CHAPTER V

CRITICAL STUDY OF HUSSERLS NACHWORT

1
Husserls Ideen zu einer reinen Ph anomenologie und ph anomenologischen
Philosophie appeared in the year 1913. In the recent Postscript (Nach-
wort) (identical with the Foreword to the English edition of 1931),
Husserl explicates the Ideen, it is true, but only in reference to a few major
points. This self-explication is naturally limited in its range. Husserl
stresses there what he saw as essentially new and, understood in a radi-
cal sense, as philosophical in the enterprise initiated as a rst beginning,
according to his own words, but with full awareness of the goal.
Indeed, the Ideen signies a decisive turning point as well in the his-
tory of Husserls phenomenology. In essential parts of the Logische Unter-
suchungen, which appeared in 19001901 (in the Prolegomena as well
as in the rst four Investigations), the concern was still pure logic:
the self-sufciency belonging to the logical sphere as a sphere of ideal
Being, the rejection of naturalizing and psychologizing the logical itself,
recognition of its own peculiar nature, its independence over against the
reduction of logical, ideal unities and entities to dispersed multiplicities of
real psychic contents. The elaboration of the logical itself as to its proper
naturecarried out in explicit debate against contemporary logic as well
as against classical British philosophyculminates in the plan of a math-
esis universalis, a completed part of which Husserl offered in the third
Logical Investigation (On the Doctrine of Wholes and Parts). In the
last two Logical Investigations, however, Husserl is no longer oriented,
in a direct and straightforward manner, towards ideal unities, ideal states
of affairs, and the like in order to formulate pure and simple predicative
propositions about them. Instead, especially in the Sixth Investigation,
1
This article, originally published in Deutsche Literaturzeitung (1932), critically dis-
cusses E. Husserl, Nachwort zu meinen Ideen zu einer reinen Ph anomenologie und
ph anomenologischen Philosophie, in Jahrbuch f ur Philosophie und ph anomenologische
Forschung (Halle, 1930), XI, pp. 54970.
119
A. Gurwitsch, The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (19011973),
Volume II: Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology,
DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2942-3 5, c Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009
120 chapter v
dedicated to phenomenological clarication of knowledge, the thematic
view is reectively directed to consciousness of idealities, to the different
ways in which species and the logical in general are intended, when they
are emptily or only symbolically meant, and in particular to the ways in
which they offer themselves in bodily presence in categorial intuition.
Here, too, Husserl takes up the problems of the coincidence of intend-
ing and meaning acts and the intuitions fullling themphenomena
of fulllment standing under the headings of truth and evidence.
These expositions reach their climax with the introduction of the con-
cept of categorial intuition along with its differentiation from sensu-
ous intuition. With these positive demonstrations, Husserl nally and
denitively refutes the traditional and classical theories of abstraction.
The motive for this turning from the things themselves to consciousness-
of-the-things was formulated by Husserl as follows in the introductory
remarks in the second volume of the Logische Untersuchungen: one can-
not be satised with developing pure logic merely in the same way as
our mathematical disciplines, viz., as a system of propositions established
with naive-material [naivsachlich] validity; instead, along with this one
must strive for philosophical clarity concerning those propositionsi.e.,
for insight into the essence of the ways of knowledge coming into play
together with the effectuation and ideally possible applications of such
propositions, for insight also into the sense-bestowings and objective
validities essentially constituting themselves through the ways of knowl-
edge. With these words the setting of the problem for the Ideen is already
prepared.
In the Ideen there is also a concern, this time exclusively, for conscious-
ness. Consciousness is understood eidetically as the eidos consciousness-
at-large, so that each de facto consciousness, each de facto mental state,
is considered only as a case of, as an example of, consciousness-at-large
as well as of its genera or species (e.g., perception, memory, phantasy
[Phantasie], and, again, color perception, sound perception, etc.). From
its being factual, no act of consciousness derives any privilege or priority
over what is merely conceived or phantasied, i.e., possible consciousness.
The eidetic inquiry into consciousness and all its most universal struc-
tures is effected now, however, in an attitude which is radically changed
over against attitudes pertaining to natural life as well as to the posi-
tive sciences. As Husserl emphasizes in the Nachwort, everything rests on
critical study of husserls NACHWORT 121
the comprehension of this change in attitude which was already now and
then practiced in the Logische Untersuchungenbut which was not explic-
itly characterized as such prior to the Ideenand on whose meaning as
well as import the greatest stress is laid.
The existential thesis, in which the world, in natural life as well as
in the positive sciences, is simply there for me and accepted by me loses
its unquestionable validity through the transcendental-phenomenological
reduction. I do not draw into doubt the universal existential thesis, nor
do I modalize it in the sense that I concede to the world existence of lesser
certainty than that thesis claims. I only set out of action the universal exis-
tential thesis; I practice an epoche over against it, without modifying it as
it is continuously present to me. Setting out of action the otherwise con-
tinuously operative and naively accepted natural existential thesis opens
up the possibility for the disclosure and thematic treatment of a wholly
new, innitely extended realm of Being which, for the most part, remains
concealed in the attitude of the positive sciences no less than in natural
life: the realm of pure consciousness, the world of consciousness purely
as such, comes into the eld of view of the phenomenologist. Instead
of abiding by existing and unquestionably accepted things per se, as phe-
nomenologists we turn to phenomena and concatenations of phenomena
in which those things appear in transcendentally puried consciousness
and present themselves as just the things which they are also in the natu-
ral attitudei.e., as actually existing things. Under the phenomenological
epoche we deal with thing-phenomena, with things just as they appear,
and within the limits in which they appear, but also only within these lim-
its and in the manners of their appearing. In other words, the world yields
its place to the world-phenomenon, the latter to be taken precisely in
the way, but also only in the way, in which it is a world-phenomenon. That
is to say, it is taken as a world-phenomenon carrying in itself the claim to
existential validity in the sense of the natural existential thesis.
Performance of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction opens
up the possibility for a radical formulation and treatment of philosoph-
ical problems beyond merely tracing them back to their roots and pur-
suing them to their very origins. Nothing is unquestionably accepted
as matter of course; whatever lays claim to existence and validity is
put under the obligation of legitimating itself in transcendental con-
sciousness. The latter is the only absolute Being, a rst-in-itself and
122 chapter v
irreducible, as already appears from its resisting Descartes attempt at
universal doubtan attempt guided by different motives and directed
toward other goals. Whatever claims existence and validity must legit-
imate this claim by showing itself as that which it claims to be. Thus
the sense of the claim to existence in general and, more particularly,
all possible claimsi.e., claims to existence in every conceivably pos-
sible sense (existence of physical things, of real psychological events as
well as all modes of existence comprised under the heading of ideal exis-
tence and admitting further distinctions and differentiations)are clari-
ed and legitimated by constitutional phenomenological inquiries (under
the heading of Phenomenology of Reason) in the eld of pure con-
sciousness. The sense of existence at large is disclosed. The sense in which
objects pertaining to the several regions can legitimately be said to exist
(in the nal analysis, the sense of existence of the very regions them-
selves) is also disclosed. This occurs by means of investigating intentional
consciousness of : its teleology, the teleological productions issuing from
its intentionality. Such investigations are oriented towards, and guided
by, the objective entities which in the natural and all quasi-natural (e.g.,
mathematical) attitudes (i.e., objectively directed attitudes) are unques-
tionably accepted. That is to say, those objective entities function as
ontological clues for constitutional phenomenological inquiries.
With this philosophizing, starting from an absolute beginning,
grounded in an ultimate foundation, and inspired by ultimate self-
responsibility, which does not rely upon any pregiven and matter-
of-course point of departure, Husserl renewed and radicalized the
o o o, of Plato in the sense of a truly absolute autonomy of
knowledge.
Transcendental-phenomenological idealism arises in the manifold
and manifoldly directed inquiries made possible on the basis of tran-
scendental subjectivity uncovered by the reduction. This idealism is
radically different from the historical forms of idealism, especially from
psychological idealism, in that it does not formulate a philosophical
standpoint. It does not take issue with the natural existential thesis, nor
does it modify it in such a way that in a new thesis the existence meant
in the natural one is degraded to mere appearance in some respect or
other. In no way does it maintain that what the natural existential the-
sis refers to is not true being, which must be sought for elsewhere. No
critical study of husserls NACHWORT 123
thesis about existence is formulated at all and, hence, no counter-thesis is
formulated over against the realistic one. The reason for this is that the
transcendental-phenomenological reduction only puts the natural exis-
tential thesis out of operation; but in no way and in no sense does it
affect it. Scheler misunderstands just this reduction when he maintains
that the specic reality-character of the real world is canceled by it and
that something like a realm of pure essences results, freed from the weight
of reality.
2
This misunderstanding rests on the confusion of the eidetic
with the transcendental reduction. Both have so little to do with each
other that even in the natural attitude or in the positive-scientic atti-
tude we make continuous use of the one (the eidetic reduction) when
we speak in the mode of the at large (

Uberhaupt), e.g., when we speak
about melody at large, a melody of a certain type, a mathematical func-
tion in general, the state at large, the species red, e.g., without ever having
to resort to transcendentally puried consciousness. On the other hand,
performance of the transcendental without the eidetic reduction discloses
the ow of my transcendentally puried mental states in phenomenal
time, without stating anything in the mode of essential universality about
these mental states and their interconnections.
It is not a matter of advocating an idealistic thesis over against a real-
istic one, but a question of clarifying the sense of existence of which we
continuously make use in the non-phenomenological attitude. As truly
existing, the world remains existing and in no respect is it interpreted
as a mere sham world; but the sense in which it is accepted as existing
and the right with which it is thus accepted come to radical and evident
explication. Thus we reach a level above the traditional conict between
realismand idealismwhich moves in the opposition of thesis and counter-
thesis; positive constitutional analyses and discoveries take the place of
arguments. When we speak of idealism here, that is because transcen-
dental consciousness proves to be the only and unique realm of abso-
lute Being. All other entities are constituted in sense-bestowings of phe-
nomenological consciousness, are intentional correlates of sense-unities
and sense-concatenations, and prove to be, seen in this way, relative to
transcendental subjectivity. The latter can be called the primal basis for
2
Cf. M. Scheler, Realismus-ldealismus, Philosophischer Anzeiger, II (Bonn, 1927),
pp. 281f.; Scheler, Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft (Leipzig, 1926), pp. 352f.
124 chapter v
all legitimacy and validity; this transcendental subjectivity itself isas
Husserl now saysirrelative, i.e., relative only to itself.
The transcendental phenomenological reduction, moreover, underlies
the difference between phenomenology and every kind of psychology,
even descriptive and phenomenological psychology. Husserl stresses this
distinction again, while at the same time he emphasizes the reform of psy-
chology implied in transcendental phenomenology. This reform depends
on further developing (in the correct direction) the concept of intentional-
ity introduced by Brentano as the basic concept of descriptive psychology
and on the actual and concrete utilization of the new conception of con-
sciousness which Brentano made possible with his doctrine. Intentional-
ity is not a property which belongs to mental states as coloredness pertains
to natural things: intentionality is not a natural property of consciousness
at all, since consciousness is radically distinct from nature. Conscious-
ness can be conceived as essentially intentional only when intentionality
is understood as productive intentionality (leistende Intentionalit at), i.e.,
seen in its teleological function. The genuine psychology of intention-
ality, resulting in its reformed shape from transcendental phenomenol-
ogy, . . . proves to be nothing other than constitutive phenomenology in
the natural attitude. Psychology of intentionality is oriented towards an
object, meant as identically the same, which appears as such in a multi-
plicity of subjective processes directed to it. The one and self-same object
comes to present itself in, and endures throughout, this very multiplicity,
appearing from various sides, in different orientations, manners of given-
ness, with varying existential characters, in different modes of position-
taking of the ego, etc. Just this appearing and presenting itself, endur-
ing, etc., fashion the theme of the psychology of intentionality. Its radical
opposition to nature is grounded in the fact that consciousness is essen-
tially intentionally productive. On that account consciousness cannot be
described and investigated in the same way as nature; it is not even suf-
cient to introduce intentionality as an additional descriptive fundamen-
tal concept. On this basis Husserl directs the reproach of psychological
naturalism against the traditional descriptive psychology of sense data
which goes back to Locke. He has in view the whole of contemporary
psychology. Even Gestalt psychology is referred to the Lockean school,
since stated in terms of principle, it makes no difference. whether one
allows psychic data to atomistically drift together like sand dunes. . ., or
critical study of husserls NACHWORT 125
whether one takes them as parts of wholes which, be it in empirical or a
priori necessity, can only be given as such parts. If one further consid-
ers the fact that the psychology of sense data conceives sense data in (as
one must say today) a thoroughly constructive manner, orienting them
to the generating stimuli, so that a strict correspondence and parallelism
obtains between stimuli and sensations, then one understands that psy-
chology as such persists in the natural attitude, positing the human ego
as real object in the pregiven world and allowing it to undergo mani-
fold inuences from that world. Such a procedure might be entirely legit-
imate in psychology as a science in the dogmatic attitude. Yet on this
very account, psychology proves to be totally different from transcenden-
tal phenomenology, and it becomes fully clear that (and why) psychology
cannot function as the basis of philosophy if the philosophical motive is
that of radical presuppositionlessness.
By referring Gestalt psychology to the Lockean tradition, Husserl over-
looks its essential novelty. It is not a question of a new theory or descrip-
tion of sense data when Wertheimer opposes the Gestalt thesis to the
bundle thesis.
3
It seems that Husserl, in the statement cited above,
4
has
that opposition alone in view. This opposition acquires its full and con-
crete sense only in connection with the relinquishment of the constancy
hypothesis.
5
As a consequence of this relinquishment, the description and
investigation of what is given to consciousness is emancipated from con-
siderations concerning constellations of stimuli. What is given must be
taken and described at face value. No knowledge of objective things and
events, no considerations as to what must occur, given certain stimuli,
and the relations between them, must inuence pure description. The
latter must not be modied nor obscured by what we learn about the
world from the natural sciences. So little is it a matter of a new thesis
concerning sense data, or even of the assertion that sense data only exist
as parts of wholes, that the concept of sense data itself, as well as that of
parts in general, becomes a problem for Gestalt psychology. In the nal
3
M. Wertheimer, Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt, I, Psychologische
Forschung, I (1922).
4
Husserl, Nachwort, loc. cit., p. 565.
5
Cf. W. Kohler,

Uber unbemerkte Empndungen und Urteilst auschungen, Zeitschrift

f ur Psychologie, LXVI (1913).
126 chapter v
analysis, when the consequences of the relinquishment of the constancy
hypothesis are pursued to their ultimate conclusion, even the very con-
cept of stimulus becomes a problem. Just that in which Husserl sees the
signicance of the epocheexclusion of all knowledge resting on everyday
experience of the world and of all knowledge derived from the positive
sciences, an exclusion combined with the disclosure of the world of con-
sciousness purely as suchis attained by the relinquishment of the con-
stancy hypothesis. This relinquishment has a function and signicance
for Gestalt theory which is similar to the transcendental phenomenolog-
ical reduction within Husserls phenomenology. To be sure, Husserl has
developed his theory of the reduction with the utmost methodical con-
sciousness of the goals to be reached and under explicit emphasis of the
principles involved.
The differences between Gestalt theory and phenomenology are indis-
putable and have their basis in the fact that Gestalt theory is psychology,
while Husserls phenomenology aims at, and prepares the ground for, a
universal philosophical science. Notwithstanding these differences result-
ing from divergencies of general theoretical orientation, there is a com-
mon ground for these two lines of inquiry upon which they meet one
another and upon which they can be further developed, the one with the
help of the other. Precisely the problems dealt with in the rst and, up to
now, only volume of the Ideen lie upon this common ground.
6
Further-
more, Gestalt-theoretical investigations which are not limited to normal
adult civilized men but extend to animals (K ohler), children (Koffka, K.
Lewin), and brain-injured patients (Gelb and Goldstein) and which allow
for L evy-Bruhls work on primitive mentality lead to problems which are
also of signicance for Husserls phenomenology, although he has not
pursued them. This extension of the investigations can and even must
be carried out in an attitude which does not presuppose any pre given
objectivity.
Although the natural world falls to the epoche, it plays the role of an
ontological clue for constitutive phenomenology, since the contents of
the world, such as natural objects, objects of value, animals, men, social
6
See below, Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego, pp. 193317 in which
the attempt has been made, on the basis of an awareness of this common ground, to
develop certain problems in Husserls phenomenology by means of views drawn from
Gestalt theory.
critical study of husserls NACHWORT 127
institutions, etc., are the correlates of the corresponding teleological pro-
ductive intentionalities. But what is the natural worldjust as natural
and not already interpreted in theoretical terms? What is the mode of
existence of its contents, and how are these to be suitably characterized?
Further, what is the sense of that natural existential thesis which is put
out of operation in the epoche and of which we make continuous use in
natural life? And, nally, what is this natural life itself, and by what is it
essentially characterized? In the present Nachwort Husserl does not enter
into these problems related to a systematical, all-embracing description,
exhaustive in breadth and depth, of whatever is encountered in the nat-
ural attitude, which he had designated in the Ideen itself: as a highly
important, scientic task scarcely seen up to now, problems which have
become acute in present-day philosophic discussions in Germany. This
omission is probably explained by the fact that this Nachwort was used as
the Foreword to the English edition of the Ideen, and that the situation of
English philosophy is very, different fromthe German. Hence, we conne
ourselves here to mere mention of those problems. As to Husserls defense
against the reproach of intellectualism, his defense seems to us super-
uous because the reproach itself is pointless. Philosophy as clarication
of the world and, more particularly, as clarication in a radical sensein
which alone the clarication deserves to be called philosophicalcan by
its very nature be nothing else than intellectualistic because clarity and
clarication are precisely matters of intellect.
Translated by Frederick Kersten