1

[G.R. No. 137774. October 4, 2002]

SPOUSES MANUEL R. HANOPOL and BEATRIZ T. HANOPOL, petitioners, vs. SHOEMART
INCORPORATED, Represented by Executive Vice President, SENEN T.
MENDIOLA, respondent.
[G.R. No. 148185. October 4, 2002]
SPOUSES MANUEL R. HANOPOL and BEATRIA T. HANOPOL, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and SHOEMART, INC., Represented by SENEN T.
MENDIOLA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to set aside the decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 45500
[1]
and
56691.
[2]

Shoemart, Inc., is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines
engaged in the operation of department stores. On December 4, 1985, Shoemart, through its Executive
Vice-President, Senen T. Mendiola, and spouses Manuel R. Hanopol and Beatriz T. Hanopol executed a
Contract of Purchase on Credit.
[3]

Under the terms of the contract, Shoemart extended credit accommodations, in the amount of
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), for purchases on credit made by holders of SM Credit
Card issued by spouses Hanopol for one year, renewable yearly thereafter.
[4]
Spouses Hanopol were
given a five percent (5%) discount on all purchases made by their cardholders, deductible from the semi-
monthly payments to be made to Shoemart by spouses Hanopol.
[5]

In consideration of the credit accommodations, spouses Hanopol executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of Shoemart on their properties covered by TCT Nos. (S-60763) 15079-A and (S-
60762) 15078-A, situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal.
[6]

For failure of spouses Hanopol to pay the principal amount of One Hundred Twenty-Four
Thousand Five Hundred Seventy-One Pesos and Eighty-Nine Centavos (P124,571.89) as of October 6,
1987, Shoemart instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against the mortgaged properties.
On March 29, 1989, to enjoin Shoemart and the Sheriff from proceeding with the scheduled
foreclosure sale on April 6, 1989, spouses Hanopol instituted Civil Case No. 89-48355 for breach of
contract, refund, release/cancellation of real estate mortgage, damages with injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
[7]
Spouses Hanopol alleged that Shoemart breached the contract when
the latter failed to furnish the former with the requisite documents by which the formers liability shall
be determined, namely: charge invoices, purchase booklets and purchase journal, as provided in their
contract; that without the requisite documents, spouses Hanopol had no way of knowing that, in fact,
they had already paid, even overpaid, whatever they owed to Shoemart; that despite said breach,
Shoemart even had the audacity to apply for extrajudicial foreclosure with the Sheriff.
On April 4, 1989, at the preliminary hearing for the petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order, spouses Hanopol and Shoemart agreed to suspend the
scheduled auction sale.
[8]

On April 11, 1989, Shoemart filed its Answer with Counterclaim
[9]
denying the material
allegations of the complaint.
The trial court subsequently formed a Commission, composed of three (3) members, one
representative from each party and Atty. Raymundo G. Vallega, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch
25, RTC Manila, as Chairman of the Commission, for the accounting of each partys records of account
with the corresponding receipts, charge invoices and other evidence of indebtedness or payment.
[10]

The Report of the Chairman of the Commission dated January 7, 1991, reads in part:
[11]

That plaintiffs, thru their commissioner, submitted to the commission a total of 153 receipts and drawn
checks. Twelve (12) of the drawn checks were reconciled by the commission, thru defendants
commissioner and both parties agreed. This leaves 141 official receipts with a total of P1,895,699.20
tending to prove that plaintiffs Hanopol had paid to Shoemart. This amount of P1,895,699.20 includes
check AF/DA No. 91434, dated 9-11-87 in the amount of P50,000.00 which seems to cover O.R. No.
167729 which plaintiffs denied. Both parties failed to reconcile this check with O.R. No. 167729. In
the event that check AF/DA No. 91434, dated 9-11-87 is covered by O.R. No. 167729, then plaintiffs
total payment to Shoemart is only P1,845,699.20. This is evidently shown in the Summary of Payments
(Annexes A to A-6) and the corresponding copies of the official receipts (Annexes B to B-46
which is also marked as Annexes C to C-46 of the memorandum/manifestation filed by the
plaintiffs, dated November 12, 1990).
Defendant, despite repeated plea of the undersigned Chairman, did not present or submit any proof of
indebtedness or charge invoices for accounting purposes to support its position/claim, claiming that
plaintiffs are now barred by estoppel and laches from demanding the charge invoices covering all their
transactions with Shoemart, Inc. way back December 4, 1985 in pursuance of paragraph 6 of the
contract on purchase on credit. Defendants commissioner with the assistance of counsel merely
2

submitted a statement of account (ledger consisting of 17 pages herein marked as Annexes C to C-
16).
In effect, defendant Shoemart reiterated its position/claim in its answer with counterclaim that plaintiffs
have still an outstanding obligation/indebtedness (to it) in the amount of P178,095.47 as of December
31, 1988 inclusive of penalty charges being collected from them (No. 10 of special and affirmative
defenses, page 7 of answer with counterclaim).
Thereafter trial on the merits ensued with plaintiffs presenting the lone testimony of Manuel
Hanopol;
[12]
and defendant Shoemart presenting four (4) employees of Shoemart, namely, Antoinette P.
Garcia, Credit Manager;
[13]
Consuelo Cadelina, Accountant Manager;
[14]
Atty. Epitacio B. Borcedes, Jr.,
Corporate Secretary;
[15]
and Mercedes M. Alonzo, Credit Officer.
[16]

On March 21, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 25) rendered a Decision
[17]
in
favor of spouses Hanopol, ordering Shoemart, as represented to by its Executive Vice-President, Senen
T. Mendiola, to effect the cancellation of the real estate mortgage executed by spouses Hanopol in favor
of Shoemart and refund the amount of Three Hundred Twenty-One Thousand Eight Hundred One Pesos
and Two Centavos (P321,801.02) which represents overpayment, with interest at the legal rate from the
time when the complaint was instituted on March 29, 1989 until full payment thereof. In addition,
Shoemart was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00), attorneys fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), and the actual
costs and expenses of the suit.
Shoemart appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which is docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
45500. In a Decision
[18]
dated November 27, 1996, the appellate court reversed and set aside the lower
courts decision and, in its stead, the real estate mortgage was reinstated and spouses Hanopol were
ordered to pay Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fees.
Spouses Hanopol sought reconsideration of the decision. Pending its resolution, Shoemart, on
January 31, 1997, filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage over the same properties with
the office of Ex-Officio Sheriff of Paraaque. A foreclosure sale was set on March 4, 1997 at 10:00
a.m.
To enjoin the scheduled foreclosure, spouses Hanopol filed a petition for injunction with
temporary restraining order and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-059 in the Regional Trial Court
of Paraaque (Branch 260).
[19]
Shoemart sought the dismissal of the same on grounds of litis
pendentia and forum shopping.
[20]
The RTC of Paraaque issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the scheduled foreclosure sale.
[21]
Subsequently, however, in an Order
[22]
dated September 29, 1997, the
RTC of Paraaque granted Shoemarts motion to dismiss. Spouses Hanopol appealed to the Court the
Appeals which is docketed as CA-G.R. CV 56691.
On May 21, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision
[23]
in CA-G.R. CV No.
45500. It reconsidered its Decision dated November 27, 1996 and affirmed with modification the
judgment of the trial court, setting the amount to be refunded or returned to spouses Hanopol at Seventy
Thousand Seven Hundred Forty-Three Pesos (P70,743.00). On June 15, 1998, Shoemart filed a motion
for reconsideration of the said Amended Decision.
On January 4, 1999, the Court of Appeals reconsidered its Amended Decision of May 21, 1998
and reinstated its Decision of November 27, 1996.
[24]
Spouses Hanopol sought reconsideration of said
Resolution but the appellate court denied the same in its Resolution dated March 9, 1999. Hence, the
petition for review on certiorari subject of G.R. No. 137774.
On December 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 56691,
sustaining the Order of the RTC of Paraaque which dismissed Civil Case No. 97-059 on the grounds
of litis pendentia and forum-shopping.
[25]
Spouses Hanopol sought reconsideration
[26]
but the appellate
court in its Resolution dated May 23, 2001 denied the same.
[27]
Hence, the petition subject of G.R. No.
148185.
Upon motion of spouses Hanopol,
[28]
G.R. Nos. 137774 and 148185 were consolidated.
[29]

In G.R. No. 137774, petitioners spouses Hanopol question the factual findings and conclusions of
law of the Court of Appeals contending that: the appellate court made a serious misapprehension of
facts; such findings are even conflicting and contrary to the findings of the trial court; the findings of
credibility of a witness by the trial court cannot be overturned by the appellate court; the appellate court
gravely erred when it did not consider the doctrine of estoppel against Shoemart on the report of the
commission on accounting, referred to by adversarial counsel as the best evidence; and the appellate
court misappreciated the evidentiary weight of the unsupported open-ended, forged so-called ledger
which cannot overcome the validity and admissibility of primary evidence composed of detailed
statement of account and the official receipts of payment both issued by Shoemart and Sps. Hanopol.
In petitions for review, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of
Appeals is limited to reviewing questions of law which involves no examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.
[30]
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; it
is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Accordingly, findings of fact of the
appellate court are generally conclusive on the Supreme Court.
However, this rule is not without exceptions, to wit: (1) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the finding of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
(10) when the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.
[31]

Petitioners submit that their case fall within the exceptions. A thorough dissection of the records,
the transcripts of stenographic notes and the evidence adduced by each party leads us to the conclusion
the extant evidence could not support a solid conclusion that there was overpayment to Shoemart by
spouses Hanopol. Thus, we find that there is no reason to reverse the factual findings and conclusions of
law of the appellate court.
3

In civil cases, the burden of proof to be established by preponderance of evidence is on the
plaintiff who is the party asserting the affirmative of an issue. He has the burden of presenting evidence
required to obtain a favorable judgment, and he, having the burden of proof, will be defeated if no
evidence were given on either side.
[32]

Petitioners claim overpayment to Shoemart. As such, they had the burden of proof. The
following communications between the parties reveal a different picture of what actually transpired
between them:
(a) Letter dated February 13, 1987 from Cesar S. Valdez, Credit Collection Manager,
informing Beatriz Hanopol that the ten (10) checks she issued were returned unpaid for
insufficient funds and advising her to make payments via Managers Check to improve
her payment record;
[33]

(b) Letter dated March 23, 1987 from Antoinette P. Garcia informing Beatriz Hanopol that
her checks were returned twice for insufficiency of funds and that she should make her
payment via Managers Check;
[34]

(c) Letter dated May 30, 1987 from Antoinette P. Garcia informing Beatriz Hanopol of the
approval of her repayment plan in connection with her past due accounts, and likewise
informing her of the terms and conditions thereof;
[35]

(d) Letter dated September 4, 1987 from Antoinette P. Garcia advising Beatriz Hanopol of
her failure to comply with the terms and conditions of her repayment plan and
demanding that she update her accounts with Shoemart;
[36]

(e) Letter dated December 4, 1987, confirming Manuel Hanopols commitment to submit
to Shoemart a final payment proposal for his total past due obligations as of December
2, 1987.
[37]

(f) Letter dated December 9, 1987 addressed to Cesar Valdez from Atty. Jose Torregoza,
counsel for Manuel Hanopol, advising Shoemart that they will avail of the Banco de
Oro (BDO) loan to pay their accountabilities instead of the repayment plan earlier
proposed;
[38]

(g) Memorandum dated December 14, 1987 from Antoinette Garcia addressed to BDO
Manager Tessie Sy Coson seeking the approval of the BDO loan to be secured
by Beatriz Hanopol to enable her to pay her principal obligation with Shoemart;
[39]

(h) Letter dated February 2, 1988 addressed to Cesar Valdez from Elisa O. Go, Manager of
Retail Banking Unit-Account Management Group, and Violeta V. Luym, Senior Vice-
President of Marketing of Banco de Oro, informing Mr. Valdez that the executive
committee of BDO has approved the proposed loan in favor of the spouses Hanopol;
[40]

(i) Letter dated February 15, 1988 addressed to Wilhelmina Guico, Account Manager of
Shoemart, from Manuel Hanopol requesting for copies of detailed products and items
purchased by their credit cardholders in preparation for the signing of their loan with
Banco de Oro;
[41]

(j) Letter dated February 29, 1988 addressed to Beatriz Hanopol from Cesar Valdez
formalizing the agreement to provide the spouses Hanopol with copies of all charge
invoices covering their principal indebtedness subject to the conditions that the invoices
shall be released only after six (6) to twelve (12) months from the date of the letter and
that spouses will shoulder the cost of retrieving the said invoices, inasmuch as the
documents have long been stored in the warehouses together with the invoices of other
cardholders/principals and the sorting process would require additional personnel;
[42]

(k) Letter dated March 9, 1988 addressed to Cesar Valdez from Manuel Hanopol stating
that he is not denying his responsibility with Shoemart, and explaining that he is
requesting for copies of charge invoices of items purchased by his cardholders for the
purpose of filing a legal action against his delinquent cardholders;
[43]

(l) Letter dated March 25, 1988 addressed to Manuel Hanopol from Cesar Valdez
explaining the discrepancy in the billings to the spouses Hanopol and informing him of
the cost that will be incurred in retrieving the charge invoices which he requested;
[44]

(m) Letter dated June 10, 1988 addressed to Atty. Borcelis from Manuel Hanopol stating
that he needed the charge invoices for the purpose of filing legal action against his
delinquent cardholders;
[45]

(n) Letter dated June 30, 1988 addressed to Atty. Borcelis from Alipio Abrenica, counsel for
the spouses Hanopol, stating that he needed the charge invoices requested to enable him
to know how much worth of goods his cardholders purchased;
[46]

(o) Letter dated October 19, 1988 addressed to Manuel Hanopol from Cesar Valdez asking
the former to acknowledge receipt of all the SM charge invoices which were retrieved
pursuant to his request covering the period from March 15, 1987 up to October 6,
1987;
[47]

(p) Letter dated January 21, 1989 addressed to Atty. Borcelis from Atty. Yadao, counsel for
the spouses Hanopol, informing Shoemart that they are interested in settling the
account, except that the spouses Hanopol are out of town.;
[48]

(q) Letter dated February 16, 1989 addressed to Atty. Borcelis from Atty. Yadao requesting
for more records to support of the total purchases of Mr. Hanopols cardholders, this
time, from December 4, 1985, when the spouses Hanopol became a guarantor of
Shoemart, up to January 15, 1988;
[49]

(r) Letter dated March 20, 1989 addressed to Atty. Borcelis from Atty. Yadao stating that
they did not receive additional records of all purchases made by all their cardholders and
demanding that the excess payments made by Mr. Hanopol be reimbursed, and
demanding further, that all his collaterals be released.
[50]

What is clear from the extant evidence is that in the year 1987 and early part of 1988, it was
petitioner Beatriz T. Hanopol who was the party dealing with Shoemart. She was the one who applied
as guarantor for credit cardholders with Shoemart,
[51]
received the documents relative to the
4

account
[52]
and dealt with the payments of the account.
[53]
Verily, petitioner Beatriz T. Hanopol was the
party most knowledgeable with the credit transactions of her cardholders and her obligations with
Shoemart. Surprisingly, she was never presented as a witness to shed light into her transactions with
Shoemart to bolster petitioners claim against the latter.
Petitioner Manuel R. Hanopol, who was the only witness presented by petitioners, appears to have
become involved personally only after the spouses already had problems settling their obligations. In a
letter dated December 4, 1987 addressed to Manuel R. Hanopol, Antoinette P. Garcia, then Assistant
Credit Manager of Shoemart, had confirmed the commitment of the former to submit a final payment
proposal for total past due obligations.
[54]
Prior thereto, all communications were addressed solely to
petitioner Beatriz T. Hanopol. When petitioner Manuel R. Hanopol started communicating with
Shoemart, the latter never dealt with petitioner Beatriz T. Hanopol nor was anything heard from her
again.
Furthermore, as to the allegation of the petitioners that Shoemart breached the contract when the
latter failed to furnish them with the requisite documents by which their liability may be determined,
namely: charge invoices, purchase booklets and purchase journal, as provided in their contract -- We
have thoroughly perused the contract between the parties and found that nowhere is it stated therein that
Shoemart is obliged to provide spouses Hanopol with charge invoices and purchase booklets. The
contract simply provides for a provision relative to the Statement of Account, which reads:
STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT. A periodic statement of account due from the PRINCIPAL shall be
prepared by SHOEMART which indicates the total amounts due from the PRINCIPAL.
The PRINCIPAL, or his authorized representative, shall pick up the purchase journal of all purchases
made from the 1
st
to the 15
th
day of the month on or before the 25
th
day of the same month, and for
purchases made from the 16
th
to the last day of the month on or before the 10
th
day of the succeeding
month from the office of SHOEMART at 400 C. Palanca Sr. Street, San Miguel, Manila, or at such
other place that may later be designated by SHOEMART.
Unless written exception is made by the PRINCIPAL on the correctness of the Statement of Account
within three (3) days from receipt thereof, the correctness of the Statement of Account shall be
considered conclusive against the principal.
[55]

It is clear from the foregoing provision that spouses Hanopol had three (3) days to question the
correctness of the Statement of Account and their failure to do so would render the Statement
conclusive.
Likewise, a Memorandum dated October 30, 1984 advised all principals, such as petitioners, that
if their cardholders should have any question about a particular charge invoice, the principal should
advise Shoemart within three (3) months after the date of their transaction, otherwise, their queries may
not be satisfied because all invoices will be stored only for three (3) months after which they shall be
disposed of permanently.
Petitioners failed to explain their failure to question or take action regarding any discrepancies in
the Statement of Account they received, doing so only when they had difficulty settling their account
with Shoemart. They never raised their claim of overpayment throughout the entire duration of the
contract.
In fact, in a letter dated March 9, 1988, petitioner Manuel R. Hanopol declared that they are not
denying their liability as guarantor but merely requesting charge invoices for legal action they will take
against delinquent cardholders.
[56]
In subsequent letters, petitioners spouses Hanopol reiterated the
purpose of their request for the charge invoices
[57]
and that they intend to settle their account with
Shoemart.
[58]
Only when informed in the letter dated March 20, 1989
[59]
of the impossibility of retrieving
the charge invoices from December 4, 1985 up to January 15, 1988 (which petitioners had requested in a
letter dated February 16, 1989
[60]
) did petitioners first bring up the issue of overpayment. From the
foregoing sequence of events, it can be fairly inferred that it was only then that petitioner Manuel R.
Hanopol was emboldened to claim overpayment since Shoemart had no documents to refute the
formers claim.
[61]

By their silence and inaction, petitioners are deemed to have admitted the correctness of the
Statement of Account of Shoemart. They are estopped from questioning the veracity of the same and
claim overpayment. Shoemart has in its favor the presumption that acquiescence resulted from a belief
that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact.
[62]

Petitioners should not, after the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of the contract with Shoemart, be
allowed to later disown the arrangement with belated allegations of overpayment when the terms thereof
ultimately would prove to operate against their hopeful expectations.
The principle of estoppel in pais applies wherein when one, by his acts, representations or
admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on
such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
[63]

Contrary to the claim of petitioners, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied to Shoemart with
respect to the Report of the Chairman of the Commission on the accounting aspect which its own
counsel considered as the best evidence. Such statement was taken out of context. The respondents
counsel merely submitted that the Report of the Commission should be read as it is. Indeed, such
declaration must be interpreted together with the contents of the Report itself. The Report simply states
the details of the hearing conducted by the Commission and its failure to reach a conclusion on the
accounting aspect of the case.
[64]

All the foregoing considered, we need not delve further on the proposition of petitioners that the
unsupported open-ended, forged so-called ledger cannot overcome the validity and admissibility of
their primary evidence composed of detailed statement of account and the official receipts of payment
both issued by them and Shoemart.
As the burden of proof fell upon them, petitioners must rely upon the strength of their own
evidence and not upon the weakness of Shoemarts defense.
5

Ultimately, spouses Hanopol failed to rebut two (2) presumptions Shoemart had in its favor, to
wit: (a) that private transactions have been fair and regular, and, (b) that the ordinary course of business
had been followed.
[65]
We opine and so hold that the claim of overpayment was voiced out more as an
afterthought, with no purpose other than to thwart Shoemarts claim against them for payment of their
outstanding account and to forestall the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.
We come now to the matters raised in G.R. No. 148185. Petitioners take exception from the
decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the Order dated September 29, 1997 of the RTC of
Paraaque to dismiss the complaint for injunction with damages on the grounds of litis pendentia and
forum-shopping, ascribing to the appellate court bias and prejudiced attitude and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They contend that Shoemart acted with manifest
bad faith in pursuing with the foreclosure and auction sale of the property of spouses Hanopol, and,
accordingly, should be held liable for damages.
We are not convinced. We find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV 56691 sustaining the Order dated September 29, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque
which dismissed Civil Case No. 97-059 on the ground of litis pendentia and forum shopping.
All the three (3) elements for litis pendentia as a ground for dismissal of an action are present,
namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity, with respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases, in such that any judgment
that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.
[66]

In the case at bench, the parties are the same; the relief sought in the case before the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are the same, that is, to permanently enjoin the foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage executed by spouses Hanopol in favor of Shoemart; and, both are premised on the same
facts. The judgment of the Court of Appeals would constitute a bar to the suit before the trial court.
It has been held that where a litigant sues the same party against whom the same action, or actions,
for the alleged violation of the same right, and the enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending, the
defense of litis pendentia in one case is a bar to the other, and a final judgment in one would
constitute res judicata and thus, would cause the dismissal of the rest.
[67]
Spouses Hanopol may not
simply ignore a prior action and bring a second, independent action on the same set of facts while the
original action is pending.
Inasmuch as the elements of litis pendentia are present, forum shopping exists. Forum shopping is
the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings on the same cause on the supposition that either
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
[68]
A party is not permitted to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two (2) different courts. This is a practice which ridicules the judicial process,
plays havoc with the rules on orderly procedure, and is vexatious and unfair to the other parties to the
case.
[69]

Considering that spouses Hanopol had a pending motion for reconsideration before the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45500 relating to the foreclosure proceedings of the real estate mortgage
executed by the spouses Hanopol in favor of Shoemart, said spouses Hanopol should have raised the
issue of Shoemarts alleged manifest bad faith in pursuing with the foreclosure sale and directed their
motion for an injunctive order in the appellate court which still had jurisdiction over the case and the
subject matter thereof.
Lastly, the allegation of bias and prejudiced attitude on the part of the appellate court is bereft of
proof. Partiality and bad faith cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.
[70]
Thus, the appellate court is presumed to have acted regularly and with impartiality.
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in issuing the Decisions in
CA-G.R. CV Nos. 45500 and 56691.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED. The assailed Decisions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 45500 and 56691 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.














6

G.R. Nos. 109131-33 October 3, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEONITO MACAGALING y ATILLANO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Sancho F. Ferancullo for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J .:
On July 19, 1991, two separate informations were filed against accused-appellant Leonito Macagaling y
Atillano for the crimes of murder and homicide and, on October 29, 1991, for an additional charge
of illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition, which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 1814,
1815 and 1834, respectively, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon.
1

Assisted by counsel de parte, appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 1814
and 1815 on August 28, 1991.
2
Likewise, appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned in Criminal Case
No. 1834 on May 28, 1992.
3
The three cases were thereafter consolidated and jointly tried under
the continuous trial system.
On September 14, 1992, the lower court rendered its decision on the aforesaid three indictments with the
following dispositions:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused LEONITO MACAGALING Y
ATILLANO GUILTY beyondreasonable doubt of the crimes of:
1) Homicide under the Information, dated July 19, 1991, in Criminal Case No. 1814,
and sentences him to an indeterminate prison term of from TEN (10) years and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the
accessory penalties therefor. The accused is ORDERED to pay the heirs of DENNIS
MACAGALING then following amounts:
a) P50,000.00 as indemnity for death and
b) P34,000.00 as actual damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
2) Homicide under the information, dated July 19, 1991, in Criminal Case No. 1815,
and sentences him to an indeterminate prison term of from EIGHT (8) YEARS
AND ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties therefor. The accused is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the
deceased TEOTIMO FAMERONAG the following amounts:
a) P50,000.00 as indemnity for death;
b) P64,000.00 as actual damages; and
c) P350,000.00 by way of lost earnings
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
3) Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition under the Information, dated
October 29, 1991, in Criminal Case No. 1834, and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the costs.
The .38 caliber revolver (Smith and Wesson original without serial number) (Exh.
E); the five (5) empty shells (Exhs. E-1 to E-5); and the live bullet (Exh. E-6) are
confiscated in favor of the government.
After the judgment has become final, the Clerk of Court is ordered to deliver
and deposit the foregoing Exhibits E, E-1 to E-6, inclusive, to the Provincial
Director, PNP, of the Province of Romblon properly receipted. Thereafter, the
receipt must be attached to the record of the case and shall form part of the record.
The period of preventive imprisonment the accused had undergone shall
be credited in his favor to its full extent and the penalties herein imposed shall be
served successively in accordance with Articles 29 and 70, respectively, of the
Revised Penal Code.
4

The prosecution's version of the incident, as culled from the testimony of its witnesses in open court, is
to the effect that in connection with the barangay fiesta of Calabasahan, Concepcion, Romblon, a
coronation ball was held in the evening of May 2, 1991 at the public plaza. Present on said occasion,
among others, were Antonieto Fabella, barangay captain of San Pedro, Concepcion, Romblon; Anita
Macagaling, mother of the deceased Dennis Macagaling;
7

Pfc. Roque Fesalbon, investigator of the local police station; and Roger Lacambra, stepson of Teotimo
Fameronag.
At about 10:00 P.M., the aforesaid Antonieto Fabella, who was also the brother-in-law of Dennis
Macagaling, was watching the festivities when all of a sudden he noticed Leonito Macagaling point and
then fire a gun at his own nephew, Dennis Macagaling. The bullet missed Dennis but wounded Teotimo
Fameronag on the right chest causing the latter to collapse in front of Dennis. Dennis, on his part, tried
to escape from Leonito by running away from the scene.
5

At this juncture, Anita saw that her son Dennis was running in a wobbly manner and she embraced him
to prevent him from falling. Leonito grabbed the hair of Dennis and yanked his head, pulling the latter
away from his mother. Anita pleaded to Leonito saying, "Don't, Leonito," but the latter pointed the gun
at the temple of Dennis and shot him point-blank. Dennis fell down ("sumubasob") on the cement floor.
Leonito then shot the prostrate Dennis three times successively on the neck, uttering the expletive
"Putang ina mo," and then tried to leave the vicinity.
6

At that very moment, Pfc. Roque Fesalbon was at the barangay tanod outpost near the plaza, having
been dispatched by his station commander to maintain peace and order there. Hearing a gunshot, he
immediately went out to investigate and, on his way, he saw Teotimo Fameronag fall down on the floor
of the plaza. He proceeded to the place of the incident and saw Dennis Macagaling lying on the floor
while Leonito Macagaling was holding a firearm. At that time, he had with him his service pistol and he
was also holding an M16 armalite rifle. Sensing that Leonito was about to flee, he fired three warning
shots to prevent him from doing so. Initially, Leonito refused to hand over his gun but he later relented.
Together with Pfc. Sofronio Fabregas, Fesalbon arrested Leonito and took him to the latter's house
which was near the scene of the incident. Fesalbon inspected the gun which he had retrieved from
Leonito and found five empty shells and one live bullet. The serial number of the gun had been erased.
7

Meanwhile, Roger Lacambra, a stepson of Teotimo Fameronag and a member of a dance group, also
heard the gunshots. He noticed that people were screaming and scampering away from the dance hall.
Wanting to know the cause of the commotion, he went near the dance hall and saw Fameronag
staggering towards him. Fameronag fell down on the floor and asked for his help. With the assistance of
his co-dancers, he brought Fameronag to a hospital in Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro and, later, to the
provincial hospital of Calapan where the latter expired.
8

On the other hand, after talking to Leonito Macagaling in the latter's residence, Fesalbon decided to go
back to the crime scene to proceed with the investigation. He verified that Fameronag had one gunshot
would while Dennis was shot four times. He also found out that the motive of the killing might have
been Leonito's suspicion that Dennis was divulging information about the former's participation in
illegal fishing. It appears that Leonito was previously charged with illegal fishing but the case was later
dismissed.
9

According to Anita Macagaling, her family incurred funeral and burial expenses in the sum of
P15,000.00. For their trips to and from Corcuera, they spent P2,000.00 for herself and their witnesses'
transportation, aside from P19,000.00 incurred as litigation expenses.
10
On the other hand, Concepcion
Vda. de Fameronag, testified that she spent P40,000.00 for the burial and the wake of her deceased
husband, and incurred litigation, transportation and other incidental expenses in the sum of
P31,500.00.
11

As was to be anticipated, the defense had a different account of the incident. Rosauro Fabreag, Jr.
testified that between 5:30 to 6:00 P.M. of the same day, he saw Dennis Macagaling, together with
Nonoy Fabellon, Roger Lacambra and two others whose names he does not know, drinking in a store
near his house. Dennis asked him to join them and he accepted the invitation. While they were drinking,
Dennis showed him a gun tucked on his waist. At about 6:00 P.M., after having taken a couple of drinks,
he decided to leave the group which appeared to be very drunk at that time.
12

William Ferrancullo, a barangay tanod of Calabasahan and a relative of appellant, was also called to
testify for the defense. He averred that in the evening of May 2, 1991, he and other barangay officials
were assigned byBarangay Captain Feras to oversee the proceedings and maintain peace and order at the
plaza. At about 9:30 o'clock the evening, he was at the gate and there he noticed a group of five
apparently drunken men enter the dance hall.
13

Later, he decided to go to the barangay tanod outpost located a few meters from the gate. Abruptly, he
heard a gunshot coming from the direction where the intoxicated persons were seated. Rushing towards
that area to investigate, he met Teotimo Fameronag who appeared to have been shot. He saw Fameronag
fall to the floor and it was then that he noticed Dennis Macagaling holding a gun and threatening to
shoot anyone who would come near him. Frightened, he did not move from the spot where he was
standing.
14

While all these things were happening, appellant Leonito Macagaling claims that he was in his residence
at Calabasahan, getting ready to rest for the night. He was startled when he heard a gunshot coming from
the direction of the plaza. Still in his short pants and undershirt, he hurried to the plaza and saw the
group of Dennis Macagaling, Willy Ferrancullo, Willito Bruit, and Carlito Macagaling. He approached
them and when he was about two meters from the group, he became aware of Dennis Macagaling who
was intoxicated and holding a gun. Leonito asked Dennis to drop the gun but the latter retorted, "Isa ka
pa." Without warning, Dennis fired at him but missed. Leonito dashed towards Dennis and tried to
wrestle the gun away from him. A struggle for the firearm ensued and they grappled for it on the floor.
While they were thus wrestling for the gun, it went off and hit Dennis. Leonito then stood up, went
home, and informed his wife of what had just happened.
15

Leonito's wife, after observing that he had some bruises, proceeded to clean them. Shortly thereafter,
policemen Roque Fesalbon and Sofronio Fabregas, together with Ferrancullo, arrived and inquired if the
gun was his. He denied ownership of the firearm. Informed by them that Dennis was dead, Leonito said
it was not his fault. The policemen then left.
16

Fesalbon, Fabregas and Ferrancullo thereafter went back to the crime scene and decided to bring
Fameronag, then still alive, to Pinamalayan for treatment. There being no doctor then available in
8

the barangay, the body of Dennis Macagaling was examined by a rural health midwife, Avemie F.
Fabroa, who submitted her medical findings.
17

Queried as to what might have motivated the deceased Dennis Macagaling to harbor any ill feelings
against him, Leonito recounted an incident that took place in October, 1990 when he slapped Diomedes,
the younger brother of Dennis Macagaling. It appears that Leonito and Diomedes had a previous
agreement that the latter would work in the former's fishing operations. Due to Diomedes' commitment
to work for him, Leonito advanced him some money but, much to his dismay, Diomedes decided to join
another group. Leonito waited for Diomedes along the shore to demand an explanation. An argument
ensued and Leonito slapped Diomedes when the latter cursed him. Having learned of the slapping
incident ten days later, Dennis confronted Leonito. There was a heated exchange of words between
them, with Dennis later warning him, "You watch out."
18

Seeking to discredit Pfc. Fesalbon's testimony, Leonito told the court that Fesalbon had reason to hate
him. He claimed that in 1976, due to an incident in a dance hall at Sampong, Calabasahan, he filed an
administrative case against Fesalbon, Luvizmindo Fabroa and Sofronio Fabregas before the National
Police Commission. In retaliation, Fesalbon filed a criminal case for less serious physical injuries
against him. However, both cases were dismissed after they decided to settle the matter among
themselves.
19
Appellant opined that
Pfc. Fesalbon continued to hold a grudge against him.
1. In a long line of cases, it has been held that where the accused admits the killing of the victim but
invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed
acted in legitimate defense of himself.
20
As the burden of proof is shifted to him, he must consequently
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.
Accordingly, the proverbial bone of contention with respect to a killing under such circumstances, is
whether or not the accused has presented sufficient evidence to support him claim of self-defense.
21

A careful analysis of appellant's version and a thorough evaluation of the evidence presented by the
parties fail to persuade this Court to rule in appellant's favor.
For one, Leonito's version of the incident appears to be too good to be true. Leonito was confronted by
an armed Dennis Macagaling who apparently was prepared to shoot him. In addition, he and Dennis did
not exactly part as good friends when they last saw each other. In fact, the latter had threatened him to
"watch out." Despite all these, Leonito is supposed to have nonchalantly directed Dennis to hand over
his gun. Not heeding his order, Dennis fired at him, whereupon Leonito heroically rushed towards
Dennis and tried to wrestle the gun away from him, seemingly unconcerned for his safety. And then,
after Dennis was shot "accidentally" while they were wrestling for the gun, Leonito just calmly got up
and went home, as if nothing had happened.
If, as Leonito asserted, he had tried to get Dennis to hand over the gun because he was even concerned
that an innocent bystander might be hurt, it baffles the Court why he did not immediately rush his own
nephew Dennis to the hospital for medical care and attention when the latter was shot. It is a most
unusual reaction for one who had accidentally shot another to just leave the vicinity with the victim
unattended to or without even making arrangements for his care. Furthermore, as will hereafter be
discussed, the number of wounds sustained by the victim completely demolishes this theory of
accidental shooting.
Principal defense witness William Ferrancullo, who was presented in court obviously to corroborate the
version of appellant, miserably failed to do so. He is one witness the defense could have done without,
for this star witness could not seem to get his story straight, conveniently changing his testimony to suit
his purpose at the particular moment, without taking into consideration the statements he had previously
made, some instances of which we shall illustrate.
For example, Ferrancullo earlier testified that when he was asked by
Pfc. Roque Fesalbon as to who started the trouble, he pointed to Leonito Macagaling as the
culprit.
22
Later, however, he insisted that he did not inform the policemen as to what he knew, giving
the flimsy reason that "there was no chance for us to talk."
23
How he could justify that excuse is beyond
comprehension since he himself asserted that he was all the while with the policemen when they went to
appellant's residence after the shooting and he also tagged along when they went back to the scene of the
crime where they conducted further investigations.
Evidently, Ferrancullo had definite knowledge that Leonito was a suspect in these cases. His statements,
however, would show that he does not have the uncanny knack for lying and getting away with it. In an
earlier testimony, he said it was only on July 2 or 5, 1992, when so informed by the wife of Leonito, that
he came to know that Leonito was a suspect in the cases.
24
Yet, he subsequently admitted that as early
as June, 1992, he had visited Leonito at
the provincial jail where the latter was detained because of the killings in question.
25

The trial court, posing clarificatory questions, asked Ferrancullo about the persons to whom he had
confided what he knew about the case. He said he first narrated the incident to his mother who lives in
the mountains of San Pedro on the morning of May 3, 1991.
26
Pressed further by the court, he amended
that by saying that he had informed his wife thereof after he left the dance hall of that fateful night. He
also told Atty. Ferrancullo about the incident in November, 1991 and, naturally, when he testified in
court. Asked if he told any other person, he said there was none. Later, he claimed that he also told
Leonito's wife.
27

The court, not satisfied with the answers it was getting from the witness, inquired why Ferrancullo,
being abarangay tanod, did not tell the barangay captain who had assigned him at the plaza as to what
he knew. This time, Ferrancullo suddenly recalled that, from Leonito's house, he did in fact go to
the barangay captain's house purposely to inform the latter of the incident.
28

Ferrancullo's propensity for prevarication is further demonstrated by his varying accounts as to the
wounds sustained by the victim. First, he asserted that while Leonito and Dennis were grappling for the
gun, he heard only two shots
29
which meant that Dennis could have sustained only two gunshot wounds
at the most. Thereafter, he said that he was sure that the victim sustained one shot on the head and three
9

on the neck, having been present when the photographs of the cadaver of Dennis was taken. Later, he
changed his mind, stating that the victim suffered only one wound on the neck and one of the
head.
30

This brings us to the matter of the number of wounds sustained by the victim, which physical evidence
is vital since it could lend credence to appellant's claim of self-defense. However, as earlier stated,
appellant's version and concomitant claim of self-defense is belied and negated precisely by the number
of wounds sustained by the deceased and the location thereof. Appellant maintains that while both he
and Dennis were struggling for control of the gun, the same accidentally fired, hitting the latter. If
indeed the firing of the gun was merely accidental and it fired only once, it would be impossible for
Dennis to sustain four gunshot wounds, one in the temple and three in the neck.
31
Furthermore, the
number of wounds indicate that the act was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined effort to
kill the victim.
32
Such wounds are indicative of aggression and confirm the theory of the prosecution
that appellant assaulted the deceased.
33

Considering the grave contradictions in Ferrancullo's testimony on issues of serious importance, this
Court agrees with the court a quo which, after chronicling twelve instances undermining the credibility
of said witness, trenchantly concluded that "the principal witness of the defense, William Ferrancullo,
did not see the incident that evening or if he did, he narrated it differently."
34

In his brief, appellant makes an issue of the fact that although Antonieto Fabella categorically testified in
court that it was Leonito Macagaling who shot and killed Dennis Macagaling, he did not mention their
specific names in his affidavit. This argument is misleading and specious, to say the least. A careful
perusal of said affidavit shows that when asked to narrate what happened, Fabella indeed did not refer to
the parties involved by their given names. However, immediately after said narration, he was asked
whether he knew their names and he answered in the affirmative, giving their first and family names.
35

Appellant, in his desperate bid for acquittal, even questions the fact that the lower court, instead of
granting his own counsel's motion for a postponement, appointed Atty. Cesar M. Madrona of the Public
Attorney's Office as counsel de oficio. Appellant asserts that, in doing so, the trial court deprived him of
his constitutional right to be represented by a counsel of his choice. We reject this pretension.
The records show that appellant was given the right to choose his own counsel. However, the court in its
desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system made appropriate
arrangements to avoid unnecessary delay and postponements of the trial in case of the absence of
appellant's counsel de parte. Thus, in its December 12, 1991 order, the trial court set out the specific
dates for the presentation of the prosecution witnesses, noting that the prosecution witnesses were all
from the far-flung island municipality of Concepcion in Maestre de Campo Island, Romblon, which is
about seven hours away by boat. It also advised appellant of the availability of Atty. Madrona as
counsel de oficio any time Atty. Sancho Ferancullo was not available. Appellant was properly
forewarned that any legal maneuvers meant to unduly delay these cases wound not be entertained by the
court.
Furthermore, after the presentation of the prosecution witnesses,
Atty. Ferancullo took over the conduct of the defense of appellant. Thus, in all stages of the trial, his
own counsel was in charge except when the prosecution witnesses were testifying. The Court, after a
review of the records, agrees with the Solicitor General's position that "with the demonstrated strength
of the prosecution evidence, it is unlikely that Atty. Ferancullo's presence during the entire proceedings
would have materially affected the result of the cases."
36

Appellant would discredit the prosecution witnesses by adverting to the fact that, except for Pfc. Roque
Fesalbon, they are all very close relatives of the victims.
37
A witness' relation to the victim does not
necessarily mean that he is biased. There is absolutely nothing in our laws to disqualify a person from
testifying in a criminal case in which said person's relative is involved, if the former was really at the
scene of the crime and was a witness to the execution of the criminal act. Precisely, being blood relatives
of the deceased, these witnesses would not just indiscriminately impute the crime to anybody but would
necessarily identify and seek the conviction of the real culprit himself to obtain justice for the death of
their relative.
Still bent on assailing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, appellant cites alleged inconsistencies
in their testimonies. Firstly, Antonieto Fabella had testified that when he heard the first gunshot, Leonito
was inside the dance hall of the barangay plaza.
38
On the other hand, appellant claims that Roger
Lacambra testified that he saw Leonito on the street at that time. This is, of course, not an inconsistency
on the part of Fabella since the supposed variant version was made by a different witness, Lacambra.
Just to satisfy appellant, however, we have verified from the transcripts that what Lacambra said was
that he saw Leonito on the street before the first shot was fired, to wit:
Q: If you heard the first shot while you were on your way, you
did not see Leonito before the first shot, am I correct?
A: I saw him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Where was Leonito?
A: He was in the street.
39

A second flaw, according to appellant, is the fact that Fabella testified that he heard Fesalbon fire two
warning shots,
40
whereas Fesalbon declared that he fired three times.
41
This is clearly an insignificant
and minor detail which would not affect the credibility of the witnesses' testimonies. As long as the
witnesses concur on the material points, slight differences in their remembrance of the details do not
reflect on the essential veracity of their statements,
42
more so where the trivial issue is the number of
shots one hears from rapid gunfire.
10

Thirdly, appellant insists that Fabella testified that when appellant was running away from the crime
scene after the incident, Fesalbon and Fabregas blocked his path while Fesalbon stated that he was alone
when he approached the suspect. However, nowhere in his testimony did Fesalbon state that he alone
blocked the path of Leonito. In fact, when queried as to what he did
with appellant after he got the gun from him, Fesalbon answered, "We arrested him,"
43
thereby
affirming the fact that he was not alone at that time but that Fabregas was working in concert with him.
On the charge of homicide for the killing of Teotimo Fameronag, appellant did not offer any defense.
When Ferrancullo was asked if he knew who killed Fameronag, he said he did not know.
44
Neither did
appellant offer any explanation on the death of Fameronag despite the positive statements of the
prosecution witnesses that while trying to shoot Dennis, appellant instead hit Fameronag. The only
defense, then, of appellant for the death of Fameronag is a complete denial. Denial, like alibi, is
inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution
witnesses that the accused committed the crime,
45
especially where, as in these cases, such denial is
unexplained and is contradicted by eyewitnesses.
For the death of Dennis Macagaling, although the information in Criminal Case No. 1814 charges the
felony of murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by evident premeditation, the People's evidence
does not prove the attendance of these circumstances. They cannot, therefore, be appreciated against
appellant and the lower court correctly convicted him of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1814.
For the killing of Teotimo Fameronag, the same cannot be said to be accidental as it was the result of
an aberratio ictus, or miscarriage of the blow. As a matter of law, since such death resulted from a
culpable aberratio ictus, appellant should be punished under Article 48, in relation to Article 4, of the
Revised Penal Code. Having committed attempted homicide as against Dennis Macagaling and
consummated homicide with respect to Teotimo Fameronag when he fired the first shot, appellant
committed two grave felonies with one single act and, accordingly, he would be liable for a complex
crime in the nature of a delito compuesto, or a compound crime.
46
However, not having been so charged,
he cannot be convicted of a complex crime,
47
hence the court below did not err in finding him guilty of
simple homicide in Criminal Case No. 1815.
2. The charge of illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition merits a more extended consideration. It
will be recalled that this third accusation was filed as Criminal Case No. 1834 on October 29, 1991, or
more than three months after the filing of the first two indictments in the same court, under an
information which alleged that during the same incident involved in Criminal Case Nos. 1814 and 1815

. . . the said accused, did then and there, without legal authority therefor, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control
one Cal. 38 Revolver (Smith and Wesson without serial number) with one live bullet
and five empty shells which he used in shooting Dennis Macagaling and Teotimo
Fameronag.
48

Prefatorily, we note from appellant's brief his position that the lower court erred in holding that the gun
was owned by him without being supported by convincing proof. He asserts that
assuming arguendo that the gun was handed by him to Pfc. Fesalbon immediately after the former
arrived at the scene of the crime, this is not sufficient proof that he owned the gun.
49
Appellant's theory
is off-tangent.
Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the gravamen of the offense is basically the fact of
possession of a firearm without a license, it being assumed that it was so possessed with animus
possidendi. We have heretofore explained that, in view of the text of said decree, the crime may be
denominated as simple illegal possession, to distinguish it from the aggravated form wherein such
firearm is used in the commission of a homicide or murder.
50
However, to be liable for the aggravated
form of illegal possession of a firearm which entails the capital punishment, such illegal possession must
be the specific and principal offense charged, with the fact of killing being included in the particulars of
the indictment.
51

In either case, the offense is committed not on the basis of ownership but of possession of the firearm
without the requisite license or permit, and this disposes of appellant's objection on this score. What,
however, is of greater concern to the Court is whether the prosecution has discharged the burden of
proof on this charge. Corollarily, the inquiry should be whether there was sufficient identification of the
firearm presented in the trial court and, more importantly, whether there was sufficient evidence to
establish the negative allegation that appellant possessed the gun "without legal authority therefor."
On the identification of the gun, these exchanges in the courtroom during the cross-examination of Pfc.
Fesalbon, the lone prosecution witness on this issue, give us ground to pause and doubt:
Q You also stated that this was the gun you got from Leonito
Macagaling that evening of May 2?
A Yes sir, that is the gun.
Q How did you know that this is the gun?
A Because it was really the gun I took from him.
Q How do you know that this is really the gun?
A Because at the bottom of the bat (sic, should be butt) there
is a serial number and it was erased by grinding and the serial
number was erased.
11

Q When did you discover that the serial number here was
erased?
A Immediately after my inspection I discovered that there is
no serial number.
Q When did you make your inspection?
A Immediately after his arrest.
xxx xxx xxx
Q But there were many guns like this whose serial number
has been erased, do you think serial number
A I don't know, that is the only gun I saw with erased serial
number, even paltik guns have serial numbers.
Q So that is the only distinguishing mark that you can tell us
how you recognized this gun to be the gun which you took from
Leonito Macagaling that evening?
A Not only that serial number but the whole body of the gun.
COURT:
Did you not place your own personal identification mark in
Exhibit E?
A My personal identification is that I could identify paltik
and those genuine guns.
COURT:
You did not answer the question, answer the question.
A I did not put any distinguishing mark.
COURT:
That should be answered that way. That can be answered by yes or no. Next tine
again you should place again your own identification in guns and even ammos. (I)n
Exhibits E-1 to E-6, did you place your own identification mark in each of them?
A No, sir.
COURT:
Next time you place your own mark. Because from apprehension up to this very
moment, it is a long, long time, it crossed the very handle (sic) by many hands.
Proceed.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. MADRONA:
Q What I mean with general appearance li(k)e this gun,
would you agree with me that there are thousands of (S)mith and
(W)esson guns with the general appearance like this?
A Yes, sir.
52

It is a curious fact that although the incident took place on May 2, 1991, the information in Criminal
Case No. 1834 for illegal possession of the gun was filed only on October 29, 1991. Pfc. Fesalbon
testified thereon on May 29, 1992 and yet, although the firearm was in the possession of the police for
more than a year, there was no attempt to ensure its positive identification through standard police
procedure of which Pfc. Fesalbon, as a police investigator, could not have been unaware.
For that matter, the efforts exerted to obtain evidence proving that appellant was not a licensed holder of
the firearm was lackadaisical at best. This is the prosecution's only evidence to prove the allegation in
the information that appellant's possession of a firearm was "without legal authority therefor," again
through the bare testimony of Pfc. Fesalbon:
Q You made mention that you conducted an investigation
after taking Exhibit D (sic, should be E) from the accused, did
you find out whether that gun is licensed or not?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you find out?
12

A I found out that the gun has no license.
Q Do you mean to tell this Honorable Court that the accused
Leonito Macagaling is not a firearm licensee of your town?
A Yes, sir.
53

This is all. Nor did the witness deign to explain how he arrived at his conclusion. No other evidence was
presented on this serious charge which, in its aggravated form could, at the least, be punished
by reclusion perpetua due to the proscription against the death penalty.* Yet, despite the opportunity
and intervening time to do so, not even a certification that appellant was not a licensed firearm holder
was obtained from the Firearms and Explosives Office or the local command of the Philippine National
Police. And this brings us to the question of the necessity and the quantum of evidence for proving a
negative allegation in an information, in this case the lack of a firearms license or permit.
The evidentiary rule on negative averments in the 1940 Rules of Court
54
as adopted in the 1964 Rules
of Court
55
in criminal cases was as follows:
Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal case. In criminal cases the burden of proof as
to the offense charged lies on the prosecution. A negative fact alleged by the
prosecution need not be provedunless it is an essential ingredient of the offense
charged. (Emphasis ours.)
While the italicized portion was not carried over to the revised Rules on evidence, there is no reason to
believe that such requirement for proof of a negative element of the offense charged has been dispensed
with, since it is specifically provided therein that the "(b)urden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law."
56

As applied to prosecutions for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, the present rule on
proving the negative fact of lack of a license actually harks back to the case of People vs.
Quebral,
57
where we find this passage clarifying the seemingly contentious pronouncements on the
matter:
The rule is, and has always been, that, if the subject of the negative averment, like,
for instance, the act of voting without the qualifications provided by law, inheres in
the offense as an essential ingredient thereof, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the same (Sec. 297, Act No. 190; U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303, 306, 307). In
view, however, of the difficult office of proving a negative allegation, the
prosecution, under such circumstance, need do no more than make a prima
facie case from the best evidence obtainable. (U.S. vs. Tria, supra) It would
certainly be anomalous to hold ". . . that mere difficulty in discharging a burden of
making proof should displace it; and as a matter of principle the difficulty only
relieves the party having the burden of evidence from the necessity of creating
positive conviction entirely by his own evidence so that, when he produces such
evidence as it is in his power to produce, its probative effect is enhanced by the
silence of his opponent" (22 C.J., pp. 81, 82).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 770 of the Administrative Code provides that "no person shall practice
medicine in the Philippine Islands without having previously obtained the proper
certificate of registration issued by the Board of Medical Examiners. . ." This
provision clearly includes the want of certificate as an essential element of the
offense charged. The negative fact is not separable from the offense as defined. It is,
therefore, incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that negative fact, and failure to
prove it is a ground for acquittal. (Emphasis in the original text.)
While the offenses involved or discussed therein were illegal practice of medicine without the certificate
of registration and the unlawful act of voting without the qualifications required by law, the rationale
evidently applies to illegal possession of firearms without a license. Thus, although there were some
supervening departures from the doctrine announced therein, the principle in Quebral was adopted
in People vs. Pajenado
58
where we held:
Upon the question of whether or not appellant should also be convicted of the crime
of illegal possession of a firearm, We agree with both appellant's counsel and the
Solicitor General that the appealed decision should be reversed.
It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758
could be invoked to support the view that it is incumbent upon a person charged
with illegal possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a license to
possess the firearm, but We are of the considered opinion that under the provisions
of Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provide that in criminal cases the
burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative
fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the
offense charged", the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove
that the firearm used by appellant in committing the offense was not properly
licensed.
It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of
the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant
. . . specifically alleged that he had no "license or permit to possess" the .45 caliber
pistol mentioned therein. Thus, is seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not
merely to allege that negative fact but to prove it. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
13

This doctrinal rule was reiterated in People vs. Tiozon,
59
People vs. Caling, supra, People vs. Ramos, et
al.,
60
People vs. Arce,
61
and People vs. Deunida,
62
and this constitutes the present governing case law
on this question. We cannot see how the rule can be otherwise since it is the inescapable duty of the
prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offense as alleged against the accused in an information,
which allegations must perforce include any negative element provided by the law to integrate that
offense. We have reiterated quite recently the fundamental mandate that since the prosecution must
allege all the elements of the offense charged, then it must prove by the requisite quantum of evidence
all the elements it has thus alleged.
63

Applied to the cases at bar, we cannot conceive of how, under the demonstrated circumstances herein,
we can sustain a judgment of conviction on this particular charge. It may be well to recall that how the
firearm came into appellant's possession is a seriously contested issue, with the prosecution witnesses
merely stating that they saw the gun only when appellant aimed and fired at the victims, but with
appellant contending that he actually wrested it from Dennis Macagaling. As to who in truth was the
possessor of the firearm prior to the incident cannot be determined with certitude due to the paucity of
the evidence thereon. In fine, since all that can be deduced is that appellant was in possession of the gun
only on that occasion for a transitory purpose and for the short moment coeval therewith, it cannot be
concluded that he had the animus possidendi which is required for the offense charged.
The highly unsatisfactory identification of the gun, coupled with the intervening time between its
retrieval from appellant to its presentation in the court below, increases our misgivings on whether it
was in fact the weapon involved. Indeed, such lack of positive identification is virtually equivalent to the
non-production of the real firearm in court and is analogous to the situation in People vs. Caling, supra,
where the rifle allegedly involved in the case was not presented in evidence. We held that such failure
effectively closed the door to any proof of the negative fact that no license or permit therefor had been
issued to the accused therein.
The foregoing disquisitions in Quebral, Pajenado and other cited cases have inevitably clinched the case
for herein appellant on this accusation, this time by reason of the abject failure of the prosecution to
adduce the requisite evidence on its negative averment. Even on the assumption that mere prima
facie evidence of the lack of a license or permit on the part of appellant would suffice, still the self-
serving, unexplained and undocumented conclusion thereon of Pfc. Roque Fesalbon could not even
assume a rough approximation of that evidential quantum.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court finding accused-appellant Leonito Macagaling y Atillano
guilty of the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1814 and also of homicide in Criminal Case No.
1815 is hereby AFFIRMED. However, its judgment in Criminal Case No. 1834 for illegal possession of
a firearm and ammunition is REVERSED and said accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the
offense charged therein on reasonable doubt, with costsde oficio.
SO ORDERED.





















14

G.R. No. 97612 March 23, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO AMANIA and GAUDENCIO GUEVARRA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Antonio S. Ramos-Uypitching, Sr. for G. Guevarra.
Public Attorney's Office for E. Amania.

REGALADO, J .:
Accused-appellants Eduardo Amania and Gaudencio Guevarra were charged before Branch XXXIV of
the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City with the crime of robbery with double homicide in an
information filed in Criminal Case No. 7942 which alleges:
That on or about July 14, 1987, at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less,
at Sitio Talustos, Barangay Amio, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and intent to kill,
waylay and ambush, assault, attack and use physical violence upon PRIMO
OMANGAY and MACARIO OMANGAY, with the use of bolos with which they
were armed and provided, thus inflicting multiple injuries on vital parts of (the)
victims' bodies, which injuries caused the victims' deathsometime thereafter; and in
pursuance of their criminal design, after having used violence against persons, the
above-named accused, with intent (to) gain and without the consent of the afore-
named victims, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away from the person of PRIMO OMANGAY the amount of SEVEN
HUNDRED PESOS (P700.00), Philippine currency, in a plastic container and
placed inside (the) victim's pocket, and one-half (1/2) sack of corn grits; and from
MACARIO OMANGAY, another one-half (1/2) sack of corn grits, the corn grits
having a total value of TWO HUNDRED NINETY PESOS (P290.00), to the
damage and prejudice of said victims in the aforestated amounts.
1

Appellants, duly assisted by counsel, both pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After trial, the lower court
found them both guilty as charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
return to the heirs of the victims the sum of P700.00 and one sack of corn grits, or to pay the amount of
P350.00 representing the value of the latter item; and to respectively indemnify the heirs of Primo
Omangay and Macario Omangay in the sum of P30,000.00 for each of said victims.
2

Hence, this appellate review, appellant Amania contending that the trial court gravely erred in
disregarding appellant's claim of self-defense and convicting him of robbery with double homicide
instead of simple homicide, "granting without admitting that he is guilty."
3
Appellant Guevarra, who
appealed as a pauper-litigant, was unable to file his brief allegedly because of his failure to secure the
complete transcripts of stenographic notes, free of charge. Accordingly, he manifested his desire to
adopt his co-appellant Amania's brief.
4

The People's version of the case, which has been correctly summarized by the trial court, is reproduced
hereunder:
The theory of the prosecution as testified to mainly by Arsenia Omangay and Isidra
Omangay is that at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 14, 1987 while they,
Arsenia and Isidra Omangay, together with Leonides Omangay and victims Primo
Omangay and Macario Omangay werenegotiating (walking in a single file) a small
trail at Sitio Talustos, Barangay Amio, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, accused
Eduardo Amania, sitting on a stone at the left side of the trail suddenly stabbed with
his bolo victim Primo Omangay. Immediately after he fell down, co-accused
Gaudencio Guevarra, who was standing at the right side of the trail, suddenly
hacked several times and beheaded victim Macario Omangay. After killing the two
victims, Amania carried away the half sack (of) corn grits earlier carried by Primo
while Gaudencio Guevarra got the P700.00 which was wrapped in plastic and placed
inside the pocket of Primo and also carried away the other half sack of corn grits
earlier carried by Macario Omangay. Upon seeing Primo who was the husband of
Arsenia and father of the other Omangays, and Macario, the son of Primo and
Arsenia, killed, Arsenia, Isidra and Leonides fled as the two accused also attempted
to assault them as in fact they chased them, though for a short distance. The two
accused then carried away the two victims' load and left.
5

On the other hand, appellant Eduardo Amania's version, as condensed in his brief, is of the following
tenor:
On July 14, 1987 at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant Eduardo
Amania was on his way home after spear-fishing at the Talustos river, (in) Barangay
Amio, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental. Primo Omangay was on his way home
together with his son Macario, wife Arsenia and a daughter. Primo inquired from
accused-appellant if he have (sic) plenty of catch and the latter answered he had no
15

catch. Primo and Macario were not carrying any bundles while Arsenia and her
daughter carried plastic bags. Macario Omangay cut a fruit-bearing banana tree
growing by the roadside within Gaudencio Guevarra's property, thus prompting
Primo to invite Amania to their house to eat the bananas gathered by his son.
Meanwhile, Guevarra who was gathering firewood within his farmland, heard the
sound of a falling banana tree. He rushed to the site and admonished Macario
saying: "So you are the one cutting down my bananas." Macario, holding his bolo
used in cutting down the banana tree, rushed towards Guevarra and stabbed the
latter. Guevarra dropped his bundle of firewood and fled, pursued by Macario.
Arsenia and her daughter ran home. Primo told Amania to chase Guevarra. Primo
became angry and boxed Amania on the chest when the latter refused to follow his
order. As a result, Amania stabbed Primo once on the left abdomen. Amania ran
away and proceeded to surrender to Noe Romero, barangay captain of Barangay
Marsogomayon, Sta. Catalina.
6

Appellant Gaudencio Guevarra testified that at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 14, 1987 he
was bundling firewood in his farm when he heard a banana tree fall, prompting him to investigate. He
saw Macario Omangay, who at that time was with his father Primo, his mother Arsenia, his sister Isidra
and Eduardo Amania, cut down his banana tree. He admonished Macario for cutting down his banana
tree without permission and the latter retorted, "Who are you to admonish here?", and immediately
rushed towards him. Gaudencio ran away and was chased by Macario who was carrying a bolo. When
Gaudencio reached the river, he slipped and was able to lean on a rock. Macario tried to hack him thrice
but he was able to evade the blows. Fearing for his life, Gaudencio successively hacked Macario. He
immediately left Macario, who was still breathing at that time, and ran to the house of Noe Romero, the
barangay captain, to surrender.
7

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, the Court would like to reiterate some elementary but
fundamental principles which are material hereto but which have apparently been overlooked. The
decision rendered by the trial court convicted both appellants of robbery with double homicide. Time
and again, this Court has held that there is no crime of robbery with double homicide. The term
"homicide" in paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is to be understood in its generic
sense.
8
The juridical concept of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide does not limit the
taking of human life to one single victim.
9
In this special complex crime, the homicides or murders and
the physical injuries, irrespective of their number, committed on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery are merged in the single composite crime of robbery with homicide.
10
Therefore, the crime in
this case should have been properly denominated as robbery with homicide.
Again, in criminal cases the burden of proof is generally on the prosecution. The prosecution must rely
on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. Herein appellants have raised
self-defense, thereby shifting the burden of evidence to them and the onus of which they must
satisfactorily discharge, otherwise conviction would follow from their admission that they killed the
victim.
11
Further, appellants must this time rely on the strength of their own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if that were weak, it cannot be disbelieved after appellants
themselves admitted the killing.
12

Still on the basics, paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the requisites of self-
defense are unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. For self-defense to prosper, it
must be positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the life
of the accused in danger and forced him to inflict more or less severe wounds upon his assailant,
employing therefor reasonable means to resist said attack.
13

Hence, the twin issues to be resolved in the case at bar are whether or not appellants acted in complete
self-defense in respectively killing Primo Omangay and Macario Omangay, as they claim, thus
absolving both of them from criminal liability; and, in the negative, what crime was actually committed
by herein appellants.
Essentially involved, in view of the conflicting submissions of the prosecution and the defense, is the
matter of the credibility of their respective theories. While it is the rule, so well-settled as to warrant
dispensing with any citation of authorities, that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is generally
within the province of the trial court which is better circumstanced because of its direct role in the
reception of the testimonial evidence, a thorough review of the evidence in the case, particularly the
testimonies reflected in the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken at the trial, persuades us that there
are certain aspects in the respective versions of the contending parties which do not justify our
acceptance thereof in toto. In fine, what actually happened in the criminal offenses charged here is
somewhat deducible from the evidence for both sides, and the truth appears to be somewhere in the
middle under a situation contemplated in the so-called dictum of veritas in medio stat.
The Court is not inclined to fully accept the thesis of the People in light of some conflicts in the
testimonies of its principal witnesses Arsenia and Isidra Omangay, both members of the immediate
family of the victims, and by reason of the absence of competent evidence to establish the elements and
commission of one of the component felonies for the special complex crime imputed to appellants.
For instance, when Arsenia Omangay was queried on cross-examination as to where appellants were
situated shortly prior to the homicidal attack, she declared that she saw appellant Amania quietly sitting
on a big stone on the side of the pathway on which the victims and their family were walking, while
appellant Guevarra was standing on the other side of that path.
14
On the other hand, Isidra declared that
both appellants were gathering firewood at that time, which declaration she later corrected to mean that
they were chopping wood while sitting on different stones.
15

Again, although both the defense and the prosecution apparently failed to discern the same and raised no
issue thereon, another contradiction surfaces from the testimonies of Arsenia and Isidra with respect to
the alleged relative positions of the victims and their family members accompanying them at the time of
the commission of the killing. Arsenia narrated that when the assault took place, they were all walking,
in single file, on an inclined pathway in this order Isidra walking ahead, followed by Leonides,
16

Arsenia, Primo and then Macario. When the victims were attacked by appellants,
16
the others ran
forward in the direction going uphill.
17

Contrarily, Isidra avowed that although they were indeed walking in single file, at the time of the
incident they were proceeding in the following
order Primo being in the lead, followed by Macario, Isidra, Leonides and Arsenia.
18
Thereafter,
Isidra admitted that she, her mother Arsenia and sister Leonides ran away and "had taken a complete
about face and taken a direction opposite to the direction when (they) were proceeding home,"
19
that is,
this time by going downhill.
While the foregoing observations do not suffice to completely discredit said witnesses, they do cast
serious doubts on the prosecution's position on the mode of commission adopted by appellants in the
killings although said crimes were admitted by them, and also on the matter of the alleged robbery.
While the Court is inclined to be lenient in its appreciation of the testimonies of said witnesses who are
unschooled and simple country folk, nevertheless their conflicting testimonies reveal, if they are
reflective of anything at all, that their powers of recollection and capacity to narrate the details of what
they supposedly observed are to be evaluated with caution.
Thus, since the apparent thrust of the submission of the prosecution which is sought to be established by
the declaration of said witnesses is that the killings were attended by treachery in view of the alleged
sudden and unexpected attack launched by appellants, we are not persuaded to accept the same as gospel
truth. At any rate, not having been alleged in the information, treachery cannot be considered as a
qualifying circumstance in the deaths of the two victims, and neither can it be considered as an
aggravating circumstance for lack of evidence that the supposed treacherous mode of commission was
deliberately adopted by appellants to specially ensure their commission of the crimes with impunity.
Aside from the foregoing flaws in the prosecution's evidence as to how the victims were killed, that
deficiency is more pronounced with respect to the charge of robbery which is the principal felony with
which the homicides are sought to be complexed. On this point, the settled doctrine is that to integrate
the component felonies of this complex crime, the killing must have been directly connected with the
robbery. It is necessary that there must have been an intent on the part of the offenders to commit
robbery from the outset and, on the occasion or by reason thereof, a killing takes place.
20
The original
design must have been robbery and the homicide, even if it precedes or is subsequent to the robbery,
must have a direct relation or was committed with a view to consummate the robbery,
21
and not where
the taking of the property was only an afterthought which arose subsequent to the killing.
22
The records
of this case do not yield the requisite quantum of evidence on the aforesaid requisite which would
produce the special complex crime charged. In fact, we have reason to believe that the incident was
unpremeditated for when appellant Amania went to surrender to the barangay captain thirty minutes
thereafter, he was half-naked since he had just come from spear-fishing in the river and had merely
proceeded thereafter to the scene of the crime.
23

The prosecution having thus failed to demonstrate the commission of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, the inquiry then is whether or not the defense has, on its part, proved that
appellants can be absolved of the homicidal acts committed by them under their invocation of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. The records of the case give us a negative answer.
Appellant Amania narrated the events which led to the death of Primo Omangay in this wise:
Q When Gaudencio Guevarra r(a)n away chased by Macario
Omangay, what did you do?
A (O)n my part, I was told by the father of Macario Omangay to
run also after Gaudencio since I did not take part in cutting the
banana tree.
Q When you ma(d)e that reply, what did Primo Omangay do, if
any?
A Because I did not help chasing, he boxed me.
Q Who boxed you?
A Primo Omangay.
Q Where were you hit?
A I was hit here, (the witness pointed to his chest) but I did not
f(a)ll down.
Q Now, after Primo Omangay boxed you and hit your chest,
what did you do?
A Because he boxed me and I was hit here and since I have (sic)
also a bolo, I dr(e)w my bolo and stabbed him and ran away.
24

Even indulging appellant Amania in his asseverations, the same nonetheless disclose that he was not
justified in stabbing Primo Omangay. Assuming that the victim did deal a fistblow on said appellant,
which may be considered as unlawful aggression, the second requisite for self-defense is not present.
There should be a necessity in both the action taken as well as the means used, and the latter depends on
whether or not the aggressor himself was armed, the nature and quality of the weapon used and the
physical condition and size of both the aggressor and the person defending himself. Primo Omangay was
unarmed. Although a bit taller, Primo was of the same size as appellant Amania.
25
The means used by
appellant Amania was clearly unreasonable for, as we have held in People vs. Montalbo, 26 "(t)hough
17

the deceased struck him with his fists, the appellant was not justified in mortally wounding his assailant
with the penknife. This was not a reasonably necessary means of repelling the attack."
The plaint of appellant Amania could, at best, fall under the ordinary mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense under paragraph 1, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, since there is also no
conclusive evidence with respect to the third requisite for self-defense. We do not believe, however, that
appellant Amania can even be granted this ordinary mitigating circumstance since, aside from the
testimonies of witnesses Arsenia and Isidra Omangay, we entertain grave doubts on the veracity of
appellant Amania's allegation that he was the victim of an unlawful aggression considering the mercurial
changes in his assertions. For, before giving the aforestated reason why he killed Primo Omangay, said
appellant had earlier given another on the witness stand, as follows: "I killed him because when we were
on the way, the son cut the banana tree of Gaudencio Guevarra."
27
On the other hand, Noe Romero,
barangay captain of Marsagomayon, Sta. Catalina, testified that when appellant Amania surrendered to
him, said appellant told him that he killed Primo Omangay because the latter chased him.
28

With respect to appellant Guevarra, his story, as earlier narrated, is that Macario Omangay chased him
with a bolo and tried to hack him three times. Fortunately, so he claims, he was able to evade the
hacking blows, and he then hacked Macario several times.
29
Obviously, said appellant was emboldened
in spinning this tale by his awareness of the fact that there were no eyewitnesses present at the scene of
the alleged fight between him and the victim. However, there are certain physical facts and indicia that
belie his aforesaid contentions which, parenthetically, also stand completely uncorroborated.
For one, as we have earlier observed, we have the testimonies of the mother and sister of the victim,
witnesses Arsenia and Isidra Omangay, which, although we did not fully credit the same with respect to
some attendant details, we nevertheless accept with regard to the main substance thereof, that is, that
appellant Guevarra was the unprovoked assailant of said victim while the latter was walking on the trail.
In view of the importance thereof to this particular aspect of the case, we reproduce the documented
counterstatement of the facts by the Solicitor General:
Arsenia was the first to see appellant Eduardo Amania. Appellant Amania was
sitting on a rock at the side of the trail holding an unsheathed bolo. At the opposite
side of the path stood Gaudencio Guevarra who also held a bolo. . . . (pp. 7-13, tsn,
August 10, 1988).
She was, however, startled when appellant Amania suddenly lunged at her husband
who was walking behind her. Appellant Amania stabbed Primo on the left side of
the body causing him to fall (p. 13, tsn., August 10, 1988; p. 23, tsn., January 11,
1989).
Almost at the same time, Gaudencio Guevarra relentlessly hacked Macario fourteen
times on various parts of the body. Not satisfied, Guevarra decapitated the then
prostrate Macario (p. 23, tsn., January 11, 1989; p. 7, tsn., June 29, 1988).
xxx xxx xxx
Both Primo and Macario Omangay died on the spot from the wounds they
sustained.
30

That Macario Omangay was killed right along the side of the trail in Sitio Talustos is not seriously
disputed by the defense. Aside from a token argument that "(i)t is quite inconceivable to propose that the
malefactors would have dared staged (sic) such a serious felony in broad daylight in the middle of the
sitio's main path, . . . ,"
31
the defense has not presented any evidence to prove that said victim was killed
elsewhere. This, therefore, completely refutes appellant Guevarra's testimony that he killed the victim
beside the river after he was chased there by the latter. By his own admission, the distance from the side
of the trail in question up to the side of the river where he supposedly killed the victim in self-defense is
about "50 arms length" or around sixty meters.
32
In fact, he even admitted that he did not tell the
barangay captain to whom he surrendered to get from the scene of the supposed fight the bolo which the
victim allegedly had, nor did he tell the police in Sta. Catalina to whom he was shortly thereafter turned
over that the victim had a bolo, much less that he killed the victim in self-defense.
33

Moreover, the number of wounds inflicted on the victim, their location on his neck, back, lap and
abdomen, as well as their depths and areas of penetration constitute ample evidence belying self-
defense. In the case at bar, Macario Omangay sustained fourteen wounds, one of which almost
completely severed his head. As we observed in People vs. Garachico, et al.,
34
"(t)he wounds inflicted
upon the victim by the two accused who were not wounded at all, sufficiently disprove their allegation
that they acted in self-defense.
Now, although the burden of evidence had shifted to the defense for having invoked self-defense, still
the burden of proof lies with the prosecution. Unlike the burden of evidence which shifts from one party
to the other, the burden of proof always lies with the prosecution.
35
Therefore, the elements of the
composite crime of robbery with homicide, as well as its attendant circumstances and the fact that
appellants are guilty thereof, must still be proved by the prosecution.
While the People, as earlier explained, failed to prove said special complex crime, the evidence fully
sustains the charge that appellants killed the victims Primo and Macario Omangay. With respect to the
unlawful taking of their lives, appellants miserably failed in their bid for exoneration by their allegedly
having acted in self-defense. Furthermore, appellants having admitted the homicidal acts, the Court is
left with no option but to find each of them guilty of homicide, appellant Amania for the death of Primo
Omangay and appellant Guevarra for the death of Macario Omangay, there being no qualifying
circumstance attending the killing and no evidence of conspiracy between appellants having been
proved.
18

Barangay captain Noe Romero testified that at around 4:30 P.M. of that fateful day, appellant Amania
surrendered to him, followed for the same purpose by appellant Guevarra some thirty minutes later.
36
A
barangay captain or chairman was and still is considered a person in authority.
37
Hence, appellants
Amania and Guevarra may be granted the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any
aggravating circumstance to offset the same since the allegation of evident premeditation is without
evidentiary basis, with the result that the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide shall be im posed in
its minimum period.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and another is rendered finding
accused-appellants Eduardo Amania and Gaudencio Guevarra GUILTY of the crime of homicide, and
each of them is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Said
accused-appellants Eduardo Amania and Gaudencio Guevarra are hereby further ordered to respectively
INDEMNIFY the heirs of the victims Primo Omangay and Macario Omangay in the amount of
P50,000.00 for each victim, in line with our current jurisprudential policy on such civil liability ex
delicto.
SO ORDERED.


















19

[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1177. February 8, 1999]
Spouses GREGORIO LORENA and TERESITA LORENA, complainants, vs. JUDGE ADOLFO
V. ENCOMIENDA, Municipal Trial Court Pagbilao, Quezon, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
The serious nature of the tasks of judges requires them to be circumspect in both their
public and their private dealings. As they are expected to rise above human frailties, they must, in all
of their activities, avoid not only impropriety but even the appearance of impropriety.
The Facts

Spouses Gregorio and Teresita Lorena, in a sworn letter-complaint
[1]
received by the Office of the
Court Administrator on August 5, 1997, charged Judge Adolfo V. Encomienda of the Municipal Trial
Court of Pagbilao, Quezon, with grave abuse of authority. The letter-complaint reads as follows:
Kami pong mag-asawa, Gregorio at Teresita Lorena, ay magalang na sumulat sa inyo upang ipaalam
ang mga sumusunod na pangyayari at tuloy humingi sa inyo ng inyong mahalagang tulong:
Kami po ay ikinulong sa pamamagitan ng pagsasabwatan simula alas 9:00 ng umaga ng Julio 4
hanggang 7, 1997 ng umaga nang wala pong habla sa amin o warrant of arrest sa piitan ng pulisya sa
Lungsod ng Lucena.
Ang mga tao po na nagtulong-tulong o nagkaisa na kami ay isuot sa kalabos o piitan ay sina Judge
Adolfo V. Encomienda, Municipal Trial Judge ng Pagbilao, Quezon, at kasalukuyan ay Assisting Judge
ng Lucena City, ang pulis po ng Lucena City na si Alex Nuyda, ang mag-ina po na si Dolores
Encomienda na ikalawang asawa ng namatay na si Herminio Encomienda na kapatid ni Judge
Encomienda, at ang anak ng namatay na si Herminio Encomienda na ang pangalan ay si Tadito
Encomienda.
Kami po ay tumira sa lupa nila na katabi ng kanilang bahay (Erminio at Dolores) dahil sa kanilang
anyaya sa amin, sapagkat ako, Gregorio Lorena, ay kanyang utusan, bodyguard at marami pang iba.
Ang dahilan po ay n[an]g kunin niya sa akin ang lupa nila na nilinis ko at tinamnan ng 680 saging at
marami pang iba ay inihabla ko sila sa DARAB at noong hinihingi nila na iurong ko ang habla ay hindi
po ako pumayag at ako ay inihabla nila ng ejectment at dahil po sa kami ay natalo ay giniba po ng
sheriff ang aming bahay noong Julio 3, 1997.
Nang kami po ay [gum]awa ng kanlungan ng aming kagamitan para huwag mabasa ng ulan noong alas
(9:00 ng umaga ng Julio 4, 1997, ay dumating po si SPO3 Alex Nuyda at sinabi sa amin na gusto raw
kaming makausap ni Mayor Ramon Talaga ng Lucena City;
Na pagdating namin sa munisipyo ay wala si Mayor Talaga at ang naruruon ay si Dolores at Tadito
Encomienda at kami ay pinipilit na pumirma sa isang kasulatan, at ang sabi naming mag-asawa ay hindi
kami pipirma sapagkat wala ang aming abogado na si Atty. Antonio Robles. Ang sabi nila sa amin ay
pumirma lamang kayo at tapos na ang lahat, at kung hindi ay kami ay ikakalabos at kami nga ay
ikinulong sa piitan ng Lucena City.
Bago po kami ikinulong ay may tumawag sa telepono at ako (Gregorio) ay tinawag at nang kunin ko
ang telepono ay ang sabi po sa akin ay kilala mo ba ako, ang sagot ko po, Opo, kayo si Judge Adolfo
Encomienda. Ang sabi po sa amin, pumirma na kayo at tapos na ang lahat. Ang sabi ko po kay Judge,
hindi po kami pipirma at wala ang aming abogado, at ang sabi po ni Judge, mga tarantado, mabulok
kayo sa kalabos sabay bagsak ng telepono.
Dahil po dito, kami pong mag-asawa ay humihingi sa inyo ng katarungan at naisip namin na kayo
lamang po ang malalapitan sa aming kaapihan na isang mahirap na tao. Bigyan mo po kami ng kaunting
halaga sa mundong ito.
Maawa na po kayo sa amin na aping-api na sa buhay at naway pagpalain kayo ng maykapal sa
pagtulong ninyo sa isang mahirap sa buhay at pinagsamantalahan ng mga may influencia at mayaman.
Kahit po ipangutang namin ang pagpunta sa Maynila, kami po ay nahahandang humarap sa
investigasyon, at upang patunayan ang sinabi sa sulat na ito ay katunayan po ay aming pinanumpaan ang
nilalaman ng sulat na ito.
[2]

In his Answer,
[3]
Respondent Judge Encomienda denied the charge against him and averred:
The dispute over the residential lot owned by the deceased brother of the undersigned, Herminio V.
Encomienda, was between said Herminio V. Encomienda and herein complainants. And said dispute
was the subject of an ejectment case filed by the owner, Herminio Encomienda and spouse against
Spouses Gregorio and Teresita Lorena, herein complainants, under Civil Case No. 1681-94 before
Branch I, MTCC, Lucena City on February 21, 1994 (Annex A[-]complaint dated February
17, 1994).
20

And on December 16, 1994, a Decision in said case was handed down by the then Judge Jose V.
Habalo in favor of the plaintiffs ordering, among other things, the ejectment of the defendants, Spouses
Gregorio and Teresita Lorena, herein complainants (Annex B Decision, dated December 16, 1994). The
Decision was appealed by the defendants which was given due course, and the records forwarded to the
Regional Trial Court, Lucena City. The case was assigned to Branch 59, then presided over by Judge
Ismael T. Portes, but was taken over upon his retirement by Judge Jose V. Hernandez who rendered the
Decision on October 9, 1995 affirming en toto the Decision of MTCC, Branch I, Lucena City (Annex
C[-]Decision, dated October 9, 1995).
Subsequently, a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution was filed by the plaintiffs on November 20,
1995 and on February 7, 1996, a Writ of Execution was ordered issued by MTCC Branch I, Lucena City
(Annex D Order, dated February 7, 1996).
Consequently, a Writ of Execution was issued on March 21, 1996 (Annex E Writ of Execution, dated
March 21, 1996) but the same was returned unsatisfied because of the refusal of the defendants, Spouses
Gregorio and Teresita Lorena to vacate the premises despite the grace period given them (Annex F[-
]Officers Return, dated May 3, 1996).
A motion for [the] issuance of [the] Writ of Demolition was filed by the plaintiffs Herminio
Encomienda and spouse on February 27, 1997, and which motion after hearing the Court granted[,]
ordering the demolition of any structure/s, building/s or edifice/s and other improvements erected by the
defendants on the property of the plaintiffs (Exhibit G[-]Order, dated June 24, 1997).
xxx [F]iled by the defendants, spouses Gregorio and Teresita Lorena [was a Motion for
Reconsideration] of the Order of Demolition but said motion was denied in the Order of the Court of
July 3, 1997 (Exhibit H[-]Order, dated July 3, 1997).
And on July 4, 1997, the Sheriff submitted his report informing the Court that the Writ of Demolition
was already implemented with the demolition of the house of defendants, but defendants still refused to
vacate the premises (Exhibit I, Compliance, dated July 4, 1997)
The complainants in the Sworn Letter Complaint claim that the undersigned together with his sister-in-
law Dolores Encomienda, nephew Tadito Encomienda and one police officer Alex Nuyda helped and
conspired with one another in placing them in jail beginning July 4 up to July 7, 1997.
In refuting this claim of the defendants, undersigned has this to say:
On July 4, 1997, the undersigned was at the MTCC, Branch II, Lucena City, performing his duties as
Assisting Judge. At about 10:00 in the morning, his nephew, Tadito Encomienda, called up, informing
him that he (Tadito Encomienda) together with Spouses Gregorio and Teresita Lorena, were at the
Lucena City Police Station. According to him (Tadito Encomienda), he saw Gregorio Lorena starting to
build another structure on the lot subject of the ejectment case. And so he (Tadito Encomienda) sought
police assistance thru the Mayor for them to settle things in the presence of a police officer. Gregorio
Lorena then asked to be allowed to stay for a few days on the premises and which request he (nephew of
the undersigned) was amenable provided that Spouses Gregorio and Teresita Lorena would sign a
written promise that they would leave the premises after the expiration of the period granted them.
During the same telephone call, the undersigneds nephew sought advice whether it was indeed
appropriate for him to require the spouses to sign the said written promise and to which query
undersigned told his nephew that there was nothing wrong [with] it.
After the first telephone call, again undersigneds nephew called up informing undersigned that
Spouses Gregorio and Teresita Lorena refused to sign claiming that they did not understand the content
of the note and that if they would be forced to do so they would rather continue staying in jail.
It was at this point that undersigned told his nephew that he would talk with Gregorio Lorena having in
mind that said Gregorio Lorena would listen to him regarding the nature of the papers he would sign, the
Decision ordering their ejectment and the Demolition order which had already been effected.
During the conversation with Gregorio Lorena, the undersigned informed him that there was nothing
wrong with him and his spouse signing a written promise to vacate, after all, they were requesting xxx
their extended stay in the premises, and the Writ of Demolition ha[d] already been enforced. However,
Gregorio Lorena insisted that he and his wife would not sign any written promise to vacate and if forced
to do so, they would rather stay in jail. Undersigned told him that they were not being forced to sign, but
since they were asking for an extended stay in the premises, it was but natural that the owner be given
assurance that they would leave upon expiration of the period given them.
The undersigned even told Gregorio Lorena that he could request his sister-in-law and nephew to allow
them to stay even for a month provided that they would sign a written promise to vacate -- but he
refused the offer.
The undersigned respectfully submits that there was no abuse of authority on his part as he had no hand
at all [I]n what transpired on July 4, 1997, and that even under the circumstances aforestated there was
no such unlawful detention as claimed by Spouses Gregorio and Teresita Lorena.
As adverted to above, the undersigned only came to know that complainants were at the police station
when he received a phone call from his nephew (Tadito Encomienda) on July 4, 1997. And this fact was
attested [to] by PO3 Alex Nuyda who responded to the call for police assistance (Annex J - affidavit of
PO3 Nuyda).
And according to the nephew (Tadito Encomienda) of the undersigned, the complainant themselves,
Spouses Gregorio and Teresita Lorena after their talk before the police investigator SPO Noel Diocos,
xxx refused to leave the police station and insisted that they would just stay in jail as their house had
already been demolished. This finds support in the affidavit of PO3 Diocos (Annex K, affidavit of PO3
21

Diocos) and the entry in the police blotter (Annex L) showing the refusal of the said complainants
Spouses Gregorio and Teresita Lorena to leave the police station.
On the ejectment case filed against Spouses Gregorio and Teresita Lorena, the judges who handled the
case can attest to the fact that the undersigned at any stage of the proceedings had never interfered in the
case -- not even asking for its status during their social and official gatherings.
On the basis of all the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully rests his case, praying that he be cleared
of the unfounded and malicious charge soonest.
[4]

The Court Administrators Recommendation

In his Report, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo recommended that the charge of grave
abuse of authority be dismissed and that the respondent judge be advised to be more prudent and more
circumspect in his actions and utterances, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
EVALUATION: A careful review of the records shows that the complainants have not substantiated
their charges in the face of respondent judges denials which were corroborated by independent
witnesses.
Complainants claim that they were imprisoned without any formal charge [or] a warrant of arrest
issued against them was satisfactorily refuted by respondent Judge in his Answer. The latters claim is
supported by the affidavits of the two (2) police officers who were present during the incident at the
Lucena City Police Station.
Complainants bare assertions were satisfactorily controverted by respondent Judge, not only with his
denial of the charges but by reason of the evidence submitted to substantiate the same. This consisted in
the affidavits executed by PO3 Alex Nuyda and PO3 Noel Diocos showing that complainant spouses
voluntarily went to the police station to confer with the Encomiendas. This negotiation later on resulted
in complainant spouses refusal to sign the document allowing them to stay in the premises within the
grace period requested. Instead, they insisted [on] stay[ing] in jail claiming that their house had already
been demolished and they had nowhere to go.
The undersigned is inclined to believe respondent judges explanation that he conferred with
complainant Gregorio on the phone simply to assure him that there was nothing wrong in signing the
document containing his personal request to be allowed to stay in the premises but subject to the
condition imposed by the Encomiendas that the same will be vacated once the grace period requested
expires.
Respondent Judges explanation is bereft of any showing of abuse of authority either as a magistrate or
as a private individual. Moreover, there is nothing in the complaint to indicate any wrong doing on the
part of the respondent Judge with respect to the ejectment case or any attempt on the part of the latter to
influence the final disposition of the case already decided by the MTCC, Lucena City in favor of the
Encomienda spouses, which decision was affirmed by the RTC, Branch 59, Lucena City on appeal.
Notwithstanding the foregoing facts, it would have been prudent on the part of respondent Judge to
have refrained from acts or utterances which could be misconstrued by complainant spouses Lorena,
considering the formers family ties with the spouses Encomienda. As held by this Court in the case of
Legaspi v. Garrets, 242 SCRA 679, Respondent forgets that a judge should be prudent and more
circumspect in his utterances, remembering that his conduct in and outside the courtroom is under
constant observation.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court are our
recommendations that the instant case be DISMISSED for lack of merit, and that respondent Judge be
ADVISED to be more prudent and more circumspect in his actions and utterances, remembering that his
conduct in and outside the courtroom is under constant observation.
[5]

The Courts Ruling

Instead of dismissing the charge as recommended by the court administrator, we are
REPRIMANDING respondent judge for his failure to exercise greater circumspection in dealing with
the complainants.
In charging Judge Adolfo V. Encomienda with grave abuse of authority, Spouses Gregorio and
Teresita Lorena contend that their illegal arrest and subsequent detention which lasted three days, from
July 4 to 7, 1997, was due to his machination and influence. They point to the fact that respondent judge
is a brother of the deceased Herminio Encomienda and an uncle of Tadito Encomienda, the plaintiffs in
the ejectment case filed against them.
To support this allegation, complainants aver that on July 4, 1997, Judge Encomienda spoke to
Gregorio on the telephone while the latter was at the police station, urging him to heed Tadito
Encomiendas demand for the spouses to sign certain papers. When Gregorio refused, Judge
Encomienda allegedly said, Tarantado, mabulok kayo sa kalabos! and then slammed the phone down.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence,
the allegations in the complaint.
[6]
In the present case, we believe that the complainants were not able to
do so. There is no showing that respondent judge used the powers and influence of his office in an
arbitrary and opprobrious manner. From the documents presented, it is apparent that he had no hand in
bringing the Lorenas to the police station. Likewise, it cannot be said that he had any participation in
the conflict between his brothers family and the Lorenas. The complainants may have surmised
otherwise, but mere suspicion without proof cannot be the basis of conviction.
[7]

22

Although the charge of grave abuse of authority was not proven, the respondent judge cannot be
completely exonerated. He himself admitted having spoken to Gregorio on the phone in order to assist
the family of Herminio Encomienda, the judges brother. The circumstances surrounding the
controversy clearly show the impropriety of respondents act. The Lorenas had just lost their
home; considering the perceived power and exalted position of the respondent judge, as well as his
relationship with Tadito and Dolores Encomienda, it was not surprising that the complainants were
disconcerted and overwhelmed by the gravity of their situation. They cannot be blamed if they believed
at the time that Judge Encomienda was somehow responsible for their arrest and detention. Whatever
his intentions were, he should have avoided talking to Gregorio, especially in the tone and in the manner
reported by the latter. In doing so, respondent steered away from the heavy responsibility of judges to
be circumspect in their public and private dealings. As the Court has stated, a judge is human, but he is
expected to rise above human frailties. At the very least, there must be an earnest and sincere effort on
his part to do so.
[8]

Canon 2 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities. Considering that a judge is the visible representation of the
law and, more important, of justice,
[9]
his official conduct, as well as his personal behavior should
always be beyond reproach.
In light of the foregoing, the Court believes that Judge Encomienda should be
reprimanded. Applicable to the present case is Conde v. Superable,
[10]
in which the Court dismissed the
charge for grave misconduct, but held:
Still, [respondent judge] should have taken greater pains to avoid the impression that his personal
feelings were not kept under control, as rightfully expected of a judge. That is an added responsibility of
the most serious character assumed by a member of the bar honored with an appointment to the
bench. He should on that account be admonished. He must take pains to assure that thereafter his
conduct would not be thus tainted.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Adolfo V. Encomienda is hereby REPRIMANDED for failing
to exercise greater care and circumspection in his actions. He is WARNED that a repetition of this or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

























23

G.R. No. 123817 December 17, 1999
IBAAN RURAL BANK INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MR. and MRS. RAMON TARNATE, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J .:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32984 affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Batangas, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 534, as well as the resolution of the Court of Appeals
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Spouses Cesar and Leonila Reyes were the owners of three (3) lots covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) Nos. 33206, 33207 and 33208 of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City. On March 21, 1976,
the spouses mortgaged these lots to Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. [herein petitioner]. On June 11, 1976, with
the knowledge and consent of the petitioner, the spouses as sellers, and Mr. and Mrs. Ramon Tarnate
[herein private respondents] as buyers, entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage of the lots in question. Private respondents failed to pay the loan and the bank extra-judicially
foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. The Provincial Sheriff conducted a public auction of the lots and
awarded the lots to the bank, the sole bidder. On December 13, 1978, the Provincial Sheriff issued a
Certificate of Sale which was registered on October 16, 1979. The certificate stated that the redemption
period expires two (2) years from the registration of the sale. No notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure
was given to the private respondents. On September 23, 1981, private respondents offered to redeem the
foreclosed lots and tendered the redemption amount of P77,737.45. However, petitioner Bank refused
the redemption on the ground that it had consolidated its titles over the lots. The Provincial Sheriff also
denied the redemption on the ground that private respondents did not appear on the title to be the owners
of the lots.
Private respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the foreclosed
lots. They alleged that the extra-judicial foreclosure was null and void for lack of valid notice and
demand upon them. They further argued that they were entitled to redeem the foreclosed lots because
they offered to redeem and tendered the redemption price before October 16, 1981, the deadline of the
2-year redemption period.
The bank opposed the redemption, contending that the private respondents had no right to redeem the
lots because they were not the real parties in interest; that at the time they offered to redeem on
September 23, 1981, the right to redeem had prescribed, as more than one year had elapsed from the
registration of the Certificate ofSale on October 16, 1979; that there was no need of personal notice to
them because under Section 3 of Act 3135, only the posting of notice of sale at three public places of the
municipality where the properties are located was required.
1

After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled in favor of herein private respondents and against the
petitioner, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants, to wit:
(a) Ordering the defendant Ibaan Rural Bank Inc., and Provincial Sheriff of
Batangas for the redemption of the foreclosed properties covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-33206, T-33207 and T-33208 of the Registry of Deeds,
Lipa City by the plaintiffs by paying the mortgaged obligation.
(b) Ordering the Provincial Sheriff of Batangas to cancel the Transfer Certificate of
Titles issued to defendant Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. and its successors-in-interest and
to issue the corresponding Transfer of Certificate of Titles to plaintiffs upon
payment of the required legal fees.
(c) Ordering the defendant Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc., to pay plaintiffs moral damages
in the amount of P200,000.00, and attorney's fees in the sum of P20,000.00.
All other claims not having been duly proved are ordered DISMISSED.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
2

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the lower court. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following modifications:
1. The register of Deeds of Lipa City is hereby ordered to cancel the Certificate of
Titles issued to defendant Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. and its successor-in-interest and to
issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title to plaintiffs-appellees upon
proper redemption of the properties and payment of the required legal fees.
24

2. Defendant Ibaan Rural bank, is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiffs the amount of
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees.
3. The moral damages awarded in favor of plaintiffs is hereby ordered deleted.
SO ORDERED.
3

A timely Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated February 14, 1996. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A REVIEW OF ITS DECISION, WHEN IT
SUSTAINED AVAILABILITY OF REDEMPTION DESPITE THE LAPSE OF
ONE YEAR FROM DATE OF REGISTRATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
SALE.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A REVIEW OF ITS DECISION, WHEN THE
RESPONDENT COURT ALLOWED RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
SIMPLY BECAUSE THE PETITIONER DID NOT ALLOW THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS TO EXERCISE BELATEDLY REDEMPTION OF THE
FORECLOSED PROPERTY.
4

Essentially, two issues are raised for resolution. What was the period of redemption: two years as
unilaterally fixed by the sheriff in the contract, or one year as fixed by law? May respondent court
properly award attorney's fees solely on the basis of the refusal of the bank to allow redemption?
We now resolve these issues.
When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents.
5
For two
years, it did not object to the two-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be
said that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption period specially since it had time to object and
did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is
proposed, his silence can be construed as consent.
6
By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private
respondents to believe that they had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of
two years, petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was only one year and
that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or
admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on
such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
7

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on Lazo vs. Republic Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc.,
8
where the court held that the one year period of redemption provided in Act No.
3135 is only directory and can be extended by agreement of the parties. True, but it bears noting that in
Lazo the parties voluntarily agreed to extend the redemption period. Thus, the concept of legal
redemption was converted by the parties in Lazo into conventional redemption. This is not so in the
instant case. There was no voluntary agreement. In fact, the sheriff unilaterally and arbitrarily extended
the period of redemption to two (2) years in the Certificate of Sale. The parties were not even privy to
the extension made by the sheriff. Nonetheless, as above discussed, the bank can not after the lapse of
two years insist that the redemption period was one year only.
Additionally, the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of a property.
The fact alone that he is allowed the right to redeem clearly demonstrates the solicitousness of the law in
giving him another opportunity, should his fortune improve, to recover his lost property.
9

Lastly, petitioner is a banking institution on whom the public expects diligence, meticulousness and
mastery of its transactions. Had petitioner diligently reviewed the Certificate of Sale it could have easily
discovered that the period was extended one year beyond the usual period for redemption. Banks, being
greatly affected with public interest, are expected to exercise a degree of diligence in the handling of its
affairs higher than that expected of an ordinary business firm.
10

On the second issue, the award of attorney's fees must be disallowed for lack of legal basis. The fact that
private respondents were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect and enforce their claim does
not justify the award of attorney's fees. The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as
part of damages because of the public policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate.
11
The award of attorney's fees must be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary
damages are eliminated.
12

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32984 is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees is deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.




25


[G.R. No. 128568. April 9, 2003]
SPOUSES REYNALDO ALCARAZ and ESMERALDA ALCARAZ, petitioners, vs. PEDRO M.
TANGGA-AN, MENAS R. TANGGA-AN, VIRGINIA III YVETTE R. TANGGA-AN,
CECIL T. VILLAFLOR, HERMES R. TANGGA-AN, VENUS R. TANGGA-AN,
JUPITER R. TANGGA-AN, YVONNE T. FRI, VIVIEN R. TANGGA-AN and HON.
JUDGE P. BURGOS and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J .:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision
[1]
dated January 10, 1997 of the Court of
Appeals
[2]
affirming the decision
[3]
dated June 26, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 17, which in turn upheld the decision
[4]
dated January 5, 1995 of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Cebu City, Branch 2, ordering the ejectment of the petitioner spouses from the house they
were renting from respondents.
On October 4, 1994, respondents Pedro Tangga-an, Menas Tangga-an, Virginia III Yvette Tangga-
an, Cecil Villaflor, Hermes Tangga-an, Venus Tangga-an, Jupiter Tangga-an, Yvonne Fri and Vivien
Tangga-an filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. R-33928,
against petitioner spouses Reynaldo Alcaraz and Esmeralda Alcaraz.
The complaint alleged that the late Virginia Tangga-an (the spouse of respondent Pedro Tangaa-an
and mother of the rest of the respondents) leased a residential building (house) located at Premier Street,
Hipodromo, Cebu City to the petitioner spouses. The lease contract was limited to the use and
occupancy of the said residential building and did not include the lot on which it was constructed
because the said lot was then owned by the National Housing Authority (NHA). Under the contract, the
petitioner spouses bound themselves for five years to pay Virginia a monthly rental of P4,000 beginning
November 22, 1991. However, since November 1993, they failed to pay rent. Thus, as of October,
1994, they were in arrears in the amount of P48,000. Despite repeated demands by respondents to pay
the rentals in arrears and to surrender the possession of the residential building, the petitioner spouses
refused to vacate the same. Respondents sought to repossess the property for their own use and benefit.
On the other hand, the petitioner spouses alleged that, on July 23, 1993, the ownership of the lot
on which the house stood was transferred by the NHA to Virgilio and Angelita D. Tangga-an. Virgilio
Tangga-an is the son of the late Virgilia Tangga-an and respondent Pedro Tangga-an, and the brother of
the other respondents. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125657 was consequently issued in the name of
Virgilio Tangga-an. According to the petitioner spouses, the subsequent change in ownership of the lot
and the house resulted in the cancellation of the contract of lease between respondents and petitioner
spouses. Thereafter, they paid the rent to the new owners of the lot (Virgilio and Angelita) and not to
respondents since the latter supposedly no longer had the legal right to collect rentals.
On January 5, 1995, the MTC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is entered by way of preponderance of evidence in favor of plaintiffs and
against the defendants, Ordering the latter to vacate the premises immediately, including all those who
are occupying the subject house in relation to them; They are also jointly ordered to pay the sum of
P48,000 representing rental payment in arrears from November, 1993 up to October, 1994 and to update
monthly payment of P4,000 thereafter until their vacation therefrom; They are saddled to pay attorneys
fees in the sum of P5,000 and litigation costs in the amount of P1,000.
SO ORDERED.
[5]

In ruling in favor of the respondents, the MTC held that the petitioner spouses clearly violated the
contract of lease due to non-payment of rent. They failed to show that the subject house belonged to
Virgilio alone. On the other hand, the respondents proved that, after the death of Virgilia, they registered
said house in the name of their trustees, co-respondents Hermes Tangga-an and his wife. Furthermore,
considering that Virgilios claim of ownership over the lot was the subject of a pending litigation for
annulment of deed of sale and reconveyance of property involving the Tangga-ans, the MTC ruled that it
cannot usurp to pass judgment on the issues, as well as the conflicting claims of the parties therein.
[6]

On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC, and held that:
xxx [D]efendants failed to present any documentary evidence modifying or amending the contract of
lease (Annex C, complaint) to justify the transfer of payment of the monthly rental to Virgilio Tanga-
an who claims only as the registered owner of the lot on which the leased house is located. It appears
that Virgilio Tanga-an does not possess any proof of ownership of the rented house. Clearly, defendants
had violated the lease agreement executed between them and the deceased lessor Virginia R. Tangga-an
(sic) the predecessor in interest of Hermes Tangaa-an and his wife as shown in the Tax Declaration of
the said spouses (Annex A, complaint) whose name appears under the space for previous owner by
stopping payment of rental to the present owner despite the existence of the contract of lease which
expires on November 22, 1996. The law on contracts basically states:
Obligations arising fro contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith. (Article 1159, New Civil Code of the Philippines).
xxx xxx xxx
[7]

In denying the petition for review and affirming the judgments of the courts a quo, the Court of
Appeals ruled that:
26

We also concur with the holding of both courts that as heirs of Virginia Tangga-an, private respondents
have the right to institute the action for ejectment, in accordance with Article 487 of the Civil Code; and
that the claim of petitioner that Virgilio Tangga-an owns the lot where the leased residential building
stands and occupied by petitioners is still the subject of a civil action for annulment of the sale of the
lot before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It does not follow as a matter of course that whoever owns
the lot owns the building in question. Ownership of the lot cannot change the nature and ownership of
the building, which belongs to the plaintiffs as heirs of the late Virginia Tangga-an through Ernest
Tangga-an and his wife. Respondent court correctly reasoned out that xxx defendants cannot hide over
the cloak of Virgilio Tangga-an, his claim of ownership over the lot as far as the Court is concerned
being irrelevant to this case xxx. Most importantly, the action involving the question of ownership of
the lot is not a lawful ground to suspend/abate the ejectment proceeding. The rationale of the rule being
that an ejecment suit involves only the issue of material possession or possession de facto (San Pedro vs.
Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 145, 150, and cases cited).
[8]

Hence, this petition on the following assignments of error:
I
THE LEASE CONTRACT EXECUTED BY PETITIONERS WITH VIRGINIA TANGGA-AN,
PLAINTIFFS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, COVERED NOT ONLY THE LAND, BUT ALSO
THE IMPROVEMENT THEREON, INCLUDING THE BUILDING.
II
VIRGILIO TANGGA-AN, AS ONE OF THE HEIRS OF VIRGINIA, HAD THE SAME RIGHTS
OVER THE PROPERTY AS THOSE OF THE OTHER HEIRS, THE PLAINTIFFS. HENCE,
VIRGILIO MAY NOT BE EXCLUDED UNILATERALLY BY THE OTHER HEIRS IN HIS
ENJOYMENT OF HIS HEREDITARY RIGHTS.
III
THE REGISTRATION OF THE LAND, INCLUDING THE IMPROVEMENTS THEREON, IN THE
NAME OF VIRGILIO TANGGA-AN UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM IS INDEFEASIBLE AND
MAY NOT BE ATTACKED COLLATERALLY IN THE PRESENT ILLEGAL DETAINER CASE.
[9]

We rule in favor of the respondents.
Section 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. - When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
The issue of ownership is precisely what the petitioner spouses raised to justify their non-payment
of rent and to resist eviction from the house they leased from respondents. Being indispensable to the
resolution of the issue of possession, we herein render a provisional ruling on ownership.
Petitioner spouses seek a dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction claiming that the only issue
to be resolved is ownership over the house which is improper in an ejectment case. We disagree. The
issue in the case at bar is whether the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were excused from paying the rent
because of the change in the ownership of the land on which the rented house was built. The main
question therefore is still the lawful possession of the subject premises by the petitioner spouses. To
resolve it, a discussion of the ownership issue is necessary.
The petitioner spouses insist that the courts a quo erred in not finding that Virgilio Tangga-an
became the new owner not only of the lot but also of the residential house. They claim that, before she
died, Virginia, the original owner of the subject house, waived and ceded her rights over the land in
favor of Virgilio. The said transfer allegedly included the subject house because, pursuant to Article 440
of the Civil Code, the ownership of the property gives the right of accession to everything which is
produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially. They also
maintain that the NHA executed a deed of sale of both the house and the lot in favor of Virgilio.
According to the petitioner spouses, the tax declaration over the house in the name of respondent
Hermes Tangga-an, as trustee of the other respondents, was self-serving and had no probative value
compared to the certificate of title over the lot in the name of Virgilio Tangga-an.
We find no merit in petitioners arguments.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for review
before this Court should only raise questions of law. In the absence of showing that the case falls under
one of the exceptions,
[10]
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not
reviewable by this Court. And they carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the
factual findings of the trial court. As such, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over
again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.
[11]

The courts a quo were unanimous in holding that the petitioner spouses failed to substantiate their
factual averment that Virgilio not only acquired the lot but also the house. After examining the records,
we found nothing to disprove the facts determined by the lower courts. All the petitioner spouses
presented was Virgilios uncertified xerox copy of the certificate of title over the lot. No document was
ever shown evidencing cession of the subject house in Virgilios favor. Virgilios title could not be used
to prove ownership over the house built on said lot as it carried no reference at all to the house. A
building by itself is a real or immovable property distinct from the land on which it is constructed
[12]
and
therefore can be a separate subject of contracts.
On the other hand, the respondents proved that, as compulsory heirs of Virginia, they were the
rightful owners of the subject house. They presented a tax declaration in the name of their trustees, co-
respondent Hermes Tangga-an and his wife, which tax declaration sufficiently evidences their co-
ownership and acquisition of title following the death of the decedent Virginia. We have ruled that:
27

Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration
of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain
title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but
also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
[13]

One of the factual issues raised by the petitioner spouses concerns the alleged waiver and cession
of Virginias rights over the house and lot to Virgilio. But the petitioner spouses did not mention any
consideration received by Virginia for the waiver of the house, in effect making said waiver a donation
thereof to Virgilio. However, in order for a donation of real property like a house to be valid, a public
instrument duly signed by the donor and accepted by the donee (which acceptance must be known to the
donor while alive) must be executed.
[14]
Moreover, said donation must not impair the legitime of the
forced heirs of the donor in order for the same not to be inofficious.
[15]
In the case at bar, no such public
instrument was presented. Neither was it explained why said waiver did not impair the rights of the
other compulsory heirs of Virginia.
To support their argument that the house necessarily became Virgilios property as a result of the
acquisition of the lot on which the same was built, the petitioner spouses invoke the principle that the
accessory follows the principal. Being an accessory, the house is necessarily owned by the owner of the
lot on which it is built.
There is no need, however, to disturb and analyze the applicability of this well-entrenched
principle because the petitioner spouses are estopped from raising the same. Both parties knew that their
contract pertained only to the lease of the house, without including the land. The contract states: 1. That
the lessor is the owner of a building of mixed materials situated at Premier St., Mabolo, Hipodromo,
Cebu City.
[16]
At the time of the perfection of the contract, the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were
aware that the NHA, and not Virginia, the lessor, owned the land on which the rented house stood yet
they signed the same, obliged themselves to comply with the terms thereof for five years and performed
their obligations as lessees for two years.
Now they assume a completely different legal position. They claim that the lease contract ceased
to be effective because Virgilios assumption of ownership of the land stripped the respondents of
ownership of the building. They argue that, under Article 440 of the Civil Code, Virgilios title over the
lot necessarily included the house on the said lot, thus automatically canceling the contract.
Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising
out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;
xxx xxx xxx
After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are barred
from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost
ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot.
We also note that the petitioner spouses rescinded the contract of lease without judicial approval.
Due to the change in ownership of the land, the petitioner spouses decided to unilaterally cancel the
contract because Virgilio supposedly became the new owner of the house after acquiring title to the lot.
They alleged that there was no reason anymore to perform their obligations as lessees because the lessor
had ceased to be the owner of the house. But there is nothing in their lease contract that allows the
parties to extrajudicially rescind the same in case of violation of the terms thereof. Extrajudicial
rescission of a contract is not possible without an express stipulation to that effect.
[17]
What the
petitioner spouses should have done was to file a special civil action for interpleader for the claimants to
litigate their claims and to deposit the rentals in court.
The petitioner spouses aver that their payments to Virgilio beginning November, 1993 were
payments made in good faith to a person in possession of the credit, in consonance with Article 1242 of
the Civil Code.
[18]
This therefore released them from their obligation. They claim that Virgilio collected
the rentals in his capacity as a co-owner. Being a son of Virginia, he was also entitled to the rent of the
subject house. We disagree. Virgilio collected the rentals not as a co-owner but as the alleged sole
owner of the subject house. The petitioner spouses themselves admitted that Virgilio claimed sole
ownership of the house and lot. It would be incongruous for them to now assert payment in good faith to
a person they believed was collecting in behalf of his co-heirs after admitting that they paid rent to
Virgilio as the sole owner thereof.
Hence, for violating of the terms of the lease contract, i.e., payment of rent, respondents can
legally demand the ejectment of the petitioner spouses.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.





28

[G.R. No. 137664. May 9, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE a.k.a.
ROBERTO SAN MIGUEL, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
Roberto Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel, Michael San Antonio, Jocel Ibaneta and Abelardo
Triumpante were charged with rape in an amended information which reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of January, 1995, in Salvacion, Buhi, Camarines Sur, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping each other and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) Rowena Contridas against her
will, to her damage and prejudice in the amount that may be proven in court.
Acts contrary to law.
[1]

All the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
It appears that at 3:00 in the morning of January 3, 1995, appellant Roberto Padrigone and the
other accused broke into the house of Rowena Contridas, then 16 years old, situated in San Benito,
Salvacion, Buhi, Camarines Sur. Appellant Roberto Padrigone and accused Jocel Ibaneta poked a knife
at Rowena and her fourteen year-old sister, Nimfa,
[2]
and threatened to kill them if they reported the
incident to others. They gagged Rowena with a handkerchief and Nimfa with a handtowel. Then,
appellant undressed Rowena, forced her to lie down and sexually violated her while his co-accused
watched with glee. Accused Jocel Ibanita tried to rape Nimfa but failed because she was able to elude
him.
After appellant satisfied his lust on Rowena, the other accused took their turns. Every one of the
accused raped Rowena. Before they left, they warned the sisters not to report the incident or else they
will kill them.
Despite the threats, Rowena and Nimfa reported the incident to the police and identified appellant
and his co-accused as the perpetrators. However, based on the police blotter, Rowena stated that it was
only appellant who raped her.
Dr. Damiana Claveria, Municipal Health Officer, conducted a medical examination on Rowena
and found the following:
patient very talkative, incoherent as to questions asked.
PE no signs of external injury
IE hymenal tear, recent 6, 9 dont bleed on manipulation, but complained of tenderness upon
insertion of 1 finger, copious vaginal discharge.
[3]

According to Dr. Claveria, there is a possibility that the fluids found inside Rowenas vagina may
be semen. She added that it was possible for Rowena to have only two hymenal tears even if four men
had sexual intercourse with her.
Dr. Chona C. Belmonte, a psychiatrist of Cadlan Mental Hospital in Pili, Camarines Sur, testified
that while she interviewed Rowena, the latter was crying, incoherent and had shouting episodes. She
was confined at the Cadlan Mental Hospital for further treatment. Upon further medical consultation,
Dr. Belmonte observed thus:
Rowena was in a depressed mood and at the same time overactive. She was combative, violent, and was
experiencing auditory hallucination, meaning, she heard things that only she could hear. She was also
grandiously deluded, falsely believing that she could do things others could not do. By that time,
according to Dr. Belmonte, Rowena had already lost touch with reality.
[4]

Dr. Belmonte diagnosed her illness as Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition.
[5]
She found that
her mental disorder was not hereditary because before the incident took place, she did not exhibit any
unusual behavior. She concluded that her mental illness was strongly related to a traumatic
experience. She noted that at one point in the treatment, Rowena confided to her that she was raped.
[6]

All the accused, including appellant Roberto Padrigone, interposed the defense of denial and
alibi. Appellant claimed that in the evening of January 2, 1995, he and his companions, Jocel Ibanita
and Michael San Antonio, visited Rowena at her house. According to him, Rowena was crying when
they arrived. When appellant asked her what was wrong, she told him that she wanted to elope with
him. He replied that he was not ready as he was still studying. Rowena snapped, its up to him but he
might regret it.
[7]
While appellant and Rowena were talking, Jocel Ibanita and Michael San Antonio
were in the kitchen cooking noodles. Later, a certain Ismeraldo Quirante, in the presence of
several barangay watchmen patrolling the area, passed by the Contridas house and advised the accused
to go home because it was getting late. They heeded the advice and left the Contridas house at around
11:30 p.m.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution evidence and rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
29

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused, ROBERTO
PADRIGONE a.k.a. ROBERTO SAN MIGUEL, GUILTY of the crime of Rape, under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659) and hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA, considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. He is likewise directed to indemnify the offended party, Rowena Contridas, the amount of
Fifty thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and to pay the costs of this suit. Accused JOCEL
IBANITA, MICHAEL SAN ANTONIO and ABELARDO TRIUMPANTE are ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence. It being shown that the three accused are presently detained at the Municipal
Jail at PNP, Buhi, Camarines Sur, their immediate release is hereby ordered.
SO ORDERED.
[8]

Appellant interposed the instant appeal based on the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF RAPE INSPITE OF THE INHERENT WEAKNESSES AND INSUFFICIENCY OF
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECIDING THE INSTANT CASE NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE IN CRIMINAL LAW THAT THE
PROSECUTION MUST RELY ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS EVIDENCE AND NOT ON THE
WEAKNESS OF THAT OF THE DEFENSE.
Appellant contends that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that according to the prosecution witness, Nimfa, he and his co-accused Michael
San Antonio, Abelardo Triumpante and Jocel Ibanita, took turns in raping Rowena while Jocel Ibanita
also attempted to rape her. However, after preliminary investigation, the Municipal Trial Court of Buhi,
Camarines Sur, dismissed Nimfas complaint for attempted rape against Jocel Ibanita because of its
findings that the latter committed only acts of lasciviousness, considering his voluntary and spontaneous
desistance from continuing to perform the acts leading to carnal knowledge. Furthermore, the
investigating Judge entertained doubts about the truth of her story, which was uncorroborated.
[9]

We agree with the following observation of the Solicitor General:
[T]he dismissal of the complaint for attempted rape filed by Nimfa against one of the accused, Jocel
Ibanita, during the preliminary investigation stage should not detract from the credibility of her
testimony. Even if the prosecution wanted to, the merits of the dismissal of Nimfas complaint for
attempted rape could not be properly challenged in the criminal proceedings below since the said
proceedings involved only the culpability of the four accused for the crime of rape committed against
Rowena, the sister of Nimfa.
[10]

Appellant further claims that Nimfas lack of credibility was underscored when the trial court
acquitted appellants co-accused. Appellants claim is not well taken. Evidence shows that the trial
court acquitted appellants co-accused because of doubt engendered on the extent of their participation
in the sexual assault committed against Rowena in light of Rowenas own statement as recorded in the
police blotter.
[11]

Appellant alleges that Nimfas reactions after the rape of her sister are unnatural, unexpected and
mind-boggling,
[12]
specifically when she resumed her sleep after having been raped and even reported
for work the following day. The contention deserves scant consideration. It is an accepted maxim that
different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling experience.
[13]

Further, appellant argues that Nimfa admitted before the police that she did not recognize the
rapists of Rowena. In this connection, we quote with approval the observation of the Solicitor General,
to wit:
Anent the portion of Nimfas testimony wherein she admitted to the defense counsel that she told the
Chief of Police that she was not able to recognize the persons who raped her sister Rowena, the same is
capable of explanation. Accused-appellant Roberto Padrigone was present when Nimfa uttered the
statement. Hence, she was afraid to tell the truth because of the earlier threat to her and sister Rowenas
lives by accused-appellant Padrigone.
[14]

We find that Nimfas credibility has not been impaired despite rigorous cross-examination. In
fact, defense counsel was not able to point to any inconsistency in Nimfas testimony. A perusal of the
transcripts of stenographic notes reveals that she was steadfast in narrating the circumstances of the rape
and in pointing to appellant as one of the perpetrators.
Appellant likewise alleges that it was error for the trial court to have dismissed his sweetheart
defense by the mere absence of love notes, mementos or pictures.
In People v. Corea,
[15]
we held that:
x x x Moreover, even if such averment is true, it does not necessarily follow that no rape can be
committed against ones sweetheart. Such a relationship provides no license to explore and invade that
which every virtuous woman holds so dearly and trample upon her honor and dignity. That relationship
is held sacred by many x x x. A sweetheart cannot be forced to engage in sexual intercourse against her
will. As a matter of fact, proof even of a prior history of a common-law marital relationship will not
prevail over clear and positive evidence of copulation by the use of force or intimidation.
30

Regardless, the most telling indication that would belie appellants sweetheart theory was the
fact that he had carnal knowledge of Rowena in the presence of Nimfa and his co-accused. It is most
unnatural for lovers to engage in the ultimate expression of their love for each other in the presence of
other people.
Appellant assails the procedural irregularities committed by the prosecution and by the trial
court. He claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting Rowena, the victim, when
the latter should have had her sane moments. As a consequence, the trial court deprived appellant of the
opportunity to cross-examine her when she allegedly declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it
was only appellant who raped her which declaration became the basis for the latters conviction.
Appellants contention is misplaced if not misleading. The basis of his conviction was not
Rowenas declaration before the Chief of Police but rather Nimfas testimony before the trial court that
it was him who raped Rowena, among others.
[16]
In fact, the trial court found, thus:
x x x The evidence adduced by the parties in this case disclosed that accused Roberto Padrigone, a.k.a.
Roberto San Miguel, Jocel Ibanita, Michael San Antonio and Abel Triumpante entered the dwelling of
the Contridas sisters at 3:00 a.m. of January 3, 1995, and at knifepoint successively raped Rowena
Contridas, a 16 year old lass. The victim became insane after the incident and was not able to testify in
Court. Nimfa Contridas, her fourteen year old sister, who was also present that time narrated the
incident when her elder sisters innocence was forcibly violated. Accused interposed the defense of
denial and alibi. x x x
The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused Roberto Padrigone ravished
Rowena Contridas against her will and consent, and with the use of a bladed weapon.
[17]

Besides, the non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as suppression
of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both
parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the
suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
[18]

Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the opportunity
to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed
to call her to the witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from Acute Psychotic
Depressive Condition and thus cannot stand judicial proceedings yet.
[19]
The non-presentation,
therefore, of Rowena was not willful. Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also
present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister.
Appellant cannot claim that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of Rowenas
statement as recorded in the police blotter. His conviction was based on the trial courts findings of
facts and assessment of the witnesses credibility. Well-settled is the rule that the findings of facts and
assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position
of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand
while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe
the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or
the scant or full realization of an oath, all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a
witness honesty and sincerity. The trial courts findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in
the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results of the
case.
[20]

Besides, in rape cases where the offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages of
twelve to sixteen, we have consistently held that the victims version of what transpired deserves
credence, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to
which such a grueling experience as a court trial, where they are called upon to lay bare what perhaps
should be shrouded in secrecy, exposed them to. This is not to say that an uncritical acceptance should
be the rule. It is only to emphasize that skepticism should be kept under control.
[21]

Nonetheless, no young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was ravished and her
honor tainted unless the same were true, for it would be instinctive on her part to protect her honor and
obtain justice for the wicked acts committed upon her.
[22]
Not to be overlooked is the complainants
willingness to face police investigators and to submit to a physical examination which are eloquent and
sufficient affirmations of the truth of her charge.
[23]

As regards the matter of damages, the trial court ordered accused-appellant to indemnify the
offended party, Rowena Contridas, the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages.
[24]
In People v. Belga,
[25]
it was held that civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the
fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on
different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. Thus,
consistently with present case law which treats the imposition of civil indemnity as mandatory upon a
finding of rape, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the additional amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00)
pesos as civil indemnity ex delicto.
[26]

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the assailed Decision, finding accused-appellant Roberto
Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is
ordered to pay Rowena Contridas civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 in addition to moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.





31

G.R. No. 103547 July 20, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO MALLARI y SANCHEZ, accused-appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
Accused-appellant Romeo Mallari y Sanchez, also known as "Romy Toyo" or "Meo," was charged with
murder in an information that reads as follows:
That on or about December 9, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill
and with treachery and evidentpremeditation, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon one ALFREDO MENDOZA Y ESTRELLA, by then and there
stabbing the latter with a bladed weapon on the chest thereby inflicting the latter
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
1

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty." Whereupon, trial on the merits ensued.
Theprosecution presented Wilfredo Eyas, an alleged eyewitness; Pfc. Norberto Obrero of the
Investigation Division and Dr. Marcial Ceido, Medico Legal Officer, both of the Western Police
District. The defense, on the other hand, presented accused-appellant himself and his father Pedro
Mallari.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
At 8:30 in the evening of December 9, 1990, Alfredo Mendoza, Wilfredo Eyas, and Ricardo Borja were
having a drinking spree at the corner of Claro M. Recto and Elcano Streets, Binondo, Manila.
2
Eyas sat
in front of Mendoza about an armslength away while Borja sat on his right.
3
About four (4) meters away
was the pushcart owned by a certain Aling Vicky where they bought
beer.
4
Mendoza, Eyas and Borja were drinking for more or less thirty (30) minutes and consumed six
(6) bottles of beer.
5
While Mendoza was pouring beer into his glass, accused-appellant suddenly
appeared from behind Mendoza and stabbed him on the chest once with a pointed weapon.
6
After
stabbing Mendoza, accused-appellant casually walked away and then fled from the scene.
Eyas ran after accused-appellant but when the latter saw Eyas running after him, he turned around and
ran after Eyas instead. Afraid, Eyas retraced his steps and returned to where he left his wounded
comrade.
7

Mendoza, by then, had already been brought to Mary Johnston Hospital where he was pronounced dead
on arrival. The guard on duty called up the homicide section of the Western Police District and reported
the stabbing incident. Responding to the call, Pfc. Norberto Obrero and Pat. Henry Nuez went to the
hospital where they saw Bartolome Castro and Joey Angeles who claimed to have been likewise stabbed
by "Romy Toyo" on C.M. Recto and Elcano, Streets, Binondo, Manila. They likewise learned that a
certain Alejandro Quintana was also stabbed dead by "Romy Toyo" on the same street corner.
At around 9:30 in the evening of December 9, 1990, the police investigators went to the crime
scene where they were informed by a certain Aling Vicky that Wilfredo Eyas was one of the drinking
companions of the victim. They sought Eyas but the latter only told them his name and address and did
not give any statement regarding the incident. Eyas knew accused-appellant was then still at large and a
notorious killer.
Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Marcial Ceido autopsied the cadaver of Mendoza. According to him,
Mendoza died of a "penetrating stab wound right anterior thorax appearing at the right venticle of the
heart."
8
In his opinion, the relative position of the wound would be more in line with the theory that the
assailant could have been standing when he attacked his seated victim.
9

Based on the information gathered, Pfc. Obrero prepared the "Advance Information" naming "Romy
Toyo" or "Meo" as the suspect.
On January 7, 1991, operatives of the Patrol Division of the Western Police District apprehended
accused-appellant in connection with a robbery with homicide case.
10
Apprised of the apprehension,
Pfc. Obrero asked Eyas and Borja to identify him. Eyas pointed to accused-appellant in a police line-up
of seven persons as the killer of Alfredo Mendoza. On the basis of the identification, accused-appellant
was formally charged for the killing of Alfredo Mendoza.
Accused-appellant denied knowing Alfredo Mendoza or killing him. He confirmed being called "Romy
Toyo" by his family and friends but denied called "Meong."
11
He claimed he was resting in his house at
J.P. Rizal St., Makati on the day the stabbing occured.
12

Accused-appellant also testified that he was invited to the Makati Police Station where he was informed
of the charge of murder against him.
13
He admitted being made to join a police line-up twice in the
Western Police District Station but denied that Eyas pointed or identified him. He further alleged that he
did not even see Eyas during the police line-up.
14
He claimed that the police officers maltreated him
while in detention and forced him to admit the charges filed against him.
15

In addition, accused-appellant alleged that Pfc. Obrero demanded money supposedly for the dropping of
charges against him. Since the money given by his father and sister was not enough, only three (3) out of
five (5) charges against him were dropped.
16

32

Accused-appellant claimed he only met Ricardo Borja, who was then also detained at the City Jail, for
the first time when he appeared before the trial court in connection with his case.
17

Pedro Mallari, father of accused-appellant, testified that he accompanied his son to the police station and
pleaded with Pfc. Obrero to help his son. However, Pfc. Obrero told him the case was already out of his
hands. He admitted offering money to the policeman for the dropping of the cases against his son.
18

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Alfredo Mendoza in the amount of
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
19

The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE FAILURE TO PRODUCE BORJA TO TESTIFY IS TANTAMOUNT TO A
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 131 WHILE BEING AT THE
SAME TIME A GROSS VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
THE ACCUSED TO COMPULSORY PROCESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO
WITNESS EYA'S TESTIMONY.
A] WITNESS EYA'S ACCOUNT OF THE STABBING DOES
NOT JIBE WITH THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF THE
MEDICO-LEGAL OFFICER AND IT FURTHERMORE
DEFIES HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
B] TREACHERY NECESSARILY WAS NOT PROVEN.
C] THERE WAS FAILURE TO PROVE EYA'S PRESENCE
AT THE TIME OF THEINCIDENT.
D] THE LACK OF PROOF OF ILL-MOTIVE ON EYAS'S
PART IS NOT REQUIRED IN THIS CASE CONTRARY TO
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION.
E] EYA'S TESTIMONY IS INCREDIBLE, AND FRAUGHT
WITH INCONSISTENCIES.
III
THE FINDING OF GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IS PERFORCE
EQUALLY ERRONEOUS.
20

This Court is not persuaded. Consequently, accused-appellant's conviction stands.
First: Contrary to the assertion of the defense, the prosecution is not guilty of suppression of evidence.
The disputable presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced is not even
applicable in the instant case. It is extant from the records that the prosecution has satisfactorily
established its case against accused-appellant through the sole testimony of Wilfredo Eyas. Hence, there
is no more necessity to present Borja as his testimony would only be corroborative, if not cumulative.
In People v. Paga
21
citing People v. de Jesus,
22
this Court has ruled that "the adverse presumption
arising from suppression of evidence is not applicable when the evidence is merely corroborative or
cumulative and/or likewise available to the defense." In the instant case, Borja was not a material
witness but merely a corroborative one. If at all, Borja would only confirm the matters already testified
to by Eyas. It should be noted that Borja was a drinking companion of Mendoza and Eyas and in all
likelihood, would only testify on what he saw during the incident which would not have been
substantially or significantly different from what Eyas had testified on. In any event, it was within the
prerogative of the prosecution whom to present as witness.
More importantly, Borja was at the disposal of both the prosecution and the defense. Both parties
subpoenaed Borja but the latter failed to appear at both times. The defense did not proffer proof that the
prosecution prevented Borja from testifying. There is therefore no basis for it to conclude that the
prosecution is guilty of suppression of evidence.
The defense was not short of alternative remedies for their failure to compel Borja to appear before the
court. They could have asked that Borja be cited for contempt, or if they were really desperate to
disprove the eyewitness account of Eyas, they could have summoned other witnesses aside from Borja
because, to borrow the words of the defense, "there are of course others who have witnessed the
crime."
23
In People v. Jumanoy,
24
this Court held:
The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the information did
not constitute, contrary to the contention of the accused, suppression of evidence.
The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses to be
presented for the prosecution. If the prosecution has several witnesses, as in the
instant case, the prosecution need not present all of them but only as many as may
be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the
33

accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may,
therefore, be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature. This Court has
ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would not constitute
suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecution's case.
Regardless, the well-entrenched rule is that the testimony of a lone eyewitnesses, if found positive and
credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction especially when the testimony bears the
earmarks of truth and sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward
manner. It has been held that witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered; hence, it is not at all
uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness. For although
the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is
not necessarily with the greater number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and
positive testimony of a single witness. Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary only when there are
reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been
inaccurate.
25
The lower court found nothing to indicate that Eyas falsified the truth or that his
observation had been inaccurate.
Second: The defense posits that it was highly incredible for accused-appellant to have stabbed his victim
in the manner described by Eyas without him leaning back or touching the shoulders of his victim.
Accused-appellant argues, "(t)o produce that mortal wound by using only one hand and without
touching the other parts of the body of the intended victim, the wielder of the knife must first lean back
in order to gain enough momentum to produce the force required to inflict such kind of a stab wound.
Either that or hang on to any part of the victim's body with one hand and then plunge the knife at (sic)
the chest with the other. In this case, no such leaning back was shown by the witness nor was there any
proof given by the witness showing that the killer clinged (sic) to the victim before delivering the fatal
blow."
26

This reasoning is flawed. It presupposes that the demonstration in the trial court as to how accused-
appellant supposedly stabbed the victim was squarely and exactly the same on all points with the actual
stabbing. The defense exaggerates the point that accused-appellant did not lean back before plunging the
pointed instrument nor did so without touching the shoulders of the victim in order to forcefully deliver
the fatal blow. Suffice it to say that the cold pages of the records of this case do not graphically convey
every minute detail that transpired in the lower courts. Not every fearful glance or guilty sigh of the
accused nor the resigned and restrained anguish of the victim is reflected and given life in the records.
This is precisely the reason why this Court has often relied on the factual findings of the trial courts.
Corollary to this, the court a quo found:
After a minutiose and incisive consideration and judicious assessment of the
evidence marshalled by the Prosecution, more particularly the testimony of Wilfredo
Eyas, the Court found, and so holds that, indeed, the Prosecution was able to prove
that it was Accused who stabbed the deceased, Alfredo Mendoza, on the chest which
caused the latter's death (Exhibits "G" and "H" and "H-I"). Wilfredo Eyas was
barely armslenght from in front of Alfredo Mendoza and positioned himself on the
side of the latter and then stabbed Alfredo Mendoza on the chest, once, with a five-
inch knife (minus the handle). The place where the stabbing occurred was illumined
by the light emanating from the 100-watt bulb hanging from the pushcart of Aling
Vicky behind Wilfredo Eyas where the latter, Ricardo Borja and Alfredo Mendoza
were having a drinking spree. Considering the proximity of Wilfredo Eyas to the
deceased when the Accused stabbed the latter and the lighting conditions in the
vicinity at the time, there is no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court of the
identification of the Accused as the perpetrator of the macabre stabbing. Wilfredo
Eyas has pointed to and identified the Accused in a police line-up of seven (7)
persons on January 9, 1991, at the Homicide Section of the Western Police District
as the person who stabbed Alfredo Mendoza (Exhibits "J" and "J-I"). When
Wilfredo Eyas testified before the Court, he spontaneously and unerringly pointed to
and identified the Accused when asked by the Assistant City Prosecutor to identify
and point, from among the persons inside the courtroom, to be the person who
stabbed Alfredo Mendoza.
There is no shred of evidence in the record and the Accused adduced none to prove
that Wilfredo Eyas had any pernicious or devious motive to fabricate and concoct
the charge against the Accused and tergervisate (sic) his testimony before the Court.
The barefaced fact that Wilfredo Eyas and Alfredo Mendoza are friends is not
enough to taint the testimony of Wilfredo Eyas. Absent such ill-motive, the
testimony of Wilfredo Eyas must be accorded by the Court full credit and probative
value.
27

Besides, the medical findings corroborated the testimony of Eyas particularly on the manner by which
the stabbing was committed. Eyas's narration complemented the medical finding's description of the
wounds inflicted upon the victim. In addition, the finding that the victim's stomach contained a liquid
substance of alcoholic odor confirmed the fact that the victim was drinking beer when accused-appellant
suddenly and unexpectedly lunged at him.
Third: The defense argues that Eyas's presence at the crime scene was not proven considering that Aling
Vicky, supposedly the policeman's source of information, was not presented before the Court thereby
making the policeman's testimony of doubtful credibility for being hearsay. We disagree. When Pfc.
Obrero said they were informed by a certain Aling Vicky that Eyas was one of the drinking companions
of the victim, he was only testifying that they were able to talk to a certain Aling Vicky. In so saying, he
was not asserting that Eyas was present at the crime scene. Under our Rules of Evidence, this is
considered an independently relevant statement and an exception to the hearsay rule. In People
v. Cusi, Jr.
28
this Court had occasion to rule that "(w)hile the testimony of a witness regarding a
statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement,
is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely
to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement."
34

Besides, there was no need to present Aling Vicky as Eyas himself categorically testified that he was at
the crime scene at the time it was committed and positively identified accused-appellant as the lone
assailant. The trial court believed Eyas's version finding him more credible than accused-appellant. The
Court sees no reason to disturb this finding. It is well-entrenced that when the issue boils down to
credibility, the findings of trials courts is accorded due weight and respect because of its unique position
to properly observe the deportment of every witness during trial.
Fourth. The inconsistencies referred to by the defense were inconsequential and trivial. The points that
mattered most in Eyas's testimony were his presence at the crime scene, his identification of accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime, and his credible and corroborated narration of accused-
appellant's manner of stabbing Mendoza. The inconsistencies pointed out by the defense referred only to
events occurring after the commission of the crime.
As to Eyas's apparent inconsistency in his description of the weapon, suffice it to say that the alleged
inconsistency, assuming there was one, is not fatal to the case at bar. In fact, Eyas's account that a bladed
weapon was used corresponds with the medico-legal officer's finding that the fatal thrust was delivered
using a pointed instrument. Be that as it may, the description of the weapon used in perpetrating the
crime was not essential in establishing the guilt of accused-appellant. Even without said description, all
the elements of the crime of murder have already been satisfactorily established. Inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy their credibility.
Such minor inconsistencies even manifest truthfulness and candor and erase any suspicion of rehearsed
testimony.
29

Fifth: The trial court correctly found that treachery attended the commission of the crime. "There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crime against the person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make."
30
In the instant case, accused-appellant stealthily approached the seated Mendoza from behind
while the latter was pouring beer into his glass. The stabbing was executed swiftly and lasted less than a
minute. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack even failed to forewarn or arouse any alarm
from Mendoza's drinking companions. Because of the suddenness by which the crime was committed,
Mendoza did not have any opportunity to defend himself. Accused-appellant deliberately approached
Mendoza from behind to avoid any risk for himself and to ensure its execution. Clearly, the attack was
treacherous. InPeople v. Mario Villanueva Y
Faustino
31
this Court held:
The victim was shot from behind by one who proceeded stealthily and quickly. The
victim was not aware of any impending attack against his person, and even Adelfa
Nacional, who had seen MARIO approach her husband, was surprised by the
suddenness with which MARIO shot her husband. Under these circumstances, the
victim was clearly deprived of opportunity to defend himself, thus ensuring the
execution of the offense without risk to MARIO. Hence, there was treachery.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 44, Manila, finding
accused-appellant Romeo Mallari y Sanchez GUILTY of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Alfredo Mendoza P50,000.00 and to pay the
costs, is AFFIRMED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
















35

G.R. No. 122899 June 8, 2000
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and G.T.P. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
BUENA, J .
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails (1) the amended
decision of public respondent Court of Appeals
1
dated 03 July 1995 in CA-GR CV No. 33395
affirming the trial court's judgment ordering herein petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(hereafter, METROBANK) to release/cancel the real estate mortgage constituted over the subject
property, and (2) the respondent court's resolution dated 04 December 1995 denying petitioner
METROBANK's motion for reconsideration.
The subject property is a parcel of land in Diliman, Quezon City consisting of six hundred ninety (690)
square meters originally owned by businessman Tomas Chia under Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
16753 (106901) of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City. Saddled with debts and business reverses,
Mr. Chia offered the subjectproperty for sale to private respondent G.T.P. Development Corporation
(hereafter, GTP), with assumption of the mortgage indebtedness in favor of petitioner METROBANK
secured by the subject property.
Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Bernardo Atienza, acting in behalf of respondent GTP,
went to the METROBANK branch in Quiapo, Manila sometime in the last week of August 1980 to
inquire on Mr. Chia's remaining balance on the real estate mortgage. METROBANK obliged with a
statement of account of Mr. Chia amounting to about P115,000.00 as of August, 1980.
The deed of sale
2
and the memorandum of agreement
3
between Mr. Chia and respondent GTP were
eventually executed and signed on 04 September 1980 in the office of Atty. Atienza. Twelve (12) days
later, or on 16 September 1980, Atty. Atienza went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch and paid one
hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen pesos and seventy-one centavos (P116,416.71),
4
for
which METROBANK issued an official receipt acknowledging payment.
This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the
subject property despite repeated requests from Atty. Atienza, thus prompting respondent GTP to file on
October 17, 1980 an action for specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia.
In answer to the complaint, Mr. Chia denied having executed any deed of sale in favor of respondent
GTP involving the subject property. Petitioner for its part justified its non-release of the real estate
mortgage (1) upon the advise of Mr. Chia that he never executed any sales agreement with respondent
GTP, and (2) by the fact that there are other loans incurred by Mr. Chia which are also secured by the
subject property.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the regional trial court on 11 December 1990 granting the reliefs
prayed for by respondent GTP as plaintiff, viz:
WHEREFORE, after a careful and thorough study of the record, this Court holds that in view
of the facts contained in the records, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and
against defendants, ordering
1. Defendant Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. to execute the release or cancellation
of the real estate mortgages executed by the deceased defendant Tomas Chia and his
wife, defendant Vicenta Chia, over the property described in TCT No. 106901 of the
registry of deeds for Quezon City;
2. Defendants to surrender or deliver the owner's duplicate copy of said TCT No.
106991; and,
3. Defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P10,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
The counterclaims set up by both defendants are dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
5

On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated 24 October 1994
6
reversing the trial
court's 11 December 1990 judgment, ruling in the main that the one hundred sixteen thousand four
hundred sixteen pesos and seventy-one centavos (P116,416.71) paid by respondent GTP to petitioner
METROBANK did not extinguish the real estate mortgage inasmuch as there are other unliquidated past
due loans secured by the subject property.
With this unfavorable turn of events, respondent GTP, on 07 November 1994,
7
filed before respondent
Court of Appeals a "motion for reconsideration with alternative prayer to require METROBANK to
furnish appellee (GTP) of the alleged unpaid balance of Mr. Chia." At the re-scheduled date of oral
arguments on 08 March 1995 where METROBANK was supposed to bring before the respondent Court
the current statement of the mortgage debt of Mr. Chia secured by the deeds of mortgage sought to be
released, METROBANK's counsel did not appear; only the lawyers of respondent GTP and Mr. Chia
appeared. Thus, the Court required GTP's counsel to file a memorandum in lieu of oral arguments in
support of its motion for reconsideration.
8
GTP filed its memorandum on March 17, 1995
9
to which a
reply memorandum was filed by METROBANK on April 10, 1995.
10

36

On 03 July 1995,
11
the now assailed amended decision was rendered reconsidering the original 24
October 1994 Decision and thus affirming the 11 December 1990 judgment of the regional trial court.
Respondent Court of Appeals took a second hard look at the evidence on hand and seriously considered
METROBANK's refusal to specify any unpaid debt secured by the subject property, in concluding anew
that "the present case for specific performance is well-grounded, absent indubitable showing that the
aforesaid amount of P116,416.71 paid by appellee on September 16, 1980 did not suffice to pay in full
the mortgage debt assumed under the Deed of Absolute Sale, with assumption of mortgage, it inked with
the late Tomas Chia. There is therefore merit in its motion for reconsideration at bench." Petitioner
METROBANK is now before us after its motion for reconsideration of the 03 July 1995 amended
decision was denied by respondent Court of Appeals per Resolution of 04 December 1995.
12

We find no compelling reasons to disturb the assailed decision.
We quote with favor the following pronouncements of respondent Court of Appeals in the Amended
Decision, thus:
. . . . In the case under scrutiny, we are convinced that We erred in reversing the appealed
judgment despite the finding that subject property covered by TCT 106901 Quezon City
had been sold, in a manner absolute and irrevocable, by the spouses, Tomas Chia and Vicenta
Chan, to plaintiff-appellee, and on September 16, 1980, the latter complied with its contractual
obligation thereunder by paying the total mortgage debt it assumed, amounting according to
Metrobank itself, to P116,416.71, as of September 16, 1980.
All things studiedly viewed in proper perspective, we are of the opinion, and so rule, that
whatever debts or loans mortgagor Chia contracted with Metrobank after September 4, 1980,
without the conformity of plaintiff-appellee, could not be adjudged as part of the mortgage
debt the latter so assumed. We are persuaded that the contrary ruling on this point in Our
October 24, 1994 decision would be unfair and unjust to plaintiff-appellee because, before
buying subject property and assuming the mortgage debt thereon, the latter inquired from
Metrobank about the exact amount of the mortgage debt involved.
The stipulation in subject Deeds of Mortgage that mortgagors' debts subsequently obtained
would be covered by the same security became inapplicable, when mortgagor sold to appellee
the mortgaged property with the knowledge of the mortgagee bank. Thus, since September 4,
1980, it was obvious that whatever additional loan mortgagor got from Metrobank, the same
was not chargeable to and collectible from plaintiff-appellee. It is then decisively clear that
Metrobank is without any valid cause or ground not to release the Deeds of Mortgage in
question, despite full payment of the mortgage debt assumed by appellee.
13

Petitioner METROBANK is estopped from refusing the discharge of the real estate mortgage on the
claim that the subject property still secures "other unliquidated past due loans." In Maneclang
vs. Baun,
14
this Court enumerated the requisites for estoppel by conduct to operate, to wit:
1. there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts;
2. the representation must have been with knowledge of the facts;
3. the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; and
4. it must have been with the intention that the other party would act upon it.
Respondent GTP, thru Atty. Atienza, requested from METROBANK that he be furnished a copy of the
full indebtedness secured by the real estate mortgage.
15
In response thereto, petitioner METROBANK
issued a statement of account as of September 15, 1980
16
which amount was immediately settled and
paid the next day amounting to P116,416.71. Petitioner METROBANK is thus barred from taking a
stand inconsistent with its representation upon which respondent GTP, as an innocent third person to the
real mortgage agreement, placed exclusive reliance. Respondent GTP had the reasonable right to rely
upon such representations as true, considering that it had no participation whatsoever in the mortgage
agreement and the preparation of the statement of account, coupled with the expectation that a reputable
banking institution such as petitioner METROBANK do conduct their business concerns in the highest
standards of efficiency and professionalism. For an admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against a person relying thereon. A
party may not go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied
upon them. In the law of evidence, whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief,
he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
17

Just as decisive is petitioner METROBANK's failure to bring before respondent Court of Appeals the
current statement evidencing what it claims as "other unliquidated past due loans" at the scheduled
hearing of 8 March 1995. It was a golden opportunity, so to speak, lost for petitioner METROBANK to
defend its non-release of the real estate mortgage. Thus, the following pronouncements of this Court
in Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals et. al,
18
speaking thru Mr. Justice Ricardo
Francisco,
19
find rightful application, viz.
It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a
liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature
must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to
produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced would operate to
his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. . . .
No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it
exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive
that the fact does not exist.
x x x x x x x x x
37

Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to establish the ultimate fact
that the evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be affected by the proof, with an
opportunity to do so, fails to deny or explain them, they may well be taken as admitted with all
the effect of the inferences afforded. . . .
The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own control, and
refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable construction upon
his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as claimed by the
opposing party.
Verily, petitioner METROBANK's omission to present its evidence only created an adverse inference
against its cause. Therefore, it cannot now be heard to complain since respondent Court extended a
reasonable opportunity to petitioner METROBANK that it did not avail.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The amended decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 3
July 1995 as well as its resolution of 4 December 1995 is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.






























38

G.R. No. 142932 May 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOEL GONZALES, JOSEPH BERNALDEZ, and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, accused,
JOEL GONZALES and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, accused-appellants
MENDOZA, J .:
This is an appeal from the decision,
1
dated February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial
Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental, insofar as it finds accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo
Bernaldez guilty as principals of the complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentences each of
them to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Nicanor Suralta in the amounts of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P2,425.00, plus the costs of the proceedings.
Accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez were charged with Joseph Bernaldez with
robbery with homicide under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code in an information which alleged -
That on or about July 5, 1992, in the Municipality of San Isidro, Province of Davao Oriental,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of violence and intimidation, with intent to gain, in conspiracy with one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away "Seiko" diver's
watch valued at P1,000.00, one "Sanyo" cassette valued at P600.00 and cash amounting
to P2,725.00, with a total value of FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE
(P4,325.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, belonging to Nicanor Suralta to thedamage and
prejudice of his heirs, represented by his widow, Carolita U. Suralta in the aforestated sum;
and on the occasion thereof, the said accused, armed with an unlicensed handgun and a knife,
with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot with said firearm one NICANOR SURALTA, thereby inflicting upon the latter wounds
which caused his death.1wphi1.nt
CONTRARY TO LAW.
2

When arraigned on December 1, 1992, the three entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon they were
tried.
3

On June 4, 1992, the accused filed a Joint Petition with Leave of Court for Reinvestigation, which the
court granted. As a result of the reinvestigation, a Motion to Dismiss with respect to accused Joseph
Bernaldez was filed. On September 9, 1993, the court issued an order stating -
On record is a motion to dismiss dated September 7, 1993 filed by OIC 1st Asst.
Prov'l. Prosecutor Pableo B. Baldoza. Finding the grounds stated therein to be well-taken and
in order, said motion is granted.
WHEREFORE, the case against accused Joseph Bernaldez only is hereby ordered dismissed.
The Provincial Warden is hereby directed to release immediately from custody the person of
Joseph Bernaldez, if there is no other case that will warrant his further confinement in jail.
SO ORDERED.
4

Thereafter, trial proceeded against accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez.
The facts are as follows:
At about 9:30 o'clock in the evening of July 5, 1992, the spouses Nicanor and Carolita Suralta had
visitors at their house in Bagsac, Manikling, San Isidro, Davao Oriental. Nicanor was having drinks with
Arsenio Abonales, Bobong Lamanilao, and Nicasio Lamanilao when two armed men, one carrying a
gun and the other a knife, suddenly entered the house through the kitchen door. The one carrying a gun
had a bonnet over his face, with only his eyes exposed, while the other one carrying a knife had the
lower half of his face covered with a handkerchief. The knife-wielder held Chona, the third child of the
Suralta spouses, and announced a holdup. All persons in the house were ordered to go inside the
bedroom, about two meters away from the sala. There, the man with a gun demanded a gun and money
from Nicanor. Nicanor answered that he had no gun, but asked his wife to give money to the holduppers.
Carolita gave P2,100.00, which was intended to be deposited in the bank, to the knife-wielder, who
placed it in his pocket. Then the knife-wielder ransacked the cabinet and took the remaining amount
of P325.00, which was intended for the school expenses of the Suralta children. In addition, he took the
family's Sanyo cassette recorder and some clothes. The holduppers also divested Arsenio Abonales, one
of the guests, of his Seiko diver's wristwatch and then left.
5

As the holduppers were leaving, two gunshots rang out. Carolita thought that the first one was a mere
warning shot, but later Nicanor was heard moaning. Carolita became hysterical after seeing her husband
lying in a pool of his own blood. Nicanor was immediately brought to the Lupon Emergency Hospital
where he was given first aid. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Tagum Regional Hospital but he
eventually died.
6
The death certificate (Exh. B) states the cause of his death as -
Immediate Cause: CARDIO-RESPIRATORY ARREST
Antecedent Cause: MULTIPLE [GUNSHOT WOUNDS] PENETRATING ABDOMEN
PERFORATING WITH MASSIVE CONTAMINATION, PERFORATING CECUM,
APPENDECIAL TRANSECTION MESENTERIC VISSEL, ILEUM, JEJUNUM &
SIGMOID
39

Other significant conditions contributing to death: HYPOVOLEMIA.
7

The incident was reported to the San Isidro Police on the same night. Carolita Suralta and Arsenio
Abonales gave descriptions of the holduppers and told the responding police investigators that they
would be able to recognize the suspects if they saw them again.
8

On July 12, 1992, there was another holdup inside the ACF passenger bus compound in the neighboring
municipality of Magdug, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental. The police team sent to investigate the
incident was able to pick up suspects,
9
one of whom was accused-appellant Joel Gonzales. He was
wearing a wristwatch (Exh. A) and had a handgun (Exh. H). Other items, consisting of watches, a
cassette recorder (Exh. D), a chain saw, and spare parts, were recovered from his house, some of which
were claimed by passengers of the ACF bus line.
10

Police Inspector Arnold Malintad of Governor Generoso, head of the team investigating the robbery of
the ACF bus compound, informed Capt. Adane Sakkam, Police Chief of San Isidro, about the
apprehension of accused-appellant Gonzales and the recovery of the items from him. Accordingly, on
July 14, 1992, Capt. Sakkam, Carolita Suralta, and Arsenio Abonales proceeded to the Governor
Generoso Police Station. Carolita and Arsenio identified accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo
Bernaldez as the holduppers. Joel Gonzales was identified as the man armed with a gun who wore a
bonnet to cover his face, while Romeo Bernaldez was identified as the knife-wielder who wore a
handkerchief to cover the lower portion of his face.
11

Carolita volunteered that accused-appellant Bernaldez is in fact her nephew. Carolita and Arsenio said
that they were able to recognize the suspects despite their disguises because they were only one to two
meters away from each other during the holdup, and the rooms of the house were well-lighted.
12
In
addition, Carolita was able to identify the Sanyo cassette recorder (Exh. D) as the one taken from their
house because of the broken antennae and the name "Nick Suralta" written inside the battery
compartment. On the other hand, Arsenio likewise identified the Seiko diver's watch (Exh. A) as his.
13

Accused-appellants put up the defense of denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales testified that he was in Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso, Davao
Oriental the whole day of July 5, 1992 working in his mother-in-law's farm, piling coconut palm leaves
together with his brother-in-law. In the evening, he had supper in his house and slept there together with
his family.
14

On July 13, 1992, Gonzales was suffering from a fever. While he was sleeping, he was awakened by
Policeman Danny Cabanilas, Inspector Arnold Malintad and Eddie Tano, who took him to the Governor
Generoso police station in connection with a robbery in the ACF bus compound. At the police station,
he was investigated by Inspector Malintad and thereafter put in jail. While inside the jail, people came to
see him. Malintad pointed at him and asked a woman companion if he was one of the persons who
committed the robbery in San Isidro. The woman answered, "I do not know them." For this reason, both
Malintad and the woman left. However, upon their return, the woman said that she recognized the men
and pointed to him and accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez as those who were involved in the
robbery.
15

On July 31, 1992, accused-appellant Gonzales was taken to Mati by Policemen Ernesto Bahan and
Alfredo Castro, but, before reaching Mati, somewhere in Baas, they alighted from the jeep and he was
made to kneel. He was beaten up by Bahan and Castro with the use of an armalite and hit on the chest
and the back. He was then brought to the Mati Cemetery and there forced to confess. Thereafter, he was
placed inside an open tomb for 12 minutes and then he was taken to the Mati Municipal Jail. After three
days, he was taken to Governor Generoso. He denied participation in the crime and stated that the
cassette recorder and other items were not confiscated from him.
16

For his part, accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez claimed that at around 9:30 o'clock in the evening of
July 5, 1992, he was sleeping in his house in Tibanban, Governor Generoso together with his father,
mother, and two sisters. On July 13, 1998, he went to the Municipal Jail of Governor Generoso to
answer accusations by the police that he was concealing a firearm. At the police station, he was
investigated by Inspector Malintad for the firearm he allegedly kept, which he denied. He was later
placed in jail.
17
Inspector Malintad, however, testified that Bernaldez was actually arrested in his house
in Tibanban.
18

Romeo Bernaldez further testified that on July 14, 1992, Carolita Suralta, accompanied by Policemen
Sakkam and Malintad, went to the jail and made the prisoners stand up, after which they went to
Malintad's office. Then, the two returned to the jail cell after a few minutes and Carolita pointed to him
as among those involved in the robbery.
19

Romeo Bernaldez also said that his residence was approximately 25 kilometers from Manikling, San
Isidro, where the robbery with homicide took place, and could be reached by several means of land
transportation.
20

Except for accused-appellants, no other witness was presented by the defense.
Thereafter, SPO4 Ernesto Bahan was presented to rebut accused-appellant Joel Gonzales's testimony.
According to Bahan, at around 5 o'clock in the morning of July 21, 1992, he left for Governor Generoso
on official mission together with SPO3 Castro, SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, and PO3 Hassan, upon order of
his superior to fetch Joel Gonzales, per letter-request of Assistant Provincial Director Supt.
Melchisedeck Barggio. Acting on said letter-request, Judge Rodolfo Castro of Municipal Trial Court of
Mati ordered Inspector Malintad, the Chief of Police of Governor Generoso, to turn over Joel Gonzales.
The party left Sigaboy, Governor Generoso at past 11 o'clock in the morning and arrived in Mati at
around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of July 21, 1992. To support his statement, SPO4 Bahan read to the
court page 362 of the police blotter for July 21, 1992, 1350H, to wit:
40

SPO3 Bahan, SPO3 Castro, SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, PO3 Azan arrived [at the] Police Station
from Governor Generoso and brought in the person of Joel Gonzales regarding the request of
Chief Inspector Melchisedeck C Bargio PNP Davao Or Provincial Command, Mati Dvo Or to
Mun. Trial Court of Governor Generoso, Province of Davao Or duly signed by [Judge]
Rodolfo Castro to turn over the custody of accused to Mati Police Station for investigation, in
relati[on] to CC No. 7183 for Robbery with Homicide which is now pending in the Mun. Trial
Court of Mati, same the Chief of Police of Governor Generoso granted to be brought at Mati
Police Station provided that maximum security must be implemented and to be returned said
to Governor Generoso Police Station within three (3) days same said Joel Gonzales also
involved in Robbery with Homicide in CC No. 7183 as pinpointed by two witnesses subject is
hereby placed under police custody as per verbal order of OIC SPO1 Fortuna to the Jailer
guard "BJMP" SPO3 Cabillada.
21

SPO4 Bahan denied having taken accused-appellant Joel Gonzales to the Mati Cemetery. He said that
when they arrived in Mati, he immediately turned over Joel Gonzales to the Chief of Police, who then
turned him over to the investigating section.
22

He further testified that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales was taken to Mati in connection with Criminal
Case No. 7183. Although SPO4 Bahan admitted he had been administratively charged with maltreating
detention prisoners, he said the case was later dismissed and he was exonerated.
23

After trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as Principal[s] of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and hereby sentences
each of them to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided by
law, to indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of the victim, Nicanor Suralta, the sum
of P50,000.00, to indemnify also jointly and severally said heirs the sum of P2,425.00, plus
the costs of the proceedings.
The cassette [recorder] (Exhibit "D") is ordered returned to the Suralta family, while the
wristwatch (Exhibit "A") to Arsenio Abonales.
SO ORDERED.
24

Counsel for accused-appellant Joel Gonzales assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the
trial court:
I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECIDING THAT THE
ACCUSED WERE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II. THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION DURING THE TRIAL
ARE INADMISSIBLE IN LAW.
25

On the other hand, the Public Attorney's Office, on behalf of both accused-appellants, assigns the
following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
IDENTITIES OF THE ASSAILANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE
CRIME CHARGED BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
26

We find accused-appellants' contentions to be without merit.
After reviewing the records of this case, we find that the prosecution evidence establishes the guilt of
accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof of
the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons
or with force upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with animus
lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide in its
generic sense is committed. The offense becomes the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
under Art. 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery. Even the Public Attorney's Office concedes that the prosecution was successful in proving the
commission of the crime, questioning only the identification made by the prosecution witnesses of
accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
27

First. Accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred in giving credence to the identification made
by the two prosecution witnesses, Carolita Suralta and Arsenio Abonales. They argue that the manner by
which accused-appellants were identified was suggestive and showed partiality. They argue further that,
most often, the bereaved families of victims are not concerned with the accuracy of identification
because they are overwhelmed by passion for vindication, regardless of whether or not the suspect is the
real culprit.
This contention is without merit. We find no reason for setting aside the lower court's conclusion on the
accuracy and correctness of the witnesses' identification of the accused-appellants as the persons who
robbed the Suralta spouses and the couples' guest Arsenio Abonales and killed Nicanor Suralta. It is the
most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence to strive to ascertain the appearance of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body
movements of the assailants create a lasting impression on the victims' minds which cannot be easily
erased from their memory.
28
There is no evidence to show that the eyewitnesses were so paralyzed with
fear that they mistook accused-appellants for the men who robbed and killed the victims. On the
contrary, fear for one's life may even cause the witness to be more observant of his
41

surroundings.
29
Experience shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed
before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, attain a high degree of reliability in
identifying criminals.
30
The desire to see that justice is done will not be served should the witness
abandon his conscience and prudence and blame one who is innocent of the crime.
31

Indeed, prosecution witnesses positively and categorically identified accused-appellants as the armed
men who held them up on July 5, 1992 and killed the victim. There was no possibility of mistaken
identification because prosecution witnesses were able to observe their movements and their body built
and height despite the fact that accused-appellants covered their faces.
32
As Carolita Suralta testified:
COURT TO THE WITNESS:
Q You stated that one of the robbers was wearing a bonnet, is that right?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And at that time when he was wearing a bonnet, you were not able to identify him?
A I cannot recognize him, but I can recognize his voice and his actions.
Q Why is it that you can recognize his voice and his actions?
A When they got inside, Your Honor.
. . . .
Q How is it that you can recognize his voice and his movements that he is the accused Joel
Gonzales, considering that he was wearing a bonnet and he is not even your neighbor?
A Because at the time he said, "silence", I recognized his voice, Your Honor.
33

Accused-appellants' counsels attempted to confuse prosecution witnesses during the trial by using the
word "recognize" to simultaneously mean identification of face and knowledge of the name. But the
witnesses were able to stand their ground. We agree with private prosecutor that a mistake is likely when
one equates knowing the person by his movements and by his voice with knowing a person by his name.
Although the names of accused-appellants were supplied by the police, the witnesses nevertheless
recognized accused-appellants when they visited them in the Governor Generoso jail.
34
What is
important is not the ability of an eyewitness to give the true and correct names of the accused, but rather
his ability to identify the persons actually seen committing the offense.
35

Moreover, in the absence of proof that a witness is moved by improper motive, it is presumed that he
was not so moved and, therefore, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
36
That presumption has
not been overcome in this case. Consequently, the identification of accused-appellants as the killers of
Nicanor Suralta stands. Nor is motive for the killing important when there is no doubt as to the identity
of the perpetrators of the crime.
37
But here the motive is plain: the victim was killed to rob him of his
possessions.
Furthermore, alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive identification of
accused-appellants. The defense of denial and alibi, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the positive testimonies of credible
witnesses.
38

Second. Accused-appellant Gonzales contends that during the interrogation and investigation, he and his
co-appellant Romeo Bernaldez were not informed of their rights to remain silent and to secure the
services of counsel, in violation of 2 and 12, Art. III of the Constitution. Hence, their admission of the
commission of the crime is inadmissible in evidence against them.
This contention lacks merit.
Inspector Arnold Malintad testified that on July 14, 1992, accused-appellant Joel Gonzales was picked
up at around 8:00 a.m. near his residence in Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso. Accused-appellant
Gonzales had a handgun tucked in his waistline and was wearing a wristwatch. According to Inspector
Malintad, accused-appellant Gonzales admitted participation in the crime upon interrogation and
voluntarily surrendered the stolen goods to him.
ATTY. LADERA:
Q Where did you pick up Joel Gonzales?
A At Barangay Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso.
. . . .
Q In his residence?
A In the vicinity of his residence.
Q Where?
A At the barangay road.
42

Q Was he sitting or standing?
A He was standing.
Q He was not bringing anything?
A A handgun and a wristwatch.
Q When did you recover the cassette [recorder]?
A I told him to turn over the loot of the ACF.
Q You told the accused to turn over the loot[?]
A Yes.
. . . .
Q Where?
A He was apprehended with the gun and the wristwatch and I brought him to the police
station and interrogated him and after the interrogation, he accepted the commission of the
crime and he told me that he will voluntarily surrender the items in his house.
. . . .
Q When you went to the house of Joel Gonzales, when was that that you said he
voluntarily turned over the loot?
A On that date.
Q The time when you went to the house?
A Yes.
. . . .
Q Did you have any search warrant?
A I did not go inside the house.
Q How many of you went to the house?
A About ten (10).
Q You were armed?
A Yes.
Q You surrounded the house of Joel Gonzales?
A No, because it is only a matter of asking his wife to surrender the items.
39

To be sure, accused-appellants were already under custodial investigation when they made their
admissions to the police. At that point, the investigation had ceased to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and had began to focus on the guilt of a suspect and for this reason the latter were taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom in a substantial way.
40
Hence, the admissions made by
accused-appellants are inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Art. III, 2(1) and (3) of the Constitution.
However, the defense failed to raise its objections to the admissibility of these statements immediately,
as required by Rule 132, 36, when Inspector Malintad was presented as a witness for the prosecution or
when specific questions concerning the confession were asked of him. Consequently, accused-appellants
are deemed to have waived their right to object to the admissibility of Inspector Malintad's
testimony.
41
Indeed, it was even the defense counsel who provided the opportunity for Inspector
Malintad to elaborate on the circumstances of accused-appellant Gonzales' admission in the course of his
cross-examination of the said witness.
Inspector Malintad also claimed that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales told him that one of his
companions was Romeo Bernaldez. He said:
ATTY. LOPEZ: (CROSS EXAMINATION)
For accused Romeo Bernaldez.
. . . .
Q So, this Romeo Bernaldez was not a suspect in the Robbery?
A He was picked up later.
43

Q Where did you pick him up?
A At Tibanban.
Q Why did you pick him up?
A It was Joel Gonzales who told me.
Q You mean to tell us that Joel Gonzales told you that Romeo Bernaldez is one of his
companions?
A Yes and he told us that he is in Barangay Tibanban and we picked him up.
42

On the other hand, Capt. Sakkam testified that when he was in the Municipal Jail at the Police Station of
Governor Generoso in order to identify the suspects, he asked them who killed the victim and accused-
appellant Romeo Bernaldez answered that it was accused-appellant Joel Gonzales.
COURT:
. . . .
Q Were you able to talk with all the accused?
A When I saw them, I asked one of them as to who killed the victim, and the other one
answered - I was not responsible in the killing - and he said, "Joel Gonzales killed the victim".
Q Who was the one who told you that the one who shot the victim was Joel Gonzales?
A It was Romeo Bernaldez, the short one.
43

Such admission by accused-appellant Bernaldez may be taken as evidence against his co-appellant Joel
Gonzales. For the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
the accused orally admitted having committed the crime.
44

Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales also contends that Inspector Malintad had no warrant when the latter
conducted a search of his residence. He contends that the alleged items taken during the robbery in the
ACF bus compound and the cassette recorder and wristwatch are inadmissible in evidence against him.
This contention deserves no merit. As explained by Inspector Malintad, accused-appellant Joel Gonzales
voluntarily surrendered the stolen goods to him. When he went to the house of accused-appellant Joel
Gonzales, the watches, cassette recorder, chainsaw, and spare parts were given to him. What thus
happened was a consented search, which constitutes a waiver of the constitutional requirement for a
search warrant. It has been held that the right to be secure from an unreasonable search may be waived
either expressly or impliedly.
45
And when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
search and seizure, as in this case, the exclusionary rule (Art. III, 3(2)) in the Constitution does not
apply.
Third. Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales denies that the stolen goods had been taken from him. Inspector
Malintad testified that he recovered watches, a cassette recorder, a chainsaw, and spare parts from
accused-appellant Joel Gonzales when he arrested the latter in his house. There is no reason to doubt
Inspector Malintad's claim that the stolen items were indeed recovered from accused-appellant
Gonzales. These items were definitively identified by the owners as those taken from them. Between the
testimonies of the police officers, who enjoy the presumption of regularity in their duties, and the bare
denials of accused-appellants, we are more inclined to believe the police officers. This is true especially
considering that the police officers have not been shown to have any motive to testify falsely against
accused-appellants.
Rule 131, 3(j) of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides "that a person found in possession of a thing
taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that
things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him." Since the
subject items were found in the possession of accused-appellant Joel Gonzales, he is then presumed to
be the taker of the stolen items. Accused-appellant Gonzales was unable to satisfactorily explain his
possession of the stolen items.
All told, we hold the evidence in this case establishes the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable
doubt. Under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for
robbery with homicide ranges from reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the absence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was correctly imposed by the trial court on accused-appellants.
The Court likewise sustains the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim,
Nicanor Suralta, the same being in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
46
An additional amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be awarded in favor of the heirs of the victim. Such
damages require no further proof other than the death of the victim.
47
The restitution of the cash and of
the stolen items to their respective owners ordered by the trial court is affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial
Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental is AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellants
Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Nicanor Suralta theamounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P2,425.00 as restitution for the stolen cash, plus costs of the proceedings. The cassette
44

recorder is ordered returned to the heirs of Nicanor Suralta, and the wristwatch to Arsenio
Abonales.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.



















45

[G.R. No. 123186. July 9, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERIC MENDOZA and ANGELITO
BALAGTAS, accused, ERIC MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J .:
On May 18, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, 3rd Judicial Region, Branch 14, Malolos,
found
[1]
the two accused Eric Mendoza and Angelito Balagtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of robbery with rape in Criminal Case No. 1941-M-91. They were meted out a
prison term of Reclusion Perpetua and ordered to indemnify the victim, Andrelita Sto. Domingo, the
amount of P12,000 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral damages, plus costs. From this
decision,
[2]
only Eric Mendoza appealed.
[3]
Mendoza was indicted under the following Information:
[4]

"The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Eric Mendoza and Angelito
Balagtas of the crime of robbery with rape, penalized under the provisions of Art. 294,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1991, in the municipality of Sta. Maria, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with a knife, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each
other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of [sic] gain and
by means of violence, threats and intimidation enter the house of one Andrelita Sto.
Domingo and once inside, take, rob and carry away with them the following, to wit:
"1. cash amounting to - - - - - - P 2,000.00
2. one (1) necklace - - - - - - 2,000.00
3. one (1) set of earring - - - 2,000.00
4. one (1) ring - - - - - - - - - 1,500.00
5. one (1) wrist watch - - - - - 5,000.00
with the total value of P12,500.00, belonging to the said Andrelita Sto. Domingo, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the total amount of P12,500.00 and that
simultaneously or during the commission of robbery, the above named accused Angelito
Balagtas by means of violence, threats and intimidation have carnal knowledge of the said
Andrelita Sto. Domingo against her will and by means of force.
"That in the commission of this crime the aggravating circumstances were present, to
wit: (1) nocturnity, (2) superior strength and (3) with a [sic] use of a knife.
"Contrary to law."
At the trial, the prosecution presented private complainant Andrelita Sto. Domingo as its principal
witness. She testified as follows:
In the evening of August 22, 1991, private complainant's husband went to San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan to haul chicken. She retired to their bedroom. She was joined by her three (3) children, while
their maid went down to the basement to sleep.
[5]
The bedroom is on the elevated portion of their
bungalow-type house in Tumana, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, while another room is located in the
basement.
[6]
The toilet and bath in the bedroom had a grill-less window with glass jalousies that open to
the roof of the terrace.
[7]
The lights in the bedroom and the bathroom were on
[8]
at the time that she and
her children fell asleep that evening.
Private complainant woke up when she felt her thighs being rubbed. Thereupon, she saw two (2)
men in black jackets with their faces covered with handkerchiefs.
[9]
She described one of them as
medium built and the other as a small man. The medium-built man poked a 6-inch knife at her neck
and ordered her to open the vault inside the room.
[10]
The two men took the cash in the vault amounting
to P2,000.00 and jewelry worth P12,000.00.
[11]

Upon orders of the medium-built man, the small man untied the curtain band and handed the same
to him. While undoing the curtain, the handkerchief loosened, revealing the small man's face to be that
of Eric Mendoza.
[12]
Private complainant recognized him because he used to work in her uncle's steel
factory in Tumana, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
[13]
After the medium-built man had tied her hands with the
curtain band and gagged her with a torn t-shirt, the small man helped him carry private complainant to
the bathroom. It was then that she noticed the missing jalousie blades on the window.
[14]

The medium-built man sent the small man out of the bathroom, through the window, to stand
guard on the terrace roof.
[15]
Alone with private complainant inside the bathroom, the medium-built man
removed the handkerchief covering his face, raised her t-shirt and began sucking her breast. While
keeping the knife pointed at her neck, he forcibly removed her jogging pants and underwear, laid her on
the bathroom floor, and sexually abused her for about two minutes.
[16]
In the meantime, private
complainant could see the small man peeping through the window and watching her being raped.
[17]

After satisfying his lust, the medium-built man threatened to kill her and her family if she would
tell anyone about what had happened. He went out through the bathroom window and joined the small
man on the terrace roof.
[18]

In the early morning of August 23, 1991, private complainant's husband arrived and learned of the
incident from her. At about 10:00 o'clock that morning, they reported the crime to Mr. Rico Jude Sto.
Domingo, the Barangay Chairman of Tumana, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
[19]
On August 25, 1991, they also
informed the Sta. Maria Police of the incident, but they deliberately left out the details regarding the
rape to avoid public embarrassment.
[20]

They reconsidered later their decision to keep the rape a secret. On August 27, 1991, they went
to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where private complainant was examined by
Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr., a medico-legal officer.
[21]
On August 31, 1991, they returned to the Sta. Maria
Police Station and reported the rape.
[22]

46

Other prosecution witnesses included Dr. Arisala, Jr., the NBI medico-legal officer; Mr. Rico Jude
Sto. Domingo, the Barangay Chairman; and Mr. Rolando de Jesus, an uncle and neighbor of private
complainant.
On the witness stand, Dr. Arisala, Jr. confirmed his signature on Living Case Report No. MG-91-
863. He stated that there was no injury on private complainant's genital area. He made no conclusion,
however, as to whether or not she was raped, since in cases like hers where the hymen has been thinned
by several completed pregnancies, sexual intercourse no longer causes any injury or laceration to the
hymen.
[23]

Mr. Rico Jude Sto. Domingo has known Mendoza for six (6) years. He testified that on August
23, 1991, private complainant and her husband went to his house to report the robbery and rape
incident. He made the corresponding entry in the Barangay Blotter.
[24]
On August 25, 1991, Mendoza's
father presented his son to Mr. Sto. Domingo, who, thereupon, brought them to private complainant's
house. There, a confrontation ensued. Mendoza eventually admitted to having pointed the private
complainant's house to Balagtas as a possible object of robbery.
[25]
He said that Balagtas was his uncle
and identified him as the rapist.
[26]
After the confession, Mr. Sto. Domingo turned Mendoza over to the
Sta. Maria police before whom he revealed that Balagtas was from San Miguel, Bulacan. The Sta.
Maria police coordinated with the San Miguel police to arrest Balagtas.
Mr. Rolando de Jesus testified that the house of private complainant, who happens to be his niece,
is only one hundred (100) meters away from their house. Their houses are on the side of a private
road. While negotiating this road on his car in the evening of August 20, 1991, at about 8:00 o'clock,
Mr. de Jesus noticed two persons lingering at the back of private complainant's house. He recognized
one of them to be Mendoza who was seemingly showing to his companion the location of the windows
on the second floor of the house. Mendoza was specifically pointing at the window without iron grills
above the terrace roof.
[27]

There were no other witnesses for the defense except the accused themselves both of whom put up
similar claims of alibi.
Mendoza testified that he was in their house in Tumana, Sta. Maria, Bulacan with his grandparents
and cousins, Totoy, Rodel, Buboy and Ana in the early morning of August 23, 1991. He denied any
confrontation with private complainant at her house where he allegedly confessed his complicity in the
robbery incident. He claimed to have been brought by Mr. Sto. Domingo, the Barangay Chairman, to
the municipal building in August, 1991 where he was detained in a cell, investigated and forced to
admit his guilt after having been mauled for about fifteen (15) minutes.
Balagtas testified that in the early morning of August 23, 1991, he was in their house in
Pinambaran, San Miguel, Bulacan.
[28]
Less than a year after, he was brought to the municipal building of
Sta. Maria where he was, like Mendoza, mauled and forced to make a confession.
[29]
He also denied
that Mendoza was his nephew.
[30]

The trial court paid no heed to the defenses of Mendoza and Balagtas. It gave full credence to the
evidence of the prosecution which it found to have established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
trial court ruled, viz:
"In view of the foregoing evidence, the Court is morally convinced that the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. Although Eric Mendoza did
not participate in sexually abusing the victim, he and Angelito conspired and helped one
another commit the crime of Robbery with Rape.
The crime having been committed before the enactment of R.A. 7659 restoring death
penalty, the court can only impose the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Eric Mendoza and Angelito Balagtas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape. The Court imposes upon the
accused the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
To pay the offended party P12,000.00 actual damage and P100,000.00 moral damage with
costs.
SO ORDERED."
The records show that only Mendoza filed a notice of appeal. As to Balagtas, therefore, the trial
court judgment has become final and executory.
Mendoza assigns the following errors:
"I
"THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH RAPE.
"II
"THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ERIC MENDOZA HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
III
"THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE
PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ERIC MENDOZA."
[31]

This Court affirms the conviction of Mendoza for the crime of robbery with rape.
First. We are in accord with the trial court's evidentiary findings, largely based on private
complainant's testimony, that Mendoza participated as a principal in robbing her of the cash and
jewelries in their house vault. She was a veracious witness whose testimony was forthright, consistent
and credible. In a long line of cases, we have held that if the testimony of the rape victim is accurate
and credible, a conviction for rape may issue upon the sole basis of the victim's testimony because no
decent and sensible woman will publicly admit being a rape victim and thus run the risk of public
contempt unless she is, in fact, a rape victim.
[32]
In the instant case, private complainant's credibility can
47

not be doubted, not only because her testimony is corroborated by other prosecution witnesses, but also
because she had absolutely no motive to falsely implicate the accused.
[33]
A married woman with a
husband and three daughters would not publicly admit that she had been criminally abused unless that
was the truth.
Significantly, too, the private complainant made her statements to the Barangay Chairman and the
Sta. Maria Police immediately after the commission of the crime when she hardly had time or
opportunity to fabricate a falsehood.
Nonetheless, Mendoza assails the testimonies of Rico Jude Sto. Domingo and Rolando de Jesus as
biased because they are relatives of private complainant. But mere relationship to the victim is not a
ground to exclude a witness or reject his testimony, absent a showing of evil motive on his part to testify
falsely against the accused.
[34]
The defense, in this case, made no such showing, hence, the testimonies
of Sto. Domingo and de Jesus are worthy of full faith and credit.
[35]
In fact, as relatives of the victim,
they are naturally interested in implicating only the real culprits, for otherwise, the latter would thereby
gain immunity.
[36]
While revenge is a normal reaction in a person who has lost loved ones because of a
crime, it does not follow that the revenge would be directed aimlessly so as to include innocent
persons.
[37]

Second. We do not believe Mendoza's alibi. He insists that he was at home in the early morning
of August 23, 1991 with his grandparents and four (4) cousins. The defense, however, failed to put them
on the witness stand. Neither did they execute any statement under oath to substantiate Mendoza's alibi.
At any rate, we have consistently ruled that where an accused's alibi can only be confirmed by his
relatives, his denial of culpability deserves scant consideration, especially in the face of affirmative
testimonies of credible prosecution witnesses as to his presence in the crime scene.
[38]
For his alibi to be
considered favorably, Mendoza must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime took
place but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it
was committed.
[39]
By his own admission, Mendoza lives in Tumana, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, or in the
same area as the victim's residence. It was easy for Mendoza to negotiate the distance between his
house and the victim's house. Mendoza's alibi cannot exculpate him.
Third. Mendoza claims that he was mauled into confessing culpability for the robbery. In the first
place, there is no proof at all of the mauling incident to support his charge. More importantly,
independent of that confession, there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of his participation as co-
conspirator in committing the robbery. To repeat, the victim positively and unequivocally identified him
and her testimony has been corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses.
Fourth. Mendoza underscores that the stolen items were not recovered from him by the police. It
has never been the rule in this jurisdiction, however, that such a fact can diminish the guilt of a robber
whose complicity in the crime has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption
that a person in whose custody are found stolen items, is prima facie the robber or the thief,
[40]
does not
translate into a converse presumption that a person indicted for robbery or theft should be acquitted
when the authorities do not recover the stolen items from him. The production in court of the stolen
property is not an indispensable requisite to sustain conviction as long as there is clear proof of the
commission of the crime charged.
[41]

Fifth. Mendoza claims that he has been charged and convicted of a crime he did not commit,
considering that he did not rape Andrelita Sto. Domingo. If at all he were guilty of a crime, it was only
of robbery, not robbery with rape.
We disagree.
Robbery with rape is a special complex crime punished under the second paragraph of Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
"Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons--Penalties.--Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer:
"x x x x x x x x x
"2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on
occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 or article
263 shall have been inflicted: Provided, however, That when the robbery accompanied
with rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"x x x x x x x x x" (underscoring ours)
When two or more persons are charged as co-conspirators in the crime of robbery with rape, the
conspiracy to rob is all that is needed to be proven to punish them all as principals in the crime of
robbery with rape. The rape may have been perpetrated by only one of them, but they will all be
convicted of robbery with rape, because the rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed
as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals
of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them actually took part in the rape.
[42]
It is enough
that robbery shall have been accompanied by rape to be punishable under the The Revised Penal Code
which does not differentiate whether the rape was committed before, during or after the
robbery.
[43]
Thus, we have held in one case that where one of the accused acted as guard while rape was
being committed on the occasion of the robbery, he is guilty as co-principal of the crime of robbery
with rape.
[44]
As we explained in the 1918 case of United States v. Tiongco:
" x x x [T]he robbers seizing the money and the other effects they found in said house, two
of them sullied the honor of the two women living therein, and the companions of the two
men who committed the rape made no opposition nor prevented these latter from
consummating this other crime, apparently unconnected with and unrelated to that of
robbery, but which, as well as sanguinary crimes, is often committed on such occasions,
and it is for this reason that the penal law, in odium of such offenses against property and
chastity, has considered them complex and punished them by one single penalty.
"x x x The defendants Rufu Tiongco and Pedro Huerva, who took no part in the rape of the
women Juaneza and Eusula, cannot be excepted from this penalty for the reason that the
48

penal law does not require the condition that the rape be committed prior to, or
simultaneously with the robbery, it being sufficient that this crime be perpetrated on the
occasion of the robbery. So the law says, in the definition of the crime, that when the
robbery is accompanied by rape or mutilation caused purposely, all the robbers who took
part in the perpetration of the complex crime are liable for all the offenses falling within the
limitation of certain circumstances specified by the law, committed by the members of the
band.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Therefore, the defendants Tiongco and Huerva, for the very reason that they are liable for
the said crime of robbery in a band, are likewise liable for all the other acts performed on
the occasion of the robbery, although they may not actually and materially have taken any
part in the rape committed upon those two women by the other two defendants, their
companions Ledesma and Castano.
"If any of the defendants had wounded or killed an inmate of the house that they robbed, all
the defendants would, under the law, have been punished for the complex crime of robbery
with the infliction of wounds of the commission of homicide; and, in the present case,
because two of the robbers raped two women, all the malefactors are liable for the complex
crime in question."
[45]

In other words, for Mendoza to be convicted only of the crime of robbery, he must prove not only that
he himself did not abuse the victim but that he tried to prevent the rape. We have previously ruled that
once conspiracy is established between the two accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they
would be both equally culpable for the rape committed by one of them on the occasion of the robbery,
unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from committing rape.
[46]

Mendoza cannot seek sanctuary in our jurisprudence that where there is no evidence that the
accused was aware of his co-accused's lustful intent and his consummation thereof so that he could have
attempted to prevent the same, the former should be held only for the robbery and not for the rape.
[47]
In
the case at bar, the evidence shows that during the commission of the rape, Mendoza climbed up and out
of the bathroom through the window and stayed at the roof of the terrace. The window, located above
the roof of the terrace, was about 3-1/2 meters away from where the victim and Balagtas were. Mendoza
knew of the rape because the private complainant saw him peep through the window and watch what
was being done to her by Balagtas. Nonetheless, Mendoza did nothing to prevent the rape.
Lastly, Mendoza submits that the trial court erred in not appreciating the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority in his favor, considering that he was allegedly born on June 30, 1975 and was
thus only 16 years, 1 month, and 23 days old on August 23, 1991, the day the crime was committed.
The burden of proof that Mendoza was a minor at the time of the commission of the offense is on
him.
[48]
He presented, however, conflicting evidence of his date of birth. On the one hand, when
Mendoza filed in the trial court a Motion for Release of the Accused Under Recognizance
[49]
on August
21, 1992, he attached a photocopy
[50]
of his birth certificate indicating his birthday to be June 30,
1981. On the other hand, when he testified in open court on September 8, 1992, he declared that he was
born on June 30, 1975.
[51]
And then just two days after that declaration, he filed in the trial court a
Manifestation
[52]
with an original copy of his birth certificate, complete with documentary stamps and
the seal of the Local Civil Registrar of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, indicating his date of birth to be June 30,
1974.
[53]

After going through the said evidence, we find that Mendoza was born on June 30, 1974 and was
thus 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. The special mitigating circumstance of
minority under Paragraph 2, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code should, therefore, be appreciated in
Mendoza's favor. Said provision reads:
"ART. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. x x x
"1. x x x x x x x x x
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed but always in the proper period."
The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of robbery with rape is reclusion perpetua to
death. Applying Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty next lower in degree is reclusion
temporal. We agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and abuse of
superior strength attended the commission of the crime. Even the defense did not make any issue of
this. When one or more aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of the crime, with no
ordinary mitigating circumstances to offset them, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period.
[54]
The imposable penalty prescribed by law, therefore, is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period. We further apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law authorizing the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence to be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the
offense.
[55]
In view of all these, this Court imposes upon Mendoza the indeterminate sentence of 10
years and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Third
Judicial Region, Branch 14, Malolos, dated May 18, 1995, finding ERIC MENDOZA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape and liable for P12,000.00 as actual damages
and P100,000.00 as moral damages, with costs, is HEREBY AFFIRMED with the modification that this
Court imposes upon ERIC MENDOZA an indeterminate sentence of 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor in its maximum period to 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.




49

G.R. No. 142039 May 27, 2004
MODESTO "Moody" MABUNGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
The Court of Appeals having, by Decision of June 30, 1999,
1
affirmed that of the Regional Trial
Court of Romblon
2
convicting appellant Modesto Mabunga of robbery with force upon things under
Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code, he comes to this Court on a petition for review.
In the morning of October 2, 1994, employees of the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) including Davy
Villaruel (Villaruel) discovered that the hasp of the door of the BFP office in Barangay Capaclan,
Romblon, Romblon was destroyed, and that the only typewriter in their office, a "Triumph" bearing
Serial Number 340118640, was missing.
From the testimonies of prosecution witnesses tricycle driver Sixto Bernardo (Bernardo), Diana Malay
(Diana), Villaruel, Sylvia Silverio Comienzo (Sylvia), and SPO2 Eleazar Madali, the prosecution
presented its case as follows:
Around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of October 15, 1994, as Diana was in front of
her store in Capaclan, Romblon, Romblon waiting for a tricycle, she saw appellant, a dealer
of marble slabs, who was carrying a box which bore the marking "HOPE" and tied with gray
straw string, board a pedicab driven by Bernardo. Having heard from her husband Rodolfo
Malay who works with the BFP that appellant was the prime suspect of the police for the
"robbery" at the BFP, Diana immediately informed her husband of what she saw. She was
thereupon instructed by her husband to follow appellant.
3

As Diana noticed that the pedicab was heading for the pier, she proceeded on foot to the house of
Villaruel
4
whom she informed of what she had witnessed.
After the lapse of about 5 minutes,
5
Villaruel, on board his scooter, proceeded to the pier. By that time
appellant had reached the pier, alighted from Bernardos tricycle, and unloaded the "HOPE" box.
In the meantime, Diana contacted Chief of Police Major Ernesto Madrona at his house.
6

Appellant, not long after alighting from the tricycle at the pier, reboarded the same tricycle
7
driven by
Bernardo, without the box, and headed for his house at Capaclan. Diana, in fact, saw him on board the
tricycle on his way home.
Diana later boarded the tricycle of Bernardo after the latter brought home appellant, and repaired to the
pier. There, by the gate, she saw Villaruel who confirmed to her that he had verified from Bernardo,
whom he earlier saw by the same gate, that the latter indeed conveyed appellant to the pier, with a
"HOPE" box.
Diana also learned from Villaruel that "he really saw the box brought by [appellant]." She
thus returned on foot to the house of Major Madrona who instructed SPO2 Eleazar Madali and PO2
Eustaquio Rogero "to surreptitiously watch a box of Hope brand cigarettes placed under a bench inside
the PPA passengers terminal owned by [appellant] and wait until somebody gets said box and load it
aboard the vessel M/V Peafrancia 8."
8

On Villaruels entering the terminal
9
he was told by Sylvia, the cashier on duty at the restaurant therein,
that a man, whom she later identified to be appellant through a photograph shown to her that same day,
entrusted the box to her, he telling her that it contained a damaged electric fan.
10

Villaruel thereupon kept watch over the box, as SPO2 Madali and PO2 Rogero later did discreetly, until
M/V Peafrancia departed for Batangas at 8:00 p.m., with appellant on board the same. About an hour
later, PPA officers Reynaldo Dianco and Leo Vedito Fontellera arrived at the terminal and the box was
turned over by them to SPO2 Madali and PO2 Rogero. The box, when opened, contained the lost
BFP typewriter.
On February 7, 1995, appellant was charged with robbery before the Regional Trial Court of Romblon,
Romblon under an information reading:
That on or about the 1st day of October, 1994, at around 12:00 midnight, in [B]arangay
Capaclan, municipality of Romblon, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent [to] gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter theOffice of the Bureau of Fire Protection by
forcibly breaking the door hasp of the main door and upon having gained entry therein, take,
steal and carry away one (1) typewriter (Triumph brand) with Serial No. 340118640, valued at
P5,894.00, Philippine currency, belonging to and owned by the government, without its
consent, and to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforestated amount.
11

On arraignment on February 21, 1995, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not
guilty."
12
Thereafter, trial ensued.
50

Appellant interposed alibi with respect to the date and place of occurrence of the alleged robbery. While
he admitted bringing to the pier on October 15, 1994 a box, he claimed, however, that it bore the
marking "CHAMPION," not "HOPE." At the witness stand, he gave the following tale:
He left Romblon on September 24, 1994 and arrived in Manila the next day. After the lapse of
12 hours, he went to the Cubao station of the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus (BLTB)
Company and boarded a bus bound for Matnog, Sorsogon. He reached Matnog on the
afternoon of September 27, 1994 and stayed there overnight before proceeding to Allen,
Samar which he reached on September 28, 1994. He then boarded a jeep bound for San Jose,
Northern Samar where he stayed for one (1) hour, after which he proceeded to Calbayog City
which he reached on September 29, 1994. He transferred to another jeep bound for Tacloban
and arrived there on September 30, 1994. For a day he stayed in Tacloban to rest, after which
he proceeded to Palo, Leyte to visit his "project." He arrived in Palo on October 1, 1994. The
next day, he went to Tacloban City and purchased materials for polishing marble. He returned
to Palo and supervised his marble "project" for a week. When the "project" was finished, he
returned to Cebu on October 6, 1994 and the next day boarded the ferry "[Backwagon] Bay"
for Romblon. He reached Romblon on October 9, 1994.
13

In support of his alibi, he presented bus tickets and purchase receipts of materials, viz:
Exhibit "1" BLTB ticket No. 60850, dated September 26, 1994, (Cubao to Matnog,
Sorsogon)
Exhibit "2" Bus ticket dated September 28, 1994 issued by E. Tabinas Enterprises to Moody
Mabunga (Matnog, Sorsogon, to Allen, Samar).
Exhibit "3" Invoice No. 18639 issued on October 2, 1993 by Terrazzo Construction and
Marble Supply to Moody Mabunga.
14

Appellant further claimed that on the afternoon of October 15, 1994, he, along with his son, boarded the
pedicab of Bernardo to which they loaded a box marked "CHAMPION" containing marble novelties to
be brought to Manila via Viva Penafrancia 8; on reaching the pier, he laid down the box at the gate of
the PPA and stood beside it as he waited for the ship to dock; and when he later boarded the ship, he
placed the box at the back of his cot.
15

Finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery, Branch 81 of the RTC Romblon sentenced
him to suffer "an indeterminate penalty of from 4 years and 2 months of prison correccional, as
minimum to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law,
and to pay the costs."
16

The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, relied on Section 3(j) Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x x x
(j) That a person in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act
is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him;
The appellate court having denied his motion for reconsideration,
17
appellant lodged the present appeal,
ascribing to it the following errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE
UNIMPUGNED ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION.
2. THE COURT OF APEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE
THE TYPEWRITER, WHICH WAS SEARCHED WITHOUT WARRANT AND IN THE
ABSENCE OF THE ACCUSED.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT PRESUMED THE
ELEMENT OF INTENT TO GAIN, WHEN THE SUPPOSED ACT OF THE ACCUSED IN
LEAVING THE BOX TO A STRANGER AND NEVER COMING BACK TO CLAIM IT
NEGATED THE NOTION OF ANIMUS LUCRANDI.
18
(Underscoring supplied)
The appeal is impressed with merit.
While courts have consistently looked upon alibi with suspicion not only because it is inherently weak
and unreliable as a defense, but because it can easily be fabricated,
19
the basic rule is for the prosecution,
upon which lies the onus, to establish all the elements of a crime to thereby hold him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Such burden does not shift as it remains with the prosecution. Tasked with the burden
of persuasion, the prosecution must thus rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of
the defense.
20

Admittedly, the evidence for the prosecution is circumstantial. The alleged robbery was discovered
when the employees of the BFP reported for work on October 2, 1994 and noticed that the hasp of the
office door was broken and the typewriter was missing.
On the sole basis of the presumption laid down under above-quoted Section 3(j) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of appellant.
51

A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group of
facts found or otherwise established in the action.
21
It is an "inference as to the existence of a fact not
actually known, arising from its usual connection with another which is known, or a conjecture based on
past experience as to what course of human affairs ordinarily take."
22

A presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the party who would be disadvantaged by
a finding of the presumed fact. The presumption controls decision on the presumed fact unless there is
counterproof that the presumed fact is not so.
23

In criminal cases, however, presumptions should be taken with caution especially in light of serious
concerns that they might water down the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. As special
considerations must be given to the right of the accused to be presumed innocent, there should be limits
on the use of presumptions against an accused.
Although possession of stolen property within a limited time from the commission of the theft or
robbery is not in itself a crime, it being possible to possess the same and remain innocent, such
possession may be sufficient for the formation of an inference that the possessor is the thief unless the
evidence satisfactorily proves that the property was acquired by the accused by legal means.
How the presumption under Section 3(j) Rule 131 is to be understood, United States v.
Catimbang
24
explains:
According to the modern view convictions in cases of this kind are not sustained upon a
presumption of law as to the guilt of the accused. The conviction rests wholly upon an
inference of fact as to the guilt of the accused. If as a matter of probability and reasoning
based on the fact of possession of the stolen goods,taken in connection with other evidence,
it may fairly be concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the theft,
judgment or conviction may properly be entered. x x x
The inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the common experience of men. But the
experience of men has taught them that an apparently guilty possession may be explained so
as to rebut such an inference and an accused person may therefore put witness on the stand or
go to the witness stand himself to explain his possession, and any reasonable explanation of
his possession, inconsistent with his guilty connection with the commission of the crime, will
rebut the inference as to his guilt which the prosecution seeks to have drawn from his guilty
possession of the stolen goods.
It is in this sense that it is sometimes said that the unexplained possession of recently stolen
goods will sustain a conviction of the crime of larceny.
25
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Before an inference of guilt arising from possession of recently stolen goods can be made, however, the
following basic facts need to be proven by the prosecution: (1) that the crime was committed; (2) that
the crime was committed recently; (3) that the stolen property was found in the possession of the
defendant; and (4) that the defendant is unable to explain his possession satisfactorily.
26

For purposes moreover of conclusively proving possession, the following considerations have to be
emphasized: (1) the possession must be unexplained by any innocent origin; (2) the possession must be
fairly recent; and (3)the possession must be exclusive.
27

Contrary to the findings of both the trial and appellate courts, the People failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant was caught in exclusive possession of the recently stolen good.
While possession need not mean actual physical control over the thing for it may include constructive
possession, it is still necessary that for possession to be deemed constructive the accused knowingly
has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either
directly or through another person.
28

The case of U.S. v. Simbahan
29
cited by the appellate court has a different factual setting and is,
therefore, inapplicable to the present case. In Simbahan, the accused, for a consideration of P50.00
pesos, disclosed to the owner of the missing carabao its precise location. There, this Court held: "The
word possession as used above can not be limited to manual touch or personal custody. One who puts or
deposits the stolen property in a place of concealment may be deemed to have such property in his
possession. x x x All the facts and circumstances[including the absence of a satisfactory explanation of
his possession] show conclusively that he had possession of said caraballa and fully justify his
conviction."
30

The accused in Simbahan exercised exclusive dominion and control over the thing lost. Appellant in
the present case did not.
The "HOPE" box was not concealed and anyone entering and leaving the PPA terminal had access to it,
it having been placed just below one of the benches, around three meters from the cashier, Sylvia.
To assume that in a busy place, such as the PPA terminal, the "HOPE" box that was opened by the
police authorities and found to contain the missing typewriter is the same box allegedly entrusted by
appellant to the cashier is to form an inference which is, however, doubtful, more than six hours having
elapsed from the time the box was allegedly left at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon until it was
opened by the police authorities at around 9:00 oclock in the evening after appellant had already
boarded the ship.
A presumption cannot be founded on another presumption. It cannot thus be concluded that from the
time the box was left under the bench, appellant was still in constructive possession thereof, the exercise
of exclusive dominion or control being absent.
52

Adding serious doubt to the prosecutions claim is that what was allegedly seen being carried by
appellant and entrusted to the cashier was not the stolen typewriter but merely a "HOPE" box.
A review of the transcript of stenographic notes in fact shows that there are flaws in the prosecutions
theory as well as inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses testimonies that do not warrant
appellants conviction.
Why appellant was considered a suspect by the police, no explanation has been proferred. The records,
however, indicate that appellant had previously been indicted before the Municipal Trial Court for
theft.
31
On that basis alone, it is non sequitor to point to him as a suspect.
At all events, apart from appellants supposed possession of the "HOPE" box on October 15, 1994, no
other evidence was adduced by the prosecution linking him to the robbery. The teaching of Askew v.
United States
32
must thus be heeded:
We have heretofore adverted to the possession of the instruments or of the fruits of a crime as
affording ground to presume the guilt of the possessor; but on this subject no certain rule can
be laid down of universal application; the presumption being not conclusive but disputable,
and therefore to be dealt with by the jury alone, as a mere inference of fact. Its force and value
will depend on several considerations. In the first place, if the fact of possession stands
alone, wholly unconnected with any other circumstances, its value or persuasive power is
very slight; for the real criminal may have artfully placed the article in the possession or upon
the premises of an innocent person, the better to conceal his own guilt. It will be necessary,
therefore, for the prosecutor to add the proof of other circumstances indicative of guilt, in
order to render the naked possession of the thing available towards a conviction.
33
(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
That the fact of possession alone, wholly unconnected with any other circumstances, cannot be relied
with certititude to convict one with robbery is echoed in People v. Geron:
34

At any rate, the mere possession by the accused of items allegedly stolen, without more, cannot
conduce to a single conclusion that robbery indeed took place or at least was the primary motive for the
killings. In the absence of positive and indubitable evidence showing unlawful taking by the accused by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, the prosecution cannot rely with certitude on the
fact of possession alone. The Courts application of the presumption that a person found in possession of
the personal effects belonging to the person robbed and killed is considered the author of the aggression,
the death of the person, as well as the robbery committed, has been invariably limited to cases where
such possession is either unexplained or that the proferred explanation is rendered implausible in view
of independent evidence inconsistent thereto.
35
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The appellate court ruled that since it was sufficiently established that appellant was in possession of the
typewriter two weeks after it was stolen, he had the burden of proving that he was not the one
responsible for the heist.
36
While a presumption imposes on a party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut such presumption, the burden of producing evidence of
guilt does not extend to the burden of proving the accuseds innocence of the crime as the burden of
persuasion does not shift and remains throughout the trial upon the prosecution.
Compounding doubts on the case for the prosecution is its witnesses differing versions on how and
where the box was opened, a fact necessarily important in determining whether its content was indeed
the stolen typewriter.
On one hand, a member of the PNP, SPO2 Eleazar Madali, testified during the direct examination by
Prosecutor Sy that the box was opened at the police station:
Q And what time did the M/V P[e]afrancia 8 le[ave]?
A About 8:00 oclock in the evening.
Q And what time was that when you entered the PPA terminal to see the carton?
A May be 3:30 oclock, more or less, the vessel has not arrive[d] yet.
Q And also because the vessel has left and the carton [w]as not brought out, what did you
do?
A We coordinate[d] with the PPA about the box that was not taken and it was turned over to
us and we brought it to the police station.
Q Who was your companion in bringing the box to the police station?
A SPO1 Rogero, our investigator Victor Miano, Fireman Sim, Dave Villaruel then we
proceeded to the guard of the Romblon Police Station.
Q And what was done with the box in the police station?
A When we arrived in the PNP Police Station we have the box opened before the guard and
the content of the box was a typewriter.
37
(Underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, the cashier, Sylvia Silverio Comienzo, testified that the police authorities opened the
box inside her small room in the terminal.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY PROSECUTOR SY:
53

Q The day in which you have identified him as Modesto Mabunga, [did he] retrieved (sic)
that carton from you that same day or afternoon?
A No, sir.
Q Who got the carton?
A The policemen, sir.
Q And what did the policemen do when they got the carton?
A They opened it, sir.
Q If you could remember, who were those policemen who got and opened the carton?
A Madrona, Eustaqio and Mike Villaruel.
Q Where did they open that carton?
A Inside the terminal because I have a small room there.
38
(Underscoring supplied)
On additional direct examination, Sylvia remained adamant in saying that the box was opened in her
small room inside the terminal.
ADDITIONAL DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY PROSECUTOR SY:
Q When the policemen as you said got this carton and opened it, where did the policemen
precisely get the carton, from what place precisely?
A Taken from under the bench.
COURT:
Q Where this Moody placed it?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR SY CONTINUING:
Q Were you personally present when the policemen got the carton from under the bench
where Moody placed it?
A Yes, sir.
Q And where did the policemen open the carton?
A In our small room.
Q Where you personally present when the policemen go the carton and opened it on that
room?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you personally present when the straw that was used in tying the carton was cut or
untie or loosen by the policemen?
A I was there.
COURT:
Q Why were you there present?
A Because I saw to it what was the content of that box and if it was really an electric
fan.
39
(Underscoring supplied)
Without doubt, the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses firsthand and
observe their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. An examination of the records
shows, however, that, as indicated by the trial judges following comments on prosecution witness
Villaruels answers to the questions posed to him during his direct examination, the prosecution
evidence leaves much to be desired.
COURT: Very familiar. This witness is a very typical witness. You are just waiting for Atty. Sy to finish
his question for you to say what you have been in your mind regardless of the question but you will just
continue what you have already in your mind without thinking about the question. But remember his
question, when the question is asked it will appear in your mind, it should be the other way around, do
you understand? You forget what is in your mind, concentrate on the question. You listen to the
54

question. You are like a tape recorder. You just switch on and then you continue, no you wait for the
question.
40

Then again, during the cross examination of the same witness, the trial court gave the following
observation on his demeanor:
COURT: The statement of the Court that you are like a fish in outer space is more applicable
to you. You are like a fish in outer space, meaning, you are a police science graduate,
meaning, that your career is to be a policeman and a police officer, an officer of the law. You
are now in the court of law, you should then feel comfortable in a court of law like a fish in the
water you should be comfortable in a court of law because that is part of your career but the
way we look at it you are like a lawyer who just graduated, took the bar and then become an
office employee not practicing law in the courtroom so that when the lawyer comes to Court,
he will not come to Court, he is afraid of the courtroom although he is a lawyer he is afraid of
the courtroom.
41
(Underscoring supplied)
Finally, logic, common knowledge and human experience teach that it is unlikely that a robber would
represent himself to be the owner of a stuff which he knows contains stolen property and seek the help
of a third person to look after it.
In fine, the life, liberty and property of a citizen may not be taken away on possibilities, conjectures or
even, generally speaking, a bare probability.
42

At all events, appellants alibi, for which he submitted documentary evidence, has not been discredited
by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the decision on review is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant,
Modesto "Moody" Mabunga, is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of robbery.
SO ORDERED.


























55

G.R. No. 114396 February 19, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM ROBERT BURTON, accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J .:
Appellant, a British national, was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, for attempting
to transport 5.6 kilograms of hashish, a prohibited drug, through the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport. Though caught inflagrante delicto, he denies criminal liability therefor on the novel ground that
he was not aware that his traveling bags contained the prohibited drug. He also challenges the credibility
of the lawmen who apprehended him.
These matters are resolved by this Court in this appeal seeking
the reversal of the Decision
1
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 116,
2
promulgated on
July 30, 1993, in Criminal Case No. 922117, involving a violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21
of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."
Accused-appellant William Robert Burton was indicted under an Information
3
which reads:
That on or about December 26, 1992 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport in
Pasay City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused WILLIAM BURTON y ROBERT while about to depart abroad, did then
and there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully carry and transport without legal
authority, 5.6 kilograms, more or less of Marijuana (Hashish), a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.
4
After trial, appellant was found guilty by the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
5

WHEREFORE, accused William Burton y Robert is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of attempting to transport "hashish", a derivative of marijuana, a prohibited
drug, weighing about 5.6 kilograms, in violation of Section 4, in relation to Section
21, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972; and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P20,000.00.
The "hashish" involved in this case, which is forfeited in favor of the government, is
ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
The Facts
The facts of the case, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows:
6

. . . At about 9:30 in the evening of December 26, 1992, accused William Burton y
Robert, 30 years old, a British national, checked in at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA), Pasay City, for histrip to Sydney, Australia, on board
Flight No. 209 of the Philippine Airlines. The accused had two pieces of luggage
with him which he passed through the x-ray machine at the departure area of the
airport. The machine showed certain portions of the sidings of one bag and the
bottom of the other to be dark in color, making its operator to suspect that something
illegal was inside them. Upon the request of the Customs examiner in the NAIA to
whom the x-ray finding was referred, accused Burton removed all his belongings
from the travelling bags. The two bags of the accused were then subjected to another
x-ray examination. The same finding was revealed.
The accused, together with his two pieces of baggage, was brought to the Customs
Office at the NAIA, where, with his consent, the sidings of one bag and the bottom
of the other were slashed open. Found inside, sandwiched between thin plastic slabs
attached to the upper and lower sides of one bag, and forming the false bottom of the
other, were twelve (12) rectangular bricks and one (1) square brick of dark brown
materials, each with a thickness of about one-third (1/3) of an inch. Their total
weight was five and six-tenths (5.6) kilos.
During his investigation, the accused was observed to be walking in an uneasy
manner. Suspecting that there was something hidden in his shoes, the investigator
requested Burton to remove his shoes to which the accused consented. Retrieved
from inside the shoes, hidden between their soles and the upper covers, were four (4)
blocks, each about one-fourth (1/4) of an inch thick, of the same dark brown
substance shaped according to the contour of the soles of the shoes. The articles
taken from the two bags and from the pair of shoes of the accused were suspected to
be marijuana or "hashish" by the Customs and the police investigators.
56

Representative samples of the substance were referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for examination. The NBI Forensic Chemistry Division and the
PNP Crime Laboratory Service found the materials to be "hashish", a derivative of
marijuana. This substance is a prohibited drug. (Sec. 2(e)(1)(i), Republic Act No.
6425)
Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution presented witnesses Felimon Napuli, Forensic Chemist Julieta Flores, SPO4 Guillermo
Zuo, and Forensic Chemist Leslie Chambers.
Napuli, a customs examiner, testified that on December 26, 1992, at 9:30 p.m., he was assigned at the
inspection lane of the East Pre-Departure Area, Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Upon being
informed by the x-ray operator that the x-ray examination showed unidentified objects inside two pieces
of appellant's luggage, he conducted a thorough examination of said luggage. After obtaining
permission from appellant, Napuli slashed the side of the suitcase with a knife and discovered twelve
(12) blocks and one (1) bar of a dark substance suspected to be hashish. The dimension of each block
was 4 x 7 x 1/2 inches (Exh. "T-EE"); and the bar, more or less 4 x 4 x 2/3 inches (Exh. "FF"). The
blocks and bar appeared as black items "processed in compact." The suspected hashish was confiscated
and turned over to the duty collector, and appellant was taken to District Collector Supervisor Bautista.
Napuli proceeded to the Investigation Section where he executed an affidavit (Exh. "A") regarding this
incident.
7

Flores, Forensic Chemist 2 of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that she received a letter-
request from the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit of the Bureau of Customs for chromatographic
analysis of the specimen of the confiscated substance from appellant (Exh "B").
8
After conducting an
examination thereof, she reported in Dangerous Drugs Report No. DD-92-600 (Exh. "C")
9
her findings
as follows:
Weight of specimen before exam. #1 = 0.4193 gram
#2 = 0.8015 gram
Weight of specimen after exam. #1 = 0.3773 gram
#2 = 0.7213 gram
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave
POSITIVE RESULTS for HASHISH.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS: HASHISH is a cannabis resin obtained from MARIJUANA. . . .
She also submitted a Certification (Exh. "D")
10
stating:
1. Brown substance contained in a small transparent plastic bag with markings.
Weight of specimen before exam. = 0.4193 gram
2. Brown substance contained in a small transparent plastic bag with markings.
Weight of specimen before exam. = 0.8015 gram
xxx xxx xxx
examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen/s
gave POSITIVE RESULTS forHASHISH.
SPO4 Zuo, team leader of the Philippine National Police Narcotics Command stationed at NAIA,
testified that at about 9 p.m. of December 26, 1992, while he was on-duty at the East Pre-Departure
Section, he was informed by SPO2 Andres Andal that two pieces of luggage, suspected to contain illegal
materials, had passed through the xray-machine. He went to the x-ray machine where Napuli was
conducting a thorough examination of appellant's luggage, consisting of a suitcase and a traveling bag.
At first, appellant was reluctant to comply with Napuli's request to open them and to remove their
contents; then, Zuo heard appellant say, "Patay." When the two pieces of luggage were passed again
through the x-ray machine, Zuo saw on the monitor a dark portion on the side of the suitcase and on the
base of the traveling bag. The suitcase and bag were subjected to a thorough examination. Zuo, passing
his hand along the interior frame of the suitcase, noticed that the side was thicker than that of an
ordinary suitcase. Using a cutter (a bladed instrument), Napuli slashed the outer side and the lining of
the suitcase. The hard plastic frame was thicker than the side of an ordinary suitcase and was wrapped
with masking tape. When opened, a dark brown substance, shaped into blocks of various sizes and
wrapped in masking tape, was concealed between the hard plastic frames.
The base of the traveling bag, which was made of two pieces of plastic and wood materials neatly
riveted to the bottom of the traveling bag, was taken out and examined. When opened, more blocks of
the same substance were found. A total of twelve blocks and one bar of the brown substance suspected
to be hashish, a derivative of marijuana, were found inside appellant's luggage.
Past midnight, appellant was brought to the Customs Legal Investigation Division, where he was
interrogated by customs investigators as to the source of the suspected hashish. Appellant denied having
knowledge thereof.
Zuo observed appellant to be walking "uneasily" arousing his suspicion that a deadly weapon or an
illegal item could be concealed in his legs or shoes. So he requested appellant to remove his white
57

Reebok rubber shoes. He took pictures while appellant was removing them (Exh. "K-M"). Customs
Police Elpidio Manuel examined said shoes (Exh. "I-J") and found four (4) blocks of a similar substance
suspected to be hashish. The blocks were either 2 x 3 x 1/4 inches or 3 x 5 x 1/4 inches in dimension, cut
to conform to the shapes of the soles of the shoes (Exh. "P-S").
When asked to comment on this discovery, appellant replied, "I have nothing to say." Zuo issued a
Receipt for Property Seized (Exh. "N")
11
which appellant refused to acknowledge.
Chambers, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Services, testified that, at the request of the
Chief ofOffice, NAIA District Office, SOD, PNP NARCOM, she conducted three types of tests: (1) the
physical test, which included weighing of the samples and microscopic observation thereof, (2) the
chemical test (Duquenois Levine Test), and (3) a confirmatory test (Thin Layer Chromatographic Test).
The tests also gave positive results for marijuana (Exh. "HH-LL").
Evidence for the Defense
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He is a British national, unemployed and with a
physical deformity (his arms are half the normal length) allegedly caused by his mother's having taken
the drug Thalidomide during pregnancy.
He testified that on December 26, 1992, he went to the NAIA to check in his luggage for his flight to
Sydney, Australia, to visit his uncle. Said luggage was purchased on that very same day from a certain
John Parry for P10,000.00 together with a tape recorder, leather boots, and several articles of clothing.
He explained that he had bought said bags to accommodate his extra belongings and to help Parry raise
money for the latter's plane fare to Australia. As his luggage was passed through the x-ray machine, the
operator found three unidentified dark areas on the top portion of the suitcase near the handle.
Brought before Napuli, he was asked to open his black canvass suitcase and to remove his personal
belongings therefrom. He was informed that his bags could not be cleared to board the plane because of
the unidentified dark portions appearing on the x-ray monitor. So, he gave Napuli permission to open the
lining of the suitcase and to remove the base of the travelling bag. Blocks of a substance suspected to be
hashish were found inside the lining of the suitcase. He denied having seen them before.
A medical kit, containing a syringe, was also found inside his traveling bag. Zuo asked if he was also
using heroin. He replied, "Hindi". He explained that his physician in Britain advised him to bring his
own syringe because, in some countries, the doctors use one syringe for two or three persons.
He claimed that he was alarmed and confused when told that he was to be investigated. He asked Andal
if he was under arrest; the latter replied in the affirmative and informed him of his rights. Insults were
hurled at him because of his deformity. Threats were likewise made; he was told that he could not avoid
trouble because nobody knew that he was there. While escorting him to the toilet, Zuo remarked that
maybe he was going to the toilet because he was hiding something.
When he returned, the police officer asked to look inside his shoes. After being threatened, appellant
handed him his shoes. Zuo examined them and opened the inner soles which yielded more bars of the
yet unidentified substance. Zuo returned his shoes and took his picture while he was putting them on.
He was detained at the NARCOM office until noon of December 28, 1992.
He admitted that his only source of income was a trust fund in an English bank; proceeds of the loan he
had obtained from it were sent to the Philippines.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court convicted accused of attempting to transport prohibited drugs under Section 4, in relation
to Section 21, of R.A. 6425. It ruled that the appellant
12

. . . should be deemed to have the intention to possess the marijuana or "hashish"
confiscated from him, in line with the principle that mere possession . . . raises the
presumption of guilt and the burden of proof is on the possessor to explain the
absence of animus possidendi.
Appellant was unable to rebut such presumption arising from his possession of the prohibited drugs. His
excuse that he had no knowledge of the hashish was unavailing, as malice or intent to commit the crime
is not required in cases of mala prohibita.
Issues
Appellant alleges that the lower court erred by:
13

I. . . . failing to consider "knowledge or
awareness" of the existence of prohibited
drugs as an essential element of the offense
charged.
II. . . . ruling that the accused failed to
destroy the presumption of "unlawful
intent".
III. . . . giving full credence to the testimony
of prosecution witness, Mr. Zuno.
The main thesis of the defense is that it was not proven that appellant knew that the bags he had checked
in at the airport contained a prohibited drug. Appellant further claims that the trial court misunderstood
his defense to be lack of "criminal intent" in carrying the prohibited drug instead of "lack of knowledge"
58

that he was carrying it. Appellant explains that the trial court confused malice or criminal intent, which
is unimportant in malum prohibitum, and animus possidendi or intent to possess a prohibited drug,
which is an element of illegal transportation of a prohibited drug.
The prosecution's evidence was allegedly overcome by appellant's testimony that he bought the luggage
and shoes from a certain John Parry without knowing that they concealed hashish.
In any event he challenges the prosecution's evidence, particularly the testimony of Zuo, as unworthy
of credence.
The Court's Ruling
Crime and Punishment
Section 4 of Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1675, provides:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions. . . .
As clearly indicated, said provision penalizes the acts of selling, administering, delivering, giving away
to another, distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting any prohibited drug. While sale and
delivery are given technical meanings under said Act, transportation, distribution and dispensation are
not defined.
14
However, in indictments for violation of said provision, the prosecution must establish by
clear and convincing evidence that the accused committed any of said unlawful acts at a particular time,
date and place.
15

Pursuant to this doctrine, the prosecution submitted in evidence the testimony of witnesses Napuli and
Zuo. Napuli testified that:
16

xxx xxx xxx
q On December 26, 1992, where were you between the time
7:00 in the morning to 7:00 in the evening?
a I was assigned at the inspection lane of the Departure Area of
the NAIA, sir.
q At 9:30 p.m., where were you on that specific date December
26, 1992?
a At 9:30 in the evening, December 26, 1992, I was assigned at
the inspection lane at the Departure Area of the NAIA, sir.
PROS. VELASCO:
q On that specific time and date, do you remember anything
unusual, Mr. Napuli?
WITNESS:
a There was an unusual incident which (sic) we were able to
apprehend William Robert Burton carrying in his luggage
suspected hashish, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
q How was he apprehended? Will you relay (sic) it to the Court,
Mr. Witness?
a He was apprehended after his luggage had passed through the
x-ray and it was found out that there was something red or an
unidentified object inside his luggage, so we conducted
immediately a thorough examination of his bag and we found
out that certain hashish.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. VELASCO:
q You said that the luggage of Mr. Burton passed through the x-
ray machine. What happened next, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS:
a So, since we already suspected that there was something
suspected hashish, we requested Mr. Burton to have his luggage
opened.
59

xxx xxx xxx
PROS. VELASCO:
q So, what did you do next?
a Then we approached Mr. Burton and requested him to open his
luggage.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. VELASCO.
q Now, after Mr. Burton opened his bag, what happened next?
WITNESS:
a I immediately conducted the thorough examination, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
q What happened next?
a I pulled out all his clothes then re-x-ray again the bag.
q Why did you re-x-ray again the bag?
a To determine thoroughly what was really inside the bag, at the
sidings of the bag.
q Why, Mr. Witness? When you first examined the bag, what
did you find inside the bag when you first examined it?
a We found out his personal belongings, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
q So, after the first examination, you did not find any drugs
inside the suitcase, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS:
a Actually, in the course of the examination, we did not find the
hashish but we already suspected that it was being put at the
sidings so we decided to re-x-ray it.
PROS. VELASCO:
q During the re-x-ray, what did you find out, Mr. Witness?
a After the re-x-ray of that bag was conducted, we decided (sic)
Mr. Burton to slash the sidings of his bag, sir.
COURT:
q What did you find out during the re-x-ray examination?
a We found out that there was something inside the sidings of
the bag, sir.
q What was that something appearing in the x-ray?
a It was red. It appeared in the x-ray a block type, sir.
q What portion of the luggage?
a It was in the sidings which contained that red and block type
appearance in the x-ray. It was in the sidings of the bag
concealed at the sidings of the bag.
q When it was re-x-ray, where were the contents of the bag
which you examined upon opening it?
a The contents of the bag were placed on the inspection lane, his
dresses, and his personal belongings, during the examination of
the bag.
PROS. VELASCO:
60

q After the bag has been passed again in the x-ray machine,
what did you do, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS:
a Again, it was passed through the x-ray, we decided to request
Mr. Burton to have his luggage slashed in order to open, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. VELASCO:
q What happened next, Mr. Witness?
a So when we slashed the sidings of the bag, it yielded hashish,
12 blocks and one (1) bar.
xxx xxx xxx
q Can you describe these twelve (12) blocks that you have seen?
a It is black in color. . .
xxx xxx xxx
q . . . These twelve (12) blocks, what was the relation ot (sic)
these twelve (12) blocks to the hashish or drugs you are
mentioning?
WITNESS:
a That is the hashish, your Honor.
COURT
q How about this bar? What is the relation of this bar to the
drugs or hashish you are mentioning?
WITNESS:
a It is the hashish, your Honor.
Witness Zuo corroborated Napuli's testimony, saying that:
17

STATE PROSECUTOR:
q So Mr. witness (sic) what happened next after Mr. Burton
complied that his bags be opened?
a After complying to have his luggages (sic) re-examined, said
luggages (sic) were brought to the customs examination table
and have it re-examined by Mr. Napuli, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
q So what happened next, Mr. witness(sic)?
a After these two luggages (sic) were brought to the said
examination table, Mr. Burton was again requested to have his
luggages (sic) opened by him, in (sic) which he complied and
that is the time Mr. Napuli started the thorough examination of
the emptied luggages, (sic) sir.
xxx xxx xxx
q What happened next Mr. witness (sic) after the bags were
subjected to the thorough examination by Mr. Napuli?
a When the suitcase are (sic) being examined by Mr. Napuli, I
notice (sic) that the sidings and the bottom of the said suitcase is
(sic) thicker than the ordinary suitcase being subjected for
examination, sir.
q So when you noticed that one of the sidings is (sic) thicker,
what happened next Mr. witness?
a With the used (sic) of a cutter or bladed weapon, and in the
presence of Mr. Burton, Mr. Napuli slashed one of the sidings,
sir.
61

xxx xxx xxx
q What happened next after this area has been opened?
a After one of the sidings has (sic) been slashed by Mr. Napuli
in our presence, I found out that a hard portion thicker than
ordinary sidings of the suitcase being examined. It is wrapped
with masking tapes, sir.
q What happened next afterthat?
a After I discovered the masking tapes wrapped on the sidings, I
made another slashed (sic) in the sidings of the hard object
found on the sidings of the suitcase. In which it yielded brown
substance wrapped with masking tapes.
xxx xxx xxx
STATE PROSECUTOR:
Will you please describe to the best of your knowledge what
was the substance found inside it?
a When that substance or object conceiled (sic) in between the
hard plastic of the suitcase was retrieved by Mr. Napuli, we cut
the portion of the said object and we found brown substance.
And thorough (sic) physical examination, we suspected that it is
hashish, sir.
STATE PROSECUTOR:
Will you please describe this brown substance?
a It is dark brown in color, sir.
q The appearance?
a It is form (sic) in blocks of various sizes, sir.
q What are the shapes of the blocks?
a The first one is rectangular in form, sir.
COURT:
How many blocks were they (sic)?
a Ten (10) blocks of various sizes, two (2) blocks also and one
(1) small bar, Your Honor.
STATE PROSECUTOR:
Mr. witness (sic) in what specific part of this travelling bag have
you found?
a It is on the bottom of the hand travelling bag, sir.
q Will you please show to us?
a This portion, sir.
(witness pointing to two (2) pieces of plastic with wood which is
placed at the bottom of the bag. It is detachable with a piece of
black plastic material in between the two (2) pieces of plastic in
effect serves as a false bottom of the bag marked as Exhibit H).
q I have noticed Mr. witness (sic) that the false bottom is
exposed, was this the condition also of this bag when it was
inspected at the time of the arrest of Mr. Burton?
a No, sir, it was neatly revetted (sic) or there were revets (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
q Can you please explain to the Honorable Court how you came
upon this present state Mr. witness(sic)?
a The bladed weapon was also used by Mr. Napuli, and when I
found the (sic) difficulty in opening the revetted (sic) portion, I
used a screw driver, sir.
62

He also testified on how he found blocks of the same substance
inside appellant's shoes. He said:
18

STATE PROSECUTOR:
What happened next after the investigation of Mr. Burton?
a While thereat, I observed Mr. Burton to be uneasy on his
shoes, so my suspicion arose (sic) that he is conceiling (sic) may
be (sic) a deadly weapon or some more illegal items. So I
requested him to untie his white Reebok shoes, which (sic) he
complied. While he was untying his shoes, I took shme (sic)
pictures, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
q So what happened next after Mr. Burton untie (sic) his shoes,
Mr. witness(sic)?
a When he untied his shoes, I requested custom (sic) police
Elpidio Manuel to examine the said shoes, and inside the shoes
we found out (sic) four (4) blocks of various sizes, sir.
q Four blocks of various sizes of what, Mr. witness(sic)?
a Suspected hashish, sir.
q Can you please describe briefly to the Court the appearance of
these blocks of various sizes of hashish?
a Well, . . I mean the form follows the forms of the inner portion
of the sole of the shoes, but it was not cut into two, and we
found four (4) blocks in the shoes he is wearing, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
So it was sandwich (sic) between the upper sole or the cover and
the sole proper?
a Yes, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
STATE PROSECUTOR:
Then after you have discovered something were (sic) hidden
inside the shoes of Mr. Burton what happened next, Mr.
witness(sic)?
a And since he was denying knowledge on the suspected hashish
that were earlier discovered from his luggages (sic), when I
asked him what he can say about the four (4) blocks that were
recovered in his shoes, and he said "I have nothing to say".
Sec. 21 of the same act provides:
Sec. 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. The same penalty prescribed by this Act for the
commission of the offense shall be imposed in case of any attempt or conspiracy to
commit the same in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation
of dangerous drugs;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing testimony amply demonstrates that appellant committed an act punishable by said law.
We agree with the following discussion of the trial court on the crime committed by appellant:
. . . To transport means "to transfer or convey from one person or place to another."
(Webster's Third New International Dictionary). The accused came from a hotel in
Paraaque, Metro Manila, where he stayed before he checked in at the NAIA and
was bound for Sydney, Australia. It is therefore apparent that he wanted to bring the
prohibited drug from Paraaque to Sydney. However, because he was not able to
pursue his trip, he should be considered only to have attempted to transport the
prohibited drug to Sydney. Under Section 21 of The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
the same penalty prescribed by the said Act for the commission of the offense of
transporting dangerous drugs shall be imposed in case of any attempt to commit the
same crime.
63

xxx xxx xxx
The act of accused Burton in attempting to transport the "hashish" in question
clearly constitutes a violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21, of Republic Act
No. 6425, since it does not appear that the accused had any legal authority to
transfer or convey the said prohibited drug from the Philippines to Australia.
Upholding the Assessment of Witness by the Trial Court
Appellant questions the trial court's conferment of faith and credence on the testimony of prosecution
witness Zuo despite some apparent inconsistencies. It is a well-entrenched rule in law that the
assessment of a witness' credibility by the trial court is accorded great respect because said court is in the
best position to observe and evaluate the witness' demeanor and deportment at the time he gave his
testimony.
19

The questions of whether appellant did utter the word "patay" in disappointment over the discovery of
his misdeed and whether Zuo took pictures of appellant while the latter was removing or putting on his
rubber shoes are of little significance. The trial court did take the utterance allegedly heard by Zuo as
proof of appellant's knowledge of the hashish in his luggage and shoes, but the ineludible fact remains
that appellant was caught with twelve blocks and seven bars of hashish in his possession. This remains
unrebutted as proof of appellant's guilt.
The trial court properly admitted in evidence Exhibits "P-S" despite the absence of Zuo's markings
because these blocks of hashish bore Customs Examiner Elizabeth Ayonon's markings instead. Zuo
witnessed Ayonon place her markings on said exhibits.
20

Existence of Animus Possidendi Unrebutted
In criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, appellant argues that there can be no conviction unless the
prosecution shows that the accused knowingly possessed the prohibited articles in his person, or more
legally put, that animus possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession or control of such
article.
21

Under the Rules of Evidence (Sec. 3[j], Rule 131, Rules of Court), "things which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him." Such disputable presumption is based upon the
principle that direct proof of facts of this nature is rarely available, except in cases of confession. In
several cases, the Court has held that possession of a considerable quantity of marijuana cannot indicate
anything except the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said prohibited drug.
22

Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an
accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus
possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration
the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence
may and usually must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case.
23

In prosecutions involving prohibited drugs, the state has a right to specify what proofs shall
constitute prima facieevidence of guilt, and thereafter to place upon the accused the burden of showing
that his act or acts are innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent or intention.
24

The existence of animus possidendi is only prima facie. Thus, it is subject to contrary proof and may be
rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in
question, and did not intend to do
so.
25
The constitutional presumption of innocence will not apply as long as there is "some rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from
proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be (a) purely arbitrary mandate."
26

The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi. A mere
uncorroborated claim of the accused that he did not know that he had a prohibited drug in his possession
is insufficient. Any evasion, false statement, or attempt at concealment on his part, in explaining how the
drug came into his possession, may be considered in determining his guilt.
27

Under the facts obtaining in this case, the 5.6 kilos of hashish cleverly and painstakingly concealed
inside appellant's luggage and rubber shoes can be said to be in the possession and control of appellant
with his knowledge. Not only were the blocks and bars of the prohibited drug of a considerable amount,
but they were placed inside three different objects in order to escape detection by the authorities.
The Court also finds incredible appellant's allegation that he had no idea that the luggage and rubber
shoes he "purchased" from a certain John Parry contained prohibited drugs. Even the alleged transaction
between them is dubious. Appellant claims that he had paid Parry P10,000.00 for the two pieces of
luggage, clothes, camera, tape recorder, and Reebok rubber shoes which Parry would redeem from
appellant in Australia. Appellant explains that this transaction, which brought no benefit or advantage to
him, was more of a loan, an act of charity, to Parry who was raising money for his plane fare. However,
appellant also admits that Parry was only a casual acquaintance whom he had met for about five to six
times only. Thus, it is unbelievable for anyone, much less appellant who was unemployed and was
relying only on the P6,000.00-per-month trust fund proceeds, to be so generous as to shell out such an
amount to a mere acquaintance.
Furthermore, this "purchase" was suspiciously made only hours prior to appellant's apprehension at the
airport. Appellant's explanation, as a whole, is undeserving of credence as it is contrary to common
experience. It leaves us with no other conclusion than that the animus possidendi did in fact exist at the
time of the arrest.
64

In People vs. Alfonso, the Court disregarded a similar excuse, saying that if it were true that the accused
was not really the owner and that he simply accepted the errand from one who was not even a friend, the
explanation, standing by itself, is too trite and hackneyed to be accepted at its face value, since it is
obviously contrary to human experience.
28
In any event, the particular circumstances surrounding the
"sale" should have raised alarm in appellant's mind about the dubious nature of the transaction. The
absence of any suspicious reaction on appellant's part is not consistent with human nature. And if he did
not mind "carrying these bags" for someone he hardly knew and whom he conveniently alleges to be
also going to Australia, it is strange that he did not point him to the airport authorities so he could have
been apprehended. The Court also notes that Parry was never presented as a witness. Hence, his very
existence, not just his alleged participation in appellant's story, remains doubtful.
All told, the possession of the prohibited drugs by appellant with prima facie evidence of his knowledge
thereof is sufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.
29

The Proper Penalty
The trial court imposed the penalty of "life imprisonment" plus a fine of twenty thousand pesos as the
crime was committed on December 26, 1992 or about a year before Republic Act No. 7659,
30
imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, came into effect on December 31, 1993. Retroactive
application of said law would not be advantageous to appellant in view of the increased range of penalty
and conjunctive fine prescribed, where the quantity of prohibited drugs is "750 grams or more." A more
succinct explanation in People vs. Ballagan states:
31

First, the wealth of jurisprudence in cases wherein "life imprisonment"' is imposed
is to the effect that said penalty, unlike reclusion perpetua, does not carry accessory
penalties. In the event that Republic Act No. 7659 is applied retrospectively to
appellant, he has to suffer not only reclusion perpetua but also the accessory
penalties.
Second, the fine imposed upon appellant is the minimum imposable of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00), whereas if he were penalized under the new law, he
would have to bear the minimum fine of P500,000.00. Thus, retrospective
application of Republic Act No. 7659, the "heinous crimes law," in cases wherein
the penalty of "life imprisonment" has been imposed by the trial court, would prove
more burdensome upon the appellant and would contradict the basic principle that
all penal laws shall be interpreted in favor of the accused.
In line with current jurisdiction, we affirm the trial court's imposition of the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000. 00) upon appellant.
32

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.




















65

G.R. No. 137348 June 21, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM ONG y LI and CHING DE MING @ ROBERT TIU, appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J .:
" the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal
trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of
the courts."
1

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
The case at bar involves the clash of two classic values - - - the need for the State to stop crimes and
preserve the peace against the right of an individual to confront material witnesses to establish his
innocence. In balancingthe two values, we shall scrutinize and set the parameters that ought to guide
prosecution when to disclose the identity of confidential informers.
On July 27, 1998 accused William Ong y Li and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu were charged with
violation of Section 15, Article III, in relation to Section 2, Article I, of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The Information
2
reads:
That on or about the 24th day of July, 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other not having been
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then
and there willfully and unlawfullysell or offer for sale 980.50 grams of Methyl
Amphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, the two (2) accused, who are Chinese nationals, pled not guilty. The records do not
show whether they had sufficient knowledge of the English language. Their trial proceeded. In the
course of the trial, the two (2) accused were given the services of a Chinese interpreter.
The prosecution, through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, sought to establish that on July
23, 1998 at around 5:00 P.M., a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD),
PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged illicit drug
activities of a certain William Ong and an unidentified Chinese male partner. After an evaluation of the
confidential information, Chief Inspector Ferro decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. He constituted
a team of eight (8) with Police Inspector Medel N. Poe as team leader, SPO1 Gonzales as poseur-buyer
and the rest as back-up support.
According to SPO1 Gonzales, the CI called up the alleged pusher, placed an order for one (1) kilo
of shabu and agreed to a P600,000.00 consideration. The CI likewise agreed to meet with his contact on
July 24, 1998 at 6thStreet corner Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, between 4:00 and 5:00
A.M. The boodle money was prepared consisting of six (6) bundles of cut bond paper with a
marked P1,000.00 peso bill on top of each bundle.
On July 24, 2004 at 3:00 A.M., the CI received a call from the drug dealer changing the meeting time
between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M. on the same day. The team, together with the CI, proceeded to the meeting
place and arrived there at around 1:30 P.M. The CI rode with SPO1 Gonzales. They parked their car
along 6th Street corner Gilmore Avenue. The rest of the team posted themselves at their back and their
right side.
A little while, accused Ong approached their car. The CI introduced him to SPO1 Gonzales who told
accused Ong in broken Tagalog to get in the car. When Ong inquired about the money in payment of
the shabu, SPO1 Gonzales showed him the slightly opened plastic bag containing the boodle money.
SPO1 Gonzales then demanded to see the shabu. Accused Ong excused himself, went out of the car,
walked a few steps and then waved his right hand to somebody. While accused Ong was walking back
to the car, SPO1 Gonzales and the CI saw a green Toyota Corolla coming. The Corolla parked in front
of their car and a Chinese-looking male, later identified as accused Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu
alighted, approached accused Ong and handed to him a gift-wrapped package. SPO1 Gonzales opened it
and inside was one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance. After its inspection, accused
Ong demanded for its payment. SPO1 Gonzales gave to accused Ong the boodle money placed in a "W.
Brown" plastic bag. Thereafter, SPO1 Gonzales signaled his back-up team by turning on the hazard
lights of the car. SPO1 Gonzales himself arrested accused Ong while the CI and the back-up agents
arrested accused De Ming.
The officers brought the two (2) accused to their office where the corresponding booking sheets and
arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the white crystalline substance was referred to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The two (2) accused were subjected to a physical and
mental examination as required. They were found to be free from any external signs of trauma.
Police Inspector Grace M. Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist, PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that the
specimen she examined had a net weight of 980.50 grams and manifested "positive results for methyl
amphetamine hydrochloride"
3
or what is commonly known as shabu, a regulated drug. Her testimony
was supported by her Physical Sciences Report.
4

66

Appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused William Ong, a Chinese citizen from the
Peoples Republic of China, claimed that he came to the Philippines in 1997 to look for a job. Upon the
recommendation of a friend, he was able to work in a pancit canton factory in Quezon City. In June
1998, he stopped working at the factory and hunted for another job. Two (2) weeks prior to his arrest,
accused Ong was introduced by his friend Kian Ling to Ong Sin for a possible job as technician in a
bihon factory owned by Ong Sin.
On July 22, 1998, Ong Sin called up and set a meeting with accused Ong at the Tayuman branch of
Jollibee the next day. While waiting at Jollibee, accused Ong received a call from Ong Sin that he could
not personally meet him. Instead, his two (2) co-workers would meet accused Ong as instructed.
Subsequently, two (2) men answering to Ong Sins description approached accused Ong. He joined
them inside a yellow car. When they reached a certain place, the driver reached for his cellular phone
and called up someone. After a brief conversation, the driver handed the phone to him. Ong Sin was on
the line and informed him that the driver would accompany him to the bihon factory. The driver got out
of the car and accused Ong followed him. After walking two (2) blocks, the driver picked up something
from the place. They returned to the car. Suddenly, the companion of the driver poked a gun at him. He
was arrested, blindfolded and brought to an undisclosed place. Several hours later, he was taken to the
police station. There he met the other accused Ching De Ming for the first time. He maintained
innocence to the crime charged.
On his part, accused Ching De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in the RTW
business. He claimed that he gets his products from Baclaran and sells them to customers in the cities of
Naga and Daet in Bicol.
On July 23, 1998 at around 4:30 and 5:00 P.M., while waiting inside his car for his girlfriend and her
mother who just went in a townhouse at 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, he was approached by
persons unknown to him. They asked him what he was doing there. One of them went to the car parked
at his back, ordered somebody inside to get out and take a good look at him. The person pointed at him
saying "maybe he is the one." He was then dragged out of his car and brought to the other car. They took
his clutch bag. They blindfolded and brought him to a place. After a few hours, at Camp Crame, Quezon
City, they removed his blindfold. He denied knowing accused Ong and the charge of conspiring with
him to deliver shabu in New Manila, Quezon City.
Avelina Cardoz, the mother of his girlfriend, and a divine healer, corroborated his story. She testified
that she requested accused De Ming to drive her to a townhouse at 8th Street, New Manila, to cure a
patient. She declared that the officers of the Peoples Journal publication could attest to her profession.
She asked accused De Ming to wait for her and her daughter inside his car. When they returned to the
car, accused De Ming was nowhere to be found. They saw him next at the Quezon City Jail.
On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them the penalty
of death. It likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million pesos.
5

The case is with us on automatic review. Appellants insist on their innocence. They claim that their guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
We agree.
I
Rule 116, Section 1 (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.-
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open
court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking
him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information. (Underscoring
and emphasis supplied.)
The arraignment of appellants violates the above rule. Appellants are Chinese nationals.
Their Certificate of Arraignment
6
states that they were informed of the accusations against them. It does
not, however, indicate whether the Information was read in the language or dialect known to them. It
merely states:
This 4th day of Aug., 1998, the undersigns (sic) states:
That, in open court, and in the presence of Trial Prosecutor Ruben Catubay, the
following accused William Ong and Ching De Ming AKA Robert Tiu was/were
called and, having been informed of the nature of the accusation filed against
him/her/them, furnishing him/her/them a copy of the complaint or information
with the list of witnesses, the said accused in answer to the question of the Court,
pleaded Not Guilty to the crime as charged.
TO WHICH I CERTIFY.
Sgd. Mary Ruth Milo-Ferrer
Branch Clerk of Court
Sgd. William Ong
67

ACCUSED WILLIAM ONG
Sgd. Ching de Ming
ACCUSED CHING DE MING @ ROBERT TIU
Neither does the August 4, 1998 Order of Judge Diosdado M. Peralta of RTC-Br.
95, Quezon City, disclose compliance with the rule on arraignment. It merely stated
in part that "[w]hen both accused William Ong y Li and Ching De Ming @ Robert
Tiu were arraigned, assisted by counsel de parte, both accused entered a plea of not
guilty."
7

From the records, it is clear that appellants only knew the Chinese language. Thus, the services of a
Chineseinterpreter were used in investigating appellants. SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales revealed in his
testimony, viz:
8

Q: Now, is it not a fact that you had the difficulty of investigating the two accused because of
communication problem from your informant?
A: We did not encounter such problem when we investigated them sir. We also asked question
and we have another Chinese who was arrested who can speak Tagalog and we used that
Chinese man to translate for us and for them if the questions are difficult to understand,
sir.
Q: Now that Chinese interpreter that is also an accused?
A: Yes sir.
9

After arraignment and in the course of the trial, the lower court had to secure the services of a certain
Richard Ng Lee as Chinese interpreter. This appears in the Order of August 28, 1998 of Judge
Peralta, viz:
Considering that the counsel of the two (2) accused has still a lot of questions to ask on cross-
examination x x x x From hereon, Mr. Richard Ng Lee, a businessman and a part time
interpreter, is hereby designated by the Court as interpreter in this case considering that
there is no official interpreter of the Court who is knowledgeable in the Chinese language
or any Chinese dialect whatsoever. The appointment of Mr. Richard Ng Lee is without the
objection of counsel of the accused and the public prosecutor and considering that the court is
convinced that he indeed possesses the qualifications of an interpreter of a Chinese
language or any other Chinese dialect known and spoken by the two (2)
accused.
10
(Emphasis supplied.)
What leaps from the records of the case is the inability of appellants to fully or sufficiently comprehend
any other language than Chinese and any of its dialect. Despite this inability, however, the appellants
were arraigned on an Information written in the English language.
We again emphasize that the requirement that the information should be read in a language or dialect
known to the accused is mandatory. It must be strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The constitutional protection is part of due process. Failure to observe the rules necessarily nullifies the
arraignment.
11

II
More important than the invalid arraignment of the appellants, we find that the prosecution evidence
failed to prove that appellants willfully and unlawfully sold or offered to sell shabu.
Appellants conviction is based on the lone testimony of SPO1 Gonzales. He was the designated poseur-
buyer in the team formed for the buy-bust operation. But a careful reading of his testimony will reveal
that he was not privy to the sale transaction that transpired between the CI and appellant William
Ong, the alleged pusher. It is beyond contention that a contract of sale is perfected upon a meeting of the
minds of the parties on the object and its price.
12
Not all elements of the sale were established by the
testimony of SPO1 Gonzales, viz:
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: After you have prepared the boodle money and you had made the proper marking which
you presented before this Honorable Court, what happen?
A: Out CI make a couple of call and he contacted William Ong thru a
broken tagalog conversation.
Q: When your CI contacted with William Ong in broken tagalog?
A: I have a conversation with William Ong in broken tagalog the deal of one kilo gram
of shabu was initially closed.
Q: When you say "closed", what do you mean by that?
A: They agreed to the sale of the shabu.
ATTY. TRINIDAD (counsel of accused) to the COURT
68

We object to the line of questioning, Your Honor that would be hearsay.
COURT:
I think what you were asking is what happened he said it was the CI who talked.
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: So after that, do you know what happen?
A: The CI informed us that the price of that shabu which were supposed to buy from
them amounts to 600,000.00 pesos, maam.
Q: Where did you come to know about this information that the amount is already 600,000.00
pesos?
ATTY. TRINIDAD to the COURT
Already answered, Your Honor.
COURT:
In other words what he say is that, there was a telephone conversation but he has no personal
knowledge. Your question then was what happened.
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: After the CI informed you that the price of the shabu is 600,000.00 pesos?
A: We prepared this boodle money and the 6,000 by our Chief SOD.
COURT to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: After the informant told you that there was an agreement to sell 600,000.00 pesos and that
you have already prepared the boodle money as you have stated, what happened after that?
A: The CI told us that the transaction is 600,000.00 pesos and venue is at 6th Street,
corner Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, between 4 oclock to 5 oclock in the
morning of July 24, 1998, maam.
Q: So when the CI informed you that they will meet at 6th Street, New Manila, Quezon City,
what transpired next?
A: On or about 3 oclock in the morning William Ong made a call to our CI informing him
that the sale of the delivery of shabu was reset to another time.
13

x x x x
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: And when you were informed that there was a resetting of this deal?
COURT to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: How did you come to know that there was a resetting because he has no participation in the
conversation and it was the CI according to him and the alleged poseur-buyer.
A: The CI told our Chief Deputy.
ATTY. TRINIDAD to the COURT
That would be hearsay, Your Honor, and that would be a double hearsay.
COURT
Put on record that the counsel manifested that his answer is again hearsay and that a
double hearsay evidence.
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: And what did the CI do?
A: The CI informed us that the time will be at about 2 to 3 oclock in the afternoon of
that same day and the place.
14

It is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, albeit only through the
telephone, with the pusher. The CI was likewise the one who closed the deal with appellant Ong as to
the quantity of shabu to be purchased and its price. He also set the venue and time of the
69

meeting when the sale would take place. TheJoint Affidavit of Arrest
15
executed by SPO1 Gonzales,
PO2 Elmer N. Sarampote and PO1 Noli Jingo G. Rivel fortifies these facts, viz:
x x x x
That after couple of calls made by our CI, suspect WILLIAM ONG was finally contacted on
or about 9:30 in the evening of July 23, 1998 and through a broken Tagalog conversation,
a drug deal/sale was initially closed in the agreed amount of six hundred thousand pesos
(P600,000.00) and the agreed venue is at the corner of 6th Street and Gilmore Avenue, New
Manila, Quezon City between 4:00 and 5:00 oclock in the morning of July 24, 1998 through
"Kaliwaan or Abutan" (Cash upon Delivery);
That said information was relayed to our Deputy Chief, who upon learning said report,
immediately grouped and briefed the team for the said operation;
x x x x
That on or about 3:00 oclock in the morning of July 24, 1998, WILLIAM ONG made a call
to our CIinforming him (CI) to reset the time of the drug deal/sale of one (1) kilogram of
SHABU and it was scheduled again between 2:00 to 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of same
date and same place;
It is therefore understandable that in his account of his meeting with appellant William Ong, SPO1
Gonzales made no reference to any further discussion of the price and the quantity of the shabu. When
they met, they just proceeded with the exchange of money and shabu, viz:
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
Q: And when you were there stationed at the venue at 6th Street, New Manila, Quezon City,
what happened?
A: I and the CI parked our car at 6th Street corner Gilmore Avenue and then we saw William
Ong emerged from Gilmore Avenue and approached me and our CI, maam.
16

x x x x
Q: And when he approached you what did you do if any?
A: Our CI introduced me to William Ong as an interested buyer of one kilo gram of shabu and
afterwards I asked William Ong in broken tagalog to get inside the car.
17

x x x x
Q: And while inside the car, what happened next?
A: While inside the car William Ong asked me about the payment of the stuff and I got the
paper bag and slightly opened. So that I get the plastic bag and show to William Ong the
boodle money.
Q: When you showed the boodle money to William Ong what did he do if there was any?
A: He looked at it, maam.
Q: And when he looked at it what happened next?
A: I told him that I should look at the stuff before I give the money.
Q: What stuff are you referring to?
A: The shabu, maam.
Q: And what did you do after expecting the boodle money or the bag where the boodle money
was placed, if there was any?
A: He excused himself and alighted from our car and told me to wait for his companion.
Q: And where you able to wait for that male companion he is referring to?
A: He walked a distance and waved at his companion as if somebody will come to him.
Q: How did he do that?
A: (put on record that the witness when answering the question he stood up and then used his
right hand in waving as if he is calling for somebody)
Q: When William Ong waved his right hand to his companion what happened?
A: William Ong walked towards to me and suddenly a green Toyota appeared and parked in
front of our car.
70

Q: When a green Toyota corolla was parked in front of the car, what happened next?
A: Chinese looking male person alighted from the car and he went to William Ong and handed
to William Ong something that was gift wrapped.
18

x x x x
Q: When that thing was handed to William Ong which identified in Court and which was
marked, what did William Ong do?
A: William Ong took it from Ching De Ming, maam.
Q: When this Exhibit was given to by William Ong what did you do in return?
A: I opened that something which was gift wrapped and I saw one sealed plastic bag
containing white crystalline substance suspected to be a shabu.
19

x x x x
Q: When you saw this Exhibit C-2 crystalline substance which was opened according to you.
What did you do?
A: The companion of William Ong demanded to me the money and I gave to him the boodle
money.
Q: When you gave the boodle money to him, what did he do if any these person who secured
the money?
A: He took the money inside the bag.
20

Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the acceptance of the offer
and the consideration for the offer, we hold that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the "poseur-buyer"
but merely the deliveryman. His testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay
and standing alone cannot be the basis of the conviction of the appellants.
21

III
We further hold that the prosecution failed to establish its claim of entrapment.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means
of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law.
22
It is commonly employed by police officers as an
effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime.
23
In a buy-bust operation,
the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense.
24
Its opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police or its agent lures the
accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him.
25
Instigation is deemed contrary to public
policy and considered an absolutory cause.
26

To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken in
effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the
operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence. For, the
courts could not merely rely on but must apply with studied restraint the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty by law enforcement agents. This presumption should not by itself prevail
over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally protected rights of the individual.
27
It is the
duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law
through lawless enforcement.
28
Courts should not allow themselves to be used as instruments of abuse
and injustice lest innocent persons are made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.
29

In People v. Doria,
30
we stressed the "objective" test in buy-bust operations. We ruled that in such
operations, the prosecution must present a complete picture detailing the transaction, which "must start
from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug
subject of the sale.
31
We emphasized that the manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer to
purchase the drug, the payment of the 'buy-bust' money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the
subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to
commit an offense."
32

In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The
confidential informant who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how
it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who
had no personal knowledge of the same. On this score, SPO1 Gonzales testimony is hearsay and
possesses no probative value unless it can be shown that the same falls within the exception to the
hearsay rule.
33
To impart probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the appellant solely on
this basis would be to render nugatory his constitutional right to confront the witness against him, in
this case the informant, and to examine him for his truthfulness.
34
As the prosecution failed to prove all
the material details of the buy-bust operation, its claim that there was a valid entrapment of the
appellants must fail.
IV
The Court is sharply aware of the compelling considerations why confidential informants are usually not
presented by the prosecution. One is the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service
to the police.
35
Another is the necessity to protect them from being objects or targets of revenge by the
71

criminals they implicate once they become known. All these considerations, however, have to be
balanced with the right of an accused to a fair trial.
The ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roviaro v. U.S.
36
on informers privilege is instructive. In said
case, the principal issue on certiorari is whether the United States District Court committed reversible
error when it allowed the Government not to disclose the identity of an undercover employee who had
played a material part in bringing about the possession of certain drugs by the accused, had been
present with the accused at the occurrence of the alleged crime, and might be a material witness to
whether the accused knowingly transported the drugs as charged.
37
The Court, through
Mr. Justice Burton, granted certiorari in order to pass upon the propriety of disclosure of the informers
identity.
Mr. Justice Burton explained that what is usually referred to as the informers privilege is in reality the
Governments privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of
violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law.
38
The purpose of the privilege is the
furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes
the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-
enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation.
It was held that the scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying purpose. Thus, where the
disclosure of the contents of the communication will not tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the
contents are not privileged.
39
Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to those
who would have cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable.
40

A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege, which arises from the fundamental
requirements of fairness was emphasized. Where the disclosure of an informers identity, or the contents
of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair
determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.
41
In these situations, the trial court may require
disclosure and dismiss the action if the Government withholds the information.
42

In sum, there is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an informer. The problem has
to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls for balancing the state interest in protecting people from
crimes against the individuals right to prepare his defense. The balance must be adjusted by giving due
weight to the following factors, among others: (1) the crime charged, (2) the possible defenses, (3) the
possible significance of the informers testimony, and (4) other relevant factors.
43

In the case at bar, the crime charged against the appellants is capital in character and can result in the
imposition of the death penalty. They have foisted the defense of instigation which is in sharp contrast to
the claim of entrapment by the prosecution. The prosecution has to prove all the material elements of the
alleged sale ofshabu and the resulting buy-bust operation. Where the testimony of the informer is
indispensable, it should be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person enjoy high importance in our
scale of values. It cannot be diminished except by a value of higher significance.
V
Moreover, the mishandling and transfer of custody of the alleged confiscated methyl amphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu further shattered the case of the prosecution. There is no crime of illegal sale of
regulated drug when there is a nagging doubt on whether the substance confiscated was the same
specimen examined and established to be regulated drug.
After the arrest of the appellants, the records show that the substance allegedly taken from them was
submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination upon request of the Chief of the SOD Narcotics
Group, Quezon City.
44
Police Inspector Grace M. Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist, PNP Crime Laboratory,
testified that the qualitative examination she conducted manifested "positive results for methyl
amphetamine hydrochloride" with net weight of 980.50 grams.
45
This is not in dispute. The issue is
whether the substance examined was the same as that allegedly confiscated from appellants.
The Joint Affidavit of Arrest
46
merely states that the evidence confiscated was submitted to the "PNP
Crime Laboratory Group for qualitative examination." SPO1 Gonzales testified on direct examination
that:
Q: When you arrested them according to you, what other steps did you take if any?
A: We brought them to our office and we requested the crime laboratory Camp Crame to test
the suspected shabu that we recovered from both of them.
47

On cross-examination, the defense only got this statement from SPO1 Gonzales regarding the evidence
allegedly confiscated:
Q: And you immediately brought him to your office at Camp Aguinaldo?
A: After we gathered the evidences we turned them over to our office, sir.
48

Clearly, there was no reference to the person who submitted it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. It is the Memorandum-Request for Laboratory Examination
49
which indicates that a certain
SPO4 Castro submitted the specimen for examination. However, the rest of the records of the case failed
to show the role of SPO4 Castro in the buy-bust operation, if any. In the Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the
only participants in the operation were enumerated as SPO1 Gonzales as the poseur-buyer, Police
Inspector Medel M. Poe as the team leader with PO2 Elmer N. Sarampote and PO1 Noli Jingo G.
Rivel as back-up support.
50
Other members of the team who acted as perimeter security were not
identified. In fact, when SPO1 Gonzales was asked during the trial as to their identities, he was only able
to name another member of the team:
Q: When you say "team," who compose the team?
72

A: I and more or less eight (8) person, maam.
Q: Can you name the member of the team?
A: Our team led by Inspector Medel Poe, I myself, PO2 Elmer Sarampote, PO1 Noli Jingo G.
Rivel, SPO3 Ronaldo Sayson, and I can not remember the others, maam.
51

These are questions which cannot be met with a lockjaw. Since SPO4 Castro appears not to be a part
of the buy-bust team, how and when did he
52
get hold of the specimen examined by Police Inspector
Eustaquio? Who entrusted the substance to him and requested him to submit it for examination? For
how long was he in possession of the evidence before he turned it over to the PNP Crime Laboratory?
Who else had access to the specimen from the time it was allegedly taken from appellants when
arrested? These questions should be answered satisfactorily to determine whether the integrity of the
evidence was compromised in any way. Otherwise, the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to
prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
VI
Finally, the denials and proffered explanations of appellants assume significance in light of the
insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution.
Appellant Ong testified that he was arrested on July 23, 1998 when he was scheduled to meet with a
certain Ong Sin for a possible job as technician in a bihon factory. On his part, appellant De Ming
claimed that when he was arrested on July 23, 1998, he was in the area waiting for his girlfriend and her
mother who just went inside a townhouse at 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City. His girlfriends
mother, Avelina Cardoz, confirmed his explanation. The prosecution tells a different story, the
uncorroborated story of SPO1 Gonzales that their team entrapped the appellants in a buy-bust operation
on July 24, 1998. Our minds rest uneasy on the lone testimony of SPO1 Gonzales.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants
WILLIAM ONG y LI and CHING DE MING @ ROBERT TIU, are ACQUITTED of the crime of
violation of Section 15, Article III, in relation to Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known
as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and are ordered immediately released from custody
unless held for some other lawful cause.
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this decision immediately and to inform this Court
within five (5) days from receipt of this decision of the date the appellants are actually released from
confinement. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.


















73

[G.R. No. 130603. August 15, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAUL GALLEGO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J .:
In a sea of nameless faces, can ones memory of an encounter or two with a stranger suffice to
identify him as the assailant of ones kin?
Raul Gallego was charged with the crime of murder in an information that reads:
That on or about the 8th day of February 1995 in the municipality of Jordan, Province of Guimaras,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to
kill, with evident primiditation (sic) and treachery, taking advantage of night time (sic), armed with a
knife did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab one Wilfredo
Lamata, hitting the said Wilfredo Lamata on the left breast which caused his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[1]

The records show that at about 7:30 p.m. on February 8, 1995, Raul Gallego appeared at the
residence of spouses Wilfredo and Lucia Lamata in Barangay Sebaste, Jordan, Guimaras. At that time,
the Lamata spouses 12-year old granddaughter, Avelyn Lamata, and their daughter, Lina Echavez, were
watching television in the living room. A flourescent lamp lighted the living room. Lucia was also
inside the house sewing clothes while Wilfredo was ill and in bed in a room upstairs. From outside the
Lamata abode, Gallego called Avelyns attention through a window. Avelyn asked him who he was and
he replied that he was a relative from Negros.
[2]
Avelyn opened the main door of the house, but Gallego
remained standing outside.
[3]
Avelyn informed Lucia that a relative of her grandfather was looking for
him, then continued watching television.
[4]
Lucia stepped out and asked Gallego who he was. The latter
replied that he was a military man named Col. Latumbo. He also said that he was Wilfredos relative
from Negros and he was eager to see Wilfredo whom he had not seen for seven years. Lucia invited him
to come in and talk with Lina while she (Lucia) fetched Wilfredo upstairs. Gallego remained outside the
house.
[5]
Lina opened the main door a bit wider. The light coming from the living room illuminated the
area outside the main door where Gallego stood. Lina stepped out and talked to him. They were about
two feet apart. She asked Gallego who he was, and the latter repeated that he was a relative from Negros
and a military man. Lina invited him inside the house because he said he was a relative but he preferred
to wait for Wilfredo outside.
[6]

Meanwhile, Wilfredo, got up from bed and together with Lucia went downstairs and headed for
the main door.
[7]
Lina and Gallego were still standing by the main door with Gallego facing the living
room. As the Lamata spouses were approaching, Lina invited Gallego to come in and opened the door
wider.
[8]
Upon seeing Wilfredo from a distance of about five feet, Gallego rushed to him saying, "(h)ere
is my relative whom I am very anxious to see". With his left hand, Gallego embraced Wilfredo and held
him on his right shoulder. All of a sudden, with his right hand, Gallego drew a knife and stabbed
Wilfredo on the lower left chest.
[9]
Lucia, who was by Wilfredo's left side, embraced her husband to
protect him from Gallego but it was too late. She was slashed in the upper left arm when Gallego
withdrew the knife from Wilfredo. Wilfredo uttered, "I have no fault, why did you do it to me?" and ran
to the kitchen.
[10]

Lina also saw Gallego stab her father. After opening the main door for Gallego to come in, she
headed for the kitchen. But before she could reach the kitchen, she turned back towards the direction of
her father. With Gallego to her left, she was Standing at an angle in front of her father about one meter
away. Suddenly, she saw Gallego stab Wilfredo on the left breast. Taken aback, Lina shouted,
"Guinbuno si Tatay!" ("Tatay was stabbed!").
[11]
Gallego then ran out of the house and Lina
immediately closed the door after him. He fled on a motorcycle.
[12]

Lucia shouted for help from her neighbors. Her son from a neighbor's house arrived. Lina, her
brother, her friend, and Lucia brought Wilfredo to the hospital. Unfortunately, when they got there, he
was pronounced dead-on-arriva1.
[13]
Policemen arrived in the hospital to investigate the stabbing
incident.
[14]

Dr. Edgardo Jabasa, medico-legal expert and Provincial Health Officer 1 of Guimaras, examined
the cadaver of Wilfredo Lamata. As reflected in the Post-Mortem Findings he prepared, the cause of
Wilfredo's death was the stab wound on his left chest which could have been inflicted by a sharp, bladed
and pointed instrument.
[15]

The following day, Lucia was informed by a relative that her husband's assailant had been caught.
At about 1:30 p.m., she went to the Jordan police station. There she was asked to identify her husband's
assailant. At that time, the accused was sitting at the porch of the police station along with other
people.
[16]
She identified him as the culprit and later on found out that his name was Raul Gallego. She
executed an affidavit narrating the killing of Wilfredo.
[17]

Subsequently, Lina Echavez also went to the Jordan police station upon invitation of a relative
named Ramon Galve. Raul Gallego was then already behind bars. She identified Gallego as the man
who stabbed her father.
[18]
On February 10, 1995, Lina Echavez also executed an affidavit regarding the
stabbing incident.
[19]

Avelyn Lamata testified that while on a jeep headed for Iloilo, she passed by Gallego in his prison
cell and also recognized him as Wilfredo Lamata's assailant. The jeep was about ten meters from the
detention cell.
[20]
On February 22, 1995, Avelyn executed an affidavit regarding the killing of her
grandfather.
[21]

When Lina Echavez took the witness stand, she recalled that prior to that night when her father
was stabbed, during the February 3, 1995 fiesta, she encountered Raul Gallego for the first time. Lina
was in her brother's house with her cousin. Gallego rode on a motorcycle and stopped in front of the
house of Lina's brother. Gallego asked Lina's cousin where Wildy (referring to Wilfredo Lamata) lived.
Lina asked him who he was and he answered that he was a relative from Negros.
[22]

74

Lucia Lamata, Lina Echavez, and Aveiyn Lamata all positively identified Raul Gallego as
Wilfredo Lamata's assailant when they took the witness stand.
[23]

The accused Gallego posed the defense of denial and alibi.
Francisco Mesa, a good friend of Gallego, testified that Gallego is from Negros, but he has
relatives in Barangay Dasal, Jordan, Guimaras. On February 5, 1995, Mesa met Gallego in the Barangay
Dasal market. Gallego told him that he was in Barangay Dasal visiting his relatives.
[24]
Thereafter,
during the whole day of February 8, 1995 up to 7:00 p.m., Mesa saw Gallego sitting alone outside the
store of a certain Lydia Gallego at the Barangay Dasal market where Mesa was a fish vendor. The
distance between Lydia Gallego's store and Mesa's vending place was about 30 meters. At 7:00 p.m., he
walked with Raul Gallego to the house of the latter's cousin, Lorio Gallego. There were many people
holding a family reunion in the said house in Barangay Dasal.
[25]
While there, Mesa talked with Raul
Gallego. He did not see him leave the house until he (Mesa) went home at past 11:00 p.m.
[26]

Mesa also testified that Barangay Dasal and Barangay Sebaste (where Wilfredo Lamata lives) are
about three kilometers, apart and are connected by a rough road where trucks, jeeps, cars, tricycles, and
motorcycles can pass. By jeep, the distance can be traversed in ten minutes, and by motorcycle, about 30
minutes.
[27]

Lorio Gallego testified for the defense. On February 8, 1995, he was at home hosting a dinner on
the occasion of the first death anniversary of his daughter. There were about 50 people in his house,
among whom were Raul Gallego and Francisco Mesa who arrived together at about 6:30 to 7:00 p.m.
Raul did not leave his house until the next morning.
[28]
He likewise testified that the distance between
Barangay Dasal and Barangay Sebaste is about eight kilometers. These barangays are connected by a
road where a passenger jeepney plies once or twice a day. If a passenger misses the jeepney,
motorcycles are available for hire to negotiate the distance. Otherwise, one would have to travel by foot
to get to Barangay Sebaste.
[29]

Reynaldo Gallego, brother of Raul Gallego, also saw Raul drinking at Lydia Gallego's store
between 4:00 to 7:00 p.m.
[30]
At about past 7:00 p.m. on February 8, 1995, Raul went to the house of
Lorio Gallego. Later that night, at around 10:00 p.m., the Chief of Police, two policemen named Rudy
Ronzales and George Galon, along with two other unnamed policemen went to Reynaldo's house
looking for Raul. Reynaldo informed them that he was in Lorio's house, then inquired why they were
looking for him. Ronzales replied that Raul killed Wilfredo Lamata.
[31]

Reynaldo also testified that Barangay Dasal is about seven kilometers away from Barangay
Sebaste. They are connected by a good road which can be negotiated in 20 minutes by passenger
motorcycle. A feeder road also connects the two barangays.
[32]

Lydia Tanaleon corroborated the testimonies of the defense witnesses. She narrated that Raul
Gallego was in her store drinking from 4:00 to 7:00 p.m. on February 8, 1995.
[33]
At past 7:00 p.m., Raul,
Lydia and her sister Josa Elsana went together to have dinner at Lorio Gallego's house on the occasion
of a death anniversary. From the time they arrived in Lorio's house until she left at past 10:30 p.m., she
did not see Raul Gallego leave the said house.
[34]

Raul Gallego took the witness stand. He testified that he was a resident of Binalbagan, Negros,
Occidental, but was born in Barangay Dasal, Jordan, Guimaras
[35]
and grew up there until he was nine
years old.
[36]
He returned to Guimaras in 1978 when his mother died then went back to Negros. On
February 6, 1995, his brother from Mindanao, Rodolfo Gallego, fetched him to go to Guimaras for a
vacation. They arrived in Guimaras on February 8, 1995.
[37]
On that day, at around 4:00 to 7:00 p.m., he
was at Lydia Tanaleon's store in front of the Barangay Dasal market. He, along with his relatives
including Francisco Mesa, had a drinking spree because his brother Rodolfo had just arrived from
Mindanao. Mesa would, however, sometimes go out of the store because he was selling fish. Raul did
not leave the store until past 7:00 p.m. when he, along with Lydia Tanaleon, Johnny Galon, his aunties
Margarita Gallego and Rosario Gallego, and Francisco Mesa stopped by Rey Gallego's residence, then
proceeded to Lorio Gallego's house to have dinner on the occasion of the first death anniversary of his
child. Raul Gallego stayed there until 8:00 the following morning when he went to the market to have
coffee. He then went back to Lydia Tanaleon's store to drink. Some policemen arrived and invited him
to go with them to the police station because he was informed that he was a suspect in the killing of
Wilfredo Lamata. He denied the killing and told them that he did not know Wilfredo Lamata, but
nevertheless went with the policemen to the police station. There, he was investigated and asked
whether he killed Wilfredo Lamata. He reiterated that he did not kill Wilfredo Lamata and that he did
not even know him. He then stayed at the balcony of the police station at around 11:00 a.m. At around
12:00 noon, some women came and conversed with the police. The police pointed to Gallego as the
suspect. A woman then stood up and told Gallego, "So it was you who killed my husband. Why did you
do it?" Gallego replied, "I did not kill your husband because I did not know you and I did not also know
your husband."
[38]

The trial court gave credence to the evidence of the prosecution. It convicted Raul Gallego of the
crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer a penalty of imprisonment ofreclusion perpetua with all its
accessory penalties and to pay the heirs of Wilfredo Lamata the amount of P50,000.00 as damages plus
the costs of suit. Hence this appeal with the lone assignment of error, viz:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAUL GALLEGO GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER."
The bone of contention in the case at bar is the identity of Wilfredo Lamata's assailant. There is no
doubt that a man mortally stabbed Wilfredo on the left chest on that fateful night in the Lamata abode.
To establish the identity of Wilfredo's assailant, the prosecution relies on Lucia and Avelyn Lamata's
and Lina Echavez' positive identification of Raul Gallego as the assailant. On the other hand, Raul
Gallego cries foul and alleges that Lucia and Lina identified him as the culprit upon suggestion of the
policemen at the police station. He has not adequately proven this allegation. The police investigators
are presumed to have performed their duties regularly and in good faith,
[39]
and in the absence of
adequate proof to overthrow this presumption, his positive identification remains free from any taint of
irregularity.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,
[40]
we explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the
test to determine the admissibility of such identification, viz:
75

"Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where
the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-
ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose . . . . In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted
the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that
time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure."
Using the totality-of-circumstances test, we find that the identification of Raul Gallego as
Wilfredo Lamata's assailant through a show-up is credible as borne out by the following salient facts.
Raul Gallego appeared at the house of the victim, Wilfredo Lamata, at around 7:30 p.m. At that
time, prosecution witnesses Avelyn Lamata and Lina Echavez were watching television in the living
room while Lucia Lamata was sewing clothes. A fluorescent lamp lighted the living room. With the
main door of the house opened, the light from the living room also illumined the area immediately
outside the main door where Raul Gallego stood. Prior to the stabbing incident, Lucia' and Lina spoke
with Raul Gallego who stood right outside the main door. Both of them also saw Gallego stab Wilfredo
in the brightness of their living doom. Lucia was right beside her husband when he was attacked, giving
her a full frontal view of Gallego. Lina, for her part, was about one meter beside Gallego when he
stabbed her father. Avelyn also identified Raul Gallego as her grandfather's assailant as she saw him
standing by the door before the stabbing and also saw him running away from the scene of the crime
right after the attack. There is no doubt that the prosecution witnesses were able to have a clear view of
Raul Gallego on the night the dastardly act was committed in the sanctity of their abode.
Lucia Lamata went to the police station the day following the stabbing incident to identify her
husband's assailant. Even without knowledge of Raul Gallegos name and likewise without prodding
from anybody, she identified Raul Gallego as the assailant from several men staying in the balcony of
the police station. She identified him without hesitation, viz:
"Q: You said you saw the accused for the second time at the police station of Jordan? .
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What time more or less have you seen him (sic)?
A: In the Municipal Building around 1:30 in the afternoon of February 9,1995.
Q: How did you happen to know that the accused Raul Gallego was in the Municipal Building?
A: I was notified, in my house that the person who stabbed my husband was already caught. So I
went to the police station to identify him.
Q: That person you identified in the police station is the same person you have seen (sic) who
stabbed your husband?
A: Yes, sir:
xxx
Q: You said that you were informed by the police that the person who stabbed your husband was in
their custody. Is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was that policeman who informed you?
A: It was not the police. They just sent somebody to notify me at home.
Q: Was that somebody also a policeman?
A: No. My relative.
Q: And that same day you went to the police station?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And, it was in the police station of Jordan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And, when you arrived in, the police station of Jordan, was it in the morning or in the afternoon
of February 9, 1995?
A: In the afternoon.
Q: And you were told upon arrival in the police station by a policeman that the person who stabbed
your husband was in the police station?
A: When I arrived, he said that man was still outside. I identified him but I just kept quiet and
when the investigator brought him inside the room and I was also around the room, he was
investigated.
Q: When you arrived in the police station in the afternoon, you of course met some policemen there
in the police station?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you mentioned that you were informed by the policemen that the person who stabbed your
husband was there?
A: No.
Q: Nobody at the police station informed you that the man who stabbed your husband was there?
A: They told me also that the man who stabbed my husband was there, "can (sic) you identify
him?"
76

Q: Who was that policeman?
A: I don't know him, and that man was sitting on the porch.
Q: And that man sitting on the porch was the only man sitting there aside from the police?
A: There were, some other persons.
Q: But those other persons were policemen?
A: No, there were other persons sitting there also.
Q: And in the porch of the police station?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you did (sic) not remember that policeman who told you about that man who killed your
husband?
A: I cannot remember anymore. I don't know him.
Q: But that man whom you saw at the police station was wearing different attire?
A: Yes, sir."
[41]
(emphasis supplied)
On a separate occasion, Lina Echavez also went to the police station to identify the man who
killed her father. Although by this time she had already heard that it was a certain Raul Gallego who
stabbed her father, she identified Raul Gallego as the assailant without suggestion from anybody at the
police station. She testified as follows:
"Q: Did you see Raul Gallego in the Police Station?
A: When I entered the investigation room, Raul Gallego was inside the prison. Then the policeman
told me to set (sic) down to identify the man who stabbed my father "Wilfredo Lamata". When
I saw Raul Gallego I felt nervous, cried, and was afraid.
Q: At that moment when you saw Raul Gallego you do (sic) not know his name?
A: No, sir.
Q: You did not know also that Raul Gallego was imprisoned at that time when you went to the
police station?
A: I went home because I have also a house in Iloilo, I really dont believed (sic) that my father
was already dead. My cousin told me that we will (sic) go to the Police Station because we
will (sic) identify that man who stabbed my father.
Q: So you did not know how Raul Gallego was imprisoned?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Who was your relative who told you to go to the Police Station?
A: My cousin Ramon Galve.
xxx
Q: Did Ramon Galve identify the accused Raul Gallego when you went to the Police Station?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Who was your companion in going to the Police Station?
A: My relative, that is the son of my cousin.
Q: So, you do not know why and how Raul Gallego was imprisoned when you went there?
A: I know him he was imprison when he stabbed my father, later I identify that his name is Raul
Gallego (sic). But I really know him when I saw him stabbing my father (sic).
Q: That is what you think that he was there because he stabbed your father?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: That you did not know him in the prison while you were there at that. time?
A: Yes, Sir. That is when Raul Gallego was detained and my mother identify him, and I was the
second who identify him as the accused (sic).
Q: Now you said that Raul Gallego was in prison or detained because he was a suspect according
to the police?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: While you were going to the Police Station, you still did not know the name of Raul Gallego?
A: While I was there,, I heard them saying that he is (sic) Raul Gallego but it did not come to (sic)
my mind.
Q: So, while you were on your way to the Jordan Municipal jail the name of Raul Gallego was
already mentioned?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: That is all for the witness.
PROS. NIELO:
That man which you said, you later knew as Raul Gallego?
A: Yes, Sir.
77

Q: That person you saw at the jail he was the same person which you sew already identified
as Raul Gallego (sic), he was the same Raul Gallego who stabbed your father?
A: Yes, sir:"
[42]
(emphasis supplied)
It is not decisive that Lucia and Avelyn Lamata and Lina Echavez did not know Raul Gallego's
name when he stabbed Wilfredo and when he was identified at the police station. This Court has
previously held that identification of a person is not solely through knowledge of his name. In
fact, familiarity with physical features, particularly those of the face, is the best way to identify a
person. One may be familiar with the face but not necessarily the name. Thus, it does not follow that to
be able to identify a person, one must necessarily know his name.
[43]
"Experience shows that precisely
because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the
victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. We
have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the
face and body movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot easily be erased from
their memory."
[44]
Relatives of the victim have a natural knack for remembering the face of the
assailant for they, more than anybody else, would be concerned with seeking justice for the victim and
bringing the malefactor to face the law.
[45]
Even if Lucia, Avelyn,, and Lina did not initially know the
name of the accused, the appearance of the accused Gallego was etched in their memory by the tragic
death of their loved one. Thus, when Lucia Lamata executed her affidavit the day following the stabbing
incident, she stated that she could identify the face, physical structure, and voice of the accused if she
saw and heard him again.
[46]
Lina Echavez also stated in her affidavit executed two days after that fateful
night that she could identify her father's assailant if she saw him again.
[47]
True enough, without batting
an eyelash, both Lucia and Lina identified Raul Gallego as the assailant when they saw him in the
Jordan police station on February 9, 1995 and February 10, 1995, respectively, as well as when they
took the witness stand. Avelyn Lamata also recognized Raul Gallego as her grandfather's assailant when
she passed by his detention cell on her way to Iloilo and also positively identified him in court.
Raul Gallego is a complete stranger to Lucia and Avelyn Lamata and Lina Echavez. No ill-motive
can be ascribed against them to falsely testify against him. Absent any evidence showing any reason or
motive for them to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their
testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit.
[48]

In light of the positive identification of Raul Gallego as Wilfredo Lamata's assailant, the accused's
defense of denial and alibi must fall. Time and again, this Court has ruled that positive identification of
the accused will prevail over the defense of denial and alibi.
[49]
Moreover, for the defense of alibi to
prosper, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of
the crime at the approximate time of its commission.
[50]
This, the accused failed to do. As borne out by
the testimonies of the defense witnesses, Lorio Gallego's house (where Raul. Gallego supposedly was at
the time Wilfredo Lamata was stabbed) was only about three to four kilometers away from the scene of
the crime - a distance which by motorcycle could be negotiated in ten minutes. As we have previously
ruled in Peoplev. J ose:
[51]

"Extant in our jurisprudence are cases where the distance between the scene of the crime and the alleged
whereabouts of the accused is only two (2) kilometers (People v. Lumantas, 28 SCRA 764 [1969]), or
three (3) kilometers , People v. Binsol, 100 Phil. 713 [1957]) or even five (5) kilometers (People v.
Manabat, 100 Phil. 603 [1957]), and yet it was held that these distances were not too far as to preclude
the possibility of the accused's presence at the locus criminis, even if the sole means of traveling
between the two places at that time was only by walking (People v. Aparato, 80 Phil. 199 [1948]).
Having established the guilt of Raul Gallego beyond reasonable doubt, we now come to the
aggravating circumstances attending the crime.
The prosecution adequately proved that treachery qualified the killing of Wilfredo Lamata to
murder. To prove treachery, the following must be shown: (1) the employment of means of execution
that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the deliberate and
conscious adoption of the means of execution.
[52]
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that Wilfredo
was without any opportunity to defend himself and to retaliate, having been ill and made to rise from
bed only to meet Raul Gallego. While the attack may have been frontal, it was so sudden and
unexpected that the unsuspecting Wilfredo did not have time to defend himself. As soon as Lina
Echavez opened the door and Raul Gallego saw Wilfredo, he (Gallego) rushed to the latter seemingly to
embrace him while he said, "(h)ere is my relative whom I am anxious to see". Then Gallego suddenly
stabbed Wilfredo on the left chest, thereby inflicting a wound that could cause instantaneous
death.
[53]
Wilfredo had not given, any provocation and was thus taken by surprise so that upon being
stabbed, he uttered, "(w)hat have I done? Why did you do this to me?" This Court has previously ruled
that even a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected end the victim was
unarmed.
[54]
It is also undisputed that Raul Gallego deliberately adopted the particular means, method or
form of attack employed by him. He purposely went to the Lamata abode carrying with him the deadly
bladed weapon.
[55]
He even introduced himself as a certain Col. Latumbo who was a relative from
Negros eager to see Wilfredo whom he had not seen an several years presumably not to raise any
suspicion that harm would befall Wilfredo Lamata.
With respect to the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, we find that it cannot be
appreciated. There is evident premeditation when the following facts are shown: (1) the time when the
accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act showing that the accused clung to his
determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of sufficient period of time between the decision
and, the execution of the crime; to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.
[56]
There is a dearth of evidence, however, with respect to these facts.
Nighttime cannot also be appreciated because although the crime took place at about 7:30 in the
evening, the fact alone that the crime was committed at night does not automatically aggravate the
crime. Nighttime becomes an aggravating circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by the
offender; (2) the offender takes advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by
insuring the offender's immunity from identification or capture.
[57]
In the case at bar, no evidence
suggests that the accused purposely sought the cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime or to conceal
his identity as he stabbed Wilfredo in a well-lighted place.
Undeniably, however, the crime was committed in the dwelling of the Lamatas without
provocation from the victim, Wilfredo Lamata. Dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance when the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not
given provocation.
[58]
"He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong, is more guilty than
78

he who offends him, elsewhere."
[59]
We have previously ruled that this aggravating circumstance may be
appreciated against the accused even if it was not alleged in the information when proved without any
objection on his part
[60]
or even over his objection.
[61]
This brings us to a thorny issue in the case at bar.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659
[62]
provides:
"Art. 248. Murder.-- Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery . . .
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code also provides:
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. -- In all cases in which the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following rules shall be observed in the application
thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater
penalty shall be applied."
By mechanically applying these penal provisions to the case at bar, the appreciation of the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling will result in the imposition of no less than the supreme penalty of
DEATH upon the accused Gallego. It is worth noting that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was
not alleged in the information. Nor was it mentioned, much less appreciated, in the decision of the trial
court convicting the accused Gallego of murder. Neither was it raised as an issue in the Briefs of the
parties. It is only now that the issue of duelling, apparently overlooked from the inception of the case up
to its elevation to this Court, has been unearthed. Considering that the accused Gallego was not apprised
of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling at any stage of the judicial proceedings and the resulting
penalty will be DEATH if dwelling is appreciated, do the previous rulings of the Court that an
aggravating circumstance may be appreciated against the accused even if it was not alleged in the
information when proved without any objection on his part or even over his objection, apply to the case
at bar?
In People v. Albert,
[63]
we admonished courts to proceed with more care where the possible
punishment is in its severest form -- death -- because the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable.
Any decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible, hence it is the bounden
duty of the court to exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' evidence.
[64]
safeguards designed
to reduce to a minimum, if not eliminate, the grain of human fault ought not to be ignored in a case
involving the imposition of capital punishment
[65]
for an erroneous conviction will leave a lasting stain
in our escutcheon of justice."
[66]
the accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to present his
defense on an aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference between life and death in order
for the Court to properly "exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' essence." This, the accused
can do only if he is apprised of the aggravating circumstance raising the penalty imposable upon him to
death. Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information, otherwise the Court cannot
appreciate it. The death sentence being irrevocable, we cannot allow the decision to takeaway life to
hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the accused in predicting what aggravating
circumstance will be appreciated against him.
In a series of cases under the regime of Rep. Act No. 7659, the Court did not appreciate the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling which would have increased the imposable penalty to death when
such circumstance was not alleged in the information.
[67]
In Peoplev. Gaspar, et a1.,
[68]
the Court found
that apart from treachery, dwelling also attended the killing of the victim. Despite this finding and the
absence of any mitigating circumstance, the Court nonetheless did not appreciate dwelling and imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand not the greater penalty of death.
[69]
Hence, in the case at bar,
considering that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was not alleged in the information, we cannot
appreciate it and raise the penalty imposed upon Raul Gallego from reclusion perpetua to death.
Anent the damages awarded to the heirs of the victim, there is sufficient evidence to warrant the
award of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
[70]
Actual damages cannot, however, be awarded for lack of
evidence to support the prosecutions claim.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the impugned decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant Raul Gallego is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.