e){'
empted from ......ere treatment. During the par
Iod of the Second Blnle for KhlA:OV, the sep-
arating of the wheat from the chaH WI. pur
sued ruthlessly, rapidly, sometimes unfairly,
oot Ilways relentlessly. Zhukov had none of
the compassion of one such al Omer Bradley
and WI. more of I task rnallltf than George
Panon ever thought of being. Panon might
slap a soldier to try to jar him beck to his
8If\I&I; Zhukoy would Ihip the lime man off
to a penal banalion "to encOl.lr&ge tl'le others."
By these methods, Zhukoy, TImoshenko, and
ITI/Iny other leaders of the period were involved
in creating a fighting army out of an army
which was undergoing one of the worst de--
featl In history.
When the Soviet counter-offensive in
front of Moscow was examIned by post-war
Soviet historians, several mistakes wele
noted. They faulted the UM of the reser-les,
claiming lhat lhey were olten thrown in with-
out adeqUate training. They all-O were faulted
for the lack of large mechanized and armored
unit.. These elemenu were to be corrected
over the coming year . HUITI/In beings ale rather
flexible and, given a IIIrga manpower pool.
The Phoenix in NumMrs
The IIccompanying chan shows the addi-
lions and losses of the various typeS of units at
lzy\Jm from the ltart of the wal to the end of
April, 1942, together wrth the number of each
type at lerum. The Totlll column reflecu the
total nUlTlber of each type unit in the Red Army
at the time.
1941
J",
TANK. DIVS
N_
12
Destroyed 3
Disbanded 0
TOl81

TANK. BDES
N_
O
""""""
0

"" .. '
' .
..,
Tot.' 0
RIFL E DlVS
N_
56
-
0
Oilbanded 0
T_
..
RIFLEBDES
N_
O
-
0
Oisbllnded 0
T_
O
CAVALRY DlVS
N_
10
OeItrowed 0
Disbanded 0
T.,.,
10
those who couldn't adapt quickly were killed
off and replaced by Ihose who could. The big
problem, and perhaps the real miracle of the
revival of the Soviel forces. was the industrial
build-up which allowed them to turn out the
necessary equipment. Beforl the stan of the
war , most of the indu, try in the USSR WI. in
Ihe lands which now were under G&rman oc
cupation. The benefit. of Iendl68se were b&-
ing lell, to some extent, in limited lank
deliveries, but the United Stales couldn't be
too generous with them since they were not
only rebuilding their own army, which had
been allowed to languish over the yeers, IxII
Several poinu are worth noting. The dis-
banded tank divisions generally want to make
the tank brigades, a unit which the Sovieufelt
to be a more viable size l han the division.
Secondly, although the Soviets'had more than
100 divisions destroyed, only in September
and October !the Smolenlk pocket and the
J"'
A",
S.p Oc, N.,
OK
34 10 2 4 2 1
7 8 11
,
0 0
7 5
,
4 1 2
29 26
"
5 6 5
0 0 10 29 9 6
0 0 0 5 0
,

,
, "
, ,
0 0 /0 34 40 ..
108
'"
31 35 15 37
12 13
., .,
5 0
3 3 1 4 0 3
, . , ..
,.,
II.
, ..
21.
0 1 7 14 5 12
0 0 0 2 0

0 0 0 3 3
0
,
1 IS
"
30
2 11
,
11 10 4
0 2 2 0
2 0 3 0
9 IS :u 30 37
.,
wefe also 8ssilling In boilding up the British af-
mored force. What Ihe US could and did send
was trucks. But land-lease cannot lake awey
from the fact thaI the Soviets had to relocate
their factories without losing too much prG-
duction and that theM factories had to vinuaJIy
fe-equip the Intire army. in light of the Ios.s8I
of the summer of 1941. They did this weN
enough to be able to launch the 1941 counter
offensives, to execute II fighting withdrawal
across southern RUSBia egaintlthe mllin force
of the German army end, In the end, launch e
crushing counter-attack. This revival Is pro-
bably without parallel in mititary history.
Kiev pocketl did rifle division 10$S8S exceed
gains. Finally, the chan does reflect lhat more
than naif of the tank brigades then in the Red
Army were al Izyum al well as almost nail 01
the cavalry dMsiona. In other WOfdl, the Red
Armycommined - lind IoIt - thecleamofiu
mobile force here.
1942
M"
J.,
F.b
M"
AiN /lzyum!
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
2 0 2
4
, ,
0 0
7 9
,
5
0 0 0
4 3 , ......... 0.-.-,
"
"
"
52 65 60 34
31 18 10 8
0 2 0 0
0 2 0 0
260 264
'74
:NI2 31
16 10 15 12
0 0 0


3 9
..
.,
'"
""
,
4 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 2 0 1
.. .. .. ..
,.
11
"
"
12
THE OPPOSING FORCES
The Red Army of this period was in transi-
tion. The army which had blundered its WilY to
victory over the Finnsand had been crushed by
the Germans in 1941 was on its way 001, but
the army which was to wjn the war was yet to
arrive. The mein difference wsa that Ihe people
ware in piece, the equipment was arriving, but
the formal reorganization not 'leI complele.
Several types of units were in the Izyum
sector: rille divisions, tank brigades, cavalry
divisions !organized in corps) , the new guards
rifle divisions, motorized rifle brigades, and in-
dependent rifle brigades.
The Soviet rifle division was somewhat
different from its Germs" counterpan. It had
an IInti -tank battalion and, in the armored re-
connaissance squadron, had 16 light tanks;
both of these elements were missing from the
typical German infantry division of the period
!elthough the anti-tank element was later ad-
ded!. By contrast, the Soviet division lacked
any support servic8l - maintenance, supply,
and the like. These were supplied by higher
heildquarters. The division was a stripped-
down force, suited solely for fighting. This has
been a constant controversy over the yeaB-
whether the SOViel system of austerity was
preferable to the western practice of having
suppon services with the divisions. At this
Slage the corps, which nad provided those
support services, nad already been pnased out
and the combat service support was being
drawn from the army.
Soviet Rifle Dh'ision
xx
~
.!.
o
Manpower: 9,354
MG: 494
SMG: 2,221
Guns 75mm + : 44
Mortars: 160
AFV: 16
"
f- @
The cavalry division was somewhat
similar to the rifle division in that it lacked ex-
tensive support elements. The cavalry units
were intended for use in aruas in which
mechanized units could not operate, although
in practice the Soviets simply used cavalry u
heavily armored mounted infantry.
The tank division and mecnanized corps
found at the beginning of the war hed elso
been pnased out, at least In this sector. One of
their replacementll was the independent tank
brigade. Thill, in turn, existed in two formsdur-
iog this period. There were both regular tank
brigades and guard tank brigades. The major
difference was tnat the latter had T34s while
the non-guardl units nad whatever wu handy,
Including lendlease U.S. Grant and British
Churchill and Mllilde medium tsnks.
Soviet Tank Brigade, New
x
T
.
~
Manpower: 1,306
MG: 29
SMG: 354
Guns 75mm+ : 0
Mortars: 10
AFV's: 65
The independent motorized rifle brigade
was little more than e rifle regiment with sup-
porting artillery 8nd other combat support ele-
ments. It lacked the punch of its counterpan,
the German infentry regiment .
Finally, the Soviets fielded e separate rifle'
brigade.
The Soviets hed guards versions of the ri-
fle divisions, tank brigades, and cavalry divi-
sions all present in the Izyum sector. The main
difference, in each case, from their regular
counterparts, wu the quality of equipment
they received. The guards units always got the
best available.
By contrast, the Germans fielded larger
units of almost as many types. Present in the
Izyum sector were regular infantry divisions, e
motorized infantry division, a light infantry
division, e mountain division, a security divi -
sion, and a Panzer division.
The German infantry divisions were not all
uniform, although they were organized Iiong
gene rilly the lime outlines. They were formed
in Welle or waves. Sometimes the differences
between them were in the combat elements;
more often they were in the lervice support
elements. Prior to the Izyum campaign the
Germans had reached the 19th Welle. Repre-
sented It Izyum were the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th,
8th end 18th/ 19th Welle. While the differences
were not really important, they do show that
the Germans were not simply turning out
cookie-cutter divisions with teutonic reguleri-
ty. The accompanying diagram shows the
combet elementa of I 1st Welle division. The
2d Welle differed from the first In having fewer
light machineguns and no infilntry mortaB; the
3d Welle was the lime 85 the first but with dif-
ferences in the combat service support; the 4th
Welle wes like the second, but with differences
In the combat service support elements; the
5th Wella was originelly equipped with former
Czech equipment; the 8th Welle wes organized
along the lines of the 1st Welle but, egain, with
combat service support differences; the 18th
and 19th Welle were similar to the fiBt but,
again, with combat service support variations.
The motorized Infantry division was In
trensition to the Panzergrenadier division et
this time. The only one present here wes the
6Othlm!. It h.ecI been motorized in the summer
of 1940. It had two infantry regiments, one of
which was the l20th Fusilier regiment, Fe/d-
herrnha/IB. The normal regimental type was
styled a "Grenadier Regiment" but the
"Fusilier" designation was an honorary one.
This was one of the few reguler army
regiments to beer a title. In place of the third
regiment was a tank battalion. OrigioaUy it nad
been a motorcycle battalion, but the Germans
were upgrading as they went .
German Motorized Inrantry Division
.! .
~
Manpower: 16,000
MG: 712
SMG: 810
,!.
Guns 75mm +: 62 ( - entitank guns)
Mortars: 96
AFV's: B2
The light (Leicht) Infantry Division was
designed for fest movement, but not herd
fighting (which, paradoxically, they found
themselves In during this battle!. As the light
companies in tha Eighteenth Century, their
function wes to perform screening missions
and to find and fix the enemy 10 that the
regular divisions could come up for the kill.
Leter in 1942 they were redesigoated Jage,
IHunter) divisions.
The mountain division wes essentielly a
light division specially trained end equipped for
mountain fighting. They had moved into the
Izyum sector in enticipation of the mountain
fighting in tho Caucasus, later in 1942. Their
principal use prior to this had been on the Mur-
mansk front, in northern Finland.
The Panzer division was, of course, the
premier unit of the German Army. During this
period it still hed some curious elements, luch
as 8 motorcycle rifle banalion.
The Security (Sicherungs) Division was e
peculiar entity, designed for rear aree security.
For some reason it had a representative on the
front lines. It wes really nothing more than e re-
Inforced infantry regiment.
German Infantry Division. 1st Well e
.! .
@lJ
xx
181
-1;;;'1
0 - "
I ~ h
Manpower: 17,200
MG: 643
SMG: 700
Guns 75mm+: 74 (- ATt
Mortars: 142
AFV's: 3
"
-6
"
-@
"
-[SJ
German Securily Division
)0(
m
.

The TO&E of thit unit
varied conside.ably
The Initial Order or Bailie
SOVIET
28th Army: 13 Gd, 81 , 124, 175, 169, 244 Rifl e
Div; 10, 36 Tank Bde; Reserve:
I1Gd, '127 Rifl e Div; 6 Gd Tank
Bde; 34 Mot Rifie Bde; III Guard
Caval ry Corps - 5Gd, 6 Gd, 7Gd
Cay Div]
38th Army: 119, 300, 304, 337 Rifle Div; 23
Tartk Bdt
6th Army:
41 , 47, 103, 253, 2f)6, 393, 41 1 Rifle
DiY; 38 Tank Bde; 26 Cay Div;
1103, 248, 343 Rille Div;
5Gds, I , 13, 36, 133 Tank Bde; 2B
Cav Div]
57th Army: 99, 106, 150, 270, 317, 341, 351 Ri-
fle o iv; 7, 16, 131 Tank Bde; VI
Cavalry Corps - 25, 38, 49 Cav
Div; Reserve: 1255 Rifle Div; 130
Tank Bde; II Cavalry COrpi - 34,
48, 62, 64, 70 Cav Div]
9th Army: 51 , 333, 335, 349 Rifle Div; 78 Tank
Bde; ResflfVfl : 114 Gd, 216 Rifle
Div; 11 Rille Bde; 23 Mot Rifle
Bde; 6, 7, lB, 121 Tank Brigade; V
Cavalry CorlM - 30, 50, 68, 79 Cay
0""
37th ArmV: 275, 295 Rifle Div; Reserve: 115,
176. 230 Rifle Div; 130 Mot Rifle
Bde; 2, 3, 54 Tank Bde]
GERMAN
6th Army:
d.Ib
T
XVII Corp,: 179. 294, 1S7 101 Div];
LI COI'ps.: 13 P:l, 23 PI, 44 IHoch
ur1d Deutschmeist), 71 Inf Div];
VIII Corps.1 08 1e, 113, 260, 3051nf,
454 Sich Divl
17th Army: GflJppe IXI Corps:
298, 380, 384, 389 Inf Div; VI
(Ruml Corps: 2, 4, 20 Rumanian
Inf Div];
11/ (motoriziJ Corps: 114 Pz, 16
Pz, 60 1m) Inf, 1 Gab., 100 Ie Inl
Div];
XXXXIV Corps: 197 Ie, 257, 295,
384 Inl Div];
LII Corps: 1101 Ie, 9, 1l11nl Div)
HOW THEY ALL
GOT THERE
Initially, the only winter offen.rve
lauoched by the Sovietl wa. the one which
stopped the Gennan offentlve on Moscow.
This was begun in December and soon had the
Gennans in reu.at in most placet and In
trouble in the few where they held out .
However, success et Moscow led the So-
vielS to consider a general counter-offensive,
intended to relieve leningf&c:l , al well as to
deliver a crushing blow to Army Group Center
and regain land in the IOUth. In all probability,
the absence of offentive operations lulled the
Germani in the IOUth into thinking tllat the
Soviets had thrown all available r_rvll Into
the Moscow operation and thet there wa.llttle
to fear in the south. As a result, they proceed-
ed with their bluer, grinding attack on Sevu-
topol which was entering itt final phase. Sud
denly, on 28 December, the Sovlott crossed
the Kerch Straits into the Crimea, lending on
its eastern tip and forcing the German, to stop
operations against Sevaltopoito deal with this
threat.
Thkl was not the only operation planned In
the south by Marahal TImoahenko, In overall
charge in the south. The obfectivlt in thll lrea
were to break throogh the G8ffJ18In be-
tween and Artemcwak, head toward
Zoparozhye, get behind the Germ.ns in me
Donbass/ Taganrog Iree, and then swing
IOUth to pin them against me SA of A:zov. At
the same time SOUth,Wllt Front wHtolneck
toward Krasnoder Ind..w, Kharilov.
The lneck was conducted in a piecernul
fashion. The fif1lt elements attKkecl on 1 Jan-
uary 1942 when 40th and 21.t Armiet of
South-Wilt Front attKked in the Ku,.
Dboyan area. Initially they did rather well, with
elements of 40th Army geining 20 milet on the
left, though its center and right were .topped.
Tirnoshenko directed 38th Army. under Mal-
Iov, to take Bepod, north of Kheritov, by the
evening of 5 January, but Masiov delayed his
attack and did not even commence it until
January 5. The Gennans Mel recovered from
the initial ahock and were In a P<ition to
by thll time. The nmltt wu
that Masiov accompillhed nothing.
Timoahenko then shifted further lOUth,
sending 6th and 57th Arm_ forward on Jan-
uary 18. For four days they macfe good pro-
gte$$, but when they fNChed BalIII;leyl and
Siavyansk, the Germans held firmly, ptevent
further expansion of the Q8P In IMt dInIc--
lion. Here, Ill11tewhere dumg the winter, the
G8ffJ18Ins __ using the
technique. &peclally in the de\oeloplng Q8P,
the Glfmllns made u .. of the little town. ..
focal points for their defenM. Thia prevented
the Soviets from penetrllting with impunity.
They had to winkle the Germlins out of each of
these nemielS, one at a time. The _mer did
not help. Although the extreme cold of the
1941-42 winter hampered Germ8n mec:hlnired
opemiona, IhiI _ en infantry war and here
the Germens_ more on I par.
Finally, on Janylry 22, tent
in three cavalry corpa: the 1st, 5th, Ind 6th.
The goal was to have them penetrate the Ger-
man lines and achieve the breakthrough which
had eIodecI the Soviets to that point. The 1st
and 6th Cavalry Corps were to take the
Krasnyl-Uman-SIaVYlnsk railway line, while
5th Cavalry CorpI would work with the 57th
Army to take Barenkovo.
Again, rwnoshenlc.o added new units as
the expected breakthrough failecllo develop.
HI put 9th Army betw.en 57th and 37th A,-
mies while hewing 38th and 6th Armies and 6th
Cavalry Corpe continue their effon to get
Iround behind Kherilov from the south. On 24
January Barenkovo finally fell . On the 26th,
TImosl1enko wu given further objectives. He
was to cut German communic.tions In the vi-
cinity of Slavyansk-Chisryakovo, secura the
wast bank of the Dnieper, and &end I force
south to either the Mariupol or Melitopol araa,
depending on the sltuetion. In addition, he wal
given 315 mora tank. and four rifle bri91dll
out of the ttralned Soviet rll8fVtlll. The lime
dey the Soviet 6th Army cut the Kharilov-
lO:lovaya road. reac:hing the Oral River, and on
the following day they took lozovaya, which
wal a commul'lieltion center due to the rail-
waY' prOCMding through it. Still, the Garmlint
held IOUth of Kharilov Ind little progress was
being macfe there.
Meanwhile, Mllinovsky, the Southern
Front commlnder, decided to try 10 podcl1 me
Germani around Sa.VYlnstt by I two pronged
It1Idt using 9th Army Ittacking *)Uth and
37th Army w.twerd. At the Nme time, 57th
Army _ to -mv behind the Germans and
heed for the
area. Seeing the danger, the Germans had
llrudy detKhed III Pamer Korpa from lit
Pamer Under MIck_, tnil corps.
moved up to the artll to
blunt 57th Army'. attack. The lOuthern
shoulder around Slavyanak held, rnitting 9th
and 37th Armlel' Ittempts .
By this time the Soviele had penetrated 80
miles acfOll the Donetl ancl70 mlln wide. At
thll point the Germ.n lines held. The bettie
wa. to go on for more than 70 deY', but those
penetratlonl made after the end of Janulry
were all thrown back.
The failure of thil offensive can be diractly
attributed to the piecernNl commitment of
troops and, in the initilll phaMt, me lack of
vigor in home the attack. AI I re.ult,
the Germent were not faced with I real c"",.
They __ able to 0.1 with the as a
.. riel of brush fim. To be sure, the huge
bulge wet! of Izyum _ now fotmed, but the
Soviets __ teriously in to
meltl I bretJI(-throogh. The strongpolnt de-
II the ovtNtlnd the commitment of re-
inforcements as the battle on allowed the
GermMIt to fa. back where they Mel to and
hold wtMtre they could. At the lime time, once
me bIttIe tenIed down into more or .. per-
mener'lt the repelted Soviet ItIIdtI
to try to get the front moving again only ..wd
to bINd off more strength.
At the .. me time, both __ reeIized thllt
thll bulge could MfVe as I for a future at
tempt to take Kherilov.
13
14
IN THE FOX HOLE or
Fritz and Feodor View
Their War
The typical German soldier of the spring of
1942 was a veteran. FriU had served with the
same people since the campaign in France. He
had been born and raised in 8 small farm town
in southern Germany, had attended school and
in fact gredu8ted. He was in the process of
working on the farm with his father when war
broke out in 1939 and he was drafted shonly
afterward, He was sent off to basic training
and managed to erld up in the infantry. whiCh
was satisfactory. He had seen little fighting in
France because the tanks kept things too fluid
for any major French operations in his sector.
The nice thing about his service, if military Sf.Ir-
vice could be called nice, is thaI his whole regi-
ment was basically from his region of Gar-
many. They spoke the same dialect, enjoyed
the same jokes 81 the expense of the Prussians
end the north Germans end, of course, some
of his comrades in atms had actually gone to
school with him, In fact, the whole division
was a regional one. Some German divisions
were based in cities, sucl'l as the 44th Infantry
ftom Vienna or the 293rd from Berlin; others
were regional. stich as the 57th, from Bavaria
or the 87th from Thuringia,
Fritz had been given a thorough training in
the military, But he was expected to use his in-
telligence, Although it was important tnat he
understood the concept of military discipline,
he was expected to use his head in accom-
plishing the mission. leadership was some-
thing the Wehrmacht wanted developed. Eve-
ry man had to be able to fill at least the next
higher position in recognition of the fact that
wartime castlalties might well p!Jt him in that
position, and he would have to execute it well
enough to preserve his fellow soldiers and, if
possible, accomplish the mission, despite
whatever losses put him in this position.
The net effect of all of this, cOtJpied with
the quality equipment he nad, gave Fritz a
strong sense of confidence in his superior of-
ficers and his fellow soldiers. He knew these
people. He knew that if one slacked in his duty,
the word would be all around back home, so
there was that pressure upon everyone to do
his bast. But he also know that they had all
gone through the seme training, without politi-
calfavotitism.
Speaking of politics, Fritz viewed himself
as non-political. Certainly Germany had
become a better place since the Nazis had
been there, but he didn't have a uniformly high
opinion of all Nazis. The Pany representative in
the town had been an employee et the Gast-
naus before 1933, and now he was taking out
his resentment by acting more important than
he was. Most people Laughed at him behind his
back; a few curried favor. Nationally, Fritz had
views on political matters. He liked the Nazi
program which hed restored economic pros-
perity to Germany; he liked some of the con-
sumer goods which were coming out. Hitler
had developed a car which was to be available
to everyone (though the coming of the war hed
stopped that program for the time being). As a
German he could not help feeling proud of the
fact that Germany had also recovered from the
shame of losing World War I and was once
more asserting her rightful place among na-
tions. If put to the question, he would un-
doubtedly say tnat he stlpported Hitler. He had
not been a Nazi himself, not out of any in-
herent political views, but simply because the
circumstances really didn't warrant it. By the
time the Hitler Youth got running, his town
was too small to warrant setting up such an or-
ganitation. They didn't have the Boy Scouts
before Hitler, for that matter, though a group
was formed just before the war broke out .
Based on what he had seen in the Soviet
Union, he was inclined to go along with the
Nazi theme that the Slavs were not Germany's
equals. They certainly had had the same length
of time to build e civilization as Germany and
hadn't done as much with their time. He didn't
really believe tnat the Slavs were in fact
subhuman-just culturally inferior. As a result,
when he saw a child wandering on the road, he
might give the child some food and he tried not
to be thoughtless of the women and old folks
who found themselves caught up in the war
without having asked for it.
He was not particularly allXious to hunt
out Jews, for that matter, and was disturbed
by the stories of the Ein$lltzgruppen which had
followed his unit into the Ukraine and had ac-
tually begun rounding up Jews before the
fighting was done. His town had no Jews. He
had never had any bad experiences with them.
He repeated the common talk that they con-
trolled the economy and that all Jews would
stick together as Jews before they would as
Germans but, like his views on the Nazis, he
really didn't care thet much either way. He felt
that if they could be rendered ineffectual, put
usefully to work, there wasn't that much pro-
blem. He was disturbed by the reports he
would hear that foreign countries were calling
ell Germans antisemitic. Fritz wasn't anti
anything in particular. He wanted to get the
wer over, keep Germany Itrong, and go back
home.
On one point he was concerned. His ex-
perience in the Soviet Union led him to give
credibility to the fact that the combination of
the Soviet peoples and the Bolshevik gO)lern-
ment was a danger to Germany. He had seen
the situation in the most civilited pans of the
Soviet Union, had obse,....ed what the people
had received from their Bolshevik masters, had
heard the stories of the cnaos precipitated by
the Communist elements in Germany at the
end of the First World War. He also knew that
the Bolsheviks had preached world-wide revol-
ution, he egreed with Hitler tnat Germanv was
the bulwark of civilitation against the Bolshe-
viks. Fritz had also e)(perienced the fanaticism
with which the Soviet soldiers could and would
fight, even when they had no reason to do so.
If that energy were harnessed by the Bol-
sheviks, the west would be in trouble. Even
though h!, had a reasonably easy time of it dur-
ing 1941 , some of his close friends had been
killed, and he nad been in stlfficiently hectic ac-
tion to warrant an Iron Cross, Second Class,
and a bronze wound medal. Then had come
the winter with soldiers freezing without ade-
quate winter clothing, followed by the offen-
sive around Berenkovo during which the
Soviets had demonstrated a frightening ability
to Inflict losses on the Germans-an ability no
one had e)(pected.
When the frozen ground turned to mud,
F,iu's division wal brought back up to
strength. Now the word was around that they
would be resuming the offensive. He had little
doubt that this one would see the end of the
waf.
Feodor, by contrast, was virtually illiter
ate. He, too, came from a farming community,
but the nearest large city WIIS farther away
than anyone in his family had ever gone. He
had grown up on the vast Ukrainian steppe and
would never have even heard of the Garmans
before they invaded had it not been for his
father talking about World War I and their oc-
cupation of tha Ukraine after the collapse of
the Tsarist regime.
Feodor had been drafted in 1941. He had
known that the war was going badly before he
was drafted, but he did not know why. All he
sew was a constant stream of refugees. He
never saw the Germans when they occupied
his town, because by that time he was off be-
ing trained to fill the yawning gaps which had
opened in the Soviet ranks. His training was
spartan, though he didn't consider it so. In
fact, he was fed and housed adequataly,
which was somewhat above the standard ha
was used to. He was issued one uniform with
boots- but not socks - a helmet, and a rifle
and began learning how to be an infantryman.
At tha same time, he was given classes on why
they were fighting. The political officer of the
training camp gave those classes and for the
first time he learned about the atrocities which
the fascists nad perpetrated in the Soviet
Union. He was shown pictures which he didn't
believe at first, but some of them actuelly
showed fascist soldiers standing over the peo-
ple they had killed, and he came to realize why
he WllS fighting.
So Feodor's training ran in two veins: the
military and the political. Militarily he was
taught that explicit following of directions was
the only way the Soviet Union could hope to
win. He knew he lacked military skill, aside
from what he was taught here, and he was
taught that the people who were in cherge of
running the war know wnat they were doing,
that they had only been surprised because they
had been benevolent but now that tha fascists
had shown their true colors, the forces of the
Soviet Union would be mounting a!lacks
which would throw them back forever. Feodor
was sent to the south and took part in the
offensive around Barenkovo. He had seen,
first hand, the ferocity of the fascist soldiers.
He had also seen what happened to those who
didn't fOllow through on the instructions with
the effort the Soviet forces deemed necessary.
More than one officer had found himself ship-
ped off to a penal battalion when the operation
had wound up.
Now, his unit's losses nad been made
good and the equipment shortages replaced.
They were ready, once the !!pring rains and
muds ended, to go into the offensive again.
There were rumors that stich an offensive was
planned, but only rumors. No one know what
they would be doing next - nor what the
fascist forces would do. All Feodor knew was
that he was flOt just fighting for his own life but
the life of everyone in the Soviet Union and if
he failed, just 8S if anyone else failed, their
cause might be irravocably lost.
Briefings
Bn.fingJ ia I threepan collection 01 shan announce
milliS 01.- gatMa and boo!< reviewl . notices do
not conetitU'1 ..t.lion11, and !hey I II9mPI 10
publiclotions objectiwIIv.
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Ad"'- IShIlISP,O PubhcatlOll$, Box !.137,
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g.Im"'9 hobby It not only iJ1(:ludes IIst,ng of al l (;om.-
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In. turn, II player- \likes any toIe "om the samel:Olumn -
or Irom lhe- same row - as the marker end moves the
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IS another numbef gllme. lor lWO plllyers. A deck 01
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In ''0'' - or .lIOlher numDef cho5ef1 In advance by the
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lor n,ne In the Itne For a more sklilfut game . Plltyer can
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Qamble on qUICk steps up - or dow" - IncluOlog a "Power
Slfuggle" w,tl'l an oooontnl ILakesrde ca '7 50 I pronl
" L_ os won by ,,,. I .. " to run S25(DmIO. mtIton. Play
lakes place at 1M! d,ff ... nt Ie'IIIIs In 6IIctI track lhe
',om \WQ buy anloques . rl. commod,
toeS. etc In the hOpe 01 ,ese!hng them. by IIIndlng on Ihe
P'OPer $pIIC8S. at UP 10 doublol Ihe- purchase pllce When
a plaver IIInds on anolt\ef D!eyer's PfOPet"IY. he muSl buy II
tor 150"" of ,IS value A(X;Urnulaung. IC)tlClloed 10181 01
fTIOt'I8Y IlIIffTIIlS a pie ..... 10 fTKMI up 10 tile ne>.t level 01
play In e&eh I'ack lhere IS one lucl<y space lnat 1m.
medoateiV WIns the money 'I!qUlfed to adv.nce IHojlow
Stump BUfl!l8low/John N H.n5efl $10001
Nlttln. lH:I;,nofllon 1I0mt Gamt potl th'etI to rnne
Plaverl ,n the uillmat. l'Oht Each. lepfll!lenllng a g.6IIt
power. Wltn a seertll I>OII\lllltlOf'l wtIod't IS '-
augmen1ed - and. supply 0' doIlBfs. mr.IStlM. ABMs.
and laclorlOS - a8 01 wlllCh carl be rep!ervshed On a
"bulldlog" turn. plll ..... s seereUy decide on lhe- oolptJl 01
faclo,lOS. whethe< ro curry lavor WIth one or more 01
erglllOOrl m."or counllles. whetl\$ 10 sel l a faclOry to a
m,m,.., or to decla,. war Once wat 5\11.11. "banlu" tUlns
alternat. w,lh bulldlog lu,ns In a bailie lurn. eadI player-
seer.l!Y dlleclS t'- own mossrIes.nd Iho5e 01 controlled
mlflors at othilf players' PO(IUlllnon and lactor . ABMs
ar.depIoyed lor Pt'OttIC\IOf'I, and d6i11s can be rnaoje lOCO-
ord"'ate allack.s The lone SUfYMlt WIns Ifly,r.g Buffalo
..""
Ou.board, by Ale_ Pt'oYides the sauslac-
lion 01 physically ",mltlilllng lhe enemy'l preces The-
plasllC b<rd CQnSISIS 01 Interseel1ng g'OIMII. sox IT! each
d"tlClron The at.doscsWll11 SIems thaI hI ,.,to the
gtOOU8ll Allhe-sla'!. all ollhelfilerseCllonsar.hlledWlth
troe \WQ p!ayars' P_. U5tng one 01 loot symmetne:Ii
st8,rl"9 poSI trons On a turn. a player PUlhes one 01 hIS
PIeces any dislance on a straight lone 9 long a5 enemy
precesand noneol. plllver's own. ere pushed OYetboBrd
Instead 01 pushIng . player- may fTKMI one 01 Ius IlMIOtIIt
to an adJ8C8tl t vacant "' t8fSeC1IOrl ILakeside C 56001
bol&lIoa Introduces a sllunkong pIByIog held The....sad
Pllt tlorm IS dMded onlO en tltgl'll by so. gnd ualPI rwo
01 the !lQUII.es one.t eadI and - hav9 hoIeswhoch. al
the beginnIng 01 a game. are coYflflld tiles
Only lWO proces a,e uSed. one to, each plllyer. and these
are Started on the rwo permanent squa,es On a lu.n a
play., moves hIS poece 10 an adlacenl Itndudmg
doagonalsl SQuar nd !hen pushes .ny one urooa:uPted
Itll. th,nugll the plal'orm When. pIa ...... s pIIIDtI III
ISOlate!!. he- loses ILakesrde c. 56 001 Cu_. IS. bettie
lor wrYIY. 1 on an toy tltgh\ boa,d. With one sqUil<9
mtSSlng 81 each co,ner Two OPPOSIte ood,ows .ro num
bared Irom "'I" to "6", and each 01 the Iwo playersS!;)'"
I'll' sr_ numbered on the malchtr>g SQUIIIlII 01 one
tOW Movement" governed by lhe- th.ow 0151_ dtoe a
pttIC(I mOY"lg one squar. tn any dtrecuon. exoept back-
wards. 10< eiICh nme tiS number shows. WIlli. bonus lor
10'0'9 or srx 01 lhe- same number C.ptures a,e by JUmPIng
but even tn lumpong. poece must tle'o'9. doe I_lor eiICh
squa,e il moYeS Reaching 'IS own numbel the
boa,d changes a poece to a kIng, whtch ties the power to
move ,n .ny dlrtIClron nd lWO SQU8te1 lor eecf1 Utne tnt
number shows (Aemco ca $9 001
SINC. by JosepllZumchok. slilrlds 'or "SlftlUlllted
InterhernrspherlC Naval Combal" 11 15 played on a
mod, ' oed ten by ton field. WIth lIddolloNt! "pOrts" and
"canals" along lhe edges lwo pllly. conlloj lt"ll a
lleer 01 small metal sh,p, A .. c.all Ca"' . .. .
111," C'Uo5efS. liM Des1l0ver.l nd lhree SUbmllrrnes-
whICh can be erther emerged or submerged Two A ...
plllnes. usabltl only once. guIIrd lhe comts ShIps
"I:IUISII" It om one 10 til"'" spaces. depending on eara-
gory Wilen "Iorlog. shlp.1so mIMIS. $lnklog en-nv
bv .eaclll"9 tiS space Soma ShIpS can Itre UP to lhletl
lImes: on orre tu,n G.nerally a turn 01 one ' hIll
crUISIng or ' '''r.g. 001 two or Ihfee smallet shillS may
CrutStl on the "'me turn Por" oller prOtllCloon and fIlMns
01 ,.PId rnovemet'Il ISINC Games. 7tD Ackerman AIIIt,
Glen Rock. NJ 07452. 11500)
Tridl " T,..p. by J CIlBIII. IS novel mo.lIand
SIIalegy game Wllh poItloca1 termoroology th,own in lor col
or The boa,d IS 8 strange comblnalron of IIIrge squates.
per1tal c"clas. and. few tloallonais. and pllly takes place
on the Inlersecl00ns ElICh player controls Hoose
liNOer . lour S_tOfS. and loor Congressmen I.nd "nce
the- onIv dlllerenltllroon 01 the wood II by hetght
ll\ey should be ma,t ed) Each type of PI80I moYes dtffer
ently, and !he House Leeoer - who5ecaPlUf.1S the oo,ecl
01 the- game - lias IIC)eCUII pow8fS Oceull'flog lhe rh<rd
tnlersecl10n of. quarlerellde 0< a tr"'''lIfe ' orces the op.
pOn&r1 ttO move. end can Iood 10caplures IThecombina
IronS can become qUI. compieJr and !he rules.re!lOtJllt-
15
16
t imes VBgu.!l, bot Just follow the 10g>C 0 1 the g!lmtI.J
IEveron Intemaloooel, 2001 FOrlUl'>e Dnve. San Jose. CA
95131 912.001 - SIdSackson
BRJEFINGS THREE:
SELECTED BOOKS FOR THE
HISTORY-GAMER
NolQ 01 Boolu: First. I Should lik<110 pa<O! OUI that
the rEM8W 01 lila Parkinson book on the Banle of 8rm:!,n
S {; r 66 Issue misspelled the rlilme5 01 Len Oetgnton and
Frarx:,s 1(,. MI!ISOfI 6""sh ml{jht be int6lested to
koow thaI SPl's War 11'11"" Eurbook. revllJWtld on this
column In !!SUe 65, w, 11 be pubHshed in 1I\a1 country by
Arms & Armout Press
Eadl of tho following worio:s is r8ted by 8 frv.digit
code on II 01 51ucellentJ to 1 (poor) in each of the
five g.aphic 'epreMfltltionl\ilerary qualityl
PlefU. accufKV. and acx:euibility of lnfollTllltion l
objectMtyl o_aH value. Priell$ IndH:;e11!d by an Ill''''''
isk(', " Ior editions; n,p no price infoflN-
lion
Ilndlwolt 011 U.S.S. M. MIUUory . ' Olftl. US War
[)eopiIrlme<>\ TM 30,0:1, Wnh,ngton 1945 700pp.
$2000' 413/415/5. ThiS is a reprint of the US Armv
TlICh Manual on lho SO"'ltt Army. It was comp'led by
G_al Gehlltn and Ius Ftemdti H_ Osr lor their new
Americen bosses el l the vast amount of intell'!J'll"ce
the Germans had assembled ,n lour years of loghnng on
the Ellstern Front Whilt resulted is the bast.sJngle
$O<Jrce llboot the end bolts of the
So_t A.my and A" Force of World Wllr II Wh,1e thero
orrers (lIS the SOVOltt Army W8S not too cooperet,ve ,n
releasmg datal, Ihos Os a book that any senous Studenl of
lhe Second World War haV9. n conta,ns chaptels
00 OfganiLllnon (TO&EsI, taCtfC$. lhell" force. hardware.
logOl!tlcs. fortlheatoorl5. p,tIra""lotary Ofgan,zBtoons. ad-
mimWBI,on. Bnd thlt SOVIet milnary system. SPI has
always found thos the most uselul smgla source lor data
on thlt Sovlllt Army. The book 's 1IV1I,lable Irom JOM
Sloan. 5218 LandgraV9 Ln. Sllnnghe!d VA. 22151. lind
comes. I,ke the orlg'''''1. In loose-leuf lorm (prov,de your
OWn b,nderl. Colonel Sloan - whose SPeCIal ity IS Russ'an
military alfll'rs - is to be congratulated On aga,n mak,ng
Iwadable wch a valullble reference.
BaUIt Slalkru by Alan O. l,mm. OUlCks,lver PfC-
ductlons; 1977 25300. RIChmond. VA 232001 4B
pages, plus mIIny charts $8,00 3/3/5/514 Th,s is thil
second ediuon of BlmltJ SrarioflS. an ucellltnt set of
wargame ruJe!i intendad lor With naval moniatures
The forst ed,t,onlfll"'lIIW!Id ,n s&rtlCn was all at-
tempt to Cfeate both a naval wargame and 10 let players
loam. through thllgame. aboul many 01 the leehniCiIh!les
and oomplexl\ies 01 mode<n naval combat
however, it looI:ed as II ,t Ilad booll produco:Kl by all orang-
Utltng who hild captured a Iypesett'ng mach,ne III re-
sponse 10 lheSecritic,sms of the graphIC laVout, a second
ed"'On has boon pUbliShed. wl!h producllon
values and W,lh ooglot pages of addi tional informlinon
81mla Stlltlons. iI9COnd ed,t'oo. is most useful alld is
recommended to those ,Ilterested in na ... al wargaJ'll(lS.
ta-ct a . alld technology While not the .... ord 00 any 01
IheSe wbtectS, II dOO$ show that 8n eccurate Simuianon
can be 8S val id a p'ece 01 hIStorICal scholarsh'p BS a
""".
FulfllimUI of I MIHlon: S)'rli Ind Lrb. lloa,
INI .... by MajorGeoeral S,r Edward Spears LoodOrlI
Hamden. CT 1977, .i" 311 pages. Sooley Servocel
Archon. 31413/2/3 Th;:; isa memo" of "the savage wars
of peace" that oU the battle front ,n Woria War II
Spears was '" chilrge of Sr illsh ha lson w,lh lhe F.ench '"
the M,ddle East, and h,s account shows why Churchill
sa,d "01 all the crosses we had !O bear , the hoavleSt was
the Crosso! LorrsHle Theaccount ,s _y much through
Spears' eves, alld though the p<cIUfe Of evenlS that
reaches the reador IS lhe aUlhor's . ,t ,5 always all on
terestlng one Chilrles De ill a mosl unllat-
tor,ng I)OItra'l. at on8 POrnt he threalened to shoot Free
French piiols in RAF squadrons as dese<lors Spear then
reminded him what the BIII,sh do to those who shoot
RAF pilOts of 8ny natlonal'ly, A monumental
followed. The subject 's not one of lhe ma,nstream areas
of the Seeond World War. but for those Sltllousiv study
,ng AllgkrFr9r\Ch relalions. or lhe dlplorT\illlC maneulle!'
Ings in the M,ddle East Ilhos book ,5 especially uselullor
the InvaSlOO of VlChv SVniI alld the Vichy role ,n the Ir8Q1
revoI tl. then thIS well w"tten bool< will beQUI!8
Arm", Oe L"AI,: A Pktorialllbtof)' of tllr
AIr Foru 1'37-45 by PaUl Caf'l'>e!,o 11 ChriStopher
Shores- 1977. Warren, MI 64 PII96S. SquadrooIS'g""j
$4.95" 41213/2/3 Tlois \h," \/OIume is baslCSl"," a cotlec-
lioo 01 w",",l-captooned phOlographs documer1ll ng the
F.ench Air Force's unlortunate role ,n World Wal
II . The bool< seems to be a,med ma,nly at those who Wish
in16.estong color scherr.es and mIIrk,ngs for their modoI
a"plaflllS. and these aro ple<1t,Iul ThIt Illlotographs aro
themselves QU'le ,mllfesHng. especoally those 01 the
rather bizarre atfcrafi whICh the Frencil PItted frultlesslv
aga,nst the remorseless BI 109s- Farmall 221s aM 222s.
Potaz 54s, Amoot 1431;, and theor dk a.e all here There are
also so. order's 01 battle from dillitfent t,mes 01 the .... ar
given. thill fo. 1945 ,ncludlllg all e:;cadrilla of captu.ed
Ju-8& used to bomb German coasrsl of
rtlSlStanc1l
Villey of n ..... _: T .... J.pn_I'Hlple end Wortd
Wa, II by Thomas R H. HaVltlls. $9_!.I.i. 213141413, A
bfllli bul aocounl of the JaparlllSlt "home lront"
on World War II It is a SOCIaIIl'story rathe. rhall SOCIology
- those 101 statm,cs rellect,ng rhe sh,hs of
JapantoSe oponlon should consult the Morale studm 01
the US StrategIC Bomb'"g Survey. Aga,n. thIS 'S a bool<
lor a limned ,nterest group. but those in!&rested on how
the war aHeeted Japanese society will lind thIS a worlh
wh,le book II'i il poses mally onte<esnng questi ons - what
elements of Japanese socie1'r' were SWltPI aSide by the
war. and which rema,ned, Ing'a,ned, to appear in pOSl -
war Japan
T .... Grand ef t .... No .... n Empire, by Ed-
ward N. LUltwak. the Johns Hopk,ns Un,verSity Press.
Balumorel London. 1976. S1300, 256 pp 4141515/5
FIMI boo"'. I.IVIIf1 the classics ,n the fiald Ie II .
Tfle Roman LegIOnS: WebSta<'s Tfle Roman /mpet;8/ A,
my of rfle First and Second Cen/uries), oon5l00,- Roman
1TUi l1ary &SpectS from a ml l,'ary oooni of voew Few"" snl l
address the quesnoo 01 some o_-all. coherenl Romall
st rategy. For thIS rooson alone thIS booO:. ,s a must for all
RomilrlollMes Although thera afe few ,lIustrat'oos,
cIa"ly thil V9rOOI descnpllonsol the Roman eUorlsdullrl9
therr phases Lultwak makes a persu.asJV9 case
thai lIVen manv 01 the campaoglls oo,-Ided by anclenland
modern hlSlonans ICaI/gula's campaogn 01 39 AO, Oami
llan's eampa'gn 01 83-85) were pan of a coh6renl pian to
defenSible borders Thil second most ... aluable
pomt he makes '$ that Rome ntNef had enough "oops to
defand all 01 ,ts lrontoers. and thai 11 basad 'IS whpje
def9ll5e on being able 10 redeploy troops to moot the
Ihreat As more and more sectors were attacked Slmulta
neously. the strain caused adlustmentln 1&CIICS Irom pre-
emot,V9 str,kes beyOrld the borde<s to defending on the
borders and. ,n the end. to acceotong larger 8M larger
penetranons before troops couk! 8mV9 to repel the in
\JDders WithoUI rehash'"g the causes of the fal l of the
emp"e. shows why, mil ,tltlltv, Roma's fate was
as much a rT\iItter 01 "me as anvth,ng else ThIS should
become one of !he bench mark bookS in lhe field
all W ..... II: Tb. lad Armon-d IJlvlsJon. by
Oonald Houston Sail FlarlCisco: 1977. ""'''. 467 PI)
PrllS'dlO Press $14 !.1.i 212/413/3 Thos lSa unn hostory 01
a famous Am<!flcan d ..... slOn. It d,ll"" from most 01 the
other boob of its breed In that it wll'i in 1977.
ra ther than ,mmedoately ahe. the .... ar . as most 01 the
others were Thus. theauthor has been able toeall UlXln a
vast range of data. 'nformal'On. and arch,ves thill Wltfe
nOI a ... allable to the div,s<onal hiSlor,ans 01 a j)el"lltfat,on
belore The book '5 best when dealing w,th the ollgins 01
the 21ld and wuh U_S, armored doctllrlll In ,IS embryoolC
form (the O,v'$Ooo dOO$Il't SIl,p out palJlt (18) The
desc. ip!fon of the dMS'oo's operations. however. are not
as or 'nformalMl as they m,ght be, Blld the uno!"s
Operauons seem to d;:;solve before the reader's eves The
lack of battle mIIPS undercuts many of thedescropt lons 01
smel l unll &Cuons, which arB ,mportant in unit hOSloroas
The hIStory of the 1st Armored. though done tlllllY vasrs
ago. was much better ,n th,s lespect. even though II was
1\01 as Ihorough or complele as Ih,s book
S ..... lnln .. for Sup...,macy: An&l ... N I
Coll.b .... t1on, 1'37-41, by James R Leutze Chapel H,II,
UnwltfS,ty 01 North Carp1inH Press J28plJ. $17 95
213/4/5/4 A lhorough. scholarlv study of the pre-war
or 'a"lls 01 The Grand AIHance. the belaled (almost too
lale) ioonmg of thlt two Ellghshspaaking dernocraclltS ,n
the vea.s before Pear l Harbor A larj)e part 01 the reason
for lhe Western Allies .... arplans gorng relauvely smoolhly
lIor coalition warfara is often coaching a collectl oo of
comprom,ses toward a goall was ,n the formauon of Plan
RainbowSin pre-WDO stal/talks Yel the Anglo-Amentan
relatJonsh,p was not an unbrol<OI1 ma.ch toward the light
Age,n. thIS bool< clearly shows that the ",tllfMI pOwer-
pol itiCS of the 8r>lIsh and Ameflcan dec,s<oo-maklng
estabhShments fand ohen asblttorl as
thil ontllfnDt,oflll l DJ1eS Thereare manyolheretear pereep-
\Ions in thos good fIIIrralMl Study Wh,le II .... ould be hard
to describe it as fa$cmaung. the book" D lucid trealmenl
of a potentoally 5Ubjtict alld illS a uselul preface 10
the All oed Grand Strategy Of World War II
- DaVId C IsbY
Correspondence
The marn QUeSliOn that prompts me towrrte IS
the article "CanadianCiviIWar" 15&T64 - ed.j,.
Your lEnglish-speakrng - ed. l aUlhor
was Simply present ing a Canadian
dencel argument. ralher than attempting to ana
Iyze Ihe elements In Ihe s,tuat,on. Have
you conSidered what such an art icle wrillell rn
1775 by a Colon,al Tory would have looked like?
Th!s is perhaps (he essenltal point of which the
readers 01 5& T should be aware: the ar ticle on
CCW IS an argument in a l one particular
opinion
There are. I Ihrnk. tWO baSic conSiderations
necessary 10 someone Irying from the OU I-
Side to understand the present relalions belween
Quebec alld Canada, and the" fulura.
The first is a clear and ever-present awareness
thaI "Canada" and Quebec are h,s totically two
assOCiated nations (01 not sHl1esl, end Ihal they
have fUllcltor\ed as two distinct elltihes w,th dll
fererlt polttlcal cultures. Whal IS going on now is
gOing on ,n Quebec. and not in Canada; aile way
of expreSSing Ihis is to say Ih'ill we see ourselves as
a malonty In Quebec, and not as a mlnOll1y In
CaMda. Mr . GOldberg's hlSIOrtcal summary ig-
nores that essenual aSp8(;t of the Queslion. not. I
presume. due to III -w,1I on hiS part. but Simply be-
cause he is livrng another hlslorv
The olher essent,al pOint IS that the Govern
menl ,s ptOposlng a pol,ey called "soverelgllty-
association" which involves negot,at lng a new
aSSOCiation wllh "Canada" on the basis 01 equal
sovereIgn s tates: the liMI resul t would be soma-
thing resembltng the European Economic Com-
mun'ty The present systam has not been working
for the past forty years, and Its 'ntermlnable clum
sv survival IS at least as dangerous as any olher
result. Mr Goldberg'sapocalypse IS unerly fantas
tiC, and represents hiS own pantC. IllS Ihe one as
pect 01 the article, alld rts attempl 10 mislead
readers Ihall would unerly condemn, It leads me
10 ask ,f he conSiders ,t reprahellS,ble to seek
change emouonally. but adm"eble 10 combat It
Qf course II os a thankless task to summallze a
hundred years' long slfuggle in a lew pages. so I
don't wanl to be too se ... ere But It tS surely pOSSI '
ble 10 try halder 10 help the readers of 5&T to
understand Quebec Iweare nelghboUls, a ltar
aill . Thev dese .... e bener. I am surprised that the
game (by an Ameflcanl does beUer Ihan Ihe artl'
cle Come 10 thInk o f II, no, I am not surprised
Prerre CorbeJ/
Drummondville-5ud.
Quebec
In late Julv, whan I was In the of
returning from a training cruise ,n the Medlterra
nean I had brought a copy of 5& T No. 62 along
wtlh me. One o f the rules 0 1 the Mili tary Airli ft
Command is that communist propaganda canllO!
be transported Irom Europe in therr planes. In case
you hava lo rgotten, S& TNo. 62's cover showed a
AK-47 w,th bayonet attached s tabbing into Soulh
Alrrca. and the catch,ng words "South Alnca
Vesllge of Colontallsm. ,. I had one hell 01 a time
gelling Ihal magazille on the plalle Could you be
a li ttle more careful on fUlure covers?
.John G. Henry, Midn. USN
OUTGOING ___ 11
lor us to survIVe There would be some vartation In
sales, but the ups compensated lor the downs
Lelllng prICeS or costs get OUt 01 line only crealed
survIVal problems In the nearly lour years that we
have been usmg lhe above syslem, we hall'e
developed a high degree of confidence ,n II -
enough confidence to enable us to utilize the
system In new ways Sales of our games are nOI
that variable with increases or decreases In proce
ThuS a game with lower potential sales I than the
"avelage" iell'eI tllQUlled for publlcallon) can have
,ts pllce increased enough to make up lor the lOSt
sales. The poce ,ncreases will vary between 10'111
and 25" NOIlhat many games Will be publoshed
,n thIS 'ashlon Perhaps only a few a year And If
thIS melhod doesn't work, we'll drop II
Actually, we're already usmg a form of IhlS
Idea Wllh our backhsl pncmg, so It'S no grealleap
Especially sn'lce the dillerenliat pncong pOliCY has
worked fOl backir-lled games
Gellong back 10 markelll1Q trends, Ihe old de
mand profile of 30'111 modern, 40% WW II and
20% preWW II has been Inel<orably changong
Ihese paSI few years unllill now s!(lnds at 36%,
22%,42% ThiS shif t ,n demand lowards preWW
II pollods has created a problem Inasmuch as there
ale fewer widely p<lI)IJlar hlstoncal evenls In lhe
Pfe-WW II peflod I Naturally - there are a 101
more years and eV8flts from which to choose. and
so lhere ale lewel people Wildly enlhuSlilSIlC about
anyone bailie) ThiS IS anolher malkellng trend
More people ale specializing. There are lewer
"mass markels" lor a particular 10p1C. ThiS I,lS
light on Wi th our altitude of pubhshong as Wide a
selecllon of games as pOSSible. It's jusl one 01
thOse problems that has 10 be solved from lime to
lime
AnOther bit of good news IS ImplICit on the 101
loWing leller WOllen by subscllber Terry M
lewiS, II afllved here belOfe he received S&T67
IwhafOin I pushed lor more people 10 do JUSt what
Tllfry lewl$ did)
Three cheenl for SPl's decision 10 publish
lhe World Wa,' Elf$! Front Qu.dplus T.nnen-
burgl
In meny respects this is a lettllf encourag'
ing SPI to occasionally remind the readers of
S&T and MOVES that they rUIIy can have a
direct influence on the production of games
laaturing historical situationl in Which they are
gr8lltly interested,
hava been playing "war games" since
the early '60s IAH's original Getrysburg,
Waterloo, etc, ); two World W"f I G1Jmes
Quidlly bec1Jme favorites of mine and my
Iellow gamIIf1I in Chicago whorl they wife lilllt
published, 1914 and JurilJnd, My Interest in
both conflict simulations and history IDOe of
my unclergrad mejofll) has led me into reading
numllfOUl milillry histories covering all eras
from earty Greek warfare to the modern and
contemporary conllicts; histories 011N'W1 have
long been one of my lavorite topics, However,
unlike othllf topics such as armored warfare or
the Ent Front of IN'WII, very few games hava
ever been P'Jblished on WWI and those that
have found their way into print have almost in
v"riably d6IlIIt with the Western Front . Also,
mt.Ich to my own " disgruntlement, " Imenaged
to miss out on SPI ' s original T.nnenburg and
even mora reeenttyon Rand' s Cilmbrai.
About three or four y8lllSago, as a con ...
Quenee of this paucity of WWI games, I decld
ed to aIw.ysplug WWI era games on my S&T
and laler my MOVES Feedback Cards,
Howell'ar, nothing really came of this and for
Quill a while the Iolio game was the ant 'I' new
WWltitle to appear; so I decided to change my
tactics. A little over a year ago l itarted sending
in specific title and situation suggeslions - bul
still no concrete results, 1 was beginning to
think lhat' would have to design my own when
I finally completed all of my graduate degrees!
(I really do enjoy designing games, frequentfy
even more than playing; but, I have never had
the time to do it seriously for publication, I
Anyway, last Spring it occurred to me that
with the current popularity of quad games of
all types and descriptions perhaps alN'Wl Quad
game would have a larger scope of appeal than
individual titles. Therefore, I began submitting
several bags" of suggested titles for
such a quad, but most 01 these suggestions
suffered flom the tact that situations like Vet
dun, Cambrai, the 1918 Germen offensive
were already in print and the battle of YPfOS
was already under considllfation by SPI.I final
Iy hit upon the idea of both an Easl Front Quad
and companion West Fronl Duad; Ither! sub-
mitted such a propoPl which included Tan
nenburg, Caparetto, Gallipoll, and the Russian
8rusilov Offensive althe East Front titles.
Much to my surprise and elation my prG--
posal (with the inclusion 01 Serbia/appeared in
the Feedback Ouestlons of subsequenl issues
of S&Tand MOVES, Yet, I walStili quiteie!lfy
that there might nOI be enough of a positive
response and hence.n insufficient martet for
you to tackle the project , However, as noted in
S&T 166, which iult arrived this week, I am
Quite pleased to learn that my fears were un
founded and that not only will you be
publishing the East Front Ouad, but that you
will also be publishing a fifth East Front game
in S&TI691
It may have taken four yealllto overcome
Ihe veritable dearth of IN'WI games, but it has
been well wonh the troublel II my count is cor
roct SPI has In the worits andl Ol is about to
release seven new WWI games in addition to
the two released in the palt couple of years or
In closing, meny thanks from myself and
the other gamelll "out there" who have long
btlen intllfes!ed in these IIIrgely neglected but
highly fascinating areas of military history
which SPI is now beginning to open up in a fine
!lIhion. Likewise, occasionally remind your
subscribers that the Feedback system does
work'
Terry M. Lewis
So keep tho cards and lettllfs coming
-JFO
Work in Progress
Do not ordet these games.n advance of thell
pubhcatlonannouncement In S&T
S .. ords lIId SorC\'I")'
The game syStem l or both the Army and the
Quest games are looking pretty sol,d as thiS prG--
Jecl gets trundled onto the Art Department Ithere's
a 101 01 malellall, and one would thiS to mean
that the game is in great shape. The game IS more
than satisfactory In many respects, but a recent
luror has ansen over the "lone" of the game.
When S&S was onglnally leedbacked as Quest,
the suggesllon was wlillen With longue planted
Ilfmly In cheek and was received Quite weil. But
when a "brindtesl" (out of house playlestl verSion
was sem 10 a West Co"t fantasy bull for hiS peru
sal, he took exception 10 some of the humor In the
rules, which gave him the Improsslon that SPI was
maligning the fantasy genre. Of course, he could
not know lhat I had not senl him tho bulk of the
"hiStory" thaI Will be oncluded In the published
game, which pr OVides - completely seriously -
the raison d'e/rfJ of the game. It is true that we had
17
laken a generalty ',ghter approach wllh the rules
themselves, but hardlv With any Intenllon of 'ma
bgnlng the geme 01 fantasy" Tho outcome IS tNI\
Ihe designer and myself have looted over the rules
with an el<lIemely CII IIC8I eye, \0 make sure our In
tenltonscannot be mISread
The Inilial penCil sketches amved Irom Tim
Kllk, and they look quite good ASide Irom the
usual fantasy characters, Ihele are some Illustra
lions that Will look somewhat unusual, which, II
nothing else, Will prOVide diverSity in Ihe
Swords and Sorcery wltl proVide the fantasy
gamer w!lh two completely separate games to be
played at vallous levelS 01 and In
cludesopenenoed and role-plaYing versIOns
Ene Goldberg
Alinc:our1
Work on Aglflcouf/ has come IntO lhe home
stretch wl\h more allentJon being diverted \01\ In
each passmg day as the SlOge Quad wmds down
The rules are gelling a close goong over these days
when I'm wlltmg things like thisl. and the
work seems to muror Ihe intenllons ol lhe Design
and lhe Input 01 the play tests. All this IS to say Ihat
the fmal drafts 01 lhe rules are now beong pre
pared Both maps and counters have been the
prov,nce of the Art Department lor some time
There are a number of new concepts whICh make
Aglflcoun a lOY - and a pam - towOfkWlth. It IS
Important thaI these concepts become 1m
mediately clear 10 Ihe players upon reading the
rules Although the game mechaniCS 01
Aglflcourt can be el<pJalned In such a way lhat the
Ideas are eaSily accessible - and that IS what we
are tOiling away at now Playtestlng has been con
ducted since late November, and wh8t remains IS
the lesllng of l he language of the rules and cross
checking each modi fication 8gainSt the scenarios
The major thrust of the work now IS to see that all
our ontenllons are realized In the correct form and
fashion. DIlvidWtvrJen
TM ul War
The Next W"r IS essentially "nlShed The
maps and countelll are In the an departmam Cur
lently we are plaYing mOfe campaign games, and
the laSt few tOUChes are being added to the !\lies
and lhe The game wlli comaln 1600 com
bal units and fI(X) markers. But do not ielthe
cesslvo size scare you. There are many one-map
and smaller scenallos The Bailie l or Vienna sce
n8110 IS played on one of the lillie el<tenslon maps
and is only an area of 10 by 16 You can see
that the scenaltos are very manageable The sce--
nallos are lhe Bailie of Hamburg, 8allie fOf 8erlln,
Bailie lor VIIIflfl8, Fulda Gap, Central ScenallO
INorth G9fman Plaint, and the 8allie lor the 8,,1
tIC, which IS ba5/C8l1y a naval game ThIS game WIll
definitely be out by Origins. See you all there
MartHlJrman
TyphOCle
ThiS game IS lust about complete. Typhoon's
development was a constant battle between the
desue to have a PGGtype game 01 last and f ree-
wheeling maneuver and the n-eed 10 SimulaTe the
actual German Autumn Olfensrve, with ItS slow,
methodICal advances In weather nOI til lor man
nor beast. There IS no doubtlhat the Ilrsl Typhoon
plaVtesl resembled the Bailie of Smolensk more
than IIghllflg In len-loot snow dnlts However,
each play test seemed to be followed by rules
changes reducing German polency to a large de
gree It now appears as If the game IS much more
balanced and accurate-al though somewhat less
el<cltmg to play than the Ofiglnal game. Aliln all,
Typhoon appears to be the hrSI SPI "monster
size" game With very Simple, playable rules 1\ is
very conceivable thai the Campaign Game can be
18
completed In one IntenSive eight-hour play test
session. JoeBiJlkoski
Tanntnbc'r&
Thf East PruMI. Campallt n, 1914
This IS the las! Progress Aepon about Tan-
nenberg, for In your Issue of SBT you shal l
have your own copy of lh'5 latest hatchlmg of my
alleged mmd, whelher you will or no. Tannenoorg
really should be qUite good. It's got it unique end
new game system. Includmg an innovative hidden
movement system, step reduction, thorough
command end control rules, lOgistICS (including
the disolganized RUSSian effortsl, ral lroods IAus-
sian and German. single and double trackedl, and
such line pomts as whether Von Mattke In Berlin
wlilloso hiS nerve and pull 'fOOPS out of Fiance. Of
whether General Samsonoy Will shOOt himsel f If
hiS Armv 15 defeated both can land somet imes In
lestlng do) happen, However. Tannenberg IS also
a short game - the campaign game IS but 14
Game-Tums long and many scenariOS are shorter.
and the map is foho-sized Therefore. I hope that I
will have Sufficiently synthesized historical accu-
racy (always, as you know. my chlel concern) With
SimpliCity In a game that Will please mysell and tha
36.(XXl people who Will be ISSUed a copy_ For those
who are lamillar with the campaign. here IS a
chance to see if you can do bett6l' than the actual
commanders For thosa who are not fami liar With
What happened in the forests and swamps 01 East
Prussia in the Augusl heal. even those people to
whom events before 1 September 1939 are but II
hazy blur. I do recommend you playa game or
two You might learn something about how thear-
mles of twO Empires clashed - one large and
cumbersome, the other small and skillful. but both
supremely Ignorant - Ignorant of lhe nature of
modern war, the effect of modern weapons, and
01 how victory mighl be achieved desplle them
Bul, Ignorant or not, no one could foresee that
Within live years, bOlh Empires would be gone,
and the modern world very much With us, The
avents Ihlll brought thiS about were shaped al
Tannenberg. Oavslsby
World War Olle 111 Ihe East Quad
have assumed the management/develop-
ment of this prOJect, and qUite a job of co-ordina-
tion II IS, too. First of all, Ih,s IS SPl's second Quad
to "inClude" a lilth game, to be published concur-
rently in S&T - which means that on any given
Fnday, one can more Of less take a tour of the
Eastern Front all in Play test Room Three. with up
to five saparate battles raging 1 Just making sure
that these games afe all set-up and matching the
play testers With them is a formidable task of co-
ordinalloni Second of all, we have assembled
quite a disparate cast of characters to work on thiS
project, three of the games being done by New
York area free-lancers: AI Noli Idoing his first
game since the Rand days and hiS first deSign
work for SPI in live years). Jay Nelson (his lirst
game since Highway 10 the Reichl, and Tony
Beavers lof Gondar and Sauron famel. When they
are not ligh\lng on the Eastern Front, these gentle-
men are, respectively, teaching full-time at Harlem
Prep (Nom, aCling (Nelson - mCldently, Boston
area subscflbers had the opportunity to see Jay in
a production of Ashes in late April/early Mayl, and
doing undergradu8te work at NYU IBeavers).
Then, of coursa, there IS the deSigner 01 the Quad
Syslem, Dave Isby, and finally, Jim Dunnigan
(who is developing the fourth game 01 the
Quad), Naturally, In a Quadrlgame, where each
game utilizes a body of standard rules, it IS ex-
tremely important thai all the games be developed
in tandem, \0 ensure that any diffiCulties that arise
With the standerd rules are solved in a way that IS
acceptable to everyone Well, getting thasa l ive
Individuals physically together, to say, nothing of
gelling them all to agree suffice It to say that
after thiS game reaches print, I plan to look for
some labor mediation work, or perhaps apply for a
Job as a netogiator In the SALT talks, for a rest.
Here is a bllel report on where each game
stands now' Tannenoorg lisbyl - the game is mto
the final phase of testing now. With the object of
achieVing game balance and lUning the system ac
cordlngly. The rules are undergomg bl ind-testing,
and we are currently workmg on a summary onthe
model 01 Cobra. CaporeltoINof,) - thiS game is
also well ,nto the development/testing stage,
Looz to Warsaw (Beaversl - concerning the back
and forth engagements around the frontier In late
1914 and early 1915. Ih,s game has Just begun
seriOUS testing after a delay in obtaining complete
Order of Battfa Serbia/Galicia (Nelson) - an am-
bitious attempt to show the IOter-relatlonshlp be-
tween the two main fronts on which Hapsburg
troops were deployed in the opening months of
the war, the deSign for thiS game IS Just now near-
m9 completion. The game needs work on a few
key elements. such as the logistrcs of the lightmg
In and a clearer defmlHon 01 the general ob-
Jectives (in game termsl for each side. Brosi/avOf-
fensive (Ross/Dunnlganl - we are ra-checkmg
the strength levels of our Order of Battle In pllmary
sources and have temporarily halted testing until
we are sure 01 our research. Hessel
C.poretlo
Which Way to Iht Rur?
Caporetlo seems to be coming along rather
nicely. We've more or less convmced the Play test-
ers that the beslltalian strategy IS to retreat whilst
inf licting whatever losses pOSSible on the Austro-
Germans and there have been no more masSive
AUSlro-German enCi rclements of Italian armies
Meanwhile work is beginning on a series of addi-
tional scenarios deSigned to use Ihe conveniently
available map and counters for Simulation of other
operallons on the Italian Front, mciuding a number
of hypothet ical ones. These scenarios Will probab-
ly be conllned to the period 1917-191B Inasmuch
as the mlhtary system changed radically between
1915 and 1917 on this Iront. Now all we need is a
"Rommel" counter and maybe a "Hemingway,"
A.A. Noli
C.mpaign for North Africa
Thai CNA has proven to be a difficult project
goes without saying. Not dlfficull because of the
system mvolved. but difficult because 01 the sheer
amounl of resaarch effort needed lor the game
As CNA wmds down (it heads Into the Art Dept. in
May lor probable release towards the end of the
summer. but definitely before September I I can
say that CNA Will be one of the mOSI challengmg
and Inlormatlve simulations ever d8\llsad. Specifi-
cally, there IS more Hard Information, more DB.
more Loglsllcal In this game than any-
where. And 1\ IS all wrapped up rn a system that Is
easy to laarn and even eaSier to implement, All you
have tohave lsalot 01 l ime_
Now, we're not klddlOg anybody by saymg
that this is a simple game It is nOI; but neither is It
a mind-bender. The difficulty IS not in the system,
1\ IS in dealing With the staggering amount of IOfor-
malion placed before you, The players are given
the same problems facing the actual commanders
In Alllca - and Virtually all 01 lhasa problems have
to be solved_ The truck is King_ The player who
can organize his logistics In some rational format
Will do well ; but thiS is eaSier said than done,
The OB work is exceptional. Not exceptional
in that it is 100% accurate; I doubt whether it is
that _ What is exceptional is that, for the first time
anywhere, owners 01 CNA will have a complete
Order of Sattle, on a bauallon level, 01 all units that
fought in Egypt and libya trom 1940-42. That in-
cludes Anti-Tank regiments (and sometimes com-
panies) , Flak battalions, 811 squadrons, Oases de-
tachments, German "ad hoc" gruppen. and a host
01 other units And Ihesa units are rated for Iraln-
mg and morale, even to the extentlhat many units
must be trained rn Desert Warfare belore they can
light at maximum effiCiency (al though you are free
to throw these units Into the front If you need them
before they are tramedi
We have worked very hard on our DB, harder
Ihan on any game. people all over the
counlry have prOVided Inlormatlon,
Yet the number of contradictions and the amount
of Simply missing mformatlon are staggellng. We
have attempted to solve that we arll 51111 work-
Ing on It Imostly Wi th scattered AA units and ar-
rivals of types 01 guns and tanks) Trymg to deter-
mine whether an artlHery regimenl has 4.5's or
25-lbers, or lS-lbers, or where the damn 6O-Ibers
are can be frustrating when each source tellS you
something differenl
But suffice to say Campaign 'or Nort/! Afnca
is. lar and away, the most definillve simulallon of
an indiVidual campaign ever designed And ItS a
hell 01 a lot of fun to boot Rich Berg
CIl)flghl & Air C."
At the moment , I am accomphshlng very hllte
work on either 01 thesa two games Cfrv'ight is in
relatively worse shape, as I am slil l not solidly con-
Vinced that we have a system we can be happy
With, We can't know Ihat untrl we are able to test,
and in order to test, deSigner Steve and I
must still resolve some thorny Issues CQnCElrnmg
the effects 01 weapons in (and ani the urban area
and sighting and movementlflre sequences, We
outlined our solullons some lime ago, but we have
nOI been able to sit down and lfash out these ideas
Into a playable prototype lalso we need a mapl Air
Cavis much lurther along. wl\h a workable system
m hand, and about one-third of the rules m near-
final SPI-format. However, lew of the scenarios
have been tested well, and the game IS eight to 10
weekS of intensive testing away Irom being ready
to enter Ihe production cycle However. I am un-
able to conduct thai testmg at present I am ten-
tatrvely planning 10 resume work on the game m
mid-May. once World WarOne Ouad IS in the can
Hessel
Tht CrusldH
Play testing IS linally underway for the multo-
player scenallo for the game IThe First CrusadeL
For this scenariO there will be a maximum of seven
players, With lesser combinations pOSSible Our
first two run-throughs proved qUite exciting, as
the MUSlims proceeded to beat each other up
(Without any adVice or assistance from the deSign-
erl while the Crusaders mellily plundered thelf
way down Ihe coast.
Several problems emerged Immediately.
which are bemg lor have boonl corrected. The Fat -
Imlds were much tOO s1l0ng, especially vis a VIS
the scattered position of the SYrians_ With Kerbo-
gha busy up North trying to hold on to the area
around Edessa_ the Syrians were hard-put to with-
stand any challenge from al -Aldal from the South
Thus they could afford little assistance to Kerbo-
gha, who spent most of hiS time attempting to
bribe the valious Armenian petty potentates In hiS
area, We have solved - or hope to have solved -
this problem by being somewhat more accurate
With the Fatamlds and their problems (Which
means hmitlng hiS early build-up of lorces.)
The second problem emerged when we
found the Crusaders having too easy a time gOing
down the coas\. By giving the variOUS walled cities
a Zone of Inlelference, plus making armoes trace
lines of CommUnicat ion back to a port, we found
that stopped pretty QUldly The Cities and castles
are placed so strategICally (nol by the designer
either - by nalure, as It wlliel that II IS Impossible
to move South without takll'lg either Anlloch or
Aleppo or, for the Fatlmlds, to move nOrlh with-
out takmg Gaza or Ramleh
We have an mterestlng Movement system,
which taKes into account foraging wahout reSOIl-
Ing 10 weird IUles A double random-events table,
wnlCh Includes treachery, assassmation, cara
vans, plague, and all the other events you'vecome
10 know and Iov!!, keeps things on Ihe up-and-up
especrally the DIssr6&nce rule, whICh breaks
up alhaflCBS. Normal cornballs SImple (In hed bot
QUi te rare las 1\ was dUling the Crusadesl and
Sf9Qe IS QUite Simple and Includes effects of Attn-
tlon as well as Surrender. The "leaders" and the
lesser knrghts, etc_. are all rated for a vallely of
thmgs IwhlCh might change with the designl, ancl
the relative weaJth of the different Crusaders 1$
taken IntO effect. We';fJ uSing 25mm hexes ancl a
mat colorful map And Redmoncl has promised
that he can give US 10+ different colors for Ihe
counters. It looks colorful and eXCiting, and thaI's
what the mi l ial playl ests have Shown. Rich Berg
Mrc: h W.r80
Tom Walczyk and I have been ptJshrng
around counters with Increasing mtenSlty. The
direct frre system IS baSically 581, and al the mo
ment 1 am addmg the mfantry Into the game. The
seQuenceol play is very long due to lhe time space
problem 01 haVing dismounted infantry operating
with mechanized units. Dismounted Inlantry
move once for every two armor movement
phases. Inlantry Will have a movement allowance
ot 1 movement point, but In extreme cases lhey
Wlil be able 10 Increase the" movement allowance
to ClOSS opeo areas. Also, ATGM systems are be
Ing handled very dillerently Once a mISSile has
been flied. the larget Unit Will have some ability to
dodge lhe miSSile, and If a unit IS overwatchmg
and can see Ihe Illing UOl!, then the ATGM can be
suppressed, decreaSing the accuracy or hit
probability M8rk Herman
NATO Comm.odu
Got the game up ancl playrng on a Bundes-
wehr tModern Banles III map The controller has
a hall'Slze version of the player's map (covered
With a BY.i x tl sheet to keep the player properly
in the darkl to keep track of the real tocatlon 01
"enemy" unitS These regular size Unit counters
are placed in seven hex areas Unto which they hll
The rules govern how much Intormatlon the acllve
player can have. The controllel gets hIS kICks
kl'lOWlng what'S really gOing on. The actIVe player
gets nervous. The active player has the diVISion
maneuver ba\1altOns (as In the Mod Quad gamesl,
less artillery. The game features ar tillery, SIgnal,
engineer, air support. etc., 10rCBS (whICh are kept
Irack 01 through off-board playing precas which
are kept In headquarters hotdlng boxesl. Bal-
tal,ons are conllOlled by a peltlcular headquarters
ancl, I' wnhln range. benefrt from these support
unitS The aClive player also has conlrol (alter a
lashtOn) over staff secuons and subordinate com-
manders whICh !If he'S lucky) Will enhance lhe
power of hiS combat bonalrons. We're work ing on
sohtaire and two player versions 01 this game in
whiCh you can be a RUSSian, West German, or
AmerlCen diVISion commander JFD
Colftm."do
An Interesllng trend l"1li5 developed lor me -
With the design of Il"IIIve now worked
on lour games that are In reality two games In one
(ConsfanMopl6, War o'the Ring and Swords and
Sorcery being the other Ihreel, Onginally, I
thought 01 COfflmBndO as solely a role-play.ng
game, but we have now decided 10 include a Vllf-
Slon that could be played by those not Interesled In
01 WIth 101e-plaYlng games. As I worked
on It, lhe "versron" became a game unto Itself.
and looks to be the Simpler of the two 10 work on
ThiS puts me in a pleasant Quandary - while my
leaning IS towards role-plaYing II am an avowed
Dungeons and Dragons enthusiastI, the hlstollcal
game wilt be eaSier to work on. The only cloud In
the sky IS that because 01 vallous colliding
schedules, t am about a month behind on start-up
time lor this game
The fJlst staff lesl scenano was a re-enact
ment of the raid on Entebbe (what elsell and was
played In aboul an hour The IsraelIS succeeded In
rescUing all the hostages and loading them up on
the c-In lor Israet, but R&D Manager Idl Amin
Hesse!"s Ugandans and leflOIiStS managed to kill
twO Israelis and severely wound a thlld. II hall hiS
fOlce had not run away In the lace of men With
guns. the commandos mrght have had deep tlOU-
ble Indeed Eric Goldberg
Feedback
Ralph Vickers can wllte In the opinion of the
readers of S6 T, al leasl - laStl$sue's winner was
hiS article on the Siege of Constantinople
FEEDBACK RESULTS, S&T66
Rank Ilem Rating
,
Constant.nople (artICle) 7.15
2 FYEO 663
3 Descent on Crete 656
,
Out-going Mall 654
5 Constantinople (game!
64'
6 Bnellngs 618
S6 T 66 overalt 6n
Five game proposals did well .n the S6T 66
Feedback Case Geld, War In the Easl Quad.
Dune. Arnhem Bfldge. and World War One Quad
The last one is already In the works ht prevlousty
received very high markS In MOVESI; we have
placed Amhem BndgfJ and the War If' the East
Ouild on lhe schedule now 100_ Arnhem 8ndge
Will be designed by Joe Balkoski while several peo.
pie Will be rnvolved 10 the Quad. Avalon HIli has ac-
qUllad the lightS to DUf16, and after strenuous
debate, we decided not to publish C859 Geld
Big Tsimmis
tJ. c_ Geld Sprong ot t946, Nall A-9' A-10tCBM-s
had ot New York C'IV. but the eoneen
Hated bombardment had tOUllty h,,1ed to eow lhe
Amef'ClinS and ttleor Common_lIh all_ .n Onawa
Wh,1e the Type XXI and XX!II U boats had long SO/ICIISUC'
ceedOO In SWflOlPlng most Ollhe US Merchant Ma"'1G&nd
milch 01 the USN I,om t he seas, the American SUDe"O"lY
0/"1 the ocean SUfi_and ,n the &or off lhecoast ot the US
tas well as the _'OJ)t,ml51OC Fuehll:!f's hOl)Ol: ot anolh6t
hloodless vICt""" comP8r<M*lto the one he hBd .chl4Mld
WIth England ,n late 19010. loIIowong theeasv voctorv"'"
F,ancel had stayed the dI!oIr4rence ot the blow
Howeve<. on The ...-Me ot lhe da!;liVdIy 005tn.ICloon 01
Hamburg by an atomoc bomb. dell_ed by /I lucky B 29
whICh had somehow dodged lhe German ,et loghler a'f
defenses, the tome for ComPf(llTlOse was 0_ SIlPPOlIBd
by a horde 01100 new klng ,ange bombers based .n Por
lugal and as _II 35 3 Task FOIC9 01 JOl).llneM
A"CfOit C8rrOl!fS. Ih'" NOli Armada sailed to set
tie the IIOOOIlnt
ThiS IS IhI.I leXI of a game proposat that ap
peared 10 S6T66 When all the results were 10. It
turned OUI thai more people Intended 10 purchase
"Case Geld" than any other game IIIIe proPOSB<l 10
that Issue. Nevertheless, after some twO weeks 01
animated give and take, we decided In early Malch
nOI 10 do a game on the hpothetlcal sublect 01 an
AKIS InvaSIon 01 Amellca follOWing German and
19
Japanese VICtOlIeS 10 EuroPe and ASia. despite lhe
eVident "demancl" for II
The diSCUSSions Ihal led 10 thiS daoSlon
touched upon several ISSUes, but the baSIC debate
was ovel the Question of whelher the game pro-
posal, as prrnted, constllutOO an appeal to the sort
01 Immoral "Nazl-admllatlon" that has occaSional
Iy surfaced 10 our hobby, and II so, if that onenta
tlon 10 the game proposal made II ImpoSSible 10
design the game In such a manner that would not
also pander 10 "Nazladmlratlon"
The phenomenon ol"Nazladm"allon" 10 our
hobby has always seemed to me to be one of lhe
mrnor Ifonres 01 human eXistence Presumably,
people who a,e oflenled loward h,stoncal simuta-
tlons would be more than usually 'aware." '
historically speakrng ISurveys report Ihal lhe
average high school graduate cannot accurately
list the Allred and the AxIS countlles 10 World War
III Thai an adm,rat.on lor the technical perf 01
mance of the German mllrtary machine could
somehow echpse the ollerwhelm.ng hlslOllcal
realilles 01 Nafladmlnrstered mass hate and
genOCide 10 someone's mrnd IS a wonder 10 me
and a dark monument 10 human "Iatlonalily and
w.llful .gnorance. Yet as oUlfageous Opponents
Wanted ads .n Generals past and the perSistence
of Nall-memorab.ha at thOld-class wargamlng con-
ventIons al1est. we do walk In lhe shadows of
such monuments
The argument over "Case Getd" was ob-
Viously not oller whether It was acceptable to
publish a game that pandered to "Nall-
., Nor was the argument oller whelher
some sublects that, although based (as are all
games) on eKplOling leaslble hlslollcat alter
natives. 'are "too hOI to .. No one here
defiles the legwmacy of senous hlstOlicalll"lQUIlY,
regardless 01 subJecl Rathe . lhe argument was
whether Ihe pubhcahOn of "Case Geld"' In par-
tICular would, by ItS vefY nature, pander 10 "Nall-
admlfallon "
Or to pul lt another wav. how IS It pOSSible to
iegmmalefy conSider the Subjecl 01 a NalllnVaSlon
01 the United States In a hYPOthellCa1 historICal
sense? By "Ieg.trmatety," I mean Within lhe COl1-
\(lXI of a game whICh presents Ihe SUbfllCt as a
senous hlstorlCllI altemauave. and not as a sellSa
tlonahloo lantasy The drsagreement here was
ove' the Issue 01 whether or nOI "Case Geld" was,
II you Will, "Iegllrmate . Those whO did recognize
such legitimacy enllissged a game along the hnes
01 See/owe, With the addllton of a delalled
hlstollCel analySIS of the IhyPOlhetrcal! events
leading up 10 the AXIS InvaSIOn Those who
Ihought the prOpOsal was nOI IegUlmate pOinted
QUI lhe sensatIOnalized word'ng of the proposat
Itself and suggested Ihal an alternallve game ex
pand the to InCOrporale dorectly the set of
hlstollcal cllcumslances that (would havefcould
havel blought Iha invaSion Within Ihe realm of the
posSible Since lhose objecting absotutely refused
10 countenance the publlClltlon of the game, the
pracllcal resolurlon 01 lhe diSCUSSIon was a dec"
Slon nOl to pubhsh lhe game
We have also decided that. from now on,
everyone here Will screen all feedback proposals
pllor to thell pubhcallon In MOVES or S6T. and
the acceptability 01 proposals mUSI be agreed to.
ThiS IS the Illst l ime II has been felt necessary 10
overrrde the outcome of the Feedback By uSing
the new screening PIOCesS, we hope 10 avoid do-
Ing so again
- Hessel
Noles From Underground
II you've found Ihls column Interesllng.
amusing, or welt wlillen. It'S all a tYPOQlaphical er-
ror and I aSSure you It won't happen agBIn
One of the great advantages of Willing this
20
cotumn IS thai t can project 8 number 01 different
outlooks and approaches thaI would be 1he envy
01 any schizophrenic. I can lecture about the need
for 1horoogh game development and meaningful
historical research wIth all the sweeping, solemn
lervor of 01"18 01 Cromwell's Captains Pf88ch'ng to
his Iroopol the New Model Armv' "looll not VB to
qUick anweB In designing wane-games, but to VB
bookes - nOI one Of two bot search mlght,ly Let
us pray thaI the wrath 01 VB Shall rise
through the malls and smile those evildoers who
relv on the catch-phrase and the glib tongue In
place 01 substance, and they shalt be cast down
mto the tlflmslone 01 Baltimore," It would go on
Irom there. foundmg ofl WIth companng Charles I
to Jim Dunnigan ,f "m In good form
Perhaps' can puff mVsei! up 85 "'he moral
eqUIvalent 01 competitIon," lor SP"ndeed has no
real market competItion AH and GDW have thelf
own audiences, and our sales do not encroach on
them. ThiS leaves us autonomous and free. With-
OUt the excuse of bemg able to blame the needs of
competition for our actions. BeSides. GDW and
AH are Nice Guys They wouldn't tell if anything
was rotlen in Denmark.
However, some people say my own personal
sense of moralilV is about equal to that of Jack the
Ripper, SO II would be hard for me 10 function as
the mOfal of anything (With the poSSible
e)fceptlon of Alliia the Hun!. So, Instead, I can
warn you which 5PI games under development
are turkeys m gestation, and Will hatch through
lhe shell 01 palnlul Progress Reporls as a real gob-
blef'sgobbler Our newedl\Jng systems, however,
have dr8StJcally cut back on tUlkey producllon -
although I lear we shall SIIII have a few new ones m
lime for Thanksglvmg Besides, I don't have Ihe
time 10 my nose InlO other people's games as
much as I used 10, and I am reluctant 10 rely on
second hand mformauon_ So, Ihe most alarmmg
thing I can say IS lhal IhlS or that game has a few
mmor errors lhallook like lhey are gomg to get m-
to print I have alSO lOSt much 01 my taste for
Ihrowlng SIOnes Since mOVing InlO a glass house
myself
I can always and frequently do - leclure
on what makes good games and magazme aru-
cles. 01 course, those phihSllne5 who have nOI ap-
preciated my effons oval the laSt 91ghl '(tIars Will
say lhat I may know how, bul can'l do II myself
That's often said about edllors (and eunUChS). But
1 don't think I have been gOing m the wrong direc-
tion In hiS column, Jim Dunnigan Willes lhat reo
cent trends are emphaSIZing the value 01 informa
lion In games and articles - real, valuable dala
that the player or reader can use to further hiS or
her understandmg of the subJecl ThiS IS Ideally
whal separates our SOrt 01 games Irom Monopoly
and OUI alilcles Irom what you might lead m
Newsweek. Yet if a game or article IS to Mve thiS
value. the 'nformallon must be put In And that
takes umeand effor t
In these variOUS gUiseS, I have very occaSion-
ally raised my vOice in ImpaSSioned outcry, and
perhaps 100 ollen aVOided leal problems and
ISSUes Ihrough generallues and repe1ll10n Bu t II
could be worse. If I dldn'l Wflle thl5 column, all
you'd get IS mOle Progress Repons - "well, the
gameiscomlngatongfll"le etc., etc "
ThiS IS the IasllSSUe that WIll appeal before
Ih,s year's Origins. Alas. due to Other obligations,
It looks like I shall have to miSS thiS one, and With It
Ihe Char1C8 10 parllCipate In the SPI softball team's
complete. Uller, Clausewtlzlan defeat of thell
Avalon HIli opponentS. If the truth be known, 5PI
wlIl probably be beller off lor my absence, as lam
pretty poor at plaYing softball In lhe ',151 SPlteam
praC\lce, I anlully struck DUIIO cnes 01 "ThIS isn'l
crlCkel. Isby" coming from my colleagues If\tle
do they know t am almost as bad at cllckel
- Osvelsb'r'
Gossip
Fire end Movement magazine Will be under
gOing some changes In edl\onal personnel The
current edltorinchlOl, Rodger MacGowan, Will
be StepPing down because 01 a heavy WOfk toed In
hiS "real" Job Richard DeBaun, the lISSOCl9te
editor, will also be devO\lng conSIderably less lime
for the same reasons. We all hope lhat Ihe new
edllors, who Will be named shortly, Will conunUB
along the same high road that lhelr predecessors
have paved
Well folks, SPllost out to Avalon Hil i on the
field 01 licenSing. BOlh of us wera bidding on the
roghts 10 do a game on Frank Herber t's book,
DUfI6. It seems Ihat lhev had the beller "m" sinca
Robert Heinlein and Frank Herbert used the same
agent. ThiS prOVided the proper Jeverage for AH to
Win oul Oh well Tom, JUSI wall untlt softball
season .No Oate yet on when Ava\on HIli Will be
publishing DUfI6. They are currently looking over
an oul5!de design
Avalon HIli is working on their f,rSI fanlasy
game which IS being done by RIChard Hamblen. II
might even be feady fOf ORIGINS
- HOW1f1BsflJSCh
ORIGINS 78
FOURTH ANNUAL NATIONAL WARGAMING CONVENTION
JULY 14, 15, 16, 1978
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN NORTH CAMPUS ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN
SPONSORED BY METRO DETROIT GAMERS
For more Information or our pre-registration nyer (available April 15). send SASE t o:
METRO DETROIT GAMERS, <Ia AL SLiSINGER, 12.5.54 DRESDEN. DETROIT, MI 4820.5
FOR YOUR EVES ONLY
J oseph Ba!koskl, and David lib'(
An Open Intelligence Summaryaf Current Military Affairs
RUMORS:
S. viel \'S. AlltHkaa N.v. 1 EkocltOllks
A Sign IS pOSted In the O"1a! of SOViet Ad-
m!!al and naval Commander -in-Chief Sergei
GOfshkov that states. "BetlBr IS the enemy 01
good enough" This statement seems to Illustrate
the SOV181theoty of ship deSIgn and technology In
recen! years RUSSian electronICS at sea
lag years betllfld Western technology-although
thau systems are Simpler. cheaper . and eaSier \0
ma,nta,n RUSSJ8n shipboard computers afB ap-
parently JUst beginning \0 enter 5eNICe, whereas
Ihe Amencan "NTDS" system has been in OpElra
!IOn since 1962. OUf de ... elopment of three-
dimenSional radar lit sea was also apPloKlmately
10vearsahead of Similar Soviet technology_ Sonar
IS an 8r!WI tn whICh the US Navy has usua1tV excell-
ed, and egam II IS obvIOUS that the SOVtets have
nOt vel caught up 10 us in thIS field. Scannmg
sonar IIrSI enlered S8fV1Ce In lhe USN In 1948,
although It IS likely tl'l8lth,s search mechanism did
nOI enler service 10 the Soviet Fleet until al least
1958. (However, both the US and the USSR
developed lhe use of bowmounled sonar at ap
proximately Ihe same tIme.) Sovtet naval elec
IronIC equlpmenl IS both much larger and much
heavlf/r then NATO models (usually !WICeas heavy
and about:n.40'lf, larger). This design lendency
leads to a lack 01 shipboard space for certalO
crmcal military functions, such as Wilapons
reloads, fuel tanks, and crew space As a result,
Soviet ships tend to have shorter crulslOg radii and
less capacity 10 withstand prolonged naval acuon
on the high seas. It IS urlCenaln whether Admiral
GOfShkov's wall,statement IS correct, but II eer
talOly appears true thaI NATO possesses the "bet
lef" and the SOVlEtt Unton the "good enough "
WhICh ollhese twO theories of stup design wlllwlO
out In the end IS not known.
IU.S. N8va/lnstitute PfOC66dmgs, 21781
Ptrv DI:wppol nttd Wltll SUU
It " reporled that the Peruvian All FOIC8 IS
dl5llppainle(l with the aVIOnICS fllted on thelf Su-
22' s. The allCl'alt are Atoll-equIpped and carry the
I-band HlQh F,x rangmg radar , whICh IS thought to
be standard on aU the Su- !7, Su-2O, and Su-22
family The I-band High F,x IS constdefed IOfOfIOf
to the Aida II set whICh IS carned by POfuvlan Air
Force Mirage 5Ps, The IFF !Identification. Friend
or Fool equipment which IS fitted to the Su-22 is
atso repouedJy With RUSSian sup
phed SA3 SAMs; also they are not inlOf-operable
WIth current Peruv",n All Force commUnicatIons
equipment. In adelmon. navtgatlOflllI aides on lhe
PeruVI8n Su-22s are reported to be Virtually non-
A further source 01 dlS8PPolOtment to
Peru was the fact that the Su-22s do not carry the
Silena III radar wllrnlng receiver Ian omnldllec-
lIonal UOlt htted to the Iale91 gef'lOration 01 Soviet
allcralt) wllh whICh lhey had II to be
eqUIPped
(Fllghr IntefTllJllOM/, 1114/78)
US Army ElKtro"k TninJDI
11 IS stated In the latest US Army Fteld Manual
Ihat electronic warfare IS one 01 the most Vital
areas 01 tralnmg thaI units can receive. However,
It appears as if thiS IS not the case In Ihe Army to-
day Highly technical and very advanced
Amellean EW equipment Is generally very
unrell(lble, poorly operated, and badly mamtalned
One sp8C",Iist, who commented that EW UOits
"are at the bonom 01 the totem pole, " claims that
IlImmlOg eqUIpment woos about one lime In
To make maners worse, It IS rumOled that low-
Army combat unit9 are in no shape to receive
EW treatment from the RUSSians. OUrlng some
maneuvers In 1976, an AN/TlO-17 jammer was
directed agamst some "aggressor" lorcos. At the
end of the maneuver9, the aggressor CO dallT'led
that this individual 18m prevented two &nitre bat-
talions Irom recetvlng command and control In a
91mllar In 19n, a 18mmor W85 dll8Cted
ag,lInSt a talkallve caplam controlling hiS company
from two miles behind hIS forward AI
jU9t Ihe right momont, the J8m worked. The cap-
tain was as useless to his men as if he had been a
thousand m.les away; as a result, the company
was desltoyed, a hole created, and the battalion
HO eradicated Some have said thaI SovlEtt EW
potOl1tl(l1 IS 20 umes greater lhan ours lallhough
lhell equipment IS not as technrcally .mpresslve)
As a result. the Russl8ns may Willi deny NATO
lorces tactical Inter-communrcatlons.
Sovit lJ I nCrtlW Logluic Bsw
SOViet UOits .n East Germany now hold am-
munl\lon for 37 days and luel for 16 days lighlmg
WIthout having to draw on strategIC stocks 10 East
GOfmany rtself .
(Defence, 121m
Conct nt ntJon of Forcu
The Soviet Army, can, if reQulled, mass up to
24 battalions in a selected 10 km front lor a
strategIC breakthrough, backed up by 70 \0 looar-
tillery lUbes per km. To reduce the SovlOt anack to
31 odds, a US dIVISIOn With 11 maneuver bal
tahons would have to move BIght of lhem directly
opposite the SOViet breakthrough, leaVing the rest
01 the divisional fronta98 covered by only three
maneuver battalions, the armored cavalry
squadron, and attached anack helicopter com-
panlOs to cover Ihe flanks
lAir ForctJ, 2178)
Fl vt Msn Tsnk CI'!'W
Tho US Army Tank FOIcos Management
Sludy Group has recommended a fifth crew
member for US tanks, This new man would be
cross-uained in all crew Iunctlons as well as In
mamtenance. The chl6ladvanlages of such an ed-
d,tion would be the assl9tence the fifth man could
give In maintenance, and his avaIlability as a pre-
trained replacemenl wllh,n the tank unit who
would not reqUIre any "breakIng in" to the Unit
While US tanks would continue to have POSItionS
only 101 four men, the fifth man Will ensure that
they are all Med
Surprist AUl eII
There IS a divergence 01 opmlon In US
Delense plannmg as to how much warning 01 a
Soviet assault NATO could elCpeCt Some
analysts, such as Ger'lOral Holhngswonh, belMWO a
54-dIVISion aSS8ult - mclud,ng 27 Soviet d,vl -
Slons - could be madew.th 00148 hours warning
The current Defense Department sceMno envI-
Sions a OO-d,vlSlon assaUlt, whICh would requlle:l)
days to prepare. If alter a week of this
preparallon, NATO would stili have 23 days to
prepare
IAviation & M8nne, 148)
1916 T.CIIatI Aln:nft Production
According to the Defense Department, the
Soviets produced the !ollowlng QUant,tlllS 01 1aC-
ItCaI Slrcralt dUring 1976, Su-15 Flagon: 35-50;
Su-17 Fltter-B 15().111l; Su- 19 Fencer. 50-70;
MiG-21 Frshbed 150170; MIG-23 Flogger
450-550; MIG-25 Fo_bat 8)-100; Yak-36 Forger
25-40
!A.-etlon Week, 2f6/78)
Aln:nf' C05lJ
The costs 01 operallng SlrClait are often JUSI
as Important 85 the cost 01 ollglnal purchase. The
follOWing are hourly costs 10 operate several a,r-
craft, IncludlOg luel, depot maintenance, base-
level maintenance, labor, end replenlshmenl of
spare partse T-3BA $469. F-4D' $2232; F-4E:
$2098; A7D $1410; F- 15: $2098,
IA.-iarion Week, 216/78)
Soviet SubmsrilM' Construction
The muchpubllCIZed Hughe$ GlomBr Ex
p/onIr recovery vessel went searchIng 10 the
PacifiC Ocean for a destroyed SOVlOt Golf-class
nuclear submaflnB In 1974 and found 1\ When pert
01 1\ was ra.sed and some surprISing
details 01 Sovlel submanne technolog'{ were
dIscovered. The baSIC welding of the hull was very
poorly performed- unusually uneven and varying
in thickness (especl8lly halch covers and vatvesi,
Some compartments Wilre bUIll by plOClng
together some wooden two-by-four planks, a
pract.ce that ce-rtalnly does not render great
strength to a navel vessel. Underwater hull and
compartment strenglh is one of the most Impor-
tant charactefiStlCS 01 any sub-surlace vessel
SAM Mbsl," f or Sub.,
As 10 lhe Second World War, lhe most deadly
enemy to lace the SUbmaflf'lO l.:>day IS theallplane,
An IOIOfmal alClom among ASW e_perts IS lhat
once a suitably ermed aircraft has spotted a
submerged submanne, the chances that the sub
will be destroyed is high (although, it must be ad
mitted, It IS QUlle diffiCul t for the allcralt to spot
the sub In the Illst place) Today, there IS no
known defense onboard a submanne agalnsl an
allClalt that has spotted thesubsubmerged ASW
helicopters can hovor 8t Will 0Y8f 9polled subs,
regardless of the sub's complex array oltorpeOos,
SOI1<Ir, and crUIse mISSIles. Th,s IS troublIng to the
Department 01 Defense, especlllily wllh lhe recent
davelopment of the Sov>ot "May" patrol plane l or
ocean surveillance and ASW work A Delense
research agency IS al1empllng to remedy IhlS defi
ciency, how_ The problem faced by an all-
hunled sub .s two-loId: firsl, lhe sub must be
capable of detecting and \Jaclung hoslile 8trcrait;
second, the sub must possess a mISSile that may
be launched underwater ago lOSt the enemy
planes The Illst pl oblem has been weil-Oigh solv-
ed and uses no more equipment than Is already
deployed on all USN subs. It fellOS s.mply on the
sub's paSSIve SOMI array, plclung up the sound
"signatures" thaI en aircraft In the viCinity would
make In lhe nearby waters The conluSion caused
by Slrcrall at varying fanges and ailitudes can be
solved by compultlfiled SIgnal processors which
Identify sound data as Il lS receIVed by a sub, ThIS
syslem has already been successfully tested In lhe
Pacific, but 1119 questionable whether its range is
sulfictenl to pick up an approachIng alfcraft before
the sub is sPOtted Itself ThIS agency has aoo
21
22
develops<! II Sell-lnltlBllIlg Anti alrcraft MIssile
(SIAM), which can be launched Irom II submerged
sub and gUided to nearby enemy Blrcraft - only if
these aircraft are beIng tracked by the sub' s
paSSive sonar By 1980, thiS program will be out of
the hands of the agency and IOta the hands of Ihe
Navy fOf development 8S an operational weapon-
system. Such" capability for submarmes is stili
very much in the design sta{j6. however; IllS stili
ques\Jonable whether the relatIVely slow-mOVing
submarine can cope With highly maneuverable
ASW aircraft and their lang-range deIectors and
weapons- wlthorWllhouta SIAM system Atany
rate. the backbone 01 NATO ASW is also the
airplane and helicopter. and we can be sure Ihal
the RuSSians BfB workmg on a Similar system, as It
would benefit them more than It does the Western
powers
INs/ionsl DefenS6, 11-121771
e ln the RUMI.lIs J i m the Ocun?
One 01 the more fasci nating possibilities in the
event of futura war IS that of "Jamming" the
ocean. The key to antl -submannewarfare is sound
search, and the cornerstone of contemporary
sound search IS "passive" (listening) sonar. The
safest and surest way to spot enemy submarines is
to listen for them under the sea by various means.
Listening for nOises underwllter, however, IS more
difficult than It appears Natural ocean sounds and
the increasmg nOise of oceangoing freighters and
tankers are making passive sonar less and less ef-
fective. The heavlDr the traffic in a water area, the
more difficult 1\ Will be to iOentlfy and track qUlDt.
submerged submarines. II IS certainly possible to
Jam an ocean by artilicially placmg exaggerated
ship noises underwater. It IS also possible tocreate
lalse submarine noises m areas where there are no
subs. Can sonar work under such conditions? It
may well end up being Simply a battle of signal pro-
cessors, TI'le more sophisticated a signal pro-
cessor is, the more accurate Its paSSive identifica
tlon Will be. On the other hand, an extremely
sophisllcated artificial noise-creator may well be
able to fool even the most advanced Idenllilcation
systems ThiS IS Just another m the long line of In-
dicators that electronic warfare has grown to
almost pnmary Importance m modern war. It is
said that artificial noise-creators In world oceans
Will be extremely harmful to marine lifa. However.
so are deplh charges and tmpedos, and IllS doubt-
ful that an ecological argument Will affect the
development of thiS system
(NlJl1onaIDefense, 11 -12/77)
Over.t he_Homol! I. Su
Presenlly, naval tactics are in a state of fluK.
The recent development of sophis\lcaled Ship-
board shlp-to-ship mISSiles (soch as the American
Harpoon and the RUSSian Styx) has brought about
the decline of the traditional naval gun. The
capabilities of these new missiles (particularly their
long ranges) have Indicated that any future naval
actions may well be fought at ranges never before
thought possible. In lact, most of these ship-to-
ship miSSIles have ranges longer than a man can
see at sea. so it is clearly possible for a slflli.e to be
(aunched agamst an enemy vessel at oVilr-the-
hOrizon (OTH) ranges. The only relaung
to this theory is that these weapons are so advanc-
ed that lirlng OTH far exceeds the current
capabilities of surface radar and submarine
sonars. As such, it would be impoSSible to initiata
an attack at OTH, thus negating one of the most
valuable aspects 01 these weapons. The US Navy
is attempting to I8medy this problem. A current
program entitled Ocean Surface Survell(ance MIS-
Sion is trying to create Viable tie-Ins between ships
carrying these types of miSSiles and a variety of
surveillance sensors. The most important of these
sensors would be land-based radars (havmg a
longar range than most shlpbome radars) and
moored sonar systems placed at vanous strategic
locations in the world's oceans (like the USNs
SOSUSL Orbiting satellites are also likely to be
used in this role Recently, a system en!Jtled Sub-
manne Satellite Information Exchange prOVIded
OTH target information to the attack subm;;rine
Richard 8. Russell in the Medi terranean Sea
Employmg a very complex computer tle-m system
between the satellite, the submarine, patrolling
aircraft, and a USN Command Center 10 Naples, a
R!Jsslan ship was successfUlly spotted and tracked
at over 100 miles range. However, in order for the
submarine to recelva and portray such informa-
tJon, it must display ItS antenna above the surface
of the water. This is not an advisable tactiC in a
body 01 watar that is being 1000ght over by the
navlDs of the \WO superpowers.
INarionsl Defense, 1-2178)
Nt'''' US Anny OJvlsloa Tesl5
In late 19n andeartv 1978. the US Armycon
ducted elaborate and sophisticated tests in order
10 determine the applicability of newly-organized
combat diVisions to modern warfare These leSl 5
constItuted Without a doubt the most complex
peacetime military wargame ever attempted.
Laser and computer technology were employed in
order to assure that the games would resemble
real combat conditions (see FYEO 166 lor a
descnptlon 01 lasers as training devices tn the US
Army!. The general aIm of these tastS was to
create a leaner combat formation that packed
more firepower than the old dlviSlon_ All sopport
elements (cooli;s, clerks, etc.1 are to be centralized
In thiS new formalton-all fronHme companies are
to be entirely wtth combat troops. Both the
basic infantry and tank platoon will be reduced
somewhat 10 strength, although the diVISIon
should expand from roughly nme battalions to 15
battalions lalbeit smaller ones). In addition, a
Nuclear, and ChemICal Defense Com
pany will beadded to the division It seems as if the
uflilthat conducted these tests- the 1st Cavalry
Divisl on - has achieved lavorable results,
although there is some controvllfSY in Army circles
over the re-structuring 01 the basic fighting pla-
toons. With at least one more year needed lor
evaluation of the new divisions, it will probably be
at least 1961 before the new organizational
scheme will be undertaken throughout the Ar-
my - provided, of course, this plan is adopted.
INarionsl Defense, 1-2178)
Tbe Ne'" Sol'lt'l A TGM
On the 60th Anniversary of the October
Revolution, the SOVlDtS unveiled a Q8W ATGM
(Anti-Tank GUided Missile!. It is believed thiS new
weapon will rep(ace the Swatler and Segger
ATGMs currently in service The new Soviet
ATGM IS thought to be very Similar to the Euro
pean MillJn. Considenng the quant;ty and quality
of security leaks from West Germany, and the
RuSSian willmgness to copy a good thing, it may
well be identical to the Milan. Like the Milan, the
new Soviet ATGM can be used on vehicles or In a
dismounted role. Range is thought to be 2 km With
a speed of 150-200 meters per second, giVing a
maximum llight time 01 13 seconds_ It can
penetrate 50 to 60 cm of armor If these estimates
are correct, the new Soviet ATGM would be
markedly sop&lIm to the US Oregon ATGM.
(International Defense Review, 117S)
Solet IFF e ooe Broken
Japanese technicians c(alm to have broken
the Soviet Air Force's IFF Transponder radar
code. which allows Soviet radars to dIstingUish
friendly from enemy aircraft. While the code has
obviously been changad since the defection of a
MIG-25 Foxbatto Japan in 1976- the source 01
the IFF (ldentlfica!Jon Fnend or Foel devIce
studied by the Japanese- it wi!) 9till provide a lead
as 10 how the Soviets WI!! use such equipment
IFlight Int 'I . 3/ 11 / 78)
Tht' Navy
TI'le French Navy has been somewhat Of a
hard-luck orgamzatlon for much 01 its long and
eventful history. Today, things are not looking
much better. By 1985, the combined French naval
tonnage WIll have dropped \0 167.<XXJ ton9 -of
which more than one-half Will be more than twen-
ty years old. At that time. thera will be fewer than
84 ships In the fleet, apprOKlmateiy 47 fewer than
at the present time. Clearly, lhe French Navy IS
caught in a crunch between the biock-
obsolescence of many 01 Its warships (most of
which wElfe conS\fuCted In the 1950's with heavy
US subsidies), and the high COSt of building and
running them. In Nelson's day, It was said that the
British sailors drank fI.Im while the French Stuck to
port . There are indications that thiS has not chang-
ed today. Last year, French warships spent an
average of only 85 days at sea lalthough the
government hopes 10 raIse thiS to 100 in the near
luture) . The French Navy 81so lacks loglslic sop-
port comparable 10 fleets such as the USN and the
Royal Navy By 1965, the French Navywlli have no
more than one-sixth of the logistics shIps and sup-
ply tankers than that 01 the already pitifully reduc-
ed Royal Navy. Indeed. il present trends conllnue,
the French floot Will be only ona-half the size 01 the
Royal Navy by thiS dllte. Another limit on the
French Navy is the Gaullist theory 01 an Indepen-
dent nuclear deterrent, even though the French
have indefinitely postponed the construC!lon of a
Sixth PolariS- type nuclear submarine. This
philosophy slIl1 claims 32% of the Flanch $14
bllhon defense budget fOI 1978
SDFT\NARE:
UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE
Order of Battle
7th UN/TED STATES ARMY /HO: Heidelbelgl
Army-Level Units:
56th FieW Artillery Brtgade: 1/ 41 Arty IPershing
missile). 1181 Arty IPershlng). 3/84 Arty (Per
shing). 2/41nf
32nd Army Air Defense Command:
10th Air Defense Anillllry Group: 111 ADA
(Hawk missile), 2/2 ADA (Hawk). 3/ 59 ADA
(Hawk), 2/62 AOA (Hawk)
69th Air Delense Anillf!ry Group: 317 ADA
(Hawk), 6/52 ADA (Hawk), 2/57 ADA (Hawkl .
3/60 ADA (Hawk)
94th Air Defense ArlI11f!ry Group: 211 AOA
INike-Hercu!eS), 5/ 6 ADA /NikeHerculesl. 21
56 ADA INike-Hercules), 3171 ADA I Nike-
Hercules)
Attached: 6/ 56 AOA /Vulcan/ Chaparral) , 2f60
ADA IVulcanl, 2167 ADA (Vulcan)
Berlin Bngade: 1/ 6Inl , 3161nl. 4/ 61nf , Company
F 40th Armor, Sattery C 94th Arty, Special
Forces Detachment Bmlin {company sizel
Special Forces Oetachment Europe (Airborne)
Airborne Combat Team: lf509 Inf (stallOned In
Italy)
1st Support Brigade
7th Signal Bflgade
15th Military Police Brigade
4th Transportation Brigade
Theater Army Support Command


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Save 20%
War in the West
The largest game ever produced! Three-coior map in nine 22" x 34" sections: over 46 sq. ft .
2,000 land, air and naval unit counters . 300-Tum Campaign Game and five Scenarios.
&ptem/)er 1st, 1939: German troops
attack across Ihe borders of Poland.
Within a few days, France and Britain
declare war in Poland's support. These
events mark the beginning of the largest
and most destructive war in human his-
tory. Within a month Poland surrenders.
crushed by Ihe German armed forces.
France and Britain maintain a defensive
policy, hoping Ihat their economic block-
ade will produce a bloodless victory. They
arc mistaken, fOr in the Spring of 1940,
the German blilzkreig strikes again, over-
running France and the Low Countries,
driving the British from Ihe Continent,
and fordng a French capitulation. Five
long, hard years of total war will [ollow,
as both sides struggle for mastery of land,
sea and air across the length and breadth
of Europe.
War In the Wert is a corps/ division
level simulation designed to recreate these
massive battles. The basic mechanics of
the game are identical to those of SPI's
popular War in the East. However, many
clarifications and additions have been
made to improve an already successful
game system. The nine 22" x 34" map sec-
tions (46 square feet of map) cover an area
from the top o[ the North Cape: of Nor-
way to the Libyan desert and the Middle
East, and from the British Isles to the city
of Stalingrad. Each hex represents 33
kilometers of actual distance and each
Game-Turn represcnts one week of actual
time (the same game scale as War in the
East). 2000 die-cut counters, prinled
frOnl and back, representing the armed
forces of over 20 nations, are provided, as
well as numerous other components to aid
in the play of the game.
The most strikin& physical feature of
the game is the map. The nine three-color
map sections, depicting the entirt Euro-
pean continent allow the owners of War
in the East to use the counters and rules
from that game to play on these revised
and updated maps, and even inlegrate the
componenls of both games to simulate
the enti re European War.
German production is another fea-
ture of the game. When playing any of the
campaign scenarios, the German Player
has the ability to choose which units to
bui ld. Production is handled in fourweek
segmenls and units are produced by all o-
cating Production Points which are re-
ceived each Production Segment. The
number of Points received varies to re-
flect changes in the German economy and
the battlefield situation. Oil is the crucial
limiting factor, since the Germans never
have enough. The German Player must
decide whether it is better 10 build costly
"strategic" weapons, such as U-Boats
and Air Points (in hopes of delaying
Allied reinforcements), or cede the Allies
control of the sea and air whi le concen-
trating on ground combat units. Even
among the ground combat units them-
sclves there are choices to be made:
whether to build fewer, very valuable
units (mechanized, airborne or SS) or less
valuable units in grealer quamity (Stan-
dard infantry and static divisions). Provi-
sions are also made in the system for the
use of conquered countries' industry and
for the capture of certain gcographical
objectives, such as th(' oilfields of the
Middle East. Production can also b(' af-
fecled by the Allied bomber offensive,
with rules provid('d to determine the spe-
cific type of larget hit, as well as the ef-
fects of these attacks.
To a great extent, the outcome of the
War in the West depended on such strate-
gic air and naval operations. These are
represented in the game by a simple Air
Point system and extensive Sea Move-
menl Rules. Also provided are rules [or
Allied Naval Gunfire and Fleet Interdic-
tion, as well as rules for the effect of
enemy air units on sea movement.
Supply rules have also been expand-
ed, with different supply sources for the
di fferent nat ionalities of units. Multiple
Weather Zones are outlined on the map,
with a variety of effects to represent the
problems of warfare under normal. mud
and snow conditions over widely scattered
areas. To help govern the actions of
various neutrals and belligerents under
th(' shifting fortunes of war, a compkte
set of Poli tical Rules is also provided.
Th('re are five scenarios: Poland.
France 1940, North Africa, Italy and
Franc(' 1944. There is also a Campaign
game of over 300 Game-Turns in length.
Each scenario is provided with the histori-
cal placement of the units involved, as
well as provisions for free: deployment. In
addition, the scenarios can b(' used as a
starting point for a Campaign game
covering the remainder of the war. The
Campaign game allows the players to
"correct" the mistakes of history and fol
Iowan endless number of alternate
strategies.
Now you can have War in the West
for only 524, by ordering on the Special
Qrd('r form in this issue.
S3
S4
SWORDS AND SORCERY
Quest and Conquest in the Age of Magic
Illustrated in Detail by Award-Winning Artist Tim Kirk
Quest Legend and Role-Playing Version
Two Games in One - Army and Quest
Swords and Sorcery is the game of fantastic and
magical combat in the Valley of the Great Sword,
located in a world in a far-off trinary sun system. Many
different races inhabit the Valley, and all strive to
become the ruler of the vast ly valuable lands. To this
end, armies ma rch to war , led by heroes with shining
blades and wi zards with fearsome spell s. But it is the Em-
pire of Man that is most feared. for it has the most
troops at its disposal and its share of brave righters. The
advantage the nations of the Valley possess is the vast ex-
perience in dealing with all manners of arcane
"magicks" which the men of the Empire can never hope
Therugond the Mage
to equal. But the Valley states have nursed ancient
hatreds against each ot her, and so the lithe Elves, the
sturdy Dwarrows, the sage Dragons, the powerful
Spiders, the cruel Orcs, and the myriad of other denizens ("':;
of the Valley war amongst themselves as much as they do

Gygax Dragonlord
Loki Hellsson
with the Empire, and this proved their eventual
downfall. Swords and Sorcery may be played in two ver-
sions - an Army or a Quest Game. In the Army version,
up to seven Players represent different forces as they at-
tempt to wrest territorial objectives from each other and
eliminate as many of the enemy as possible. The Quest
Game deals with all quests standard to the fantasy genre,
but Swords and Sorcery allows the Player to achieve
them. The game comes with fifty-six lavishly illustrated
cards, including Characters, and allows for role-playing
aficionados devising their own Characters.
Swords and Sorcery will sell for $13.
Available 16 June 1978 .
GiUlh
The Polodin Glode
/<O<4,.-WIII / ft1III _ 111
V CORPS (HO Frankfunl
V Corps ArtIllery
47s/ F/lJk1 AniJ/ery Group' 215 Arty 1175mml,
1132 Arty Ilance miSSIle! . 2/ 75 Arty 18-'. 2/ 83
Arty (S-I . Sanery 8 1126 Am IT AS)
42nd FftJki Aml/6ry Group: 6/9 Arty, !175mml,
3/ 79 Atty. Ilance mISSile!. 2/92 Arty (S-I,
1/ 33 Arty Ilancel . Banery A 1/26 Ally IT AB)
130th Engineer Brigade
3rd Corps Support Command
3fd ArrTlOfed D,VIS,on tHO Frankfunl
lSI 8ngadtl (HO Klfchgoens)- 2/ '32 Armor,
2/ 33 ArrTlOf , 3/ 33 Armor , 2136 Inl (Meehl ,
3/ 36 Inl tMeehl
2nd 8rig.td6(HO: GelnhausenJ: 1/ 33 Armor , 11
48 Inl tMeehl. 2148 In! (Meehl , 3112 cav, 31
61 ADA (Chaparral/Vulcanl
3rrJ 8ngadtl IHO Fnedberg) 1/ 32 Armor, 31
32 Armor, 1/36lnltMechl
Aflill6ry 2/3 Arty, 216 Arty, 2/27 Arty, 1/ 40
Any
8th Mechanized Infantry OIVISlon tHO: Bad Kreuz-

lSI 8ngadtl tHO MamzL 4/ 69 Armor , 2/ 28
InltMeehl, 2/ 87 tnf (Meehl. 1/ 59 ADA tChap-
arralfllulcanl
2nd 8rig6dfJ tHO Baumholc\er) : 1/ 68 ArrTlOf .
2168 ArmOf . 1113 Inl (Meehl, lI39lnflMeehl ,
1187 Inl (Meehl
3rrJ8ng1KJetHO Mannhe1ml : 3/ 68 Armor . 5/ 68
Armor. 21131nl iMechl. 3/S Cay
Artillery' 3/16 Arty, 1/2 Any, 2/81 Arty, 1183

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment HO: Fuldal
\/11 Cav, 2/11 Cav, 3/11 Cav, one All Cav
!foop
4th Mechanized Infantry DIVISion, detachment
(HO Welsbadenl
41h 8ngade 1/ 70 Armor, 21121nIIMeehl . one
mlantry battalion (deSignatron unknownl, 2/ 20
Arty l Troop 1110 Cav
VII CORPS IHO Stuttgart)
VII CorDS Anillery:
7200 FftJki Anillery Group: 6/10 Arty, 3/35 Arly,
2/42 Arty. 1/75 Arty. 1180 Arty, 3/17 Arly
210th FHIId Artillery Group: 1/ 18 Arty, 1130
Arty, 1136 Arty, 3/37 Any, 2177 Arty, 211B
Arty
7th EngmtNJr 8riglJdtI
2nd Corps Support Command
lst Armored 01V1SIOfI IHQ. Ansbachl
lsr 8ngscJe tHO IIleshelml. 1113 Armor, 1/ 37
Armor , 1/ 6 Inl tMeeh), 1I511nliMeehl
2nd Bngadtl !HO Erlangenl 1/35 Armor, 2/ 37
Armor . 2/S1 Armor, 1/46lnltMeehl
3rrJ 811f}lJfM (HO Bamberg) 3/35 Armor, 1/ 52
InltMeeh), 1/54lnl (Meehl
AmI/tHY, 6/14 Arty. 1122 Arty, 2178 Any, 1/94
Arty
60151 Combat AVlallon 8attallon
3rd Meehanlzed Infantry Division tHO: Wurzburgl
1st Brigade (HO Schwllinfurll 2/64 Armor,
HARO\I\IARE:
NAVAL TACTICAL
SURFACE-TO-SURF ACE MISSILES
On 22 October 1967, the Israeli destroyer EIIBI
was hit and sunk by Egypllan SSN -2 Surface-to-
Surface MIssiles ISSMsl while on patrol In the
Mediterranean The Egyplian missile boats
launched lhe SSMs Irom OV81 twenty miles away
3/64 Armor. 1130 InllMeehl. 2130 Inl (Meehl
2nd 8rigade (HO. K,lllngen) _ 1/ 64 Armor. 1/ 15
IniIMeehl. 2/ 1 InllMeehl
3frJ 8rigade tHO Aschaflenburgl 4/ 64 Armor,
1/ 41n11Meehl. Il7lnllMeehl
Anil/6ry: 1/ 10 Arty. 2139 Atty. 2/ 41 Arty. 1176
Arty. 3/ 67 ADA (ChaparrallVulcanl
Arrscheci: 317 Cav, 3rd Combat AViation Bat -
talion
2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment tHO
Nuremberg) : 112 Cav, 212 cav, 3/2 Cay, one
Air Cay troop
1St Meehanlzed Inlantry DiVISIOn. detaChment
tHO Goppmgen)
3rd 8rigade. 3163 Armor. 4/ 73 Armor, 1/ 16 tnt
tMeehl. 1/ 26 Inf t Meehl. 1/ 33 Arty, Troop C
1/4 Cav
2nd Armored DivISIOn, detachmenl (HO. Garlstadt
be! Bremenl
TRENDS:
THE TEMPO OF MODERN
AIR COMBAT
Today' s combat aircraft Will ,nfliCt tand
18Celvel much more damage In much less time
than those of WoOd War II The whole spectrum
01 modern weaponry all -Io-alr, HIt-toground,
sUlface--to-8If - MS become much mOfe IICCllrate
and ellectlveSlnc8 1944 Yet the vulnerabllllY of alt
or ground targets has not decleased As a result,
modern air combat IS very much a game of the
3tri8f1f}Mie 2/66ArmOf, 1/41InJ!Mechl, 1/14
Any, Troop C VI Cav
[Thanks 10 Tom Dtnackus; any addItIOns or cor
rectlons \0 thIS OB wIll be approcloilled.J

23
In the US Army. IndIVidual battalions of all 81m!
lira deSIgnated by battalion numbef / reglmental af
fl118uon IWlth arms type] In effect. the regImental
designation IS ffi8IInmgless. As cen be sean, bal
tahons of the same regiment rarely have common
aSSIgnments las l hay did In WWII and Koreal
Thus, the conoepl of a regiment in the US Army
today IS nothIng more than a historical and Ired,
llOnal one The desognallon 3/ 36 Ii'll should be
read " 3rd Batlallon, 36th Inlantry Regiment ..
AbblfJVJ8flOflS. Any .. ArtIllery; Ii'll - Infenlry,
ADA .. AI! Defense Arliliery, M6Ch .. MechaOlz
ad Infantry; rAB .. Target AcqUISition Battery.
Cav .. Cavalry Squadron
qUick and tho dead - an enVironmentlllied With
SAMs, AAA, and enemy eltcraft allows few
second chances, In a l uturewar, It IS thought thai
50% 01 thearrClaft commlued to air combat WIU be
destroyed In seven days, while 60% 01 those who
must run the 98untlet of SAMs and AAA to stllke
ground targets WIU be lost WIthin flItle days Win or
lose, an Hif waf In Europe WIll resull rn the loss 0/
many alrcral! and lhelt crews very qUICkly, and
unlls Will burn themselves out much more qUICkly
than they did even In the mOSllnt6nS8 aenal actJon
01 World War Il
(AlrUmversltyRfJlllf)W,I'-12Jn)
T .. po .r M ...... AIr CoIIIbo'
"..
,..,..
Size of friendly !Ofce 100 alc 100 alc
of dMlcting eed'I
--
0 .. ...
Probability of engaging each detected
enemy aircraft
D.' D.'
Pn:IbIibIII, of hitting eed'I engeged
--
0. 1 D.
Time to hit 100 enemy aircraft B,Omo 2.25 days
SortieIper IIircratt per .. 0.1 2 .
losses p8f sortie 0.002 0.04
TirM to -.., IriIndIy IIircratt tI.Omo, 7,0 "
T_ 01 M .....
Size of friendly force
V_ ...
-
SOfties pet aircraft per day
Time to hi!: 111OO..mt YINdaI
losses per sortie
TirM to -.., IriIndIy -..rt
and were n011l"V9fl engaged. The EilBtwas the flrsl
warship to fall VlClim to a weapon lhat has greatly
shaped modern naval UlChCS - the SSM
Since the the loIlowlng warshrps have
been hit by SSMs: 5 lJfJcfJmbfJr, 19n PaklSlanl
00 Kllybefsunk, 00 ShahJahanposslblydamag-
ad by Indian SSN-ls, Xl M8Y, 1973: Israeli fLINT
trawler Oni; four Egypllan SSN-2s flfed, two near
mIsses, Sunk, 6-7 October, 1973' One Synan
mlflasweeper. twO mISSile boats sunk by Israeli
,.,. ,.,..
100 alc 100 ./c
... 3.0
'0.6
2.'
.. -

0.005 0.03
. ,Omo,
... -
Gabriel SSMs. IJ..S Ocfober, 1973 __ Two Egyptl8n
miSSile boats sunk by ISfael, Gab"el SSMs 10- 1 I
October, 1973. Two Syrl8n mISSIle boats sunk by
ISfaeir Gabriel SSMs. 21 22 October: Two Egyp-
tl8n radar pICkel boats sunk, possibly bv Gatltlel
SSMs, posslblV by gun/ire_ J8f1uary. 1974 Paracel
Islands flghtlflg Soul h Vietnamese minesweeper
Nhu( T80 sunk by two Chinese SSN-2 hilS l i itst hit
left her dead in the wat8l1 Destrover Escort Ttan
Khanh Dull probably hit by one SSN-2 and SUNIV
24
ed. Other AVN warships possibly hil as well In ad-
dition. some neutral merchantmen gal in the way
In both the 1971 and 1973 Arab-
Israeli wars lind were sunk .
The accuracy ollhe SSM has varied widely,
filing II[ "Silting" destroyer-sizB targets, the Egyp-
tians and Indians have realized 70% - 90% ac-
curacy with the primitive SSN-2. Yet In the 1973
Waf, the Afabs fired more than 55 SSN-2s ilnd did
not score a single hit. The Israelis scored about
44% accuracy with their Gabriels, but It is thought
that this would be higher were It not lor lhe fect
that the first Gabrllli hit usually blew the largel 10
splinters, leaVing nOlhlng for subsequent rounds
to home In on.
The SSM's theorellcally high accuracy - with
II mBiumum of about 70% hits lor earlier weapons
to 90% lor the latter ones - can be reduced by Ihe
larget ship uSing ECM toiem the SSM, by evading
It, or by shooting It down. The Israelis used all
Ihree techniques in the 1973 War. An SSM or the
radar of the lirlng ship can be jammed, although
thiS also has limitations. The jamming ship muSI
radiate electrOniC energy, and i t IS reported that
many Soviet SSMs have an ActivefPassive
"home on lamming" feature. An SSM is also dif-
ficult to Shoot down, al though the IsraeliS did
down twO of them using 76mm shells With prox-
imity fusas The US Navy is countrng on the
Phalanx automatic 20mm gun system to shoot
down incoming SSMs. Some navies Intend to usa
40mm shells With proximity lusas. Other navles -
Such as the Royal Navy - do not primarily rely on
" hard kill" weapons end trUSt \0 the ship's ECM
deviCes. The Brrtish Seawolf Surface-ta-Alr Mis-
sle ISAM), however. is capable of destroying in
coming SSMs. and is the lirSI true tactical anti -
missile missile . The most effec t i ve
countermeasure. however. is 10 destroy the
enemy' s SSMs and their ships before they are
launched
The best SSM guidance systems are those
that are least vulnerable to jamming. That is why
Radio Controlled Guidence is not used in the more
modern SSMs. Pre-launch programmed inenial
gUidance is least vulnerable to jamming, as It is
completely internal , but it requires the firing ship's
computers to prad..:t where the target Will be
when the miSSile comes within range of its t9l-
minal homing guidance. Otherwise. their terminal
guidance will never lind the target. Radar homing
is usually ACllve Iwilh the missile Itself locking-on
to the lergell or Semi -Active IWlth the missile
picking UP and heading for lhe lock-on obtained
by a ship or aircraft!. All radar gUldllnce IS sublect
to lamming. however.
One advantage of some SSM, is in being
"surlace skimmers." These miSSiles stay al low
altitude In llighl. ThiS allows them to sliP in under
radar cover. makes them less vulnerable to enemy
weapons and, probably most Irnportantly, II
means they will probably Iheir target near
the waterline rather than in the superstructure.
Waterline hits will let water InlO 0 ship. Super-
structure hilS Wilt let air in
Many SAMs also have a secondary surface-
to-surface capabilily. but they are not as effective
as SSMs. This is due 10 their fhght IrajeclOry,
which wovld result in them striking the superstruc-
ture 01 the larget, rather than Ihe hull . The
warheads on SAMs are opumized to destroy
rela\IVely fragile aircral t with proximity fusas. and
so will not be most effective in having 10 secure
dlfect hilS on warships, although the light w9!ght
superstructure of modern wer5hips and their Vital
electronics would be vulnerable to SUCh a hit.
Nevertheless, a SAM travels 81 supersonic speed
and the shock 01 the impact alone will probably
cause a great deal of damage. and whatever fuel
remains in the SAM will add 10 the The
us Standard and, probably. the SO'Jiet SAMs
come closest \0 being dual -purpose mISSiles
While the requirements lor an elfoctJ\l9 SAM
and SSM are to an mutually exclusive, the
Soviet ship-launched SSN- l0/ 14 and SSN-15/ 16
weapons systems are ASW weapons that also
possess II significant anti -ship capability, and they
may be SWitched between ship and sub targets
while In their launch tubes. The SSN- l0/ 14 rEI-
qUires the use of nuclear warheads for maximum
effectiveness,
Sources:
Defence Magazine
Navy ImernIJlionlJl Magaz!ne
Jane's Weapons Systems, 1977
Jane's Fighting Ships. 1977-78
U S. Navallnsllw/8 Proceedings.
NAVAL TACTICAL SURFACE-TO-SURF ACE MISSILES (SSM)
WESTERN NAVAL SSMs
y- Typo R."", W",,-,
S_
a_
66 Penguin 1 11.0+ 264/HE 0.7 Initial program, lerminallR
7U SeaK .... 2 25.0 1Mf HE 10.91 RCG, bMm riding
72 Gabriel 1 12.5 165IHE to.7) SAH
72
""'"'"
, ...
400I HE 0.7..Q.9 I,.,.. progrMI, IfInTINI
...... -
73 Exocet MM38 20.0 330fHE 1.0 Initial program, terminal
radar guidance, SS
74
""""', 1
32.0 . / HE 0 . lni'dIIf progrMI, ee1MI ,.."
TSS
76 Harpoon 00.0 U HE or N 10.9) Initial program, tarminal
active radar
SOVIET NAVAL SSMt
y- T,po .....
w_ Spwd
59 SSN-'
150.0
_900'
(0.7) RCGMCR, IR tMminal
large HE
.. SSN-2 25.0 U N or HE 0 . AP or RCG, IR or
RAH_
62 SSN-3 300.0+ UN or HE
I.,
RCG-MCR, RAH original ,
RAH terminal
.. ...... 100.0 - U N or HE 1.0+ AP or RCG with MCR
150.0
70 SSN-7
".0
UN or HE
I.,
Initial progrem, IIctivef
passive terminal
7. 5S ... 11 30.0 U N, HE, DC 11 .51
1 SSN- 12 1250.01 UN or HE 11.5) Activa/ passive terminal
,.
SS""3
300.0 U .... N 1
'-""
SOVIET DUEAL PURPOSE ASW SVSTEMS
11by". WI Mipsl
y- T,..
.....
w_ S_
a_
68 SSN-l0 25.0 ?IN, DC RCG, MCR possible
.. SSN 14 ,0.0 1/HT 1
74 SSN-15 25.0 UN, DC 1 Rocket powered
,
SS ... lI
,5.0
1/HT
NOTES: Year: Yeer entered saNice; Range: max-
imum range of SSM. In the case of Soviet SSMs.
it may require mid-course guidance to reach this
range, expressed in nautical miles; Warhead:
weight of warhead (in pounds)/typa of detonating
charge: HE .. high explosive, nuclear, DC =
depth charge (can detonate on surface). HT '"'
homing forpedo, N "" nuclear; Speed - speed 01
SSM, meaSlJred in mach numbers. Mach 1 .. 665
knolS at sea level; Guidance: Initial Program '"'
missile programmed before launch. then uses iner-
tial guidance to tollow program; RCG _ radio
command guidance; MCR _ mid-course correc-
tion (by radiol rllQuired; SAH '"' semi-active redar
homing; AP '"' Autopilot; RAH _ Radar active
homing; IR .. inlre rad Iheatseelling); SS .. Sur-
face Skimmer; TSS .. Terminal Surface Skim-
mer; 7 ., unknown. Data in parenthesis is
estimated.
USE: SSN-l: was used on Kildny and Kfupny
DDs. now out of seNice; SSN-2: "Styx" used on
1
,
osoand KomarMissila Boats - being replacad on
USSR units; SSN3 Echo, Juliet SSB, (must sur-
face to launchl, Kynda. Kres/a I CLs; SSN-7:
Charlie and Papa class SSNs - can launch
submerged from target data from passive sonar;
SSN-9: NanUlchke class corvettes - requires
mid-course correction from aircraft to exceed 40
nautical mile range; SSN-l1: SSN-2 replacement;
SSN-12: SSN-3 replacement, also on KieV; SSN-
13: On Yankee SSBNs - anti-task IOfce ballistic
missile with no guidance after launch - may have
ASW role; SSN-l0f14: on K/Jra, Kresla 1/ CLs.
Krivak DDs, Moskva and KieV CVa. SSN-15f16:
on Ch/Jrlie, Victor. T/Jngo SSN, perhaps
Echo. and Brevo classes as well.
Western Missiles shown by nations used (nation
of design in Italic). Exocet: Fnnce, UK, S. Afriea
many S. American navies; Gabriel 1: Israel;
Gabriel 2: Israel. Taiwan, S. Africa, Singapore;
Penguin: Norway, Turkey, Greece, Sweden; Har-
poon: US, UK, S. Korea, W. Germany, others.
Sea Killer: Italy, Iran; Dtomat: Italy.
The TriumQh of Archery
over Armor, 25 October 1415
by Albert A. Nofi
It was St . Crispin's Day. The sun had risen at 0643 on this chill, damp morning. By then, the King
had already been about for hours, donning his armor, hearing Mass, consulting with his officers, passing
among his men. For days the English had striven to avoid battle. Finding this impossible, a time and a place had been
arranged with the French. In the distance the French host could be seen untangling itself. This might yet prove
a hot day for the tiny English army. For this St . Crispin's Day - 25 October 1415 - was the
apPointed time. and the fields near the village of Agincourt the appointed place.
r
25
26
0643: Deplo)' menl
Had Henry V 01 England tried. he probably
could not have pocked 8 held much bel1l!f SUited to
make a stand with his weary. hungry lillie Brmy
than lhal lIm"s! upon him by Fate Bnd the French
It was a roughly rectangular patch 01 muddy. lea
lureless larm land some 900 \0 1100 yards Wide
end about 1200 yards deep On the left was the
forest of Agmcourl and on the ught that 01 Trame
court At the nofth end were the French in Ihell
lens al thousands. Over allhe south end were the
English, barely&XXl all together. The lleld nrcely til
the needs of the unv English army With the flanks
well covered by the forests, the French could not
employ their numbers 10 m'lXJmum advsnlsge
The tack 01 ObstaCles between the armlfls greatly
ISlIored the use 01 the bow, WhICh const,tuted the
principal eml8m8nl 0185% of the KIng's men, and
the muddy ground would grve the advanlage to
whomever stood In defense For KII19 Henry in-
tended to do Just th81. stand on the defenSive,
emploYing tectlCS which had proven sound since
the days of his great-grendfatner
Henry had approximately 5000 light Inlentry-
men armed with longbow end sword or ex, plus
ellOthe/ I:KX) or so men-at-arms, heavily armed and
armored men trained In the Ell9hsh lasrlloo to fight
either 8S cavalry Of heavy ,nfantry By ludlClously
milling dismounted men-et-arms wIth bowmen,
Henry would create e watt against which the
French would beat In vain, In the centet 01 hiS hoe
the King placed e "bauahon" 01 some XIO diS-
Map A
(f)
mounted men-at-arms III a 10rm8tlOn aboul 75
men wide by four deep, roughly B5 yards by SiX or
etght yards On either side of IhlS was a "biIl-
lal,on" of 500 bowmen III tnangular lormauon on a
fronl of aboul B5 yards and up 10 seven ranks
deep On the OUler Side 01 the two "battahOllS" of
archers was another mass 01 XIO heavy ,nfantry
deployed In a manner similar to the cenler "bat-
talion," And belween these ouler "battahons" of
heavy fOOl and the lorests on either flank the King
deployed huge blockS of aboul lBC() alchers,
thrUSting them slightly forward of the main line as
they approached the covellng woods
To further strengthen the poSition, Henry had
each man Implant In the ground belore him a Stout
wooden stake about SIX feel long, angled loward
the French so as to catch a charging horse square-
ly In the chest , ThiS created a loose belt 01 ob-
stacles perhaps 20 yards deep, In whICh a lightly
armed man could move With ease, bUI which
would Impede the movement of a heavily armed
one and prohibit that of mounted troops, More-
over, as the obstacles covered Virtually the entlfe
English line, only three narrow cOllldors, each
8bout B5 yards wide, rem81ned uncovered, severe-
ly Ilmnlllg the route which an anack could take
These arrangementS left the King With no more
than 500 bowmen to spare About 200 were sent
all Into the woods on SIttler Hank to bum the
Villages of Aglncourt end Tremecoun and then to
Infiltrate the woods al the edges of the field end
deliver flanking Ille on the FrellCh The remaining
bowmen were d,smbuted as baggage guards and
body gU8fds, The left flank "banellOn" 01 heavy
Infentry the King placed In charge of hiS stOOl,
middle aged uncle, the Duke of Yorl!;, wh.le that
on lhe light went 10 the elderly, war-wl$9 beron
Lord CamOIS The King himself assumed com-
mand of lhe cenlral "battalion" By 0700 the
Enghsh were ready Not so the French, however
The French had been having some dllllCulty
gett ing into poSitron, The only really experienced
soldiers among them - the Constable of France,
the Marshal, and the Admilal-alilacked suffiCient
rank to Impose untty of command on the horde of
O u ~ e s Counts, Barons, and KnrghtS whICh had
come 10 the lreld An angry councIlor war dUllng
the night had given grudgmg assent to Constable
d' Albert's general plan lor the battle, but had
failed 10 establiSh a cham 01 command M8IIn-
while. many of lhe men had spent the flight dnnk-
mg and gambling. while others had stood around,
nOI wanting 10 get then armOl, banners, 01 sur-
coats Stained Wi th mud So many were suffeflflQ
Ihe after effects 01 theIr nOCturnal aCtlvll18S Nor
had thetr days-long approach march helP&CI therr
Slamlna On tOP of that, each one WiShed 10 be In
the Ilrst rank, as demanded by honor and where
the greatest glory would be found As the armV-
some 2O,<XXl men-at-arms, 10CXl crossbowmen,
2\XX) short bowmen, and one Of two gl8llt bom-
bards - began to deploy, everyone began Shaul-
Ing at once ebout then "rtght" to be on the lore-
front of lhe fight Even belore dawn the tumul l
had begun Hours were spent arguing aver tNerY-
one's ancestry and deeds Eventually, WIth muCt'
ENGLISH
argument, a lew challenges, and 8 great deal of
counting of armorral Quarterrngs, the order of bat -
tle was SOrted OUI The French would deploy In
threa main "battles" plus a few odd bits here and
there_ But no one would be In overall authoruy
The flf!t "banle" or dMslon consisted of be-
twean 6CXX) and 0000 dismounted menatarms
with Lances shoflened to seNe 85 pikes These
were undef the command of the Duke of Bourbon,
the Constable of France, Marshal BOUCICBUt, the
Duke of Orleans, and the Count of Eu, all of whom
InSISled on being in the 'ustlme The formation, a
rough rectangle perhaps lOCO yards Wide and
&lght or 10 yards deep, was packed rather tightly,
and lhe men crowded together In groot confUSion
while trying to keep their Imp!'ovlsed pikes out of
each other's way As thIS was a difficult task even
for well trained plkemen, the "bailie" greatly
resembled an undiSCiplined mob - which. of
course, to a great e_tent It was A few yards be
hind this first "battle" was anothel, 0 1 appro_I
mately the same number of dismounted men-at
al ms In apprO_lmately the same formation and
condl llon, under the Dukes of Alencon and Bar
Behind t his, again by but & few yards, were some
4OCO men-at-arms, some mounted and some ap-
parently on loot, under the CountS 0 1 Dammart ln.
Marie, and FauQuembourg, among others
Slightly forward and to either !lank of the flfst
"bailie" were twO troops of 500 mOUnted menat-
arms each, the leh under the AdmIral of France
and the light under the Count of Vendome The
JOOO or SO crossbowmen and shonbowmen were
Map B
SQueezed some between the first and second
"battles" and some were placed over on Ihe right,
to the rear of the Count of Vendome's troop,
together wllh some bombards 01 course, such a
deployment did not favor the use 01 miSSile
weapons If tile French archers or artillery loosed
any rounds, they were far more likely to hit other
Frenchmen than any Englishmen. The French had
not deployed to their besl advantage, but then,
lhey did nOI e_peet to attack Remarkably, Con
Stable d' Albert had conVinced the counCIl 01 war
that the French should let the English do the at
tack,ng So when they completed their deploy-
ment - some lime after Ihe English were ready -
they wal led And walledl
0130: Wailing
Both the English and the FrenCh completed
deploying by about 073), and, as each had
planned to conduCI a defenSive aCI IOn, nothing
happened Each army rasted on its arms, e_peel -
Ing the other Side to attack momentarily Time
passed Soon an hour had gone by, then two The
men beg<!fl to rela_. The French host soon resem-
bled a gang of picnickers rather then sn army Men
milled about. speak,ng w'th old friends, drrnkrng
Wine, thrOWing dice on cloaks spread over the
muddy ground Several arguments occurred, and
duels were arranged f or latel settlement What 111-
tie diSCipline or 5errousness Ihat might have ex-
ISted evaporated The English relaxed too, but nOl
so much. They were ured, lhey were hungry;
many suffered from dysentery Their Sltuallon was
........ [3J
.. 11l
.... 2
....
.... ....
[X] [X]
.....
....
....



[X] [X]
[. J

[X]
....
....

...
....
....
...
FRENCH
desperate, and they knew It So they stayed tense
and determ,ned The wa,"ng continued. Krng
Henry began to wOlry
The English were In a grrm posmon Hunger,
Cold. and disease could do the worlo; of the French
withOUt a blow being slruck. All tile French had to
do was wall The English could nOI Withdraw
wllhOUt e_po!lIlg themselves to a masSMI attack
on unlavOI'able ground Nor could they allack,
Since tllelr lac tICS were unsu,ted to an olfensrve
action T,me was wOl'klng 101' the French. And It
looked as though they preferred It that way So
Henry decided to try 10 force Ihe Issue
Shortly before 1100, the Kong began kICking
hiS army ,nto pos't,on again Under the superviSion
of Sir Thomas Erprngham-a war WISe veteran
who apparently was chl8f of archers-the bow-
men upped thel! stakes. When l hey were ready,
Sir Thomas tosse<! hiS baton of command rnto the
air and the King ordered an advance
1 tOO: Advance
"Banners Advancel" rang out across the
field Almost as one every men knelt. crossed
himself. and k,ssed the cold, muddy ground, tak-
Ing a bit of SOi l Into his mouth in symbolIC acceP-
tance of Ihe Inevltabiht y of death Then they were
up and, With tr umpet blasts and banners waving,
they stepped off slowly The movement was good
lor morale Indeed, though the men had accepted
the probablhty 01 death In the l ield, they were
gflmly determrned Befole they began 10 advance,
and while thev marched, the King had allowed the
Agincourt
Battle Maps
MAP A: Deplo)' menl and
Operations through c. t 13S
1 .. Initial positions, c. 0730; 2 .. English ad-
vance, c. 1100; 3 _ English arrow sllike, c .
1125-1130; 4 _ French cavalry charge, c.
1130; 5 - FrenCh l irst " battle" advance, c,
1135. NOle that , for Ihe sake of clarlw, iden-
tification of the various contingents has been
om!lted from the map. Reier to the main te_t
of the article for this information.
MAP 8: Operati ons. c. 1140
through c. 1215
1 _ French first " battla" in melee with English
men-al-arms. c_ 1140; 2 _ English bowmen
begin to harass French fugitives, c. 1200; 3 _
Personnel of French second and third " bet -
tles" begin to drift away, beginning c. 1200; 4
.. French second " bailie" advances, c. 1215 .
trO t' ) :
rJJ;. = Mounted men-aI-arms
.><. = Dismounted menat-arms
= Long bowmen
<r- = Cross bowmen
,,-... = Short bowmen
--+ =Advance
_-+ =Retreal
:.::. :: ,=Stakes

_ = Road
27
28
rumor to spread that the French would sever lhe
right hand of each archer laken. They might die,
but all alike were determined to avoid mutila\lon.
And as they walked across the fietd thelf physical
condition Improved somewhat Although hungry,
the exercise was Stimul"l1ing after standing about
,n the chili for hours
They moved slowly, Wi:lry of the French and
hampered by Ihe muddy ground. TWice in their
ten-minute walk they halted 10 dress ranks. AI
aboul1110 they halted, havong covered some
The French were now 001300 yards in fronl
-8 long bow shot . Themen-at-arms look up thelt
positions again, the archers went about Ihe
bUSiness of implanting thell Slakes anew, roughly
sharpening the ends as they worked.
As the English advanced, the French had
whllt was probably Iheff best chance to desuoy
them. A swift attack by cavalry againSt the moving
English might sweep them away before they could
reset their or loose more than a couple of
volleys_ ButthQ French were, il anything, less pre-
pared to deliver an attack at Ih,s time than Ihe
English Vitlre to receive one. They probably no-
tiCed that the English were ge"lng ready to move
about the lime the bowmen began to pull up their
stakes. By that time the French ranks were a mass
of confUSion. Many had wandered far Irom their
appointed pJaces. Others had Imbibed too much
wine In the carnival-like atmosphere of the pasl
few hours_ So time was wasted getting back Into
forma lion. As the English began to reset their
stakes in their new pOSition, Ihe FrenCh had
scarcely begun 10 shape up. And there was stili
conSiderable confUSion in the ranks when the
English were finished. The French needed more
time. King Henry did nOI intend 10 give it to lhem,
AI 1124 the King passed the word to Erplngham.
SII Thomas tossed his baton high into the air.
1125: BaUle
As Sir Thomas' baton rose In the all 11.1114500
shahs were loosed. A second valley followed
li:lose upon the hlst. At such range-3:Xl
yards - no serious wounds were Inflicted. None,
save that to FrenCh pnde, Stil l but panially re-
formed, the French attacked, The first "battle"
stepped forward. And the mounted men-at-arms
an its flanks put spurs to horse.
No more than half the 1<XXJ cavalry assigned
to the lIanking troopS were available for the charge
across the muddy fields, but Ihose that were came
on with determination. The English poured volley
aher volley into them. With each, the number of
wounded and panicked horses grew, Horses
crashed to the ground. and others stumbled over
Ihem, Riders went down wit h shanered arms or
legs or backs. Yet stili they came. The first 200
yards or so were covered in about twa minutes as
the mud slowed the horses, The remaining 100
yards or so took tess than a mlnule as the horses
went flat out Into the charge. All along the English
front the archers had advanced somewhat beyond
the caver of their stakes Now they fell back upon
them in the lace of the maSSive potential of the
charging men and horses. Some archers moved
too slowly and were caught in the open to De rid-
den down. Then the Slakes loomed. On the Eng-
lish light the Count of Vendome's horse turned
aSide in time. But over on their lef t. Ihe Admiral's
men-al -arms were not so lucky, Unable to turn
aSide, some horses ran full into the stakes, Impal-
ing lhemselves. Quickly their riders were pulled to
the ground and taken prisoner or killed with knrfe
thrusts In joints or face or by a mallet blow to the
head Some few fortunate ones managed to turn
aSide and floo. From I,rst bow stnke to the shaner-
109 of the charge, barely Ihree minutes had
"""".
Now the surviving men-at-arms had to reach
safety, with the lerrible volleys still rarnrng down
on them, across a field littered With broken men
and horses-a field on whiCh, even now, thell
own infantry was advanCing. With no alternallve,
the remnantS of the French cavalry plunged into
their infantry, rnfhcting further disorder on the
already disorganized ranks which were slfugghng
across the muddy ground. Shaken, the French
foot doggedly pressed on, as it too began 10 re-
ceive thousands of shafts With each passrng
minu te.
1140: Melee
The confused, crowded ranks of French
rnfantry grew even more disorganized as they ad-
vanced. The mUd, churned almost liqUid by the
passrng of the cavalry, caused men to lase their
footing. Others feil wounded by the thousands of
arrows showerrng upon them. Still others fell
under the hooves of their awn cavalry as It tried
desperately to escape. And as each man went
down, he caused others to stumble into the mud
as well. Yet stili they came on. There being little
honor - and no profit - in fighting base-born ar -
chers. the eagerly advancing French sought King
Henry's three tiny "battalions" of men-at-arms,
As they did so, their front narrowed from 1<XXJ
yards to but 250 rn three columns, one confronting
eaCh of the English "battalions," The crowding
grew worse as the men on the flanks pressed
toward the middle and those In the rear pressed
toward Ihe front
As the French came on, the English readied
for batt le. The King, standing Wi th hiS bodyguard
In Ihe Interval betwoon the second and third lines
of the central "battalion," gave his final orders
The French drew nearer. When they came within
20 yards they Increased their pace. thrusting their
ImprOVised pikes aut and charging headlong
against the English. At the moment of imminent
Impact. the Engl ish stepped back I
The King, timing hiS move Wisely, chose the
Instant before Ihe French would smash Into his
front to fall back ten or twelve foot. The sudden
move broke the momentum of the French charge.
They halted, confused, some yards rn f ront of their
foes. Then, eager for batt le and glory, and pushed
forward by their comrades to Ihe rear, they
pressed on.
Soon Frenchmen and Englishmen were hack-
Ing, Slabbing, chopping, and smashing at each
ather. Men began 10 go down all along the fronlS
01 the Ihroo English "battalions." But more of the
FrenCh were falling than of the English. The loose
formation adopted by the King enabled the first
two ranks 01 English heavy Inlantry 10 take par1 In
the battle. The French, crowded together, often
could barely wield sward or lance before being fell-
ed by a mighty blow from sword or or warham-
mer or before being hooked and dragged down by
bill or halberd. Many indeed, fell without seeing
their slayers as the relentless pressure from the
rear thrust the men in the lront on the very swords
of the English. As men fell on the muddy ground,
they caused those behind to lose their footing,
making sllil more difficult the task of staying alive.
The nOise grew intense as men screamed and
shouted and prayed and crred and as sword rang
an sword or smashed against armor. And the
slaughter grew.
Amid the chaos, great feats of arms occurred.
The Constable of France, d' Albert, fought With
frantic fury that belied his 46 years before lalling to
English swords. The youthful Duke of Orleans per-
formed what one contemporary called "prodigres
of valo(' befote being stunned and taken for ran-
som, And King Henry seemed everywhere at
once. having determined thaI death would be pre-
ferable to saddlrng England With a huge ransom
for his capture.
Two French knrghts, Brunelete de
quehen and Garnot de Bournonville led a band of
16 others, all sworn to stnke Henry' s crown from
hiS head or die In the attempt . Attacking the King
with suicidal fury, one of them-forever to remain
anonymous-struck a golden fleuron from the
royal war crown and severely dented the royal
helmet. But Henry and his bodyguards and the
men-at-arms around him beat the attackers off,
killing them all. Their bodies jOined the growing
numbers 1i11ering the ground In Iront 01 the English
posItions. There lhey further hampered the French
attackers, who had to try to advance over their
prostrate fellows, while avoiding English blows
and trYing to deal blows of their own.
1200: Crisis
As the savage melee between French and
English heavy ,nfantry ran Its course, the Enghsh
bowmen kept up their lire, belaboring lhe flanks of
the crowded French columns, but by noon the vol -
leys had became ragged. Many of the bowmen, in
action for aver half an hour now, had run ou! of
shafts, Same of them began to drllt over the field
In l ront 01 the English line, picking up some or the
thousands of spent but undamaged arrows which
httered the ground. As they did so, many noticed
stragglers from Ihe French attacks wandering
across the fields wounded, confused. lost. or
merelv afraid. Many archers began 10 seek these
unfortunales out, abandoning lhe shelter of the
stakes and leaving their now useless bows behind.
Soon some hundreds of archers were scallered
across the l ield. s\luggling twO or three to one
againSt stray French men-at-arms.
Though unable to stand up to a man-at-arms
singlv. the archers could gang up on Wi th With
relative Impunrty - one man to dlstracl the man to
one side, another to run around behind him and
deal a blow With sword or or mallet to his back
or knees, and dawn he WOuld go. A quick dagger
Ihrust rn visor or grOin or 10lnt would sellie the
fellow then and Ihere il he wasn't worth a goodly
ransom. In this fashion some hundreds perished or
were laken pllsoner and led to Ine rear . And as the
archers worked, Ihe French attack began to falter .
Mast of the pnncipal magnates-the Con-
stable, the Marshal, the RoVal Dukes, the Counts
- had already fallen dead or been taken prisoner
when the yeomen began Iheir deadly work . The
bailIe, l or those who could see, was rapidly be-
coming no place for a nobly-born man-at -arms to
wrn glory. Men an the fri nges of the French col -
umns began to dll ft toward the rear, dodging the
roving gangs of alchers as they went . Some men
seem to have panicked, running aimlessly aboul
untillhey blundered rnto some 01 the deathdeal-
rng bowmen, But the heads of the columns were
firmly agarnStthe Iroms of the Ihree "battal-
ions" of English heavy foot, kept there by the ter-
rible pressure of the thousands of men 10 their rear
who sllil eagerly pushed forward, hoprng to get a
chance at Ihe glo/V, and as yet ignorant of the Im-
minent disaster which loomed aver the French ar-
ray. The killing went on, and the French fell in in-
creasingly disproportionate numbers.
1215: Reinforcement
By now the French first "banle" had been
engaged for nearly an hour . During thiS time their
second "bailie" had been standing in readiness
some hundreds of yards to the rear, awaltrng ilS
chance to bid for honor and glary with litt le notion
of the course 01 eventS on the battle line It IS dlf
flcullto Judge the stale 01 morale in this "bailie" al
Ihis time. Many of the men seem to have been
emotionally worn out just from haVing stood about
waiting lor well aver four hours. Others seem 10
have boon very keyed up and quite wlllmg to go m-
to action when ordered. Then the I'rst panic-
stricken fugitives from the slaughter appeared,
and two thmgs happened very quickly. Some
men, apparently in fair numbers, became inl ected
Wi th the pamc and themselves lied the field. and
others determined to advance at once m order to
save the day. Among Ihls latter group were Ihe
Dukes of Alencon and Bar, mOle or less in com-
mand ollhe "battle." At their order, that porllon
of Ihe second "bait Ie" which had nOI already
abandoned Ihe held stepped lorward The first
"battle" would be remloread with some thou-
sands of fresh troops Which was precisely what
was not needed II Ihe growing disaster at the front
was to be averled.
1230: Disaster
The fresh men 01 the French second "battle"
ran enthUSiastically imo the rearmost ranks of their
lirst "baule," aggravating the Situation of the men
actually in contact wllh the English. More men
were pushed lorward onto the English weapons;
mora man became Jammed together, unable to
Wield a sword or all; and more man went down in
the press to be trampled underfoot. The failure of
the remforcement became eVident in minutes.
Panic, hllherto confined to the men 01 Ihe Iflnges
of the messlve column and to those 01 the second
"battle" as had chosen to flee, now began 10 in-
fect those in the center as well, and even some of
the men of the third "battle" were touched by it.
Something temble was happenmg to the French
army, and somethmg desperate would have to be
done to save it. The only problem was /l nding
someone to do II By now all of the ranking per-
sons 01 the first "battle" were long gone and Ihe
Duke of Bar, haVing somehow shoved hiS way to
the front 01 the tightly packed French troops, fell
almost Immediately. The only Frenchman of ranK
lelt was the Duke of Alencon.
Slipping from the melee, Alencon found and
mounted a stray horse, one 01 hundreds wander-
mg about the field, Ridmg back and forth across
the ballielield, Alencon tned to rally the men. It
was to noavall , He was rebuffed by all and sundry
the small knots of fugitives collecllng to the rear;
some elements of his own "bailie" which had
failed to advance; and even the uncommitted men
of the third "battle." FrenCh morale had broken.
The only Ihing he could do was die gallanlly
Alencon rode back to the melee, dismounted,
and joined the few thousands Slill fighllng. Per-
sonally leadmg a desperate attack on the English
center, he became involved Irl a combat With the
Duke 01 Gloucester, King Henry's younger broth-
er. The young Duke received a dagger in the belly
The l ighllng around him grew fierce, The King and
his bodyguard came up, beallng ofl the French
Alencon, S88lrlg that all was lost. shouted hiS sur-
render . Henry shouted back his acceptance. The
heat of battle was upon everyone An English
manat-arms struck Alencon down The last
Frenchman of rank had fallen .
1245: Plnic
With the death of Alencon, the few thousand
Fl8nch shll slfuggling with the English men-at-
arms gave up There was no one lel t to give
orders. There was no one willing to obey them
anyway Panic tOOk hold, and the French fled as
best they could across the muddy, corpse-littered
ground, with King Henry's archers in hot pursuit.
Some scores of FrenCh lell now, and stili hundreds
more ware dragged 011 as prisoners Withlrl min-
utes It was over, With the shattered and p'llful rem-
nants of the two proud "battles" shel tering in the
v!elrll ty of the fast dl mlrllshmg men-at-arms of the
French third "bailie." From the look of thlrlgs. the
bailie was over
The King unquestionably welcomed the col
lapse 01 the French_ Though hiS forces had suf-
lered relatively few casualt ies, the army was Irl no
fit condllion to fight on, Many hundreds - perhaps
thousands - of men had gone off to escort priS-
oners or loot corpses. Most of his archers were
very short on arrows, despite the fact that many
had been recovered from the ground_ And what
men as sull remained in the ranks were tired, stili
hungry, and Irl many cases stili siCk The magni -
tude 01 the victory was stili probably unclear The
French had the third "bal1le" which might yet
make things difficult. Henry thought It beSt to
keep hiS men-at-arms and archers wellirl
hand. to wal t on developmentS, The battle might
seem to be over, but one never knew. The Klrlg
was right. For the battle had yet to run Its lull
course
1300: Beau geste
As the lasts learful SUrviVorS of the French
foot reached the salety of their third "bailie:' the
young, Impetuous Duke 01 Brabant arflved on the
scene With a smal l escor\. Full of chivalrous Ideals,
Antoine of Brabant had IIdden hard and long to
lake part m the bailie, even defYing hiS brother-
Ihe powerful Duke of Burgundy - to do so. In hiS
eagerness he had outstripped the bulk of hiS con-
tingent Indeed, so intent was the Duke on amvlrlg
'n time lor the balt le that he had behind hiS ar
mar and standards_ Nonetheless, seelrlg the d,sas-
lfOUS outcome of the !ightlrlg, he sought to save
the day
In borrowed armor, and using a stray banner
as an improvised surcoat , Brabant led hiS small
band on a thundenng cavalry charge. If supported
by the French third "banle" - which stili compos-
ed some thousandS of uncommined men-at-arms
- Brabant's attack might pOSSibly have reversed
the deciSIon reached by the mfantry Sweeping
across Ihe lield, the French could have swept up
hundreds of Englishmen, slaughtering them
Without arrows, Klrlg Henry's archers would not
have boon able to stop the charge But the third
"bailie" did not move And as Brabant's Iiltle
band charged, the lew bowmen With arrows
let fly In a mlrlute or two it was over, the horses
roiling in the mud, the men-at-arms and the Duke
himself taken It had boon gallant and noble and
chivalrous, but 11 had notlrlfluenced the course of
the bailie a bll. Nor would the Duke be rewarded
for hiS courage.
1310: Raid
While the Duke 01 Brabant was makmg hiS
Irultless charge, another Frenchman was beStir -
ling himsell lsambard, Lord of Aglrlcourt, the
local baron, apparently had observed the battle
from alar Eventually the thought occurred that he
might Irlilict some damage on the Engl ish by at -
taCking them in the rear, whilst their atlentlon was
in front. Wi th two other menat-arms and a
gang of some hundreds of peasants armed wllh
agricul tural implements, lsambard fell upon Kmg
Henry's baggage train. The men-al-arms and
bowmen assigned to guard the wagons had long
slrlce dnlled off to jOin the battle, 01 were oc-
cupied guarding prosoners some hundreds 01 yards
away. All that remained in the camp were some 30
pliests, a !lock of servants, and some laborers.
The rClid caused a panic among the English
camp followers_ lsambard's armed rabble gallantly
slit some priestly throats, tortured a l ew stable
boys, and made off wrth the King's spare crown
and some other regalia. Then, satisfied that he had
fulfilled hiS duty to France, the Lord of Aglrlcourl
and his mob fled like the thieves they were. But by
then, King Henry believed there might be a major
French threat 10 his rear
1320: Debilt gest"
The Duke 01 Brabant' s gallant but frUitleSS
charge sti rred the ollhe French third "bat-
tle" as nothing had done so far St ill some thou-
sands strong, their men had stood Idly around
through the entlle batt le, Ignoring even Alencon's
ImpaSSioned efforts to get them movlrlg Then
came Brabant's ellort. Some of the leaders 01 the
third "banle" were touched by hiS courage The
Counts 01 Marie and Fauquembourg tried to col
lect their men for a charge. Some hundreds re-
sponded But most. Includll"lg even the Count of
Dammarun, refused No matter, the two counts
and their small band put spurs to horse. Wllhm
minutes It was over, as a lew hundred arrows-
qui te pOSSibly the very last 11"1 Ihe belts of the Eng-
Iish- shanered the feeble effort It might just as
well have not taken place Indeed, it might have
been beller il the whole thing had not taken place.
For Just as Marie and Fauquembourg rode to their
deaths, King Henry learned of lsambard's raid on
the baggage It seemed that the English were be-
sellrom IranI and rear both. And the King made a
temble deslclon
1330: Atrocily
29
By now the banle had lasted four hours In
that time the English had taken some thousands of
prisoners, Includll"lg a pride of dukes, a flOCk of
counts, a herd of barons, and a hOSt of lesser
nobility. All had surrendered on their word, With
no more than a tOken removal of helmet and
weapons to coniine them, There were far too
many pnsoners to guard properly, or indeed even
to bind. They milled about in their thousands some
yards Irom the a held by now littered
With thousands of discarded weapons The attack
of Brabant, the feeble efforts 01 the French third
"bailie," and then the raid by lsambard of AglI"I-
court on the English rear allll"ldicatoo lhat the day
might not yet be over The Kll"lg was Waffled. The
poSSibility of rescue could turn the pflsoners Irom
a listless mass 01 dejected humamty mto a major
threat to the safety 01 hiS tired l!ltle army Some
thll"lg would have to be done. Henry ordered the
prisoners slain,
The men-atarms gualdmg the Dflsoners balk-
ed. Humanitarian conSiderations aSide, the
prisoners represented a conslderabla limmclal In-
vestmen\. Ransoms could run to the thousands of
pounds, and one did not lightly throw that sor t of
money away. To stille the protest -and
the grisly task, the King sent 200 archers under a
squire.
There IS a problem here, mvolvmg Henry's 11"1-
tent ions, On the one hand he might seriously have
mtended to slaughter al l the prisoners On the
other, he might have meant hiS order pnmarily to
cow them stil l further intO submiSSion, Certamly
even 200 men without scruples would find the
sheer phySical task of killing five or ten times their
number difficult, particularly given the weaponry
available WhiCheVer the case, It IS unquestioned
that some hundreds were slain, and someonesven
put to the torch several huts m which wounded
prisoners had boon placed. Certainly these men of
fered no threat, even should rescue have oc
curred. But blood lust was upon the English, And
In such Circumstances even the Geneva Conven-
tion tolerates such an atrOCi ty
How many were slain is unknown Certainly
many were, but few among the great The
here IS the Duke 01 Brabant: his Impro-
vised equipment made him look like a poor coun-
try knight, and belore anyone Knew It, some yeo-
man had sli t hiS thfoat. The total of the sial n can
not have boon more than a few hundred. Within
mmutes of Issuing the order, the King rescinded lI.
The threats m fron t and to the rear had
evaporated.
30
1400: Victory
By mid-afternoon, the remaining French had
given up and fled the field In httle more than
three hours tnelr host had been reduced from
25JXXl \0 nOtt1lr1g. Over 6(X)(} of their number
were dead, including Ihe Constable, an Arch-
bishop (I), three dukes, five coon\s. 90 barons.
lind 1500 A fur ther 2000 or SO were
prisoners' among them were the Marshal, two
dukes. 111 least five counts, some scores of
barons, and hundreds of knights, And the fest -
all lied On the balance, Ihe English had suffered
lightly; the Duke of York dead of II stroke; the
youthful Earl of Salisbury mortally stricken by a
French blow; II dozen other men'lIt-arms killed;
and a few score yeomen lost for II \Olal of perhaps
100. It was II tremendous victory for the English,
cheaply won
THE HUNDRED YEARS
WAR: 1337-1453
Arguably the longest war in history, the
Hundred Vears War was actually a series of
wars between the Kings 01 England and the
Kings of France stretching over a period of a bit
more then 115 years. Its origins were rather
complex, but by no means unusual for the
Feudal Age. These may be briefly summarized
as follows:
_A distant claim 01 tha Kings of England
to the throne of France.
- The fact that the King of England was a
vassel of the King of France as well as
sovereign in his own right.
- Franco-English commercial rivalry over
the Flemish wool and lulturies trade.
- French assistance to Scotland in its
ceaseless wars with England.
- Depredations of English and French
pirates on each other's shores and ships.
The war is generally divided into eight
phases or periods which are generally known
afte' the event or person which dominated
them.
Tht Sluys Puiod, 13371343. Ki ng
Philippe VI of France declared the fiefs of Ed
ward III of England forfeit and proceeded to in
vade them. Edward sent raiding parties into ac
tion and proclaimed himself King of France so
that he might gain support from other French
lords dissatisfied with Philippe. The war pro
ceeded at a leisurely pace until 24 June 1340.
when the English seized command of the seas
in the naval Battle of Sluys. Thereafter every
one lost interest and a truce was proclaimed.
Tht Cruy Pt riod, 1345 1347. A civil war
in the Duchy of Brittany gave a pro-English
faction the advantage, and Edward outfitted
an expedition to take advantage of the situa
tion. The French promptly invaded Gascony.
Edward's principal fief in France. and laid siege
to vanous castles. To relieve the pressure on
Gascony. Edward took his army to Normandy
and marched inland. After various adventures
his 20,000 men- menatarms, archers. and
light troops- met a considerable French force
at Crecy (26 August, 13461 and. employing the
tactics later used at Agincourt. soundly de
feated them. Edward than marched north-
Reprise
Agillcourl IS a difficult battle to explain. Every
batlie must have a viClor and a vanquished. Bu t It
is somelJmes dlfflcull to determine who conln
buted more to the outcome. Such IS the case al
Aglncourt. To be sure. Henry V - Shakespeare's
"Hal" - empioyed hiS lIule army In such fashion as
to galll the grealllSt advantage from its unique
combination of longbowmen and heavy infantry
BUI In a very real sense Ihe French losl Ihe battle
far more decisively Ihan Henry won II. AI no lime
did any of the French moves do more than contn-
bute to thelf destruction. Indeed. the very facllhal
the battle occurred is because the French wished
It , Given Henry's situation, there was no need l or a
general engagement. Isolated In Ihe heart 0 1
France, surrounded by enormous armies, the Eng
IIsh would have surrendered from starvation wlth-
wards to Calais, besieged and took it, A 101'lQ
truce fOllowed as each side readied itself for a
renewal of the struggle and coped with the
Black Death, which Europe Irom 1348.
T ht Poitltr'5 Period. 1355-1360. Having
failed to negotiate s real peace, Edward III in-
vaded France again. aided by his able sons, Ed-
ward the Black Prince and John 01 Gaunt,
Beginnil'lQ in 1356 the Black Prince several
times raided deeply into Central France. Usual-
ly he was pursoed by a large French army. On
19 September 1356, a battle was fought at
Poitiers in which the decision of Crecy was
reconfirmed, save thaI this time the French
were on foot . The King of France and scores of
his nobles were taken. After Poitiers. the Black
Prince withdrew 10 the English base at
Bordeaull, and the war ran on as a series of
raids. On 24 October 1360, the Peace of
Bretigny was concluded. Edward III received
some additional lands. but agreed to give up
his claim to Normandy and to recognize Jean
II - Philippe had died in 1350- as King of
France, thereby technically yielding any right
he might have had to that throne. But Jean's
ransom was so great it was never paid. He died
in England in 13641 A long truce followed in
which the English end French backed par
ticular factions in the ongoing Breton civil war
and various adventures in Spain.
T he Uu Period, 1368-1396. A
revolt against Edward III by some Gascon
nobles prompted a ranewal of the war and of
Edward's claim to the French throne. Bertrand
Du Guesclin, Constable of France, injecled
some sensibility into French operations.
Avoiding pitched banles. making use of
sieges, artillery and even such "unknightly"
things as night attacks. Du Guesclin slowly
pushed the English out of most of their ter
ritories, save only the fortress-cities of
Bordeault, Bayonne, Brest. Calais, and Cher-
bourg. By his death in 13110, the reconquest
had been almost completed. Meanwhile both
Edward III and his sons had died. Thus, both
sides were relatively leaderless, as the replace-
ments were uninspired, Desultory warfare
broken by fraquent truces lasted for some 16
years more. but nothing decisive occurred.
Then in 1396 a JO-years truce was signed. Both
countries were beset by internal disorder and a
collapse of royal authority. England promptly
In days. Only thelf ViCtOry at Agillcourt saved
them.
Consider the French eflors:
lack 01 a chain of command
lack 01 a clear plan of batlie.
failure 10 employ thalf archers
Failure to coordlnale their at tacks.
ExceSSive zeal
ExceSSive Chivalrous Idealism.
Ultimately. the French fai led because they
could not Will . An army IS no bener than the socie-
ty which pu ts It 10 the field Sunken In feudalism.
Late Medieval France could not but l ield an army
which rellected Its ideals. And such an army could
nOI cope with the raahnes of warfare. So, given
Ihat it had t o occur, there could be no other out-
come than Ihal the English would Will at Agln-
court .
revived, but France fell into 8 long civil war be-
tween pro- and anli-Orleanist factiorHl known
respectively as Burgundians and Armangacs.
And through it all intermittent warfare con
tinued.
Tht Allincourl Period. 1401428. The
throne of England passed 10 Henry V in 1413,
who promptly renewed the war, aiming again
at the French throne. His first campaign almost
ended in disaster but the French, having for
gotten Du Guesclin, saved him by giving vic-
tory at Agincourt on 25 October 1415. In tha
following years, Henry conquered or received
the cooperation of most of Northern France in
cluding thai of Ihe Burgundian faction. Finally
he got the French king to designate him as his
heir. On his death in 1422, Henry's infant son
Henry VI was proclaimed King of England. The
King of France died shortly thereafter and lillie
Henry was likewise proclaimed King of France.
Meanwhile the "rightful" heir proclaimed
himself Charles VII . As the war continued. the
English seemed likely to soon conquer all of
Frence. During 1428 the English laid siege to
Orleans. the last important French stronghold.
Tht Junnt d'Art Ptrlod ,
142'.1444. The peasant girl from Champagne
who had visions of saints was somehow given
command of the French armies by Charles VII.
Wilhin a ShOM time she had driven the English
from Orleans and went on to win a series of
remarkable victories. Betrayed to the English in
1430. she was burned as a wilCh. Butshe acted
as a catalyst, inspiring French resistance, and
in the next live years the military situation was
more or less completely reversed. Subse-
quently, the French gradually eroded the
English position until, in 1444. a fiveyear truce
was concluded 8t Tours.
The Fl'fnch Triumph. 1449 1453. The
French spent the truce reorganizing their army
and turning it into a prolessional force, The
end of the BurgundianArmagnac civil war
more or less foretold the end of English inter
lerence in France, as the French could now
concentrate their entire energies against the
English. Within lour years of the expiration of
the truce in 1449, the war was over. Using ar
tiBery to telling effect, the French were able to
beat the English bow tactics. On 19 October
1453 Bordeaux fell , leaving England only the
port of Calais from the vast Empire enjoyed by
Edward III and Henry V.
POUNDS, SHI LLINGS,
PENCE, and FARTHINGS
Money is, of course. one of the crasser
realities. Throughout history it has con-
stituted-or rather it's absence has can
stituted-a significant problem for the OV8r-
whelming majority of humanity. And for just as
long, war has been seen 8S 8 viable alternative
to starvation and 8S II shortcut to great wealth.
At the time of Agincourt the pound was II
fairly standard measure of money throughout
Europe. 01 course the exact value en<! com-
pO$ilion of Iha pound varied from country 10
country and even from city to city in the same
country. The English pound (about $300.00 in
1978 termsl was actually based on 8 standard
set by merchanls from Flanders- "Sterling" is
cognate with "Eesterling" - though the actual
minting had long been in the hands of the
King. The French had rwo official pounds at
this time, thatol Paris and that 01 Tournai . This
was actually a vast improvamant on their
earlier situation, whiCh had seen 30 different
standards, including that of the King and a
couple of dozen nobles and towns. Eventually
the livre tournais (about S67.(0) was to
become the official standard for all of France.
The pound was, of course, broken down into
smaller denominations, to facilitata trade,
business, and taxation. The English, and all
other pounds, broke down thus: Pound - 20
Shillings; Shilling " 12 Pence; and Pence .. 4
Farthings !literally "a fourth"). This was, of
course, the break-down used in the Sterling
area until very recently, when Britain finally
decimalized the pound. The other surviving
pounds- Italian, Israeli, and Turkish-had
long since been decimalized. They have also
all-including the English-lost any real can
nection to their original value or standard. For
originally the pound, regardless of type, was a
literal pound of silver, with value difference
due primarily to the lack of a standardized
system of weights and to debasement of the
coinage. And when the pound was closer to its
origins than it is now it was 8 truly poweMul
coinage.
Changes in purchasing power and stan
dard of Jiving make conversion of antique
moneys into modern terms misleading. Never-
theless, soma idea of the true power of King
Henry V's coinage may be obtained. Aoughly
Henry's coin worked out:
Pound $300.00
Shilling(.s)
Pence (d)
Farthing (n
15.00
1.25
.32"
In terms of purchasing power, two far-
things could get you one scrawny chicken-
we're not talking about the quality of Medieval
merchandise here-or a dozen eggs, which
were relatively dearer at that time than now.
This doesn't sound too bad, of course. But in
order to make the purchases one had to have
the money. Which was why a lot of people
chose war as an occupation.
As the table clearly shows the profession of
arms was a bit more profitable than any other
at the time. Incidently, French wages seem to
have been somewhat lower than English at this
tima. The rigidity of t he social scale is also
demonstrated, of course. However that was so
inherent in the system that no one ever really
questioned it overmuch. But wages we,en't
the only way a soldier-regardless of rank -
could turn a profit. For he could supplement
his pay with loot - though Henry V frowned on
it - and, more importantly, with ransom. A
man who took a prisoner could demand ran-
som. And. depending on the rank of the per-
son taken, ransoms could be enormous.
DAY WAGES
England, c. 1415
CiVilians
,
d
,
= $1978
Master
Carpenter 3 3.75
Master
Mason 4 5.00
Carpenter 2 2.50
Mason 2 1.95
Aeaper 34 3.75-5.00
Thresher 1.25
Soldier.s
Archer 6 7.50
Man-at-arms 15.00
Knight 2 30.00
Baron 4 60.00
E,'
6 8 99.00
Duke 13 4 200.00
SOME AGINCOURT RANSOMS
Item Amount Plidro
1 M. de Corpe $107,005.00 2 menat-
arms + 1
archer
2 Menat-arms 4, 000. 00 Sir Aobert
Laurence
1 Man-at-Irms 3,000. 00 unknown
I Man-at-Irms 1,500.00 I man-at-
arms
1 Man-at-Irms 325.00 an archer
I Unknown 180.00 an archer
Now obviously these are randomly selected
eKamples. But the ransom for the Seigneur de
COIPO was not unheard of. Some ransoms
were so high they might beggar a man and his
family for years. Indeed. Henry V swore to die
rather than be taken because he feared his ran-
som would break England for generations. The
ransom fOf the Duke 01 Orleans was so high it
was never paid. The duke spent 30 years as a
"guest" of the Kings of England. Apparently
the best ransoms were paid to the higher rank-
ing captors. Lower ranking guys were very like
Iy to get skinned. Even so archers obviously
were able to get a piece of the action. The
yeomen who took the two bottommost
prisonen; on the table still managed to make a
nice profit: $325.00 (21s Sd) represented 2)1,
months wages. One wonders whether any of
the great landed fortunes of England are
traceable to a little ransom picked up at Agin-
court by an enterprising bowman. Certainly
the common people thought it peMectly possi-
ble. Which is why they were quite willing to go
off to war. The profits were better and the
danger about the same as staying home and
starving.
,,'oolnole: English ProW and l oss
a t Agi ncourl
War is a form of industry in which one invests
capital and labor in the hope of realizing a pro
fi!, victory. But in Medieyaltimes it could yield
not merely victory, but excellent monetary
benefits as well. Consider what might be term-
ed a profit and loss statement for Agincoort .
Expendiwres (debit!
Manpower $52.471 .00
Munitions 37,500.00
Total $89,971.00
Incomefcredit!
Ransoms
Total
$30, 000.000. 00
$30.000,000.00
Grand Total $29,910,029.00 profit
Obviously Henry V appears to have turned a
neat profit at Agincourt . But things are not
always what they seem and the table needs
some clarification.
The then current day wages
have been used to calculate Henry's expen-
ditures here, based on an army which included
as combaMnts two dukes, foor earls, five
barons, about 890 miscellaneous men-at-
arms. and some 5000 archers. This theref ore
excludes some hundreds of non-combatants
who were also on the payroll, including a
bishop and 31 priests - one for every 178 men;
a physician and 20 surgeons - one for every
200 men; a flock of engineers and stone
masons; and all types of courtly officials, such
as heralds, stewards, and chamberlains.
Munitions. Only arrows have been counted,
at 3d, Of $3.75 per sheaf of 24. The king sup'
plied these to the troops at his eKpense. On the
other hand he did not feed them, as their pay
was considered sufficient for them to obtain
their own yictuals. The king did, however, let
contrlcts or permissions to specific merchants
allowing t hem to supply the army Ind waiving
any eKcise on their goods. This could be con-
strued as a net loss to the king, But no one was
eating at Agincourt enyway.
Ransoms. The figures represent approx-
imately 2000 prisoners, including the Marshal,
two dukes, l iye counts, SCOles of barons, and
hundreds of other men-at-arms, pro rlted on
the basis of the average 01 known ransoms.
But actually t his enormous sum was not fully
realized. When the English reached Calais on
29 October t hey discovered that there was little
surplus food in the town and that prices were
high. As I result many prisoners were rlnsom-
ed at a discount, representing a considerable
loss to many indiyiduals. Only about 700 of the
prisoners ever got to England. And even t hen
many were never ransomed. The Duke of
Orleans managed to spend 30 years IS an
English "guest," emerging in 1445 It 56 years
of age with little to show for his life but a
reputation as a minor French poet. His raf150m
was n8V9r paid. It could not heve been without
beggaring his family for generations.
Pront. Eyen assuming only 1 % of the total
of ransoms were actually collected, England
still made a t remendous prof it for one day's
work at Agincourt, Indeed, the total must have
gone a long way towards defraying t he costs
of t he entire war.
31
32
MAN AND HORSE
AND STEEL
The mounted, heavilV armored knight im-
mediately recalls the Middle Ages. With lance
and shield he thunders across the centuries,
sweeping all before him. But, beginning in the
Thirteenth Century, he commenced 8 long.
,low decline in Iha fece of increasinglV effec-
tive infantry. By Agincourt, he had already
been several l imes defeated in encounters with
Swiss, Italians, Scots, or Dutch srmed with
the pike and, of course, by Englishmen IIrmed
with the longbow. Nevertheless, in 1415 he
was 51ill considered the premier arbiter of bat-
tle.
The custom is to app1v
the word "knight" to any of the armored
cavalrymen of the Feudal Age. This is nOI ac-
curate by any means. Actually the knight was
one, albeit the most honored and ranking one,
of a class of such warriONl known as menat
IIfrm;. Anyone with the armor, the horse, and
the training could qualify as a man-at-arms.
But only a few would be knights. The knight,
almost always of "noble birth, " qualified for
his position through various arduous
ceHlmonials and essentially belonged to a sort
of ley religious brotherhood with strong
mysticlIl characteristics. Below him in rank
were several degrees of less prestigious men-
at-arms: squires, serjeants, Villers de guerre,
and even pages. The heirarchy of men-at-arms
below the rank of knight tended to get
somewhat com pie . A squire, for example,
could be a flObly born youth getting some on
the job training from a proper knight or could
be lin independent gentleman of some means
or even II hired outrider for a proper knight . A
was usuaUy the hired outrider or the
undeNltudy for an independent squire. The
vlller dB gUtlrrB was a youthful, or not so
youthful, servant of a knight or SQuire. Now, in
battla, all of these would be equipped pretty
much in the SlIme fashion, though the knight
or wealthier independent squire would pro-
bably have the most el(pensive and modern
equipment and the best mount. The lower
ranking men-aI-arms had to make do with
older stuff, often very old, and less splendid
mounts. In battle the lesser ranking types ohen
ended up in tha rear. Indeed, there is some
suggestion that the French third " battle" at
Agincoun WIIS composed of such: poorly
equipped fellows afoot or on old nags, who
had jusl seen the flower of the men-at-arms go
down under the English arrows and bills. NOI
the sort of thing Ihat was good for morale.
Finally came the pages, who were really jusl
unarmed boys of 16 or less, in training_ There
was al$o a higher rank than knight, the "ban-
nerel", or slandard bearer, who was usually an
experienced man-at -lIrms-not always a
knight - who could be trusted 10 lead a
squadron of his fellows in battle_
Armor_ Armor was perhaps Ihe principal
characleristic of Ihe man-at-arms. By the time
of Agincoun - the early Fifteenth Century -
armor was just completing a transition from
chain mail 10 plate. A proper suit of plate, with
associated underarmor and padding, ran to a
weight of between 40 and 100 pounds, de-
pending upon the degree of protection desired
and the stature of the man wearing it. It was
actually lighter than chainmail, which required
vary extensive Illyers of padding to be eHec-
tive. The suit was made in literally dozens of
separate pieces, all having a special name,
specific function, and panicular maintenance
requirements. The pieces fitted together in a
pre$Cribed fashion, thus enhancing the protec-
tion afforded_ The man-et-arms would first
don some light padding, then a vest of chain-
mail designed as a sort of last ditch defense
against punctures, Then the feet would be en-
cased in steel, followed by the legs, the arms,
the back, tha chest, the hands and the head.
Each piece fitted over the preceading in such a
way as to provide e.tra protection at the junc-
tures. Now, some joints could not be protected
by plate and resort was made to the less effec-
tive chainmaiL As much as possible, all plate
surfaces were curved and free of decoration so
as to permit blows to glance off_ By heavily
strengthening the left side, and paniculariy the
left arm, a shield could be dispensed with, thus
lightening the man's load considerably and
permitting him to use two hands in battle.
When all fitted together, the suit of armor was
a flel(ible, well-articulated covering, if not over-
ly comfortable in el(treme weather. A man-al-
arms in full armor could do pretty much what
he could do without it, The notion that a man
so equipped was vinually helpless is hardly ac-
curate, as borne out by el(periments con-
ducted with actual suits from various periods,
Even Ferry de Lorraine, a French man-at-arms
who fell at Agincoun, could get around pretty
well in his 90 pound suit of armor. Cenainly his
load was better distributed than that of his
many times great-grandsons in the World
Wars_ A modern infantryman's load has often
approached 90 pounds in combat and much of
it rested squarely between his SMulders_ At
Agincourt not everyone wore a proper full suit
of plate armor. Armor was e.pensive_ Even lor
a high ranking noble it represented a con-
siderable investment. Recently a major inter-
national corporation offered tailor made suits
of armor to its customers at the remarkable
price of S2,OOO, about the price in 1415, Con-
sidering that steel is cheaper nowadays than in
1415, one can get the general idea. So many
men wore older equipment and some probably
even wore full chain mail outfits, which were
only about a generation out of date, These
people in p;:!rticular must have been highly
vulnerable to the English bodkin point, which
was especially designed to pierce chainmail. Of
course, armor is essentially defensive. To win
battles the man-at-arms had to have offensive
equipment,
Weapon f)' , The existence of armor greatly
restricted the types of weapons which could be
used by the man-at-arms, Although the sword
was an object of almost mystical veneration, it
was not normally the main combat arm. Sur-
viving el(amples are between five and ten
pounds, ohen very tapered and having a very
sharp, needle-like point, so that it could be
thrust through chainmail and other weak por-
tions of one's armor_ Of course against a man
properly armored and armed, such a lucky
blow would be unlikely. Sosmashing weapons
were more imponant than thrusting ones. And
a considerable variety of smashers e.isted, in-
cluding swords, a.es, maces, and hammen;.
These could be relied upon to smash plate and
break the bones beneath it_ Indeed, a blow to
the head, even if it did not smash the helmet,
would very likely cause a concussion, render-
ing the luckless victim incapacitated. Since the
man-at -arms was technically a cavalryman he
usually also was armed with a lance of some 18
feet in length for use in the charge. AI Agin-
court, of course, the men-at-arms on both
sides fought dismounted, in what had become
a custom of sons. As a resuh, the French
found their lances too long and broke oH a
couple of feet at the bUll to make them more
manageable, This probably still left them
somewhat unwieldy. The English did not have
this problem_ Their standard lance was
shorter, designed soma time before for either
mounled or foot use as circumstances dic-
tated, Moreover, many of the English men-at-
arms do not seem to have carried lances, but
rather bills or halbards. These weapons were
about eight feet long and resembled nothing
less than gigantic can openers, which was
more or less what they were. The halbard, for
e.ample, had a blO/ld Il(e blade, a spear point,
and a hook. Thus the man wielding it could
chop, $lab, or hook his opponent as needed.
At Agincourt, the English second line in each
"battalion" seems to have used bills and
halbards primarily as hooking weapons:
reaching over their fellows in tha first line, they
would hook an unsuspecting French man-at-
arms and drag him forward and to Ihe ground,
where he could be disposed of in more tradi-
tional fashion, Finally, of course, everyone car-
ried a dagger, which was often large enough to
quallfy as a short sword.
HorsH. The man-at-arms was, above all,
a cavalryman, 50 his mount was an essential
part of his arms and equipment . It was, accor-
dingly, often costly, running 100 10200 pounds
at times ($30,000-$60,000), Surprisingly, the
typical horse for a man-at-arms was not a huge
Clydesdale or Percheron type truck horse.
Rather it was a largish animal similar to the
English hunler or American quaner horse. The
point is Ihat the charger did not have nearly the
load which is customarily assumed, at least in
the period when the mounted man-at-arms
was an effective battlefield combination.
(Later, in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Cen-
turies grossly overweight armor, and even el(-
tensive horse-armor, was introduced, making
It almost impossible for the man-aI-arms or his
mount to do anything_ But bv then Ihe system
was already long since obsolete,) The total
weight to be carried was usually no more than
250 pounds- man-at -arms, armor, weapons,
and SIIddle altogether. Horses, at this time,
carried little protection, Of course, this made
them highty vulnerable to arrows. IxIt it did
keep things light. A Napoleonic cuirussier tip-
ped the scales at about the SlIme weight as a
Fifteenth Century man-It-arms. Many mounts
were trained to aid in the fight with hooves and
teeth. But no horse, however well-trained, was
willing to run itself up against a row of spear
points. So once steady infantry evolved,
beginning in the Thirteenth Century, mounted
combat began to go out of style_ The man and
horse combination which had dominated the
battlefield for some 600 yeaNl became ob-
solete.
Tralnln&. Fora nobly born person, or even
a person of gantle binh, training was a matter
of Ilfe, From his youth, the potential man-al-
arms engaged in hunts, jousts, and games, all
of which helped ready him for battle, There
was a lot to learn: riding; mounted combat
with lance, sword, axe, mace, and whatnot;
dismounted combat; and the rules of chivalry
and heraldry. Men often started as pages and
learoed on the job, worlr;ing their way up in
rank . 11 is by no means certain, however, that
the man-III-srms was panicularly skillful. Most
of his worle was pretty simple; swordplay. for
example, was essentially B matter 01 cut-and-
thrust, rather than anything resembling fenc-
ing, which evolved in Italy in the SiKteenlh
Century. But however well-ltained, eventually
he had to go into banle.
Ort_nln tlon. The man-al-8rms did not
go off to war in a vast disorganized mass. A
regular system of organization existed. though
one which might give a modem staff officer
nightmares. Basically. ell men-at-arms in an ar-
my were organized into "lances." A lance was
a combat team of three to Shl men, thoogh in
exceptional cases it consisted of more.
Typically it would be headed by a knight or in-
dependent squire, supported by one or two
squires or serjeants, a valet de gue,rre or page
or both, and perhaps even one or two
bowmen, Normally this would be the retinue of
a single Individual , consisting of himself and
the men he was obliged, by contract or feudal
oath, to supply in time of war. Five or ten
lances would form a troop or "post" usually
under the senior knight or squire, Several such
troops would form a squadron or "benner"
under a still more senior man, perhaps a baron
or other lord, Eventually a separate rank was
evolved, banneret, to designate the man
qualified to lead a banner. A great lord, such as
a duke or count or earl, would of course be like-
ly to bring a considerable number of lances
with him, And his own personal "lance" -
everyone wore twO or mora hats in this
primitive TO&E- might consist of a fairly large
number of men-at-arms, who comprised his
bodyguard and personal retinue, In battle.
groups 01 banners would lorm the various lines
or "battalions" or "bettles" which the army
would be divided into. Rank, 01 course, rather
than practical military experience, olten deter-
mined who would receive the post 01 greatest
responsibility,
Tacllcs Ind Erfectlnness, The ultimate,
indeed the only, tactic 01 the mounted man-at-
arms was the charge, This was surprisingly
short . Ahhough Hollywood would have us
believe that cavalry can charge for hours, the
horse is actually a less durable runner than
man. So most charges lasted no more than
lour or live minutes, Usually this was mostly
accomplished at the trot, perhaps three to five
miles per hour. But when the enemy was
within 50 yards or so, the attacker would pick
up speed to about 12 to 15 miles per hour. This
is actually less than a horse's maximum speed,
but it preserves his wind. Althe moment of im-
pact, the kinetic energy was enormous: an
1800 pound man and horse charging at 15
miles per hour possesses nearly 2,000,000 foot
pounds 01 kinetic energyl Small wonder that it
took centuries to evolve inlantry steady
enough to face up to the charge of the
mounted man-et-arms. But. of course, such
infantry was evolved: the Swiss, the Ilalians,
the Scots, and the Dutch all developing sturdy
pikemen who could stand against the mailed
ranks present ing unwavering rows of spear
points for the horses to impale themselves
upon. As the horses were usually more con-
scious of their survival than were their riders, it
became increasingly difficult to drive home II
charge against such a foe. So dismounted
combat began to develop. The EngliSh were
the first to be successful with it . The man-al-
arms was essentially a spearman on horse-
back, so they began taking him off from time
to time in the face of particular problems:
superior numbers 01 enemy menat-arms; stur-
dy enemy inlantry: ground illsuited to cavalry;
and so on. And the man-at-arms became an i"n.
lantryman. The English rapidly understood
that this was a reasonabla option. Apparently
tha French considered it somewhat less than
desirable. Of course the English used the
system defensively. well supported by natural
features and by their excellent longbowmen.
The French had to use it most ohen offensive-
ly, unsupported by effective missile t roops.
From the evidence, it appears that the system
was ideal for defense. Certainly the lew occa-
Armor at the time of Agincourt (horse armor of
a laler era). This sketCh gives some idea of the
more up-to-date patterns of armor worn at
Agincourt. Only the principal pieces have been
named: a panoply this extensive may have had
over 100 separate parts. The use 01 relatively
less effective chainmail i5 fairly widespread,
demonstrating that this outfit falls toward the
sions when the French were able to employ it
in that marmer worked for them. At Formigny,
15 April 1450, an English army of 4500 men-at
arms and archers encountered a French army
of 5000 men-at-arms wirh two light cannon,
The English deploved in their traditional
fashion. The French dismounted, lined up. and
let the cannon work over the English JUSt out of
longbow range. After a few enfilading rounds,
the English broke ranks, charged, and were
wiped off the field by a counter-charge of the
French menat-arms acting as infantry. In
essence, the French had done to the English
what Henry V did to them at Agincourt : pro-
voked an attack. At Agincourt the French
oughl to have stood on the defensive. Once
Henry lorced them 10 attack, they wele doom
od.
____ Upper Arm
_--ElbOW Cap
Horse Housing
or Trappings
end of the transition from full chain mail armor
to complete plata coverage. The charge. is
protected only about the head and neck, leav
ing a considerable area of the body exposed to
arrows. Later, of course, armor, lor both man
and horse, was to become conaldarab-ly more
extensive. But by then itwas already becoming
obsolete.
33
34
"WITH CLOTH
YARDSHAIT .
..
Celebrated in song lind story, the yeomen
archer with his longbow stands 85 the most
uniquely English contribution to the art of war.
Surprisingly, our knowledge of this man, of his
weapon, Bnd of their function in baltle is poor.
In its day the longbow was so common an 0b-
ject that everyone must have understood
something of its construction, US8, and
capabilities. As it went Qut of style, fewer and
fewer people shared thel knowledge. And
eventually, there was no oniliell. So loday we
must rely on a very small bit of firsthand
evidence, supplemllflled by our knowledge of
the modern sporting bow, end with the gaps
filled in by $Orne well reasoned conclusions
based on Inherent military probability.
Equlpmtnl. Based on the thr911 admitted-
ly incomplete. but genuine bows which have
come down to us, the typical English longbow
seems to have been between 6' and 6' 4- long,
about 4- around the grip, and weighing
perhaps six to eight pounds. The best bows
were rn.ade of Mediterranean vew, which is
springier and sturdier than that grown in the
cold damps 01 England. Oiling with wax or fat
helped preserve the bow and its linen string
from the elements. Arrows were 3r long- the
famous cloth yard- with a plain, unbarbed
steel head- the famous bodkin point . Fletch
ing, preferably of peacock, was more normally
of !;:heaper duck or goose feathers and occa-
sionally of parchment . Twenty-four arrows
constituted a sheaf, of which six were long-
range flight arrows, whilst the balance were or-
dinary man-killers, or sheaf arrows. Each arrow
weighed two to three oyncas so a sheaf ran to
about four pounds. Some archers carried t heir
shafts in a belt Quiver, but it was not unusual
for a man to just jam them into his belt. The
normal combat kit for an archer ran to his bow,
one or two sheaves - with or without
Quiver - and an lilia, sword or leadened rn.allet .
This was supplemented with a Quilted surcoat
over his nonnal rags, plus a belt to jam all his
gear into, aOO some sort of footgear. A few
men wore halmets, mOlt juSI a boiled leather
cap. So John Yeoman went to war light, with
no more than 25 pounds of anns and not half of
Organization of Men-at-Arms
Ihat in other gear. The king supplied a nag for
him to ride, but otherwise the bowman was re-
Quired to supply most of his equipment
himself, OYt of his princely six pence a day
salary. And it was princely: a mason of the dey
made only fOYr pencel So war was profitable.
For the survivors.
TTlil ielnl_ The yeoman was required to
maintain and practice wilh the bow by
England's ancient militia laws. Indeed, anyac-
tivity axcept Church and practice was pro-
hibited on Sundays and holy days. These prac-
tice sessions were social, as well as military af-
fairs. And there were pecuniary and social
rewards lor accuracy, as well as military onll!! .
Mandatory practice might nol rn.ake everyone
a Robin Hood, but it did produce a pool of ef-
fective, trained bowmen. Nor did the king
necessarily want a host of Robin Hoods. He
did want men who could deliver fast, accurate,
disciplined fire at need. So practice stressed
mass fi re at area targets. Each parish had its
Captain of Archers, usually a professional
soldier in the employ of the local squire. This
worthy supervised what was known as clout
(i.e., cloth) shooting. A large piece of cloth
was spread on the ground oron a frame set ata
Slight angle. The Captain would then drill his
men to lire into the cloth from various ranges.
Norrn.al practice was conducted at about 200
yards - ten score paces. As the men were not
stupid, a series of simple commands was easily
learned which enabled the Captain to regulate
fire. All of this would, of course, pay off in bat-
tle.
Orx_nlzati on. When war came, the king
usually contracted with various nobles,
barons, knights, and other magnates for vary-
ing numbers of soldiers. These men would
hire- or press-bowmen. Most of the bow-
men would be grouped not with their technical
employer's entourage lor further pra!;:tice, but
rather with the bowmen from other
hoyseholds, so as to be better organized lor
battle. Over ea!;:h twenty men an old soldier, or
vinrenBf ("twent ier"), was placed. Five such
commands were grouped under a moynted
squire, or centenar ("hundreder"1. These, in
turn, were subject to an overel! commander of
archers, such as SiT Thomas Erpingham was at
Agincourt. The system reeks of efficiency. The
(somefimes)
Valet de Guerra Page
vin/enars and cen/enars commanded what
were, In effect, platoons and companies, The
5imilarity to modern infantry ueage is striking,
And modern infantry ueage is based on the
number of men that can be directlV command-
ed in battle by one man.
Oeploymul. There were apparently
about 46CX) bowmen on 660 yards of front in
the ET11Jliah array at Agincourt . This approx-
imates seven men per yard of front . As each
man had an anti-cavalry stake implanted in the
ground in front of him, the depth of the Iront
must have been about 14 yards. If arranged in
checkerboard fashion, the individual bowman
would have had about two yards between him
and the next man in any direction. Vimenaf s
would have been at the head of their com-
mands, which would have occupied three
yards of front. The cemenars must have stood
mounted some yards in front of their men, who
would have occupied ahoot15 yards 01 f ront.
So a mass of 500 archers, as at Agincourt,
would have occupied about 8J yards of front,
14 yards deep, and muSI have looked much like
an infantry battalion in Napoleonic times, with
horsed officers to the fore and NCOs at the
heads of their platoons, all presenting a neat,
symmetri!;:al appearance. Bul neatness was
not the object.
Firt Control. To weigh in the scales of
bailie, the archers had 10 deliver fire when
needed, where needed, and in the volume
needed. This required a system of fire control
to tell them when, where, and how mu!;:h to
shoot , From available evidence, Sir Thomas
Erpingham, in addition to being in charge of
marshalling the bowmen, was also accorded
the honor of conveying the order to loose at
Agincourt. This was probablv done by trumpet
blast orthe waving of Sir Thomas' banner. The
centenBrs relayed the !;:ommand to the
vintenars, and they to the men, who would
loose. The whole process must have greatly
resembled what happens when a well-drilled
bilttalion is put thrOYgh its paces by the
sergeant major: commands echoing end a rip-
ple of execution passing through the ranks
almost before he has finished . Once the overall
command 10 shoot was given, the regulation
of range and rete of fire must have been in the
hands of the centenars, the noise and conl u-
Organization of Archers
1 Centenar
5 i n t e n a ~
100 Bowmen
1 Vinlenar
20 Bowmen
1 Centenar
1-2 Pages
lion baing 100 great IOf quick reference to
higher authority. Simple commands, based Ofl
practice Itandards-"SevlIn scote pacesl Sill
ICOre and ten''' - I'T'HJ.t have been used, al'ld
the men were probably briefed befOfehand
anyway (cl, l.inly the CSf/tllll"! Ind
vinrenafl'musl hIve beenllO fscilit&te regula
tion of une of fire lind poa.sible movements
during baltle. The net result is Ihal the king had
his firepower when he needed it, wl'lere he
needed ii, end In the amount. he needed.
Effecllunns. This, of course, wal the
IIIIItnCe 01 the malter. No matter how well
treined, weN OfQ3nized, and well equipped, if
the Iroopl could not inflict damage on the
IlW!my they may lI5 well have stayed home.
The problem it to define effectiveness. To be
effective, the Iongbowmen had to reach tile
enemy before the enemy reached the
bowmen. Allhi, they were quile good, though
nOI nearly so good 8S legend and Hollywood
luggest. While m8llimum range waB in exelN
of 300 yardl, the object WIIS killing, not world
distance record . A flight arrow could kill an
unarmored men or hof'5e at about 250 yards. If
it could hit him. Accuracy at this renoe, or in
deed much O\i1Ir 120 yards, was primarily a
mettar of lUCk. Moreover, tha target. unless a
h0fS8, was not likely to be unarmored, but
tathe!' encesed in verious 01 plate and
chein armor. A dirllet impect Ii.e .. at gool by a
shealarrow with bodkin point was supposedly
C8peble of piercing \4. plate at 120 yards. This
did not, of course, mean instant death to the
wearer. as he wa.likely to have a light chain
mail shin and some quitted padding under his
plate. Moreover, the plate wes curved so as to
prevent dirllel impect: the arrows would thus
glance off. This is aupported by modern e.
perimentation. II seems fairly certain thai ar
mored men were tarely killad outright by the
cloth yard shah. Certainly the mathemalics of
the situation must lead us to this conclusion.
At Agincoun the English shot between
120,000 and 240,000 shalts. but the French
auff8fed only ebout 6000 dead and perhaps a
further 2!XXl wounded. So it required between
15 and 30 arrows 10 Inflict injury on one man,
even ignoring the work 01 the English menat
arms. This is hardly deadly fire. The r"llmpect
of the arrows must therefore have been to
harass the attackelll, disorganizing them for
tha hand' lo-hand fighting which was to come.
Now this Is not to say thet men were not kUIed
by the longbow. Large portions of the menat
arms' body was not protected by plate armor.
The }Dints, the neck. the eyes, the groifl were
all either unprOlected or covered with chain
mall alone. And all were highly vulnerable. Of
course to hit these by means of eimed fire
would heve been difficult . Moreover, aimed
fira would have had to have been of low
volume. In a block of 500 bowmen. only about
2S,*, might be able to employ aimed fire. The
rest would be acreened by their comrades to
the Iront . So volume of fire must have been
more Important than aimed tire. A large
number of shalls reaching an aree
target - which was what clout shooting was all
aboul - would result In a fair number of hilS in
places of high vulnerability, plus e considetable
amount of disorder. As long as the volume was
kepI up, the accutacy and effectiveness of the
individual shah were not Important. And
volume it truly was. A single volley by the
English at Agincourt - perhap5 4600 shalll -
W1Iighed some 72S pounOsl In contemporary
terms this would be equal to the W1Iight of 22
howitz8f shens 005mm), albeit lacking the e.
plosive content . At the theoretical me.imum
01 si. shafts per minute. lhe English would be
delivering a projectile mass equal to that of
almost four batteries 01 150s. Assuming each
Englishman e.pended just 48 shafts at Agin
court - his "basic load" plus whatever he
could pick up from the field averaged to
gether- the lotal weight delivered would have
been upwards of 16 tons. all In the form of
some 2OO,(X)Q..odd arows. Of course to main
tain this volume, certain conditions had to be
met . To begin with, the bowmen had to be
protected from unfriendly swords, a ... , and
whatnot . This was done through the useof the
stakes. But more importantly, the range had to
be sufficienl to permit the rear rank men to
employ relatively high angle fire. OthelWise. as
the range decreased, so 100 would the volume
of fire. and thus the fate of useful hits. Ap
parently the most effectiva range- and there
fore Ihe maximum "killing zone" - was bet
ween 100 and 150 yardl . At Agincoun. the
French cooperaled by placing themselves
deliberately in that zone. And the result was a
French disaSler.
Footnote: Shorlbows and Crossbows
The French had JOOO or 4000 bowmen at
Agincourt, about twothirds of whom W8fe
armed with Ihe shonbow. while the rest car
ried lhe crossbow. Having been placed behind
the first "battle" and over on the French right
behind the cavalry, these archers played no
pert in lhe battle as far as can be datlrmined.
allhough there is I suggestion that they at
tempted to follow behind the charging cavalry
at about 1125. only to be beaten off by the
longbow volleys which decimated the cavalry.
The shortbow was a rather leeble affair . In
every way it was inferior to the longbow:
range, accuracy, effectiveness. Impact . The
French had some tens of thousands of
armed with this threeorfour foot weapon. One
of their kings, lmarting under the impact of
English arrows, had tried to estabHsh a national
bowarmed yeomenry such as the English had
enjoyed. But he picked the wrong bow. The
crOll!lbow, however, was another matter.
In the EngHah speaking world Iha
crossbow Is usually given shon shrift. being
considered generally Inferior to the long bow.
Some of Ihis attilucle derives Irom social or
moral considerations: crOll!lbowmen wera
usually mercenaries. And much of it II
undentandable ethnocentrism. But not a little
of it most derive from the fact thaI the two
weapons were never testad against each other
in battle. For each has certain advantages and
disadvantages which might have made for an
interesting outcome.
The croubow has three principal dis
aclvantag ... 11 has a somewhat shorter range
than the longbow, no more than 250 yalds or
so. though the effective ranges seem to have
been similar, 100 10 150 yards. The rate offire is
rather low, no more than two lhotl per
minute. but this was probably reduced to one
in practical terms. Most importantly. however,
the crossbow was a complex piece of
machinery, liable to break or become damaged
easily. Now. on the other sideol the argument,
the crossbow has cenain clear advantages. It is
more accurate than the longbow up 10 its me.
imum range. And it is far mora effective. There
exist numerous e.ampl .. of plate armor pierc,
ed by crossbow boili. but few. If any, pierced
by longbow shafts.
So whit would the outcome have been in
a stand up fight7 One can never know. Pro--
bably the aup8rlor ma.imum range of the long
bow would have been the decisive element:
crossbowmen were armed and equipped like
Iongbowmen. Without armor the crossbow
men might have been massacrad before com
ing into effective range. But one wonden.
THE LONGBOW COMPARED
Weapon WI PWI
Longbow 6-8.0 000
Crossbow 10.0
. ""
Arquebus 15.0 700
"Brown Bess" 10.7 500
Minie Rifle 9,'
, ..
Mauser '98 9,0
15'
M'
9,'
""
M16 ' ,3 110
This table compares the English longbow
and the conlemporary crossbow with other
famous infanlry small 8rma: Ihe early Six
leenth Cenlury ArquebuI; Ihe English "old
Brown Bess" Tower Muskel , In use from Ihe
early 1700s through the l000s; the American
Model 1842 Rifle-Musket widely used in the
mid l000s; the German Infentry Rifle ' 98 used
e.tensive!y since 1898; the American Ml
Garand Semi-automatic rille; and the ament
American M16 rille. The important data in lhe
table is the IKE. or initial kinetic energy: 1M
energy possessed by the projectile as It leaves
the weapon. This helpa delermine bolh range
and effecliveness. The higher Ihis figure. the
better bolh will be. A kinetic energy of aboul
MV IKE RPM Range
... 1312 612 .50
...
,...
2/1
'50
H'"
.000
.,"
75
',200
50,400
'13 H'"
950 .7,381 613 350
2,500
" ,750
20/ 10 800
2,700 76,545 2."2 800
.. .." 8.748 650/ 650 450
75 fOOl pounda is required to pierce humen
skin. bulat least 150 fOOl pounds is necesssry
to inflict severe Injury. Thus. bolh the longbow
and the crOlllbow were superior to lirearms
through 1M Sixteenth CBfltUry.
Abbreviations: WI .. W1Iight in pounds 01
the weapon; PWI .. weight in grams of the
projectile; MV _ muzzle velocity, the speed at
which the PlotectHe leaves the weapon, in leel
per second; IKE . initial kinetic efMIfgy. the
energy 01 the projectile as it leaves the
W1Iapon, a factor of projectile weighl and mUl
zle velocity. expressed in foot pounds; RPM _
rounds per minute. with the maximum given
then the normal; Range .. the effective
range, in yards.
35
36
AGINCOURT AND OTHER
MEDIEVAL MYSTERIES
We know a grllat deal about the Battle of
Agincoun. lndeed, we know a great de'll about
the Middle Ages in general. But there is much
that we do not know. and what we do nOI
know is frequently of critical imponance. The
principallll8son that we lack accurate informa-
tion on manvasp!lCts of Medieval lifa is nOI duo
to any tack of interest: Medieval studies con-
stitute a remarkably vibrant branch of History.
Nor is there any lack of resources; documenta-
tion on Ihe period is voluminous. Rather thll
problem sIems Irom the lact that people usual -
ly do not write down for posterity what theV
consider common knowledge. Future archae-
ologists digging into the ruins of OilS Moines or
New York may well be hard pressed to 8)(plain
the purpose of certain peculiar small loops 01
motDI whiCh we produced in great profusion:
documentary references to beer can pull tabs
are likely to be rare. This module is designed to
point out some of the things we do not know
about warfare in late Medieval times - with
particular reference to Agincourt - and to ex-
plain how Wi! have attempted to fill in the gaps
where nece$Sllry.
The principal tool used in helping us re-
construct what we know is something called
Inherent Militllry Probebility, or IMP for short.
IMP is the application of common sense and
basic military knowledge to any situation in
which we lind the SOIJrces to be of little help. In
effeCt, we inler from available information and
certain fundamentally unchanging data, the
probably original circumstances. These facts
are things like march fates, food consumption,
common practice of the times, and so forth.
Nor is an occasional bil 01 practical experimen
tation unwelcome. While the use 01 this tech-
nique can only establish a probability, rather
than a certainty, it is nevertheless a highly
reliable probability and a particularly useful
tool.
We have nearly a dozen eye-witness ac-
counts of the Battle of Agincourt. All of the ac-
counlll, whether of French or English proven-
ance, are in general agreement as to the
general course of events. But all of them are
woefully inadequate and contradictory when it
comes to details. What follows is a series of
brief discuuions concerning some of the many
points which could stand clarification.
Numbfn. Medieval use of numbers was
remarkably casual. Frequently we find
reference to armies running Into the hundreds
01 thou$lnds, carelessness with casualty
figures, and an incredible lack of accuracy in
accounting. For Agincourt the English Ire-
quently claimed that the French numbered up-
wards of 100,000, while the French often gave
the English two or three times their probable
strength. Aside Irom the practical impossibility
of feeding such hordes, the size of the belUe-
field alone would indicate the impossibility of
such numbers. As noted in our discussion of
the battle, the field was just wide enough for
the English army to lit comfortably, and justa
little too narrow for the French. Moreover,
careful examination of admittedly fragmentary
muster rolls for the English army show tllat our
estimate olsomethirtg near 6000 is not far Irom
the truth. No such documenlll appear to sur-
vive for the French, but the entourages of cer-
tain of the magnates in their army are known
with some degree of accuracy, enabling us to
make a reasonable estimate of their numbers
as well. Casualty figuresBrealso a problem and
the English frequently put in claims of upwards
of 50,000 French dead. But , aside from some
few hundred men buried in local church yards,
all their dead were interred in a vast excavation
by the Bishop of Cambrai, who totalled them
to 6000, which in itself is probably as accurate
a figure as we will ever see. English casualties
have been stated as anything between 12 and
100. As the names of at least 26 men killed are
known- all knights or other gentlemen- it is
probable that the laner figure is closer to the
truth. Certainly such revised figures would in
no way detract from the magnitude of King
Harry's victory.
0rt_nb_l lon. S1rictly speaking we know
virtually nothing about the internal organiza-
tion of either the French or the English armies.
However, the English system of vinten8rs and
centenars had been in use since the time of Ed
ward IJI a century earlier, and there is occa-
sional reference to men holding these rank!;, so
the inferance is on firm ground. Edward III had
also elCperimented with groupings of 1000
bowmen, called ml1litlfds. But these had been
employed only briefly and then apparently
abandoned, thus they were elCciuded from our
discussion. It is highly probable that the French
crossbowmen and shortbowmen were organ-
ized in very much tha same fashion - there
was remarkably little variation in military prac-
tice from country to country in this period
- but this is something for which we have no
ellidence. The grouping of men-ai-arms into
lances. po!lts, and bannen; is by no means
clear for this battle, but the practice was very
common and Ilas been assumed.
Dfployment. We know surprisingly few
details about the deployment of the French.
There were, to be sure, three divisions of men-
at-arms, plus their bowmen and a couple of
bombards. It is certain that the two divisions of
men-at-arms which actually participated in the
battle were dismounted. And it is clear that at
least a pan of their third division was mounted,
but by no means certain that all of it was, parti-
cularly if, as has been assumed, this "battle"
was composed primarily of valers de guerre
and pages. There is some difficulty concerning
the deployment of the French bowmen since
they are reported as being squeezed between
the first and second "battles, " but with some
also over on their right . Several accounts of
the battle place some bowmen on the French
left as well, but this is by no means clear.
French bombards - however many there
were - are variously reported as being all on
the right, split between tha two flanks, or, in
one case, allan their left. The first option has
been adopted. !Incidentally the effectiveness
of these guns is difficult to determine. Only
one Englishman was killed by gunfire, but that
was probably due to the fact Ihal the advanc-
ing infantry rapidly masked the pie<:es.l The
situation for the English is somewhat better
known. Nevertheless, there are several hazy
areas. The most important of these is that
some accounts have King Hal sending a strong
detachment of archers in the forest of Trame-
court to provide enfilading fire. Not all ac-
counts are in agrooment with this, and it is
possible that such troops as were in this wood
had infiltr.ted from the large right flank block
of bowmen. A very interesting question is how
the area between the archer blocks and the
men-at-arms was arranged: was Ihere some
sort of a gap between each group or did the
outside archer rub shoulders with the outer-
most man-at-arms?
Comm.ad. This is perhaps the most dif-
ficult area. Bluntly Wi! have no idea how either
army was commanded. We know who was
technically in command, but we are unable to
e ~ p l i n the process by which they conveyed
orders once the show began. All of the ranking
personnel in both armies were Involved In tha
hand-to-hand combet and clearly unable to
take matters in hand. Erplngham, for elCample,
was almost certainly King Henry's marshal
with direct responsibility for the bowmen. But
during the battle he stood with the king in the
central "battalion" taking part in the melee. So
who regulated the rate of fire? Was everything
left up to the judgment 01 the individual
centenars and vintenars? Or was there a " lire
plan" agreed upon in advance? For this, and
other command questions, we aralikely never
to halle an answer.
F..qulpmfnt. Superfk:ially it would appear
that this area would present tha fawest pro-
blems. In fact, In Its way it presents fully as
many difficulties as some Olher aspects of the
battla, for wa can not be sure what type of ar-
mor was being used by most of the men-at -
arms involved. Unquestionably the magnates
- the King, the Dukes, the Earls, the Counts -
wore the most up-to-date, stylish equipment .
But armor was elCtremely elCpensive. A rela-
tively cheap iron outfit ran around one pound
sterling. For superior steel it ()(luld go as high
as four pounds, roughly $1200. Many of the
lesser nobility were not remarkable fOf their
wealth. And the ordinary man-at-arms, the
squire, the serjeant, the valer de guerre were
often relatively impoverished. Tiley often had
to make rio with their overlords' hand-me-
down!; or odds and ends of loot. So there is a
very high probability that many of the menat
arms et Agincourt were wearing outdated ar-
mor. Indeed, it would seem that an army in this
period, particularly if it was a f8l.ldellevy such '
as the French at Agincourt, was something of
a mobile museum of military fashion. with
some men ancased in the mOSt stylish steel
plate, whilst others got along in CentlJryo/d
chain mail. Hardly the image one conjures
when thinking of the word " knighthood. "
Thf Hnllds. Thera is an interesting
question concerning the heralds at Agincoun.
Heralds wefe originally officials charged with
supervising coats-ol-arms and protocol. As
time went on they were also used for
communications between rival armies. At
Aoincourt the English and French heralds had
arranged for the battle to taka place where It
did. During the battle they are $lid to halle
stood together viewing the action Irom
someplace on the field. At the end of the battle
the French heralds conceded that tha English
had won and offered "Agincourt" as a conve-
nient name for the fight . The problem is:
Where did the heralds stand? The battlefield
was very narrow, with woods on either side so
they had to have been standing on it while tha
fight raged all around Ihem. Hardly a comfor -
table siluation. NO!' one likely to be particularly
58fe.
Tl mf SfilutnCt. It Is fairly cenain Ihal the
ermies deployed about dawn and lhat tl'le bat-
tle itlelf began somewhat before noon and
anded IOfTletime in ttle aarty aft&moon. UntOf-
lunatety, it iI unclear just how long Itle aClion
actually lasted. The times india ned in this arti-
cle are based on an estimata of Ihe minimum
tima necessary for Iha events to unfold in view
of our knowledge about march rates. rate of
aHOW fire , II'Ie nature of the teHllin, and tl'le
minimum time necessary to do in one' . fellow
man whilst he is trying to do you in. If any-
Ihing. ttle times gMln may be 5%-10% 100
k>w.
Thf C .... lr)' AClion . There is some
dispyle as to the number of mounted men-al -
arm, the French had alf1lllable for the opening
cavalry charge, and il has been suggesled that
only their right llank horle look part . In our ac-
counl we heve assumed an attack from both
flankl, but with less than Itle mal(imum avail-
able oomber of men because there is evidence
that the English archers on both flank, were
engaged. Ttle general description relied heavi-
ly on the known capabilities and practices of
cavalry.
Tht Hrst Dh-ision Alll ck. The discus-
sion relies on the question of the physical
space required lor a given gtoop of men to
light properly, plus the fact that all accounts
agree that lhe French rllnks were very crowd-
ed. Ttle Engli5h fallback has sometimes been
amibuted to the impact of the French
onslaught , but is more probably deliberate, so
that the French would lose momentum. The
tactic's use is recorded elsewhere. The prC)-
blem. created by the corpses which quickly
began to litter the front ale el(amined in some
detail by John Keegan in The FlIce of 8l1ttle.
Cenainly they interfered with lhe IIction. but
there is no reason to believe they quickly piled
up Into small mountain .
Tilt ArclltfS' hUt,""tntlon . We know
Ihat tha English bowman began attacking stray
French men-et-arms s hortly after the action
began. Our account presumes they did so
when ttleir Irrow supply was nearly el(haustoo.
tooghly half-an-hour after they began to shoot
assuming a minimal nile of fill . The general
details culled 'rom all accounts tend to agree
as 10 this leries of events.
Tht Srcond AtI.tk. It is clear
that a considerable time passed before the
French second "battle" intervened. It is nOI
clear why they did not do IKl earlier. The Duke
of Alen c on's adventures are largely
reconstructed. His difficultiel in getting ttle
third " battle" to move would indicate that ttle
chaln-of-command had brolcen, it one ever el( -
isted. French casualties up to this point afe
very difficult to assess. but it is highly probable
that a great many men were running away,
perhaps more than were actually engaged in
fight ing .
Tilt Sukldt SqUId. Most accounts of the
banle agree thai thil group of knights reallyel(-
illed and IIctually made a suicidal Ittack on
King Henry, only to be wiped out 10 a man.
None, however, place this attack relative 10ltle
larger framework. of the battle. We haye
aDumed it occurred during lhe first French at-
tack. It may justal well haye come during the
second attack - if iI happened at all.
l ht I)ukt of O".bant . There is general
agreemenl lhat the Duke arrived without hi'
equipment or retinue. We know he borrowed
some almOf - unimpressive stuff at that - and
mUlt Issume he " borrowed" some men from
the third " battle" in order 10 make hilattack.
a, it does seem 10 have been made mounted.
.l rrqufmboufI 5 Anack. This Iction is
by no meanl clear. Beyond the bare facttnat it
occurred, we have virtually no information. It il
probably that only a small portion of the third
" battle" took part in this mounted charge.
Most likely ttle attack was broken up by the last
few volleys available to ttle English as there is
no evidence of any English casualties resulting
from this movement.
Tht Slluglltrr of lilt Prhontrs. There iI
no question but that King Henry did order the
prilKlners killed. Just how many were so
treated, however, il conjectural. Ttle stated
purpose, thaI the King leared they would
Iflaten weapons from ttle field and fall on his
army from the reer, can only hold water it we
assume the English had advanced during ttle
battle, which i. unl ikely since available
eyidence tends 10 suggest that they fell back
lomewhat. (All accounta mention the French
as haying trouble with corpses underfoot. not
the English. Such a lituation would be impos-
sible if the English were slowly advancing duro
ing ttle battle.! The suggestion thaI the move
was intended to cow the prisonen is I reason
able one.
CIU5 Solidull). All the Iccounts of the
battle suggest that both sides fought with
greet courege. This seems to have been IKlme
what less than accurate. Indeed, it is almost
certain that many Frenchmen must have run
away from the field. The total number of
French troops committed to combat was per-
ha"" 16.000 to 18.000. These suffered up..
wards of 7000 deed on the outside, plus
petha"" 2000 taken prisoner. We are therelore
left to account for something between 7000
and 9000 additional men who were commilted
to aClion but whose late we cannot be certain
of. As only a small number are supposed to
haye fallen back wtlen the French broke off
combat , there can be but one conclusion: a
greal many men took off on their own. pro-
bably in panic. That this panic is not recorded
by Iny of ttle eyewitnesses is undrmtandable
given that the upper class of both sides felt
more ekin to each other than to their less for-
tunate fellow-countrymen. AIIKl. who would
admit he lost a battle due to panic in the ranks
or gained as Yictory because the enemy fan
away?
The foregoing discunion by no means ex-
hausts the unanswered questions concerning
Agincourt. We could go on. But there is so
much more that the task would soon fill t he en-
tire megadne. These el(ampies serve to illus
trite what we know, what we don't know. and
what we can conjectule with some certainty.
As in these cases, we have Ittempted 10 deel
with all similar cases In a like fashion.
DESCENT ON CRETE
S&T66 Article Errata
COMMONWEALTH Order of Battle Module
The 234th Mediterranean Ba tt erv should be the
2341h Medium Battery.
The 2nd and 4th Auslralran Infantry Bat talion
should be the 2/ 4 Australl8n Infanlry BattalIon
The 2nd Argyll and Sutherlanders were In BUlma
at the tIme 01 the banle for Crete Ttle lSI Argyll
and Sutherlanders were pm'sant at Crete
All leference5 to "!fanspofl " should be read as
"!lOOP"
All relelences to "Royal AlmV" should be read as
" Royal ArtIllery"
All references to "Royal Antl-Arrcraft" should be
read as "Royal Australian Artillery"
GERMAN Order of Battle Module
All references to "PanzerJagel" shoold be read as
"Jager". and VlCe-yersa
A reader pOInted ou t to me that thele IS a con-
trad,ctiOn between the books that I used lor my
500rce meterial and The Ultra Secret. TM Vlrra
Secret states INII Freyberg knew IMt the assault
would occtJr on May 20th, while all othef sources
IndICate thet tle was rnformed that the attack
would occur on May 17th. Whatever the case,
Freyberg's BCIlOn! of the Ilf51 day show thet I'Ie
either dId not possess the necessary InformatIon
or chose \0 completely Ignore it While I lInd 1\
hard to behave that Freyberg was that incompe
tent. I must bow to the WIsdom of the authOf of
The Ultal Secret. who researched the matter
thoroughly Mea culpa [riC Goldberg
STONEWALL
S& T 61 Game Errata
The following corrections and clarificltions hayt
been made \0 Iht S&T67 issues gamt . SlOneWQII.
[1.71[ (udditiorr) A unit may eilllef be plaetd in
restIVe' s tatus or bt laken oul of rtSC'""C' $lalUS
durin. a Friendl)' Movemt nt Phast. Tht unit may
Rot do both in the same Friendly Movemtnt

[ 11.0) (c:larifir:alion) General Rult: Mounted
cavalry units do not have a Zonc of Control.
11l. 2] (omUsionJ The sond sentcnce should
read: Furthermore, it must be able to moyt into
tht dtfending unit's Itu t"raux" Orllt oj IhIt tlt_
ItlckinX unit's frontal husidrs.
113.171 (additionJ Artillery units defcnd In mdec
combat with I strcngth of 1. rcgardlrss of the cur-
rent strength of tht lIun crew.
If ,.011 _\'ft'1 Jd ........
Me ...... ,. .......... ,.
IItlJtIW lit tIw All'. eM'" 0rcMuI( .. III
Po .. I'oIIdI2 A """",,,,,,,... ItM SIIIt
.IMI -',.,. fMwa
Wb)" IlOt satIIcrilIe .." WI .., 'et
year (6 ....... , . .............. tarS2.SO
each. Set order , __ ..... , .. SPI
.........
37
Mine Warfare
Ever SInce thell f,rst widespread use In war-
IsrB, minos have posed a problem 10 those
who have had \0 sweep them. In the presenlSlale
of the arl, the conleet mme has y.elded pnmacy \0
the "Influence" mille whICh, planted directly on
the sea bottom, explodes when one Of II comblna-
lion of a ship's ctun3CterlS!ICS ,oUuances liS trig-
gering mechanism Moreover. CUH8nl1echnologv
ell0W5 8n In"uenee ffill'\8 10 leap 110m the sea bol
tom and home In on 8 largel
MagnetIC m'nesexoloclewhen a metal obf6C1,
such as the hull of 8 warship, passes overhead
Acousuc mines are sel off bv the sound 01 B ship's
engine Pressure mmes, regarded Bven today as
being almost unsweepeble. BfB exploded by io-
creased water pressure Stlfred up by the hull of an
approaching ship
The deadlv gamecan be played," many vaoa
I,ons and comb'n&uons Certam mmes can be pro-
grammed to explode only aller detecting the
sound of an approachmg ship, Its magnetic held,
Increased water pressore, and then ils sound
again Some can dillerentoale be!Weeen the $(lund
of fnendly and enemy vessels. Mines can be built
uSing the "lallef" COfIcepl, explodmg only after a
certain number of shIps go by ThiS Increases Ihe
chances of bemg bypassed by a mlneswaeplng
fleet In lavor of capilal ShiPS, Of the escorts 01 a
carner task torce In laVQl' of the IlBnap Itself
Whe1l used, for Instance, as a politico-military
weapon, they can be set to aCllvate al a certain
future time and looeacllvale or self-destrucllBle!,
as were the !!(XX) magnetIC and acousllc mines
sown by the U S In HaIphong halboi" m 1972
Essentially, II mine 15 a sobmerged bomb, so
the larger the payload, the more damage II can do
and the bl99fll the targel II IS capable of damagmg
or destrOYing Indeed. mUles lire often nothIng
more Ihan aerial bombs togged out w!lh sophlSu-
CoiItBO OOtOll1ltlng deVICB5 The general range of e.
ploslve charges used IS 200 to 2(XXJ pounds, and a
commonly used rule of thumb putS a mine's de-
structive range at one foot lOr each pound of e.-
ploslve used
Quantltallvely, mining reached Its zenith dur-
Ing WWlI, when a tOlal of about a half mIllion
mines were laid by all Sides, and intluence types
were used on a broad scale In the European
theater. the Allies laid more than 260,{XX) mines,
about 70% 01 them sown defenSively In such
places as the Nonh Sea and Ihe approaches to
British naval bases But It was ollenSlve mines,
planted In the Hehgoland Bight, the KIB! canal. lhe
BaltIC Sea, end off Norway that did the most
damage. accounting for some la;o AXIS ships
sunkand540damaged
Unlll reclOlly, the US has neglected Its min
ing capability, the Haiphong operallon not
Withstanding Recent testImony belore Congress
disclosed that lhe US mme StOCkPIle, numbering
In lhe tloS of thousands, IS pflmaflly of WWll Vln
tage But WIth the numerICal balance of sea power
now tiPped heaVIly In favor of the SOVlBtS, the US
IS recognlzmg !hat oflenslVB mine warfare can help
slQnlhcantly to redress lhe tmbalance. CUllently
the US IS develOping II lout -member famtly 01
modern mmes. and IS reqUlflng that each sorface,
air, and undersea combal unll have mlnelaY-lng
capabIlity. However, Ihe new lamlly 5111115 largely
unborn; only one ot the lour IS In active service -
the Captor anllsubmallne mlfle
Mil'lB Countermeasures IMCML The key to
mine countermeasures. bener known as
mlflesweeping, !S locating the minefield. Hopeful
Iy, thIS can be accomplished technologically-, via
DATA FILE 004
sonar or underwater TV. rather than empirically,
by havmg one of yOU! shIps blown to bits. Wllh the
prospect that pi"BSSure mines, Vlftually-
unsweepable as they are, Will be WIdely used In
any future major connlCt. much of the old MCM
doctllne is changing radically, allhough illS sllillar
from obsolete Old and new doctnflBS are descllb-
ed below to put each In contexl
SweePing Inlluence mines IS Ilicky, because
lhe mlfle IS Iflhmlely smarter lhan liS primItive
predecessor. the contacl mlne_ The SW9BPBf has
to fool 100 mine Into detonating by SImulating the
passage of a ship while staYIng far enough away- 10
aVOid damage to Itself The PIiOOple IS 10 magnify-
Simulations so that the mine Will be set off at a safe
distance.
MagnetIC mines are swept by slreammg a
long, rubbercoated " tall" afl of the sweeper The
tall emits a strong electromagnetic current which
Simulates the "SIgnature" of a StOOl-hulled vessel
Because the sweeper hrst has 10 pass over the
mine, MCM vessels nowaday-s /Ire made 01 wood
and carry- as httle magnetIC eQu lpmenl aboard as
necessary Even the ashuays are made of a non
magnetic metal alloy
AcoustiC mines lire swepl by streamlflg a sub
merged nOlsemakmg "hammerbox" alongSide the
vessel The deVice projects the magnlhed sound 01
a ship's engmes well ahead of the sweeper
Moored, magnetIC. an<! !"COUStlC sweeps can be
made simultaneously by the same ship
Helicopters can carry and Slream Ihel! own
moored and acOUStIC gear, allhough \hey reQulle
an amphibIOUS support shiP to carry and IIg the
magnetIC tall. They also lack a powtlrful eleel/o-
generaltng capacity. and thuS can sweep only the
mOSI unsophlsucaled magnetic mInes, such as
those lhal were dropped al Haiphong
No surefire way has been found to sweep lhe
pressure mine, and there have beEtn preciOUS few
ways to escape It One way IS to steam al low
speed (4 knols or lessl. assuming one knows It'S
Ihereand isn'l 10 a hurry ObViously-, those precon
dltlons aren't always gOlflg to apply. Hence, II ma-
Jor change In doctflne - tomlnehuntmg - Isevol
Vlng, With the BIIIISh, French. and Wesl Germans
10 the van. The doctnne Involves locating lind
identifYing mines WIth underwater TV and im
proved sonar and then aVOIding the field where
pOSSible or destrOYing the mines by remote.
controlled, unmanned sweepers or by underwater
charges placed by divers or small drone subs
Howev8l, none of Ihe new hun ling syslems
appear to be foolproof agamSt pressure mmes,
which can be laid at depthS beyond which divers
and remote-controlled subs can operate More
over. although new woes of BritIsh and French
sonal ale highly accurate. they can be hobbled
when mines are laid on muddy- 01 sandy- bottoms
whICh CoiIn quickly hide the mine from detecuon
About hall the North Sea and of the BaltIC
have such chalact8llstlcs
If the Ben Rings. Given the current awareness
of West8ln and Eastem blocs as 10 lheadvantages
of mine warfare, large-scale mlfllng of both SIdes'
ports. Choke points, and sob uansn-Ianescould be
expected In lhe evenl of a maJOf war But, because
of Ihe current MCM unpreparedness 01 the US
and the Wesl's greater reliance on lhe sea, the
SOViet bloc probably could achl8Ve a greater
strategIc advantage at the OUlset ThiS could be
deciSive
To be sure. the West could probably stifle the
SOVtet submallne effort by mmlflg sub tranSlI-
routes m the Not'W{lglan S\l8llS, the BaltIC. the
Black Sea, the Bellng Sea. the Sea of Okhotsk,
and the Sea of Japan. But the SOVI815 are capable
of mmmg key- areas along both US seacoasl S, the
sea approaches to Japan and Weslern Europs,
and the StraIts of Gibraltar Such an ellort could
cllpple US reinforcement 01 any- threatened over-
DATA FILE 004
seas area and transform a land war 10 Westem
Europe Into II relatively qUICk SOVIBI vlClory-
Should MIddle Eastern harboi"S used by SOpef
tankers be mined. the US OIJ supply would be
gravely threatened allIS source
01'lB Man'" Mine Family. Of the four members
of the US prOfBCted fam.1y of mmes. only the Cap
tor IS In servICe The submarme-iaonched mobole
rmne (SlMMII5 beIng lested. whIle lhe olhef!WO
mines are tn the developmental stage FoIlowtng
are details of the four
CAPTOR. or enc8psulated rolpedo, IS an
adaptation of the Navy's Mark 46 antJsub hormng
torpedo WelQhlng 570 pounds. II IS filled wnh an
acOUStIC Utggellng device that can recognize the
somc Slgnatu,e of an eoomy sub It can be planted
by ancrait 10 deplhs of 2500 feet. Once aCllvated
the torpedo seeks OU\ IlS target and Iscapableol at
least one ,e-at tack 10 case 01 a mIss. About 1200
have been produced However, despite a cutoff
deVIce whICh supposedly- preventS the Captor
Irom vessels on or near the surface.
thele IS eVidence that Ihe weapon has had trouble
dlfleren\taung belween an enemy sub and a sur-
face vessel, which could be unfortunate for r"end-
Iy ships passmg above. It!s designed to deactIvate
Itself Sl. months alter being planted
PRAM, or propelled aSCenl mtne, when put In
service, IS de5igned 10 aaack both subs and sur-
lace craft from depths of up to 500 leel The mIne,
weighing about 2000 pounds, would be propelled
StraIght upward by a rocket Apparently- 11 would
have magnetIC, aCOUSl1C andlor pressure 1I1QgB1
mgdev+ees
OUICKSTRIKE IS a shallow-wal&!, \)OlIom
mine 10 be adaPled from the Mark-8l senes of 8Bf-
lSI bombs, whICh lange In weight from 250 to 2(XXJ
pounds It IS designed to be tnggered by either
subs or surface shIps
SLMM, IstheNavy'sobsolescent Ma!k37an
tlsub torpedo converted to an Intluence mille The
weapon, wtth tiS 3l:)pound explosive payload,
can be launched flom a sub's tOfPedo tubes 10 Ihe
general duectlOn of a shallowwatel ship passage
There II woutd 511 untli actIValed by a paSIMg sub
or ShiP, whereupon It would home In on Its target
Oick Rustin
MI NE COUNTERMEASURE VESSELS
OF PRINCIPAL NAVIES
""""
MH Msti Mst
WESltItN NAVIES:
UU
a .11
".
U .
n.,
D
..... 1315


. """""
12. B
,
" ,.
"."
"
111
EASmIN NAVIS::
U ..... 1

tl I5
-
I 12
"
'''''
,
""
".
KEY:
MSB
11

D


11
"'
MH .. Minehunt ers laM typeS); MSO -
Minesweepers (ocean-going); MSC
MllWISWBBpefS (coastal); MSB Minesweepers
(inshore!. StrengthS include bol h &cl ive and
reservel vessels. Figure IIhe, .. +" indicates ships
building or planned. Combst fleets of the
WOfld, Annapolis: Inst itute Press, 1976.
"Olher" Western navies: Netherlands, Belgium,
Norway, Sweden, Oenmarit., Spain, Portugal ,
Greece, Turkey, Italy, Australia. Japan. " Other"
EaSlern navies: East Germany-, Poland,
--------------
ROMMEL
IN NORMANDY
Friedrich Ruge
In the months beroTe the Invasion,
Admiral Ruge assisted Fil'ld Mar-
shal Rommel on his lours of the
French coast. and sen'ed as his
friend and confidant. Through
Ruge's eyes. Rommel is seen as a
dignified, courageous man; a man
to be respected for his personal
qualIties as well as his military
exploils.
288 p .... s.lUust.awd
6" 11 9"
S'2.9!)clmh
PANZER
ARMY AFRICA
James Lucas
Here, for the first time in the En
glish language, is the desert war
from the German Viewpoi nt. The
author has made exte nsive use of
material from original Gemlan
sources and interviews with many
men who took part in the campaign,
211 Ilh ..
6" 11 9"
ORDER FORM
S 12. 00 cl oth
o ROMMI::!. IN NORMAND\'
o SUMMONS OF THE TRUMPET
o PANZER ARMY
o IIITU: R'S GENERALS
o MOUNTING THE TIIREAT
THE
SUMMONS OF
THE TRUMPET:
U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective
Dave Richard Palmer
", .. no publication that I havl' r{'ad
more accurately addresses the corn
plex and controversial issues in
volved in our most visible but least
understood war."
William C. Westmoreland
General, U.S. Army, Retin'd
from the adviSOry stage to with
drawal, hl-'rI' is thl-' complete story
of our military involvement in Viet
nam- why we entered. what we did,
and how we left. If there an' to be
no more Vil!tnams' we need to un
derstand and apply th .. lessons of
Summons of the Trumpe/ .
d"l h
, ....
,.
[II
Sf:ND TITU:S c la: c "",: o TO:
MOUNTING THE THREAT:
The Battle of
Bourguebus Ridge
John J. T. Sweet
"One of the better additions to
World War II literature .. . this very
readable book deserves a place in
every reference library and on the
family bookshelf. "
O'Baliance
Sweet provides an Incisive analysis
of the controversy surrounding
GI-'nerat Montgomery and Operation
Goodwood- lhe breakout from
Normandy following Dday.
142
!",," " 8'."

HITLER'S GENERALS
Richard BrettSmi/h
" .. recommended highly to both the
genl-'rnl reader and the enthusiast."
Soldier
An intimate look at 82 of Hitl er's
gent'rals. re\'ealing them as soldiers
lirst and Nazis second. and always
among the greatest soldil-'rs in history.
306 palPJ.
6"" " 9"
S12.95dolh
Name: ______________________________________ _
Address: __________________ -:-_________ _
City: ____________________ -'S"ta,,"'=, ________ Z"<;""-p,, __ _
Paymfnl m .. sl M"company o.du. 30 day .... f .. nd
Presidio Press, 1114 Irwin St., Dept. SAT, San RaCael , CA 94901
39
40
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KEY TO ABBREV1 ... TlOtlS: 4H _ Il_ H.; Bl . a.ItIIOIino;
6 51, e ... , IS AM ISPI 5 51. OAGC lS1'1 5 51. y.., 01 ,n. RallSI'I
CGC _ Com'Ict U- Co.; EG _ beolitn a.n-; 551, Fo,bo, & P,,"nlom WI\( . ' SM IAH 5 51 . F,.,..,o-
SPI BESTSELLER LIST Jan/ Feb '18
Buff..,; GOW _ 0..- o.oIgMtI WO<Ic-'-; IG_ a.n-; Pru .... n W", l"""io;II51'1 5.51; lI ,fIIt & SMl<tI (51'1 5.51.
MGC _ SPI . SIrnuIMionI 1'_,
Ma'", 151'1 5,51. W",*_ 151'1 551. Helm! Dee!>
The fist shows the top ten SPI games in terms of
lne.; TC _ Tho c-...; TSM _ TKtIeoI 5 ...... Au .... AUOI'L IF&F 5.51. I'uno<: W.n ISI'I 5 41; WoII"";;' ISI'I 5. 41. ODay IAH
R.IirIjr . ,,,,, __ __
5 4). L ... MOYeS r-IOIthlSI'15 41. SSN IGOW5 41 . 1,1""' ........... 151'1
unit sales over the previous four month reporting
oI ___
5 17!i9IGTG5 41. N..cIBarDM'ru<:IIonIFB5 41. Coomoc
period (calculated a s a moving average).
&fing" the ... tIv. """""".;,yol IN_on. ocMoI
Eneoonter (EI' 5,41. Sw LOI" IFe 641; Oil War 151'1 53). altl'
1(.....,....)109.
1)0,,,.... (51'1 5 31; DOgln" 01 WW tllAH 5.31. Bul Aun 151'1 5 31;
Prell. Times
TheYlMl MGC 5,31. SOIJIIIAI'oeoISI'15 U. "",","I '" theEasllSPI
Rank Tirle Rank on Lis!
LOWER RATED GAMES
5 II. EI Alameon 151'15.11. c..r.dion CM!w., 151'15.11. 0 .... 151'1
491, Ge'lV$IJu,.. (AH 4]f; F .. 01 AomelSI'14 51; Los' Bo,u..ISI'I
1. Middle Earth 4
ISP1591. 9.,110 01 tile IAH 5.91. 5.91, 4 51, Combo""" Ar"." ISPI 441; Tac' ics II IAH 441. ScrIlrl<MQl
Moscow Carncaogn ISI'I 5 91; S" .'egV 1151'15 91. 1918151'15.91 ,

2. Obiective: Moscow
N_
A"";"'" R ........ bOn ISI'I 5.91, ISPI 5,91. Solomons
GAMES PLAYED BY LESS THAN FIVE PERCENT
3. Drive on Stalingrad 2 lSI" 5.91. 8. 1110 101 Mo<Iway IGOW 591. Cor .. s... 3
IGOWS 91. 0b,0c1Mt A!Ion1ll1Bl5.91; S"'9lIF&F5.91, N.poIw>n Scl>utz,ruppe IJB 6,31. IGOwa 21; U,tIo Big HOIn ITSR
4. StarForce 3 22
.,W.,1tIoo 131'15,8). MoIw..,.IAH 5 BI. Red SW/Whll<t S! .. 611; SUpof hnl; I ISAT 5.91. Thol EM, f ,on,ITCB 591. Thol
5.61. Wattllloa IAH5.al. Lev'e AlriconC.omp 12nd EdllTSR 5.BI. M ......... IGOW5,91. lOO15AO
5. Descent on Crete N,w 1
ISPI 5 81. TUrNng PoonllSPI 5 BI. II ... & Pur.,,! (SPI 5 al. nSf! 5.81. Napoleon (GZ 5 8) , o..cinro & F .. (WG 5, 81. BIttle of
151'15.8); IIjjUJ:r'"'ll M<>duiloISPI5 81. Co<IO No",. Sec- f .... A ........ ILOR 571. FtUlll ., In. IlSI! 571; 80ltle of
6. Up Scope! 4 3
101 IPe 5.81, SPlI"'" ISI'I 581. 1812 151'1 5.BI. C-,'I Legjono Sari',*, lOG 5.71. [agio OIV IHG 571. Godslinl IMGC 581,
IAH 5 81. Alion Spoa ILZ 5 81. Bu""," IGOW 5.81. ChItco mow CUOIe<'.lMt SI...-.;I 18L 5.61. lEG 5,61, Turow. 1943 lEG
7. To the Green Fields
5.81. S-ct. & o."ovISPl5.81. IGOWS 91; Y.1u 5 61; Troy ITC 5.51; Sf8\lO 01 POI' Anh", ISf 5.51; B.o,,* 01 T
Bevond N,w
IBL 5 at. a-.!ion 0Iy"""" ISPI 5 11. IAH 5.71. lull IBG 5,51. A!Ionlll IGG 5,41. 0I1lOO AD IHO 5,21. Arlt Tr"",* lAW
wolle IAH 5.71; WotId Witi' III ISPI 5 1); A"*"",,, CNii w .. 151' 1 511; CreutIEG5.11. E"OIishCMIWarIlG5.11.
B. Air War 5 5
571. K_'Pllntflf ISI' 15.n. 18!2"(51'151); 'he Grea' 5 II; Stalkl Ice 511; v __ DMlIlICtio!I lEG 5.11; A,IIIn ...
IAH 5.11. ICGC 5 71. Alrrkl K_ IAH 5 61. lEG 5,01. fly"'lj T'II"'S ILZ 5,01. ChlcI".m.'gI IF8 5,01, M,'"
IAH 5.81; Hili''''''' FOIM' ISI'I 561; Gr_ ISI'I 5.61, Super Cr .... lAW 4. 91 . A_, oIln. r-IOIm ITG 4 91 , RomtnoII IlS 4.at.
9. R&d Sun Rising 10 2
cllargot 151'1 561; Gettysburg 77 IAH 561; CI,.n<:eIIorwiIIo IAH & Burr"""" IfGU 4 71. \/",. IF8 4. 41. Ca.aIty IAIW
10. Crimean War Quad N,w
5.61 . E""""OI ot Chino lOG 561. 11'''00 01 IImam ILZ 5.61; 4.21. IIhfonbu'll IAW ' .01; W,r of Sta, S"""", lAW J 91. I'llion
LonU,,,,,,, ITSR 5 61. V",dun ICGC 5 61. 1'101 to A-';""", 151'1 IIIGll71
42
Feedback Questions
S&T nr. 88, pubilihed M ., / Jun 1978
How /0 use rile FfttldbBck Re&pOfIStI CIJrd: Alter you've
finlSJled reading 1M issue of S&T, please read !he Feed-
back QlJesbons below, and 9've us vour BfISW8(S bV wnt
ing the aoswer'f1umbefs 0f1 the card in the response
boxes whICh COflespond 10 each Queslloo number See
cef1!erlold for card. Ple8se be sure to allSWel' 1111 questIons
Ibu! 00 not wms anythIng ,n the 00. fOf question-num-
bers labeled "no Question"l Incompletely lillad-out cards
canno! be prOOttSSed.
WhIll rfle nurrlblNs mtMfI: WIlOO IrlSWfInng QU8S!fOns,
"(1' always mfIlIns NO OPINION Of NOT APPLICABLE
When!he Question is 8 "yes or 00" QUesuon, "I" mea,,!
YES and "2" means NO When the questIon IS 8 1!llIng
QlJ95lion, "I" 1$ the WORST la/mg. "9" IS the BEST r8-
tlng, "5" is an AVERAGE 181m9, and 1111 numbefs In be-
twe&n &xprass various shades 01 or disapproval.
1. 3. No Question
The folowing NIt you to nile' rheflrricie! in this
iuutl ona suM of ' (IJ(KN) 0 no
opin;on.
. Kh/I,kov !{lBmal
5. NOQuesl1Ofl
6. Kharkov lefllclel
T. Agir.cour1
t . Oulgo;ng M8il
9. For Your Eyes Only
... Briefings
... Data FiJe: Mine
U. No question
... No Question
... This issue o"ll'ell
15. Was this ISWe better than thelastonel
16. Assume that you doIl't subscribe to S&T Would the
quality 01 th" issuealone mot,llate you to SUbscribe?
11. For haw IT\oIIny Issues ha"ll you had COntinuous sub-
scription to $&17 0 _ I don't subSCfibe. I _ ThiS 1$ my
first Issue; 2 _ ThiS hi my secol'>d or third issue: 3 .. This
"my fourth or !.hh issua. 4 _ This is my Sixth issue. 5 -
This 15 my seventh ISSUe; 6 - Thl$ IS my eoghth through
twelfth Issue: 7 - Th" is mV thirteenth through 81gh
toonih !$SUa: 8 _ ThtS tS mv nmaleenlh or subseQuent
issue: 9 _ I am a LifellfnB Sub.saiber to S& r !regardless
of numbef of ISSues r9Cl!!ll9d1
II. Dod you seod In lhe feedback card for you, last lossue
ofs&r?
19. You. ag&: 1_ 13 years old or voungar; 2 .. 14-17:
3 _ IB21. 4 _ 22-27. 5_28-35: 6 .. 36orolder
10. l_MaJe.2 _ Famale
11 . EdU<;auon: 1 _ 11 VIIiI'S or less. 2 _ 12 vears: 3 _ 13 15
I'tllIrs. 4 _ 1;).-15 vears al'>d stili in 5 _ 16 vears:
6_17vearsormore
11. Haw long ha"'" YOU boon plavlng conflict 51mulalion
gameslO- 1ess !han II vea.; 1 - I year: 2 - 2year5 8- 8
year!l. 9 _ 90r moreyear5
U . What is the a\l8fage number of hours you spend plaV-
ing S'mulaTlOn games ea<:h monlhlO_ m,lM; 1 _ 1 hour or
less: 2 - 25 hour,; 3 _ 6-9 hours; 4 _ 10-15 hour!l;
5 - 16-20 I\o<Jrs: 6 _ 21 25; 7 _26-D. 8 _ 31-40. g .. 4Q Ot
more hours
2-4. How IT\oIInv SImulation games lof all publishefsl do
YOU pOSSeSSl 1_110; 2 .. 1120: 3 _ 21 3): 4_31>.
5_ 41 00; 6_ 51-00: 7 _61_70. 6_ 71-00: 9_81 or mora.
lS. Whal level 01 comPJexily do you prafer In gamasl
Rale your pmfereoce on a 19 seaJe. with hogher numbers
indrcatlng incl"/:lilsed Use the follawing gamas
as gUIdelines. 1_ SrrikeForce. 45 .. Cfllck!lmeuflll.
7 _ Perroll; 9 _ Ai, We'
26. Pick lhe onearoo aboul whrch you would mas! liku to
see games and anJCle$ done' l _ Anclam (Rome. G.ae\<.
Biblic!ll. XOO BC - 6CKlAOI. 2 .. Agus and Ranals,
SBI1C8 16CKl AD- 10Cl'J AOI; 3 _D Vears War and pI'&o
Napoleonic 116CKl AO-17'90I: 4 - NapOloonrc (1790 -
lB:J:ll : 5- Civil War/19th Cunlury (1m - 1!D)1.
6- World Wa, I (1!D) - 19:1)1. 7 .. World Wat 11119:1)-
194!i1: a _ modern 094!i-preserlll. and
SClel1C8 Ficllon
11. OveI'ali. whrch of the follawlng leatur85 in the past
faw ISsues 01 S&Tare most in of chang.e Ito maku
thi:lm bell&r through changes;n quality. lormal ,
Btcl . D_don't change anything. I _ the game. 2 - 100
lead arliCle fon lhe samesubjocl6S lhe gamel. 3 _ lhe se-
cond malOl arlrcJe: 4 _0ulgoing Mall; 5_Briefings.
6 _ For Your Eyes Only. 7_Gamas Rating Cha,t.
a_ Foodbad; 9 _ somu other aspect of lhe magazine lhal
bugsvou.
11. Appeanng in th" !$Sue 01 S&TlSa DamFile. In lorlh-
coming !$Sues of ShT. wu inlend to run _al DaIJJ-
Files on a vatlety of toplCSasa tegular fOOlUru. On a 1 t09
seaJe. ra tu the concept of the DataFile as a concenuatud
and (f"IOpufullyllucld examination of topics 100 limllud 10
warrant full-size articles
19. If a month has passed sll1C8 you lasl orderud som&-
Ihlng from SPI, please answer the following quesllon
about theservrce 1 .. 1 orderedagamelsl and recaill<ld my
order complele w, th,n throo weu\(s 01 send'ng ,t in: 2_1
ordered a gamu and rllOOlll6d my order compielU W1lhin
Ih,oo wueks 01 sending il in. bul with a game parllsl miss-
ing from one 01 the games; 3-1 orde,ed a game al'>d
,/:IO&iVed my ord&r wi thin Ihtoo weeO:s, but one of the
games was the wrong gamu: 4.1 didn' t rllC8ll18 my order
Within thrlMlweu\(s. but didrocuiVf! an OUI of , tock notic/:l.
5 _1 ordered a pr&opublic!ltlon sale game and didn' l ex
pect 10 soo il lor a whiJe: 6 - Ol/ll'f Thf98 W1leks MII8 pass
ed. al'>d I have Slill rocerVlld no game or notification;
7 _ MV last order was for a subsc.iption. a. My last order
was for a nonsubscnptlOll. nongame Item and was
handll:ld all right; 9 _ My last ord&r wes for a non-
subscriplion. nongame ilum and I consider SE!f\lICfJ 10
hall8 bI:Ien unjuslJfiably slaw 0/ otherw!se
The following refer. only to nonS& T SPI ga .... publish-
ed In the last 12 months fllal 'r'OU haIIe played.
30. Old you na"ll any p'oblems wllh lhi:Ise games' .ulesl
O_Oid not play uny non-S&T SPf games in the l81ill2
months; 1_ No problems wi lh gamas 2 .. A faw
problems. but not unough to pr_nt my plaYing Ihe
game, al'>d I was abJe to handle thi:lm myseil; 3_A few
p.oblems. wtOIU 10 SPI fot a clanficallon and tecewad 8
teplv Within a month: 4 ... A lew problems. wrole 10 SPI
for a clarilicallon and roceived a reply O\l8f a month laler;
5 - A lew probl&ms. wtote 10 SPI for a clarrfication but
f\8\I8I' recetll8d an answer; 6 _ Had ser,ous probJems With
the that plUllenled play. wroleto SPI forclarrlocallon
and reoeill1!d reply Within a month; 7_ HIId seriOUS pro
blems With the rules that prlt\lentud play, wrOle 10 SPI for
clanfrcat lon and received reply more lhan a monlh let&r:
B_ Had se,ious pfoblems With the rules that p,_nled
play. wrotu to SPllor clarr lrcalJon but OIM!I' recetlled a
9 _ Had pr'oblams Wllh the tules and called SPI for
cianlrcallon
31 . Ouesllon n. 93 or The S&Tre Feedback p,opooud
the producuon of lhe game C8w GtIId 111 mighl be ad
vlsabJe to ,el .... 10 thu lu,t or Ihat quesllon. reptrnted In
"Bog Tsommis' In OGM Ihls Issue). and the respor>5e In
drcatlld lnal 1111le game was dOM. many peopJe would
buy il. Ofl/:lof theedllorS. hOWf!ll8l". lhePOSltlon that
lhe Ptoposed game wes a base appeal to faSCist fantaslZ'
Ing al'>des 5uchconSlllwed a glorilica\lon of fhe Nazi,. Ha
SlfongJvslated Ihal he did nOI WISh SPI todo lhegameon
mo.al grounds. The other edltor51although nol 8\lrOOlng
With hIS objUClions to thu gamel agreed flOl 10 do lhe
game. WO'd like to haIIi! your r68C\lon 10 thiscourse olae
lion 1 _ I approve of the editor a stand against
"Case Geld" on grounds (even though I don't
r>fIC:fISMritv agree Wl1h hiS objuctlonsl; 2_1 disapprove of
the ed,lor I18lorng "Case Geld" (8IItKI though I moghl or
mIght not parwnalJv agrue Wllh hiS moral reserval>onsl
32. Alter raroodlnglho Cass Geld p'Qp<ISlII . ,ndicate lhe
OM response you most agree WIth. 1 _I feel tMI the
premise 01 the game dlSlorts 10 lhe poinT wlleru II
conS1I1Ules fanlBSy. ralher Ihan a reasonable hlStorrcel
alt8l'nal .... u; 2_1 foo( tllat tho ptemlSe is farfetched: 3 . 1
consider The premisu 10 be a legitimate hiStorical aile<
nallvu. 4 _ I feellhe premISe 10 be a IlkefV hlst04'ical alter
natl"'"
ll. I considar 911'me5 such as CMS Geld. Objeclive:
Moscow, /nvasiofl: AmeriaJ. and Dilliu 10 be scrence fic-
tion/fantasy. and to ha"ll lillie or no legitimacy from a
serious hlSlorrcal pp<nI of 'iH1W. l _ sltongly 8IIrOO;
2- 8IIroo; 3 _ disagroo: 4 _ st ronglV dlsagroo, 5 ", olhar
(pluese comment!.
oM. SP\ should not publish such lilies es Case Geld. Ob-
jeclive: Moscow. Amenee. and Dillie
l _ slfongly IIQtoo; 2_ agree: 3 _ d,sagree. 4 .suongly
d'sagree. 5 _ 1 BgI"8tI. but C(lS8 Geld IS a $PeCII'I1 casu. and
ought 10 be published. 6 - 1 di$llgme. bul CaS(! Geld is a
special case and oughl fIOl to be publ,shed
Please tate the followirlg gam. 0f1 a , to 9 8Cll1e with "I"
indic!lting a pe,rtlcularfy .Irang d'-lik' lo< I gBn1fIand ''9''
an eBfl8CIally favorable opinion. PIaese ,ete only those
ga .... which 'r'OU have played tagainsl an opponent or
soIitai.el al IaBsl once in the laS! llix months. If YOU have
not played !he game In the last st. monlhl. do not rate it
(please respond "0" in the space!. AU gamBI lilted are
SPI-publisiled ga ..... unless oThBlWiae apeclfi8d.
35. Ba,1eY ICGC)
36. Mach War n
31. C'tadelIGOWI
31. Oclob&r Waf
39. Chir.ase Farm
40. Sinai
41. MukdEtn
41. Woehl am Rhern
43. War in the West
44. War In lhe east (2nd edi tionl
45. DNOIUnantsch,eOen (GDW)
46. Narvlk IGOWI
41. Wooden Sh,ps & Iron Men IAHI
41. Chodcamauga
ff. Napoleon al War Quad
SO. Cflmea (GOW)
SI. Wag.am
51. Bluu & Gray Qued I
53. Marungo
54. Antl!llam
55. Sallie of Nalions
56. Shiloh
51. Fngate
51. JenaAuerstadt
59. Shenandoah (BLI
60. Road to Richmol'>d
... COflStant inopJe
... Stonewall
.,.
Desc/:lnt on Ctelu
... Ob)I:ICtl"'" Moscow
".
Cnmean War Ouad
...

".

... Inkerman
... Tcharnava R,I/Il'f
".
Aif Assaull on CrU!l:l (AH)
The "GrBltt Banies of HiltOf'(' _ieI has bMn ptopOMd
in _al issue.. and the resullll have been go<>d, buT not
g'At. Thil reception has forced uS to r&-8IIIIluatu the pric.
ing lUuctUte in otder 10 proc-' wiTh the .. ries. We heve
also d!K:ided 10 be more eI3borala. wl>ere tile game per.
mits. In the uM 01 lour colo, maps. count ..... etc. As
mentioned pl'evious.iy. !he gernes would oon1lMn an ""Tun,
.... S& T type article covering the banle, the Ieeder.. the
I,miel, lhe tactics. tile Irt of wariate at that time. plus a
module describing the course of the blinle In game terms.
Indillldually the gerr. would sell 10< $14.00: thtough
subscriptionllhey would $811 101' $59.95 per $8T 01 .....
SUbscriptions would be hal'>dled in Ihroo paymenlll.
71. Would you b/:I Interested in the "Gr6B1 Butties of
History"? 1 "' Would defrnrtely SUbscr ib/:l to the first sel16
games) of the _085. 2 _ Would dellniTaly subscr,be 10
mom lhan one set of thu semes: 3 ... Would possibly
subscllb/:l to thu series. 4. NOI inleresled in SUbscrlbong.
bul would definrteiV buy s.ell!(:tlld ti tles. 5- NOI Interesled
In subscflbon9. but would possiblv buy selected lliles.
6 a Not Sur8 I'8t (would 10 see the 11151 gamel.
7 _ D<lfrnlteiy nOI onteresled BIther way in lhe SIl'1IIS
Please rate the following game proposaia on a IClIe of 1 to
9 with " 1" indicatingll8lY If11lIIlndination to buy the geme
if published. up Through "9" . il'>di(:3I'ng a definilR int&n'
lion to purchase it.
71. The Sea Dogs: A Gan"l/:l of ShIP' to-ship combat on the
Age of hplotatlon DepICting sniPS hom fN8f'I sea-fa"ng
nallon of the day. The S6B Dogs would p,OI/iOOscenllrIOS
ranging from the BatHe 01 lepanto 10 pllvate&r
Irom the Anglo-Dutch Wars 10 Veneta. sea bal-
11$5 Wi th 4(X) cO<.Jn ters and geomorphIC map. TSO
would prOVide 8 delailed, in depth study 01 a subject
rI!MIf prev,ously covered on a warg&me
Given the auccesa and ramarkable acceptability 01 TlNTibie
Swift Sword - S1On-'l-
we are inte<ested In _ng if SPI galTllll'S would likato_
aoothe< CMI War Baltle _ a seriea 01 bani""
covering all lheImponanl lIfl989IIIll8Ou 01 the war - at
lhelevallncorpofaled in lhe two games abo ..... Size 01 the
ga ...... would depend on lhe battle, bul mool would t.a""
3-4 tsome would hava ooly twol, and prices
would renge lrom .15 10 .25, depeoding 00 Ihe simula-
tion. PleaSfl ans_ lhe following qU8llions:
73. Would you like to see more games on the CIVil War
uSing the TSS/STonewal 1 SYSHlml
'4. What S4ze game would YOU prefer? 1 Kooe game-
map. 2- 2 game-maps, 3- 3-4 gamemaps; 4 _ don't
care. as loog as the SObjectlS a08Qualely COV!Ifed
Rale!he 100Iowing beltlet:
75. Ch;ckamauga
76. Shiloh
77. FilSt Bul l Run
1'. Second Bull Run
79. ChanoellOfSvil1e
110. Anu!'I1am
11. In 1864 Sne.man , VICIOfI!lS around Atlanta ITIIIde
POSsJble h" famous "March 10 the Sea. " As Sherman ad-
vanced on Atlanla the Conledefl'lle armies under
Johnston (later Hoodl made sharp local counter'aua<;h
in an el!Oftto deleat Sherman's army in deta,1 Ballles f or
A,I/Infll depo<;tS the Confederate altempl to Stop Sher-
man A senes of games would cover the Bailie lor K9f1 -
nesaw Mountain V June 1864, Bailie of P8I!tChtroo Creel<
20July 1864. Battie Ie< Atlama 22 July 1984. and The Bat-
t'" of Ezra ChUfch 28July 1864 Ba(11as for Atlllnrllw,1I use
tile TSSIStor>flVt'al1 system. and wil l be saki arther lIS a
SuperOuad or It!I separate g.a.rnes. The SuperOuad will
havalink rules for the four bal!les Bllllles forAlilInfll will
sell lor $23
12. Nev vs. Wellington MeelJng allh6 Crossr01JdS. The
B9tt'" of Oualre Bras. The F'8I'ICh II corps and Cavalry
CorpS lace one lone Dutch Belg.an DIVISIon wa<tmg fOf
Bliush Aeinlo<oemontS 10 IIrrivg Cavalry charge and
counter-charge take and the vttal oossroadS
leadtng to Waterloo A man&ge8ble Grand Tact'C!lI1)8me
usins II mod,lied Victory System. One map
400 counters . $10.
Il. Ebb Tide; Allied Invasions of Tums;' and Sicily; The
Germafl!l. hugely tied down In Russ'll, wureclearly on the
sllateglC del9flSl\'8 in the Med. but the sltualIOO had not
'(fI1 deteriofated to the pornt wherechoocewllS so limlled
The Tunisoan game will COV&!' 8 C!lmpBlgn In wh,ch the
Germans struggled 10 rel8ln a loothold In AIrica. Special
I\lllls wllll8ke into IICCOUnl Allied 8" superiority and con-
trol ollhe SIIII . The Qllme on the Invasion 01 SICily will In-
dude thOSllIlSPOCIS. IISwell SPIIC'III prO\f1srons IOf linking
the two games will allow fOf the e><ammanon of SU<,;h pro-
'IOC!It ..... mil itary Questions as what il the Germans had
abandoned Tunis to the All .. and fa lkln beck to deland
SlClly&(lequalely; or what il the Aile had merelyconl8ln-
ed the Isolated AKIS troops in Africa and oPted for an ,m-
mediate mo\I9 on Srcilv1 A $15 TWIn-Pack game.
811ltiIJ for From Norml/ndy ro riHI WestwaN_ A
lour mapgIImecovering u.. AHied Invasion 01 France_ the
... blequant raot!l acroa Frence and Belgium. and lhe
breaching of !he W8I\WaH. Two separl'tB double map
ga ...... would be inclllded _ ThtllnvllSion of Europe 1944
covering the Allied Invasion options from Normandy 10
Holland; and Sm.shing IhtI WIISrwaf' covering the Allied
advan<:e to and breaching 01 the W_II defending Ger-
many. BOlh gil ...... would be available separl'leIy 81 well
at to{llllher in the lour map Birtle for FrlnCfl, covering the
entiftl ClImpeign Irom June 1944 to 1946 In weakly
w .... , The Alii! n.eed not Invade In Normandy, and units
InvoMld In the battle of the Bulge may be u.:! defensive-
ly by the German 10 "rengthen the W_aH. 5 kilomrtt ...
10 the he>!, Ragimef1t-Srigade leva!, Umiled intelligence.
AltpOWe' and FuH Scale Amphibloul Opera-
tiona. and ltatl of tile an WWII regimental game
mechanics_
PIeTlle IlIte each MIPI''''' game package:
.... BIlII/e for From N()ml8i1dy ro rfIB Was/Wal/
would ir'ldude lour lull-S4led maps and 12(X1 COUnters.
""
85. Thelnvasron of Europe 1944 Two-map game lor $12
86_ Smeshmg lhe WfIS/W1l1i Two-map game lor $12
81. Orbnill. The war lor the control 01 earth's upper at
mosphere Setiess than a generation in the future. Orbilltl
will deal WIth banies between Sp/JC8 salellites of the
United States. RUS$III and other na tions The objecwe is
to control Ofbital space lor lhe PUlpose of recon-
naissance. weaTher control. destroying ICBM'S aOO,
b8sic8l1y. control of the earth ilsell. A wide variety of
will be used in the gama (50mIl ot which already
There w,11 be Batliestabons lsem,-automated
space 518tions equipped w'th small", Auto1ighler
satelhtes 101 clafanse and off9f1se as well as elactronic
sealch and communications eQuipment and olher
weaponsl , Sentonals !plepOSI\loned maneuverable
satellites to be aclova ted when enemy samMes come
Within rangel, and many other$. Weapons w,1I 'nciucla
homong missiles and charged partida beam and taSilf can-
non. as well as conventional automatic 40mm cannon I,,
ing maneuverable P'Of!ICliles. In addilloo to destrOYing
enemy satel lites and pulli ng your own uP. each Side Will
1111empt to capture "nemy l!he bal1er to com-
promIse therr lechnologyf Also InvoMKl WIll be earth snd
moon bases. Players W111 start the game wllh preselected
mlK of satellites and bases and. WIth hourly lor somewhat
longerl turnS anemptto use superior orbital ta<;IICS and
sllal9QY to Win A $12 gama with StrIlI9Q'C, \8Ctrcal . and
soilt8lfe VllfS>ons .
sa_ OfilCUllI: An unusual game based on one of the most
famous novels of 1111 time. US4ng a game-map coverong an
arBS 01 london, the DrllOJta player uses h,s mght turns 10
seek out victims and tum them inlO vamprres. returning
during dav turns to one 01 the collons he has hidden In
vallous locanons. The Van Helsing Pla)'8r seeks to find
the coffins and/Of DrllOJla In an effort to hall the spread
of the "disease 01 vamplnsm" A chaso game with
elements of hidden movement and much use of random
events and surPl'so. Fa'thfully based on the Bram Stoer
novel, using actual maps 01 the locatIons. One map. 100
counters. pta)'81 cards, boxed; $12
89. The Dragon MIIstfml. Based on Jack Vance's Hugo-
winnIng story of the same name. th,s ta<;ticlol representa-
lion Of man and monster combat on a planet many lighl
years removed hom Ealth would take In all !he major
a:;pects 01 the BanOOck-Carcoio war The game would
center on the conlllCt betwoon units made UP of such
monsters liS Juggers. Fiends. and Stflders. Combet
would be waged In extremelv rough ter,ain (for oxample.
the mountainous Banbeck Vlllel, and malntaln'ng morale
and army Ofganilat,on would be extremelv Important.
The game would include 400 counters. extenSive play
eids. and one or two maps and would sell lor $12 to 515
90_ The Dymg ElIrth. In an age fa' in the lutu,e. Earth's
Sun 1$ slowly going out. Many 01 the people who love ,n
43
the Cltles choose to end tller r e",stenctl by wallOWing In
Decadence. But II I!!W 01 the more resourcelul men and
women will live OUI therr liVes as fullV as pOSSIble To thIS
9f1d. they bend the natural lOfC8S 10 therr ends. CIealing
magIcs thai have long S4noB been thoughtlOfgollan To
aid on thIS renaossanoB of the arts ITII'Igrcal. bold adven-
turers seek to go to IOSI c,ues and alternate realitlllS in
search of hidden sacrats But many dangers lurk in the
tmests and l1,nterlandsol this WOfJd Thtl OVing ElIrthw,1j
use a system looselv ba5tl!l on the Swords lind Sorcery
game-system. but will be slighlly less stra,ghdorwa.d, as
many 01 the various lands Will be unknown to the PIII\'9f',
It WIll incorporate all spell, memlO/led In Jack
VDIlCO!'S SIOry of thesama name. plus a !!!Wadded twistS
To sell for S15.
A great nUmbel 01 the "old" SPt ga ...... - aspeciaUy!he
old iIIua ga ...... - hava been bypassed by the State 01
the An. HOW8IIeI, !he I-Ubjacts aftl ,6H . .a WI
are asking you rll' " !he loIIowing "bjecllr, III previoul-
Iy CO'o'8fed by old SPIISbT ga ...... 1111 to whelher you
wouJd li ke to see a brand new trNtment of the topic,
complete with fuK-size map and 200-400 countlll'l; all in
the $9-tO range.
91. PlnltlrArmt/6Afn'kll. Using !til the Inlo<manon
ed I,om the CllfnP/Jign for North Africll. a tull map,
bngade-Iave! coverag.a of the war In AI,ICiI, w'lh Simp'"
rules for logIstics. the air war. and commanders. Com-
ple .. ty range would be modera te
92. Kursk The claSSIC tank battle 01 the Russ'lln Cam-
pa'gn. With a system based on PlInltNgruppt/ Gud6rilJn
but advanced to take in the spec'lli usa 01 armor. as WIll i
lIS 811 rules. Iog,stics lind command Plobktm1l
93. The FntllC(}-PruS$iIJn War Ona of lirs! modern
wars (lB701 Ul!.rng a system completely d,lier9f11 from the
ollglllal, )'81 rel8lning the flavor of strengths
More emphasis on the operaHonal aspects 01 the war
(supplv and ieadfl<shlpf than before. WIth soma pohtrcal
ram,f,catlons thrown In
94. FilII 01 Rome A lull-mao game on the tnals and
tflbul8tions of the Empore. uS4ng r8C9f1t studies on Roman
poli tics lind m,litary stralegy, Actual legions in a<;lUal
locations as well as actual Emperors. emp<re POlitICS and
personal,ues. multi-player as as two-player
9S. War pf (he Workis. The dass;c H.G Wells
rendered as II "charftCter/advenlure" type game in which
the plavers assume the rotes of vanous people In amain lit
the lime of the Martian ,nvaS4OO with the matn obJ8CtMi
bemg escape and evasion unlll (as we an know) the Mar -
toans bile the dust due w earthly Infto::llOO Played on a
map evocat ..... ot turn 01 the century Sussex. using ""Ids
and counter! to lepresent the PIa\'9fS lind an automatic
semI-random MarMn movement system DesIgned as a
game that call ba used to draw In non-wargartl8fs to the
hobby of SllflOU5 gam<ng. $12 to $15
96. No Quest,on
Penn Con 78
June 23-25, 1978
Widener Coll ege
MacMorland Center
Chester. Pennsylvania
Tournaments General Gaming Exhibits Auctions Seminars
Movies Miniatures Boardgames Fantasy Science Fiction
The East Coast Con!
Contact: Jay Hadley (SASE)
C/o Strategy and Fantasy World
Valley Forge Shopping Center
King of Prussia. Pennsylvania 19406
THE NEXT WAR
Combat in Europe During the Late 1970s
Detailed supply rules Extensive air game Emphasis on rear-area security
l/is March30
(Moscow) The SOYIEI I Union yesterday
announced thai Its annual SPflng Army
m n e u ~ in EilSI Germany would lake place
March 31 through Apnl 10 American obser-
vers have beef1 inVited by SOViet Defense
Ministry offICials to watch the 8l(8rclSII under
a provISion 01 the HelSinki Accords
ISonnl German olficl8ls here said there
was "nOthIng new" in the latest round ol anll -
German propaganda Irom the Soviet press
lSchwBrnfur\ Army Bases Wookly
Trumperl Advert isement: American Gr!
welcome 81 the Cafe Casablanca Speclel
show 81 mIdnight Saturday MarCh 31 starring
Fraulein IIseZKllen. All you can drink for $5
)Pentagon Report, Summaryl SOViet
depots have shown ill conSIderable ,ocr8SS81n
ac\JV1ty ollete Many 50 ... 181 second line diVI-
SIOns 818 on starld-by readiness. The conch.l-
Slon 01 this rsport IS that this IS due to the up
coming SPring maneuvers
In rhe Kromlln: The Field MarShal.
dressed in 8 Ireshly-pressed Ileid unilorm,
stepped to the lectern and looked around 91
hiS sl aff in the Defense Ministry confarence
room "Comrades. this is ,I Today wo leave
for l he Urals. Let every man do hiS duty The
Motherland expects much of us. The Ministry
expects much 01 us They Will not be d.sap-
POinted The roeXI Mav Day parade shall be
held In Parlsr He lurned and w.lhOUllooking
back left IheconfllfOnce room
Sunday was Apnl Fools Day; II was also
the hrsldayoftheNoJ/f Waf
The Next War IS SPl' s new operatIOnal
level game dealing With a hypotheucal conflict
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the
late 7Os. The rules have been lavered, so that
players can play the fasl game which keeps
play Quick and clean. Then players may at
then optIOn plug in the variOUS optional rules
allOWing fOf a much more complex game
Combat. The combat system is new and
Innovailve Combat IS a functJOO 01 move
ment Units expend movement pOInts to por-
form varIOUS types of IIssaults 1/ a combal
unit IS successful In one attack, ,t can con-
tinue to move and perform another attack
nils allows fOf extremely mobile situatIOns In
addi tion. when a unl l ,s lorced to retr98l. a
breakthrough marker is pl aced on the map to
show Ihe Droach In tho enemy hnes. Friendly
umts can explOit the breach and move in10
delicate roar areas destroying headQuaflers
and SAM Sites
Flit/guo. Combat unllS can exceed then
baSIC movement allowance by omplOYlng
" FatlQue Movement.' The more movement
pOInts a unll moves In excess of Its baSIC
movement allowance. the greater the chance
of "fahgue," whICh Impairs the unit's ability
to move and partiCIpate In combat
Cadro Ratings Each nationality has a
Cadre Rating As units partiCipate In combat.
they become bellor due to combat expenonce
or worse due 10 OXceSSlve casualties The
ralJngs are chan-geable \0 show dlffOfent
OOSSlbtlltleS
Organic Sum. In add,llOn to the regular
traclngasupply path rules, there oro optloool
rules allOWing players 10 move away from
their supply lines and explOi t breaches In the
enemy lines. Unlls Iha1 move OUI 01 general
supply expend fuel to move and ammuni tIOn
10 partiCipate in combat Organic supply is
kept track of With markers IIml\mg the record
k.eepmg Plavars can recreate deep penetra
tlons l(1tO the enemy rear areas, but" the fol
low-up UfIII,s do not penetrate, a unll can hnd
Itsell Without fuel and ammunlt.on deep In
hostile temtory
Detailed Air Game. Aif unl\S represent
SpecIfIC types of allcraft wl\h raungs lakIng In-
to accounl all supenOflly Ihlgh levell, inter-
ception (low levell. and ground suppor t Each
all Unit represents one squadron. All units
I ,rsl fighl over the map uSing a unique airIO
air system. Then, asa resul t 01 all-toair com
bat, certain ground support air units Will
penelrate to the bau lelield 10 perlorm tactical
ground support . The land game also contains
a very detailed SAM Order of Bailie. All UMS
that penetrate to the batt leheld must contend
With the ground-to-8It fire that could abort l he
mlSSlOO or eliminate the planes. In addition,
helICOpters are rated by type and function asa
cross betwe811land and all Units
AI' Drops Both sKIes possess alfmoblle
and allborne un.ts II a plaY81 can 981n alf
supenorl tv In an air sector, he may be able to
drop aorborne unllS onto the map If a player is
careless with his rear area dispositIon. he may
lind enemy paratroopers conl rolling a vl lal air
IleldorClty
SpecllJl Forces. Both Sides command
special forces or commando Units. Players
plot mISSions whereby Sj')8(:1B1 fOfC9s umts try
to knock out airfield and portS in an effOfI to
harass the enemy If the mission IS mlS-lIfned
or POOIIy planned. thespeclillforces units can
be eliminated
Naval Game. The entlle BaltIC naval
situallon 15 portrayed, Irom Baltyslt; It he malor
RUSSian base In the BaltiC) to Denmark Rus-
sian naval units al1empl to pass Ihrough one
of the three narrow straits In an effort to OXlt
the Bal uc and commence raider operations
The game also features extenSive minelaying
and mmesweeping rules. The NeJ/t W"r
comes With three maps, 2400 counters, 1
rules booklet and an artICle on the current
SIlUltlOn m Europe.
Soviet troops dillfnOunt from II B TR-IiOPB.
Available at Ori gins ' 78 Conventi on, 15 July 1978. Orders received on or before 16 July 1978 will be
honored at $22. After 16 July 1978, the price of The Next Wsr will increase to reflect rising cost s_