1

An Instrumental Epistemology
Analogous to Newtons gravity on external bodies, is Humes custom in the operations of
the mind. We pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity
[custom]. We only point out a principle of human nature (emphasis added). This
describing rather than explaining characterizes Humes epistemology. Unlike Locke, still
looking for the ultimate springs and principles of the mind, Humes more modest goal
is to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes. Thus to reconcile
Humes positive with his negative aim, I argue that Humes skepticism concerning
ultimate causes and his naturalism concerning the human understanding should be seen as
Instrumental Epistemology.


Explaining custom
After surveying what he believes to be all of the possible kinds of evidence that serve as a
basis for our belief that the future will be conformable to the past, Humes solution is
custom. Hume instrumentally postulates as a principle of human nature, just as gravity is
a principle of external bodies, that the force of custom is a fundamental mechanism of
human understanding. His description of custom, is sensible to the principle itself. That
is, Hume is aware that his idea of custom is derived solely on the basis of custom.

Nothing can be known to be the cause of another but by experience. We can give no
reason for extending to the future our experience of the past; but are entirely determined
by custom, when we conceive an effect to follow from its usual cause. (Emphasis added)

Dennett uses the example of how there is nothing intrinsically sweet in sugar to explain
this seemingly counterintuitive position. It seems as if the experience of sweetness is
caused by the glucose molecules in sugar. If we examine the glucose molecule however,
there is nothing sweet about it. The statement, Sugar causes the experience of sweetness,
therefore we like it is incorrect. It is rather the case that, Because we like sugar, it
causes the experience of sweetness. Glucose is high in energy, and so the brain is wired
up to experience sweetness from sugar; there is nothing intrinsically sweet in glucose.

The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of mind, is not, properly speaking, a
quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being, who may consider the action

Causation therefore, does not really exist external to the mind. Rather the mind projects
its experience of causation on to external objects just like we project the experience of
sweetness on to sugar. That was Humes great insight! We cannot know essences. Thus,
Humes epistemology limits its principles to instruments of explanation.







2
Hume on Meaning and Concepts.
What stood out from the Moral Enquiry, was the phrase a more lively sympathy. The
word lively then conveys to mind Humes discussion of belief in the Epistemological
Enquiry, belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of
an object. A similar situation arises with vivacity used to distinguish belief from fantasy
as well as Ideas from Impressions.
I propose that, in accordance with Humes atomistic approach to ideas, in which
complex ideas [are] nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas, belief
and sympathy are complex ideas containing the idea of liveliness as one of their
constituent simples. Also, by employing the same words to describe apparently different
phenomena, Hume sets up semantic fields in which complex ideas participate in a shared
meaning network. This creates another level of complexity in the compounding of ideas.
Compound ideas are not only made of simples, but share some of their parts with one
another. In this manner, every compound idea is somehow connected to other compound
ideas that share a common semantic ground. Such is the case with the distinctions
between impressions-ideas and belief-reveries. This not only is consistent, but necessary
to the constructive aim of the enquiry, which is to resolve the many particular effects
into a few general causes. This reading strengthens Humes anti-essentialist instrumental
position because it acknowledges that the different operations of the mind share common
grounds a position widely accepted among the neuroscience community I must add.
I argue that it is also consistent with the purpose of the Enquiry, written as a
pedagogical work of philosophy. In the introductory discussion, Hume proposes a third
species of philosophy, one to mitigate the abstruseness of metaphysics and the largely
unproductive easy philosophy. This third Different Species of Philosophy is a
prominent theme throughout Humes work. I argue that Hume is proposing that rather
than seeing Human Understanding as categorized within discrete boundaries as the
essentialists would, these categories should be defined instrumentally, orchestrated with
all the other aspects of the mind. Hume know(s) that a human body is a mighty
complicated machine, and thus in order to make his philosophy accessible must draw
certain lines where no such clear-cut lines exist. Such is the case of the distinction
between impression and ideas. I contend that this is for a pedagogical purpose, and that
such clear boundaries drawn between concepts can be replaced by a visualization of
Humes concepts as participating in networks of simple ideas embedded within complex
ideas which are further embedded within semantic fields.