Cases:

1. David v. Arroyo (GR #171396 May 3, 2006)

Facts: In February 24, 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the
discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be
implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant
to such Presidential Proclamation, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at
the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public
organization/meeting. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that
warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be
implemented. During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without
warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and
newspaper columnist. Exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national
emergency, the President lifted PP 1017 by issuing Proclamation No. 1021.
Issue: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 are constitutional
Held: The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. While the "Take Care" Power pertains to the
power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This Court rules
that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature (Art.6 Sec.1). Moreover, Congress is the repository of emergency
powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to
delegate such powers to the President subject to certain conditions. Section 17, Article
XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. Let it be
emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility
or business affected with public interest.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and
the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering
that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the
Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.

2. Ople v. Torres (GR #127686 July 23, 1998)
Facts: On 12 December 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order
308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System."
The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a Population
Reference Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO) through the
use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY . On 24 January 1997, Senator Blas F. Ople, as a
Senator, taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
filed instant petition against then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of
the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee are charged with the implementation of Administrative Order 308.
Issues:
1. Whether the Philippine President can issue an Administrative Order for the adoption
of a National Computerized Identification Reference System, independent of a
legislative act.
2. Whether or not the AO violates the citizens right to privacy protected by the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution.
Held:
1. The AO establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope,
affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizens and foreign residents and therefore, it
is supposed to be a law passed by Congress that implements it, not by an
Administrative Order issued by the President. AO 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an Administrative Order. An administrative order is an
ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of the government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the
sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
2. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to provide a
common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through
the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY. The AO does not even tells us in clear and
unequivocal terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide
who shall control and access the data and under what circumstances and for what
purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity
of the information.

3. Lagcao vs. Labra (GR # 155746, October 13, 2004)
Facts: The court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to
execute the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the
lot only to discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, petitioners instituted
ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the
MTCCs decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition. However, when
the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote
two letters to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that
the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayors
request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition. Unfortunately for
petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu
City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant
to RA 7279. On July 19, 2000, Ordinance no. 1843 was enacted authorizing the mayor
of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceeding on petitioners property.
Issue: Whether or not Cebu City Ordinance No. 1843 contravenes the Constitution and
other applicable laws
Held: For an ordinance to be valid, it must be in accordance with certain well-
established basic principles of a substantive nature. Ordinance No. 1843 failed to
comply with the substantive requirements. A clear case of constitutional infirmity having
been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify the subject ordinance. We
recapitulate: first, as earlier discussed, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160; second, the precipitate
manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor
ordinance; third, the fact that petitioners small property was singled out for
expropriation for the purpose of awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated
manifest partiality against petitioners, and fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there
was a reasonable relation between the end sought and the means adopted. While the
objective of the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum dwellers, the
means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible and
called for by the circumstances.

4. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Inc 234 SCRA 255
Facts: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a
portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated &
equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casinos
opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit
and cancelling existing business permit to the establishment for the operation of the
casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and
providing a penalty for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both
violated Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local
Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of
casino for the general welfare.
Issue: WON the Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 are valid.
Held: The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a
statute is obvious. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869 (allowing the playing of
certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general). This decree
has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.
Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a
casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy
announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

5. Lucena grand terminal vs. JAC liner inc 425 SCRA 174
Facts: Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with
the objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been caused by the
existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city. City Ordinance 1631
grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance,
establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary terminals
in the City of Lucena the right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand
Central Terminal, Inc. The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631
as a valid excercise of police power while declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and
void for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. filed its Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena then elevated it via petition for review under
Rule 45 before the Court. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA)
with which it has concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the
challenged orders of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by
the CA, Lucena now comes to the Court via petition for review to assail the Decision
and Resolution of the CA.
Issue: whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted
the subject ordinances.
Held: As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly
exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and
lawful method. The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of
relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, involve public interest warranting the
interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is
thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed
by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were
reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances
assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. Since the compulsory use of the
terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and
charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court.
What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then
to stop it right there. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the
flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart
from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve
the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened.

6. Dela Cruz vs. Paras (L-42571, July 25 1983)
Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise
Facts: Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of
Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to
engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That
the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with
customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after
due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which
reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE
POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION
OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of
police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were
deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the
exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of nightclubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in
pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If nightclubs were merely then regulated and not
prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had
stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It
cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy
and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a
field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose
sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than
by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and
can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

7. White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila 576 scra 416
Facts:On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini
hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance
infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled
that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of
police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist
guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private
rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there
for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to
freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or
less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights
may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare.

8. KMU labor center vs. Garcia 239 SCRA 386
Facts: On June 26,1990, Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos issued memorandum
circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB, Chairman Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing
provincial buses operators to charge passengers within a range of 15% above and 15%
below, the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. On December 5, 1990 private
respondent PBOAP filed an application for fare rate increase to P0.085 and again it was
reduced to P0.065 per kilometer rate. The application was opposed by the Philippine
Consumer Foundation Inc. that the proposed rate were exorbitant and unreasonable
and that the application contained no allegation on the rate o return on December 14,
1990. Public respondent LTFRB granted the fare rate increase on March 16, 1994.
Petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of
bus fares, it was dismissed for lack of merit, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Provincial Bus Operators has the power to reduce and
increase fare rated based on the circular order issued by the LTFRB?
Held: Supreme Court held that the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus
operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and
invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority, Potestas
delegata non delegari protest what has been delegated further delegation of such
power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in
the delegate inandated to discharged it directly. Furthermore rate fixing or making is a
delicate and sensitive government function that requires dexterity of judgment and
sound discretion with the settle goal at arriving at a just and reasonable rate acceptable
to both public utility and the public.
Doctrine of Potestas delegata non delegari potest; Exception
- Art VI, Secs. 23 (2), 28 (2)
- Local governments may be allowed to legislate on purely local matters (Art X).
Since what is given to local legislative bodies is true legislative power and not just the
power to promulgate rules and regulations, it is not necessary that the delegating
statute follow the rules for valid delegation applicable to the empowerment of
administrative agencies.
Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 (1994)

An administrative body may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in
the details which the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide.
However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies
authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator or other
public service.
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION:
The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range
over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an
undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegate non delegari potest. What
has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle
that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by
the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another. A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute
a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to
discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change and
increase their fares at will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic
state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators
who may increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it
pleases them or whenever they deem it necessary to do so.

9. U.S vs. Ang Tang Ho 43 phil 1
Facts: On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and
approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice,
Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the
Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued
EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which
rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily,
criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty
centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale
was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was charged in violation of
the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an
undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the
act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the
crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued
pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable
standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide
definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in
use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination
of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not
possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it
leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the
judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in
form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take
effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

10. Ynot vs. IAC 148 SCRA 659
Facts: Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer
confiscated by the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which
prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to another.
Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ
of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the
merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they
could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner,
for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to
the outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial
court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of
legislative power by the former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution
wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that had the
force of law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Held: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted. The lower courts are not prevented
from examining the constitutionality of a law. Constitutional grant to the Supreme Court
to review. Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by
simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary,
they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound
or excise the affliction. The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but
it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing
an existing law due to the grant of legislative authority over the president under
Amendment number 6. Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language
to avoid controversy. In the due process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous
so it would remain resilient. This was due to the avoidance of an iron rule laying down
a stiff command for all circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every
situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due process lest they be
confined to its interpretation like a straitjacket. There must be requirements of notice
and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness. There are exceptions such as
conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary evidence as long as such
presumption is based on human experience or rational connection between facts
proved and fact presumed. An examples is a passport of a person with a criminal
offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which
both restrains and is restrained by due process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in
addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, it cant be said
that it complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the
purpose sought has a gap. Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings
as procedural due process is not juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court
of justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution. The challenged
measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the method to confiscate
carabos was oppressive. Due process was violated because the owner was denied the
right to be heard or his defense and punished immediately. This was a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and against the separation of powers. The
policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.

11. DAR vs. Sutton (GR 162070, October 19, 2005)
FACTS: Respondents herein inherited a land which has been devoted exclusively to
cow and calf breeding. Pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the
government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to
petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. a new agrarian law, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of
1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and
swine. Thereafter, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR

This Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in
the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain
provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of
agrarian reform. Thus, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to
withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and
thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. However, DAR issued A.O. No. 9,
series of 1993 which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the
coverage of the CARL. The DAR Secretary issued an Order partially granting the
application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL but applying the
retention limits outlined in the DARA.O. No. 9. Respondents moved for reconsideration.
They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted
exclusively to cattle-raising and appealing that the DARA.O. No. 9 be declared
unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which
prescribes a maximum retention for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is
constitutional?
HELD: The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of
agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership is invalid
as it contravenes the Constitution. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that
livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the
definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and
poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural
activity. DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by
the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in
issuing the assailed A.O. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken
down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the
scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.

12. Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila 204 scra 837
Facts: On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic Command,
West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the confiscation of the license
plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be
imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only
under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the
public streets. Even the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations was not
directly prescribed or allowed by the decree. After no motion for reconsideration of the
decision was filed the judgment became final and executor. Withstanding the Gonong
decision still violations of the said decision transpired, wherein there were several
persons who sent complaint letters to the Court regarding the confiscation of drivers
licenses and removal of license plate numbers. On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued
Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself to detach license plate/tow and
impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing
the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a resolution
regarding the matter which stated that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in
conflict with the decision of the Court, and that the Court has received several
complaints against the enforcement of such ordinance.
Issue: W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 are
valid in the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents
of the national legislature?
Held: No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991,
of the MMA and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong,
Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila
from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under
LOI43) and confiscating drivers licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
To test the validity of said acts the principles governing municipal corporations was
applied, according to Elliot for a municipal ordinance to be valid the following requisites
should be complied: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not
be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and
consistent with public policy. In the Gonong decision it was shown that the measures
under consideration did not pass the first criterion because it did not conform to existing
law. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of
drivers licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing
in the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such sanctions. Thus Local political
subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents
vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the
Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the
will of the principal. In the case at bar the enactments in question, which are merely
local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a
statute.



13. Boie Takeda vs. De la Serna (G.R. No. 92174 December 10, 1993)
Facts: P.D. No. 851 provides for the Thirteen-Month Pay Law. Under Sec. 1 of said law,
all employers are required to pay all their employees receiving basic salary of not more
than P1,000.00 a month, regardless of the nature of the employment, and such should
be paid on December 24 of every year. The Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D.
851 contained provisions defining 13-month pay and basic salary and the employers
exempted from giving it and to whom it is made applicable. Minister Ople set items of
compensation not included in the computation of 13-month pay. (Overtime pay,
earnings and other remunerations which are not part of basic salary shall not be
included in the computation of 13-month pay). Pres. Corazon Aquino promulgated on
August 13, 1985 M.O. No. 28, containing a single provision that modifies P.D. 851 by
removing the salary ceiling of P1,000.00 a month. Then Sec. of Labor Franklin Drilon
issued the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13 month Pay Law. Sec.
5(A) of the guideline states that Employees who are paid a fixed or guaranteed wage
plus commission are also entitled to the mandated 13 month pay based on their total
earnings during the calendar year. A routine inspection was conducted in the premises
of the petitioners Boie-Takeda Chemicals Inc. and Philippine Fuji Xerox Corp. in which
the respondent-public officials find that the Medical Representatives and salesmen of
the two companies were underpaid of their 13-month pay of years 1986, 1987, 1988
since the commissions of the said employees were not included. The respondent public
officials ordered the petitioners to pay their employees the underpaid amount of the 13
th

month pay. The petitioners assailed that remunerations, such as commissions, are not
part of the basic salary of the employees and should not be considered in their 13
month pay. Furthermore, they contend that the revised guidelines are null and void for
violating the equal protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not commissions are included in the computation of 13-month pay
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that remunerations, such as commissions, are not part
of the basic salary of the employees. Citing San Miguel Corp. vs. Inciong, the court said
that any compensations or remunerations which are deemed not part of the basic pay
is excluded as basis in the computation of the mandatory bonus and the later
Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 851 issued by then Sec. Blas
Ople states that overtime pay, earning and other remunerations are excluded as part of
the basic salary in the computation of the 13
th
month pay. In remunerative schemes
which have a fixed wage plus commission, the fixed wage forms the basic salary for this
is what the employee receives for a standard working period while commissions are
treated as incentives for the extra efforts in consummating sales or other related
transactions. Thus, they do not form part of the basic salary. Wherefore, the petition
was granted and assailed orders set aside


14. United BF Homeowners Association vs. BF Homes, Inc. 160 scra 304
Facts: United BF Homeowners Association, Inc.(UBFHAI) is the sole representative of
all homeowners of BF Homes while BF Homes, Inc (BFHI) is the owner-developer of the
subdivision. Due to financial difficulties, BFHI was placed under receivership by SEC for
10 years under Atty. Orendain for 10 years. Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over
management of respondent BFHI. Preliminary to the rehabilitation, Atty. Orendain
entered into an agreement with the two major homeowners' associations, the BF
Paraaque Homeowners Association, Inc. (BFPHAI) and the Confederation of BF
Homeowners Association, Inc. (CBFHAI), for the creation of a single, representative
homeowners' association and the setting up of an integrated security program that
would cover the eight (8) entry and exit points to and from the subdivision.
Subsequently, this tripartite agreement was reduced into a memorandum of agreement,
and was amended. Pursuant to these agreements, petitioner UBFHAI was created and
registered with the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), and recognized
as the sole representative of all the homeowners' association inside the subdivision.
Respondent BFHI, through its receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the
administration and operation of the subdivision's clubhouse and a strip of open space
respectively. The first receiver was relieved and a new committee of receivers,
composed of respondent BFHI's board of directors was appointed. Based on BFHI's title
to the main roads, the newly appointed committee of receivers sent a letter to the
different homeowners' association in the subdivision informing them that as a basic
requirement for BFHI's rehabilitation, respondent BFHI would be responsible for the
security of the subdivision in order to centralize it and abate the continuing proliferation
of squatters. On the same day, petitioner UBFHAI filed with the HIGC a petition for
Mandamus with preliminary injunction against respondent BFHI alleging that the
committee of receivers illegally revoked their security agreement with the previous
receiver. The HIGC issued ex parte a TRO which enjoined respondent BFHI from taking
over the clubhouse, securing all entry and exit points, impeding or preventing the
execution and sale of properties and otherwise repudiating or invalidating any contract
or agreement or petitioner with the BFHI. Without filing an answer to petitioner
UBFHAI's petition with the HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for prohibition for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order, to enjoin HIGC from proceeding with the case. The HIGC issued an
order deferring the resolution of petitioner UBFHAI's application for preliminary
injunction, until such time that respondent BFHI's application for prohibition with the
appellate court has been resolved. When the twenty-day (20) effectivity of the
temporary restraining order had lapsed, the HIGC ordered the parties to maintain the
status quo. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals granted respondent BFHI's petition for
prohibition. Motion for reconsideration by the petitioners was denied. Hence this
petition.
Issue: whether or not HIGC has jurisdiction and authority to hear the case as provided
for in sec1 (b) rule II of HIGCs rules of procedure.
Ruling: HIGC has no jurisdiction to hear the case. Originally, administrative supervision
was vested by law with the SEC but pursuant to PD902-A, this function was delegated
to the HIGC. As stated in PD92-A, HIGC was given the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide homeowners disputes arising out of the following intra-
corporate relations:
1.Between and among members of the association;
2.Between any and/or all of them and the association of which they are member; and
3.In so far as it concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity, between the association
and the state.
When HIGC adopted its revised rules of procedure in the hearing of homeowners
disputes, it added the phrase between the association and the state/general public or
other entity. The HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it
promulgated the revised rules of procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly
expand the provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A.The inclusion of the phrase
GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a matter which HIGC cannot legally do. The
rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power,
which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or the
Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. The rule-making power
must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect
the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute." If a
discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is
the former that prevails. Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive
or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an
express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have
the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not
represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an
administrative body to legislate. "Astatutory grant of powers should not be extended by
implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

15. Lupangco vs. CA 160 scra 848
FACTS: On October 6, 1986, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued
Resolution No. 105, which prohibited the examinees in accountancy from attending
review classes, receiving handout materials, tips or the like 3 days before the date of
the exam. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions
prescribed by Sec. 8, Art.III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. On
October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy scheduled on October 25 and November 2 of the same
year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the
issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the
latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitutional. Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the
ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement
of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had
jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and
giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not satisfied
therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petition was
granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 13, 1987.
ISSUE: W/N the Resolution is valid
Held: The Court held that although it was adopted for a commendable purpose--to
preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure exams, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
being unreasonable in that the examinee cannot even attend any review class or
receive any handout etc. It is even more unreasonable that one who is caught violating
this prohibition is barred from taking future examinations conducted by the PRC.
Furthermore, the Resolution infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by
the Constitution. PRC has NO authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they
should prepare themselves for the licensure exams. They cannot be restrained from
taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become
public accountants. The Resolution also violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that these schools believe
would best enable their enrollees to meet the standards required before becoming a full
fledged public accountant. It is an axiom in administrative law that admin authorities
should NOT act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To
be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in
view.