Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Frede writes: [T]here are a large number of reasons why Plato may have chosen to write in such a way
as to leave open, or to make it very difcult to determine, whether or not he endorses a particular
argument. It seems that these reasons are at the same time reasons against writing philosophical
treatises . . . the dialogues are not philosophical treatises in disguise (:,,:: ::,). According to Nails,
the dialogues are occasions to philosophize further, not dogmatic treatises, and they demonstrate
a principle of double open-endedness, according to which it is not only the conclusions of
philosophical argument but the assumptions on which those arguments are based that must remain
radically open to further challenge (:,,,: , and :::,). Opinions similar in some respects to those
Preface xiii
Vlastos.
,
However, it is beyond the scope of this study to enter into
the debate over dogmatic or non-dogmatic interpretations of Platos
dialogues.
o
The focus of my work, however, differs in two main respects from that of
previous studies of the erotic dialogues. First, I concentrate on the character
Socrates in all four dialogues. Even though the secondary literature on
these dialogues, and especially on the Symposium and Phaedrus, is very
extensive, surprisingly few scholarly monographs focusing on Socrates and
er os in these dialogues have been published in the last hundred years.
;
Many books are concerned with one or more of the erotic dialogues only
as part of a broader study of themes or characteristics of the dialogues
as a whole.
For example: Arieti :,,:; Friedl ander :,o,; Guthrie :,;,; Kahn :,,o; Lutz :,,; Nichols :cc,;
G. A. Scott :ccc.
,
For example: Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan :cc; Gould :,o,; Hunter :cc; Osborne :,,; Price
:,,; Robin :,c; Santas :,; Shefeld :ccoa.
:c
Blondell :cc: does not discuss these dialogues; Clay :ccc discusses them tangentially.
::
For example: Nussbaum :,o; Rutherford :,,,.
xiv Preface
Socrates never wins over an opponent,
::
and that, far from being friendly,
Socrates is guilty of a failure of love: there is a last zone of frigidity
in the soul of the great erotic.
:,
More recently, John Beversluis writes
of the Socrates of the early dialogues: His humor is always at someone
elses expense usually demeaning, often unkind, and occasionally cruel.
:
My focus on Socrates erotic art in these four dialogues provides counter-
examples to these claims, and support for those who argue that Socrates
has a positive effect on his interlocutors.
:,
I hold that in portraying Socrates
as practicing an erotic art, Plato represents him as succeeding, at least to a
signicant degree, in enlisting his interlocutors, with whom he establishes
friendly relations, in his own search for wisdom.
This book is intended primarily for specialists and advanced students
of both classics and ancient philosophy. It is also written so as to be
accessible to all serious readers who have an interest in the ancient world.
Translations of the Greek and a glossary of commonly used Greek words
are provided. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own, and I
use the following texts: Plato: Duke et al. (:,,,), for Euthyphro, Apology,
Crito, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman; Slings (:cc,),
for Republic; Burnet (:,cc:,c;), for other dialogues; Euripides: Diggle
(:,o:,,); Iamblichus: Dillon (:,;,); Olympiodorus: Westerink (:,,o);
Proclus: Segonds (:cc,); Sophocles: Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (:,,c).
::
Vlastos :,;:: :, quoted by Beversluis :ccc: ,.
:,
Vlastos :,;:: :o:;.
:
Beversluis :ccc: :,,. Gill :cc: provides some helpful criticisms of Beversluis views, noting, for
example (,:;), that Socrates varies his mode of discourse to match that of his interlocutor.
:,
Opinions differ greatly about the effects of Socrates on others. Those who argue that Socrates fails
to benet his interlocutors include: Beversluis :ccc: ,o; Blondell :cc:: ::,; (citing passages in
n.;), who notes (::o) that sympathetic or youthful interlocutors are treated less harshly; Nehamas
:,,: o,o. Positive results are emphasized by, for example: Brickhouse and Smith :,,: :o:,;
Michelini :,,; Rossetti :ccc. Clay :ccc: :;,, contends that the elenchus (cross-examination)
has a positive effect on Platos readers, although not on Socrates interlocutors within the dialogues.
G. A. Scott :ccc: argues that Socrates achieves some degree of success in the two exceptional
cases of Lysis and Alcibiades. Teloh :,o: :c, claims that Socrates fails because of the defects of
the culture in which he lives. I hold that Socrates success is to be measured not only by his use of
the elenchus, but also by his interactions of many other kinds with his interlocutors.
Acknowledgments
This book could not have been written without the help and encourage-
ment of many people. I am indebted to Julia Annas for encouraging me
to write about ancient views on love and friendship, and to Frank Lewis
for introducing me to Socrates, many years ago, and for his continued
support even as our interests have diverged. I thank my colleagues and
students in Minnesota for providing a community that fostered stimu-
lating discussions of philosophical ideas, and for reading drafts of all or
part of my book. Among these are Norman Dahl, Gene Garver, Richard
Graff, Christopher Moore, Sandra Peterson, Del Reed and William Vann.
Many other scholars have helped me to understand particular issues and
provided insightful comments on earlier drafts. For discussions about the
Symposium I owe thanks to Ruby Blondell, Jill Gordon, Christopher Rowe
and Constance Meinwald; for insights into the Phaedrus I am indebted to
Paul Dotson, John Finamore and Richard Seaford. Gale Justin and George
Rudebusch gave me valuable suggestions concerning the Lysis, and David
Konstan provided much stimulating discussion about issues concerning
friendship in this and other dialogues. I am indebted to David Leitao and
Marilyn Skinner for help with issues concerning sex and gender, and to Jill
Frank for providing me with new perspectives on many issues. My hus-
band, Peter Belore, provided encouragement, good-humored willingness
to keep hearing about Socrates, and valuable editorial assistance as I wrote
and rewrote many successive drafts.
I also beneted greatly from the opportunity to present papers at
Columbia University (:cc:), the University of Minnesota (:cc,), Uni-
versity College London (:cc,), the Arizona Colloquium in Ancient Phi-
losophy (:cc: and :cco), the annual meeting of the American Philolog-
ical Association (:cc,), the annual meeting of the Society for Ancient
Greek Philosophy and of the American Philological Association (:cc),
the annual meeting of the Classical Association of the Middle West and
xv
xvi Acknowledgments
South (:cc,), and the annual Minnesota Conference on Ancient Philoso-
phy (:cc:, :cc, and :cco). Grants from the University of Minnesota in
:cc::cc:, :cc and :cc, supported research for this book.
I am deeply grateful to the anonymous readers for Cambridge University
Press for their careful analyses of an earlier draft of this book, and for their
many insightful suggestions and constructive criticisms that have helped
me to improve it in many ways. I owe special thanks to the Classics editor,
Michael Sharp, for helping me to make good use of the readers comments
in order to clarify my views about many issues, and to present them more
effectively, and for his patient, expert assistance at every stage. I am also
grateful to my other very helpful editors at Cambridge University Press:
Elizabeth Hanlon, Jodie Hodgson, Josephine Lane, and to my copy-editor,
Elizabeth Davison.
Earlier versions of parts of this book have been previously published.
Chapter o is a substantially revised version of Belore :cco, and Chapter ,
contains some material of which an earlier version was published as Belore
:c::.
Abbreviations
For ancient works, I usually adopt the abbreviations used inthe Oxford Clas-
sical Dictionary, ,rd edn., eds. S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (Oxford,
:,,o). Some exceptions are, for Platonic works:
Lys. Lysis
Sts. Statesman
For the works of Aristotle:
NE Nicomachean Ethics
EE Eudemian Ethics
For modern journals, I follow those of LAnnee Philologique. Other
abbreviations are the following:
ARV
2
Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters, ed. J. D. Beazley (Oxford, :,o,,
:nd edn.)
DK Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, eds. H. Diels and W. Kranz,
, vols. (Berlin, :,,::,,:, oth edn.)
LSJ A Greek-English Lexicon, eds. H. G. Liddell and R. Scott
(Oxford, :,c, ,th edn.), with a revised supplement, ed.
P. G. W. Glare (Oxford, :,,o)
SSR Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, ed. G. Giannantoni, vols.
(:,,c)
xvii
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues
1.1 er os and philosophia
Of the three speeches in the rst half of the Phaedrus, the rst is delivered
by Phaedrus, who attributes it to Lysias, while the second and third are
given by Socrates. Socrates rst speech argues, like Lysias speech, that a
lover is harmful to his beloved, and that a boy should grant his sexual favors
to a man who is not in love instead of to a lover. However, Socrates recants
in his second speech, which praises the lover. At the end of this second
speech, Socrates prays to Eros not to take away the erotic art (er otike
techne) that is essential to his philosophical activities:
This palinode, dear Eros, has been given and offered in payment to you, the most
beautiful and the best I am able to make, especially considering that it had to
be spoken in a somewhat poetic style, for Phaedrus sake. In forgiveness for my
previous words, and in gratitude for these, be kind and gracious, and do not in
anger take away or weaken the erotic art [er otike techne] that you gave me. Allow
me to be held in honor by the beautiful even more than now. . . [And as for Lysias,]
turn him toward philosophy . . . so that his lover here [sc. Phaedrus] may no longer
be of two minds, as he is now, but dedicate his life wholly to er os together with
philosophical words. (:,;a,bo)
:
Er os is also a major theme in the Socratic dialoguesthose in which Socrates
is protagonist of many ancient writers other than Plato. Some characterize
Socrates concern with er os in a positive way. For example, in the Alcibiades
of Aeschines, Socrates claims to have beneted Alcibiades by means of er os
(oic :c tpv).
:
In the works of other writers, however, Socrates connection
with er os is represented in a very negative fashion. For example, Phaedos
:
Following Rowe :,, on :,;bo, I read er os, not Eros. Throughout this study I leave er os
untranslated or I translate it as love or passionate desire. On the different senses of the Greek
term see further below I.:.
:
Aeschines, Alcibiades: SSR, frag. VI A,,, quoted by Kahn :,,o: ::, whose ch. : provides an excellent
survey of the theme of er os and philosophy in the Sokratikoi logoi.
:
: Socrates Daimonic Art
dialogue Zopyrus opposes Socrates erotic tendencies to his devotion to
philosophy. Here, the physiognomist Zopyrus, reading Socrates character
from his physical appearance, states that he is stupid and a womanizer.
Socrates says that Zopyrus is right: these are his natural weaknesses, but he
has overcome them by the study of philosophy.
,
In Platos own dialogues, as in the passage from the Phaedrus just quoted,
er os is often associated with philosophy in a positive way. In other passages
and dialogues of Plato, however, er os is opposed to reason and philosophy.
In the Phaedo, Socrates says that er os is among the affections of the body that
impede wisdom (phronesis) and philosophy (ococ,, especially ooc:).
In the Republic, Cephalus quotes with approval Sophocles characterization
of sex (:c qpcoioic) as a mad master (:.,:,bd:), Glaucon agrees that
the pleasures of sex are mad (,.c,ao), and Socrates agrees with those
who characterize Eros as a tyrant (,.,;,a,;,a;). According to Timaeus,
er os is among those things that a just person must conquer (Ti. :aob:),
and it is one of the terrible and necessary affections of the mortal soul
(o,c,do). In Laws o.;:d:c;,b:, the Athenian Stranger associates er os
with madness and hybris and says that it is a disease that needs restraint.
Such passages appear to suggest that a philosopher would need, like the
Socrates of Zopyrus, to attempt to overcome erotic inclinations. How, then,
can Platos Socrates claim, as he does in the Phaedrus, that erotic art is not
only compatible with, but actually necessary to, philosophical activities?
I argue that Plato answers this question in a group of four dialogues:
Alcibiades I, Lysis, Symposium and Phaedrus.
,
I refer to these four dialogues
as the erotic dialogues, in part because ordinary er os (desire for sexual or
other objects such as wealth or power) is a central concern in all of them.
The Symposium contains a series of speeches in praise of Eros, followed by
Alcibiades praise of Socrates, his beloved. The Phaedrus begins with three
speeches about the relationship between lover and beloved speeches that
are the subject of subsequent discussions about rhetoric and in the Alcib-
iades I Socrates represents himself as the lover of Alcibiades. Although the
central philosophical concern of the Lysis is the question of what a friend is,
the dramatic framework of this dialogue concerns Socrates demonstration
to Hippothales, a young man in love with Lysis, of howa lover should treat a
,
qicocqic, cosnoiv: Rossetti frags. :c (Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato o) and o (Cicero, De fato
:c). The texts relevant to Zopyrus are collected in Rossetti :,c, and discussed in Blondell :cc:: ;:,
and Kahn :,,o: ::. On Socrates physical appearance see further Chapter at .o and Chapter o
at o.,.
Br` es :,o: ::,,: gives a helpful survey of negative attitudes toward er os, in the sense of desire for
sexual pleasure, expressed in Platos dialogues.
,
I take Alcibiades I to be Platos own work, for reasons given in Chapter : n.:.
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues ,
beloved. Most important, all of these dialogues are erotic in that they depict
Socrates as practicing an art or skill that is itself erotic because it shares
certain characteristics attributed to the daim on Eros in the Symposium. In
all four dialogues, Socrates art enables him, like Eros, to be marvelously
skilled in the philosophical activities of searching for wisdom and beauty,
and of helping others to seek these same objects of er os. A central compo-
nent of the erotic art is Socratic er os: a passionate desire for the wisdom,
beauty and other good things that one recognizes that one lacks.
o
Socrates claim to have an erotic art is explicit in his prayer to Eros
in the Phaedrus, quoted above. Here, Socrates states that he has a special
relationship to Eros, the god who has given him erotic art. He also claims
in this passage to have used his art, in the recantation speech he has just
made, to exhort Phaedrus to devote himself to the life Socrates second
speech has represented as best, and to which he himself is devoted: a life
that combines philosophical words with er os (cf. :,a:: and :,oa;b:).
;
The nature of the erotic art, and of the relationship between er os and
philosophy, is claried in the Symposium. Socrates teacher, Diotima, says
that er os in a broad, or generic, sense is desire for any of a number of good
things. For example, one kind of er os is desire for wisdom (philosophia:
literally, liking, or love, for wisdom).
In so doing,
he strives, together with the people he questions, to attain the object of his
er os; that is, to become as wise and good as it is possible for him to become
(for example, Alc. 1 ::;e,;). Second, Socrates searches by using certain
:
Cf. English adjective expert (from the Latin experior, to try or experience), used of someone
who has tried or experienced something: see Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. expert, adj
(accessed September ::, :c::).
:
Brickhouse and Smith :,,: , correctly deny that this kind of empeiria is necessary or sufcient for
the use of the elenchus.
,
See Resp. ,.,:a,, where Plato writes that we judge by means of empeiria, phronesis and reason.
This passage was drawn to my attention by Frank :cc;: oc.
Griswold :,o: ::o, notes that Socrates erotic art ([Phdr.] 257a78) is the dialectical rhetoric that uses
the power of questioning to lead the soul to insights (emphasis in original); Reeve :ccoa: :,, writes
of [t]he identication of the craft of love with that of asking questions, and Roochnik :,;: ::
states that the paradigmatic form of philosophical discourse is the question, which itself is erotic in
structure. I hold that the art of questioning is an important aspect of erotic art, but not identical
with it. On the connection between loving (eran) and questioning (er otan) see below, :.,. and n.,,.
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues :;
god-given abilities, which do not depend on reasoning, to attain true belief.
He claims, for example, to have a god-given ability to recognize lovers and
beloveds (Lys. :cb;c:, discussed further in Chapter :). Socrates also has
experience in exhorting others to acquire erotic art (component (,)). An
important aspect of his exhortation of others involves leading them to
recognize that they lack wisdom.
,
In giving his demonstration of how to
produce friendliness in a beloved, Socrates leads Lysis to agree that Lysis
lacks wisdom (phronein) and needs a teacher (::cd). Moreover, the
Lysis ends in aporia about what the friend is (:::e:;). In the Alcibiades I,
Socrates shows his ambitious young beloved that he, Alcibiades, lacks self-
knowledge and needs to care for himself (for example, at ::b;,, ::;do
), while in the Symposium, Socrates induces Agathon to agree that he did
not know what he was talking about when he gave his speech about Eros
(:c:b::::), and he leads Alcibiades to be ashamed of his own deciencies
(::oab,). In the Phaedrus, Socrates shows his young interlocutor that the
speech of Phaedrus beloved, Lysias, is inferior in both content and style
(:,co:,,a, :o,d,:oe,), thus implying that Phaedrus did not know
what he was talking about when he expressed admiration for it.
Socrates erotic art, then, is not craft-knowledge, but is instead erotic or
daimonic in that it, like its possessor, the daim on Eros in the Symposium,
is always in a state in between wisdom and ignorance.
o
A passage in the
Cratylus (,,;d:c,,c) supports interpreting this daimonic state as a kind
of skill that is based on experience rather than on knowledge of the truth.
Socrates begins his discussion of daimones, and heroes, and daimonic
humans
;
by quoting Hesiods account of the daimones as the golden race
of humans who, after their death, become guardians of mortals. Hesiod,
he says, named them daimonas because they were wise [phronimoi] and
experienced [daemones] (,,bo;).
At ,,;e::,,a:, Socrates quotes Hesiod, Op. :::,, with slight variations from our texts. On the
Cra. passage see Clay :,;: and :ccc: ,:,; West :,;,: :,,.
,
Cunliffe :,o,.
: Socrates Daimonic Art
life, a marvelously skilled magician, sorcerer, and sophist.
,c
Socrates, like
Eros, is daimonic in that he recognizes his own lack of wisdom, and has the
kind of art that allows him to be a marvelously skilled hunter for wisdom.
Like the daimones of the Cratylus, he is daemon, skilled or experienced.
1.4 setting and characterization
Two dramatic elements that contribute to Platos representation of Socrates
successful and friendly use of his erotic art are the settings of the erotic
dialogues and the characterization of his interlocutors. These dialogues are
not set in a public place, such as the Lyceum, which is the setting of the
Euthydemus, or the entrance to the law courts, where the Euthyphro takes
place, but in a private or secluded location. Such a setting is conducive to
conversations with younger people, who are, from the beginning, friendly
and sympathetic toward Socrates. Absent are adult antagonists like the
sophists, who engage in eristic (contentious) competition.
,:
In the Alcibiades I, Socrates is alone with Alcibiades, a young man who
is not quite twenty years old, being just past the bloom of adolescence
(:,:e::) and soon to address the Assembly for the rst time (:c,a;b:).
,:
We
are not told exactly where they are, but Socrates stresses the fact that they
are alone (::b,).
,,
Alcibiades is sympathetic to Socrates fromthe beginning
of the dialogue, saying that he would have approached Socrates if Socrates
had not rst approached him (:cc;d,). He is sometimes exasperated by
Socrates questioning (for example, at ::d;, where he calls Socrates hubris-
tic), but is always friendly and cooperative. In the Lysis, Socrates is alone
with a group of boys and young men (:c,a,,, :c;a:) in a wrestling school
(palaistra: :ca:). Their distance from the adults with whom these young
people often associate is emphasized by the fact that the only adults who
appear are slave attendants (pedagogues), who are characterized as drunken
barbarians and whose removal by force of Lysis and Menexenus puts an
end to all conversation (::,a:b,).
,
All of the interlocutors are friendly
toward Socrates: Hippothales invites him to enter the palaistra (:c,b,);
Lysis is eager to listen to the conversation (:c;a,o); Menexenus comes
to sit down beside Socrates and willingly answers the latters questions
,c
Symp. :c,d: Rowes translation, :,,, adapted.
,:
Coventry :,,c: :; provides a good discussion of the difference between dialectic and eristic.
,:
Denyer :cc:: ,, on :c,a;, notes that citizens could address the Assembly at age twenty.
,,
Cf. Forde :,;: :::.
,
The adult trainer who interrupts the conversation at :c;d:, remains off stage and sends an
unidentied person to summon Menexenus.
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues :,
(:c;a;c::). The Phaedrus is set in the countryside, outside the city of
Athens and its crowds of bystanders (:,ccod,).
,,
Moreover, Socrates is
alone with the younger Phaedrus, a sympathetic interlocutor who shares
Socrates love of speeches like a fellow Corybant (::b;).
,o
Phaedrus is
in fact characterized, toward the beginning of the dialogue, as another
self in Socrates statement: If I do not know Phaedrus I have also forgot-
ten myself (::a,o, cf. :,oco). In the story narrated by Apollodorus
in the Symposium, Socrates is at rst alone in the street with his lover or
fan (erastes), Aristodemus (:;b:), and is afterwards an invited guest at
the house of Agathon. The symposiasts create further privacy by sending
the aulos (pipe) player away at the beginning of the dialogue (:;oeo,).
Moreover, before telling the story of his attempted seduction of Socrates,
Alcibiades orders the servants to shut their ears (::b,;).
,;
In this narra-
tive, Alcibiades repeatedly stresses that he was alone with Socrates (ucvc,
ucv: ::;b,, cf. ::;d;e:) when the events occurred. Socrates has a
large number of sympathetic interlocutors in the Symposium. According to
Alcibiades, all of the guests named in the dialogue share with Socrates a
philosophical madness and Bacchic frenzy and have been bitten by philo-
sophical words that seize upon a young and noble soul and make it do and
say anything at all. Alcibiades specically mentions Phaedrus, Agathon,
Eryximachus, Pausanias, Aristodemus and Aristophanes, and says that he
himself experiences these same things (::;eo::b,). The symposiasts also
share Socrates interest in er os (:;;doe,). Not all of them are young, but
one of Socrates main interlocutors, Agathon, is a youth (neaniskos: :,a:),
and Alcibiades tells a story about the relationship that he had as a young
man with Socrates. The symposiasts compete in praising Eros, but they
do so as friends, and Socrates does not subject them to the harsher treat-
ment he reserves for the sophists in other dialogues. The only elenchus
(cross-examination) narrated, that with Agathon, ends in a friendly way,
for Socrates addresses the young man as beloved (:c:c).
Socrates is able to use his erotic art successfully in large part because
of these private settings and young, sympathetic interlocutors. In contrast
to dialogues in which Socrates does not succeed in changing his inter-
locutors minds, in these four dialogues, he is represented as producing,
,,
On the setting of the dialogue see the excellent discussion of Ferrari :,;: :,o.
,o
Phaedrus explicitly states that they are alone in a deserted place and that he is younger than Socrates
(toutv ot ucvc tv tpnui . . . t,c sci vtc:tpc,: :,ocd:). According to Nails :cc:: :,: Phaedrus
is in his mid-twenties.
,;
Nails, :cco: :c rightly notes, however, that there are some indications that the conversation is
overheard by non-participants: women and slaves.
:c Socrates Daimonic Art
at least temporarily, positive changes in others. His success is shown, in
part, by the er os or friendly feelings he arouses in his interlocutors. At
the end of the Alcibiades I, Alcibiades says that he will be Socrates atten-
dant (pedagogue) and begin to study justice. Socrates then speculates that
his own er os may have hatched a new er os in the young man (:,,d;e,).
Although Socrates expresses fears about his own future and that of Alci-
biades, he also states that he does not distrust Alcibiades nature (:,,eo).
The Lysis ends in aporia (impasse) about what the friend is, but within
this dialogue Socrates successfully demonstrates to Hippothales his ability
to create friendliness in a beloved (:coc; with ::ce:,). Lysis, the sub-
ject of the demonstration, is humbled by Socrates. Far from being angry,
however, Lysis addresses him in a friendly manner (:::a,). By the end of
the dialogue, all of the interlocutors give the impression of being friends
with one another (::,b,;). In the Symposium, Agathon yields gracefully
to Socrates criticisms of his speech about Eros. When, in the nal scene,
he gets up to sit next to Socrates in order to be praised by him, Agathon
clearly indicates that he does not object to receiving more of the same
kind of critical treatment (::,a,,). Alcibiades in this dialogue is beneted
at least temporarily by his association with Socrates, for he feels shame
and agrees with all that the philosopher says (::,e;::obo). Moreover, the
behavior of Socrates that Alcibiades calls hybris (::,c,) leads him to fall in
love with Socrates (:::b,, c:,), and Alcibiades warns Agathon against
doing so also (:::b;).
,
In the Phaedrus, Socrates interlocutor, Phae-
drus, seconds his prayer to Eros (ouvtycuci: :,;b;) that both Phaedrus
and Lysias may turn their lives toward er os and philosophical words. At the
end of the dialogue, Phaedrus joins in another prayer made by Socrates,
this time to Pan, and remarks that friends have possessions in common
(:;,co;).
This is not to deny that Socrates success, as the examples just noted
make clear, is also due to his ability to arouse emotions very different from
friendliness. In showing his interlocutors that they lack the wisdom and
other good things they think they have, Socrates gives them a benecial
humbling that is necessary for the removal of false beliefs and for the arousal
of love for wisdom.
,,
He acts, moreover, in ways that sometimes appear
to his interlocutors to be offensive, or even hubristic. In the Symposium,
,
I leave untranslated the Greek term hybris (often rendered as insolence) because its meaning is
controversial. See detailed discussion in Chapter at .:.
,,
Cf. the end of the Apology (:e::a:), where Socrates asks the jurors to give his sons the same
punishment Socrates has given the Athenians, if his sons appear to care more for wealth or anything
else than for virtue. On the benecial effects of shame see further Chapter : at :.: and n.:,.
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues ::
both Agathon and Alcibiades tell Socrates: You are hubristic (opio:n,
t: :;,e;, ::,b;). Alcibiades compares the man to an hubristic satyr and
his words to the skin of an hubristic satyr (::,b,, :::e:). Even though
they occur in a friendly and playful atmosphere, these accusations of hybris
highlight an important aspect of Socrates use of erotic skill in helping
others to acquire it also: his ability, like that of the daimonic satyr, to
arouse shame. Indeed, Alcibiades says that Socrates is the only one who
can cause him to feel shame (Symp. ::oab,). Socrates gives Alcibiades a
similar humbling in Alcibiades I by, for example, showing the young man
that he knows even less than the women of his adversaries (::a,;), and
that he is in the most shameful state (::;do). As a result, Alcibiades
says, just as he does in the Symposium: You are hubristic (Alc. I ::d;).
The humbling of Lysis in the company of his friends could also be seen as
offensive, and it makes Lysis lover, Hippothales, very uncomfortable (Lys.
::ce,o). In the Phaedrus, Socrates speaks disrespectfully of a speech that
was much admired by Phaedrus, thereby in effect showing the young man
that he did not know what he was talking about when he admired this
speech (:,co:,,a).
Thus, my focus on Socrates erotic art helps to explain some puzzling
features of Platos Socrates. In the erotic dialogues, at least, Socrates is more
successful in persuading others, and more friendly towards them, than he
is often represented as being by those scholars who emphasize his use of
the harsh elenchus against adversaries.
oc
His friendliness, however, does
not prevent him from arousing painful emotions in those who require the
benecial humbling that is conducive to their recognition of their own lack
of wisdom.
Not only does the youth of Socrates interlocutors contribute to his
comparative success in the erotic dialogues, it also helps us to understand
the emphasis on er os in these dialogues, as the next section will argue.
1.5 the erotic dialogues in context
In other dialogues also, Socrates practice of philosophy is represented as
having characteristics similar to those portrayed in the erotic quartet. He
is devoted to divine matters; he desires to attain the wisdom he recognizes
he lacks, and he helps others to do the same. Er os, however, has a much less
prominent role in other dialogues, nor is Socrates represented as practicing
an erotic art. While the emphasis on er os in the erotic dialogues increases
oc
For examples see Preface nn.:::,.
:: Socrates Daimonic Art
dramatic interest, it also serves crucial philosophical purposes. Comparison
with another quartet, the trial and death dialogues (the Apology, Euthyphro,
Crito and Phaedo) helps to clarify what these purposes are. In the erotic
quartet, Socrates practice of philosophy is represented as the education of
passionate young men for a life devoted to Socratic er os for wisdom. In the
trial and death dialogues, in contrast, philosophy is a preparation for death
of older people, and of Socrates in particular as he nears death.
Three thematic aspects of the erotic dialogues are especially important
for an understanding of the emphasis on er os in this quartet as a whole.
First, as discussed above (I.: and I.), all four are concerned with education
of the young. In this context, it is appropriate for Socrates to use and adapt
the erotic-educational conventions of his social and literary culture. Each
dialogue makes use of these conventions, partly in order to appeal both
to Socrates young interlocutors and to Platos own audience, and partly
in order to highlight the contrast between the ordinary er os of convention
and Socratic er os.
Second, Plato makes use of the traditional association of er os with mys-
tical initiation in representing Socratic education as an initiation into the
mysteries of Socratic er os.
o:
The initiatory role of er os is explicit in Dio-
timas speech in the Symposium. According to this account, initiation into
the Lesser Mysteries, in which ordinary er os plays an essential role (:ce
:c,e), is necessary preparation for initiation into the Greater Mysteries
of er os for true beauty (:c,e,:::a;: Chapter , at ,.,.,). In the Phaedrus
also, when he uses the language of the Mysteries in the myth of his second
speech, Socrates portrays er os as a madness and enthusiasm accompanying
mystic initiation (:a:,;a: Chapter , at ,., and Chapter o). As in the
Symposium, ordinary er os is represented as contributing to an initiation
that leads a lover toward Socratic er os for true beauty. Although the Lysis
and Alcibiades I do not use mystical terminology, Socrates activities in
these dialogues may nevertheless be considered initiatory in that the edu-
cation with which they are concerned helps young men to begin to live
the same kind of life that is described in the language of the Mysteries in
the Phaedrus: a life turned toward er os together with philosophical words
(Phdr. :,;bo), in which lover and beloved are also friends (:,,bo;, :,oc;).
In the erotic dialogues, then, Plato adapts erotic-educational conventions
and religious traditions very effectively so as to represent Socrates art as
o:
Er os and initiation: Seaford :,,: :,, citing Soph. Aj. o,o and o,, (tqpi tpc:i), Eur. Bacch.
:,, and Platos Phdr. :,:a. Philosophy as initiation: Morgan :,,c and :,,:: esp. :,,.
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues :,
including the proper guidance of ordinary er os so that it becomes a power-
ful and positive motivational force in the search for the wisdom and beauty
that are the objects of Socratic er os. As Socrates says, there is no better
helper than Eros for human nature (Symp. :::b:).
Third, Socrates interlocutors in the erotic dialogues are passionate by
nature and deeply concerned with ordinary er os. These young men, unlike
the sophists in other dialogues, are capable of being motivated by ordi-
nary er os to strive to acquire Socratic er os for beauty and wisdom. It is
Alcibiades er os to acquire the greatest power, a power that he at rst
mistakenly believes to be renown and tyranny (Alc. I :c,c,, ::bo,
:,e:,,b,), that makes it possible for him to acquire er os for what is
truly the greatest power, namely, the power conferred by wisdom in the
form of self-knowledge and self-care. In the Symposium, Alcibiades pre-
occupation with ordinary er os is evident in his attempt to seduce Socrates
(::;a::,d), in the theme of his sexual jealousy of Socrates (::,cd, :::c
::,a), and in Aristodemus statement that Alcibiades still seems to be in
love with Socrates (:::c:,). This is so, even as Alcibiades description
of his own strong emotional reactions to Socrates philosophical words
(::,e::oc, ::a:;) suggests that his passionate nature makes it possible
for him to be drawn, however temporarily, toward Socratic er os. Agathon,
who benets greatly from his association with Socrates, is characterized by
Eryximachus as, like Socrates, marvelously skilled in ta er otika (Symp.
:,,e,). The young poets speech demonstrates his skill in praising an Eros
who is the patron of many activities, including the composition of love
poetry (:,odoeo), that are erotic in the ordinary sense. The rst two
speeches in the Phaedrus are evidence of the interest of both Socrates and
his interlocutor in ordinary er os. At the end of his second speech, Socrates
claims to have used er otike techne (:,;a;) in an attempt to lead Phaedrus
from his interest in ordinary er os to a life motivated by Socratic er os, just as
the lover within his speech is led by erotic enthusiasm from love of physical
beauty in this world to love of heavenly beauty. In the Lysis, Hippothales
er os for Lysis drives the dramatic action, in which Socrates demonstrates
his erotic skill by showing how a lover can become liked by his beloved
(:cob,c;) if the two engage in the common search for the wisdom that
is the object of Socratic er os.
Inthe trial anddeathdialogues, incontrast, Socrates andhis interlocutors
are preoccupied not with er os but with death. This difference is especially
evident in the use of initiation language in the Phaedo, where Socrates
compares true philosophers to initiates into the Mysteries who prepare
: Socrates Daimonic Art
for a better afterlife (o,d,e,, :a,).
o:
The other three dialogues may
also be said to represent Socratic philosophy as a kind of initiation, in
a non-mystical sense, that prepares one to face death courageously. This
training for death (Phd. :a::) emphasizes the avoidance of wrongdoing
rather than the passionate striving toward the objects of Socratic er os. These
different philosophical purposes of the two quartets help to explain why
er os is all but absent from the trial and death dialogues.
Socrates makes his defense in the Apology by emphasizing his lack of
wisdom about divine matters, his pious obedience to the divine, and the
ways in which he has beneted others. He thus resembles the Socrates
of the erotic dialogues in many respects. However, the absence of er os
from this dialogue corresponds to a notable difference in his philosophical
purposes.
o,
Socrates represents himself as devoted to a god very different
from the daim on Eros: Apollo, the god of the oracle, who is associated not
with passionate striving toward beauty and wisdom, but with the restraint
that comes fromknowing ones own limits.
o
Socrates is also obedient to his
daimonion, the divine voice that, like Apollo, urges restraint, and that may
in fact be the sign of Apollo.
o,
Unlike the daim on Eros in the Symposium,
who provides the impetus that moves lovers toward the objects of er os
(Symp. :c,d), the daimonion is a divine voice that always turns him
away (apotropei) from doing something wrong, and never turns him toward
(protrepei) anything (Ap. ,:cd). Socrates claims, as he does in the erotic
dialogues, to lack wisdom of the kind only a god has (:,bco, :cd,e:,
::b,, :,a,), and instead to possess a kind of human wisdom(:cd;,) that
consists in knowing that a human being is worth nothing with respect to
wisdom (::d, :,b:). However, Socrates is not represented as eagerly
striving for the wisdom and beauty that he recognizes that he lacks, but
as searching more narrowly to discover what the oracle means (::b:;,
e,), in obedience to Apollo (:,bc:, :,a, :,d,, ,ca,;). This search
is not passionate striving, but a labor (tcvcu,: ::ao), undertaken
with great reluctance (uc,i, tvu: ::b), that has aroused hatred and
enmity (::de, :,a, :,e:a, :ab) instead of the mutual philia Socrates
o:
I am concerned here only with the fact that Plato uses the language of initiation in the Phaedo,
and am unable to consider many controversial issues. See Bussanich :cco; McPherran :,,o: esp.
:o;:; Morgan :,,c: ,,;, and :,,:; Peterson :c::: ch. o.
o,
Er os and cognates do not appear in the Apology.
o
The presence of Apollo is also felt in the Phaedo, in which the gods festival delays Socrates execution
(,bc), and Socrates calls himself the servant of Apollo (,a,b,), to whom he composes a hymn
(o:b:,). On the association of Apollo with Socrates see McPherran :,,o: :oo, ::;:, ::o,;
Morgan :,,:: :,:; Reeve :,,: :,;.
o,
Bussanich :cco: :c,; McPherran :,,o: :,;, :c.
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues :,
common search creates in the erotic dialogues. Socrates represents himself
as skilled in, or at least uniquely tted to conduct, this search when he
says that he himself is a gift from the god that cannot easily be replaced
(,cdoeo). Socrates benets others by means of his search, specically by
helping them to recognize their own lack of wisdom and to be ashamed of
placing higher value on things that are in fact of lesser value (:,d;,cc:).
In so doing, however, he does not represent himself as educating the young,
but as serving the god and providing the greatest good to the city (,oc).
In describing his obedience to Apollo, Socrates appropriately character-
izes himself not as an erotic, but as an heroic gure, explicitly comparing
himself to Homers Achilles (Ap. :c:d). Socrates avoids wrongdoing by
thinking little of death and danger, and placing the highest value on the
affairs of the god (::e:, :boc:), on justice (,:e:,), and on remaining
at the post where the god placed him (:e:,a:). He cares nothing for
death, and everything about doing whatever he can to avoid acting unjustly
or impiously (,:d:). An attitude more consistent with an erotic striving
toward what is both good and pleasant, appears, signicantly, only after
the verdict, when Socrates looks fearlessly toward death and the possibility
of an afterlife. He then says that the greatest good for a human being in
this life is to converse about virtue (,a:,), and that doing so in Hades
would be a great good, something not unpleasant, and an immeasurable
blessing (:c,). In living the philosophical life that has prepared him
to face death courageously, Socrates has also prepared himself to receive
blessings in the afterlife, if in fact the soul goes to another place after death
(cco:c).
In the Euthyphro, Socrates search for wisdom is represented as moti-
vated not by Socratic er os, but by fear of acting impiously. Indeed, er os and
cognates are absent, as in the Apology, from discussions about the search
for wisdom.
oo
Socrates tells Euthyphro that Meletus has indicted Socrates
on the charge of corrupting the young by inventing new gods (,a,b).
Socrates is well aware of the dangers to which this charge exposes him (,co
e). He shows no fear of death, however, but is instead deeply concerned, as
he has always been, with knowing about divine matters (,ao;). What he
fears is acting impiously, through ignorance of these matters (:,e,:oa). To
avoid this great evil, Socrates claims that he desires (epithum o: ,c,) to learn
from Euthyphro.
o;
Euthyphro, Socrates says, clearly has knowledge about
oo
It is disputed whether or not cognates of er os occur, at :c, in the context of a general remark
about leading and following. Duke et al. :,,, read tpc:cv:c. . . tpc:cutv; Burnet :,:, on
:c, defends tpcv:c. . . tpcutv.
o;
See also ,a,,, ::e,, ::e:,, :bc,, :do, :,c:::oa.
:o Socrates Daimonic Art
what is holy, because he has no fear (co qcn) of doing something impious
when he prosecutes his own father (e). If he did not have this knowl-
edge, Socrates says, fear (totioc,) of the gods and shame before humans
would have prevented him from taking the risk of doing something wrong
(:,d). Although his motivation differs, Socrates has characteristics that
are similar to those in the erotic dialogues. He is devoted to learning about
divine matters so as to avoid acting impiously. He also recognizes that
he lacks wisdom about divine matters, and he desires to obtain this wis-
dom (sophia: :d). In attempting to learn, Socrates uses the question and
answer method, in which he claims to have skill. When Euthyphro com-
plains that Euthyphro does not know how to say what he means, and that
Socrates makes Euthyphros statements move around (::bo), Socrates
replies that he must, then, be more marvelously skilled (deinoteros . . . ten
technen) than his ancestor Daedalus (::d,). Socrates uses his skill in a
vain attempt to help Euthyphro recognize that Euthyphro lacks wisdom
about what is holy, and so to experience fear and shame at the possibility
of wrongdoing.
In the Crito, Socrates friend Crito arrives at the prison to bring Socrates
the news that his death is imminent and to persuade himto ee (,c,c,).
This dialogue represents Socrates as using his reason to make a courageous
decision to avoid acting unjustly. He says that one should value living well
rather than merely living (b,), and that death and suffering are of no
concern compared with doing injustice (d,o; cf. ,b,,). In contrast to
the pain and grief of Crito, Socrates remains calm and fearless in the face
of death (,b,c). He claims to revere and honor those arguments he has
followed in the past, arguments that have always persuaded him to obey
the reasoning that appears best to him. He cannot, he says, cast out these
arguments in his present circumstances, through fear of death (ob,co).
Specically, Socrates listens to and obeys the arguments telling him that it
is best to obey the laws of his country (,ca,e), who are his parents and
masters (,ce:). In so doing, Socrates indicates that he acts in obedience
to the divine, for he characterizes his country and its laws (,:a:,) as having
divine qualities, being more honored and revered and holy than father and
mother, in the eyes of gods and humans (,:a,b). The dialogue concludes:
Let us act in this way, since the god leads us in this way (,e::). The
Crito shows Socrates using his accustomed question and answer method,
when he answers the questions put to him by the Laws (,cc,:c), and
persuades Crito that it would be unjust to escape.
Socrates, then, is portrayed in the Crito as devoted to the divine, in
that he obeys the laws of his country, which have divine qualities. His
recognition of his own lack of wisdom about justice and other virtues,
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues :;
and his search for wisdom about matters that do not directly concern his
present crisis, are not issues in this short and sharply focused dialogue.
Socrates is also portrayed as placing the highest value on avoiding injustice
and obeying the laws, as skilled in searching for what justice is in his present
circumstances, and as helping Crito to value acting justly, and to search
for what justice is by means of reasoning. Er os is never mentioned in this
dialogue concerned not with Socrates eager pursuit of wisdom and beauty,
but with his decision to turn away from doing injustice, even in the face
of death.
o
In the Phaedo, Socrates companion, Phaedo, narrates the death of this
man whose practice of philosophy has prepared him to die fearlessly and
nobly (,e,). Socrates spends his last hours in philosophical conversa-
tion, just as he has done all his life. He notes that the topics of discussion,
death and the afterlife, are appropriate (tpttti: o:e:; cf. ;cb:cc:) for
this occasion. The Phaedo, however, is exceptional among the trial and
death dialogues in using erotic terminology to refer to love for wisdom.
The argument shows, Socrates says, that only after death might we be
able to obtain that which we desire [ttiuuc0utv] and that of which we
say we are lovers [erastai]: wisdom [phronesis] (ooe:). It would be very
illogical, he says, if the true philosophers, those who practice dying,
should fear to go where there is hope of obtaining that which they have
loved [npcv] throughout life and what they have loved [npcv] is wis-
dom (o;e,oa:). Someone truly loving [tpcv] wisdom, he says, and
who hopes to nd it nowhere else than in Hades, will not grieve when he
dies (oa;bo).
o,
One explanation for this exceptional use of erotic vocabulary is that,
in the Phaedo, philosophy is explicitly compared to initiation into the
Mysteries, just as it is in the Phaedrus and Symposium, and, as noted
above, er os is associated with the Mysteries. The one who has practiced
philosophy correctly, Socrates says, is like the initiate into the Mystery
rites (teletas) who is described at Phaedo o,c,d,. This philosopher is not
profane and uninitiated (un:c, sci :tto:c,), but, being puried
(stsccputvc,) and initiated (:t:ttoutvc,), will dwell with the gods
after arriving in Hades. The account of er os and initiation in the Phaedo,
however, differs signicantly from that of the Symposium and Phaedrus. In
the Phaedo, the initiate prepares not for a life devoted to er os together with
philosophical words (icv: Phdr. :,;bo), but for death. Moreover, the er os
for physical beauty that is portrayed very positively in the erotic dialogues,
o
As is the case in the Apology, er os and cognates do not occur in the Crito.
o,
Cognates of er os are also used in this dialogue to refer to ordinary er os associated with the body
(ooc:, :a;, b,), and to lovers reminded of their beloveds (;,do).
: Socrates Daimonic Art
as preparatory to initiation into Socratic er os for true beauty, is represented
in the Phaedo as a hindrance to attaining the wisdom that is achieved only
by separation, or purication, of the soul from the human body (oc
o,e), which lls us with (ordinary) er os, desire and fear, and thus prevents
us from hunting for the truth (ooc:). The characteristics of Socrates
practice of philosophy in the Phaedo differ from their counterparts in the
erotic dialogues in large part because of this difference in the way in which
Socratic er os is represented. In the Phaedo, Socrates expresses and enacts his
devotion to the search for wisdom, a divine good that can be obtained, if
anywhere, only among the gods in Hades. He does not emphasize his own
lack of wisdom, but his statement that there is no hope of obtaining wisdom
anywhere else than in Hades (o;e,ob,) makes it clear that he recognizes
that he now lacks it, as does his exhortation to his interlocutors to examine
more closely the rst assumptions of his arguments (:c;bo). Socrates
also has a passionate desire, called er os, to obtain wisdom of the kind that
results from purication of the soul from the body. He demonstrates his
skill in searching for wisdom by his use of the question and answer method
(;d::) to present a number of arguments for immortality. Socrates also
helps others, by argument and exhortation, to share his own devotion to
and desire for wisdom so as to do everything so as to participate in virtue
and wisdom in life (::c;), and thus to have hope of gaining a better
afterlife as well (:c;c:d,).
As he nears death, Socrates and his interlocutors turn away from life in
this world. He no longer needs a daimonic, erotic art that mediates, like
the daim on Eros, between mortals and gods, for he now speaks of the hope
of going to live not with mortals and daimones, but with gods, who do not
desire the wisdom they already possess (see Symp. :ca::, Lys. ::a:).
part i
Socrates and Two Young Men
chapter 1
Your love and mine: er os and self-knowledge in
Alcibiades I
1.1 puzzles about er os
The Alcibiades I, a dialogue I take to be authentic, was long thought to be a
good introduction to Platos philosophy.
:
It is also an excellent introduction
to Platos characterization of Socrates as a man who practices erotic art. At
the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates approaches Alcibiades as his rst and
only remaining lover (:c,a:,) and at its end, he declares that his own love
is like a stork, if it has indeed hatched a new love in Alcibiades (:,,e:,). In
the course of the dialogue, Socrates accomplishes what has been described
as a philosophical seduction,
:
thus demonstrating that his erotic art
is superior to the expertise in sexual seduction possessed by the many
lovers who failed to persuade the young man (:c,b,). This dialogue,
unfortunately, has been neglected in modern times, and what attention it
has received has tended to focus on issues concerning authenticity, religion
or psychology rather than on its erotic aspects.
,
As a result, important and
puzzling questions about er os have not been adequately addressed. One
question concerns Socrates love for Alcibiades, who might appear to be an
:
This view of the Alcibiades I was expressed in antiquity over many centuries by a wide range of
sources, including Olympiodorus (:c.:::.o) and Proclus (::.:::), both cited by Denyer :cc:: :;
Iamblichus (frag. :), cited by Pradeau :ccc: ::; and Segonds :cc,, vol. i, Introduction: xxiv.
The dialogues authenticity was not questioned until Schleiermacher in :,o (Schleiermacher :,;,:
,:,o); see Denyer :cc:: ::, and Pradeau :ccc: :,. Pradeau :ccc, Annexe I: ::,:c provides
a useful survey of positions taken on the question of authenticity from Schleiermacher to :,,;. I
add to this list, on the side against authenticity: Gribble :,,,: :oc:; Joyal :cc,; Slings :,,,: :o,;
Smith :cc, and on the side for authenticity: Allen :,o:; Annas :,, and :cco: :; Denyer :cc::
::o; Giannantoni :,,;: ,o,;,; Gordon :cc,; Grote :o;: :,:o,; Johnson :,,,: :; OConnor
:,,,: ,,; Pangle :,;a; Pradeau :ccc: ::, and :; G. A. Scott :ccc: :c,; n.:. I am convinced by
the arguments of many scholars that there are no sound reasons, internal or external, for suspecting
this dialogue.
:
Denyer :cc:: ,,; Gordon :cc,.
,
Exceptions include Denyer :cc:: ,,; Forde :,;; Friedl ander :,::: esp. :c; Goldin :,,,: ::o;
Gordon :cc,; Wellman :,oo. In antiquity the erotic aspects of the dialogue were studied extensively
by Proclus (for example, :o,;, ;o;, :,,) and Olympiodorus (for example, :,.:c:, [on :c,a],
:.;,. [on :cc:c,c], ::,.::, [on :,cd:,,c]; :,:.:o:; [on :,,e]).
,:
,: Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
unlikely love object for Socrates. He is a wealthy young man from a noble
and powerful family (:cb:c:), whose arrogance (:c,b:ca:, :cc:)
has led him to repulse his many lovers. Socrates characterizes Alcibiades
political ambition as a desire for tyranny (:,,b,,).
A similar idea is suggested in the Lysis: see Chapter : at :.,.:. See also Resp. ,,bc:, where Socrates
states that er os for philosophia may be given by divine inspiration.
,
Denyer :cc:, on ::c, notes that oicqtpc means be superior here.
o
Pradeau :ccc: :c n.:co sees an allusion here to the daim on of :c,a:coa.
;
I am sympathetic to Dorions view (:cc: :c) that mutual aspiration to the good is the basis for
love and friendship in Alc. I (:,:d) as in Lys. but I hold that this is only one of the bases for loving
(philein, eran) in both dialogues. On the Lysis see Chapter : at :.:.,.
, Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
of Socratic love.
This view of Socratic love, associated most often with Vlastos :,;,, is recently defended by Penner
and Rowe :cc,, who write that in the Lysis Socrates construes all love and all desire . . . as involving
a means-end . . . hierarchy, culminating in a single ultimate end, which end . . . is then asserted by
Socrates to be the sole thing loved or desired (:).
,
Cf. Phdr. :,cc:,:a;, :,,cd,, where er os is said to be caused by beauty, and Symp. :c:a,:c, e,,
:cb,, d,, where er os is said to be of or concerned with beauty. Denyer :cc:, on :,:d:, notes that
the statement loving the soul is without exact parallel in Plato or Xenophon.
,c
Denyer :cc:, on ::,c:, citing Phdr. :o,d. See also Resp. o.,a,c:b, listing qualities specic to the
philosophical nature, especially courage, high-mindedness, facility in learning and good memory
(esp. ,cc,::; cf. ;a:, and ,a:cb:). A contrast between physis and upbringing is explicitly
mentioned at Alc. I ::ce,, although trophe in this passage is not the same as paideia (Denyer :cc:,
on ::ce,; Pradeau :ccc: nn.;o and ).
,:
OConnor :,,,: ,o;, quoting Resp. ,b:,oc,. Cf. Gordon :cc,: :; Gribble :,,,: ::,::;
Olympiodorus :;,.:,. On this idea in the Lysis see Chapter : at :..:.
,:
On the idea that Alcibiades high thoughts make him worthy of love see Proclus ,,.o:cc.o,
:,;.,:,.,, :.:c:,c.:;.
Your love and mine: er os and self-knowledge in Alcibiades I ,,
well (:c,co;). Alcibiades soul, then, is not only beautiful, but also lovable
because of its beautiful nature and its desire to acquire the good things that
it realizes that it lacks. These qualities, as noted above (stage i, :.:), help
to prepare Alcibiades to acquire components (:) and (,) of the erotic art.
Socrates says that he will love Alcibiades soul as long as it continues to
become better, and he urges the young man to try to be as beautiful (in
soul) as possible (:,:d:;). By the end of the dialogue, Alcibiades comes to
love Socrates soul for the same two reasons. When Socrates says that he
himself is ,ctn:c,, worthy of love (claim v.d, at :,:e,), the implication
is that he is worthy because he also has a beautiful soul, one that has a
beautiful nature, and a passionate desire for the self-knowledge that confers
the greatest power. These qualities also make Socrates soul beautiful and
lovable.
The close relationship in this dialogue between er os for the greatest power
and er os for an individual can help to illuminate ::,c,, a line that presents
difcult textual and interpretive problems. After Alcibiades questions his
need for improvement, saying that his nature alone will make him superior
to his competitors (::,b,c:), Socrates states, according to the manuscripts:
I am vexed on account of your love and mine (,cvcs:c ottp :t :c0
oc0 sci :c0 tuc0 tpc:c,).
,,
Whose er os is referred to in this passage?
According to Nicolas Denyer, the text just quoted (with :t :c0 oc0) implies
that Socrates and Alcibiades love each other. He objects, however, that it
would be far too presumptuous of Socrates to assume that, at this stage,
Alcibiades has already come to love him, and instead interprets Socrates
to mean on your account, and on account of the love that I have [sc.
for you].
,
Such an interpretation, however, requires emending the text.
,,
Modern editors do so on the basis of Olympiodorus text: ,cvcs:c
ottp oc0 sci ottp tucu:c0 (I am vexed on account of you, and on
account of myself). Olympiodorus explains: On your account because
you are small-minded [ouispctpttn,] and on mine because I love what is
small-minded. Olympiodorus, however, goes against the manuscripts in
omitting :t :c0.
,o
,,
Codicil T. Cf. Codicil B: ,cvcs:c ottp :t :c0 oc0 sci :c0 tucu:c0 tpc:c, (I am vexed on
account of your love and my own).
,
Denyer :cc:, on ::,c,.
,,
Burnet :,cc:,c;; Carlini :,o; Croiset :,,; and Denyer :cc: read: ,cvcs:c ottp :t oc0
sci :c0 tucu:c0 tpc:c,. Cf. Lamb :,:;: ,cvcs:c ottp :t oc0 sci :c0 tuc0 tpc:c,, who
translates: I am grieved for you, and for my love. Hutchinson :,,; and Marboeuf and Pradeau
:ccc translate similarly.
,o
Olympiodorus :;.:::, (who also omits tpc:c,).
,o Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
The manuscript readings (with :t :c0) can be preserved if we interpret
Socrates as referring to the two kinds of love shared by Socrates and
Alcibiades: love for the greatest power and love for one another. If one way
in which love is created is by gazing into the beautiful soul of another, and
if soul gazes at soul by asking and answering questions, then Alcibiades
has already begun to reciprocate Socrates love by falling in love with his
beautiful soul.
,;
Socrates also refers to the love they both share for the
greatest power. Socrates is grieved on account of both kinds of love. He
fears that if Alcibiades is willing to settle for lesser objects he will no longer
have a passionate desire to attain the greatest power and his soul will be
less beautiful. If this happens, Socrates love for Alcibiades will cease and,
in turn, Alcibiades developing love for Socrates beautiful soul will be
overcome by his desire for lesser objects.
1.4 the eye and the soul
Another controversial passage helps to shed light on the relationship
between Socratic er os and er os for another person in this dialogue. Socrates
explains the process by means of which a person can gain self-knowledge
by drawing an analogy between the eye and the soul at :,:ao:,,c:; (at
stage v, part 3, discussed above :.:). I argue that in this highly controversial
passage Socrates suggests (otct:tc: :,:d:) that self-knowledge is gained
by means of dialectic with the most god-like part of the soul of another
person, who, at least in Alcibiades specic case, must also be a lover. He
thus provides further support for his earlier claim that he alone, as the only
lover of Alcibiades soul, is able to help the young man to acquire the object
of his desire.
Alcibiades has agreed that in order to care for himself he must know
his own soul (stage v, part 1, at ::;e,:,:c), and that Socrates alone is
a lover of Alcibiades soul (stage v, part 2, at :,:c,:,:ao). He then asks
Socrates to show him how they might care for themselves (stage v, part 3:
:,:b,). After summing up the agreements previously arrived at (:,:bo
c:), Socrates asks how we can know the soul most clearly (:,:c;), and says
that he will say what he suspects (otct:tc) the Delphic precept to
mean (:,:d::). At :,:ao:,,c;, Socrates and Alcibiades agree that if soul
is to know itself, it must look into (another) soul (:,,b;), just as an eye
could see itself by looking into another eye (:,,a,;). Moreover, the soul
must look into the most divine part of another soul, that in which the
,;
See :,cdeo, with :,:d::,,c:;, discussed further below :..
Your love and mine: er os and self-knowledge in Alcibiades I ,;
excellence of a soul, wisdom (sophia), comes to be, and into anything else
that is like this part (:,,bc,). Socrates concludes: This part of the soul,
then, resembles god, and by looking into it and coming to know all that
is divine, that is, the god and wisdom [phronesis], one could best come
to know oneself also (:,,co).
,
Before considering the signicance of
Socrates highly controversial statements about the divine and the god
in this passage, it will rst be helpful to consider the theory of vision that
is operative in this passage.
To see oneself (:,:do) according to Socrates interpretation of the
Delphic precept, one looks into a mirror, or something similar, in which
the eye sees itself (:,:d;e,). The eye itself can serve this same purpose
(:,:e,). In this latter case, one sees an image (eid olon) of oneself in the
eye of another person: Do you recognize that the face of the one looking
into an eye appears in the pupil [opsei] of the person opposite as if in
a mirror, and we call this [sc. the reection of the face] the doll [kore],
being a kind of image of the person looking into the eye? (Lvvtvcnsc,
cov c:i :c0 tvttcv:c, ti, :cv cqcucv :c tpcoctcv tuqcivt:ci
tv :n :c0 sc:cv:ispu cti cottp tv sc:ct:p, c on scpnv scc0-
utv, toccv cv :i :c0 tuttcv:c,: :,:e;:,,a,). My translation follows
the interpretation of Jacques Brunschwig, who argues that opsei refers to
the pupil, while the kore is the doll, the little image of a persons face
reected in the eye. The antecedent of c (this) is, then, the reection
of the face (tpcoctcv) of the person looking into the eye of another.
,,
Interpreted in this way, the passage states that the pupil, the best part of
the eye, that with which one sees (:,,a,;, :,,b:,), also contains a doll
that is an image of the face, the best part of the body of the person look-
ing into the eye.
oc
There is, moreover, a very close connection between
the pupil and the reection in ancient Greek theories of vision, accord-
ing to which sight is caused by the reection of objects on the pupil.
o:
According to the Timaeus, when we see something, an inner re, or
ray of light, coalesces with a similar re from outside (,b:oa:). Reec-
tions are a particular case of this general principle (oa:b,). It is the
coalescence, or intercourse with each other (scivcvic, nci,: oa,),
,
Reading tcv :t sci qpcvnoiv (:,,c,) with the MSS., Burnet :,cc:,c;; Croiset :,,; and Denyer
:cc:. Suggested emendations are noted by Carlini :,o and :,o,: :;o.
,,
Brunschwig :,;,: :,, followed by Denyer :cc:, on :,,a; and Pradeau :ccc: ::,: nn.:, and
:. Opsis clearly refers to the pupil at :,,b,.
oc
In the Timaeus the head is said to be the best and most divine part of the body (d,o, ,a:,
o,doe,, ,ao).
o:
Brunschwig :,;,: :,. A recent discussion of ancient theories of vision, with bibliography, is
provided by Nightingale :cc: :c::.
, Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
of the inner and outer res on a smooth, bright surface that allows us to
see the reection of a face (tpcoctcv: ob:) in a mirror. A. E. Taylor
explains: [T]he ray of light proceeding from my eye and the light reected
from the real face of the person whom I see in the glass coalesce at the
surface of the mirror and the united ray is then thrown back from it.
o:
In
the Timaeus, then, it is the surface of the mirror that allows the ray of light
from the eye to unite with the ray of light from the face that is reected
in it. If, as seems probable, the Alcibiades I relies on this same theory of
vision, what Socrates means at :,:e;:,,a, is that one sees ones face in a
mirror or in the pupil of another eye because this mirror or pupil allows
the ray from ones own eye to unite with the ray reected from ones face.
The two united rays are then thrown back from the mirror or the pupil.
The kind of reection discussed in the Alcibiades I, however, is more
complex than that outlined above. Socrates goes on to say that, just as we
can see our face reected in the eye of another person, so an eye can see itself
by looking into the best part of another eye, that part with which it sees.
This part is the pupil (:,,a,b,). Because it is also the pupil that looks into
another eye, Socrates statements imply that the eye sees itself by looking
at the reection of its own pupil within the pupil of another eye. When
this happens, according to the theory of vision discussed above, the ray of
light proceeding from the pupil of the gazer unites, within the pupil of
another person, with the ray reected from the gazers own pupil. Nicholas
Denyer perceptively remarks: Hence, when an eye sees itself by seeing its
reection in a pupil, it is seeing itself by seeing how another sees it.
o,
The image of soul looking into soul can be better understood within the
context of the theory of vision just discussed. Just as we see an image of
the best part of our eye (the pupil) reected in the best part of the eye of
another person, so we see the best part of our soul reected in the best part
of the soul of another person. This best part of the soul, corresponding to
the pupil of the eye, is that part in which wisdom comes to be (:,,b;:c).
It might be thought that one difference between the two cases that of
the pupil-mirror and that of the soul is that we see our soul in a medium
that is active rather than passive. However, not only are pupils active,
o
according to Aristotle, mirrors are not passive but are changed by what is
reected in them.
o,
Some support for the idea that Plato held a similar
o:
Taylor :,:: :o;. A similar theory of mirrors is given at Soph. :oob,c.
o,
Denyer :cc:: :,,.
o
Noted by Gill :cc;: :c; Linguiti :,,: o.
o,
On Dreams :.,,b:,oca:o states that when a menstruating woman looks into a mirror it takes
on the red tinge with which her eyes are colored. Sprague :,, makes the intriguing suggestion that
the mirror in this passage represents an eye.
Your love and mine: er os and self-knowledge in Alcibiades I ,,
view of mirrors is provided by Phaedrus :,,c:do, where the beloved is said
to see, as in a mirror, the ood of his own beauty reected back from the
lover in a process that changes both lover and beloved.
This theory of vision helps to explain the mechanism by means of
which one sees oneself, according to Socrates, but it does not tell us how
to interpret Socrates statements about the god and the most divine part
of the soul. Scholars have proposed two main explanations. According
to the theological interpretation, we acquire self-knowledge by looking
into the best and most divine part of another soul, because in so doing
we see the god that is our true self. This is the rational, impersonal
soul that is the same in each person.
oo
This interpretation, however, does
not take into account the emphasis on interpersonal communication in
this dialogue. The gaze has erotic connotations (discussed below), and the
focus throughout is on dialectic between two people. It is by asking and
answering questions that one becomes better (::;e,;), and to associate
(tpcocuitv) with one another by means of words is to address soul
with soul (:,cde,), that is, to engage in dialectic (:,ce,). A second,
humanist, interpretation focuses on dialectic, arguing that to look into
another soul is to converse, asking and answering questions.
o;
Scholars
who hold this view, however, do not adequately explain the emphasis on
the god and the divine in this passage (:,,c:, c, c,, and, in the lines
of doubtful authenticity, :,,c:,).
o
However, the god, or a god, plays an
extremely important role in this dialogue, as Socrates guardian, who did
not allow him to engage in dialectic with Alcibiades until this day (::c,
:c; cf. :c,e,:coa:), and by whose will Socrates and Alcibiades can become
better by asking and answering questions (::;e;; cf. :,,do). Moreover, in
introducing the analogy of eye and soul as an interpretation of the Delphic
writing (that is, know thyself : :,:c,d:; cf. ::ab:), Socrates alludes
to the god Apollo. An interpretation of the analogy, then, must take into
account both elements: the interpersonal and the divine.
A third interpretation, recently proposed by Christopher Gill, does just
this. Gill argues for a triangular model, in which both psyches are related
to each other (as active capacities for knowing), and in which this (shared)
active capacity is also god-like. That is, the psyches are related to each
other at one axis, while their converging axis is directed to god . . . the
oo
This view is held by Annas :,,: :,c, and Brunschwig :,,o: ;:c, who both note the Neoplatonic
sources for it.
o;
Johnson :,,,: ,; Linguiti :,:: :o, and :,,: :. The term humanist is used by Brunschwig
:,,o: ;:.
o
On the authenticity of :,,c:; see above n.,;.
oc Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
god-like element is shared or common to the two psyches, and . . . self-
knowledge . . . is knowledge of this shared, common element.
o,
According
to Gill, then, the part of the soul in which excellence comes to be is a
god-like capacity for knowing that is shared by two souls.
Gill does not provide a more detailed account of his model, but I
suggest that other passages in the dialogue allow us to make some plausible
inferences about this shared, god-like part of the soul. Just as that part of
the eye with which it sees is the best part of the eye (t:io:cv: :,,ao), so,
according to the analogy, the best part of the soul is that concerned with
knowing and wisdom (phronein), in which wisdom (sophia) comes to be
(:,,b;c:). Now the best part of the soul is also the most beautiful (:,:d::
t:icv; :,:d;: sio:c,) and therefore the most lovable (:,:d::). As I
argued above at :.,, Alcibiades soul is beautiful and lovable, both because
it has a beautiful nature, one that is capable of becoming better and more
beautiful, and because it has a passionate desire to acquire the greatest
power. His soul is also similar to Socrates own soul in these respects. There
is reason to infer, then, that the best part of the soul in the analogy is in fact
its beautiful nature and desire for the greatest power. This nature and this
desire make it possible for the soul to strive to acquire the self-knowledge
that confers the greatest power. The soul does this by using dialectic to look
into the best part of another soul that has the same nature and desire. The
god has an appropriate place in this analogy for two reasons. A beautiful
nature and er os for the greatest power might reasonably be thought to be
god-like, and, according to Socrates, desire for the greatest power is closely
associated with divinity. The god who is Socrates guardian allows him to
converse with Alcibiades only after the young man acquires this desire,
and Socrates hopes that this god will help both Socrates and Alcibiades to
achieve the objects of their desires (:c,e::coa:, ::c,:c, ::;e,;).
There is nothing impersonal about either the god-like part of the soul or
about the process of gazing. This part of the soul can be used in different
ways by different people; for example, in public affairs by Alcibiades, and
in private matters by Socrates. Moreover, the dialectic by means of which
self-knowledge is obtained in soul-gazing varies considerably depending
on the people involved. The questions Socrates asks Alcibiades have to do
specically with his particular desire for political power. To see ones soul
by looking into the soul of another, then, is to engage in the dialectic in
which Socrates and Alcibiades have participated throughout the dialogue
in a mutual striving for self-knowledge,
;c
an activity that is god-like and
encouraged by a god, but that is also specic to the individuals involved.
o,
Gill :cc;: :c,.
;c
Cf. Goldin :,,,: ::o.
Your love and mine: er os and self-knowledge in Alcibiades I o:
If this interpretation is correct, self-knowledge results more fromanswer-
ing than from asking questions, for it is the answerer who gives his opinions
(:::e:::,a:c) and who, as a result, becomes persuaded (::e:,). If the
mirror analogy can be pushed yet further, we might say that to answer
questions is to see ones own opinions most clearly, reected in the mirror
of the soul of the questioner, who responds by asking more questions. To
ask questions, on the other hand, is to provide something analogous to the
surface of the mirror on which the two rays of light coalesce. In asking
questions, questioners do not state their own opinions and so do not come
to know themselves in the same way that answerers do. However, in testing
the opinions of answerers, questioners also test opinions that they might
hold themselves, or consider holding. To the extent that questioners share
the opinions of answerers, they question themselves as well as their inter-
locutors. Questioners might also come to know that they would not be
justied in holding opinions that do not stand up to scrutiny when others
assert them.
;:
In addition to suggesting that dialectic is the means by which soul
looks into soul, the mirror analogy has yet another dimension, for in
Greek art and literature gazing into the eyes of another has intensely
erotic connotations.
;:
Socrates is, famously, inamed when he sees inside
Charmides cloak (Chrm. :,,d,). Equally important, but less often noted,
is the fact that the encounter in the Charmides begins with a gaze of eye into
eye: He looked at me with his eyes in an indescribable manner, Socrates
says (:,,cd:). Moreover, mirrors themselves have erotic connotations.
;,
The gaze of soul into soul, then, explicitly said to be analogous to the gaze
of eye into eye or mirror, would certainly have had erotic connotations for
Platos original audience.
;
This passage in the Alcibiades I has rightly been compared with the
mirror passage of the Phaedrus.
;,
In that dialogue, a stream of beauty
ows from the beloved to the lovers eyes, where it enters and lls him to
overowing. The stream then rebounds and enters the beloved through
his eyes, lling him in turn with an image of love that is a counterlove
;:
It is also possible to ask questions of oneself; see, for example, Hp. mai. :,b::c: and ,cb;e,.
On questioning oneself as well as others see Griswold :,o: :;:,, citing Tht. :,e[:,ca], Soph.
:o,e[:oa], and ::,:o.
;:
Denyer :cc:: ::, cites many examples in Greek literature, although he misses the erotic implications
of the Alc. I passage that are noted by Gill :cc;: :c, and Goldin :,,,: :o. On the erotic connotations
of the gaze see Calame :,,,: :c,; Skinner :cc,: ,;. On the gaze in the visual arts see also Frontisi-
Ducroux :,,o: esp. : (sight is the medium of Peitho).
;,
Frontisi-Ducroux :,,o: ,,c; Stewart :,,o.
;
Forde :,;: :,o; Goldin :,,,: :; Gordon, :cc,: :::,.
;,
See Annas :,,: :,: n.,:; Clark :,,,: :,,; Friedl ander :,::: o; Johnson :,,,: ::,; Soulez-
Luccioni :,;: :co. On Phdr. :,,c:e: see Chapter , at ,.,.:.
o: Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
(:,,c:e:). Thus, the beloved sees his own beauty reected in the lover
and falls in love with it. In some ways, the psychology of the Alcibiades
I is less complex than that of the Phaedrus. In contrast to the elaborate
description of the three capacities of the soul in the myth of the charioteer
and horses in the Phaedrus, the soul in Alcibiades I is merely said to have a
part that reasons. Socrates also acknowledges individual differences more
explicitly in the Phaedrus when he says that different lovers and beloveds
follow different gods, each pair following that god whose nature (physis:
:,:e,, :,,a:) it shares.
;o
In other respects, however, the image of the Alcibiades I is more complex
than that of the Phaedrus, in which the beloved sees only the reection of
his own beauty. Alcibiades sees reected in Socrates soul that part of his
own soul that is best and most beautiful. The term kore, used of the image
reected in the eye (:,,a:), also means votive image of a divinity, and
this sense is in the background here.
;;
If, as in the Phaedrus, the beloved of
the Alcibiades I sees the best part of himself in the eyes of the lover, he sees
his soul as the lover sees it, as beautiful and god-like.
;
In addition, unlike
the beloved of the Phaedrus who sees only the beauty of his own soul with
which the lover is in love, the beloved of the Alcibiades I also sees and falls
in love with the beauty of soul of his lover. Moreover, the gazer in Alcibiades
I also sees the reection of his own defects. By engaging in dialectic with
Socrates, Alcibiades gains knowledge that he is at risk of becoming ugly
in soul. Immediately before the mirror passage, Socrates urges Alcibiades
to be eager to be as beautiful (in soul) as possible (:,:d;) and warns
him against becoming cioyicv (more ugly-and-shameful: :,:a:: see above
stage v, part 2). After the mirror passage, Socrates questions Alcibiades
and concludes by asking him, Do you perceive what state you are in now?
Is it a state worthy of a free man or not? Alcibiades answers: I think I
see very well indeed (:,,c:c::). One thing that Alcibiades has seen by
answering Socrates questions is that he needs to care for himself in order
to avoid shame and ugliness, and that Socrates alone can help him to do
this.
The mirror passage does not tell us into whose soul one must gaze.
Paul Friedl anders view that the soul must be that of Socrates alone has
been opposed as too restrictive by many scholars. David Johnson offers a
broader interpretation, according to which the important thing is that the
;o
Johnson :,,,: ::, rightly notes that there are multiple gods in the Phaedrus, which also contains
a psychology that is more complex in some respects. On the psychology of the Phaedrus see
Chapters , and o.
;;
Pradeau :ccc: ;, n.:, citing Phdr. :,cb[].
;
Phdr. :,,a::, Alc. I :,,c:o.
Your love and mine: er os and self-knowledge in Alcibiades I o,
other person be a friend or lover.
;,
There is some truth in both positions.
Taken as an analogy with general applications, what is required is the good
will, affection or love that makes dialectic possible. This is in accord with
Socrates description of his practice in the Apology, where he says that he has
affection and love (otcuci utv sci qic: :,d,) for the Athenians, that
he goes around to each person like a father or older brother, persuading
[him] to care for virtue (,:b,,), and where he asks the jury to admonish
his own sons if they seem to care for anything more than for virtue (:e:
:a:).
c
This broad interpretation is also consistent with the account of
other erotic dialogues, in which interpersonal love is not represented as
being necessary to the practice of the erotic art. However, as applied to
the specic case of Alcibiades in the Alcibiades I, the only soul available is
that of Socrates. Socrates alone is the lover of Alcibiades soul (claim v.a,
at :,:de::), and in Athens almost no one
:
except a lover cares about
a persons education (claim iii.b, at :::b,). Socrates mention of Athens
provides an important qualication. He does not say or imply that progress
in education can be made only if there is interpersonal love between two
people; he says that this is usually (almost no one) the case in Athens. In
Persia, in contrast, the kings son is educated by four men who are reputed
to be the best in wisdom, justice, sophrosyne and courage, but who are never
said to love their pupil (:::e:::a).
Socrates helps to explain why only a lover can help Alcibiades to improve
when he says that the lover of Alcibiades soul will not depart when physical
beauty fades, but will remain as long as the beloved keeps on becoming
better and more beautiful (:,:c:::,:a:). Alcibiades soul-lover, this state-
ment implies, desires to associate with the beautiful soul that is the object
of his er os, just as the lover of the body desires to associate with the object of
his desire. However, the soul-lovers er os is more lasting because its object,
unlike physical beauty, does not necessarily fade, but can become more
beautiful over time. In helping it to do so, the lover makes his object more
lovable as well as more beautiful. For in the Alcibiades I, as in the Phaedrus,
the sight of a beautiful object creates er os.
:
The soul-lover, however, must
himself be lovable (,ctn:c,: :,:e,), having a beautiful nature and a
desire to improve, if he is going to help his beloved to become better. Now
;,
Friedl ander :,:,: : and :,o: ,,:: n.:,; and Johnson :,,,: ,. Friedl anders restrictive view is also
opposed by Bluck :,,,: , n.o; Clark :,,,: :,; Linguiti :,,: ;; Wellman :,oo: :;.
c
I thank Sandra Peterson for calling this parallel to my attention.
:
c, ttc, tittv (so to speak) is used in qualifying a too absolute expression: LSJ s.v. ttc,, .
:
See above n.,. However, I disagree with Friedl ander :,:,: :o, who holds that er os in the Alcibiades
I must begin with the sight of physical beauty.
o Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
Socrates has long been in love with Alcibiades beautiful soul, even before
conversing with the young man, and his love, we may assume, increases
as he engages in dialectic with Alcibiades, thereby gazing into his soul and
helping it to become more beautiful. Alcibiades, in contrast, comes to love
Socrates in the rst place as a result of soul-gazing. When Alcibiades returns
Socrates psychic gaze, by seeking self-knowledge through dialectic of soul
with soul, he not only sees himself, reected in Socrates soul, he also sees
and falls in love with the best part of Socrates soul.
The mirror passage, like the end of the dialogue, contains a warning
to Alcibiades, this time in the form of a literary allusion. In Sappho ,:,
an observer watches a man sitting opposite (tvv:ic,: :) a woman and
listening to her speaking and laughing. This man appears to the observer
to be equal to the gods (qcivt:ci uci svc, oc, tcioi: :). In contrast,
when the observer briey looks at her beloved (c, ,cp t, o oc pcyt:
;) she loses control of the heart in her breast (scpoicv tv o:ntoiv: o),
which is, in Greek thought, the seat of thought as well as feeling. She is
no longer able to hear, speak or see (;::) and is close to death (:,:o).
,
The poem thus implies that it is god-like to be able to look at, speak with
and listen to the person one loves, while still retaining ones physical and
intellectual senses. Similarly, in the Alcibiades I passage, the person who
looks at (tt:tcv: :,,b) the soul of another who is opposite to him
(sc:cv:isp: :,,a:) comes to resemble a god in that he might come to
know the god and wisdom [phronesis] (:,,c,). Signicantly, if we exclude
the doubtful lines :,,c:; the passage is bracketed by tuqcivt:ci (appears
in: :,,a:) and qcivt:ci (It appears so: :,,c;, cf. :,,a). Now qcivt:ci
(He appears) is the rst word of Sapphos poem, and would have been
quoted in references to this poem.
The older lyric poems were usually referred to by their opening lines: Maehler :,,o: :,:.
,
Alcibiades has learned to read and write, play the lyre, and to wrestle (:coe,o). Learning to play
the lyre included learning lyric poetry (Denyer :cc:, on :c,eo). Alcibiades also says qcivt:ci (It
appears so) in other passages (for example, :,:c:,, :,bo, :,c::, :,,b:c), but the use of this word
has a particular signicance in a passage that recalls Sapphos poem in other respects. There are also
allusions to Sappho ,: in Phdr. :,:c:,: see Chapter , n.,. On Platos use of literary allusions see
further Chapter ,.
Your love and mine: er os and self-knowledge in Alcibiades I o,
is also contrasting the kind of self-knowledge that he urges Alcibiades
to cultivate with the knowledge of her own senselessness that Sapphos
observer expresses.
1.5 er os the stork
The love Socrates offers Alcibiades also differs from that of Sapphos
observer, and from that of the conventional erastes, in another respect:
the lover will become a beloved. The end of the dialogue makes this trans-
formation explicit. Socrates says: My love will be no different from a stork,
if, after having hatched a winged love in you, it will in turn be cared for
by this love (ttcp,c0 cpc c tuc, tpc, cootv oicioti, ti tcpc oci
tvvtc::toc, tpc:c otc :c:cu tiv tpcttot:ci: :,,e:,). In this
passage, as at ::,c, (above :.,), the er os in question is both er os for the
greatest power and er os for another person. Socrates er os for the greatest
power that only self-knowledge and self-care can confer, and his er os for
Alcibiades have, in turn, created in Alcibiades both the er os for the greatest
power that is conferred by self-knowledge, and er os for Socrates, without
whom he cannot obtain the object of his desire.
Alcibiades says that he and Socrates will change roles (:,,d;,), but
the end of the dialogue does not simply represent a role reversal, for the
love that has been created in the beloved is a reciprocal er os, in which
both partners love and are loved.
o
Socrates remains a lover, who is now
permitted to help Alcibiades care for himself. Alcibiades remains a beloved,
but he also becomes a lover of Socrates who may now be able, in turn,
to help Socrates acquire greater self-knowledge. This interpretation helps
to explain a puzzling passage at the end of the dialogue. Alcibiades says:
There is no way I will not be your pedagogue from this day on, and
that you will not have me as your pedagogue (co ,cp to:iv ctc, co
tcioc,c,nocot tc :oot :, nutpc,, ou o ot tuc0 tcioc,c,non:
:,,d,:c). The verb tcioc,c,tv (literally, child-lead) does not simply
mean attend on, or follow, as some scholars claim.
;
It refers instead to
the reciprocal education between the two men: Alcibiades says that he will
now, in turn, become Socrates pedagogue.
o
On this idea see Halperin :,o: o,;c. Role reversal is stressed by Friedl ander :,::: ,:. Davidson
:cc;: ;,; discusses examples of life-long relationships betweensame-sex couples inancient Greece,
although he denies that Greek er os can be both mutual and concurrent (:,,:). Alc. I, I contend, is
a counter-example to this view.
;
For example, Denyer :cc:, on :,,d,::; Lamb :,:;: ::c n.:.
Pradeau :ccc: :: n.:o, notes that the verb tcioc,c,tv means both to follow and to instruct a
child. Gordon :cc,: :, states that Alcibiades could become as erotically expert as Socrates.
oo Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
Earlier in the dialogue Socrates says that both he and Alcibiades are
especially in need of education (::c:,), and that they both very much
need to care for themselves (::d:,). In the course of their conversation,
the two men have joined in a common consideration (scivn cun: ::,b:,
::b:c; ostt:tcv scivn: ::d,) about how to become educated. Socrates
believes that he is beneting himself no less than Alcibiades in asking the
questions the young man answers (::;e,;) in the course of this com-
mon consideration. It is obvious how Alcibiades benets from answering
Socrates questions. He gains self-knowledge, both about his own defects
and about his true beauty, by seeing the best part of his own soul as he looks
into Socrates soul, and by realizing that wisdom alone, in the form of self-
knowledge and self-care, can help him to acquire the greatest power that is
the true object of his er os. He also gains by acquiring a worthy love object
when he falls in love with Socrates soul. Socrates also benets from his
conversation with Alcibiades. He achieves greater self-knowledge and cares
for himself by testing and rejecting Alcibiades belief that tyranny confers
the greatest power.
,
He also makes progress toward acquiring the greatest
power with Alcibiades by enlisting the young man in the common search
for wisdom, and by demonstrating that he alone is able to help the young
man know and care for himself. In so doing, he helps to make Alcibiades
soul more beautiful and more lovable, for as Alcibiades self-knowledge
increases, so does his beauty of soul, the object of Socrates love.
Finally, Socrates gains Alcibiades not only as a beloved, but also as a lover
of Socrates soul, who engages to educate Socrates. At the beginning of the
dialogue, Socrates asked Alcibiades to question him or to make a speech
by himself. Alcibiades, however, said that he did not know if he would be
able to make a speech to Socrates (::b:,), did not seem to be willing to
ask questions, and even hesitated briey before agreeing to answer them
(::d::e::). The image of er os as stork suggests that now, at the end of the
dialogue, Alcibiades may nally be able to take an active role in questioning
Socrates. In this way he will care for Socrates and be his pedagogue.
,c
The
stork image also suggests that the love between Socrates and Alcibiades is,
like the counterlove of the beloved in the Phaedrus, not only er os, but also
,
On the idea that Socrates gains self-knowledge by testing others see Brickhouse and Smith :,,:
: n.:, (citing Chrm. :ooc;d, Grg. od:b:, Prt. ,c,d,, Resp. ,,oe:,,;a:, ,a;b);
G. A. Scott :ccc: :c,; Weiss :ccob: :; Yonezawa :cc: :::.
,c
Friedl ander :,o: :,, notes that in this dialogue we witness for once someone undergoing a
profound change (cf. Forde :,;: :::,). As G. A. Scott :ccc: , points out, Friedl ander does not
notice that Lysis changes in a similar way. Guthrie :,;:: ;, misses the change in Alcibiades when he
writes of Socrates erotic delusion about the possibility of converting Alcibiades. The conversion
may be temporary, but it is real.
Your love and mine: er os and self-knowledge in Alcibiades I o;
a kind of philia (Phdr. :,,doe:). Just as storks were thought to return the
care they received from their parents by caring for them in old age, so the
younger Alcibiades will care for the older Socrates as for a father.
Of course, the dialogue ends before Alcibiades actually plays this more
active role of questioner. Socrates uses the conditional, if, in referring to
the care he may receive (:,,e:). Moreover, the future tense is used by both
men to refer to Alcibiades activities of being a pedagogue and caring for
Socrates (:,,d,:c, e,) and it is used again when Alcibiades says that he will
begin to take care about justice (:,,e,). This future, Socrates suggests in
his last words about his fears (:,,eo), may never come to pass. Instead,
just as Socrates fears, the great strength of the city will in fact overcome both
Alcibiades and Socrates. The city has power over Alcibiades because the
young man is tempted by er os for the people of Athens (:,:a:,), a senseless
love similar to that described in Sappho ,:. The dialogue concludes, then,
with a reminder of the sad historical future, in which Alcibiades is in fact
corrupted by his love of the demos, and Socrates questioning is silenced by
death.
,:
It also gives us a brief and tantalizing glimpse of an alternate future,
in which Alcibiades and Socrates do in fact care for and know themselves
and each other by means of reciprocal er os for the soul.
In this dialogue, Plato indicates that Socrates, aided by the god (:c,e,,
::c:c, ::;e,;, :,,do), used his erotic art to do everything possible to
bring about this better future. Socrates is represented here as a lover of both
Alcibiades and of wisdom, as he is in the Gorgias (:d,), and as someone
who has a passionate desire to obtain wisdom because he recognizes that
he lacks it. He is also portrayed as a man who has marvelous skill in using
his erotic art. Socrates, unlike all of the lovers of Alcibiades body, is able
to persuade the young man not only to accept him as lover, but also to
return his love, and to acquire Socratic er os for the wisdom he recognizes
that he lacks. Socrates is not responsible for the fact that Alcibiades will
again be overcome by ordinary er os for tyranny. This dialogue, then, is an
apology not only for Socrates in his relationship with Alcibiades, but also
for an erotic art that desires and strives to attain wisdom rather than sexual
pleasure.
,:
,:
Friedl ander :,o: :,:,.
,:
For the idea that the dialogue is an apology for Socrates see Denyer :cc:: :,:; Weil :,o: ;o;.
On the relationship between Alc. I and Symp. see Chapter at end of .,.
chapter 2
In love with acquiring friends: Socrates
in the Lysis
2.1 impasse as success
The failure of the Lysis to arrive at a positive conclusion frequently induces
in its readers the kind of dizziness Socrates reports that he himself experi-
ences as a result of the inconclusive discussions that take place (tii,,ic
otc :, :c0 c,cu tcpic,: ::oc,o). During a large part of the dia-
logue, Socrates and two young interlocutors, Lysis and Menexenus, attempt
to answer the question: What is the friend (philos)?
:
A number of possible
answers are proposed, to all of which objections are raised. Near the end of
the dialogue, Socrates says: We are as though drunk with the argument
(:::c:), and he sums up the difculties: If none of these is the friend, I no
longer have anything to say (:::eo;).
:
Socrates concludes that he and his
young interlocutors will be ridiculed (sc:c,tco:ci) by the bystanders
for not having been able to discover what the friend is (::,b).
What can Socrates interlocutors and Platos readers learn from these
conversations that, according to Socrates own admission, do not arrive
at a positive conclusion about the topic of discussion? As the history of
scholarship shows, each of the proposals about what the friend is contains
:
c:i to:iv c qic, (::,b;); cf. ttpi :cv qicv, c :u,yvcuoiv cv:t, (::a,); tnupnscutv c
to:iv :c qicv (::b;); ttpi qicu, c to:iv (:::b,). Against the view that the Lysis is a dialogue
of denition (e.g., Justin :cc,; Levin :,;:: :,,; Robinson :,o: o,) Sedley :,, (followed by
Dorion :cc: :;:) argues that it instead attempts to discover what the relationship is between those
who are friends. Bordt :,,: ;o correctly notes that it is fruitless to choose between these two
interpretations. Indeed, the Lysis is about the term qic,, which describes a relation (Mackenzie
:,: :o).
:
In this chapter, I reserve the translations love and to love for er os, eran, and cognates, and I use
English terms cognate with friend, like and dear to translate Greek phil- words. To like,
however, is a much weaker term than the Greek philein, which can refer to affection as intense as
love, although usually without an erotic component. See further below :.:.:. Moreover, lack of an
English equivalent forces me to translate the nominal forms philos (masc.) and philon (neut.) as
friend, even though both can be used to refer to things, as well as to persons, that are objects of
affection. When Socrates asks, What is the friend? he is not necessarily referring to a human being,
as the English friend would usually imply.
o
In love with acquiring friends: Socrates in the Lysis o,
important insights into the nature of friendship. It is, however, a mistake to
interpret the dialogue as containing a hidden message concealed within
what merely appears to be aporia (impasse).
,
I will argue that aporia itself
plays an important and positive role in this dialogue, a role that can be
better understood within the context of Socrates erotic art. In the Lysis, as
in the other erotic dialogues, Socrates recognizes his own lack of wisdom
and other good things (component (:) of the erotic art). At the same time,
he also claims to be marvelously skilled in searching for wisdom and the
good things he desires (component ()), and in helping others to join in
this same search, by leading them, in the rst place, to recognize that they
lack wisdom and other good things (component (,)). Inducing aporia in
his young interlocutors is an important part of this process.
On the components of the erotic art see Introduction at I.:. I agree with Weiss :ccob: :,: that [f]or
Socrates, denition is not an end in itself. Cf. Weiss :ccoa: ,.
,
Slings :,,,: :c:. Mackenzie :, also appears to hold that aporia, in at least one sense, is both a
necessary and a sufcient condition for desiring to learn. She writes that puzzlement is productive
;c Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
sufcient condition for desiring to obtain wisdom. Alcibiades agrees that
he would not wish to discover or learn things that he thought he knew
(:cod:c::). He also admits that he sometimes thinks one thing, sometimes
another, as a result of Socrates questioning (::oe:).
o
Thus, even though
he does not use the term aporia, he admits that he has in effect arrived at
this condition. Nevertheless, Alcibiades is still not convinced that he needs
education, since, as he states, his competitors in politics are also uneducated
(::,b:c:).
;
Before he arrives at a desire to become educated and acquire
wisdom, Alcibiades also needs, in addition to aporia, to experience shame
resulting from the recognition that he is inadequate with respect to what
he values most.
This is why, in the Laws, the earliest education is said to train the
emotions by means of music and dance, leading children to love and hate
correctly. It thereby prepares them to form true opinions when they are
older (o,,a) about which objects are lovable or hateful.
,
Because philein
arises naturally in all humans and is something that we all experience from
earliest childhood, we easily understand ordinary language referring to it,
and it does not tend to give rise to questions about what it is to philein.
However, philein does lead us, after we become able to reason, to ask
questions about the objects we like and believe to be good, especially when
we do not think we possess these objects (see Lys. ::;e::c:), or fear
that we might lose them. When we like something good that we believe
we lack, we naturally want to learn everything we can about it and to nd
out how to keep or acquire it. In this way, the experience of philein leads
us to desire wisdom about the object we like, the philos (the friend, or
the dear). That is, philein leads us, especially when we are guided by
someone who has erotic skill, to philosophize, literally, to like wisdom:
philo-sophein.
o
This process, once started, builds on itself. As will be seen
shortly, the aporia to which the search for wisdomabout the philon naturally
leads increases our doubts about whether we possess or will continue to
possess the object we desire. This in turn increases our liking and desire for
the philos, and our liking for wisdom about what it is and how to acquire
it. More generally, philosophein leads us to desire and seek wisdom about
other objects, including philein.
Philein is also closely related to philosophein in another way. An impor-
tant aspect of Socrates marvelous skill in helping others to love and search
for wisdom involves his extraordinary ability to create friendly relations
among fellow searchers. The search for wisdom is a cooperative endeavor, a
shared search that proceeds by means of question and answer (dialectic).
Lys. :::e;::,a, states that young children like and hate. According to Laws :.o,,b:: pleasure
and philia and pain and hatred could come to be in a correct way in souls that are not yet able to
receive reason.
,
Laws :.o,,a,o,c; cf. Resp. ,.c:dc:a. On musical education in the Laws see Chapter o at
o..
o
On the interconnections between philosophein and loving or liking see further Chapter , at ,.,.,
with n.::,.
Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
Friendly, non-competitive cooperation with others is necessary for dialectic
to take place, and the activity of searching for the wisdom one lacks cre-
ates and increases reciprocal friendliness among fellow searchers.
;
In the
Alcibiades I, the shared search for wisdom in the form of self-knowledge
and self-care creates or reinforces mutual er os between two searchers, and
er os for the object of their search. In the Lysis, in which interpersonal
er os is not represented as necessary to the common search, a similar idea
is expressed in terms of philein rather than er os: the shared search for
wisdom about the philos helps to create and reinforce liking for fellow
searchers and for wisdom. In all of these ways, then, philein is conducive
to philosophein which, in turn, requires and is conducive to philein. The
interconnections are well stated by Ludovic Dugas, although I disagree
with his characterization of what Socrates does as instructing or com-
municating wisdom: Philosophical instruction is based upon friendship;
moreover, it takes the form of friendship. To teach is to like [or love:
aimer]; it is to like wisdom; it is to like those to whom one communicates
wisdom. . . Finally friendship . . . itself becomes one of the objects of this
instruction.
It is not merely ironic, as Penner and Rowe claim (:cc,: , n.;). The idea that wisdom comes
from god is traditional: Hadot :cc:: ::,.
,
Cf. McPherran :cc,: :o:;, who writes that the daimonion is a source of non-expert moral
knowledge (or justied belief ); cf. :c n.:o and :,,o: :,,. I am indebted to Gale Justin for helping
me to understand that Socrates claim to have god-given abilities implies a claim to have true beliefs.
o
Cf. Tht. :,:a,,, where Socrates says that his daimonion allows him to associate only with those
people who are able to make progress by means of this association.
In love with acquiring friends: Socrates in the Lysis ,,
He says that it is necessary for a genuine lover, someone who is not
merely pretending, to be liked by his beloved ( Avc,sccv cpc :,vnoi
tpco:n sci un tpcotcin: qitoci otc :cv tcioiscv: :::ao;).
Scholars have long debated how to interpret this statement, and, in par-
ticular, the meaning of the genuine lover. According to Paul Friedl ander,
the genuine lover is someone who is kindred to his beloved.
;
However, the
premise that the friend is what is kindred or belongs to one (oikeion: :::do
:::b:) is questioned at :::b,d and rejected in the summary at :::e,;
(un:t c cistci . . . qicv to:iv). Another interpretation holds that the
genuine lover, like the lover in Socrates second speech in the Phaedrus,
is simply someone who really loves and does not merely pretend to love,
and that someone who is the genuine lover of a particular beloved really
loves that individual.
Robinson and Hermann no date, on :::aob:, write: The noble lover, i.e. the one who does not
pretend but is genuinely attracted to his beloved, will inevitably himself be loved by his beloved.
,
Noted by Bordt :,,: ::,.
,c
Bolotin :,;,: ;:.
,o Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
then who Lysis is and how Hippothales treats him (:ce;:c,b,). Socrates
claim is best interpreted as indicating that he has the ability to recognize
a beloved who has lovable qualities, including the ability to learn to like
a genuine lover. Socrates readiness to demonstrate to Hippothales how to
treat a beloved suggests that he thinks Lysis is an appropriate object for
this young man, whom he recognizes as someone who has the potential to
become a genuine lover. That is, just as Socrates claims in the Theaetetus
that the god or the daimonion (Tht. :,cc;, d,, de:; :,:a, d:,
d,) helps him in midwifery and match-making (Tht. :,cbo:,:do), so in
the Lysis, Socrates claims to have the god-given ability to recognize which
beloved is a worthy object for a genuine lover and to have true beliefs about
this matter.
,:
2.3.4 This is how one should converse with ones beloved
In addition to his god-given ability, Socrates also explicitly claims to have
another, more human, kind of skill.
,:
He asks Hippothales to demonstrate
(ttiotici) what he, Hippothales, says to Lysis, so that I might know if
you understand (vc tioc ti ttio:coci) what a lover should say about
the beloved, to him and to others (:ce:c:c,a:). After learning what
Hippothales says to Lysis, Socrates makes a claim about how a wise person
treats a beloved: Whoever is wise [sophos] in ta er otika, friend, does not
praise the beloved until he captures him. Someone who praises a beloved,
Socrates continues, lls him with pride and makes him harder to capture
(:coa:;). Hippothales next asks Socrates to advise him about what the
lover should say or do to the beloved so as to become liked by him
(:coc:,). Socrates replies that this is not easy to tell (tittv), but that
he might be able to demonstrate (ttiotci) how a lover should converse
(oict,toci) with a beloved (:coc;). After giving his demonstration,
by questioning Lysis, Socrates as narrator says that he was about to tell
Hippothales: This is how one should converse with ones beloved (c0:c
ypn . . . :c, tcioisc, oict,toci: ::ce:,). He did not speak because
he remembered that Hippothales, who had been listening without being
seen, did not want to call attention to his presence (::ce::::a:).
In these passages, then, Socrates, claims to have practical knowledge
about how a lover should converse with a beloved so as to create friendliness
in him, and he claims to be able to demonstrate this practical knowledge
to others. The dialogue provides specic details about Socrates skill in
,:
On recognizing the beloved see further below :..:.
,:
Cf. Bolotin :,;,: ;.
In love with acquiring friends: Socrates in the Lysis ,;
treating a beloved. First, it includes skill in conversing and questioning.
This idea is brought out by the association in this dialogue of the terms
eran (to love) and er otan (to question). Socrates knows that Hippothales
loves (tp,: :cbo, ;; tpc:c,: :cb), and Hippothales reveals his love by
blushing when he is questioned (tpc:nti,: :cb,; tpc:cutvc,: :cd;
) by Socrates.
,,
Second, being able to create friendliness in someone is
not the same as knowing how to acquire a friend, for Socrates denies
that he has this latter kind of knowledge (:::ao). Third, Socrates skill
in creating friendliness differs signicantly from his ability to recognize
lover and beloved. He is able to recognize lover and beloved quickly, by
means of a divine gift and without the use of reason. His demonstration
of how to converse with a beloved, on the other hand, involves lengthy
questioning of Lysis and reasoning about a specic issue. Fourth, Socrates
claims that his questioning humbles and restrains Lysis instead of pufng
him up and pampering him (::ce,,), and it is characterized by Lysis
himself as punishment (:::c,). Fifth, Socrates claim to have this kind of
skill is shown to be justied. The fact that Lysis addresses Socrates (:::a,)
in a friendly way (qiisc,) and in the fashion of a child or a boyfriend
(tcioisc, means both
,
) shows that Socrates has succeeded in making him
friendly by means of his questioning that is a kind of benecial punishment.
Punishment, then, can actually produce friendliness instead of the hatred it
sometimes produces in young children (:::e;::,a,).
,,
In demonstrating
how to produce friendliness in a beloved, then, Socrates also demonstrates
how to benet the beloved. Finally, Socrates success with Lysis, with whom
he is not in love, shows that skill in creating friendliness in a beloved is the
same skill that creates friendliness in someone who is not a beloved.
,,
The pun in the Lysis was drawn to my attention by Sandra Peterson. Cognates of eran and er otan also
occur at the beginning of Socrates conversation with Menexenus: tpc:, (:::d,), tpcuci (:::d;),
tpc:isc, (:::e,). That Socrates plays on these words in Symp. :;;d, and :,,beo is noted by
Reeve :,,:: ,:,, who also calls attention to the explicit word play in Cra. ,,c,e,, where the word
npc, (her os) is said to be derived either from tpc:c, (love), because heroes were born from the
love of gods and mortals, or fromtpc:v (to question) because they were wise [sophoi] and clever
rhetors and dialecticians, being able to question [tpc:v] (,,d:;). Cf. Reeve :ccoa: :,, and
:ccob: :,,, who writes (:,): Socrates knows about the art of love in that but just insofar as
he knows how to ask questions. Roochnik :,;: ::; notes (::;): Philosophical discourse . . . is
forever the love, and not the possession, of wisdom. . . [It is] fundamentally interrogative (emphasis
in original). The pun on eran and er otan also occurs at Alc. I :cob:c (on which see Chapter : at
:.: and n.:); Chrm. :,,d:, e:; Prm. :,;a with c:; Euthphr. :c, (where the MSS vary between
forms of the two verbs.)
,
Bordts translation (:,,) captures the double meaning: ganz wie ein Liebling und ein Freund.
,,
Renaud :cc:: :, writes that Lysis is one of the few interlocutors who is genuinely thankful for the
humbling given him by Socrates. G. A. Scott :ccc: ;c also notes that Lysis reacts positively to this
humbling that borders on humiliation.
, Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
Skill in conversing with a beloved is demonstrable and, unlike Socrates
ability to recognize lover and beloved, it depends on the use of reason. It
is not, however, craft-knowledge, for Socrates does not claim to have a
complete understanding of the relevant eld, or to be able to teach, or to
give an account of his eld and his skill. In fact, Socrates says that it is not
easy to tell (tittv), that is, teach or explain to, Hippothales how to speak
to his beloved, but that he can perhaps give a demonstration (:coc;).
,o
Socrates demonstration shows that his knowledge (ttio:coci: :c,a:) and
wisdom (sophos: :coa:) about how to treat a beloved is practical wisdom
about how to create friendliness by benetting someone in a particular
way. It is skill in questioning an interlocutor so as to induce a recognition
of lack of wisdom, together with a desire to obtain this good thing. That
is, Socrates skill induces philosophein.
,;
His wisdom about how to treat a
beloved, then, is component (,) of the erotic art: skill in helping others to
acquire this same art. Even though Socrates believes that he is inferior and
useless in other respects (:cbc:), he demonstrates that he is justied in
claiming that he himself has this skill, and that he is able to demonstrate
it to others. Through dialectic, Socrates also expresses friendliness toward
others and creates reciprocal friendliness in them. He is useful and therefore
likable (::cd:,) in so far as he has erotic skill. However, Socrates success
in producing friendliness in others, for wisdom and for other people,
depends on their having certain characteristics. Socrates god-given ability
to recognize lover and beloved includes, I argue in :., the ability to
recognize these characteristics.
2.4 socrates and his interlocutors
2.4.1 Hippothales: the lover
When Socrates says that it is necessary for the lover who is genuine and
not merely pretending to be liked by his beloved (:::ao;), Hippothales
reaction he turns all kinds of colors because of pleasure (:::b:) suggests
that he takes himself to be this genuine lover. Most scholars, however, agree
that Hippothales is not the kind of genuine lover Socrates has in mind,
but instead an inferior lover, fundamentally selsh or misguided, or a
,o
I follow the criteria for craft-knowledge given by Annas :cc:: :. On Socrates techne see Intro-
duction at I., and nn.,,;.
,;
Cf. Rudebusch :cco: esp. :,;, who argues that Socrates is portrayed in Lys. as trying to convert his
interlocutors to philosophy by bringing them to a state of awareness of their lack of wisdom, and
Reeve :ccoa: esp. :,.
In love with acquiring friends: Socrates in the Lysis ,,
pretending lover.
,
Socrates criticism of Hippothales treatment of his
beloved (:c,d,:cob) might appear to support this view. If Hippothales
is not the genuine lover, however, why does Socrates help him, by giving
his demonstration, to become liked by his beloved? Is Socrates merely an
unscrupulous pander? Is he himself the genuine lover who is pleading his
own cause?
,,
Or is he simply mistaken about Hippothales?
I argued above (:.,.,) that Socrates phrase, the genuine lover, refers
to someone who not only loves, but has also acquired the erotic skill that
enables him to become liked by his beloved This skill includes the ability
to converse with this beloved in the way in which Socrates converses with
Lysis.
:cc
That is, the genuine lover knows how to engage in dialectic in
a common search for wisdom, a search for which friendly feelings are
necessary, and which in turn increases these feelings (see above :.:.,). My
interpretation provides support for the view that Socrates aids Hippothales
because his god-given ability leads him to recognize that the young man
has the potential to acquire the erotic art, and thus to become a genuine
lover. His demonstration is also an initiation into this art.
There are a number of indications that Hippothales is represented as
someone who has the potential to become a genuine lover, and that he
begins, in the course of the dialogue, to acquire erotic skill. That he has
at least the potential to become devoted to ta er otika (component (:)
of the erotic art) is suggested by the statements that he is far gone in
love (:cb;), to the point of being mad (:c,a;), with a beautiful
beloved, about whom he is always speaking, composing poems and even
singing (:cc,d;). The young mans ordinary er os for someone with a
beautiful body is not in itself a sign that his motive is merely pleasure,
for in Greek thought, physical beauty is closely associated with beauty of
soul.
:c:
Moreover, Socrates exclamation at :ce,:c (how noble . . . in
every way is this love you have found) indicates that Lysis has beauty of
soul as well as physical beauty, and suggests that Hippothales loves the boy
,
Such views are held by Bolotin :,;,: ;o; Bordt (who holds that Hippothales is really in love,
but that emotion is not the criterion for a genuine lover) :,,: ::, and :ccc: :,,oc; Dorion
:cc: :o:; Gonzalez :,,,b: ,o and :cc,: :,,o; Hoerber :,,,: :,::; Nightingale :,,,: ::o;
Penner and Rowe :cc,: :o,; G. A. Scott :ccc: ;:; Teloh :,o: ;: and c:; Tindale :,:
:c,. One of the few to argue that Hippothales is the genuine lover is Kuiper :,c,: , and
:co.
,,
Gonzalez :,,,b: , writes: While pretending to advance Hippothales cause, Socrates has been
seducing Lysis for himself. On Socrates as the genuine lover see also Friedl ander :,o: :cc and ,:,
n.::; Gonzalez :cc,: :,,o; Penner and Rowe :cc,: :o,;c and :,:; Teloh :,o: ;::; Tindale
:,: :c.
:cc
Cf. Justin :cc,: ::.
:c:
On the connection see Nehamas :cc;b: esp. :co;.
:cc Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
for both reasons.
:c:
Moreover, there is no indication in this dialogue that
Hippothales motive is sexual pleasure.
:c,
His request to Socrates (:coc:,)
indicates that he simply wants to be liked by Lysis.
Hippothales also shows the intense liking for speech (logoi) which is a rst
step toward becoming skilled in searching for wisdom (component ()) by
means of dialectic. At the beginning of the dialogue, Hippothales accosts
Socrates and asks him to enter a wrestling school Hippothales himself
frequents, in which there are many beautiful young men whose chief
occupation is speech (logoi: :ca:,), and where the teacher (oioosti:
:ca) is Mikkos, an admirer of Socrates (:c,a,:ca,).
:c
In saying that
he spends time in this school (:c,b;), Hippothales shows that he shares
Socrates liking not only for beauty, but also for speech. He is, however,
misguided in having learned about speech from Mikkos. Hippothales says
that this Mikkos is a companion and praiser of Socrates (:ca,), but
Socrates himself casts doubt on both characterizations. When he calls
Mikkos an able sophist (:cao;) and characterizes himself as inferior
and useless in everything except ta er otika (:cbc:), Socrates suggests
that the kind of wisdom (sophia) Mikkos would be likely to praise is
very different from the erotic skill Socrates himself possesses.
:c,
Either
Hippothales has misunderstood Mikkos, or Mikkos is himself wrong about
Socrates. Moreover, when Socrates later denies that he has a friend (:::a
o), he in effect denies that Mikkos is his companion. The opening of the
dialogue, then, represents Hippothales as very much interested in speech,
but as having learned about it from the wrong kind of teacher. His speeches
(sc:cc,onv: :cd,) and poems about Lysis are also, as Socrates will
soon point out, indications of his lack of wisdom.
Hippothales, however, demonstrates that he is capable of learning, with
Socrates help, to recognize his errors about both speech and love. In so
doing, he shows that he has acquired component (:) of the erotic art. When
Socrates asks who is beautiful to him (:cb:), Hippothales reveals his
love by blushing (:cb,, c,, d) and confesses that Lysis is his object
(:c,a,). Hippothales blush not only reveals that he really is in love, it
also indicates that he is modest and, at least in the presence of Socrates,
subject to shame.
:co
His shame, like that of Alcibiades, makes him more
:c:
Justin :cc,: :: perceptively notes that Hippothales apparently loves Lysis for his good character
traits as well as for his physical beauty.
:c,
As Wolfsdorf claims (:cc: ;c:). Contra: Ludwig :cc:: ::,.
:c
Nothing certain is known about this Mikkos as an historical gure: Nails :cc:: :co.
:c,
Cf. Symp. :;,e:o, where Socrates contrasts Agathons bright wisdom with his own inferior and
doubtful kind of wisdom.
:co
Noted by Hoerber :,,:,o: :;:; cf. Bolotin :,;,: ;:,.
In love with acquiring friends: Socrates in the Lysis :c:
ready to recognize his lack of wisdom. Socrates next questions Hippothales
to learn whether he knows how a lover should speak (legein: :c,a:) to his
beloved, asking the young man about the ideas expressed in the poems and
speeches he makes to Lysis (:ce:c:c,b,). Because of modesty and shame,
Hippothales does not respond himself, but refers Socrates to Ktesippos.
:c;
According to Ktesippos, Hippothales praises Lysis for his ancestors, among
whom were wealthy men who won victories in athletic contests and played
host to their relative, Heracles (:c,bd). According to Ktesippos, Hip-
pothales songs and words are ridiculous (sc:c,tco:c: :c,b;, c:).
Socrates then proceeds to show that Hippothales is as laughable as his
poems. He addresses the young man as ridiculous Hippothales (:c,d,),
and by questioning leads Hippothales to agree that when he praises his
beloved before capturing him, he shows himself not to be wise (sophos) in
ta er otika, but to be an inferior hunter of his beloved (:coa:::). In response
to Socrates questioning, Hippothales further agrees that he is uneducated
(unmusical: :cob:,), makes himself obnoxious to everyone (:cob,o)
and harms himself (:cobo). However, instead of taking offense at what
could be construed as public humiliation, Hippothales immediately agrees
that what he has been doing is very unreasonable (tcn . . . c,ic) and
says that for this reason (oic :c0:c) he wants to ask Socrates advice about
how to speak with and act toward his beloved (:cob,c,).
This last statement clearly reveals that Hippothales has come to recognize
that he lacks wisdom, in addition to lacking his beautiful beloved (compo-
nent (:) of the erotic art). It also indicates that he passionately desires to
acquire these good things (component (,)). His er os for Lysis and for speech
led him to question (er otan) Socrates. When he asks Socrates for advice,
Hippothales also takes a rst step toward becoming skilled in searching for
wisdom together with others (components () and (,)). It is noteworthy
that he now asks Socrates how he might converse (dialegomenos: :coc:)
with Lysis, rather than how he might make speeches (logoi) to the boy. He
is now interested in a kind of speech different from the logoi associated
with Mikkos. In asking for Socrates advice, Hippothales also indicates that
he is willing to admit that his way of courting by praising the beloveds
ancestors as the epinician poets do is inferior to Socrates philosophical
method.
:c
:c;
Shame: Bolotin :,;,: ;,.
:c
Hippothales positive response to Socrates criticisms is not usually noticed. Scholars argue that
this scene reveals that Hippothales has selsh motives (Bolotin :,;,: ;); that his love is really
self-love, and that he is unwilling or unable to enter into a dialogue with Socrates (Bordt :,,:
::o:c); that he is a fundamentally selsh character, whom Plato uses to criticize the traditional
:c: Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
Another indication of Hippothales desire to acquire the wisdom he rec-
ognizes that he lacks, and to become skilled in searching for it, is his silent
presence throughout Socrates lengthy questioning of Lysis and Menex-
enus. Before he consulted Socrates, Hippothales never stopped speaking.
According to Ktesippos, Hippothales tortures and deafens his hearers by
speaking so often about his beloved (:cc,d:, :c,b,). After Socrates asks
him about his love, however, Hippothales does not speak, but blushes
(:cb,, c,, d), and he lets Ktesippos do almost all of the talking about
Hippothales love.
:c,
Hippothales longest speech (:cocdo) merely gives
information about how Socrates can enter into conversation with Lysis.
After this, Hippothales is silent. His extremely attentive presence, however,
is referred to on three signicant occasions.
After Lysis joins Socrates group, Hippothales stands behind the rest
of the bystanders, where he thinks he wont be seen by the boy. Socrates
comments: Standing thus, he listened (:c;b;). Socrates calls attention
to Hippothales silent presence for a second time after Lysis, in response
to Socrates questioning, admits that he is without sense and needs a
teacher (::cd). As narrator, Socrates remarks that he almost made a
mistake when he looked at Hippothales and was about to say that this
is the way to treat a beloved, humbling and restraining him and not,
as Hippothales does, pampering and pufng him up. However, Socrates
says that he checked himself and did not speak, for he saw that Hippothales
was in agony and disturbed, and he remembered that Hippothales did not
want to be noticed by Lysis (::ce::::a:). Why is Hippothales distressed?
There is no indication that he reacts in this way because he is jealous of
Socrates.
::c
Nor is he distressed because he is afraid that Socrates will reveal
his presence. Hippothales does not react in response to fears about what
Socrates will say or do, but because of what is being said (otc :cv
t,cutvcv: ::ceo), that is, Socrates conversation with Lysis. Hippothales
is disturbed on Lysis account because of the lesson Socrates has just given
the boy, a humbling that Lysis himself refers to as punishment (:::c,).
:::
Hippothales distress gives evidence of his emotional involvement with
concept of er os (Gonzalez :cc,: :); and that Hippothales treatment of Lysis, in contrast to that
of Socrates, corrupts the boy (Nightingale :,,,: ::o and :,,,: :c;:c). Vann :cco provides a rare
positive interpretation of Hippothales response, as well as an excellent analysis of the parallels
between Socrates and Hippothales.
:c,
Hippothales says that Ktesippos will speak for him at :c,b,, and Ktesippos does so at :cc,d
and :c,bod. Hippothales remark at :c,a, indicates that Ktesippos is also the speaker at :ce,o
and e.
::c
As suggested by Bordt :,,: :,:,.
:::
G. A. Scott :ccc: , and :,; n.:; suggests that Socrates comes at least close to committing hybris
in his treatment of Lysis.
In love with acquiring friends: Socrates in the Lysis :c,
Lysis, just as his blushing indicates the strength of his love. The fact that
he does not stop Socrates, in spite of his anguish, shows the intensity of his
desire to acquire wisdom about erotic matters.
At the end of the dialogue, Socrates calls attention to Hippothales silent
presence for the third time. After Socrates says that the genuine lover
must necessarily be liked by his beloved (:::ao;), Hippothales turns
all kinds of colors because of pleasure (:::b:). Hippothales blushes,
just as he did at the beginning of the dialogue when Socrates asked him
whom he considered beautiful (:cb,). Now, however, he blushes for
a very different reason. The young man is pleased because he correctly
understands that in order to become liked by his beloved he must rst
acquire Socrates erotic skill, which includes the ability to engage indialectic
in a common search for wisdom. After listening to Socrates demonstration
and the ensuing conversations, Hippothales believes that he will be able to
become a genuine lover, because he has made progress in acquiring erotic
skill.
:::
In the course of the dialogue, he goes from blushing in shame,
to distress and agony at Socrates humbling of his beloved, and nally to
blushing with pleasure. These silent indications of emotion are evidence
of his intellectual progress, and correspond to important stages in it.
Hippothales is not mentioned by name again after his last blush, but it is
possible to see an allusion to him in Socrates remark after his summary of
the difculties of the argument: Saying these things, I had it in mind nally
to stir up someone of the older people (::,a::). It is likely that Socrates
includes Hippothales among these older people. If the conversation had
not been interrupted, Socrates suggests, Hippothales would at last have
taken an active part in the philosophical discussion, conversing with both
Socrates and Lysis. In so doing, Hippothales would have continued to
make progress in acquiring the erotic art.
2.4.2 Lysis: the beloved
I argued above (:.,.,) that when Socrates says he is able to recognize the
beloved (:cc::) he does not merely claim to be able to recognize the
identity of someones particular beloved. Nor does he include the beloved
in his statement merely because a lover necessarily has a beloved. Socrates
is instead claiming that he can recognize a beloved who has qualities that
make him lovable for his own sake, including the ability to learn to like a
genuine lover, with whom he shares a mutual desire for the good.
:::
Renaud :cc:: :,: correctly notes that Socrates examines and guides both Lysis and Hippothales.
:c Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
This interpretation is supported by Socrates reaction when he learns
that Lysis is Hippothales object. After hearing the boys name mentioned
(:cd:), Socrates conjectures that Lysis is young, because he does not
recognize his name (:ce::). Ktesippos then tells Socrates that Lysis is
the oldest son of a very well-known father, Democrates, and that Socrates
cannot be ignorant of the boys beautiful form(:ce,). More information
about Lysis relatives is given shortly afterwards, when Ktesippos reveals
that they are famed in the whole city for having achieved victories in
athletic contests and for hospitality to their kinsman, Heracles (:c,c:
d,).
::,
Socrates conrms that he thinks Lysis is not only beautiful, but
also noble, in appearance (ocuc:c, . . . ,tvvcicu: :c,a::). Socrates also
indicates that he believes Lysis to be noble in other respects when he
remarks that the boy appears to be beautiful and good (scc, :t s,cc,:
:c;a,). Moreover, after Ktesippos explains who Lysis is, Socrates exclaims:
O Hippothales, what a love you have found, noble [or true born] and
vigorous [,tvvccv sci vtcviscv] in every way! (:ce,:c). The term
vtcvisc, (vigorous or spirited: :ce,) is used, signicantly, in the
Republic to refer to people who have the superior natural qualities that can
be trained either for great good or great evil.
::
Since Socrates does not
know Lysis, he presumably calls him vigorous because he believes that
the boy is likely to have inherited superior natural qualities from his father.
Socrates, then, calls Lysis a noble and vigorous love-object because he is
young and beautiful, and is the noble or true-born oldest son of a family
well known for its achievements and noble ancestry.
::,
These qualities make
Lysis a worthy object of affection for his own sake, both to the parents who
like him very much (oqcopc qit: :c;do), and to a lover.
::o
In being
noble or true-born (,tvvcic,), Lysis is a proper love-object for a genuine,
or legitimate (,vnoic,: :::ao) lover.
::;
::,
The historical evidence about Lysis family is collected by Nails :cc:: :,,;.
::
In Resp. ,:e:o Socrates says that great injustices do not come from an inferior nature, but from
one that is vigorous (vtcvis, qotc,), but has been corrupted by education. This vigorous
nature is the philosophical one (,:a:). Cf. Resp. ,c,c:;, where Socrates states that those who
are both intellectually superior and vigorous (vtcvisci) do not usually want to live in an orderly,
quiet and stable way. On the application of this idea to Alcibiades in Alc. I see Chapter : at :.,.
::,
Cf. Chrm. :,e:,, where Socrates remarks that it would be tting for Charmides to have a soul
that is good by nature (to ttqusc,), since he comes from the house of Kritias.
::o
Westermayer :;,: , notes that Lysis is characterized in this dialogue as an especially lovable
boy. This characterization tells against the interpretation of Penner and Rowe :cc,: :,::, :o;,
:,:oc that love for individuals is purely instrumental. A non-instrumentalist view of friendship is
defended by Dorion :cc: :c.
::;
Seech :,;,: :: n.: notes that ,vnoic, can mean legitimate as well as genuine.
In love with acquiring friends: Socrates in the Lysis :c,
In being beautiful and from a noble family Lysis resembles Alcibiades in
the Alcibiades I.
::
This comparison can help us to understand why Lysis
natural and social superiorities make him an interesting object not only to
lovers but also to Socrates. Platos contemporary readers might also make
the connection between Lysis and Alcibiades because Democrates, Lysis
father, was Alcibiades lover.
::,
Moreover, the term used to characterize
Lysis, vtcvisc, (vigorous, or spirited: :ce,), is also used to characterize
the family of Alcibiades (vtcvisc::cu: Alc. I :cao). As discussed in
Chapter :, Alcibiades advantages give him a very high opinion of himself
(ut,ccqpcvcv . . . ottpnti, :qpcvnuc:i), and he rejects all lovers,
thinking that he has no need of anyone for anything (:c,b:ca:). To
correct this arrogance, Socrates gives Alcibiades a benecial humbling, one
that also leads the young man to love him in return (:,,e:,). Unlike
Alcibiades, Lysis has not yet become arrogant. Indeed, as Hugh Benson
points out, Lysis is the only interlocutor in Platos early dialogues who
does not claim to have wisdom and who is not reputed to be wise by
others.
::c
However, Lysis natural and social superiorities put him at risk
of becoming arrogant. For one thing, they subject him to attery, which,
as Socrates says, puffs up and pampers a beloved (::ce,). Because of all
his advantages, Alcibiades is given to boasting (ut,ccuycutvc,: Alc. I
:cc:), and Socrates warns Hippothales that praise lls the beloved with
arrogance and boasting (qpcvnuc:c, . . . sci uc,ccuyic,: Lys. :coa).
Just as Socrates corrects Alcibiades, so he counteracts the attery Lysis
receives from Hippothales and others by showing him that he has no reason
to have a high opinion of himself (ut,c qpcvtv: ::cd,; ut,ccqpcv: d;)
and that he needs a teacher (::cdo). He thus helps Lysis to become more
aware of his own lack of wisdom (component (:) of the erotic art).
:::
This
treatment will not only benet Lysis by humbling him, it will also make
him, like Alcibiades, more able to return affection. As Socrates later states,
no one likes something if he does not need it (::,a;b:).
In the course of this dialogue, Lysis, like Alcibiades, shows that he is able
to submit to and learn from the humbling process, and thus become able
to like the person who benets him in this way.
:::
Lysis is able to do so
because he, like Alcibiades, already has a desire to improve, in addition to
::
See especially Alc. I :caobo. On Socrates similar treatment of the two young men cf. OConnor
:,,,.
::,
Plut. Alc. ,, cited by Nails :cc:, s.v. Democrates I.
::c
Benson, :ccc: :; cf. Dorion :cc: :: and :;c n.o,.
:::
Dorion :cc: :;c n.o; notes that Socrates treatment has the effect of preserving Lysis moderation.
:::
Cf. Renaud :cc:: :,; and Versenyi :,;,: :,;.
:co Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
an excellent nature (physis). He, like Alcibiades, is lovable in part because he
has this desire. Alcibiades has er os for the greatest power, although he at rst
mistakenly believes that this power is tyranny. His ordinary er os, however,
helps Alcibiades to acquire Socratic er os (component (,) of the erotic art),
once he understands, aided by Socrates erotic skill, that the greatest power
is in fact conferred by wisdom in the form of self-knowledge.
::,
Similarly,
Lysis has an intense liking, but is at rst mistaken about the object he
likes. Before Socrates meets Lysis, Hippothales states that the boy has
an exceptionally strong liking for listening (qinscc, . . . oicqtpcv:c,:
:coc:c), that he is, literally, a liker of listening. The same term is used in
the Republic of people who run about to every Dionysian festival but have
no interest in philosophical conversations (,.;,d:e:). In the Lysis passage
also, the term suggests that Lysis is indiscriminate in what he likes listening
to, just as Hippothales at rst likes the wrong kind of speeches (logoi).
Just as he helps Alcibiades understand the true object of his love, so
Socrates helps Lysis to recognize that what he really likes listening to is
not just any kind of speech, but the philosophical conversation that can
help him to acquire wisdom. Socrates begins by noting Lysis liking for
speeches, when he says that the boy wants to approach when he sees
that Socrates and Ktesippos are conversing (oitt,cutc: :c;a,o). He
then says that Lysis is perplexed (at an impasse: ntcpti) and reluctant
to approach (:c;ao;), referring to the boys praiseworthy reserve, and
also using a verb, cognate with aporia, that has connotations of fruitful
philosophical impasse.
::
When Socrates converses with Lysis, the boy
is responsive to his questioning, readily admitting that he does not yet
have sense (::cd), and becoming friendly to Socrates as a result of
this questioning (:::a,). Lysis responsiveness leads Socrates to address
Lysis as phile (friend or dear: ::ca,) toward the end of their rst
conversation. Finally, Lysis is able to become an active seeker of wisdom in
the conversations he likes listening to. After the boy breaks into Socrates
conversation with Menexenus (::,d:,), Socrates says that he is pleased by
Lysis philosophia, his liking for wisdom (noti, :n qicocqi: ::,d;). He
thus indicates that the boy has come to understand, by listening to Socrates
conversations, that the true object of his liking is wisdom. Lysis, then,
acquires components (:) and (,) of Socrates erotic art by recognizing that
he has a passionate liking for the wisdom he recognizes that he lacks. In the
process, he becomes friendly toward Socrates, who helps himto arrive at this
understanding.
::,
See Chapter : at :.:, stage vi.
::
Reserve: cf. Dorion :cc: :o n.,.
In love with acquiring friends: Socrates in the Lysis :c;
Lysis friendliness and his progress in acquiring the erotic art are also evi-
dent in his relationship with Menexenus. Lysis is very much a companion
(uio:c t:cpc,) to the young man (:cod), and he demonstrates this by
following and sitting beside Menexenus (:c;aob,). Lysis also shows that
he likes his companion when he asks Socrates to give Menexenus the same
punishment he himself has just received from Socrates (:::a:c,). Lysis
does not want Socrates to punish his companion because he is resentful
of the treatment he himself has received from Socrates, but because he
likes Menexenus.
::,
Lysis has just told Socrates that his mother, who likes
him very much, would beat him if he touched her weaving (:cd;e:),
and Socrates will go on to say that young children are most of all liked
(philtata) by their parents when these parents punish them (:::e;::,a,).
Socrates punishment of Lysis, then, is like that of a father, who expresses
his friendship by correcting and improving his child.
::o
Lysis wants Menex-
enus, who is eristic (contentious: :::b,), to receive the same benecial
punishment.
::;
Moreover, when Lysis asks Socrates to use dialectic to cor-
rect Menexenus eristic tendencies (:::c;), he shows that he is beginning
to acquire Socrates own erotic skill in searching for wisdom (component
()), and that he has the desire to help others acquire this skill also (com-
ponent (,)). Socrates indicates that the boy has already acquired some of
this skill when he tells Lysis that Lysis has paid such close attention to
his own conversation with Socrates that the young man is now able to
question others (:::aob,). In being able to question, Lysis has become
lovable not only for his own sake, but also because he can be instrumental
in helping others to acquire this good. Lysis, then, resembles Alcibiades
in the Alcibiades I in being able to help others. Lysis, however, has begun
to acquire erotic skill more quickly and with less resistance, and Socrates
expresses no fears about his future.
Socrates, then, correctly identies Lysis as a beloved, someone who is
lovable for his own sake, and who has the ability to learn to like a genuine
lover, a person who not only loves, but who has also acquired the erotic
art. Lysis has the potential to like Hippothales, provided that this lover
::,
Bolotin :,;,: :c,o argues unconvincingly that Lysis responds to his humiliation by loving Socrates
and by turning his resentment for his humiliating treatment against Menexenus, whom he wants
Socrates to punish.
::o
Cf. Fraisse :,;: :,::, who notes that the Lysis contains an example of Socratic friendship, in which
the wiser person makes the less wise aware of his imperfections by means of a certain humiliation.
Socrates is also said to act like a father or older brother in Ap. ,:b,, and Symp. ::,cod:.
::;
Menexenus is a cousin of the Ktesippos (:cod,) who imitates eristic techniques in Euthydemus
(,c,e;). Gonzalez :cc,: :c:, interprets Lysis request that Socrates punish Menexenus as part
of the competition for wisdom and virtue in which the philosopher engages Lysis and Menexenus.
I would characterize the activity Socrates encourages as a shared search rather than competition.
:c Part I Socrates and Two Young Men
acquires Socrates art. In the course of the dialogue, Lysis and Hippothales
have made progress in establishing the basis for a new kind of relationship
(ouvcuoicv: ::,b,), in which a beloved is captured (tn: :coa:), not by
listening to ridiculous words of praise, but by participating in philosophical
conversations in which lover and beloved search together for wisdom. In
emphasizing the aporia at which they have arrived, Socrates encourages
them to do just this.
2.5 conclusion
The Lysis represents Socrates as sharing the dizzying puzzlement of his
young interlocutors, as he examines and nds objections to many state-
ments about what the friend (philos) is. It also represents him, however,
as someone who has skill in loving (eran) and liking, and who recognizes
his own deciencies. Socrates uses his skill to show his young interlocutors
how a lover can question his beloved so as to lead this beloved to become
aware of his own lack of wisdom and to reciprocate friendliness, so that
lover and beloved may engage in the dialectic that is an expression of liking
both for wisdom (philosophein) and for each other. In so doing, he initiates
them into the erotic art. These conversations may lead to aporia about a
particular subject, but they are worthwhile (cicv: :c,b,) for their own
sake, in part because aporia helps to produce a fruitful awareness of ones
own lack of wisdom. The conversations also help to create the reciprocal
liking that is necessary to the common search for wisdom. In this dialogue,
then, Socrates does not arrive at a denition of philos, but he does raise
important questions about who or what the philos is, and he encourages
the search for wisdom among people who need not be lover and beloved,
but who must be friendly.
part ii
Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
Introduction to Part II: the narrators
of the Symposium
The Symposium has the extremely complex formal structure of a dramatic
dialogue in which narratives are nested within narratives.
:
In the intro-
ductory framework (:;:a::;a:), Apollodorus says that he will comply
with the request of some unidentied friends (:;:a:) to tell them about
the speeches made at a symposium in honor of Agathons victory with his
rst tragedy (:;,a,o), and an unnamed Companion speaks a few lines
(:;,d:c, :;,eo). The rest of the Symposium takes the form of a long
narration by Apollodorus. Within his narration is another narration, for
Apollodorus, who was not present at Agathons symposium, reports what
the eyewitness Aristodemus told him. The reader is constantly reminded
of this narrative frame by Apollodorus use of indirect discourse (He
said that . . . : e.g., :;a,).
:
Moreover, within Apollodorus narration of
Aristodemus narration are still other narrations, for Apollodorus narrates
Aristodemus narration of what the symposiasts said, including the speeches
some of them made in praise of Eros. Furthermore, two of these speeches
themselves narrate speeches made by still others: Socrates narrates what
Diotima said, and Alcibiades narrates what Socrates said. Of course, still
another narrator Plato tells the entire story to the reader.
This narrative complexity corresponds to, and helps to produce, an
equally complex characterization of Socrates. The multiple narrators por-
tray him as an erastes, an er omenos, a man who is marvelously skilled
concerning ta er otika, and as a gure who resembles the daim on Eros of
Diotimas speech. Socrates is also represented as both hubristic and virtu-
ous, comic and serious, wise and lacking wisdom. According to Alcibiades,
Socrates spends his life playing, but is also capable of being deeply serious
(::oeo). Alcibiades Socrates has the virtues of moderation (s ophrosyne),
courage, wisdom (phronesis) and endurance (::,d;), but is also guilty of
:
On the narrative frame see, among many others, Gill :,,,: xviiixix; Halperin :,,:; Hunter :cc:
::.
:
Indirect discourse: Dover :,c, on :;a,:;,e:c.
::c
Introduction to Part II: the narrators of the Symposium :::
disdain, mockery, hybris and arrogance (::,c,o; hybris: cf. ::,b;, :::a).
In Alcibiades narrative, Socrates himself disclaims wisdom (::do::,a),
just as he does in his initial conversation with Agathon (:;,e:). Agathon,
like Alcibiades, thinks that Socrates is wise (sophos: :;,c), but also accuses
him of hybris (:;,c;). Taken together, all of the narrators create a perplex-
ing, composite portrait of the philosopher who is said to play roles erotic,
ethical and dramatic that are usually thought to be incompatible.
,
Like
Alcibiades (::oc,), many of Platos readers have not known what to do with
this man.
The narratives within the Symposium, then, present readers with puzzles
that encourage them to open up Platos representation of Socrates, just
as Alcibiades claims that Socrates himself needs to be opened up in order
to be understood (::oe,;). Part II of this study does just this. I argue
that a focus on Socrates daimonic art can help to illuminate the many
puzzling, even apparently incompatible, accounts given by the narrators of
the Symposium, as well as many other aspects of the dialogue.
Indeed, the subject of Platos Symposium is not er os but Socrates.
This
man is the main concern of Apollodorus and Aristodemus. In the opening
passage, Apollodorus tells his unnamed friends, who want to learn about
the speeches on love made by Socrates, Alcibiades and others at Agathons
symposium: I think that I am not unpracticed [utt:n:c,] in the things
about which you ask (:;:a::). We learn shortly afterwards, however,
that the business of Apollodorus life, for the last three years, has been to
become practiced (ttiutt,), not about er os, but in knowing what he [sc.
Socrates] says and does (:;:c,o). Moreover, Apollodorus has gotten his
information about the symposium from Aristodemus, a man whom he
identies as a lover (tpco:n,: :;,b,), that is, an admirer, of Socrates.
,
That Socrates is the main subject of the Symposiumis also emphasized by the
structure of Aristodemus narrative as reported by Apollodorus. It begins as
Aristodemus rst meets Socrates (He said that Socrates met him: :;a,)
and then follows him to the symposium, and it ends as Aristodemus again
follows the philosopher, as is his custom (::,d:c), after the party is over.
Moreover, of the dialogues fty-one Stephanus pages, Socrates dominates
more than thirty. He is the topic of conversation in the introductory
,
Clay :ccc: :, notes that Socrates was characterized as dimorphos (two-formed) by an anonymous
comic writer (citing SSR I.A.:;, vol. i: ;). On the ambiguity of Socrates persona cf. Blondell :cc::
o,c and :cco: :;;; Blundell :,,:: ::,c; Corrigan :,,;; Hunter :cc: ,:c; Nehamas :,,: esp.
,,o,; Ziolkowski :,,,: ,c:.
On this point see Plochmann :,;:: ,,c and ,,,; Wardy :cc:; Warner :,,:: :,.
,
Unlike Rowe :,,, on ::b:, I see no reason to doubt that the symposiasts have all been strongly
affected by Socrates philosophical words. This does not imply, however, that they have become
philosophers in the sense that Socrates is a philosopher.
:: Part II Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
even if they are reported by someone very inferior, Socrates words never-
theless produce the same powerful effects (::,d,o). These effects are due
to Socrates use of component (,) of the erotic art: his ability to use words
to persuade others to recognize their own ignorance and to desire to seek
wisdom.
Socrates also produces another kind of emotional effect on those who
associate with him, many of whom become his lovers. Aristodemus, as
noted above, is a lover of Socrates (:;,b,), and after Alcibiades speech, the
symposiasts laugh because Alcibiades seems to them still to be in love with
the older man (tpc:isc, tytiv: :::c:,). Alcibiades conrms that he is in
love when he says that Socrates deceives people into thinking that Socrates
is a lover, when he is actually a beloved. In addition to himself, Alcibiades
names Charmides, Glaucon, Euthydemus, Diocles and very many others,
and he warns Agathon against suffering the same fate (:::ab;).
The narrative structure of the dialogue is ideally suited to portraying
the ways in which the philosopher affects others, for the reader is always
aware of seeing Socrates through the eyes of the narrators on whom he has
these powerful emotional effects. This structure, however, also contributes
to the difculties of interpretation, for each of the narrators has a different
point of view, and none is represented as completely reliable. In particular,
and as Apollodorus readily admits, neither Apollodorus nor Aristodemus
provides a narrative that is complete, accurate and objective: All that each
person said, Aristodemus did not entirely remember, nor did I remember all
that he said. But I will tell you what he remembered best, and what seemed
to me most worth remembering in the speech of each person (:;a:,).
:c
Apollodorus claims to have veried Aristodemus report: I asked Socrates
about some of the things that I heard from him [Aristodemus], and he
agreed that it was as he [Aristodemus] said (:;,b,o). This very statement,
however, is an admission of bias, for Apollodorus asked Socrates about
only some of the things that happened at Agathons symposium, and he
questioned Socrates only about what Aristodemus said, without attempting
to ll in the gaps in this story. Apollodorus apparently did not, for example,
ask Socrates about the speeches that occurred between those of Phaedrus
and Pausanias, that is, the speeches, given by some other people, that
Aristodemus did not entirely remember (:cc::), or about Socrates
nal discussion, during most of which Aristodemus was asleep (::,bd:).
In addition to being selective and forgetful, Apollodorus and Aristode-
mus are also represented as biased due to their individual natures and ways
:c
I discuss these two narrators in greater detail in Belore :,.
Introduction to Part II: the narrators of the Symposium ::,
of imitating Socrates.
::
Apollodorus shows himself to be disdainful and
quarrelsome in the introductory section of the dialogue. He tells Glaucon
that, before becoming a follower of Socrates, he, Apollodorus, used to be
more wretched than anyone, no less than you are now (:;,a:). His low
opinion of others is also evident in his statement that he enjoys exceed-
ingly (ottpquc, c, ycipc) hearing speeches about philosophy, and that
when he hears other kinds of speeches, especially those of wealthy money-
makers, he is annoyed (cycuci) and feels pity for the speakers (:;,c:;).
Apollodorus is, paradoxically, very condent that his recognition of his
own defects makes him superior to others: Perhaps you believe that I am
unfortunate, and I think that you are right. But I do not just think that
you are unfortunate, I know it well (:;,d:,). That Apollodorus uses the
elenchus in a combative way is evident in the exchange at :;,de. Accord-
ing to the unnamed Companion, Apollodorus reviles (scsn,cpt,) and is
harsh to (,picivti,) himself and all others except Socrates (:;,d:c).
My very dear friend, Apollodorus replies, is it clear that I am mad and
out of my senses to have this opinion about myself and you? The Com-
panion responds: Its not right to quarrel [tpitiv] now about these things,
Apollodorus. Apollodorus appears, then, to be like the young imitators
of Socrates mentioned in the Apology, who lack real understanding, but
take pleasure in listening to Socrates public refutations and in engaging in
these activities themselves (:,c:o, cf. Resp. ;.,,,b:o).
::
Aristodemus is a different kind of imitator of Socrates. He is a lover
or fan (erastes), not of wisdom, but of Socrates (:;,b,), and we know
from ::,d:c that he makes a practice of following Socrates about.
:,
He
even imitates the philosopher in going unshod (:;,b:, :;a,, ::cbo).
Aristodemus is small (:;,b:), and his low social status corresponds to
his physical stature. Aristodemus inferior social status is suggested by the
fact that he needs to be described in detail (:;,b::), unlike the well-
known gures Agathon and Alcibiades, and by the fact that he does not
make a speech and is otherwise ignored by the others.
:
That Aristodemus
has a low opinion of his own social and intellectual status is apparent
::
The view of Osborne (:,,: o:c:) that the two narrators are philosophical guides is refuted by
G. A. Scott :ccc: , ::,, :c: n.;, and Scott and Welton :cc: :,:. On the two narrators see
also Arieti :,,:: ,o;, :c;; Babut :,c; Blondell :cco: :;,:; Blundell :,,:: :,:; Corrigan and
Glazov-Corrigan :cc: :; Halperin :,,:; Hunter :cc: :,; Kofman :cc:: ; Nightingale
:,,,: ::;:; Penwill :,;: :oo;.
::
On Apollodorus in Plato and in the Socratic literature see Burnet :,::, on Phd. ,,a,; Nails :cc::
,,c; de Vries :,,,.
:,
On lovers as fans see Davidson :cc;: :o.
:
These characteristics of Aristodemus are noted by Rowe :,,, on :;,b:,, and :cc:.
::o Part II Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
from his statement that, in going to Agathons party uninvited, he will
be an inferior man going to visit a wise man (qc0c, cv tti ocqc0
vopc,: :;c;). Moreover, the fact that he goes to the symposiumuninvited
(csn:c,: :;b:, c;, c) by his host, and is put in the ridiculous (,tccv:
:;e:) position of arriving without Socrates, who invited him, would
have reminded Platos audience of the akletoi, the uninvited hangers-on of
inferior social, physical and ethical status, who earned a dinner by providing
comic entertainment for the invited guests.
:,
Instead of imitating Socrates
by using the elenchus in a combative way, as Apollodorus does (:;,e),
Aristodemus yields to Socrates authority, telling him, Ill do whatever
you order (:;b:), and instead of defending himself against the charge of
being an uninvited guest, he asks Socrates to do this for him (:;c;d:). In
keeping with his humble opinion of himself, Aristodemus, unlike Agathon,
Alcibiades and the very many others Alcibiades mentions (:::ab,),
never aspires to be an er omenos of Socrates, but is represented from the
beginning as an erastes.
Apollodorus and Aristodemus, then, are unreliable narrators, who imi-
tate Socrates words and deeds but are not able to acquire the erotic art
that is essential to his practice of philosophy. The stories told by these
narrators, and by the narrators within their narratives, serve to remind the
reader that the dialogue cannot be accepted as an historically accurate tran-
scription of what Socrates said and did (:;:co), that it is ction, and that
it requires critical evaluation.
:o
Part II analyzes these puzzling narrations of
what Socrates says and does (:;:co), rst, in Chapter ,, by contrasting
Socrates with the rst ve speakers, and then, in Chapter , focusing on
his interactions with Agathon and Alcibiades.
:,
Akletoi: Fehr :,,c; Halliwell :cc: :,; Wilkins :ccc: ;:o.
:o
Clay :ccc: ,:, writes that the narrative framework suggests that the memory of Socrates cannot be
independent of the character of his memorialist.
chapter 3
In praise of Eros: the speeches in the Symposium
3.1 victories in words
The Symposium is set within the context of a number of competitions.
At a symposium honoring Agathons victory in a dramatic competition
(:;,a,o), six speakers compete in praising Eros, and a seventh, Alcibiades,
praises Socrates. Before this competition begins, Agathon says that he and
Socrates will soon be judged by Dionysus concerning their wisdom (sophia:
:;,e;,). Socrates is explicitly represented as winning a victory not just
once but six times.
:
First, like Perseus killing the Gorgon, he overcomes
the Gorgianic power of Agathons words that threaten to reduce him to
silence (:,b:c,). Second, he defeats Agathon in an elenchus, at the end
of which the poet admits his own lack of wisdom (:,,c,:c:c,). Socrates
is awarded a third victory by Alcibiades, who crowns him, declaring that
this man wins the victory in words over all people, not just the other day,
like you [sc. Agathon], but always (::,e:o). At the end of the Symposium,
Socrates wins two more victories in words. He wins a fourth victory by
persuading Agathon, the most beautiful man present, to sit beside him in
order to receive Socrates praise (::,a,,). And in a fth victory, Socrates
compels Agathon, the tragedian, and Aristophanes, the comic poet, to
agree that a comic poet who has skill also knows how to compose tragedies
(::,cdo).
Most importantly, Socrates wins a sixth victory in the competition
(n,cvioci: :,a:) in praising Eros proposed by Eryximachus (:;;a:d,).
That his speech is the best is not explicitly stated in the dialogue. There are,
however, several indications that Socrates in fact wins the victory. For one
thing, his speech receives the most enthusiastic responses from the other
symposiasts. After Phaedrus speech, we are merely told that Pausanias
:
I discuss some of these victories in detail below. Socrates rst victory is the subject of ,.,.: below,
his second that of Chapter at .,, and his fourth and fth victories are analyzed in .,. Socrates
sixth victory is discussed throughout Chapter ,.
::;
:: Part II Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
criticized Phaedrus view that there is only one Eros (:cc:d:), while Pau-
sanias own speech is followed by Eryximachus criticism of the last part of
this speech (:,eo:oa:). Eryximachus speech is accompanied by Aristo-
phanes comic attempts to stop his own hiccups (:,ce,) and followed
by Aristophanes jokes about this speech (:,a:b:). Aristophanes speech
receives only slightly better treatment, for Eryximachus, after politely say-
ing that it was pleasantly spoken, states that he knows that the next speakers,
Agathon and Socrates, will not be at a loss since they are marvelously skilled
in ta er otika (:,,e,;). Agathons speech receives applause (vccpuoci)
fromeveryone for having been spoken appropriately (tpttcv:c,: :,a:
,). Socrates, however, suggests that this speech, like all the others, paid no
attention to the truth (:,d,e). He then praises the beginning of the
speech (:,,c,o), but goes on to demonstrate that Agathon did not know
what he was talking about, an assessment with which Agathon himself
agrees (:c:b,::). Socrates speech receives by far the most positive reac-
tions, for everyone except Aristophanes is said to praise it (ttcivtv:
:::c). This verb and its cognates are used, signicantly, to characterize
the praises of Eros that the speakers give (for example, :;;b,, o, d:; :,d;;
:,,a,). Aristophanes does not join in praising Socrates speech because
he is about to discuss a point that Socrates made about Aristophanes
speech (:::co). He is, however, interrupted by the entrance of Alci-
biades, who gives Socrates part of the victory crown he had intended for
Agathon, declaring the philosopher to be the victor in words, not just on
one occasion, but over all people at all times (::,deo).
Socrates is represented as winning these victories because he really has
marvelous skill concerning ta er otika, in contrast to the other speakers, who
falsely claim to have expert knowledge that they lack. The rst ve speakers
Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes and Agathon all claim
to be experts on er os, each according to his own kind of skill.
:
Aristophanes
tacitly accepts Socrates statement that Aristophanes whole occupation
is concerned with Dionysus and Aphrodite (:;;e::), and he prefaces his
speech by saying that his audience must learn from him and teach others
(:,d,o). Phaedrus and Pausanias discuss the role of er os in political virtue,
stressing military and intellectual virtue respectively (:;e,:;,b,, ::a;
d, :ce). They claim to have superior knowledge in these areas when
they condently make long speeches and criticize the views of others. The
:
Bacon :,,,: :, writes that each man sees love in terms of his own profession; Reeve :,,:: ,: views
the speakers as representatives of conventional wisdom. Scott and Welton :cc: , hold that each
speech is an expression of one kind of love. Shefeld :ccoa: ::,:o n., argues convincingly that
each of the rst ve speakers can be associated with one of the Muses.
In praise of Eros: the speeches in the Symposium ::,
physician Eryximachus speaks as an expert when he argues that medicine
is an erotic science (:oc,e,), as does the tragedian Agathon, when he
contends that the god Eros is a wise (sophos) poet, who is able to make
others wise also (:,oe:,).
Each of these speakers happens to make some good points about er os,
as scholars have often noted.
,
However, because they do not examine
their claims critically, each is in fact characterized by amathia, lack of
understanding, about er os. According to Socrates Diotima, amathia is the
condition of someone who is not ne and good or wise [phronimos] but
thinks that he is adequate in these respects (:cao).
Socrates remarks
after Agathons speech indicate that he believes that all the speakers have
exhibited this amathia. He says that all of the previous speakers
,
seem
to have thought that the task set by Eryximachus was to represent Eros
so that he might appear to be as beautiful and good as possible [c,
sio:c, sci cpio:c,], to the ignorant, clearly certainly not to those
who know (:,eo:,,a:). This comment refers most immediately to
Agathons statement that Eros is most beautiful and best (sio:c, sci
cpio:c,: :,;c:, :,,a;), but it is a criticism of the other speeches as well,
each of which represents Eros as the best and most beautiful of the gods.
This view of Eros, as Socrates will show in his speech, is a result of amathia.
In addition to Socrates explicit criticism of these speeches, Plato uses other
techniques to portray the rst ve speakers as lacking understanding. Their
speeches contain internal inconsistencies, make a selective and uncritical
use of literary authority, and fail to give an adequate account of the good
things they claim Eros gives to humans.
Socrates, like the other speakers, represents himself as having skill con-
cerning er os. He says that he knows nothing except ta er otika (:;;d;),
and claims to be marvelously skilled in these matters (:,d::). He also
claims to have learned about er os from a wise woman (sophe), Diotima
(:c:d:,). Socrates claims, however, are justied by his possession of the
erotic art. Socrates is wiser than his competitors because he does not lack
understanding, but recognizes that he lacks wisdom (,vct: ::od,). He
,
Detel :cc, (,, with bibliographical survey n.:) and Shefeld :ccoa (:,,, and :c;:, with
bibliographical survey ::: n.:) and :ccob discuss the positive contributions of all of the speeches.
Friedl ander :,o,: :, and Sedley :cco emphasize Agathons speech in particular.
For amathia as lack of understanding see LSJ, Supplement s.v. ucn,. Plato does not always use
the term in this sense, however. Brickhouse and Smith :,,: ::o n.: point out that Socrates uses it
of his own ignorance at Grg. a,, and I note in Introduction to Part III n.:, that he also uses it
in this sense at Phdr. :,,c:. On the comic aspects of the speakers false conceit of wisdom see
Patterson :,:: esp. ,c (quotation: :).
,
This is suggested by each of us at :,e,. Plurals are also used at :,e,, eo.
::c Part II Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
demonstrates this component of the erotic art (component (:)), not only
by criticizing the false pretense to wisdom of the other speakers, but also
when he suggests, in part through his characterization of Diotima, that
he did not acquire wisdom from Diotima in the form of truths contained
in a body of teachings that are to be accepted without critical examina-
tion. Socrates speech also exhibits the other four components of his erotic
art, especially (,): his marvelous skill in persuading his audience to devote
themselves to ta er otika, to recognize their own lack of wisdom and other
good things, to desire these things passionately, and to seek to attain as
much of them as they can. In making a speech that appeals to each of the
self-styled experts with whom he competes, Socrates uses his daimonic
art very effectively to persuade his audience that the philosopher-daim on
Eros described by Diotima is the best helper for humans (:::b:).
3.2 the first five speakers: the best and most
beautiful of the gods
3.2.1 The symposiasts and the poets
One way in which each of the rst ve speakers exhibits amathia is by
appealing uncritically to the Greek literary tradition, especially poetry.
o
This tradition is explicitly mentioned at the moment when the contest in
making speeches about Eros is proposed. After the initial sparring between
Socrates and Agathon (:;,c;e:c), the guests dine and agree to drink
only as much as each man pleases (:;oa:eo). The physician Eryximachus
then makes a proposal about the kind of entertainment they will enjoy:
I propose that we let the aulos-player who just now came in go and
pipe to herself or, if she wishes, to the women inside, and that today
we spend our time with each other in talk (:;oeo,). After all of the
guests enthusiastically agree to decline the womans services, Eryximachus
proposes, specically, that they compete in praising the god Eros (:;;a:
d,). In proposing Eros as a topic for competitive speaking, Eryximachus
reports the complaint of Phaedrus that neither poets nor prose writers have
yet made an encomiumof Eros (:;;a,b:). Prodicus, Phaedrus said, praised
Heracles,
;
and another man praised salt for its usefulness, but no one has
o
As far as I know, this aspect of the theme of rivalry between poetry and philosophy in the Symposium
has never been discussed. A good, recent account of this theme from another perspective is that of
Scott and Welton :cc: esp. ,,,, :,:,, ::: and :,:,.
;
Bury :,,:, on :;;b, notes that Prodicus story about Heracles choice of Virtue is recounted in Xen.
Mem. :.:.::ff.
In praise of Eros: the speeches in the Symposium :::
adequately praised Eros (:;;b:c). The salt example suggests that the kind
of encomium Phaedrus and Eryximachus have in mind is one that praises
something or someone for qualities that are useful to humans. Phaedrus
complaint, then, while perhaps an exaggeration, is an accurate reection
of much of Greek literature, in which er os is often represented as more to
be feared than praised, a destructive force causing sickness and madness.
Eros is also frequently associated with hybris, a term that has connotations
of violence, lust and dishonor.
,
There are indeed hymns to Eros in tragedy
that are encomiastic in that they represent the god as a powerful force.
:c
In
another respect, however, these passages are not encomia, for they attribute
to Eros a power destructive to human beings. In Sophocles Antigone, Eros
is addressed in these terms: You who make unjust the minds of even just
people, to their ruin, you have stirred up this quarrel of kindred men (Ant.
;,:), and in Euripides Hippolytus the god is called: Eros, the tyrant
of men . . . destroying mortals and sending all misfortunes to them when
he comes (Hipp. ,,:). In giving his encomium, then, each speaker is
asked to remedy what is presented as a deciency in the literary tradition,
by praising Eros for the good things he gives to humans.
One way in which the rst ve speakers do this is by their use of
quotations and allusions to show that, even if the poets and prose writers
have not made formal encomia of Eros, their works do in fact praise the god
for his benecence. Despite having agreed to entertain one another with
their own words and to dispense with the musical entertainment provided
by another person, the aulos-player, each of the rst ve speakers in effect
invites others to speak for him when he quotes extensively from poets and
prose writers.
::
The symposiasts competitive use of quotations is itself a
traditional sympotic game, and an activity at which Platos Socrates excels,
as will be seen below ,.,.:.
::
In the context of the Symposium, however,
Numerous examples, especially in archaic poetry, are given by Calame :,,, and Cyrino :,,,.
,
Examples of the association of er os with hybris are given by Fisher :,,:: esp. :c::; Lattimore :,o,:
:, and :: n.:; and MacDowell :,;o: :;. On hybris and violence see Lattimore :,o,: :,. Hybris
and dishonor are discussed in Chapter at .:.
:c
Sophocles Antigone ;:[c:] and Euripides Hippolytus ,:,[,o] are cited by Bury :,,:: :,. Cf.
Soph. Trach. :,, where Eros is said to be a sickness and to rule gods and humans. In lyric poetry,
Alcaeus (frag. ,:; Voigt :,;: = Lobel and Page :,,,) characterizes Eros as otivc:c:cv (most
terrible) without attributing benecence to the god (cited by Rowe :,,, on :;;b::). Friedl ander
:,o,: :c cites evidence for the worship of Eros.
::
Brandwood :,;o: ,,::cc, provides a useful Index of Quotations in Plato, although it has
limitations noted by Halliwell :ccc: ,, n.. Brownson :,:c: ::;, and Tables: :,,o, collects
and discusses Platos quotations of and references to the poets. Tarrant :,,: is also helpful. A good
survey of each speakers use of rhetorical gures is given by Brisson :,,: ,,:.
::
See Halliwell :ccc on the general Greek practice of invoking and citing poetic texts to formulate,
illustrate, or reinforce a point of view (,,), and on Platos portrayal of and reaction to this practice.
::: Part II Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
the reliance on, and selective use of, quotations and allusions by the rst
ve speakers reveal not only their own lack of understanding about er os,
but also the inadequacies of the Greek literary tradition itself. When the
symposiasts quote or cite literary works without examining critically the
views these authorities express, they implicitly claimexpertise they do not
in fact have. Poetry is itself full of contradictions.
:,
Moreover, as Socrates
notes in the Protagoras, it is not possible to question the poets, whose
works can be interpreted in different ways by different people. To quote
poetry, he says, is to act like inferior people who invite aulos-players to their
symposia.
:
The rst ve speakers, then, demonstrate not only their own
amathia, but also the accuracy of this assessment of the poets and other
literary authorities.
3.2.2 Phaedrus: courage
According to Phaedrus, Eros is a great god (:;a;) who is the cause of the
greatest goods for us (:;c:,). His encomium follows Greek conventions
in idealizing an asymmetrical relationship between two men, the older
erastes, lover, and the younger er omenos, beloved (:;e::, :cab,).
Eros is a benefactor because he inspires the lover with shame in regard to
shameful things and with love of honor (philotimia) with respect to what is
noble (:;d::, :;eo). Phaedrus is almost exclusively concerned with only
one aspect of Eros: the gods role as a source of courage in facing death either
in battle or in other circumstances.
:,
More specically, courage leads the
lover to protect (:;,ao) or even to die for the beloved (:;,b). Eros inspires
even the most cowardly man with the virtue of courage (tvtcv tcinotit
tpc, pt:nv . . . utvc, tutvt0oci), so that he becomes like someone who
is by nature bravest (:;,a;b,). Phaedrus holds that courage is conducive
to political virtue. An army or city of lovers and beloveds, he says, would be
Competitive quotation of poetry at symposia is discussed by Lissarrague :,,cb: esp. :,,, and in
several of the chapters in Murray :,,c, Lukinovich, esp. :o, Pellizer, esp. :;,c and R osler. Vetta
:,, provides an excellent introduction to the role of poetry in the Greek symposium. Of particular
interest is his discussion of metapoiesis, the correction or transformation of a poem known to an
audience (xxxxxxi).
:,
Halliwell :ccc: :c: cites Laws .;:,ce, Meno ,,d,oa and Prt. ,,,aff. for Platos view that self-
contradiction is a fundamental characteristic of mimetic poetry. Two poets may also contradict each
other. For example, in Platos Lys., Homer and Hesiod are cited in support of opposite views: Lys.
::ao quotes Od. :;.::, on the attraction of like to like, and Lys. ::,c,d: quotes Hesiod, Op. :,o
on their enmity (noted by Vicaire :,oc: :,::).
:
Prt. ,;b,a,, noting that different people have different interpretations of poetry; cf. Phdr.
:;,de,.
:,
Military terminology is used at :;e (o:pc:cttocv), :;,a: (ucycutvci), :;,a, (itcv :iv,
ctc tcccv).
In praise of Eros: the speeches in the Symposium ::,
best governed, for they would refrain from all shameful things and compete
with each other in love of honor (:;e,:;,a:).
:o
There are, however, indications that Phaedrus lacks understanding when
he makes these claims. For one thing, he seriously compromises his own
thesis whenhe attributes the same virtues to the beloved, who is not inspired
by Eros, as he does to the lover, who is so inspired. According to Phaedrus,
the beloved, like the lover, experiences shame and loves honor, and he
ghts courageously in the presence of his lover (:;e::;,a:). The beloved
is even capable of dying for his lover, as Achilles dies to avenge his lover
Patroclus by killing Hector (:;,e::ca).
:;
Indeed, Phaedrus suggests that
the beloved who acts courageously has virtue superior to that of the lover
precisely because he is not inspired by love: [T]he gods . . . marvel and
admire more . . . when the er omenos has affection for the erastes than when
the erastes has affection for his boyfriend. For the erastes is more divine than
the boyfriend, since he is inspired (tvtc, ,p to:i: :ca;b).
:
If the
beloved acts virtuously without the inspiration of Eros, however, it would
appear that the god is not, after all, the cause, or at least the sole cause, of
the greatest goods for us, as Phaedrus claims (:;c:,).
:,
Another weakness in Phaedrus account is that he appeals uncritically
to sources that could also be used to undermine his claims. In support of
his view that Eros is the oldest of the gods, Phaedrus quotes from Hesiod,
Theogony ::o:c: Hesiod says that rst Chaos came to be, but next [came]
broad-breastedEarth, the ever steadfast seat of all things, andLove (:;b,
;). However, he leaves out any negative associations and attributes when he
omits Hesiods reference to Tartarus (::,) and stops just before the poets
lines attributing destructive powers to the god: Love . . . the loosener of
limbs, who overcomes sense and prudent counsel in the breasts of all gods
and humans (Theog. ::::).
:c
Phaedrus also quotes Homer selectively
:o
Bury :,,:, on :;e notes that this principle was exemplied in the sacred band of the Thebans and
cites a parallel in Xenophon, Symp. .,:.
:;
Phaedrus follows Aeschines (:.::: Against Timarchus) and Aeschylus, Myrmidons (frags. ::, ::,
Mette :,,, = :,,, :,o Radt :,,) in representing this relationship as an erotic one, although he
departs from Aeschines in portraying Achilles as the er omenos (noted by Dover :,,: ,, and :,;).
Dover :,c on :ca suggests that Aeschylus may have been the rst to represent Achilles as the
erastes. Unlike Phaedrus, Xenophons Socrates (Symp. .,:) denies that there is an erotic element in
Homers representation of this relationship (Dover :,,: :,,). Davidson :cc;: :,, argues that
the relationship was erotic even in Homer.
:
I borrow the translation boyfriend from Gill :,,,.
:,
Cf. Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan :cc: ,, and Rowe :,,, on :ca;b.
:c
On the omission of :::: cf. Hunter :cc: c:. Theog. ::, is bracketed by Solmsen :,,c and by
Mazon :,,:, who cites Plato in support of the excision. The line is, however, accepted by West :,oo,
and Phaedrus omission of Tartarus is consistent with his omission of Theog. ::::.
:: Part II Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
when he argues that Eros inspires courage in lovers. According to Homer,
says Phaedrus, a god breathed battle-strength into some of the heroes
(:;,b::). Phaedrus, however, omits the name of the god who does this
in Iliad :c.:: Athena, a virgin goddess, whose domain is not er os but
wisdom.
::
The passages omitted by Phaedrus, then, suggest that wisdom is
more desirable than er os. His use of the example of Achilles and Patroclus
reinforces the same idea. In stating that Achilles gave aid to his lover
Patroclus by taking vengeance on Hector (:;,e::ca;), Phaedrus omits
the fact that it was Achilles mistake in judgment that caused Patroclus
death in the rst place. Indeed, Achilles blames himself for his companions
death when he speaks the well-known lines in the Iliad:
I must die soon, then; since I was not to stand by my companion
when he was killed. And now, far away from the land of his fathers,
he has perished, and lacked my ghting strength to defend him.
Now, since I am not going back to the beloved land of my fathers,
since I was no light of safety to Patroklos, nor to my other
companions, who in their numbers went down before glorious Hektor,
but sit here beside my ships, a useless weight on the good land,
I, who am such as no other of the bronze-armoured Achaians
in battle, though there are others also better in council. (Il. :.,:co)
::
According to these lines, courage without wisdom leads to disaster. More-
over, Phaedrus example of Alcestis, the lover who so excelled in philia
[friendship] because of er os (:;,c::) that she was willing to die for her
husband, Admetus, is also questionable. At least in Euripides play, Alcestis
appears to be motivated by philia rather than by er os.
:,
It is instead Adme-
tus who exhibits sexual passion for his wife, saying that he will embrace
a model of her in bed (,,:). Admetus er os does not make him coura-
geous, however. He allows his wife to die for him because he is a coward
(Alc. ,,;), and because of a mistake in judgment that he later recognizes
(cp:i ucvvc: ,c). A more comprehensive survey of the passages Phae-
drus quotes, then, suggests that, according to the very tradition to which
he appeals, the association of er os with courage is a dubious one, and that
er os and courage without judgment lead to disaster. One way in which
Phaedrus shows his amathia, then, is by failing to ask questions about the
relationship between er os and courage represented in these passages.
::
In Il. :,.:o: the phrase is used of Apollo, another god associated with wisdom. References are given
by Bury :,,:, on :;,b.
::
Translation: Lattimore :,,:. Lines :c,o, often suspected, are ably defended by Edwards :,,:.
:,
Noted by Rowe :,,, on :;,b,o. See especially Alc. :;,: onv ,cp qiicv otcutoc (I honor
your friendship).
In praise of Eros: the speeches in the Symposium ::,
3.2.3 Pausanias: education
Pausanias departs from Phaedrus in distinguishing two kinds of Loves and
two kinds of lovers. The inferior lover, governed by the Eros who is the
son of the vulgar Aphrodite, loves women as well as boys, bodies more
than souls, and foolish more than sensible people, being concerned only
with accomplishing the act (::a;bo). The statement that the heavenly
Aphrodite, the mother of the superior Eros, has no part in hybris (0ptc,
ucipcu: ::c) suggests that, in contrast, the inferior Eros and lover are
indeed hubristic. When they are governed by the inferior Eros, both lover
and beloved act shamefully and give rise to negative judgments in others,
who blame this kind of er os and think it shameful for a beloved to yield to
a lover of this kind (::a:,, :,cd,). Pausanias is primarily concerned
with the superior lover, inspired by the superior Eros, who is the son
of the heavenly Aphrodite. This man loves only males, who are by nature
stronger and more sensible (::c:o), and he loves good character (ncu,
ypno:c0: :,e,) more than body. Superior lovers love with the intention
of being together and living in common for life with their beloveds
(::d,,).
Aside frompositing two Loves, Pausanias accepts much of what Phaedrus
says, including the idealization of the relationship between older erastes
and younger er omenos, and the assumption that Eros is a god (:cd,).
Pausanias also agrees with Phaedrus in holding that the superior Eros
inspires virtue. The superior lover educates (tciotuoiv: :e:) the beloved,
who in turn graties his lover sexually (:c;e). Like Phaedrus (see
:;e,:;,a:), Pausanias is concerned with virtue within a civic setting.
He stresses the importance of law and custom, and favorably contrasts
Athens with other cities.
:
Pausanias, however, stresses the intellectual
virtues that are conducive to political virtue, whereas Phaedrus emphasized
love of honor and courage. Pausanias beloved graties the lover in order
to acquire philosophy and other virtues (qicocqicv sci :nv cnv
pt:nv: :d:) or wisdom [phronesis] and other virtues (qpcvnoiv sci
:nv cnv pt:nv: :d;e:).
Closer examination of his speech, however, reveals that Pausanias lacks
those intellectual virtues that he himself emphasizes, for his account of the
two Loves depends on a dubious way of distinguishing noble fromshameful
:
The word vcuc, (law) and cognates appear at ::d;, e,; ::a,, a;, b:, b;, d,, d, e:; :,b, c:, c,,
d,; :a:, ao, b,, b;, c, d, e,. Davidson :cc;: :, provides an insightful analysis of Pausanias
speech as a source of information about distinctively Athenian customs.
::o Part II Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
acts.
:,
Pausanias states that an act is not noble or shameful in itself, but
that it is noble if done well, shameful if done shamefully (:ce::a;
:,do). He also claims that it is noble to do anything whatsoever for the
sake of virtue (:,b:,). These statements entail that superior lovers who
act for the sake of virtue can act nobly even while engaging in activities
that would be thought shameful in other circumstances. They can, for
example, resort to entreaties, swear oaths, lie in doorways (:,ao) and
in other ways endure a kind of voluntary slavery (:,ao;, :b;c:).
According to Pausanias, superior beloveds, like their lovers, can also act
nobly even while doing things that might appear to be shameful. Pausanias
holds that it is right for the beloved to endure even voluntary slavery in
gratifying the lover (:c:;), and to serve him in any way whatsoever
if the beloved will thereby become wise [sophos] and good (:d,;).
:o
Even if the beloved is deceived and his lover turns out to be a bad man, his
deception is a noble one (scn n t:n), for he has shown that for the
sake of virtue he is ready to do anything for anyone (tv . . . tcv:i), and to
do anything in any way (tv tv:c,: :,a,b,). These last statements in
particular, with their repetition of any, can be taken to imply that license
is justied if it promotes virtue.
:;
They thus risk collapsing Pausanias
distinction between the vulgar Eros and the heavenly Eros. At the very
least, their phrasing suggests that Pausanias views need to be supported
further. Pausanias also shows his own lack of understanding about er os in
another way. According to his account, one kind of lover is superior because
he is able to educate his beloved, by giving him wisdom (phronesis) and the
other virtues (:c;e). What really distinguishes the superior from the
inferior lover, then, is not er os of a certain kind, but virtue and wisdom.
Like Phaedrus, Pausanias uses quotations to support his criticism of
the inferior lover, whose oaths are no oaths (:,b;) and who goes ying
away (:,e,).
:
In referring to the genealogies of the two Aphrodites, the
heavenly and the vulgar (:cdoe:, ::bc), who are the mothers of the
two Loves, Pausanias does not name his sources, but his fellow symposiasts
would have recognized them as Hesiod and Homer.
:,
:,
Bury :,,:: xxvixxvii notes that Pausanias is sophistic in taking the side of law against nature, and
in being inconsistent and self-contradictory.
:o
In contrast, Socrates in Euthydemus ::b,o restricts the slavery of the beloved to noble service:
c:ic0v . . . otnpt:tv :cv sccv otnpt:nu:cv.
:;
Cf. Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan :cc: oc:; Nichols :cc,: :,; Rosen :,;: ::; and Rowe
:,,, on :,b,.
:
Bury :,,: notes that the statement at :,b; is a proverbial expression with a number of poetic
versions and that :,e, recalls Il. :.;:.
:,
Dover :,c, on:cdo, cites Hesiod Theog. :,cff. (daughter of Ouranos) and Il. ,.,;c,c (daughter
of Zeus and Dione).
In praise of Eros: the speeches in the Symposium ::;
Pausanias also resembles Phaedrus in using literary sources selectively,
omitting those lines that tell against his distinction between the two Loves.
Specically, he omits important details of the Hesiodic account of the birth
of Ouranian (Heavenly) Aphrodite. According to Hesiods well-known
story, Ouranos hates the children Gaia bears him and hides them deep
within her, causing her pain. Gaia then persuades her son, Cronos, to
castrate his father, and Aphrodite grows fromthe severed genitals (Theogony
:,:cc). The circumstances surrounding Aphrodites birth in Hesiods
poem might well lead Pausanias audience to question his view that she
has no share in hybris (::c). The outrage Ouranos commits against
Gaia could be considered hubristic, as could Cronos dishonoring violence
against Ouranos. Hesiods Aphrodite, then, does share in hybris, at least in
so far as her birth is the result of hubristic acts by her father and brother.
,c
Pausanias also fails to mention Hesiods statement that deceit is included
in Aphrodites portion (ucpcv . . . tct:c,: Theog. :c,,). Nevertheless,
his contention that the superior beloved may be deceived (t:n: :,b:,
cf. :,a:, a;) might well remind his audience of this characteristic, of
dubious morality, attributed by Hesiod to the heavenly Aphrodite. The
Greek literary tradition to which Pausanias appeals, then, suggests that the
son of the heavenly Aphrodite may, like his mother, have some share in
hybris and deceit. If this is so, the superior Eros may not be very different
from the inferior Eros, the son of the vulgar Aphrodite. It appears, then,
that the literary sources to which Pausanias appeals could equally well be
used to support the view that there is no distinction between the two
Loves. His selective and uncritical use of these sources is one indication
that Pausanias lacks understanding of his subject.
3.2.4 Eryximachus: medicine
The physician Eryximachus agrees with Pausanias in holding that Eros
is a god (:ob:) who is double (:oa:,) and in idealizing the Eros
who inspires virtue and lacks hybris. The common association in Greek
literature of er os and hybris is downplayed in both of these encomia of
a non-hubristic Eros.
,:
The physician also resembles his predecessor in
failing to give adequate criteria for distinguishing the two Loves, thereby
demonstrating his lack of understanding in the very eld in which he
claims expertise.
,c
The circumstances of ones birth were thought to inuence character. For example, in Platos Laws
;;,de:, the Athenian states that people who commit hybris or injustice before conception stamp
these effects upon the souls of their children.
,:
For the association see above n.,.
:: Part II Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
Eryximachus distinguishes the noble, heavenly (:;d;) and orderly
(:a,, c,) Eros, who acts with s ophrosyne (moderation) and justice (:d,
o) from the shameful (:od:) and vulgar Eros (tvonuc,: :;e:), who is
hubristic and unjust (c ut:c :, 0ptc, Lpc, . . . noisnotv: :a;). He
does not limit the gods effects to human relationships, a topic he mentions
only briey (:oa,), holding instead that Eros has power over all human
and divine affairs (:ob::), and over medicine in particular (:oe:;a:).
The hubristic Eros produces greed and disorder, plagues, diseases of ani-
mals and plants, and bad weather (:a;b,), while the noble Eros creates
philia and community (scivcvic: :c:) among humans, and between
humans and gods (:bod,). Medicine is the science of distinguishing
(oic,i,vcoscv) the noble from the shameful er os in the case of the body,
and the most accomplished physician is someone who knows how to cre-
ate the former instead of the latter (:oc,d,).
,:
Other sciences music,
gymnastics, agriculture (:;a:) and divination (:b;) know how to do
this with respect to other things.
Far from telling us how to distinguish the noble from the shameful er os,
however, Eryximachus does not even explain why the shameful er os should
be called er os at all, rather thanhostility. The science of medicine knows how
to make things that are most hostile (tyio:c cv:c), that is, the opposites
in the body (for example, the cold, the hot, the wet and the dry), become
friends and have er os for one another (:od,e:). Similarly, the science of
music knows how to produce er os and agreement (:;c,) between high
and low sounds that were formerly in disagreement (:;ab:). In both
cases, then, the skilled physician does not replace a shameful with a noble
er os, but rather produces er os instead of hostility and disagreement. The
doctor adds further confusion when he recommends making judicious
use of the vulgar and shameful Eros: One must take care in applying
this Eros to those to whom one does apply him, so as to provide benet
from the pleasure he brings without producing licentiousness (:;e:,).
In making this surprising concession to the shameful Eros, Eryximachus
fails to distinguish science from the shameful gratication of appetite,
and undercuts his own fundamental distinction between the noble and
the hubristic er os.
,,
It seems, then, that because Eryximachus does not
,:
In this passage, oic,i,vcoscv (cf. :;c;) is used almost in the technical sense of making a medical
diagnosis (Bury :,,:, on :oc).
,,
Cf. Rosen :,;: ::,:o. Attempts to justify Eryximachus statement do not satisfy. Konstan and
Young-Bruehl :,:: : write: It is permissible . . . to take advantage of the baneful desires, so long
as they are not permitted to gain the upper hand. Rowe :,,, on :;e:: (cf. :,,,b: o:) argues
that Eryximachus addresses Aristophanes and refers to comedy.
In praise of Eros: the speeches in the Symposium ::,
have the knowledge that would enable him to make an accurate diagnosis
by distinguishing the noble from the shameful er os, he is not a good
physician, according to his own denition (:oc;d:). Moreover, his failure
to recognize that he is ignorant in these matters is an indication of his
amathia.
,
In support of his views about music, Eryximachus does not, like his
predecessors, appeal to poetic authority, but instead quotes the prose of the
philosopher Heraclitus. Music, he says, is governed by Eros:
as perhaps Heraclitus means to say, although he doesnt say it well with his words.
He says that the one being at variance with itself agrees with itself, like the
harmony of bow and lyre [oicqtpcutvcv co:c co: ouuqtptoci, cottp
cpucvicv :ccu :t sci pc,]. It is very illogical to say that harmony is at
variance or is composed of elements that are still at variance. But perhaps this is
what he meant to say: that harmony has come into existence, by means of musical
skill, from things that were previously at variance (that is, the high and the low)
and then later came to be in accord. (:;a,b:)
The text of the Heraclitus passage quoted by Eryximachus is problematic.
Fragment :: B,: DK reads: they do not understand how, being at variance
with itself it is in accord [homologeei] with itself; there is a back-turned [pal-
intropos] harmony like that of bow and lyre.
,,
Kirk, Raven and Schoeld
(:,,,), on the other hand, read sumpheretai (agrees) instead of homolo-
geei (is in accord with) on the basis of Symposium :;a,, and they read
palintonos (back-stretched or counter-stretched) instead of palintropos
(back-turned). They translate: being at variance it agrees [sumpheretai]
with itself . . . there is a back-stretched [palintonos] connexion, as in the
bow and the lyre.
,o
They convincingly argue that palintonos, which has
as much support in ancient sources as does palintropos, gives better sense,
referring to something tending equally in opposite directions. A tension
in one direction automatically produces an equivalent tension in the other;
if not, the system collapses.
,;
The texts of both DK and Kirk, Raven and
Schoeld, then, indicate that Eryximachus misquotes Heraclitus, adding
the one before being at variance, and leaving out back-stretched
,
McPherran :cco argues that Eryximachus speech is philosophical in that it places er os within the
context of the universal. He does not, however, address the concerns noted above.
,,
co uvioiv csc, oicqtpcutvcv tcu:ci cucc,tti tcivtpctc, cpucvin cscottp :ccu sci
pn,.
,o
Kirk, Raven and Schoeld :,,,: :,:, frag. :c,: co uvioiv csc, oicqtpcutvcv tcu:uuqtpt:ci
tciv:cvc, cpucvin cscottp :ccu sci pn,.
,;
Kirk, Raven and Schoeld :,,,: :,:,; quotation: :,, n.:.
:,c Part II Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
(or back-turned).
,
The addition is of little signicance for present pur-
poses, but the omission, as will be seen below, has serious philosophical
consequences.
The doctor not only misquotes, but also radically misinterprets
Heraclitus.
,,
One problem is that Eryximachus is concerned with harmony
between musical notes, while Heraclitus focuses on the very different kind
of equilibrium that exists within a single physical object.
c
Heraclitus pal-
intonos harmonia is a back-stretched connection in which two opposite
tensions that produced by the strings of a bow or lyre and that produced
by the curved arms of these artifacts are balanced so as to create a sin-
gle unied effect.
:
According to Heraclitus, this kind of war and strife
between opposites produces order in the cosmos: One must knowthat war
is common and justice is strife, and all things happen according to strife
and necessity (DK :: Bc). Eryximachus, however, calls this principle
of equilibrium of opposites very illogical (:;ao;), and he reinterprets
Heraclitus so as to eliminate it. What Heraclitus really means, according
to Eryximachus, is that a harmony cannot exist where there is variance. He
then uses his corrected version of Heraclitus to support his own view that
medicine and music produce er os, friendship and harmony between things
that were previously enemies and in disagreement (:oc,:;c,).
Eryximachus correctionof Heraclitus contains playful elements.
:
How-
ever, it can also be taken as symptomatic of this physicians lack of under-
standing of his own science (episteme: :oco) of medicine. There is con-
siderable evidence that many medical writers, from Alcmaeon on, held a
Heraclitean view of health as a krasis (blend) of opposing powers in the
body (for example, the hot, the cold, the wet and the dry). In this dynamic
equilibrium, no opposite was suppressed: it retained its own power, but
was restrained by the corresponding opposite.
,
The fact that Eryximachus
simply calls this theory illogical and omits the word back-stretched,
which characterizes the kind of harmony constituted by a dynamic
,
DK vol. i, :o: n., note Dielss suggestion that cucc,t tv (the one agrees) is a possible reading,
quoting Symp. :;a.
,,
Pace McPherran :cco: c, who provides (n.:;) helpful bibliography on the issue.
c
Cf. Konstan and Young-Bruehl :,:: :; Nehamas and Woodruff :,,: :: n.:.
:
I follow Kirk, Raven and Schoeld :,,,: :,:,.
:
Hunter :cc: ,,,, and Rowe :,,,b: o: and n.,.
,
Alcmaeon, DK : B. On ancient medicine see Vlastos :,;: esp. :,o, citing Alcmaeon, and
Tracy :,o,: ::;o: esp. :, and o;: Health . . . is . . . a dynamic equilibrium maintained through
the active interplay of opposing forces (:: emphasis in original). I argue in Belore :,o, :cco
and Chapter o at o. that psychological health is also said to depend on an equilibrium of opposites
in Platos dialogues.
In praise of Eros: the speeches in the Symposium :,:
equilibrium, suggests that Eryximachus has neither the medical knowl-
edge he claims, nor an adequate understanding of Heraclitus.
Another indication of Eryximachus lack of understanding is provided
within the dramatic framework by Aristophanes, who was prevented by
the hiccups from speaking in his proper turn. Throughout Eryximachus
speech, Aristophanes hiccups and applies the remedies prescribed by the
doctor: holding his breath, gargling with water, and tickling his nose in
order to sneeze (:,doe,). When he nally stops, after applying all of
these cures, he remarks that he is surprised that the orderliness of the body
desires such noises and ticklings (:e:,ao). In actions and words, then,
Aristophanes ridicules (,tc:ctcit,: :,a) the doctors speech.
On the hiccups see Bury :,,:: xxiixxiii; Clay :,;,: :::; Lowenstam :,o; Plochmann :,;:: ,,;
Scott and Welton :cc: ,;; and Wardy :cc:: :,:c.
,
Translation: Bury :,,:, on tti :c tp,c (:,:c).
:,: Part II Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
these matters due to frustrated desire, as was the case before Zeus made
sexual intercourse possible (:,:ab:). Eros also contributes to political life,
according to Aristophanes, for boys who enjoy embracing men are the only
ones who turn to political affairs in later life. These boys, he says, are not
shameless, but brave and manly (:,:a:;).
o
Aristophanes Eros, then, like
the Eros of Phaedrus, is a single entity having nothing to do with shame,
instead of being a double god, like the Eros of Pausanias and Eryximachus.
Aristophanes begins his speech by explicitly claiming to have supe-
rior knowledge of Eros. Because people have entirely failed to recognize
the power of er os (:,c,), Aristophanes says, he will try to initiate the
symposiasts into an understanding of this power.
;
They in turn will be
teachers (oiooscci) of others if they rst learn (uctv) from Aristo-
phanes (:,d,o). In using the term didaskaloi (teachers), Aristophanes
elevates his own art, for the term can also mean producers or trainers of
a dramatic chorus.
See, for example, the essays in Gonzalez :,,,c and Press :ccc.
,
The last point is made by Blondell :cco: :,:.
o
Cf. Shefeld :ccoa: ,o.
;
David Leitao, in correspondence, called my attention to the fact that, in being childless, Diotima
is unlike the midwife of Platos Tht. :,bc,. On the issue of Diotimas childlessness see Hobbs
:cco: :o,. Plato may have had good reasons for making Diotima a woman (Halperin :,,c;
Saxonhouse :,: :,::; and Sier :,,;: :c::), but her gender raises many questions. Arieti :,,::
:c, calls the introduction of Diotima subversive. Gill :,,,: xxix remarks that Platos use of this
gure is paradoxical and surprising.
In praise of Eros: the speeches in the Symposium :,
one should not expect profound philosophy.
You must see in me some extraordinary beauty, and entirely superior to your own
ne form. If you do see this and are trying to get a share of it, exchanging beauty
for beauty, you intend to cheat me not a little. Youre trying to pay for true beauty
with its appearance, and what you really have in mind is an exchange of gold for
bronze. But, my good friend, take a better look, so that you dont fail to notice
whether Im worth nothing. (::e:::,a:)
Just as Socrates disdains Agathons ability to speak beautifully, so he disdains
that of which Alcibiades is most proud: his physical beauty. And just as
Socrates tells Agathon that physical proximity cannot convey wisdom, so
he does not accept Alcibiades offer to enter into a conventional erotic-
educational relationship by giving sexual favors in exchange for wisdom.
The philosopher not only shows that he thinks little of Alcibiades physical
beauty, he also suggests that Alcibiades is trying to cheat him by exchanging
his bronze for Socrates gold, and that the young man is so lacking in
mental insight that he cannot see that Socrates may be lacking in beauty
of mind. Like Agathon, Alcibiades does not understand the self-mockery
that is contained in Socrates suggestion that he, Socrates, may be worth
,
Cf. Babut :,c: :;. Tarrant :,, suggests that Plato appeals to a common belief in inuence by
touch.
On the meaning of eir onik os, often translated as ironically, see below .o, and n.o:.
:; Part II Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
nothing. Socrates disdainful behavior leads Alcibiades, like Agathon, to
accuse Socrates of hybris (opio:n, t: ::,b;), and just as Agathon says
that he and Socrates will be judged by Dionysus (:;,e;,), so Alcibiades
brings Socrates to trial before a jury of the symposiasts (::,c:o).
Alcibiades accuses Socrates of hybris in large part because of the sexual
humiliation he believes that the philosopher inicts.
,
The young man
behaves like both the lover and the beloved of convention in his attempted
seduction of Socrates, and is frustrated in both roles. In Alcibiades story, he
challenges (tpcusccunv: ::;c:
o
), attacks (ttit:tcv: ::;c,), and plots
against (tticutcv) Socrates just as a lover plots against a beloved
(::;c;; cf. ::;d,). Alcibiades also acts like the beloved, however, in
attempting to wound Socrates when he offers his sexual favors (::,b,
), and in thinking that Socrates cares seriously about his beauty and will,
in exchange for sex, tell him all that he knows (::;a:,). Moreover, he
refers to Socrates as his erastes, who can help him to become as good
as possible, and he tells Socrates that he is ready to gratify him sexu-
ally (ycpitoci: ::c;d,). Socrates, however, does not respond to the
young mans advances, but, by refusing the role of the conventional erastes,
reduces him to a state of slavery (::,e,,). Alcibiades experiences aporia
(c0:t . . . notcpcuv: ::,de:; ntcpcuv: ::,e,) in his interactions with
Socrates, for he thinks himself dishonored, but also admires Socrates: he
can neither be angry with Socrates nor win him over (::,d,e:). Humili-
ated by the philosophers resistance to his beauty, Alcibiades concludes that
although Socrates appears to have er os for beautiful young men, and to be
stunned by them (tpc:isc, oisti:ci :cv sccv . . . sci tstttns:ci:
::od:,), he really disdains (sc:cqpcvt: ::od;e:) their beauty. Alcibi-
ades thought that Socrates was serious (totcuocstvci) about Alcibiades
beauty (::;a:,), but it turned out that the philosopher instead disdained
it (sc:tqpcvnotv: ::,c,). Indeed, according to Alcibiades, Socrates has
disdain not only for physical beauty, but also for wealth and honor, and he
thinks that all these possessions are worth nothing and that we are noth-
ing (::od;e). In response to these slights, Alcibiades accuses Socrates
of dishonoring him (::,d), and says that the philosopher disdained and
laughed at his beauty, and committed hybris (::,c,).
Alcibiades also tells how, on many other occasions, the philosopher
leads him to agree that although he, Alcibiades, is very decient (tcc0
tvotn, cv), he neglects himself, and instead takes care of the affairs of the
,
Fisher :,,:: ,: remarks on the consistent expression of hybris . . . in sexual humiliation.
o
Challenge: Dover :,c, on ::;c;.
You are hubristic: Socrates, Alcibiades and Agathon :;,
Athenians (::oao). Socrates, moreover, produces in Alcibiades some-
thing of which no one would have thought him capable: shame (::oab,).
Alcibiades shame produces painful aporia similar to that he experienced on
the occasion when Socrates rejected his physical beauty (::,de:, ::,e,).
Like Agathon (:c:co;), Alcibiades is not able to contradict Socrates. How-
ever, instead of continuing to listen to the philosopher, as Agathon does,
Alcibiades holds his ears and ees like a runaway slave, overcome by desire
for honor from the many, only to feel shame when he sees the philosopher
again (::oaobo). As a result, Alcibiades often wishes that Socrates were
dead. He realizes, however, that this would cause him even more pain, and
he concludes: I dont know what to do with this man (::oc:,).
At the end of the Alcibiades I, Alcibiades says that he will exchange roles
with Socrates and become his pedagogue (:,,d;:c). Alcibiades charges
Socrates with another, less positive, kind of role reversal at the end of
his speech in the Symposium. He rst tells the symposiasts that he has
given Socrates praise mixed with blame in his speech, by recounting the
ways in which Socrates treated him with hybris. Furthermore, he says,
Socrates has done the same thing to very many others, deceiving them
into thinking that Socrates is a lover, while turning out to be a beloved
instead. Alcibiades specically warns Agathon against suffering this same
experience: So I tell you also, Agathon, not to be deceived by this man,
but to watch out, learning from my experiences. Dont, as the proverb
says, learn like a fool by suffering (:::a;b;). The experience to which
Alcibiades alludes is that recounted in his story of the attempted seduction:
according to Alcibiades, Socrates seems to play the role of lover (::od:,),
but in rejecting Alcibiades sexual advances he acts more like an er omenos
than an erastes.
Alcibiades aporia results in part from his admiration for what he refers
to as Socrates virtues. After recounting the story of his attempted seduc-
tion of Socrates, Alcibiades says that Socrates has moderation (s ophrosyne),
courage, wisdom (phronesis) and endurance (karteria) (::,d,;).
;
His
courage is shown by his fearless actions in war (::cd,:::c:), and his
endurance is attested by his extraordinary resistance to pleasure and pain.
Socrates resists the effects of wine (::cao, conrmed by Eryximachus at
:;oc,,), the need for sleep (::cc,d,, conrmed at ::,do::), the temp-
tations of money (::,e::), and the effects of hunger (::,e::ca:) and
cold (::caoc:). His moderation is evidenced by his remarkable ability to
;
The term arete is used at :::a. Rowe :,,: :co notes that the traditional virtue of justice is not
included in this list because Alcibiades charges Socrates with hybris.
:c Part II Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
spend the night in Alcibiades willing arms without having sexual relations
with the beautiful youth (::,b,d:). Above all, Alcibiades attributes to
Socrates an exceptional wisdom (phronesis: ::,do) that he himself wants to
acquire (::;a:,, ::d:,). Alcibiades also acknowledges Socrates intellec-
tual superiority when he says that he cannot contradict Socrates (::ob,).
Moreover, according to Alcibiades, Socrates uses his virtues to benet
Alcibiades. His courageous acts save the life of the young man, along with
his weapons, and he gives up to Alcibiades the prize for valor that he,
Socrates, deserves (::cdoe). That Socrates moderation benets Alcibi-
ades, even though the young man characterizes it as a form of hybris (::,c,),
is suggested by the latters statement that Socrates relations with him are
like those of a father or older brother (::,c;d:).
::od:. I translate the text and punctuation of Bury :,,: and Rowe :,,: cp:t ,cp c:i 2csp:n,
tpc:isc, oisti:ci :cv sccv sci ti ttpi :c:cu, to:i sci tstttns:ci, sci co ,vct tv:c
sci cootv cotv, c, :c oyuc co:c0. :c0:c co oinvcot,; Burnet :,cc:,c; punctuates with
full stop after cotv (knows [nothing]).
,
The evidence relevant to the physiognomist Zopyrus is collected by Rossetti :,c, who quotes
(:,: frag. o) Cicero, De fato :c, where Socrates appearance is said to indicate that he is stupidum
and mulierosum. On Socrates physical appearance see Blondell :cc:: ;, (and ,o: on ancient
physiognomy); Kahn :,,o: ::; Zanker :,,,: ,:,. For characteristics like those attributed to Socrates
cf. Arist. [Phgn.] c;b:,:: (a eshy neck is a sign of dullness of sense), ::b: (a snub nose indicates
lechery), ::b:, (protruding eyes signify imbecility). See further Chapter o at o.,.
o
Alain :,,:: o,;c; Blondell :cco: :o;; Nehamas :cc;b: ,;:c;; Patterson :,,:: :,,:c:, citing
Resp. ccdc:a.
:, Part II Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
attributes to Socrates also characterize Diotimas Eros.
;
Like Eros (:c:d:,)
and Alcibiades Socrates (::,c:), a satyr is commonly represented as a
daim on.
Seaford :,b: ,: and :,; on Eur. Cyc. ,,,c:. On the daimonic qualities of satyrs see further
Chapter o at o.,.
,
Satyrs as inventors: Seaford :,b: ,o; and Lissarrague :,,,: :::,.
,c
Seaford :,b: ,c.
,:
Lissarrague :,,,: ::.
,:
On the role of disdain in Diotimas account of the Greater Mysteries see Chapter , at ,.,.,.
You are hubristic: Socrates, Alcibiades and Agathon :,,
fact differ from the gods inside the statue. Socrates resembles both Eros
and Marsyas, daim on and satyr, because he is a philosopher, who has the
erotic, daimonic art. His devotion to Eros (component (:)) leads him to
resemble this daim on. Socrates recognition of his own lack of beauty and
wisdom (component (:)) leads him to desire these things passionately
(component (,)). He is, moreover, resourceful and energetic in pursuing
them (component ()), with a satyr-like disregard for convention, and a
disdain for such inferior objects as Alcibiades physical beauty, the rhetorical
beauty of Agathons speech and Socrates own inferior and doubtful kind
of wisdom and virtue. This disdain leads Alcibiades to charge him with
hybris (::,c,) and to compare him to an hubristic satyr (::,bo;). Finally,
because Socrates, like Eros and Marsyas, has daimonic characteristics, he
is marvelously skilled at helping others to attain as much wisdom as they
can (component (,)).
One particularly signicant way in which Alcibiades Socrates resembles
both Eros and Marsyas is in being a magician.
,,
The philosopher uses
binding spells (sc:tycutc: ::,do, cf. ::a,;) to enslave (::,eo;, ::,e,
,), give pain (::a:,) and produce shame (::oab,). More specically,
Socrates words are a kind of love magic; they seek to create, in a young
mans soul that has natural ability (vtcu uy, un quc0,: ::ao), not
ordinary er os for an individual but Socratic er os for wisdom and virtue.
,
When Alcibiades listens to Socrates, he falls under the philosophers spell
and thinks that his present life is not worth living (::,e:::oa:). In thus
recognizing his own deciencies (tcc0 tvotn, cv: ::oa,), a lesson rein-
forced by what Alcibiades later calls Socrates hybris, Alcibiades himself
comes to resemble, for a time, the philosopher-daim on Eros, whose recog-
nition that he is decient (tvotn, tvci: :cao) makes it possible for him
to desire to become as wise as he can.
Socrates love magic, however, can also produce another result in those
who fail to understand him: ordinary er os for a Socrates who is thought to
be wise and virtuous. The philosopher has many lovers in the Symposium.
Alcibiades seems to be still in love with Socrates (:::c:,); Aristodemus
is very much a lover (erastes) of Socrates (:;,b,) and according to
Alcibiades account, Charmides, Glaucon, Euthydemus, Diocles, and very
many others have thought Socrates to be a beloved (:::b:). There is
,,
Eros :c,d, Marsyas and Socrates: ::,c:d:. On Socrates as a magician see Belore :,c and Gellrich
:,,. Shefeld :ccoa: :,: n.:: points out that the magician was a prominent character in satyr-plays.
,
On love magic and binding spells see Faraone :,,,, who notes (::, :c, :,;) the portrayal by
Xenophon of Socrates as a practitioner of love magic. On Socrates erotic pedagogy cf. Renaud
:cc:: :,;.
:,o Part II Er os and Hybris in the Symposium
no indication that any of these people love Socrates for the true beauty of
soul he possesses, including, in the rst place, his recognition of his own
lack of wisdom.
Alcibiades warns Agathon not to be deceived by Socrates (:::b;).
It is Alcibiades own story, however, that contains the deceptive image of
Socrates as wise and virtuous er omenos. Neither Agathon nor anyone else
at the symposium attempts to examine this image critically: Alcibiades
speech is followed by laughter (:::c::), not analysis. It is left for Platos
readers to experience an aporia, like that of Alcibiades, concerning the
puzzling portrayal of Socrates in the Symposium, and as a result to desire to
open up the image of the silenus-statues. By leading us to aporia without
satisfying our desire to resolve the issues it raises, the dialogue suggests that
if we do open up Alcibiades image we may, perhaps, arrive at a better
understanding of the philosopher than is provided by the symposiasts in
the story, or by Apollodorus and Aristodemus, the narrators who tell that
story.
part iii
Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
Introduction to Part III: the erotic art in the
Phaedrus and Symposium
The rst part of the Phaedrus contains three speeches: one delivered by
Phaedrus, who attributes it to Lysias, and two by Socrates. At the end of
his second speech, Socrates claims to have been given er otike techne by
Eros. One way in which this second speech demonstrates Socrates erotic
art is by means of a vivid, mythical representation of the initiation of
a lover into this art. In contrast, the rst two speeches represent lovers
and self-proclaimed non-lovers who lack this art. All three speeches help
to illuminate the nature of the erotic art, especially by emphasizing the
friendship that the common search for wisdom and beauty (component
(,)) helps to create between lover and beloved, and between those who, like
Socrates and Phaedrus, share Socratic er os for wisdom without being lovers
of each other. That Socrates himself has erotic art is also shown by his
relationship with Phaedrus, whom he persuades to dedicate his life to er os
together with philosophical words (:,;b,o). These topics are discussed
in Chapters , and o. The Introduction to Part III compares the erotic
skill Socrates is represented as practicing in the Symposium with the er otike
techne he explicitly claims to have in the Phaedrus (:,;a;). I argue that
er otike techne in the Phaedrus differs from the techne of the philosopher
who has craft-knowledge, and from the practice without art used for
sexual seduction by the lovers and non-lovers of the rst two speeches.
One especially important aspect of this art is the ability to combine er os
with friendship.
At the end of his second speech in the Phaedrus, in which he recants
his impious characterization of the lover as someone who desires only
physical beauty, Socrates prays to Eros: Be kind and gracious, and do
not in anger take away or weaken the erotic art [er otike techne] that you
gave me (:,;a;). In this dialogue, as in the Symposium, Socrates is
represented as someone who has erotic art in that he (:) is devoted to Eros
and to ta er otika, (:) recognizes his own lack of wisdom and other good
things, (,) passionately desires the good things he recognizes that he lacks,
:,
The erotic art in the Phaedrus and Symposium :,,
is () marvelously skilled in the search for as much wisdom and other good
things as he can attain, and (,) is marvelously skilled in helping others to
acquire the erotic art. Just as he does in the Symposium, Socrates makes
speeches about er os in a competitive context, and he addresses a beautiful
young man (:,e,) with whom he engages in erotic banter. Moreover, as
in the Symposium, he argues that er os is the cause of the greatest good for
humans.
In the Phaedrus, Socrates devotion to Eros is especially evident in his
prayer to Eros, whom he calls his master (:o,c:), addresses as dear
(:,;a,), and from whom he claims to have received erotic skill. In this
dialogue, Socrates explicitly represents himself as under the patronage of
Eros. He is also devoted to ta er otika in that he has an erotic nature that
shows itself above all in his love for words. At the beginning of the dialogue,
Phaedrus remarks that Lysias speech is appropriate to Socrates because it is
erotic (::;c,,). Socrates refers to himself as a friend of words (qicc,:
:,oe,), as a man [love-]sick for hearing words (: vcoc0v:i ttpi c,cv
scnv: ::bo;), as a lover of words (:c0 :cv c,cv tpco:c0: ::c::)
and of the collections and divisions (:oob,) that facilitate discourse.
He even compares his enthusiasm for words to that of a celebrant of the
rites of the Corybantes (::boc:).
Just as the Socrates of the Symposium claims to have only an inferior kind
of wisdom (:;,e:), so, in the Phaedrus, he shows awareness of his own
lack of wisdom. Socrates says that he has no time for the allegorical study
of myth because he is not able to know himself; he therefore studies himself
rather than the monsters of myth (::,e:,cao). Socrates also states that
it is tting to call only a god wise (sophos), while a human should instead
be called a wisdom-liker (philosophos: :;d,o; cf. Symp. :ca::, Lys.
::a:). However, the Socrates of the Phaedrus, unlike the Socrates of
the Symposium, does not claim to have even as much human wisdom as a
philosopher (:;b:, with :oob,; and :;d,o). Recognition of human
limitations is also apparent in Socrates second speech, in which he says
that lovers imitate a god to the extent that this is possible for humans
(:,,a:,), and that they make their beloveds as similar as possible to this
god (:,,a;b:).
Socrates also says in the Phaedrus that he knows his own amathia
(ignorance
:
) about the love matters that are discussed by the poets (:,,c:
). His rst speech, he claims, was a false tale (:a,) derived from the
:
Because Socrates says that he is aware of his amathia, the term means ignorance in this passage
and does not, as in Symp. :cao and Lys. ::a:b,, refer to lack of awareness of ignorance.
:cc Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
Muses (:,;a;b:) or from some other source outside himself (:,,cd:),
and he is aware that he erred against divinity in giving it (::bco). Even
in his second speech, composed by means of the er otike techne given him
by Eros (:,;a;), Socrates does not claim to tell a true story, or to
have knowledge of the truth about love, any more than he does in the
Symposium.
:
Instead, he tells a story that, like the myths told to children
in Republic : and ,, is as much like the truth as he can make it. In the
Republic, Socrates says that people can create stories (mythologia) that are
useful, even if they are false in a literal sense, by likening what is false
as much as possible to the truth, because we dont know the truth about
ancient things (:.,:d:). That is, stories can be useful if they convey
true beliefs about moral and religious matters, for example, that the gods
are the cause of good things only (:.,cc;:c).
,
A similar distinction helps
to explain Socrates statements about Eros and the soul in the Phaedrus.
His story does not tell what the soul is, which would be the task of a divine
and lengthy narrative, but only what it is like (:oa,o). When Socrates
says that no poet in this world ever will hymn adequately the things in
heaven, he means, among other things, that no human can know the truth
about these things. Nevertheless, Socrates says, one must dare to speak
what is true, especially when one is speaking about the truth (:;c,o).
Such a story, that is, must convey true beliefs about Eros, who, because he
is either a god or something divine, cannot be evil (::e:,). A similar kind
of distinction between knowledge of the truth and true belief is suggested
at :,:bc:, where Socrates says that one may or may not believe what
some poets claim, that the divinity called Eros by mortals is called Pteros
(Winged One) by the gods. Nevertheless, he afrms that the experience
of the lover happens to be this very thing that he has just described in
his mythical account. Later in the dialogue Socrates explicitly refers to his
myth of the charioteer and horses as a kind of game (:o,c,) that may
nevertheless grasp some of the truth:
We created a likeness of erotic passion, perhaps grasping something true, but maybe
also carried off in another direction. Mixing together a not entirely unpersuasive
speech, we played a mythical hymn in reverent measure to my master and yours,
Phaedrus, Eros. (:o,boc:)
Socrates story, then, is not represented as expressing knowledge of the
truth, but instead as giving a plausible account, based on god-given true
beliefs, of Eros and the psychology of the lover. For example, it is a myth
:
Cf. Dorter :cco: :;:.
,
I discuss these ideas in detail in Belore :,,.
The erotic art in the Phaedrus and Symposium :c:
that illustrates, as does another mythical hymn Diotimas metaphor of
the ladder of love the general principle that desire, eran or philein, is a
necessary condition for seeking wisdom.
In
realizing this, and in continuing to reciprocate friendship by associating
with the lover, the beloved has himself taken a step toward reciprocating
the extraordinary friendship that is er os.
() Passage C, at :,,b;c;. As time goes on, the lover comes still closer
to the beloved. Now the two not only associate with, but also touch each
other (:,,b;). This physical closeness allows the stream of beauty that
ows from the boy to enter the lover, to overow, and to be carried back
to the beloved.
(,) Passage C, at :,,c;e,. When it enters the boy, the stream of beauty
causes the feathers of his soul to grow, and it lls him with er os. The boy
loves, but is at a loss (tcpt) to say whom he loves, not realizing that he
sees himself in the lover, as though in a mirror: :,,do).
,
The beloved now
has a counterlove (anter os), an image (eid olon) of er os that he calls not er os,
but friendship. He now desires, although less strongly, the same kind of
physical contact that the lover also desires; that is, he desires to see, touch,
kiss and lie down together with his lover. The boy calls what he experiences
friendship, not because he is still inuenced by convention, but because
this kind of divine madness really is indistinguishable from the greatest
friendship.
,c
In stage (,) of passage C, Socrates uses an image of a mirror to portray a
kind of friendship in which each partner helps the other to know himself,
and to become a better, and more divine, self.
,:
In some respects, then, they
are like those friends that Aristotle calls other selves.
,:
Socrates states:
NE ::,a:c:, and ::;:a::::; cf. Pl. Laws ,;ao,. I thank Eugene Garver for calling my attention
to the importance of the parallel in Aristotle.
,
Cf. the lovers aporia at :,:d.
,c
Convention: Ferrari :,;: :;.
,:
Good accounts of this process are given by Price :,,: o and Ferrari :,;: :;,.
,:
Cf. Arist. [Mag. mor.] :::,a:c:: Just as when we wish to see our own face we see it by looking
into a mirror, in the same way, when we want to know ourselves we could do so by looking at a
friend. For the friend is, as we say, another self. The phrase other self also occurs at NE ::ooa,::,
::;cbo;, EE ::,a:,,c, ,,. On this concept see Belore :cc:: :::o.
:, Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
[T]he stream of that ood, which Zeus, in love with Ganymede, called desire,
is carried with great force toward the lover. Some of it enters him, while the rest,
when he is lled to the brim, overows outside. And just as a wind or some echo
rebounding from smooth and hard objects is carried back again whence it rushed
forth, so the ood of beauty enters the beautiful one again through the eyes, by
which means it naturally goes to the soul. Arriving and giving new wings to the
soul, it waters the roots of its feathers, stirs it to grow feathers and lls the soul of
the beloved in turn with love. Indeed he loves, but is at a loss about what he loves.
He neither knows what he has experienced, nor can he tell, but, like someone who
has caught a disease of the eyes from another and cannot say what the cause of
it is, he does not know that he sees himself in the lover as if in a mirror [cottp
ot tv sc:ct:p tv : tpcv:i tcu:cv cpcv tntv]. When his lover is present
his pain ceases, just as the lovers does, and when the lover is absent, the beloved,
just like the lover, longs and is longed for, having a counterlove that is an image of
love [toccv tpc:c, v:tpc:c tycv]. He calls this, however, and believes it to
be, not love but friendship. (:,,c:e:)
As Socrates had previously stated, the ood of beauty that ows from
the eyes of the beloved causes the feathers of the lovers soul to sprout and
grow (:,:b:;). The beauty in question is physical, perceived by the bodily
senses (:,ccd), but there is good reason to believe that it is also beauty
of soul, perceived by the soul, that resembles (cucicuc: :,cao, b,) the
divine beauty of the god followed by both lover and beloved. According
to the passage just quoted, that part of the ood that cannot be absorbed
by the lover is turned back from his eyes as light is reected from a mirror.
ln this mirror, the eyes of the lover that are the entrance to the soul (:,,co
;), the beloved sees himself, and from this mirror he absorbs the reection
of his own beauty that is a reection of divine beauty. The beloved then
loves in turn, with a love that he calls friendship, and he, like the lover,
sprouts feathers. Socrates mirror image implies that there is not just a single
reection, but an innite series of reections. For if the reected stream of
beauty is not merely seen by the beloved, but also waters the feathers of
his soul, it will make him still more beautiful in soul, thus increasing the
stream of beauty he sends out. This in turn will increase the reection of
beauty that the beloved receives back from the lover. The reected stream
of beauty nourishes the soul of the beloved, helping to create a new and
more beautiful self, which, in turn, nourishes the soul of the lover. Lover
and beloved are thus dened and created by the love they create in each
other.
The stream of beauty not only helps to create a new self in lover and
beloved, it also increases their love for one another. This mutual interper-
sonal love cannot be separated from love for divine things, but is itself a
The lovers friendship :,,
form of Socratic er os.
,,
As each partner inspires the other to remember and
imitate their god, each loves the other still more (see :,,a,o), so that each
is yet more inspired. Moreover, as lover and beloved imitate their god, they
become more divine, more lovable, and more able to inspire one another
to imitate the god. Finally, as they imitate the same god, lover and beloved
become still more like each other and therefore love each other more.
The image of the mirror differs in an important respect from that of the
man with dialectical techne who sows in another soul words accompanied
by knowledge that can in turn be passed on to another soul (:;oe:;;a).
In the mirror image, and in the imitative process it illustrates, there is no
suggestion that a way of life is transmitted from lover to beloved, who
in turn will transmit it to his own beloved.
,
Instead, according to my
interpretation, the beloved is an active partner, who affects the lover as
much as the lover affects him. The process is thus interactive, like the
soul-gazing that is compared to looking into a mirror in the Alcibiades I. In
both dialogues, moreover, the partners gain self-knowledge and knowledge
of the divine.
,,
In the Alcibiades I, Socrates claims that, just as an eye sees
itself by looking into another eye as if into a mirror, so a soul, by looking
into the most divine part of another soul, might know not only itself, but
also god and wisdom (:,:e::,,co). Similarly, in the Phaedrus, each partner
gains self-knowledge as he gazes into the other as into a mirror. By seeing
his reection in the lovers eyes, the boy comes to know his own beauty
and to see that it is a reection of divine beauty. He also comes to know
the lover, for he recognizes that the lover loves not merely physical beauty
but also divine beauty, which is within the lover, as well as within the boy.
In the same way, the lover comes to know his own beauty of soul by gazing
at the beautiful beloved, whose nature resembles his own and that of the
god both imitate.
The mirror in the Phaedrus, then, is an image of a relationship in which
lover and beloved interact with each other in such a way as to become
more beautiful in soul, as each imitates the divine beauty he sees reected
in the other. Moreover, as each partner takes into himself (that is, imitates)
what is most beautiful in the other, namely, the beauty that is derived from
the god whom both follow, each imitates (mimoumenoi: :,,bo) this god.
,,
I disagree with Gooch :,,:: ,:: and Pradeau :cc;: :,,, :o,o, who argue that interpersonal love in
Socrates myth is merely instrumental to love for higher things.
,
On the idea of transmission of lives see Price :,,: :,,, (on Symp.), ,,:c:, ::o, criticized by
Ferrari :,,:, to whom Price (:,,;) replies.
,,
See Chapter : at :. for a discussion of Alc. I :,:ao:,,c:; and for a comparison of the passages in
the two dialogues. One notable difference is that in Alc. I soul-gazing leads to knowledge of the
ugliness as well as the beauty of ones soul.
:,o Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
The mirror image in passage C uses a visual image to convey the ideas that
were expressed in passage A, at :,:e,:,,co (above, stage ()): the lover
uses his erotic skill to imitate his god, that is, to search for true beauty,
and to help his beloved do so also. This earlier passage uses metaphors of
exchange of liquids to express the idea of imitation: the lovers draw drafts
of inspiration (p:coiv: :,,ao) from their gods and pour them onto the
soul of the beloved (ttcv:c0v:t,: :,,a;). Similarly, in the mirror passage,
the ood of beauty waters the roots of the feathers in the soul of the beloved
(:,,cod:). In the mirror image, however, there is good reason to believe
that this exchange is interactive, unlike the passive transfer of wisdom like
water through a siphon (Symp. :;,d,;). Reection and re-reection in the
mirror is an image of mutual imitation, which is also imitation of a god.
In summary, then, according to Socrates account of the beginnings of
the erotic relationship (passage C, stages (:)(,)), interpersonal er os and the
greatest kind of friendship are not only compatible with, but also necessary
to one another. Moreover, this interpersonal er os is also Socratic er os for
the divine beauty that is reected in the physical and psychic beauty of the
beloved, and in the psychic beauty of the lover. The lovers er os leads him
to have friendship for the beloved, after having rst established friendship
within his own soul so that his hubristic tendencies are tamed, and he
follows the beloved with reverence (passage B, at :,e,:,,a:), serving him
as he would serve a god (passage C, at :,,a::). The fact that the boy and
the lover have the same nature predisposes the boy to reciprocate the lovers
friendship. The boy begins to do so when he associates with the lover,
increases this association (passage C: cuiicv: :,,b:, b,; cuiici,: :,,b),
and permits physical closeness (passage C: t,,tv: :,,b,, tnoin:
:,,b;). This proximity allows the boy to perceive and be powerfully affected
by the extraordinary nature of the lovers friendship and good will, to
reciprocate it still more, and nally to acquire from the lover the er os that
is an excess of friendship. The idea of reciprocal er os is certainly signicant
in this passage.
,o
Equally important, however, is the concept of reciprocal
friendship within an erotic relationship.
Friendship with the lover plays an important role in helping the boy to
acquire erotic skill. As discussed in the previous paragraph, it is the lovers
friendship that creates er os in the beloved. Just as the arousal of the lover
is described in terms of the growth of feathers (,.,.:), so, when the stream
of beauty enters the soul of the beloved boy and lls him with er os, this
,o
Halperins view that er os is reciprocal (:,o and :,,c: :,::, citing [n.::,] Foucault :,,: :,,c) is
challenged unconvincingly by Calame :,,,: :,,c. Price :,,: o;, notes the difculties involved
in interpreting Socrates account.
The lovers friendship :,;
stream is also said to cause the feathers of his wings to grow (:,,c,d,).
We may infer, then, that the aroused beloved, like the aroused lover, has
acquired the components of erotic skill that lead him to be devoted to ta
er otika (component (:)), and to desire passionately to attain as much as he
can of the true beauty that he realizes he lacks (components (:) and (,)).
Because of his friendship with the lover, moreover, the beloved is receptive
to the older mans guidance in the search for true beauty.
After discussing the persuasion of the beloved (passage C, stages (:)(,)),
Socrates next relates what happens after the beloved has been persuaded to
enter into an erotic relationship with the lover whose er os he returns (stages
(o) and (;)). After rst narrating the preliminary reactions of lover and
beloved, Socrates discusses the two possible kinds of lives that they may go
on to live.
(o) Passage C, at :,,e:,oao. The partners now act on their desires,
doing what the beloved desired in stage (,) of passage C (at :,,e:,).
That is, they look at, touch and kiss each other, and lie down together.
Socrates language leaves no doubt that the boy, like the older man, feels
sexual desire. The black horse of the boys soul, swelling and being at an
impasse [tcpcv], embraces and kisses [qit] the lover, and is ready to
gratify him if he asks for this (:,oa:,). A struggle in the souls of both
lover and beloved now takes place, as the charioteer and white horse resist
with reverence and reason the desires of the black horse (:,oa,o). The
struggle in the soul described in this passage is a second one, subsequent to
the rst struggle in the lovers soul described at length in passage B. This
new struggle is more difcult than the rst. Once the beloved comes to
feel er os and permits physical contact, the lovers black horse once again
attempts to seize control, asking the charioteer to allow it some enjoyment
in exchange for the many pains it endured during the previous struggle
(:,,e:,oa:). In this new struggle, however, the lovers black horse has an
ally in the black horse of the beloved and the lover must not only control
his own black horse but also help the beloved to control his. If he has not
gained control over his black horse in the rst struggle he will not be able to
do this. This passage, then, like passage B (see tcsi,: :,eo), suggests
that the struggle in the soul is frequently renewed, and that the human
soul requires continual re-education.
(;) Passage C, at :,oa;e:. At this point, two outcomes are possible. If
the forces for good win the struggle, the partners live an ordered and philo-
sophical life, one that is blessed and characterized by concord. Throughout
their lives, these partners are orderly and self-controlled, having enslaved
that by means of which evil of soul attempted to enter, and when they
:, Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
die they are winged (:,oa;b;). However, if the partners lead a more vul-
gar, unphilosophical and honor-loving life (:,ob;c:), the black horses
take control of their souls when they are drunk or neglectful for some
other reason, and they commit the sexual act. These honor-loving part-
ners continue to have sex, although they do so rarely, because they do
what is not approved by their whole mind. They live as friends (qic),
although they are friends to a lesser degree than the philosophical partners.
Their friendship lasts as long as interpersonal er os does, and continues
even after er os ends, for the love-pledges they have received prevent them
from becoming enemies. After death, they leave their bodies without yet
being winged, but with the desire to become winged. They travel together
in the journey under the heavens, and when they do become winged,
their feathers are alike (cuct:tpcu,) because of their love for one another
(:,ob;e:).
,;
The philosophical pair and the honor-loving pair have more in common
than is often realized.
,
Up to the point at which the beloved comes to
feel a counter-er os, philosophical and honor-loving partners have had the
same experiences: the inspired lovers have tamed their black horses and
captured their beloveds. In so doing, they have acquired erotic skill. One
way in which the honor-lovers differ fromthe philosophical pair is that they
let their guard down on occasion (otcvi: :,oco). That is, we may infer,
they do not always retain the memory of divine things, to the extent of
their ability, nor use the reminders of these things correctly (:,c), nor
do they pass their lives in philosophizing without guile, and in combining
boy-loving with philosophy (:,a:,, :,oa;b;). That is, the honor-lovers
have not acquired what Socrates later characterizes as the craft-knowledge
of dialectic that allows them to know the truth. They do, however, desire to
become winged (:,od), and will eventually achieve this goal, even though
they cannot do so in this life (:,odoe:). In desiring to become winged,
they may be said, like Socrates (:;b:, with :;d,o), to pray to become
philosophers.
Another difference is that philosophical lovers have greater friendship
than do the honor-lovers because they have greater concord (cucvcn:iscv:
:,ob:). Each partner of this philosophical pair has concord within his own
soul, being self-controlled and orderly (:,ob::), and lover and beloved
,;
The fact that these partners are characterized by love of honor (philotimia) suggests that the white
horse is dominant in them. See Chapter o at o.:.
,
I disagree with Robins view that the honor-lovers share an erotic madness in which philosophy
has no part (:,,: cxxv).
The lovers friendship :,,
have concord with each other, agreeing that this is the best kind of life.
Each member of the honor-loving pair, in contrast, lacks complete inner
concord, and hence these partners occasionally do things that their whole
minds do not agree to. We may thus infer that they also lack complete
concord with one another. Socrates account of the two possible lives
could also be taken to imply that the honor-loving partners have less er os
than do the philosophical partners, for Socrates says that the er os of the
former eventually ceases (:,od:: sci tc ,tvcutvc). Indeed, the er os of
the philosophical partners need not, like that of the honor-loving partners,
cease when the boys beauty fades. The physical beauty of the boy will
fade, but, as the boy recollects the true beauty he saw in a former life,
his beauty of soul will increase, thus increasing his attractiveness to the
lover. The Socratic er os that all lovers and beloveds have for the true
beauty they once saw contributes to the er os each has for the beautiful
soul of the other. This er os for the soul is likely to be stronger and more
lasting in the philosophical partners than in the honor-lovers. The fact
that Socrates does not explicitly tell us whether or not the philosophical
partners continue to have er os for each other is, however, signicant. His
myth about erotic madness ends not with er os, but with friendship, thus
emphasizing, as have all three speeches in the Phaedrus, the importance of
friendship within an erotic relationship. In concluding his second speech
with a discussion of friendship, Socrates also creates an effective link to the
prayer that immediately follows (:,;a,bo). Here also, Socrates emphasizes
friendship, for he asks dear [phile] Eros to turn Socrates friend, Phaedrus,
to a life that combines philosophical (literally, wisdom-liking) words with
er os.
5.4 socrates and phaedrus
I have argued that Socrates demonstrates his own erotic art in the Phaedrus
by making two speeches that help to persuade Phaedrus to become devoted
to er os together with philosophical words. In persuading Phaedrus, Socrates
helps to establish with his interlocutor a friendly relationship that reects,
in some respects, the relationship between lover and beloved in Socrates
second speech, who share a mutual er os for true beauty. Similarly, Socrates
and Phaedrus come to share, in the course of the dialogue, a friendship that
is based, in part, on mutual devotion to er os together with philosophical
words.
,,
,,
See Introduction to Part III n.:,.
:c Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
There are many indications that Socrates appeal to Phaedrus is that of a
friend rather than a lover.
oc
This is apparent from the use made of terms for
friendship throughout the dialogue, and from the absence of indications
of a love relationship between the two men.
o:
Signicantly, the rst words
of the dialogue are dear Phaedrus ( 0 qit 1copt: ::;a:), and it ends
with the statement that friends have possessions in common (scivc ,cp :c
:cv qicv: :;,co;). During their conversation, the two friends, Socrates
and Phaedrus, have created the possession they now have in common a
devotion to er os together with philosophical words which they will go on
to share with their respective beloveds, Lysias and Isocrates (:;,b:,).
The last word of the dialogue is Socrates statement: Let us go ( lcutv:
:;,c). Socrates does not merely address Phaedrus as friend (qit), as he
frequently addresses interlocutors in other dialogues.
o:
He also tells him,
You are most dear (qi:c:c, t: :,,e:), calls him dear one (c qic:n,:
::do), dear head (qin stqcn: :oa), and says that he likes Phaedrus
very much(t,cot tvu qic: ::e:). Inturn, Phaedrus addresses Socrates
as dear Socrates (c qit 2cspc:t,: :,,e;, c qit: :,ob,) and appeals
to Zeus, god of friendship (tpc, Aic, qiicu: :,e:) in addressing him.
That these two are friends rather than lovers is also made clear by the fact
that each has a beloved. According to Socrates, Phaedrus is the erastes
of Lysias (:,ob,, :,;b,, :;,b:,), while Socrates own boyfriend is
Isocrates (:;,b::). All of this is evidence against the view of some scholars
that an erotic relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus is alluded to in
the passage, immediately preceding Socrates second speech, in which he
asks for the boy to whom I was speaking, and Phaedrus replies: Here,
beside you (:,e).
o,
Just as, in Socrates second speech, the friendship of the lover with
erotic skill arouses the beloved so that he becomes devoted to ta er otika
(component (:) of the erotic art), and desires passionately to attain as much
as he can of the true beauty he realizes that he lacks (components (:) and
(,)), so the friendship of Socrates, who has erotic skill, arouses in Phaedrus
the same devotion and desire. Moreover, just as the lover in Socrates speech
oc
Gooch :,,: argues cogently that the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus is predominantely
one of friendship, not love, as Nussbaum claims (:,o: esp. ::: and ::,). Others who characterize
Socrates and Phaedrus as lover and beloved include Asmis :,o: :,, and :o,; Coventry :,,c: :,o;
Lebeck :,;:: :c,; Rutherford :,,,: :, and :o:. Partridge :,,, argues that Socrates begins as
lover and then changes roles.
o:
Cf. Gooch :,,:: ,:c.
o:
Socrates addresses Phaedrus as qit at ::;a:, ::,e,, :,cc,, :,c,, :,a,, :;:b;, :;,b,, :;oe, :;,a,.
On Socrates use of this term in other dialogues see Chapter : n.;.
o,
Good arguments against this interpretation of the passage are given by de Vries :,o,, on :,e;.
The lovers friendship ::
leads the beloved to imitate the god whose nature both share (:,,b,c:), so
Socrates leads Phaedrus to imitate the god both men are by nature suited to
follow: Zeus, the god of philosophers (:,cb;, with :,:e:,) and of friends
(Aic, qiicu: :,e:).
o
Socrates and Phaedrus strive to imitate this god as
they engage together in philosophical discourse, especially in the second
half of the dialogue. To the extent that they succeed, they become skilled
in searching for beauty and wisdom, and in helping each other to do so
also (components () and (,)).
In the rst half of the dialogue, Socrates persuades Phaedrus by making
a poetical, mythical speech that appeals to him emotionally as well as intel-
lectually. When he discusses rhetoric in the second half of the dialogue,
Socrates uses instead a more purely rational means of persuasion. There
is still another way in which Socrates persuades Phaedrus to dedicate his
life wholly to er os combined with philosophical words: he enacts the role
of another self (see ::a,o, :,oc,), that is, a second Phaedrus who
is attracted to shameful, Lysianic words, and who must, in consequence,
undergo purication. Socrates plays this role of another self in his interac-
tions with Phaedrus throughout the rst half of the dialogue. He claims that
his rst, shameless (:,c:) and impious (::d;) speech was really spoken
by Phaedrus, through Socrates mouth (::d::e:). Afterwards, Socrates
gives his second speech, a recantation that serves as a purication for those
who have erred concerning story-telling (mythologia: :,a) about Eros
(:,a:b;). These people who need purication include Phaedrus, Lysias
and Socrates himself, as the speaker of his rst, impious speech.
o,
Socrates role-playing, however, is not merely a pretense, for he, like
Phaedrus, is a lover of words (::boc:, :,oe,), who really has been and
still is tempted by non-philosophical words, especially when he meets a
fellowenthusiast, andwho therefore frequently needs to renewthe harmony
within his soul.
oo
He does not, after all, claim to be the philosopher who
has dialectical techne, but only prays to become like such a man (:;b:
). Socrates thus enacts, partly in play and partly seriously, a role that is
not entirely alien to him.
o
I take we at :,cb; (We, following after Zeus) to allude to Socrates, and not to Plato, as Hackforth
suggests (:,,:: ,, n.:). Socrates includes Isocrates in this category when he says that this man has by
nature . . . a certain philosophia (:;,a,:c). When he prays that Phaedrus may be turned entirely
toward philosophy (:,;b:o), Socrates implies that this young man also has a nature suited to
philosophy.
o,
Cf. Nichols :cc,: ,,o, who also notes that the historical Phaedrus was exiled on charges of impiety.
oo
I disagree with Asmis :,o and Schenker :cco: ;:, who see (mere) role-playing in Socrates madness
and expressions of enthusiasm for Lysias speech.
:: Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
Socrates role as another Phaedrus is introduced at the beginning of
the dialogue, where both men are represented as lovers of words. When
Socrates meets Phaedrus, the conversation immediately turns to a speech of
Lysias that Phaedrus has heard. Socrates, eager to hear this speech, says he
knows that Phaedrus has not only memorized it, but has also borrowed the
scroll on which it is written. Socrates prefaces these remarks by stating: If
I dont know Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself (::a,o), thus referring
to Phaedrus as a second self, with whom Socrates shares a passion for words
(::bo;).
o;
Phaedrus reciprocates this sentiment when he urges Socrates
to make a speech, saying: If I dont know Socrates, I dont know myself
(:,oc,). Phaedrus love of words is not limited to passive enjoyment, but
is active and creative. According to Socrates, Phaedrus has caused more
words his own and those of others to come into being than almost
anyone else in his time (::a;b,). These words are the children he has
begotten (:o:a,).
o
Within the Phaedrus, he is the cause of both Socrates
rst speech (::d::e:) and of his second (::b,). The young mans
fertile er os for words shows itself in comic fashion when he hides the scroll
containing Lysias speech under this cloak. Socrates remarks on this, asking
him, like the Socrates character in Aristophanes Clouds, to show what you
have in your left hand under your cloak.
o,
Although the two men share er os for words, they love different kinds
of words. Phaedrus, who admires the speeches of Lysias, is said to be
the lover of Lysias (:,;b:,; cf. :,ob,, :;,b:,), while Socrates claims
to be attracted to the words of Isocrates (:;e:;,b,), whom he calls
his boyfriend (:;,b:). These two writers are associated in the dialogue
with different kinds of words. Lysias not only lacks technical skill (:,,a:,
:o,d,:oe,), he also speaks shamelessly (:,c:) in making a false and
impious speech (::d;:,a:). Lysias therefore does what is shameful and
deserving of reproach (:,d,, :;;d:e,). On the other hand, Socrates
says that Isocrates is capable of better things because his mind has by nature
o;
Noted by Ferrari :,;: o;. On Socrates passion for words see beginning of Introduction to
Part III.
o
On this interpretation of scitcio :t 1copcv see de Vries :,o,, on :o:a, n.:. In Symp. :;;d,
also Phaedrus is called father of the speech. Cf. Symp. :c,d:,, where the words of Homer and
Hesiod are said to be their offspring.
o,
:i cpc tv :n pio:tp tyti, otc : uc:i: ::do;. Cf. Aristophanes, Clouds, ;,,, where
Socrates asks Strepsiades, who is wrapped up in bed, what he is holding. Strepsiades replies,
Nothing but my penis in my right hand. In Lysistrata ,:,: jokes are made about the erection of
the Spartan messenger, which he tries to hide under his clothing, and which he claims is a messenger
stick (osu:c: ,,:, on which see Sommerstein :,,c). Svenbro :,: ::c: discusses some erotic
connotations of the Phaedrus passage.
The lovers friendship :,
a certain philosophical impulse (:;,a,b,).
;c
Neither Lysias nor Isocrates
has dialectical techne (:;oe:;;a). Isocrates, however, appears to have a
philosophical nature, and is therefore attractive to Socrates, who is devoted
to philosophical words.
Love of shameful words leads Phaedrus to do shameful things in the
rst part of the dialogue. The shameful nature of his love for Lysianic
words is graphically represented by his hiding the scroll under his cloak.
The young mans er os for words is shameful partly because it leads to
threats of violence, as is apparent in his manipulation of Socrates.
;:
Instead
of examining Lysias speech with Socrates, he attempts to force Socrates
to compete with Lysias.
;:
Phaedrus rst tries bribery (:,,de:), and then
suggests that he will use physical force (:,ocd,). Finally, Phaedrus resorts
to threats, saying that if Socrates does not speak, Phaedrus will never again
make a speech in his presence (:,oe:,).
Phaedrus, however, is also susceptible to love for philosophical words, as
evidenced by his favorable reaction to Socrates second speech (:,;b;c:).
As a result, he is at odds with himself (ttcuqc:tpin: :,;b,). In some
respects, then, the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus resembles
that between Socrates and Alcibiades in the Alcibiades I. In both relation-
ships, Socrates builds on the er os a young man already has in order to lead
him to love the same objects loved by Socrates himself.
At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates plays the role, that is partly
his own, of someone who, like Phaedrus, is at odds with himself because
he is attracted to two different kinds of words: shameless, Lysianic words,
and philosophical words. He says that he is eager to listen to the Lysias
speech (::;d:,), and when Phaedrus threatens not to report any more
speeches to him, Socrates says that Phaedrus has found a way to compel
a lover of words to do whatever he orders (:,oe:). In playing the role
of someone who loves even shameful words, Socrates, like Phaedrus, does
shameful things. He gives a speech of which he is so ashamed that he covers
his head while speaking (:,;a,). He also threatens not to let Phaedrus go
until he recites Lysias speech (::co,), and he forces the young man to
reveal the scroll hidden beneath his cloak (::doe:). In fact, this Socrates,
who is lovesick (vcoc0v:i: ::bo) for words, resembles the sick (vcoc0v:i:
:,e) lover in his own rst speech. When he yields to Phaedrus and gives
his rst speech, Socrates plays the role of this lover who is ruled, contrary
;c
Hackforth (:,,:: :o) argues convincingly for taking the praise seriously. Others nd irony (Robin
:,c: :c:o, following Raeder :,c,: :;; Rowe :,, on :;e,ff.), or sarcasm (de Vries :,o, on
:;,a,).
;:
Ferrari :,;: :c,::, calls this a manipulative affair.
;:
Competition: Coventry :,,c: :,,.
: Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
to reason, by the desire for pleasure which, according to the denition of
Socrates rst speech, is a kind of hybris (:,a::). In being a lover of words
(qicc,: :,oe,), then, Socrates resembles the man ruled by gluttony,
drunkenness or lust (:,a:c) in his rst speech, or the untamed hubristic
black horse in his second speech.
;,
Unlike Phaedrus, however, Socrates is aware of the shameful nature of
the attraction to inferior words that he and Phaedrus both experience, and
he recognizes, moreover, that these words are attractive to him now in large
part because of the inuence of Phaedrus. He thus resembles the lover in
his second speech, who has been victorious in the struggle within his soul
(passage B, discussed in Chapter o at o.:), but must undergo a new internal
struggle after capturing the beloved (passage C: :,,e:,oao). Socrates fre-
quently calls his own self-awareness to Phaedrus attention. After Phaedrus
reads Lysias speech, Socrates remarks that he was stunned (ut tstc,vci:
:,d:), not by the speech itself, for which he has a very low regard (:,e:
:,,b,, :o:e::oe,), but by Phaedrus enthusiasm: I experienced this
because of you, Phaedrus, when I looked at you, for you seemed to me to
glow with delight because of the speech while you were reading it . . . and
following along, I joined in the Corybantic rites [ouvtsytuoc] together
with your divine self (:,d:o).
;
Phaedrus, whom Socrates calls divine
and marvelous concerning words (::a;), compels Socrates to speak
(:,;a,:c, ::d,). Socrates represents himself to Phaedrus as someone
who makes a shameful speech because he is drugged (sc:cqcpucstutv-
:c,: ::e:; cf. qpucscv: :,cdo).
;,
However, unlike most people who are
drugged, Socrates appears to be fully aware of the nature of the drug and
how it affects him. He criticizes Lysias speech immediately after hearing it
(:,e,:,,a), and he says that he is ashamed of his own rst speech even
before he makes it (:,;a,). Socrates further distances himself from this
speech by breaking off in the middle to call attention to its dithyrambic
qualities and to state that he is afraid of being possessed by the Nymphs
(:,c,d,). After the speech he says that these Nymphs will lead him to
speak not just dithyrambically, but also enthusiastically if he continues
(::e:,). Socrates self-awareness is particularly evident in his statement
that his accustomed sign did not allow him to depart without purify-
ing himself, after having wronged the divine (::bd:). In these ways,
Socrates shows that he differs from Phaedrus and the lover in the rst two
;,
Dorter :,;:: :, sees part of the truth when he characterizes Socrates as hubristic.
;
On the ecstatic Corybantic rites see Chapter o at o..
;,
The poisonous drug to which he is susceptible is not that of physical pleasure, as Ferrari claims
(:,;: :::) but the drug of inferior words, combined with the inuence of Phaedrus enthusiasm.
The lovers friendship :,
speeches in being aware of his own deciencies. Thus, he has already made
an important step toward overcoming his shameful impulses.
Socrates second speech enacts, partly in play and partly seriously, the
purication needed by the person who is attracted to shameful and impious
words, and who therefore has a soul that is not in harmony with itself. Just
as the lover of beautiful boys must repeatedly tame his black horse in order
to bring his soul into harmony with itself, so the lover of Lysianic words
must undergo purication in order to bring his er os under the control
of reason. Accordingly, in giving his second speech, Socrates demonstrates
hower os for words can be used for philosophical purposes, and he concludes
this speech with a prayer that Phaedrus may devote his life entirely to
er os combined with philosophical words. Socrates also prays on his own
behalf to be forgiven for his rst speech, and he dedicates his recantation
speech to Eros (:,;a,bo). He thus suggests that his second speech was a
purication that has restored harmony and friendship to his own soul. At
the end of the dialogue Socrates makes another prayer, this time to Pan, the
god he resembles, to make him beautiful within, and to create friendship
between his inner and outer qualities (:;,bc,).
;o
Although the sense of
inner and outer is disputed, this prayer also suggests the idea of psychic
harmony.
;;
In addition to restoring harmony to his own soul, Socrates creates
greater friendship between himself and Phaedrus. Beginning with his sec-
ond speech, he uses persuasion instead of the threats and force he earlier
used (::co,, doe:) to get Phaedrus to recite or read Lysias speech,
and he shows his friendship by leading Phaedrus in a gentle way to see
the defects of the Lysianic words he loves, without subjecting the young
man to the harsh elenchus. Phaedrus, in turn, shows his agreement with
Socrates, and his new lack of ambivalence, by joining in the older mans
prayers (ouvtycuci: :,;b;, ouvtycu: :;,co) and remarking that friends
hold their possessions in common (:;,co;). The Phaedrus, then, ends in
prayer instead of aporia, and, instead of hostility or avoidance, in friend-
ship and cooperation between the interlocutors who share the passionate
devotion to er os together with philosophical words that characterizes the
person who has erotic skill.
Chapter , has shown that even though the gentle and friendly side
of Socrates predominates in the Phaedrus, the dialogue contains sugges-
tions that this complex persona has another, more hubristic, aspect that is
;o
As Motte :,,:: ,::, notes, prayers occur at important moments throughout the dialogue. On the
connections between Socrates and Pan see Chapter o at o.,.
;;
Insightful interpretations of this difcult passage are provided by Clay :,;, and Gaiser :,,.
:o Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
more prominent in the Symposium. In making his rst, shameless speech,
Socrates plays the role of the shameless, hubristic lover of Lysianic words.
A second suggestion appears in the middle of Socrates second speech,
when he sketches a little self-portrait in describing the black horse, who
is a companion of hybris, as snub-nosed and short-necked (:,,e:,).
Chapter o analyzes this self-portrait within the context of the psychol-
ogy represented throughout Socrates second speech, and especially in the
image of charioteer and horses.
chapter 6
The lovers dance: charioteer and horses
6.1 introduction
Socrates second speech in the Phaedrus contains a powerful image in which
the soul is compared to a winged team and charioteer (:oa;). The horses
of the gods souls are good and obedient, while mortals have one horse
that is beautiful, good and white, and one that is ugly, unruly and black.
:
The charioteers of the gods drive around the vault of heaven and see divine
sights, and in a previous existence, mortals followed them as initiates in
the rites of the gods. After a time, however, the charioteers of mortals
were unable to control their horses, and in the confusion that followed,
mortal souls lost their wings and fell to earth. According to Socrates, they
can become winged once more and return to the rites of the gods if their
charioteers succeed in the difcult task of controlling their ill-matched
teams while the soul is under the inuence of erotic madness.
This myth of charioteer and horses contains a vivid representation of
the way in which a lover, in the process of acquiring erotic art, creates
friendship within his own soul. After becoming aroused and maddened by
the sight of beauty, the lover acquires the rst three components of erotic
skill, becoming devoted to ta er otika (component (:)), realizing that he has
lost the beauty, wisdom and other good things he glimpsed in a former life
(component (:)), and passionately desiring to regain as much of these good
things as he can (component (,)). After this, the lover is ready to acquire
skill in searching for beauty and truth (component ()), together with his
beloved, whom he helps to acquire the erotic art (component (,)). Before
he can engage in this common search, however, the lover must capture
the beloved. The rst step in this capture is the creating of harmony
within his own soul, while the second step is the persuasion of the beloved
:
Commentators correctly note that Socrates does not explicitly state that the gods souls have two
horses: Finamore :cc,: ; Hackforth :,,:: o, n.,, followed by de Vries :,o,, on :oa;; Rowe :,,
on :oao;.
:;
: Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
to enter into an erotic relationship. The lovers struggle to create agreement
among the three elements within his soul charioteer and two horses is
the subject of Phaedrus :,,c;:,,a: (hereafter, passage B).
:
Socrates image has been the subject of much controversy, especially con-
cerning the role of the black horse. According to some scholars, this horse
represents an ineradicable evil in the soul, the cause of the original fall from
the heavens to earth, and an impediment to the souls return to the gods.
,
However, this interpretation fails to account for the fact that it is always the
black horse who initiates movement (:,a,o, :,d;: see below, o.:).
Other scholars attribute some good qualities to the black horse, but do not
give a sufciently clear and detailed analysis of the nature of these qualities
and their functioning within the soul.
See Bluck :,,: :,;; Burger :,c: o,o; Griswold :,o: :::, :,o; Stoeber :,,:: :;;; Thompson
:o: ;,.
,
Nussbaum :,o: ::,.
o
Rowe :,,c: :,o;, makes similar objections to Nussbaums views.
;
Ferrari :,;: :,:c,, esp. :,. On integration, cf. Griswold :,o: :,,.
The lovers dance: charioteer and horses :,
having a number of satyr-like characteristics (:,,e:), he does not merely
characterize it as bestial and ugly, but also suggests that it shares in the
daimonic qualities of satyrs. This horse is not purely evil, but resembles a
satyr in being a mixture of the bestial and the divine, with an important
role in helping the soul return to the rites of the gods. My interpretation
is supported by the fact that the satyr-like black horse has characteristics
of Socrates himself, for example, a snub nose and short neck (:,,e:,). In
portraying the black horse as a caricature of himself, Socrates uses poetic
language to create a playful self-portrait that appeals emotionally to Phae-
drus, while also conveying important information about his own daimonic
art. In this self-portrait, Socrates represents himself as a man who, like the
lover in his myth, has the erotic skill that includes a recognition of his
own deciencies. Like this lover, Socrates has a black horse, and therefore
needs to repeat the struggle again and again in order to tame the unruly
aspects of his own soul, for example, his love for Lysianic words. Finally,
in portraying himself as a satyr-like black horse, Socrates calls attention to
the daimonic, satyr-like characteristics that are essential to component (,)
of the erotic art that includes the ability to lead others to recognize their
own deciencies.
The dance imagery in Socrates second speech also supports the viewthat
the black horse plays a positive role within the soul. When he characterizes
the rites of the gods as initiatory dances (ticu ycpc0: :;a;, :tt:cv:
:,ca), Socrates suggests that the task of the charioteer is to guide both
horses in the orderly movements of a dance inspired by the gods. In so
doing, the charioteer produces in the soul an equilibrium between the
opposing tendencies of restraint, represented by the white horse, and bold
movement, represented by the black horse. Each of these tendencies is
harmful when excessive and lacking proper guidance, but necessary and
useful to the soul when properly trained and balanced by the opposing
extreme. The story in passage B of how the charioteer learns to guide the
two horses so that they move in orderly fashion represents the psychic
education, mediated by er os, of the entire soul. This education is character-
ized as an initiation that produces within the soul a rhythm and harmony
derived from the gods.
For the Neoplatonic view that that the horses represent movement, irregular in itself, that can be
regulated by intellect so as to become movement around a center, see Robin :,c: :o,.
:,c Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
skill that he uses to control the disparate elements in his own soul. After
creating harmony within his own soul in this way, he becomes able to help
his beloved to attain psychic equilibrium also.
I rst analyze the psychology expressed in allegorical form in the myth
of the charioteer and horses in Socrates second speech (o.:). Next, I
discuss the satyr-like characteristics of the black horse (o.,), and examine
the imagery of the dance in the Phaedrus, arguing that it is based on
psychological principles similar to those explained in more detail in the
Laws (o.).
6.2 charioteer and horses (passage b: 253c7255a1)
Even before passage B, Socrates characterizes all three elements in the souls
of humans as having a combination of good and evil qualities. When
he introduces the image of the charioteer and horses, Socrates says that
the soul is a compound of three different capacities (ouuq: ouvuti:
:oao;), represented respectively by the charioteer and the two horses.
Socrates does not explain what these capacities are, nor does he give many
details about how they differ from one another until passage B. Before
passage B, however, he characterizes the entire mortal soul as a mixture of
good and evil, in which all three capacities have a divine, winged element,
and all three are to blame for the loss of this element and for the evil that
subsequently lls the entire soul. Of all bodily things, Socrates says, the
wing is that which most shares in what is divine: that is, what is beautiful,
wise and good (:odoe:). Now the entire mortal soul was once winged
(:,:b;), and after it has lost its wings and fallen to earth (:c), er os causes
feathers to grow again under the whole form of the soul (:,:bo;), that
is, under every part of it. Socrates statements imply that all three capacities
of the soul, including that represented by the black horse, originally shared,
and are capable of coming to share again, in the divine qualities beauty,
wisdom and the good associated with the wing. All mortal souls, Socrates
says, are also decient (toci . . . :tt,: :b), and in all of them the
differences between the two horses makes driving difcult (:ob:). In
even the best soul, the charioteer has difculty seeing the things that are,
because he is disturbed by both of the horses (:a:,).
,
The fall, therefore,
is also caused by the bad driving of the charioteers (:b:), who are not
sufciently competent to control the horses. The soul falls when these
defects in horses and drivers are combined with some misfortune that
,
The plural at :ao is noted by Price :,,: , and :,,,: ;;,.
The lovers dance: charioteer and horses :,:
weighs the soul down with forgetfulness, lls it with evil, and causes it to
lose its wings (:c,).
When Socrates returns to the image of the charioteer and horses in
passage B, each of the three capacities in the soul continues to be repre-
sented as having both positive and negative characteristics. The charioteer
is, at rst, unable to drive the horses so that they pull the chariot toward
the beloved in orderly fashion. Instead of providing proper guidance, he
sometimes yields to the black horse (:,b,), and at other times punishes it
severely (:,d;e,). Indeed, the charioteer, as Ferrari has shown, not only
uses the violence of whip and goad (:,,e, :,a,) on the horses, he is
also characterized in equine terms, as feeling the goad of desire (:,a:) and
rearing back (:,b) like a horse.
:c
Moreover, although the charioteer has
the ability to remember the beauty seen in a previous existence (:,b,
;), he cannot, without the help of the horses, approach the object that
reminds him of it.
::
The horses were previously said to represent capacities
in the soul that are opposed to each other (:ob,), and the black horse
was simply characterized as opposite to the white horse, who was said to
be beautiful and good (:ob:,). Socrates now provides a more detailed
characterization. Before being tamed, the black horse is licentious (liter-
ally, unpunished, scco:c,: :,,e,) and a companion of hybris (:,,e,),
having a tendency to move forward and cry out without order. He pulls
the chariot toward the beloved (:,ao, :,d;), leaping (:,a) and
neighing (:,d). Even before being tamed, however, as Ferrari points out,
the black horse uses and is amenable to reason, and is capable of coming to
an agreement with the white horse and charioteer (cucc,nocv:t: :,b,,
cucc,icv: :,d:, ouvtycnpotv: :,d:).
::
Moreover, his tendencies to
leap about have positive aspects, for it is always the black horse who pulls
the chariot toward the beloved, allowing the soul to approach beauty.
:,
The black horse is said to be licentious, not because he is ineradicably
vicious, but because his shameless tendencies are unpunished, like those
of a child. The punishment he receives is severe and bloody, but a necessary
part of his education.
:
:c
Ferrari :,;: :o,c.
::
Cf. Dorter :cco: :o, and Nichols :cc,: :::,.
::
Ferrari :,;: :o,. See also Nichols :cc,: :::, and Nightingale :,,,: ::,.
:,
Noted by Ferrari :,;: :,:; Burger :,c: o,o; and Stoeber :,,:: :;;. Rowe :,,c: :: objects that
it is the wings, not the horses, that carry the chariot forward and that the black horse contributes
nothing but trouble. This interpretation does not take into account the clear indications in passage
B that the black horse initiates movement: see further below.
:
Punishment is described, for example, at :,e:,. The charioteer presumably uses a bit hardened
by spikes or wheels: Xen. On Horsemanship :c.o::; Vigneron :,o, vol. i: o:;o; and Delebecque
:,,c: :;,;. According to Pl. Grg., akolasia, the state of being unpunished, is the greatest of evils
:,: Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
The white horse also has a mixture of positive and negative qualities
throughout Socrates second speech. He is said to be noble and good at
:ob:,, and at :,,doe: he is characterized in apparently positive terms,
as obedient and as a lover of honor together with s ophrosyne and aid os
(moderation and reverence). There are, however, clear indications that he
also has signicant defects, including, in particular, a tendency toward
excessive love of honor (:iu, tpco:n,: :,,do) when he is not properly
trained. In even the best souls, both horses cause trouble to the driver
before the fall.
:,
The most inferior souls, those that cannot raise themselves
at all, act like animals, trampling and running into one another (:a),
and they are also characterized as engaging in activities associated with
excessive love of honor: wanting to be rst, and engaging in competition
and struggle (:ab:). Love of honor is certainly better than hybris, but
it is signicant that Socrates second speech attributes it to the second-
best partners, those who are more vulgar, less philosophical and more
honor-loving (qic:iu ot ypnocv:ci: :,oc:) than are the philosophical
pair.
:o
The white horse, moreover, has the hubristic desire to leap upon
the beloved, but he restrains this desire by force (iccutvc,: :,a:,)
rather than reason. Another potentially negative characteristic of the white
horse is a tendency toward restraint that can, when excessive, prevent the
movement that is necessary for the dance.
:;
Indeed, the white horse holds
himself back (:,a:,), pulls against the black horse (:,a;), and only
moves forward when compelled by the black horse (:,a,, :,d,). The fact
that the white horse, as well as the black, has defects means that the driver
must work to control both horses and not only the black.
:
This characterization of all three capacities as mixtures of good and evil
suggests that the image of charioteer and horses is based on a more holistic
(;;e), and just punishment is benecial (;oa;;a, ,c,b, ,c;de). On this idea, in Grg. and other
dialogues, see Mackenzie :,:: esp. :;,:co.
:,
See above n.,.
:o
The connection between the honor-loving pair and the white horse is noted by Nichols :cc,: ::,.
On the honor-lovers see Chapter , at ,.,.:, stage (;) of passage C, at :,oa;e:. In the Republic
also, honor-lovers are said to be less than fully virtuous. They are educated by force rather than
persuasion and philosophy, take pleasures in secret (.,bc:), love honor, victory and war, are
obedient to rulers (,d,,b;), and are inuenced by both reason and desire (,,cb:,). Rowe
:,: :,, on :,ob;e: notes the connection between the second-best partners and the honor-lover
of the Republic. Shefeld :cc:: :c and :ccoa: ,:, observes that the lovers in the Lesser Mysteries
passage in Platos Symposium (:cc,) are also honor-lovers. On the connection between love of
honor and injustice in Platos dialogues see Pakaluk :cc: :::.
:;
As Statesman ,:cd:ce, makes clear, there can be too much aid os in the soul.
:
The charioteer and white horse are not one in purpose and function (Hackforth :,,:: :c;) nor is
the white horse a mere foil to the other two, who learns nothing from his experience (Ferrari :,;:
:,: and :,).
The lovers dance: charioteer and horses :,,
view of the soul than are passages in other dialogues in the Phaedo, for
example.
:,
All three capacities, and not only a rational part of the soul,
are given an essential and positive role in striving toward the good and
the beautiful, and each capacity is represented as having certain defects.
Although the three capacities have some similarity to the three parts of the
soul in Republic reason, appetite and spirit it is debatable to what
extent they should be equated with these parts, and I prefer to characterize
them differently.
:c
The charioteer represents a guiding principle in the
soul, with desires of its own. The black horse represents an impulse to
move in bold and disorderly fashion toward erotic objects, while the white
horse represents the impulse to stand still and to resist these objects. Both
horses are able to use and to follow reason, and are therefore capable of
being trained by the charioteer, who must also train himself to guide the
horses without imposing excessive restraint or yielding to the impulse to
move forward without any restraint. In this image, all three capacities of
the human soul have divine, winged qualities, and all three also have bestial
characteristics. The black horse, then, is not innately evil, but can be a force
for good if he is properly trained. Without the guidance of the charioteer,
the black horse moves in shameless and disorderly fashion, bending his
head, stretching out his tail, taking the bit in his teeth, and dragging the
chariot shamelessly forward in pursuit of an erotic object (:,do;). After
he is tamed, however, the black horse helps to move the chariot toward the
beloved in an orderly way, that is, with reverence and fear (ciocuutvnv :t
sci otoiucv: :,e,).
In Socrates narrative of the struggle in the soul (passage B), er os sets the
chariot in motion by activating all three capacities of the soul. Under the
inuence of er os, the black horse at rst moves in disorderly fashion toward
the object of desire, unrestrained by fear or the law (:,a,b:), while the
white horse forcibly restrains himself from leaping upon the object of desire
(:,a:,). The charioteer, seeing the beloved, remembers true beauty, and
experiences fear and reverence (:,b,). As a result of the charioteers
vision, the soul becomes aroused, acquiring divine erotic madness and
enthusiasm (:,de: see Chapter , at ,.,.:). The lover then attempts
(passage A, discussed in Chapter , at ,.,.:) to rejoin the gods, by imitating
:,
On Phd. oco,e, where the body and its desires are said to hinder the soul from attaining wisdom
and virtue, see Introduction at I.,.
:c
It has often been claimed that the charioteer and horses correspond to the three parts of the soul in
Resp. . See, for example, Dorter :cco: :o and n.:c; Finamore :cc,; Hackforth :,,:: ;:; Robin
:,,: cxxxix; Rowe :,, on :ob:,; Thompson :o: ,. Ferrari :,;: :,:c, and White :,,,:
,,, argue against too exact a correspondence.
:, Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
the god he used to follow in the dance (:,:d:), and by helping the beloved
to follow the rhythm of the same dance (:,,b,;). In order to succeed in
these endeavors, the charioteer, guided by the rhythm and harmony of the
god he imitates, must temper, with the restraint of the white horse, the
tendency of the black horse to make disordered movements. If he does so,
the whole soul will follow the beloved with fear and aid os (:,e:,,a:).
::
This state of soul is one of equilibrium, in which the impulse to move in
disorderly fashion is opposed by an impulse toward restraint.
My interpretation of the psychology upon which the myth of the char-
ioteer and horses is based nds support in the fact that similar ideas are
expressed in other dialogues as well. As noted in Chapter , at ,.:., the
physician Eryximachus in the Symposium supports his misguided medical
views by misquoting and misinterpreting a passage in Heraclitus that in
fact attributes harmony to the balance of opposites. Psychic equilibrium of
this kind is described in more detail in the Republic. According to Republic
,.:cb:c::a;, a correct mixture of music with gymnastics in educa-
tion softens the spirited part of our nature and hardens the philosophical
nature in order to produce a soul that is both moderate and courageous
(:ce:c::a:). The Statesman also stresses the need for correct education
of different dispositions so as to counteract any tendencies toward harm-
ful extremes. If the courageous soul receives a good education, it is made
gentle; if not, it inclines toward the bestial nature. Good education makes
the orderly nature moderate and wise, but lack of education renders it
simple-minded (,c,d:ce). According to the Statesman, the right kinds
of marriages also help to produce a correct mixture in the dispositions of
children. Over many generations, intermarriage among people who have
dispositions that are courageous, without any admixture of the moderate
nature, produces madness. On the other hand, the race that is too lled
with aid os becomes dull and is crippled (,:cdoe,). Similar views about
marriage are expressed in Laws o. In a well-ordered state, people who are
too eager and hasty should marry those who are slower (;;,a;c). This
mixture of different dispositions is compared to the krasis (mixture) of
wine with water: a city should be mixed like a wine bowl, in which mad
wine boils when poured in, but when it is punished by another sober god
[sc. water] and joins in a good combination, makes a ne and measured
drink (;;,cd). As I will show in o., the idea of psychic equilibrium
is especially prominent in Platos Laws.
::
::
Price :,,,: ;,, incorrectly attributes the fear to the black horse and the reverence to the white
horse. Socrates point is that all three capacities in the soul learn to experience these emotions.
::
Similar ideas about psychic equilibrium are expressed in Laws ,.;,:b,d, and in the passages cited
by des Places :,,:, on Laws ,.;:e: Resp. o.,c,cd, Tht. :ab, Sts. ,coc,cb, Epin. ,,bc.
The lovers dance: charioteer and horses :,,
The preceding analysis makes it easier to understand what happens in
the different stages of the process by means of which the lovers soul is said,
in passage B, to achieve equilibrium.
(:) The process begins when the charioteer sees the beloved and causes a
sensation of heat to suffuse the entire soul, which is lled with tickling and
desire (:,,e,:,a:).
:,
Although the stimulus comes rst to the charioteer,
this passage implies that all three parts of the soul have the same emotional
response, characterized earlier as a boiling and tickling (:,:c,), resulting
from the growth of the feathers, which affects the entire soul (:,:bo;).
(:) The three parts of the soul react differently in response to the same
emotional stimulus. The white horse compelled then and always by aid os,
restrains himself from leaping upon the beloved (:,a:,). The black
horse, however, is himself carried away by force and in turn compels
(:,a,, b:) the white horse and the charioteer to approach the beloved and
to mention the pleasures of sex (:,a,;). They at rst resist (:,a;b:).
Finally, however, the white horse and charioteer yield and agree to do what
the black horse orders, and they approach the beloved (:,b:).
(,) When forced to draw near to the beloved, the charioteer sees his
beauty and remembers the true beauty he saw in a previous existence
(:,b;). That is, he once again has the experience that was said earlier
(:,de) to be the madness and enthusiasm of the lover, who, seeing
beauty here, is reminded of beauty in the heavens. As a result of this vision,
the charioteer experiences reverence and fear (:,b;).
:
() Approach is followed by retreat. The charioteer is now compelled by
his reverence and fear to pull back strongly on the reins, so that both horses
sit back on their haunches. The white horse obeys willingly and without
resisting; the black horse obeys, but much against his will. The two horses
then retreat (:,bc).
(,) The two horses react differently after the retreat. The white horse
experiences shame and terror, and it waters the whole soul with sweat
(:,c,). This horse experiences not aid os, the good kind of shame that
restrains him from leaping upon the beloved, but aischyne, shame at having
done wrong in yielding to the black horse.
:,
When the black horse recovers
from the pain caused by the bit and the fall backwards, he becomes angry
and abusive, and tries, without success, to force the others to approach the
beloved again. Finally, the black horse grudgingly agrees with the others to
:,
My translation of :,,e,o (causes . . . soul) follows Hackforth :,,:: :c, n.,, and de Vries :,o,, on
:,,eo.
:
An excellent account of the charioteers vision of the beautiful boy and subsequent experiences is
provided by Nightingale :cc: :oc.
:,
Noted by de Vries :,o,: :o,;c and Price :,,,: ;,.
:,o Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
postpone a second approach (:,c,d:). This stage of the conict ends in
a temporary truce.
(o) The whole process of approach and retreat is repeated a second
time (:,d:e,) and many times (tcsi,: :,eo) thereafter. The black
horse again compels the others to approach, pulling shamelessly toward
the beloved, and the charioteer again pulls back on the reins. On these
subsequent occasions, however, the charioteers experience of reverence
and fear before the vision of beauty is more powerful (t:i ucv: :,e:),
and he pulls more strongly on the reins of the hubristic horse (t:i ucv:
:,e:). The white horse is not mentioned.
(;) At last the black horse is tamed (:cttivcti,). He ceases from hybris
and obeys the charioteer, feeling extreme fear at the sight of the beloved
(:,eo).
() At the end of the process, the whole soul of the lover follows the
beloved with aid os and fear (:,e:,,a:). This process results not only
in the taming of the black horse, but also in a permanent or at least
semi-permanent agreement of all three parts of the soul. The charioteer
is in command and the two horses obey willingly. The whole soul now
experiences both the aid os that was at rst a characteristic of the white horse
alone, and the fear (:,e,) that the charioteer originally experienced when
he was reminded of true beauty by the sight of the beloved (:,b;), and
that the black horse experienced while being tamed (:,e). The motion
toward the beloved that the black horse once forced upon the others has
now been imparted to the whole soul so that it follows the beloved in
orderly fashion. In this way, the lover, having transformed disorder into
order in his soul, creates inner friendship and begins to follow his god.
In creating his story of the horses and charioteer, Socrates exhibits his
erotic skill in two important ways. First, as just discussed, he creates a myth
about a lover who, in the process of acquiring erotic skill, creates harmony
within his own soul. Second, Socrates uses poetic language in order to
persuade Phaedrus to dedicate his life to er os together with philosophi-
cal words (:,;ao, bo). Because the addressee is Phaedrus, a lover of
speeches who responds to them with the enthusiasm of the Corybantes or
the Bacchantes (::boc:, :,d:o), Socrates uses the emotionally charged
language of poetry to appeal to him (:,;a,o).
:o
Socrates myth also has
emotional appeal because it tells a story in which the personication of the
parts of the soul and conict among them provide dramatic interest. In the
:o
Rowe :,, on :,;a,o notes that poetry is the language of emotion, citing Resp. oc,bff. and Arist.
Rh. :cb:cff. Cf. Yunis :cc,: :::.
The lovers dance: charioteer and horses :,;
rest of this chapter I analyze two important aspects of the poetic imagery in
Socrates myth: that of horses and satyrs (o.,), and that of the dance (o.).
6.3 horses, satyrs and socrates
The horse is an erotic symbol in Greek literature, representing both lover
and beloved. For example, in a poem of Ibycus, paraphrased in Platos
Parmenides, the lover compares himself to an aged race horse forced to
compete against his will.
:;
Greek literature, as Jacqueline de Romilly has
shown, also contains many images of a combat between charioteer and
horses.
:
She calls attention to some striking verbal parallels between the
description of the runaway horses that cause their masters death in Euripi-
des Hippolytus and the story of the struggle in the soul of the Phaedrus.
:,
My account below elaborates on her ideas.
In Euripides play, Hippolytus refuses to honor Aphrodite, who pun-
ishes him by causing Phaedra, Hippolytus stepmother, to fall in love with
him. When Hippolytus discovers that she loves him and reacts with horror,
Phaedra kills herself after writing a letter to Theseus accusing his son of
rape. Theseus exiles Hippolytus, calling on his father Poseidon to punish
the supposed adulterer. Poseidon does this in a particularly appropriate
way. Hippolytus, whose name means one who unbinds, or unharnesses,
horses,
,c
and who is devoted to horses (Phaedra calls him the son of
the horse-loving Amazon, qiittcu . . . lttcu:c,: ,:), is killed by
these same horses. As Hippolytus drives a chariot on his way to exile,
Poseidon sends a bull from the sea (:::,). This bull strikes terrible
fear (otivc, . . . qcc,: :::) into the horses, maddening with fear the
four-horse chariot (qc :t:pcpcv tsucivcv cycv: :::,). Hippolytus
grasps the reins with his hands and pulls them as a sailor pulls an oar, let-
ting his body hang backwards on the reins [tsti . . . uoiv t, :c0tiotv
p:noc, otuc,]. But the horses, biting . . . onto the bits [tvocsc0oci
:;
Ibycus frag. :; (Page :,o:), paraphrased in Plato, Prm. :,oe:,;a. The beloved is compared to a
horse in Theognis ::,,: and ::o;;c, and in Anacreon frags. ,oc and :;. An excellent, recent
survey of Platos use of images of horses drawn from lyric poetry (including the passages just cited)
is that of Pender :cc;: :c;, who also discusses earlier studies. Young girls about to be married are
often compared to horses that need to be tamed: Calame :,,;: :,; OBrien :,,,: :; and
Seaford :,a.
:
Romilly :,:: :c::, citing Hom. Il. :,, Soph. El. oc;o,, Aes. Cho. :c::ff., and Isocrates, To
Demonicus ,:.
:,
Romilly :,:, who notes (:c,) the following verbal parallels in Hipp: tsti (::::), ti, :c0tiotv
(::::), tvocsc0oci o:cuic (:::,), i qtpcuoiv (:::).
,c
On Hippolytus name see Burkert :,;,: ::::,.
:, Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
o:cuic] forged in re, carry him away by force [i qtpcuoiv] (:::c
). The horses pay no attention to their master, but race on until the bull
brings down and overturns (toqnt svtyci:iotv: ::,:) the chariot. At this
point everything is confounded together (::,) and the man is dragged
by the reins, breaking his esh (pccv :t opsc,: ::,,), although
he calls out to the horses, who were reared in his stables, not to destroy
him.
The story of the struggle in the lovers soul in the Phaedrus also rep-
resents a driver trying to control unruly horses. The black horse, under
the inuence of er os, is carried away by force (i qtpt:ci: :,a) and
approaches the beloved. The charioteer is afraid (totiot: :,b;) and falls
backwards (vtttotv ot:ic: :,b), being compelled to pull back on the
reins (ti, :cotioctsoci :c, nvic,: :,bc:) so strongly that the horses
sit back on their haunches. After an interval, the black horse once again
bites the bit (tvocscv :cv ycivcv: :,d;), and the charioteer once again
falls back (vcttocv) and pulls the bit by force from the horses teeth
(:,e:,). At last the driver controls the black horse, who dies with fear
(qcoicu:ci: :,e) whenever he sees the beloved. The verbal echoes
and the striking image of the charioteer bending backwards as he pulls the
horses down to the ground with the reins strongly suggest that Plato had
Euripides passage in mind when he wrote the Phaedrus.
,:
He has, however,
modied it for his own purposes. The god-sent madness that causes the
trouble is not destructive, as it is in the tragedy, but benecial. Fear, in
the myth recounted by Socrates, is not felt by the horses in response to the
vision of a monster, but is induced in them after rst being experienced by
the charioteer (:,b;) when he remembers true beauty. (See above o.: for
the stages in this process). Most important, as de Romilly notes, the char-
ioteer gains control of the horses rather than being destroyed by them.
,:
There is indeed a crash, when the horses of many souls trample and run
into each other, and the charioteers drive badly (:aob,). All of this
causes many souls to have their wings broken (t:tpc pccv:ci: :b,,
cf. pccv :t opsc,: Hipp. ::,,), and eventually all souls fall to earth
(:co). In Socrates myth, however, the charioteer is able to recover
from the fall, under the inuence of er os. The charioteer does just what
Hippolytus does, bending backward to pull on the reins but he, unlike
Hippolytus, gains control of his horses. Socrates story of the struggle in
,:
Romilly :,:: :co notes that the gesture of bending backwards while pulling on the reins also occurs
in Xenophon, The Cavalry Commander ,.: [ot:icu, vcttt:csc:c, tcvtiv], but that the
gesture in Phdr. of pulling the horses to the ground is without parallel.
,:
Romilly :,:: ::::,.
The lovers dance: charioteer and horses :,,
the soul, then, uses the language and imagery of poetry and alludes to
poetic precedents, but it describes a process in which er os is not destructive
but controlled by reason.
,,
Socrates myth contains allusions to comic, as well as tragic, precedents.
The description of the growth of the lovers feathers (:,:b:d;) and the pun-
ning etymology Eros/Pteros (Love/Winged One: :,:b,) are humorous.
,
Moreover, the explicit sexual imagery resembles the obscenity of Old Com-
edy, while the description of the relationship between lover and beloved
(:,,a::,oe:), which emphasizes interpersonal love, has a romantic inter-
est like that of New Comedy. Still another comic element is provided by
the outlandish gure of the black horse. Scholars have not noticed, as
far as I know, that the black horse resembles a satyr or silenus, a hybrid
creature with human form and horses tail, ears and sometimes hooves.
,,
This allusion is apparent from Socrates description: The other [horse]
is crooked, big, with limbs put together at random, strong-necked, short-
necked, snub-nosed, black, with gray and bloodshot eyes, companion of
hybris and boastfulness, shaggy around the ears, deaf, barely yielding to the
whip together with the goad (:,,e:,). Descriptions of satyrs are rare in
extant literature, but images abound in the visual arts.
,o
They are typically
represented as big, misshapen creatures, with snub noses, high foreheads,
shaggy hair, thick, short necks, large eyes, and large, erect phalluses.
,;
The
black horse not only looks but also acts like a satyr, being characterized by
hybris and lack of restraint, especially in sexual matters, and in failing to
achieve his sexual goals.
,
Just as satyrs are usually represented in motion,
so the black horse leaps about and pulls the chariot forward.
,,
The chariot
pulled by the satyr-like black horse also has parallels in vase-paintings, a
number of which represent two satyrs harnessed to chariots.
c
Of particular
,,
Cf. Pender :cc;: o,. Insightful comments on the compatibility of rationality and er os in Phdr.
are also provided by Nehamas and Woodruff :,,,: xxxxvi.
,
On the winged phallus see Chapter , at ,.,.: and n.,:. That Socrates speech has comic aspects is
noted by Coventry :,,c: :;; Rowe :,: :c; and on :,:c, and :,:b:; Rutherford :,,,: :o,.
,,
On the satyr/silenus see Brommer :,,;; Lissarrague :,,ca and :,,,; Kuhnert :,,:; Seaford :,b.
Because little distinction is made between satyr and silenus at this period (Seaford :,b: o), I use
the term satyr generically, to refer to horse-human hybrids. On satyrs see also Chapter at .:
and .o.
,o
Kuhnert :,,:: , and Belore :cco: g.:.
,;
That horse-ears, high foreheads and snub noses were sufcient to designate a satyr is apparent from
the fact that the Pronomos vase (ARV
:
:,,o) represents these features on the masks worn by actors
in a satyr play. See Lissarrague :,,ca: ::,.
,
Hybris: Phdr. :,,e,, :,c,, :,e:, eo; failure to achieve sexual goals: :,bc,, :,e:,. On satyrs
lack of restraint and frustration in sexual matters see Lissarrague :,,,: :: and Seaford :,b: ,,.
,,
Black horse: Phdr. :,a,o, :,do;; satyrs in motion: Lissarrague :,,,: :::.
c
Satyr chariots: Lissarrague :,;: ::, and Carpenter :,,;: :,, with illustration, plate oB. See Belore
:cco: g. :.
:oc Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
interest is a cup discussed by Thomas Carpenter which represents, on the
inside, Zeus mounting a chariot, while a chariot pulled by satyrs is depicted
on the outside. According to Carpenter, this satyr-chariot is a parody of
the gods chariot represented on the inside of the same cup.
:
Similarly, in
the Phaedrus, the chariot with the satyr-like horse can be seen as a comic
counterpart of the winged chariots of the gods (:oe:;e).
Satyrs are not merely comic hybrids of human and animal, however:
they also, like the daimones in Platos Symposium, have a status intermedi-
ate between mortals and gods.
:
The idea that satyrs are superior to humans
is illustrated by the story of Midas capture of a satyr in order to acquire
his more than human wisdom.
,
Yet, satyrs are not fully equal to the gods.
They accompany Dionysus as subordinates rather than equals,
and are
frequently separated from him. In the only extant satyr play, Euripides
Cyclops, the chorus of satyrs, after being captured, separated from their god
and made to serve a harsh master, are liberated and reunited with Dionysus.
This theme of captivity, servitude and temporary separation from Diony-
sus, followed by liberation, was characteristic of satyr plays.
,
In another
story illustrating the ambiguous status of satyrs, the satyr Marsyas, to whom
Socrates is compared in the Symposium, challenges Apollo to an aulos con-
test, something no mortal would dare to do, and is punished in a way no
god could be, by being ayed.
o
Like the daimones in the Symposium, satyrs
mediate between humans and gods.
;
One important way in which they
do so, as Richard Seaford has shown, is through their role in initiation.
Seaford cites Laws :,c, where Plato discusses Bacchic dances and the like,
which (the dancers allege) are an imitation of drunken persons they call
Nymphs and Pans and Sileni and Satyrs, and which are performed during
purications and initiations [:tt:, :ivc, tc:tcv:cv].
,
Although
other literary evidence is relatively late, support for an association of satyrs
with initiation prior to Plato is provided by representations on black-gure
vases of satyrs in ritual contexts.
,c
:
Carpenter :,,;: :,o with plates A and B. See Belore :cco: gs. ,A and ,B.
:
Seaford :,b: ,: and :,;, on Eur. Cyc. ,,,c:. In Symp. the daimonion is a being between god
and mortal (:c:d:,e:). On satyrs as daimones see Chapter at .o.
,
Seaford :,b: ;, citing Herod. .:, and Arist. frag. Rose. On this story and satyric imagery in
Symp. see Usher :cc:.
My account here is similar to that of Belore :,o, although I would now characterize the desires
and emotions aroused by wine as shameless rather than anti-rational.
:;c Part III Love and Friendship in the Phaedrus
gives older people a temporary and articial disorder in the soul, upon
which, under the guidance of the sober symposiarch, they can impose order.
It thus makes it possible for them to repeat the process by means of which
they learned choreia as children. Wine, then, is a medicine to produce aid os
in the soul (:.o;:d;) by, paradoxically, rst creating shamelessness.
,
It
thus helps to produce in the soul tendencies to make shameless movements,
like those made by the untamed black horse in the Phaedrus. These tenden-
cies counteract the opposing tendencies toward restraint that characterize
both older people in the Laws and the white horse of the Phaedrus. Just as
the charioteer controls both horses so that they move toward the beloved
with aid os (Phdr. :,e:,,a:), so the symposiarch guides the drinkers as
they combat the renewed shamelessness in their souls.
According to the Laws, then, all three kinds of choreia help to produce
in the soul a proper balance between an impulse toward movement, like
that represented by the black horse of the Phaedrus, and an impulse toward
restraint, like that of the white horse. To learn to dance is to impose order
upon disorder, creating a psychic equilibrium like that represented in the
myth of the charioteer and horses in the Phaedrus.
6.5 conclusion
In the second half of the Phaedrus, Socrates says that this myth is in part
a game (:o,c,). When he concludes his second speech with his prayer
to Eros (:,;a,bo), however, Socrates reveals the serious purpose of this
playful recantation speech offered to the god. His second speech itself
shows that he has the erotic skill he prays to retain. Socrates demonstrates
his understanding of erotic skill when he creates the myth of charioteer and
horses. In this vivid dramatization, the lover of true beauty strives to create
friendship, in the form of a harmonious equilibrium of opposites, within
his ownsoul. This inner friendship is essential to the lovers skill insearching
for beauty and truth (component () of the erotic art). It is also a necessary
condition for helping his beloved to acquire the erotic art (component
(,)), and for engaging with him in a common search for divine beauty and
truth. In representing this search as an initiation, mediated by er os for divine
beauty, Socrates places the relationship between lover and beloved within a
cosmic context, far transcending the narrow connes of the conventional
Greek erotic-educational relationship. Moreover, in representing himself as
,
Aid os is the fear of wrong-doing that opposes shamelessness (:.o;ab:) and wine provides practice
in resisting shameless impulses by rst arousing them (o,a:d:).
The lovers dance: charioteer and horses :;:
the daimonic, satyr-like black horse, Platos Socrates suggests that his own
erotic impulses are not, like those of the Socrates of Zopyrus, weaknesses
that he has overcome by means of philosophy, but strengths that he has
harnessed in the service of philosophy.
o
Socrates also demonstrates erotic skill by using the poetic language
that is most persuasive to Phaedrus (:,;a,o), and that exhibits, in a
virtuoso performance, the many literary manifestations of Eros. The image
of the horse is associated with erotic lyric poetry, while the story of the
driver attempting to control unruly horses alludes to a scene in Euripides
Hippolytus, a well-known tragic example of the destructive power of Eros.
Like many Greek comedies, Socrates story of the lover who captures his
beloved ends in a kind of marriage.
;
Graphic sexual imagery in Socrates
account of the arousal of the lover recalls the obscenity of Old Comedy,
while the emphasis on interpersonal love reminds the audience of New
Comedy. The satyr-play is alluded to in the description of the physical and
ethical attributes of the lustful, satyr-like black horse. Socrates also makes
extensive use of language associated with Greek choral poetry, especially
dithyrambic poetry. Just as Eros reveals himself in a wide variety of forms,
each of which can lead the soul to true beauty, so Socrates uses all of the
resources of language and imagery to persuade Phaedrus, his fellow erastes
of words (::boc:), to use the beautiful words of his second speech as a
reminder of the beauty of the other world. The fact that Phaedrus joins
Socrates prayer (2uvtycuci), and says that he marvels at the beauty of
Socrates speech (:,;b;c:) suggests that the prayer has been answered.
o
Zopyrus is discussed in Introduction at I.: and n.,.
;
Noted by Nichols :cc,: ::o.
Pace Coventry :,,c: :,,.
Conclusion
This study has argued that Socrates is characterized in four Platonic dia-
logues as practicing an art or skill that is erotic, or daimonic, not in
a narrowly sexual sense, but because it shares characteristics attributed to
the philosopher-daim on Eros in the Symposium. As the chapters of this
book have demonstrated, a focus on this aspect of Platos characterization
of Socrates helps to illuminate many signicant philosophical and literary
issues in each of the four dialogues. I also hope to have shown that Plato
accomplishes several important philosophical purposes in the quartet as a
whole. First, he provides his own, unique, version of the theme, common in
the Socratic writings, of Socrates deep concern with er os. Platos Socrates
is an erotic gure not because he has ordinary er os for beautiful young
men, but because he has marvelous skill in searching for the objects of
Socratic er os: wisdom, beauty and other good things. Plato also appeals to
his audience and provides dramatic interest, just as his Socrates does within
the dialogues, by representing Socrates as practicing the erotic art within
the context of the Greek convention of erotic-educational relationships
between older and young males. Platos adaptations of this convention also
serve an important apologetic purpose. Instead of exchanging wisdom for
sexual favors, as the conventional erastes claims to do, Socrates helps his
interlocutors to become skilled in searching for the wisdom they recognize
that they lack. The four dialogues represent this educational process as an
initiation of passionate young men, at the beginning of their lives, into the
mysteries of Socratic er os.
By demonstrating that Socrates successful use of his art is dependent on
the characteristics of his interlocutors, and on external circumstances, the
quartet also helps to explain why Socrates did not achieve greater success,
even among friends in his own city. Sometimes, external forces interrupt
or threaten to put an end to his conversations. At the end of the Lysis,
the discussion is forcibly interrupted by drunken, barbarian slaves (::,a:
b,), and the conversation at the end of the Symposium is stopped by the
:;:
Conclusion :;,
arrival of revelers, who force the symposiasts to drink too much (::,b:o).
Ominously, the Alcibiades I ends with Socrates expression of his fears about
the power of the demos (:,,eo), which will, in historical fact, corrupt
Alcibiades and silence Socrates by means of death. In the Symposium, the
shame that Socrates induces in Alcibiades has only temporary effects, in
part because the young man refuses to listen. Alcibiades blocks his ears and
runs away instead of listening to the arguments he is unable to contradict
(::oac,). Even the Phaedrus, which ends on a note of agreement between
friends, contains suggestions that this concord is contingent on the unusual
setting of the dialogue: it takes place outside the walls of Athens, where
Socrates seldom goes and where he is very much out of place (:,ccoe).
As he speaks the last word of the dialogue, Let us go ( lcutv: :;,c),
Socrates sets out to return to the city, where agreement may be more
difcult, in part because of the competitive atmosphere fostered in Athens.
This last word, however, also resonates with Platos audience, for whomit
has more positive implications. As Alcibiades says, if we listen to Socrates
words, even if reported by an inferior speaker, we too, whether we are
women, men or young people, become stunned and possessed (Symp.
::,d,o). If we listen long and attentively, without covering our ears and
running away, like Alcibiades, we can, like Socrates himself, become pos-
sessed by er os for the wisdom we recognize that we lack, and skilled in
searching for it together with others who share our love.
Glossary
aid os: reverence
amathia: lack of understanding; failure to recognize ones own ignorance
aporein: to be at an impasse, at a loss, without resources, perplexed
aporia: state of being at an impasse
arete: excellence
atopos: out of place, strange, outlandish
atopia: state of being atopos
aulos: pipe
daim on: a being with a status between god and mortal
elenchus: cross-examination, refutation, test
epithumein: to desire
epithumia: desire
eran: to love
erastes (pl. erastai): lover
eristic: contentious (adj.); contentious speech (n.)
er omenos (pl. er omenoi): beloved
er os: love, passionate desire
er otike techne: erotic art or skill
hybris: violence, lust, dishonor, insolence
oikeion: kindred
philein: to like
philia: friendship, kinship
philos (masc. sing.; pl. philoi; neut. sing. philon): the friend, the dear (n.);
dear (adj.)
philosophein: literally, to like wisdom; to philosophize
philosophia: philosophy; literally, love or liking for wisdom
phronesis: wisdom
phronimos: wise, sensible
physis: nature
sophia: wisdom
:;
Glossary :;,
sophos: (masc.; fem. sophe): wise
s ophrosyne: moderation, sound-mindedness
ta er otika: erotic matters; matters with which the daim on Eros is
concerned
techne: art, skill
Works cited
Adams, D. (:,,,) A Socratic theory of friendship, IPQ ,,: :o,:
Adkins, A. W. H. (:,o,) Friendship and self-sufciency in Homer and Aris-
totle, CQ :,: ,c,
Ahbel-Rappe, S. and R. Kamtekar (eds.) (:cco) A Companion to Socrates. Malden,
Mass. and Oxford
Alain, C. E. (:,,:) Idees. Platon, Descartes, Hegel. Paris
Allen, R. E. (:,o:) Note on Alcibiades I, ::,b:, AJPh ,: :;,c
(:,oo) A note on the elenchus of Agathon: Symposium :,,c:c:c, Monist ,c:
oc,
Annas, J. (:,;;) Plato and Aristotle on friendship and altruism, Mind o: ,,:
(:,,) Self-knowledge in early Plato, in Platonic Investigations. Studies in Phi-
losophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. xiii, ed. D. J. OMeara. Washington,
DC: :::,
(:cc:) Moral knowledge as practical knowledge, Social Philosophy and Policy
:: :,o,o
(:cc,) Ancient philosophy for the twenty-rst century, in The Future for
Philosophy, ed. B. Leiter. Oxford: :,,
(:cco) Ethics and argument in Platos Socrates, in Reis (ed.) :cco: ,:o
Anton, J. P. (:,;) The secret of Platos Symposium, SJPh ::: :;;,,
(:,,o) The Agathon interlude, GRBS ,;: :c,,,
Anton, J. P. and G. L. Kustas (eds.) (:,;:) Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy.
Albany, NY
Arieti, J. A. (:,,:) Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Drama. Savage, Md.
Armstrong, J. M. (:cc) After the ascent: Plato on becoming like God, OSAPh
:o: :;:,
Arnim, H. von (:,:) Platos Jugenddialoge und die Entstehungszeit des Phaidros.
Leipzig
(:,:o) Platos Lysis, RhM ;:: ,o;
Arnould, D. (:,,c) Le rire et les larmes dans la litterature grecque dHom`ere ` a Platon.
Paris
Arrowsmith, W. (:,;,) Aristophanes Birds: the fantasy politics of eros, Arion
n.s. :: ::,o;
Asmis, E. (:,o) Psychagogia in Platos Phaedrus, ICS ::: :,,;:
:;o
Works cited :;;
Babut, D. (:,c) Peinture et d epassement de la r ealit e dans le Banquet de Platon,
REA :: ,:,
Bacon, H. H. (:,,,) Socrates crowned, Virginia Quarterly Review ,,:
:,,c
Balogh, J. (:,:;) Voces paginarum, Philologus :: :c,, :c:c
Balansard, A. (:cc:) Techn`e dans les dialogues de Platon. Lempreinte de la sophis-
tique. Sankt Augustin
Bandini, M. (ed.) and L.-A. Dorion (trans.) (:cc,) Xenophon. Memorables, vol. i.
Paris, :nd edn.
Bashor, P. S. (:,o) Plato and Aristotle on friendship, Journal of Value Inquiry
:: :o,c
Belore, E. (:,c) Elenchus, epode, and magic: Socrates as Silenus, Phoenix ,:
::,;
(:,) Dialectic with the reader in Platos Symposium, Maia ,o: :,;,
(:,,) Lies unlike the truth: Plato on Hesiod, Theogony :;, TAPhA ::,:
;,;
(:,o) Wine and catharsis of the emotions in Platos Laws, CQ ,o: ::,;
(:,,:) Tragic Pleasures. Aristotle on Plot and Emotion. Princeton, NJ
(:ccc) Murder Among Friends. Violation of Philia in Greek Tragedy. Oxford
(:cc:) Family friendship in Aristotles ethics, AncPhil ::: ::,,:
(:cco) Dancing with the gods: the myth of the chariot in Platos Phaedrus,
AJPh ::;: :,::;
(:c::) Poets at the Symposium, in Plato and the Poets, eds. P. Destr ee and
F.-G. Herrmann. Leiden and Boston: :,,;
Benson, H. H. (:ccc) Socratic Wisdom. The Model of Knowledge in Platos Early
Dialogues. Oxford
Benveniste, E. (:,o,) Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-europeennes, vol. i. Paris:
,,,,,
Beversluis, J. (:ccc) Cross-Examining Socrates. A Defense of the Interlocutors in
Platos Early Dialogues. Cambridge
(:cco) A defense of dogmatism in the interpretation of Plato, OSAPh ,::
,:::
Blanckenhagen, P. H. von (:,,:) Stage and actors in Platos Symposium, GRBS
,,: ,:o
Blitz, M. (:,,,) Platos Alcibiades I, Interpretation ::: ,,,,
Blondell, R. (:cc:) The Play of Character in Platos Dialogues. Cambridge
(:cco) Where is Socrates on the ladder of love?, in Lesher, Nails and Shefeld
(eds.) :cco: :;;
Bloom, A. (:,o) The Republic of Plato. Translated with Notes and an Interpretetive
Essay. New York
Bluck, R. S. (:,,,) The origin of the Greater Alcibiades, CQ n.s. ,: o,:
(:,,) The Phaedrus and reincarnation, AJPh ;,: :,oo
Blundell, M. W. (:,,) Helping Friends and Harming Enemies. A Study in Sophocles
and Greek Ethics. Cambridge
(:,,:) Commentary on Reeve, in Cleary (ed.) :,,:: ::,,,
:; Works cited
Bolotin, D. (:,;,) Platos Dialogue on Friendship. An Interpretation of the Lysis with
a New Translation. Ithaca, NY
Bordt, M. (:,,) Platon. Lysis.
Ubersetzung und Kommentar. G ottingen
(:ccc) The unity of Platos Lysis, in Robinson and Brisson (eds.) :ccc: :,;;:
Bos, C. A. (:,;c) Interpretatie, vaderschap en datering van de Alcibiades Maior.
Culemborg
Bossi, B. (:ccc) Is the Lysis really aporetic?, in Robinson and Brisson (eds.)
:ccc: :;:,
Boyanc e, P. (:,,:) La religion astrale de Platon ` a Cic eron, REG o,: ,::,c
Brandwood, L. (:,;o) A Word Index to Plato. Leeds
Br` es, Y. (:,o) La psychologie de Platon. Paris
Brickhouse, T. C. and N. D. Smith (:,,) Socrates on Trial. Princeton, NJ
(:,,) Platos Socrates. Oxford
Brisson, L. (:,,:) Lunit e du Ph`edre de Platon. rh etorique et philosophie dans le
Ph`edre, in Rossetti (ed.) :,,:: o:;o
(:,,) Platon. Le Banquet. Traduction inedite, introduction et notes. Paris
Brommer, F. (:,,;) Satyroi. W urzburg
Brown, M. and J. Coulter (:,;:) The middle speech of Platos Phaedrus, JHPh
,: c,:,
Brownson, C. L. (:,:c) Platos Studies and Criticisms of the Poets. Boston, NJ
Brumbaugh, R. S. (:,o:) Plato for the Modern Age. New York
Brunschwig, J. (:,;,) Sur quelques emplois d ci,, in Zetesis. Antwerp:
:,,
(:,,o) La d econstruction du Connais-toi toi-m eme dans lAlcibiade Majeur,
Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage :: o:
Burger, R. (:,c) Platos Phaedrus. A Defense of a Philosophical Art of Writing.
Tuscaloosa, Ala.
Burkert, W. (:,oc) Platon oder Pythagoras? Zum Ursprung des Wortes Philoso-
phie, Hermes : :,,;;
(:,;,) Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual. Berkeley, Calif.
(:,,) Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacricial Ritual and
Myth, trans. P. Bing. Berkeley, Calif.
Burnet, J. (:,::) Platos Phaedo. Edited with Introduction and Notes. Oxford
(:,:) Platos Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito. Edited with Notes. Oxford
(ed.) (:,cc:,c;) Platonis Opera (, vols.). Oxford
Burnyeat, M. F. (:,;;) Socratic midwifery, Platonic inspiration, BICS :: ;:o
Bury, R. G. (ed.) (:,,:) The Symposium of Plato with Introduction, Critical Notes
and Commentary. Cambridge, :nd edn.
Bussanich, J. (:cco) Socrates and religious experience, in Ahbel-Rappe and
Kamtekar (eds.) :cco: :cc:,
Cairns, D. L. (:,,o) Hybris, dishonour, and thinking big, JHS ::o: :,:
Calame, C. (:,,;) Choruses of Young Women in Ancient Greece, trans. D. Collins
and J. Orion. Lanham, Md. Revised version of Les choeurs de jeunes lles en
Gr`ece archaque (:,;;). Rome
(:,,,) The Poetics of Eros in Ancient Greece, trans. J. Lloyd. Princeton, NJ
Works cited :;,
Calvo, T. (:,,:) Socrates rst speech in the Phaedrus and Platos criticism of
rhetoric, in Rossetti (ed.) :,,:: ;oc
Carlini, A. (:,o,) Studi sul testo della quarta tetralogia platonica, SIFC ,:
:o,,
(:,o) Platone. Alcibiade, Alcibiade Secondo, Ipparco, Rivali. Introduzione, testo
critico et traduzione. Torino
Carpenter, T. H. (:,,;) Dionysian Imagery in Fifth-Century Athens. Oxford
Carpenter, T. H. and C. A. Faraone (eds.) (:,,,) Masks of Dionysus. Ithaca,
NY
Chroust, A.-H. (:,;) Philosophy: its essence and meaning in the ancient world,
PhR ,o: :,,
(:,o) Some reections on the origin of the term philosopher, The New
Scholasticism: :,,
Clark, P. M. (:,,,) The Greater Alcibiades, CQ n.s. ,: :,:c
Clay, D. (:,;:) Socrates mulishness and heroism, Phronesis :;: ,,oc
(:,;,) The tragic and comic poet of the Symposium, Arion n.s. :: :,o:
(:,;,) Socrates prayer to Pan, in Arktouros, eds. G. W. Bowerstock,
W. Burkert and M. Putnam. Berlin and New York: ,,,,
(:ccc) Platonic Questions: Dialogues with the Silent Philosopher. University Park,
Pa.
(:cco) The hangover of Platos Symposium in the Italian Renaissance from
Bruni (:,,) to Castiglione (:,:), in Lesher, Nails and Shefeld (eds.) :cco:
,:,,
Cleary, J. J. (ed.) (:,,:) Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient
Philosophy, vol. viii. Lanham, Md
Cleary, J. J. and G. M. Gurtler (eds.) (:,,,) Proceedings of the Boston Area Collo-
quium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. xiv. Leiden
Cobb, W. S. (trans.) (:,,,) The Symposium and the Phaedrus. Platos Erotic Dia-
logues, Albany, NY
Corlett, A. J. (:,,;) Interpreting Platos dialogues, CQ ;: :,,;
(:cc,) Interpreting Platos Dialogues. Las Vegas, Nev.
Cornford, F. M. (:,c;) Elpis and eros, CR ::: ::,:
(:,;:a) Thucydides Mythistoricus. Philadelphia, Pa.
(:,;:b) The doctrine of eros in Platos Symposium, in Plato: A Collection of
Cricital Essays, vol. ii, ed. G. Vlastos. New York: ::,,:
Corrigan, K. (:,,;) The comic-serious gure in Platos middle dialogues: the
Symposium as philosophical art, in Laughter Down the Centuries, vol. iii,
eds. S. J akel, A. Timonen and V.-M. Rissanen. Turku: ,,o
Corrigan, K. and E. Glazov-Corrigan (:cc), Platos Dialectic at Play. Argument,
Structure, and Myth in the Symposium. University Park, Pa.
Coventry, L. (:,,c) The role of the interlocutor in Platos dialogues: theory
and practice, in Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature, ed.
C. Pelling. Oxford: :;,o
Croiset, M. (:,,) Platon. Oeuvres compl`etes. Texte etabli et traduit, vol. i. Paris,
,th edn.
:c Works cited
Cummins, W. J. (:,:) Eros, epithumia, and philia in Plato, Apeiron :,: :c:
Cunliffe, R. J. (:,o,) A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect. Norman, Okla.
Cyrino, M. S. (:,,,) In Pandoras Jar. Lovesickness in Early Greek Poetry. Lanham,
Md.
Dancy, R. M. (:cco) With friends, More is going on than meets the eye. A
discussion of Terry Penner and Christopher Rowe, Platos Lysis, OSAPh ,::
,:,;
Davidson, J. (:cc;) The Greeks and Greek Love. A Radical Reappraisal of Homo-
sexuality in Ancient Greece. London
De Vries, G.-J. (:,,,) Apollodore dans le Banquet de Platon, REG : o,,
(:,o,) A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato. Amsterdam
(:,,) Laughter in Platos writings, Mnemosyne ,: ,;:
Delebecque, E. (ed.) (:,,c) Xenophon. De lart equestre. Paris
Denyer, N. (ed.) (:cc:) Plato. Alcibiades. Cambridge
Detel, W. (:cc,) Eros and knowledge in Platos Symposium, in Ideal and Culture
of Knowledge in Plato: Akten der 4. Tagung der Karl-und-Gertrud-Abel-Stiftung
vom 1.-3. September 2000 in Frankfurt, eds. W. Detel, A. Becker and P. Scholz.
Stuttgart: ;,,,
Dickey, E. (:,,o) Greek Forms of Address from Herodotus to Lucian. Oxford
Diehl, E. (:,,-:,,:) Anthologia Lyrica Graeca (, vols.). Leipzig, ,rd edn.
Diggle, J. (ed.) (:,o:,,) Euripides: Fabulae (, vols.). Oxford
Dillon, J. M. (:,;,) Iamblichi Chalcidensis. In Platonis dialogos commentariorum
fragmenta. Edited with Translation and Commentary. Leiden
Dirlmeier, F. (:,,:) FILOS und FILIA im vorhellenistischen Griechentum. Munich
Dixon, B. (:cc) Phaedrus, Ion, and the lure of inspiration, Plato. The Inter-
net Journal of the International Plato Society . http://gramata.univ-paris:.fr/
Plato/spip.php?articlec (accessed September ::, :c::)
Dodds, E. R. (ed.) (:,oc) Euripides. Bacchae. Oxford, :nd edn.
Dorion, L.-A. (:cc) Platon. Charmide, Lysis. Traduction inedite, introduction et
notes. Paris
Dorter, K. (:,o,) The signicance of the speeches in Platos Symposium, Ph&Rh
:: ::,,
(:,;:) Imagery and philosophy in Platos Phaedrus, JHPh ,: :;,
(:,,o) Three disappearing ladders in Plato, Ph&Rh :,: :;,,,
(:cco) The method of division and the division of the Phaedrus, AncPhil :o:
:,,;,
Dover, K. J. (:,,) Greek Homosexuality. Updated and with a new Postscript. New
York
Dover, K. J. (ed.) (:,c) Plato. Symposium. Cambridge
Duke, E. A. et al. (eds.) (:,,,) Platonis Opera, vol. i. Oxford
Dugas, L. (:,;o) Lamitie antique dapr`es les moeurs populaires et les theories des
philosophes. New York, rpt
Duncan, R. (:,;;) Platos Symposium: the cloven eros, SJPh :,: :;;,:
Dyson, M. (:,:) Zeus and philosophy in the myth of Platos Phaedrus, CQ ,::
,c;::
Works cited ::
Edmonds, R. G., III (:ccc) Socrates the beautiful: role reversal and midwifery
in Platos Symposium, TAPhA :,c: :o:,
Edwards, M. W. (:,,:) The Iliad: A Commentary, vol. v, books :;:c, gen. ed.
G. S. Kirk. Cambridge
Eisner, R. (:,:) Socrates as hero, Ph&Lit o: :co:
England, E. B. (ed.) (:,::) The Laws of Plato (: vols.). Manchester
Erasmus, D. (:,;:cc) Collected Works of Erasmus (o vols.), eds. R. J. Schoeck
and B. Corrigan. Toronto
Faraone, C. A. (:,,,) Ancient Greek Love Magic. Cambridge, Mass.
Fehr, B. (:,,c) Entertainers at the symposion: the akletoi in the archaic period,
in Murray (ed.) :,,c: :,,,
Ferrari, G. R. F. (:,;) Listening to the Cicadas. A Study of Platos Phaedrus.
Cambridge
(:,,:) Moral fecundity. A discussion of A. W. Price, Love and Friendship in
Plato and Aristotle, OSAPh ,: :o,
(:,,:) Platonic love, in Kraut (ed.) :,,:: :;o
Finamore, J. F. (:cc,) The tripartite soul in Platos Republic and Phaedrus, in
History of Platonism. Plato Redivivus, eds. R. Berchman and J. Finamore. New
Orleans, La.: ,,,:
Fisher, N. R. E. (:,,:) Hybris. A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in
Ancient Greece. Warminster
Foley, H. P. (:,,) The mother of the argument: eros and the body in Sappho
and Platos Phaedrus, in Parchments of Gender. Deciphering the Bodies of
Antiquity, ed. M. Wyke. Oxford: ,,;c
Ford, A. (:cc:) The Origins of Criticism: Literary Culture and Poetic Theory in
Classical Greece. Princeton, NJ
Forde, S. (:,;) On the Alcibiades I, in Pangle (ed.) :,;b: :::,,
Forster, M. N. (:cc;) Socrates profession of ignorance, OSAPh ,:: :,,
Fortenbaugh, W. W. (:,oo) Plato Phaedrus :,,c,, CPh o:: :c,
Foucault, M. (:,,) The Use of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality, vol. ii, trans.
R. Hurley. New York
(:,) Technologies of the Self. ASeminar with Michel Foucault, eds. L. H. Martin,
H. Gutman and P. H. Hutton. Amherst, Mass.
Fraisse, J.-C. (:,;) Philia. La notion damitie dans la philosophie antique.
Paris
Frank, J. (:cc;) Wages of war. On judgment in Platos Republic, Political Theory
,,: ,o;
Frede, M. (:,,:) Platos arguments and the dialogue form, OSAPh Suppl. ,:
:c::,
Friedl ander, P. (:,::) Der Grosse Alcibiades. Ein Weg Zu Plato. Bonn
(:,:,) Der Grosse Alcibiades. Zweiter Teil: Kritische Er oterung. Bonn
(:,o) Plato, vol. ii, The Dialogues. First Period, trans. H. Meyerhoff. New
York
(:,o,) Plato, vol. iii, The Dialogues. Second and Third Period, trans. H. Meyer-
hoff. Princeton, NJ
:: Works cited
Frontisi-Ducroux, F. (:,,) In the mirror of the mask, in A City of Images.
Iconography and Society in Ancient Greece, eds. C. B erard et al., trans.
D. Lyons. Princeton, NJ: :,:o,
(:,,o) Eros, desire, and the gaze, trans. N. Kline, in Kampen (ed.) :,,o:
::cc
Gadamer, H.-G. (:,c) Logos and ergon in Platos Lysis, in Dialogue and Dialectic:
Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, trans. P. C. Smith. New Haven, Conn.:
::c
Gagarin, M. (:,;;) Socrates hybris and Alcibiades failure, Phoenix ,:: ::,;
Gaiser, K. (:,,) Das Gold der Weisheit. Zum Gebet des Philosophen am Schluss
des Phaidros, RhM :,:: :c,c
Gantz, T. (:,,,) Early Greek Myth. A Guide to Literary and Artistic Sources (: vols.).
Baltimore, Md.
Gellrich, M. (:,,) Socratic magic: enchantment, irony, and persuasion in Platos
dialogues, CW ;: :;,,c;
Gerson, L. P. (:cco) A Platonic reading of Platos Symposium, in Lesher, Nails
and Shefeld (eds.) :cco: ;o;
Giannantoni, G. (:,,;) LAlcibiade di Eschine e la letteratura socratica su Alcib-
iade, in Giannantoni and Narcy (eds.) :,,;: ,,;,
Giannantoni, G. and M. Narcy (eds.) (:,,;) Lezioni socratiche. Napoli
Gill, C. (:,,c) Platonic love and individuality, in Polis and Politics. Essays in
Greek Moral and Political Philosophy, eds. A. Loizou and H. Lesser. Aldershot:
o,
(:,,:) Dogmatic dialogue in Phaedrus :;o-;?, in Rossetti (ed.) :,,:: :,o;:
(:,,o) Afterward: dialectic and the dialogue form in late Plato, in Form and
Argument in Late Plato, eds. C. Gill and M. M. McCabe. Oxford: :,,::
(:,,,) Plato. The Symposium. Translated with an Introduction and Notes. London
(:cc:) Speaking up for Platos interlocutors. A discussion of J. Beversluis,
Cross-examining Socrates, OSAPh :c: :,;,::
(:cc:) Dialectic and the dialogue form, in New Perspectives on Plato, Modern
and Ancient, eds. J. Annas, and C. Rowe. Washington, DC: :,;:
(:cc;) Self-knowledge in Platos Alcibiades, in Reading Ancient Texts, vol i,
Presocratics and Plato. Essays in Honour of Dennis OBrien, eds. S. Stern-Gillet
and K. Corrigan. Leiden: ,;:::
Glidden, D. K. (:,c) The language of love: Lysis :::a::,c,, Pacic Philosoph-
ical Quarterly o:: :;o,c
(:,:) The Lysis on loving ones own, CQ ,:: ,,,,
Golden, M. (:,) Slavery and homosexuality at Athens, Phoenix ,: ,c:
Goldin, O. (:,,,) Self, sameness, and soul in Alcibidades I and the Timaeus,
FZPhTh c: ,:,
Gonzalez, F. J. (:,,,a) Introduction: a short history of Platonic interpretation
and the third way, in Gonzalez (ed.) :,,,c: :::
(:,,,b) Platos Lysis: an enactment of philosophical kinship, AncPhil :,: o,,c
(:,,) Dialectic and Dialogue. Platos Practice of Philosophical Inquiry. Evanston,
Ill.
Works cited :,
(:ccc) Socrates on loving ones own: a traditional conception of 1lAlA radi-
cally transformed, CPh ,,: ,;,,
(:cc,) How to read a Platonic prologue: Lysis :c,a:c;d, in Plato as Author.
The Rhetoric of Philosophy. Cincinnati Classical Studies, new series, vol. viii,
ed. A. N. Michelini. Leiden: :,
Gonzalez, F. J. (ed.) (:,,,c) The Third Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies.
Lanham, Md.
Gooch, P. W. (:,,:) Has Plato changed Socrates heart in the Phaedrus?, in
Rossetti (ed.) :,,:: ,c,::
Gordon, J. (:,,,) Turning Toward Philosophy. Literary Device and Dramatic Struc-
ture in Platos Dialogues. University Park, Pa.
(:cc,) Eros and philosophical seduction in Alcibiades 1, AncPhil :,: ::,c
Gottschalk, H. B. (:,c) Heraclides of Pontus. Oxford
Gould, T. (:,o,) Platonic Love. New York
Granger, H. (:cc) Heraclitus quarrel with polymathy and historie, TAPhA :,:
:,,o:
Gregory, J. and S. B. Levin (:,,) 1lAO2O1lA A1OONO2 (Plato, Symposium
::cd), CQ : c:c
Greifenhagen, A. (:,,;) Griechische Eroten. Berlin
Gribble, D. (:,,,) Alcibiades and Athens. A Study in Literary Presentation. Oxford
Grifth, M. (:,,c) Contest and contradiction in early Greek poetry, in Cabinet
of the Muses. Essays on Classical and Comparative Literature in Honor of Thomas
G. Rosenmeyer, eds. M. Grifth and D. J. Mastronarde. Atlanta, Ga.: :,:c;
Grimaldi, W. A. (:,) Aristotle, Rhetoric II. A Commentary. New York
Griswold, C. L. Jr. (:,o) Self-Knowledge in Platos Phaedrus. New Haven, Conn.
Griswold, C. L. Jr. (ed.) (:,) Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings. New York
Grote, G. (:o;) Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates, vol. i. London, :nd
edn.
Guldentops, G. (:cc:) Platon, Phedon, Banquet, Ph`edre, Parmenide, Theet`ete,
Phil`ebe, in Motte and Rutten (eds.) :cc:: o:,
Guthrie, W. K. C. (:,o:) AHistory of Greek Philosophy, vol. i, The Earlier Presocratics
and the Pythagoreans. Cambridge
(:,;:) Socrates. Cambridge
(:,;,) A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. iv, Plato: The Man and His Dialogues:
Earlier Period. Cambridge
Hackforth, R. (:,,:) Platos Phaedrus. Translated with Introduction and Commen-
tary. Cambridge
Hadot, P. (:cc:) What is Ancient Philosophy? trans. M. Chase. Cambridge, Mass.
Halliwell, S. (:,,,) Forms of address: Socratic vocatives in Plato, in Lo spettacolo
delle voci, eds. F. de Martino, and A. H. Sommerstein. Bari: ;::: (parte
seconda)
(:ccc) The subjection of muthos to logos: Platos citations of the poets, CQ
,c: ,:::
(:cc) Greek Laughter. A Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer to Early
Christianity. Cambridge
: Works cited
Halperin, D. M. (:,,) Platonic er os and what men call love, AncPhil ,: :o::c
(:,o) Plato and erotic reciprocity, ClAnt ,: occ
(:,,c) Why is Diotima a woman? in D. M. Halperin, One Hundred Years of
Homosexuality. New York: ::,,:
(:,,:) Plato and the erotics of narrativity, in Klagge and Smith (eds.) :,,::
,,::,
Harris, W. V. (:,,) Ancient Literacy. Cambridge, Mass.
Havet, L. (:,::) Platon, Alcib. :,,c, Revue de philologie, de litterature et dhistoire
anciennes n.s. ,: ;,
Headlam, W. and A. D. Knox (eds.) (:,oo) Herodas: The Mimes and Fragments.
Cambridge
Heath, M. (:,,) The unity of Platos Phaedrus, OSAPh ;: :,:;, and :,,:
Hedreen, G. M. (:,,:) Silens in Attic Black-gure Vase-Painting: Myth and Perfor-
mance. Ann Arbor, Mich.
Hendrickson, G. L. (:,:,) Ancient reading, CJ :,: ::,o
Hobbs, A. (:cco) Female imagery in Plato, in Lesher, Nails and Shefeld (eds.)
:cco: :,:;:
Hoerber, R. G. (:,,:,o) Character portrayal in Platos Lysis, CJ :: :;:,
(:,,,) Platos Lysis, Phronesis : :,:
Hooker, J. (:,;) Homeric qic,, Glotta o,: o,
Hug, A. (:;o) Platons Symposion. Leipzig
Hunter, R. (:cc) Platos Symposium. Oxford
Hutchinson, D. S. (trans.) (:,,;) Alcibiades, in Plato. Complete Works, ed. J. M.
Cooper. Indianapolis, Ind.
Hyland, D. A. (:,o) Lpc,, Ltiuuic, and 1iic in Plato, Phronesis :,: ,:o
Irwin, T. (:,,,) Platos Ethics. New York
Jackson, B. D. (:,;:) The prayers of Socrates, Phronesis :o: :,;
Jaeger, W. (:,) Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of his Development, trans.
(with the authors corrections and additions) Richard Robinson. Oxford, :nd
edn.
J akel, S. and A. Timonen (eds.) (:,,) Laughter Down the Centuries, vol. i. Turku
(:,,,) Laughter Down the Centuries, vol. ii. Turku
Jenks, R. (:cc,) Varieties of qiic in Platos Lysis, AncPhil :,: o,c
Johnson, D. M. (:,,,) God as the true self: Platos Alcibiades I, AncPhil :,: ::,
Joly, R. (:,,o) Le th`eme philosophique des genres de vie dans lantiquite classique.
Brussels
Joyal, M. (:cc,) Review of Denyer :cc:, BMCRev :cc,.c:.:
Joyal, M. (ed.) (:ccc) The Platonic Theages. An Introduction, Commentary and
Critical Edition. Stuttgart
Justin, G. (:cc,) Identication and denition in the Lysis, AGPh ;: ;,:c
Kahn, C. H. (:,;) Platos theory of desire, RMeta :: ;;:c,
(:,,o) Plato and the Socratic Dialogue. The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form.
Cambridge
Kampen, N. B. (ed.) (:,,o) Sexuality in Ancient Art. Cambridge
Kassel, R. and C. Austin (eds.) (:,,:cc:) Poetae Comici Graeci ( vols.). New
York
Works cited :,
Kirk, G. S., J. E. Raven and M. Schoeld (:,,,) The Presocratic Philosophers. A
Critical History with a Selection of Texts. Cambridge, :nd edn.
Klagge, J. C. and N. D. Smith (eds.) (:,,:) Methods of Interpreting Plato and his
Dialogues. OSAPh Supp. vol. Oxford
Knox, B. M. W. (:,o) Silent reading in antiquity, GRBS ,: ::,,
Kofman, S. (:cc:) Socrates and his twins (The Socrates[es] of Platos Sympo-
sium), in Feminism and History of Philosophy, ed. G. Lloyd. Oxford: :o;
Konstan, D. (:,,o) Greek friendship, AJPh ::;: ;:,
(:,,;) Friendship in the Classical World. Cambridge
(:,,,) Commentary on Rowe: mortal love, in Cleary and Gurtler (eds.) :,,,:
:oc;
(:ccc) Plato on love and friendship, Hypnos ,: :,o,
(:cco) The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks. Studies in Aristotle and Classical
Literature. Toronto
Konstan, D. and E. Young-Bruehl (:,:) Eryximachus speech in the Symposium,
Apeiron :o: co
Kosman, L. A. (:,;o) Platonic love, in Facets of Platos Philosophy, Phronesis
Suppl. :, ed. W. H. Werkmeister. Assen: ,,o,
Koster, W. J. W. (:,,:) Le mythe de Platon, de Zarathoustra et des Chaldeens. Leiden
Kraut, R. (ed.) (:,,:) The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge
Krentz, A. A. (:,,) Dramatic form and philosophical content in Platos dia-
logues, Ph&Lit ;: ,:;
Kuhnert, E. (:,,:) Satyros und Silenos, in Ausf uhrliches Lexikon der griechischen
und r omischen Mythologie, vol. iv, ed. W. H. Roscher. Hildesheim: ,,:
Kuiper, W. E. J. (:,c,) De Lysidis dialogi origine, tempore, consilio. Zwolle
Kullmann, W. (:,,,) Die antiken Philosophen und das Lachen, in J akel and
Timonen (eds.) :,,,: ;,,
Lacan, J. (:,,:) Le seminaire de Jacques Lacan, Book , Le transfer. Texte etabli par
Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris
Lamb, W. R. M. (trans.) (:,:;) Plato. Charmides, Alcibiades I and II, Hipparchus,
The Lovers, Theages, Minos, Epinomis. Cambridge, Mass.
Landfester, M. (:,oo) Das griechische Nomen philos und seine Ableitungen.
Hildesheim
Lane, M. (:cco) The evolution of eir oneia in classical Greek texts: why Socratic
eir oneia is not Socratic irony, OSAPh ,:: ,,
(:cc;) Virtue as the love of knowledge in Platos Symposium and Republic, in
Scott (ed.) :cc;: ,;:,,
Lapatin, K. (:cco) Picturing Socrates, in Ahbel-Rappe and Kamtekar (eds.)
:cco: ::c,,
Lattimore, R. (trans.) (:,,:) The Iliad of Homer. Chicago, Ill.
(:,o,) Story Patterns in Greek Tragedy. Ann Arbor, Mich.
Laurent, J. (:cc:) La mesure de lhumain dans lAlcibaide et les Lois, in
J. Laurent, La mesure de lhumain selon Platon. Paris: ;:,,
Lawler, L. B. (:,oc) Cosmic dance and dithyramb, in Studies in Honor of Ullman,
eds. L. B. Lawler, D. M. Robathan and W. C. Korfmacher. St. Louis, Mo.
:::o
:o Works cited
Lear, G. R. (:cco) Permanent beauty and becoming happy in Platos Symposium,
in Lesher, Nails and Shefeld (eds.) :cco: ,o::,
Lear, J. (:,,) Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul. Cambridge, Mass.
Lebeck, A. (:,;:) The central myth of Platos Phaedrus, GRBS :,: :o;,c
Lefka, A. and A. Motte (:cc:) Platon, Conclusions, in Motte and Rutten (eds.)
:cc:: :,,,c
Lesher, J. (:cco) Some notable afterimages of Platos Symposium, in Lesher,
Nails and Shefeld (eds.) :cco: ,:,c
Lesher, J., D. Nails and F. C. C. Shefeld (eds.) (:cco) Platos Symposium. Issues
in Interpretation and Reception. Cambridge, Mass.
L ev eque, P. (:,,,) Agathon. Annales de lUniversite de Lyon :o. Paris
Levin, D. N. (:,;:) Some observations concerning Platos Lysis, in Anton and
Kustas (eds.) :,;:: :,o,
Linforth, I. M. (:,o) The Corybantic rites in Plato, University of California
Publications in Classical Philology :,: :::o:. Berkeley, Calif.
Linguiti, A. (:,:) Il rispecchiamento nel dio. Platone, Alcibiade Primo :,,c:;,
Civilit` a classica e cristiana :: :,:;c
(:,,) Amicizia e conoscenza di s e nell Alcibiade Primo e nelle Etiche di
Aristotele, Annali dell Istituto di Filosoa dell Universit` a di Firenze ,: ::
Lissarrague, F. (:,;) Dionysos sen va-t-en guerre, in Images et societe en Gr`ece
ancienne, eds. C. C. B erard, C. Bron and A. Pomari. Lausanne: ::::c
(:,,ca) Why satyrs are good to represent, in Winkler and Zeitlin (eds.) :,,c:
::,o
(:,,cb) The Aesthetics of the Greek Banquet. Images of Wine and Ritual, trans.
A. Szegedy-Maszak. Princeton, NJ
(:,,cc) The sexual life of satyrs, in Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic
Experience in the Ancient Greek World. eds. D. M. Halperin, J. J. Winkler
and F. I. Zeitlin. Princeton, NJ: ,,:
(:,,,) On the wildness of satyrs, in Carpenter and Faraone (eds.) :,,,: :c;:c
Lloyd-Jones, H. and N. G. Wilson (eds.) (:,,c) Sophoclis Fabulae. Oxford
Lobel, E. and D. Page (eds.) (:,,,) Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta. Oxford
Lowenstam, S. (:,,) Paradoxes in Platos Symposium, Ramus :: ,:c
(:,o) Aristophanes hiccups, GRBS :;: ,,o
Ludwig, P. W. (:,,o) Politics and eros in Aristophanes speech: Symposium :,:e
:,:a and the comedies, AJPh ::;: ,,;o:
(:cc:) Eros and Polis. Desire and Community in Greek Political Thought.
Cambridge
Lukinovich, A. (:,,c) The play of reections between literary form and sympotic
theme in the Deipnosophistae of Athenaeus, in Murray (ed.) :,,c: :o,;:
Lutz, M. J. (:,,) Socrates Education to Virtue. Learning the Love of the Noble.
Albany, NY
MacDowell, D. M. (:,;o) Hybris in Athens, G&R :,: :,:
Mackenzie, M. M. (:,:) Plato on Punishment. Berkeley, Calif.
(:,) Impasse and explanation: from the Lysis to the Phaedo,AGPh ;c: :,,
Mader, M. (:,;;) Das Problem des Lachens und der Kom odie bei Platon. Stuttgart
Works cited :;
Maehler, H. (:,,o) Books, Greek and Roman, in The Oxford Classical Dictionary,
eds. S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth. Oxford: :,,:, ,rd edn.
Marboeuf, C. and J.-F. Pradeau (:ccc) Platon: Alcibiade. Paris, :nd edn.
Mason, H. A. (:,c) Platos comic masterpiece?, Cambridge Quarterly ,: :::
Matthews, G. B. (:,,,) Socratic Perplexity and the Nature of Philosophy. Oxford
Mazon, P. (:,,:) Hesiode. Theogonie, Les travaux et les jours, Le bouclier. Paris
McGibbon, D. D. (:,o) The fall of the soul in Platos Phaedrus, CQ :: ,oo,
McKim, R. (:,) Shame and truth in Platos Gorgias, in Platonic Writings,
Platonic Readings, ed. C. L. Griswold. New York: ,
McPherran, M. L. (:,,o) The Religion of Socrates. University Park, Pa.
(:cc,) Introducing a new god: Socrates and his daimonion, in Socrates Divine
Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy, eds. P. Destr ee and
N. D. Smith. Kelowna, BC: :,,c
(:cco) Medicine, magic, and religion in Platos Symposium, in Lesher, Nails
and Shefeld (eds.) :cco: ;:,,
Meinwald, C. C. (:,,:) Platos Parmenides. New York and Oxford
(:,,:) Good-bye to the Third Man, in Kraut (ed.) :,,:: ,o,,o
Mette, H. J. (ed.) (:,,,) Die Fragmente der Trag odien des Aischylos. Berlin
Michelini, A. N. (:,,) lOAAH AIPOlKlA: rudeness and irony in Platos
Gorgias, CPh ,,: ,c,
Mitchell, L. G. (:,,;) qiic, t0vcic and Greek interstate relations, Antichthon
,:: :
Montiglio, S. (:cc,) Wandering in Ancient Greek Culture. Chicago, Ill.
Moore, C. (:cc) Socratic Persuasion. Diss. University of Minnesota
Moore, J. D. (:,;,) The relation between Platos Symposium and Phaedrus, in
Patterns in Platos Thought, ed. J. M. E. Moravcsik. Dordrecht: ,:;:
Moravcsik, J. M. E. (:,;:) Reason and eros in the ascent-passage of the Sympo-
sium, in Anton and Kustas (eds.) :,;:: :,,c:
More, T. (:,,,) Erasmuss The Sileni of Alcibiades, in Thomas More. Utopia
with Erasmuss The Sileni of Alcibiades, ed. and trans. D. Wootton. Indi-
anapolis, Ind.: :o,,:
Morgan, M. L. (:,,c) Platonic Piety: Philosophy and Ritual in Fourth-Century
Athens. New Haven, Conn.
(:,,:) Plato and Greek religion, in Kraut (ed.) :,,:: ::;;
Morris, T. F. (:,o) Platos Lysis, Philosophy Research Archives ::: :o,;,
Morrison, J. S. (:,,) The origins of Platos philosopher-statesman, CQ n.s. :
:,::
(:,o) Four notes on Platos Symposium, CQ :: :,,
Morrow, G. R. (:,oc) Platos Cretan City. A Historical Interpretation of the Laws.
Princeton, NJ
Motte, A. (:,o:) Pour lauthenticit e du Premier Alcibiade, AC ,c: ,,:
(:,,:) Laventure spirituelle du Ph`edre et la pri` ere, in Rossetti (ed.) :,,::
,:c,
Motte, A. and C. Rutten (eds.) (:cc:) Aporia dans la philosophie grecque des origines
` a Aristote. Louvain
: Works cited
Moutsopoulos, E. (:,,,) La musique dans loeuvre de Platon. Paris
Murphy, D. J. (:,,,) Review of Bordt :,,, BMCRev ,,..
Murray, O. (ed.) (:,,c) Sympotica: A Symposium on the Symposion. Oxford
Nails, D. (:,,,) Agora, Academy, and the Conduct of Philosophy. Dordrecht
(:cc:) The People of Plato. A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics. Indi-
anapolis, Ind.
(:cco) Tragedy off-stage, in Lesher, Nails and Shefeld (eds.) :cco: :;,:c;
(:cc) Socrates, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall :cc edn.),
ed. E. N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall:cc/entries/socrates/
(accessed September ::, :c::)
Narcy, M. (:,,;) Le socratisme du Lysis. i. Philia et dialegesthai, and ii. Proton
philon et oikeion, in Giannantoni and Narcy (eds.) :,,;: :c,: and ::,,,
(:ccc) Le Socrate du Lysis est-il un sophiste?, in Robinson and Brisson (eds.)
:ccc: :c,,
Nauck, A. (ed.) (:,o) Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, with supplement by
B. Snell. Hildesheim
Nehamas, A. (:,,) The Art of Living. Socratic Reections from Plato to Foucault.
Berkeley, Calif.
(:cc;a) Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art.
Princeton, NJ
(:cc;b) Beauty of body, nobility of soul: the pursuit of love in Platos Sympo-
sium, in Scott (ed.) :cc;: ,;:,,
Nehamas, A. and P. Woodruff (:,,) Plato. Symposium. Translated with Introduc-
tion and Notes. Indianapolis, Ind.
(:,,,) Plato. Phaedrus. Translated with Introduction and Notes. Indianapolis,
Ind.
Nichols, M. P. (:cc,) Socrates on Friendship and Community. Reections on Platos
Symposium, Phaedrus, and Lysis. New York
Nightingale, A. W. (:,,,) The Folly of Praise: Platos Critique of Encomiastic
Discourse in the Lysis and Symposium, CQ ,: :::,c
(:,,,) Genres in Dialogue. Plato and the Construct of Philosophy. Cambridge
(:cc) Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in its Cultural
Context. Cambridge
Normann, F. (:,,:) Die von der Wurzel fil- gebildeten W orter und die Vorstellung
der Liebe im Griechischen. M unster
North, H. F. (:,,) Opening Socrates: the eikon of Alcibiades, ICS :,: ,,
Nussbaum, M. C. (:,o) The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek
Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge
(:cc:) Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge
Nye, A. (:,,c) The subject of love: Diotima and her critics, Journal of Value
Inquiry :: :,,,,
OBrien, J. V. (:,,,) The Transformation of Hera: A Study of Ritual, Hero, and the
Goddess in the Iliad. Lanham, Md.
OConnor, D. K. (:,,,) Socrates and political ambition: the dangerous game,
in Cleary and Gurtler :,,,: ,:,:
Works cited :,
Opsomer, J. (:cc:). Plato, Hippias mineur, Alcibiade I, Apologie . . . Lysis . . . , in
Motte and Rutten :cc:: ,;,,
Osborne, C. (:,,) Eros Unveiled. Plato and the God of Love. Oxford
(:cco) Socrates in the Platonic dialogues, Philosophical Investigations :,: :::
Padel, R. (:,,:) In and Out of the Mind. Greek Images of the Tragic Self. Princeton,
NJ
Page, D. L. (ed.) (:,o:) Poetae Melici Graeci. Oxford
Pakaluk, M. (:cc) Socratic magnanimity in the Phaedo, AncPhil :: :c::;
Palmer, J. A. (:,,,) Platos Reception of Parmenides. Oxford
Pangle, T. L. (:,;a) Editors introduction, in Pangle (ed.) :,;b: ::c
Pangle, T. L. (ed.) (:,;b) The Roots of Political Philosophy. Ten Forgotten Socratic
Dialogues. Translated, with Interpretive Studies. Ithaca, NY
Partridge, J. (:,,,) Socratic dialectic and the art of love: on Phaedrus :;oe:;;a,
AncPhil :,: :::,:
Patterson, R. (:,:) The Platonic art of comedy and tragedy, Ph&Lit o: ;o,,
(:,,:) The ascent in Platos Symposium, in Proceedings of the Boston Area
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. vii, eds. J. J. Cleary and D. C. Shartin.
Lanham, Md.: :,,::
Payne, A. (:,,,) The refutation of Agathon: Symposium :,,c:c:c, AncPhil :,:
:,,,,
Pellizer, E. (:,,c) Outlines of a morphology of sympotic entertainment, in
Murray (ed.) :,,c: :;;
Pender, E. E. (:,,:) Spiritual pregnancy in Platos Symposium, CQ :: ;:o
(:cc;) Sappho and Anacreon in Platos Phaedrus, LICS o: :,;
Penner, T. and C. Rowe (:cc,) Platos Lysis. Cambridge
Penwill, J. L. (:,;) Men in love: aspects of Platos Symposium, Ramus ;: :,;,
Peterson, S. (:c::) Socrates and Philosophy in the Dialogues of Plato. Cambridge
Piccone, E. H. (:,,:) Four features of dialectic in Platos Phaedrus, in Rossetti
(ed.) :,,:: :o:
Pickard-Cambridge, A. (:,o:) Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy, revised by T. B. L.
Webster. Oxford, :nd edn.
Places,
E. des (:,,:) Platon. Oeuvres compl`etes, vol. xi, Les Lois. Paris
Planeaux, C. (:cc:) Socrates, an unreliable narrator? The dramatic setting of the
Lysis, CPh ,o: oc
Plass, P. C. (:,;) Platos pregnant lover, SO ,,: ;,,
Plochmann, G. K. (:,;:) Supporting themes in the Symposium, in Anton and
Kustas (eds.) :,;:: ,:
Pohlenz, M. (:,:,) Aus Platos Werdezeit. Berlin
(:,:o) Review of Arnim :,:, GGA ,: :::
(:,:;) Nochmals Platos Lysis, Nachrichten von der K oniglichen Gesellschaft der
Wissenschaften zu G ottingen. Philologische-Historische-Klasse: ,oc
(:,::) Review of U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Platon (:,:c), GGA :,:
:,c
Politis, V. (:cco) Aporia andsearching inthe early Plato, inRemembering Socrates.
Philosophical Essays, eds. L. Judson and V. Karasmanis. Oxford: :c,
:,c Works cited
Pradeau, J.-F. (:ccc) Introduction, notes, bibliography and index in Marboeuf
and Pradeau :ccc
(:cc;) Tumescence and spiritual seed in the Phaedrus, in Reading Ancient
Texts: Essays in Honour of Denis OBrien, vol. i, Presocratics and Plato, eds.
S. Stern-Gillet and K. Corrigan. Leiden: :,,oo
Press, G. A. (:,,o) The state of the question in the study of Plato, SJPh ,:
,c;,:
(:cc;) Plato: A Guide for the Perplexed. London
Press, G. A. (ed.) (:,,,) Platos Dialogues. New Studies and Interpretations. Lanham
Md.
(ed.) (:ccc) Who Speaks for Plato? Studies in Platonic Anonymity. Lanham,
Md.
Price, A. W. (:,,) Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford
(:,,:) Martha Nussbaums Symposium, AncPhil ::: :,,,
(:,,,) Mental Conict. London
(:,,;) Afterward (:,,;), in Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford:
:,c;:, rpt. of :,, edn., with additions and corrections
Race, W. H. (ed. and trans.) (:,,;a) Pindar. Olympian Odes, Pythian Odes. Cam-
bridge, Mass.
(:,,;b) Pindar. Nemean Odes, Isthmian Odes, Fragments. Cambridge, Mass.
Radt, S. (ed.) (:,;;) Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, vol. iv, Sophocles.
G ottingen
(:,,) Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, vol. iii, Aeschylus. G ottingen
Raeder, H. (:,c,) Platons philosophische Entwickelung. Leipzig
Ralkowski, M. (:cc;) Was Plato a Platonist?, AncPhil :;: ,,:c:
Rappe, S. L. (:,,,) Socrates and self-knowledge, Apeiron ,;: ::
Reeve, C. D. C. (:,,) Socrates in the Apology. An essay on Platos Apology of Socrates.
Indianapolis, Ind.
(:,,:) Telling the truth about love: Platos Symposium, in Cleary (ed.) :,,::
,::
(:ccoa) A study in violets: Alcibiades in the Symposium, in Lesher, Nails and
Shefeld (eds.) :cco: ::o
(:ccob) Plato on eros and friendship, in A Companion to Plato, ed. H. Benson.
Malden, Mass.: :,,c;
Reis, B. (ed.) (:cco) The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics. Cambridge
Renaud, F. (:cc:) Humbling as upbringing: the ethical dimension of the elenchus
in the Lysis, in Scott (ed.) :cc:: :,,
Renehan, R. (:,,c) Three places in Platos Symposium, CPh ,: ::co
Reshotko, N. (:,,;) Platos Lysis: a Socratic treatise on desire and attraction,
Apeiron ,c: ::
(:cco) Socratic Virtue. Making the Best of the Neither-Good-nor-Bad. Cambridge
Richter, G. M. A. (:,o,) The Portraits of the Greeks (, vols.). London
Riedweg, C. (:,;) Mysterienterminologie bei Platon, Philon und Klemens von
Alexandrien. Berlin
Robin, L. (:,c) La theorie platonicienne de lamour. Paris
Works cited :,:
(:,,) Notice, in Platon. Ph`edre, eds. C. Moreschini and P. Vicaire. Paris:
viiccv
(:cc:) Notice, in Vicaire and Laborderie (eds.) :cc:: viicxv
Robinson, D. B. (:,o) Platos Lysis: the structural problem, ICS ::: o,,
(:,,c) Homeric qic,: love of life and limbs, and friendship with ones uuc,,
in Owls to Athens: Essays on Classical Subjects Presented to Sir Kenneth Dover,
ed. E. M. Craik. Oxford: ,;:c
(no date) Lysis. Overall Interpretation, Archelogos Projects, http://archelogos.
com/project/archie-frameset.jsp?xmlle=lysisc.xml (accessed September ::,
:c::)
Robinson, D. B. and Hermann, F.-G. (no date) Plato: Lysis. Commentary, Arche-
logos Projects, http://archelogos.com/xml/toc/toc-lysis.htm(accessed Septem-
ber ::, :c::)
Robinson, T. M. (:,;c) Platos Psychology. Toronto
Robinson, T. M. and L. Brisson (eds.) (:ccc) Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides.
Proceedings of the V Symposium Platonicum: Selected Papers. Sankt Augustin
Romilly, J. de (:,:) Les conits de l ame dans le Ph`edre de Platon, WS n.s. :o:
:cc:,
Roochnik, D. L. (:,;) The erotics of philosophical discourse, HPhQ :
::;:,
(:,,o) Of Art and Wisdom. Platos Understanding of Techne. University Park, Pa.
(:cc:) Self-recognition in Platos Theaetetus, AncPhil ::: ,;,:
Rosen, S. (:,o,) The role of eros in Platos Republic, RMeta :: ,:;,
(:,;) Platos Symposium. New Haven, Conn., :nd edn.
(:,) The Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry. Studies in Ancient Thought.
New York
R osler, W. (:,,c) Mnemosyne in the Symposium, in Murray (ed.) :,,c: :,c;
Rossetti, L. (:,c) Ricerche sui Dialoghi Socratici de Fedone e di Euclide,
Hermes :c: :,:cc
(:ccc) Le ridicule comme arme entre les mains de Socrate et de ses el` eves, in
Le rire des grecs. Anthropologie du rire en Gr`ece ancienne, ed. M.-L. Desclos.
Grenoble: :,,o
Rossetti, L. (ed.) (:,,:) Understanding the Phaedrus. Proceedings of the II Symposium
Platonicum. Sankt Augustin
Rowe, C. J. (:,o) The argument and structure of Platos Phaedrus, PCPhS ,::
:co:,
(:,) Plato: Phaedrus, with Translation and Commentary. Warminster, :nd edn,
corrected
(:,,) The unity of the Phaedrus: a reply to Heath, OSAPh ;: :;,,:
(:,,c) Philosophy, love, and madness, in The Person and the Human Mind,
ed. C. Gill. Oxford: ::;o
(:,,) Plato: Symposium. Edited with an Introduction and Commentary.
Warminster
(:,,,a) Socrates and Diotima: eros, immortality, and creativity, in Cleary and
Gurtler (eds.) :,,,: :,,,,
:,: Works cited
(:,,,b) The speech of Eryximachus in Platos Symposium, in Traditions of
Platonism: Essays in Honour of John Dillon, ed. J. J. Cleary. Aldershot: ,,o
(:ccc) The Lysis and the Symposium: aporia and euporia?, in Robinson and
Brisson (eds.) :ccc: :c:o
(:cc:) Socrates and his twin in Platos Symposium, Omnibus :: ,c,
(:cc) All our desires are for the good. Reections on some key Platonic
dialogues, in Plato Ethicus. Philosophy is Life. Proceedings of the International
Colloquium, Piacenza (Italy) 2003. Lecturae Platonis, vol. iv, eds. M. Migliori
et al. Sankt Augustin: :o,;:
(:cc,) The charioteer and his horses: an example of Platonic myth-making,
in Platos Myths, ed. C. Partenie. Cambridge: :,;
Rudebusch, G. (:,,,) Socrates, Pleasure, and Value. New York
(:cc:) Review of Bordt :,,, AncPhil ::: :;;c
(:cc) True love is requited: the argument of Lysis :::d:::a, AncPhil ::
o;c
(:cco) Socratic love, in Ahbel-Rappe and Kamtekar (eds.) :cco: :o,,
(:cc,) Socrates. Malden, Mass.
Ruprecht, L. A., Jr. (:,,,) Symposia. Plato, the Erotic and Moral Value. Albany,
NY
Rutherford, R. B. (:,,,) The Art of Plato. Ten Essays in Platonic Interpretation.
London
Rutland, L. (:,) Hope springs eternal: disaster in Thucydides, EMC (= Clas-
sical Views) :;: :,::
Santas, G. (:,) Plato and Freud. Two Theories of Love. Oxford
Saunders, T. J. (trans.) (:,;c) Plato. The Laws. Harmondsworth
Saxonhouse, A. W. (:,) Eros and the female in Greek political thought. An
interpretation of Platos Symposium, Political Theory ::: ,:;
Sayre, K. (:,,:) A maieutic view of ve late dialogues, in Klagge and Smith
(eds.) :,,:: :::,
Schein, S. L. (:,;) Alcibiades and the politics of misguided love in Platos
Symposium, Theta-Pi ,: :,o;
Schenker, D. J. (:cco) The strangeness of the Phaedrus, AJPh ::;: o;;
Schleiermacher, F. (:,;,) Schleiermachers Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato,
trans. W. Dobson. New York
Scott, D. (:ccc) Socrates and Alcibiades in the Symposium, Hermathena :o:
:,,;
Scott, D. (ed.) (:cc;) Maieusis. Essays on Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles
Burnyeat. Oxford
Scott, G. A. (:ccc) Platos Socrates as Educator. Albany, NY
Scott, G. A. (ed.) (:cc:) Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in
Platos Dialogues and Beyond. University Park, Pa.
Scott, G. A. and W. A. Welton (:cc) Erotic Wisdom. Philosophy and Intermediacy
in Platos Symposium. Albany, NY
Scully, S. (trans.) (:cc,) Platos Phaedrus. Newburyport, Mass.
Seaford, R. A. S. (:,;o) . On the Origins of Satyric Drama, Maia :: :c,::
Works cited :,,
(:,a) The eleventh ode of Bacchylides: Hera, Artemis, and the absence of
Dionysos,JHS :c: ::,o
(:,,) Sophokles and the Mysteries, Hermes :::: :;,
Seaford, R. A. (ed.) (:,b) Euripides. Cyclops. Oxford
Sedley, D. (:,,) Is the Lysis a dialogue of denition?, Phronesis ,: :c;
(:cco) The speech of Agathon in Platos Symposium, in Reis (ed.) :cco: ;o,
Seech, Z. P. (:,;,) Platos Lysis as Drama and Philosophy. Diss. University of
California, San Diego
Seeskin, K. (:,;) Dialogue and Discovery. A Study in Socratic Method. Albany, NY
Segonds, A.-P. (ed. and trans.) (:cc,) Proclus. Sur le Premier Alcibiade de Platon
(: vols.). Paris
Shefeld, F. C. C. (:cc:) Psychic pregnancy and Platonic epistemology, OSAPh
:c: :,,
(:ccoa) Platos Symposium: The Ethics of Desire. Oxford
(:ccob) The role of the earlier speeches in the Symposium: Platos endoxic
method?, in Lesher, Nails and Shefeld (eds.) :cco: :,o
Shorey, P. (:,,,) What Plato Said. Chicago, Ill.
Sier, K. (:,,;) Die Rede der Diotima. Untersuchungen zum platonischen Symposion.
Stuttgart
Sinaiko, H. L. (:,o,) Love, Knowledge, and Discourse inPlato: Dialogue and Dialectic
in Phaedrus, Republic, Parmenides. Chicago, Ill.
Skinner, M. B. (:cc,) Sexuality in Greek and Roman Culture. Malden, Mass.
Slings, S. R. (:,,,) Plato. Clitophon. Edited with Introduction, Translation and
Commentary. Cambridge
Slings, S. R. (ed.) (:cc,) Platonis Opera. Rempublicam. Oxford
Smith, N. D. (:cc) Did Plato write the Alcibiades I?, Apeiron ,;: ,,:c
Solmsen, F. (:,;:) Parmenides and the description of perfect beauty in Platos
Symposium, AJPh ,:: o:;c
Solmsen, F. (ed.) (:,,c) Hesiodi. Theogonia; Opera et Dies; Scutum. Fragmenta
Selecta, eds. R. Merkelbach and M. L. West. Oxford, ,rd edn.
Sommerstein, A. H. (:,,c) Lysistrata. Edited with translation and notes. The Come-
dies of Aristophanes, vol. vii. Warminster
Soulez-Luccioni, A. (:,;) Le paradigme de la vision de soi-m eme dans l Alci-
biade majeur, RMM ;,: :,o:::
Sprague, R. K. (:,,) Aristotle on Red Mirrors (On Dreams II ,,b:oca:,),
Phronesis ,c: ,:,,
Stewart, A. (:,,o) Reections, in Kampen (ed.) :,,o: :,o,
Stewart, Z. (:,,) Laughter and the Greek philosophers: a sketch, in J akel and
Timonen (eds.) :,,: :,,;
Stoeber, M. (:,,:) Phaedrus of the Phaedrus: the impassioned soul, Ph&Rh :,:
:;:c
Strycker, E. de (:,:) Platonica I. Lauthenticit e du Premier Alcibiade, LEC :::
:,,,:
Strycker, E. de and S. R. Slings (:,,) Platos Apology of Socrates. A Literary and
Philosophical Study with a Running Commentary. Leiden
:, Works cited
Svenbro, J. (:,) Phrasikleia. Anthropologie de la lecture en Gr`ece ancienne. Paris
Szlez ak, T. A. (:,,) Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie: Interpretationen
zu den fr uhen und mittleren Dialogen. Berlin
(:,,,) Reading Plato, trans. G. Zanker. London
Tarrant, D. (:,,:) Platos use of quotations and other illustrative material, CQ
,: ,,o;
(:,,) The touch of Socrates, CQ : ,,
Taylor, A. E. (:,:) A Commentary on Platos Timaeus. Oxford
(:,,o) Plato. The Man and His Work. New York
Tecus an, M. (:,,c) Logos sympotikos: patterns of the irrational in philosophical
drinking: Plato outside the Symposium, in Murray (ed.) :,,c: :,oc
Tejera, V. (:,,c) On the form and authenticity of the Lysis, AncPhil :c: :;,,:
Teloh, H. (:,o) Socratic Education in Platos Early Dialogues. Notre Dame, Ind.
Tessitore, A. (:,,c) Platos Lysis: an introduction to philosophical friendship,
SJPh :: ::,,:
Thomas, R. (:,,:) Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece. Cambridge
Thompson, W. H. (:o) The Phaedrus of Plato. London
Tindale, C. W. (:,) Platos Lysis: a reconsideration. Apeiron :: :c:,
Tracy, T. J. (:,o,) Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and
Aristotle. The Hague
Turner, E. G. (:,,) Athenian Books in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries b.c. London
Usher, M. D. (:cc:) Satyr play in Platos Symposium, AJPh ::,: :c,:
Ussher, R. G. (:,;;) The other Aeschylus. A study of the fragments of Aeschylean
satyr plays, Phoenix ,:: :;,,
Vann, W. (:cco) The Good Friend: An Analysis of Platos Lysis. Diss. University of
Minnesota
Verdenius, W. J. (:,o:) Der Begriff der Mania in Platons Phaidros,AGPh :
:,:,c
Vernant, J.-P. (:,,) At mans table: Hesiods foundation myth of sacrice, in
The Cuisine of Sacrice among the Greeks, eds. M. Detienne and J.-P. Vernant,
trans. P. Wissing. Chicago, Ill.: ::o
Versenyi, L. (:,;,) Platos Lysis, Phronesis :c: :,,
Vetta, M. (:,,) Introduzione. Poesia simposiale nella Grecia arcaia e classica,
in Poesia e simposio nella Grecia antica: Guida storica e critica, ed. M. Vetta.
Rome: xiiilx
Vicaire, P. (:,oc) Platon. Critique litteraire. Paris
Vicaire, P. and J. Laborderie (eds.) (:cc:) Platon. Oeuvres compl`etes, vol. iv,
part :, Le Banquet. Paris
Vigneron, P. (:,o) Le cheval dans lantiquite greco-romaine (: vols.). Nancy
Vlastos, G. (:,;) Equality and justice in early Greek cosmology, CPh ::
:,o;
(:,;:) Introduction: the paradox of Socrates, in The Philosophy of Socrates. A
Collection of Critical Essays, ed. G. Vlastos. New York: :::
(:,;,) The individual as an object of love in Plato, in G. Vlastos, Platonic
Studies. Princeton, NJ: ,:
Works cited :,,
(:,;,) Platos testimony concerning Zeno of Elea, JHS ,,: :,oo:
(:,,:) Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Ithaca, NY
Voigt, E.-M. (ed.) (:,;:) Sappho et Alcaeus: Fragmenta. Amsterdam
Wardy, R. (:cc:) The unity of opposites in Platos Symposium, OSAPh :,: :o:
Warner, M. (:,,:) Dialectical drama: the case of Platos Symposium, Apeiron :,:
:,;,
Weil, R. (:,o) La place du Premier Alcibiade dans loeuvre de Platon,
Linformation litteraire :o: ;,
Weiss, R. (:ccoa) The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies. Chicago, Ill.
(:ccob) Socrates: seeker or preacher?, in Ahbel-Rappe and Kamtekar (eds.)
:cco: :,,,
Wellman, R. R. (:,oo) Socrates and Alcibiades: the Alcibiades Major, History of
Education Quarterly o: ,::
Werner, D. (:cc;) Platos Phaedrus and the problem of unity, OSAPh ,::
,::,;
West, M. L. (ed.) (:,oo) Hesiod. Theogony. Oxford
(:,,:,,:) Iambi et Elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum Cantati (: vols.). Oxford,
:nd edn.
West, T. G. (:,;,) Platos Apology of Socrates. An Interpretation, with a New Trans-
lation. Ithaca, NY
Westerink, L. G. (:,;) Review of Bos :,;c, AJPh ,,: ;:,
Westerink, L. G. (ed.) (:,,o) Olympiodorus. Commentary on the First Alcibiades of
Plato. Critical Text and Indices. Amsterdam
Westermayer, A. (:;,) Der Lysis des Plato: zur Einf uhrung in das Verst andniss der
sokratischen Dialoge. Erlangen
White, D. A. (:,,,) Rhetoric and Reality in Platos Phaedrus. Albany, NY
Wilkins, J. (:ccc) The Boastful Chef: The Discourse of Food in Ancient Greek
Comedy. Oxford
Winkler, J. J. and F. I. Zeitlin (eds.) (:,,c) Nothing to Do with Dionysos? Athenian
Drama in Its Social Context. Princeton, NJ
Wohl, V. (:cc:) Love Among the Ruins. The Erotics of Democracy in Classical Athens,
Princeton, NJ
Wolff, F. (:,,;) Etre disciple de Socrate, in Giannantoni and Narcy (eds.) :,,;:
,:;,
Wolfsdorf, D. C. (:,,;) Aporia in Platos Charmides, Laches and Lysis. Diss.
University of Chicago
(:cca) Socrates avowals of knowledge, Phronesis ,: ;,::
(:ccb) Interpreting Platos early dialogues, OSAPh :;: :,c
(:cc) Trials of Reason: Plato and the Crafting of Philosophy. Oxford
Woodruff, P. (:,,c) Platos early theory of knowledge, in Epistemology: Compan-
ions to Ancient Thought, ed. S. Everson. Cambridge: oc,
(:ccc) Socrates and the irrational, in Reason and Religion in Socratic Philoso-
phy, eds. N. D. Smith and P. B. Woodruff. Oxford: :,c,c
Yonezawa, S. (:,,,) Socratic knowledge and Socratic virtue, AncPhil :,: ,,,
(:cc) Socrates conception of philosophy, BJHP ::: :::
:,o Works cited
Yunis, H. (:cc,) Eros in Platos Phaedrus and the shape of Greek rhetoric, Arion
:,: :c::,
Zanker, P. (:,,,) The Mask of Socrates. The Image of the Intellectual in Antiquity,
trans. A. Shapiro. Berkeley, Calif.
Zeitlin, F. I. (:,,o) Playing the Other. Gender and Society in Classical Greek Litera-
ture. Chicago, Ill.
Ziolkowski, J. E. (:,,,) The bow and the lyre: harmonizing duos in Platos
Symposium, CJ ,,: :,,,
Index
Achilles
as beloved, in Symp. ::,
and desire for glory :, :,;
and Socrates :,, :;, :
Adkins, Arthur ;o
Aeschines, Alcibiades of, on er os :
Aeschylus, term er os in Aga. of ,
Agathon (see also amathia, elenchus, shame,
symposium)
character in Symp. :c, :,, ::;:,, :,;, :o:,
:o;;
compared with character Alcibiades (in Alc. I)
:;o; (in Symp.) :o:, :o, :;o, :;,,
:c;
historical gure :,, :,,, :;:
aid os (reverence)
in Laws :;c
opposed to hybris :on,
in Phdr. ::,, :,o, :,;, :,:, :,,, :,,o,
:o
in Statesman :,
Ajax, and Socrates :;, :
Alcibiades
character in Alc. I passim ch. :
character in Symp. :o::, :;;,o; passim
ch.
historical gure :c,
see also Agathon, Alc. I, amathia, aporia,
atopia, beauty, elenchus, honor, Lysis,
shame
Alcibiades I (Alc. I) passim ch. :
authenticity of ,:, ,:n:
term er os in :c
see also Alcibiades, Athens, gods, hybris
Alcidamas :,
Alcmaeon :,c
amathia (lack of understanding)
of Agathon :,o, :o,, :o,, :;,, :;o
of Alcibiades ,,, :o,, :o,
meaning of term ::,, ::,n, :,,, :,,n:
of Socrates :,,
and speeches in Symp. ::::, :,;, :,; passim
ch. ,
ambiguity
in Diotimas speech :,, :c:
of er os, in Diotimas speech :,c
linguistic ;o, ,
of persona of Socrates :::n,, :o:,, :o;,
:,
in status of satyrs :oc, :o
Anacreon, and er os :::
Annas, Julia :, :o
Aphrodite
and Dionysus ::, :,c
in Eur. Hipp. :,;
mother of Eros ::,;
see also Homer
Apollo and Delphi
in Alc. I ,, , ,o;, ,,
in Ap. :
and Marsyas :oo, :oc
in Phdr. ::,
Apollodorus ::c:o, :,o
Apology (Ap.)
characterization of Socrates in :,, o,, :,,
:,, :c
daimonion in :,; see also daimonion
and erotic dialogues :,
imitators of Socrates in ::,
see also Apollo, Athens
aporia (impasse)
of Alcibiades ,,, c, :, o,;c, :o:, :o,
:;,, ::, :,o, :;, :,
in Lys. ,, :;, o;, :co, :c; passim ch. :
in Phdr. :,:, :,,, :,;, :,
of Platos readers ;c, :;, :,c, :,o
Platos use of xii, o,;c
see also Meno
Archilochus, on er os :
Aristodemus ::c:o, :o,, :;,, :,o
Aristophanes
character in Symp. ::;:, :,:
:,;
:, Index
Aristophanes (cont.)
historical gure :
Socrates in Clouds of ::, :o:
Aristotle
on er os, in NE ,:, ,,, :,,
on friendship, in ethical works :,,, :,,n,:
on hybris, disdain and slighting, in Rhet.
:o,,, :o, :;c
on mirrors, in On Dreams ,, ,no,
art (techne)
as craft-knowledge, criteria for :, :co
of medicine :,, :co
see also erotic art; rhetoric, theory and practice
of
Athena
and aulos :,, :,,
and courage ::
Athens
in Alc. I :, , ;, , ,:, o,, o;
in Ap. o,
and setting of Phdr. :,, :;,
atopia (outlandishness)
of Alcibiades ,,
of Socrates ,o;, :o:, :o,, :;,, :;, :
aulos (ute)
at Agathons symposium :,, ::c, :::, :;
and Corybantic rites :o;
in Greek art and literature :,,
and Marsyas :oo, :, :,,, :,, :oc, :o
and Socrates :::, :,, :;, :,,, :,, :o
beauty
of Alcibiades ;, ,o, oc, o:, oo, :;;,,
:;, :
creates er os ,, ,n,, :,, ,o, o,, ::,, :,,,
in Diotimas speech ::, :,:,, :,
Greek attitudes toward ,,, :,,
in myth of charioteer and horses o::, ::,
:,co; passim ch. o
of Socrates ,,, oc, o, :oc, :;;, :o, :,, :,:,
:,:, :,o
Benson, Hugh :c,
Beversluis, John xiv
Bordt, Michael ;
Brunschwig, Jacques ,;
Burkert, Walter ,:
Cairns, Douglas :o
Calame, Claude :oo;
Carpenter, Thomas :oc
charioteer and horses, myth of, in Phdr. ::,,,;
passim ch. o
and the dance ::,, ::, ::, :,,c, :,,
:o;c
and Greek art and literature :,;oc
imitation of gods in o:, :,,, ::c, ::,,
:,co, :c:, :,, :,,, :,o, :oo
interpretations of :
and satyrs :,, :,,o
Socrates self-portrait in :o, :,, :o::
souls of gods in :;
taming of black horse in :,;, :,, :,:,
:,,o, :,,
three capacities of soul in :,o
and true belief :cc:
two lives in :,;,, :,:
see also aid os, beauty, honor, hybris, initiation,
interpersonal love, Phdr., shame,
s ophrosyne
Charmides (Chrm.), er os in o:
children and childhood
education of ,, :cc, :oo,
in Platos dialogues , ,, ,, ,c, ,, ,;, :c;,
:,
see also madness, shame
Cicero, Socrates in De fato of :o:
Clay, Diskin :o,
collection and division :, :,,, :c;, ::
comedy, Greek :,,, :;:
see also Aristophanes, tragedy
comic elements
in Greek art :,,oc
in Greek literature :,,c
in Platos dialogues ::, :,c, :,:,, :c,,
::
in Platos portrayal of Socrates ::c, :o:, :,c
use of, by Socrates :, :,, :,,:, :,,,
:,,oc, :o:
see also laughter and ridicule
Corybantes :,,, :, :,o, :o,, :o;
Cratylus (Cra.), daimones in :;:
Crete, and the dance :oo
Crito
and erotic dialogues :o;
and persuasion by arguments :,,
daim on, daimones :;:
see also Cratylus, Eros, satyrs
daimonic art see erotic art
daimonion
as characteristic of Socrates , :,c
and Socrates divine sign :, ,o, ,o, :::, :,
:o,
dance see charioteer and horses, Corybantes,
Zeus
Davidson, James
Demosthenes, on hybris, in Against Conon :o;
Denyer, Nicholas ,;, ,,, ,
dialectic
absence of, in Symp. ::::,, :
Index :,,
as art (techne), in Phdr. :c, ::,, ::, ::,,
:,,, :,, ::, :,
and erotic art ;, ,, , ,oo,, ;:, ,, o,
,, ,,, :cc, :c,, :c;, :c, :,
see also rhetoric
dialogue form see Plato
Dionysus
god of drama ::;, :o,, :;c, :;, :,, :,c
god of wine and symposium :,, :,c,
:o,;c
and satyrs :,, :,c, :oc, :o:, :o,
see also Aphrodite, Euripides
Diotima :coc
denes er os ,, :, :,;
as prophet :c, ::, :, :,, :o
as teacher of Socrates ,, ::,:c, :co,
:,,oc, :;,, :;o, :
as woman ::
see also ambiguity, beauty, Eros, honor,
interpersonal love, sophists
dithyramb
in Greek culture :o,
and Socrates rst speech in Phdr. :,
:o,
Dodds, E. R. :,
Dugas, Ludovic
eir oneia (irony) :;;, :,
elenchus (cross-examination)
of Agathon :,, ::,, ::;, :,o, :,;, :,,c, :,,
:o, :o,, :;:;
of Alcibiades c
in Platos dialogues ::, ::,, ::o, ::, :,
of Socrates :,,, :,
see also dialectic
equilibrium of opposites
in medicine ::,,:
in soul :,,c, :,o, :oo;c
see also Alcmaeon, Heraclitus
er os
and the gaze , ,oo,, :,,
and Greek art ::o
and Greek conventions :c:,, ::, ,:,, :::,
::,, :,:, :;,c, :,,, :oc, :;;:, ::c,
::,, :::, :;c, :;:
in Greek linguistic usage :c
in Greek literature ,:, o, ::c:, ::;, :,,o,
:,;,, :;:
in Platos trial and death dialogues ::
and questioning (er otan) :o, ,;n:, ,;, ,
;, ,;, ,;n,,, :c:
reciprocal ,:,, ,,o, o,;, ,,, :;, ::, :,,,
:,o
and sex :, ::, ::,, :,:,, :;,, :c,,
::::,, ::;, :,;, :,,, :,,, :;:
Socratic ,, ,;, ,:c, ::,, :, :, ,,, ,:o,
o;, ;c, :co, :,,, :, :,,, :,, :c, :::,
::o, :,c, :,,o, :;:
in Socratic dialogues ::
see also ambiguity, beauty, Diotima, Eros,
erotic art, friendship, hybris, initiation,
interpersonal love, madness, philosophia,
shame, and specic authors and works
Eros, the god or daim on passim ch. ,
as daim on xi, ,, :;:, :, ,c, ::, :, :o,
:,o, :,:,, :o:,
in Diotimas speech ::, :,oc, :,c
in rst ve speeches of Symp. ::;,;, :;:,
:;,
and Socrates :, ,, o, ,c:, :o, :,,o,
:,,, :o:, :;,,, :,:c:, :,,, :o:,
Socrates praise of, in Symp. ::,:c
see also Aphrodite, er os, erotic art, Hesiod,
magic, Phaedrus, satyrs, s ophrosyne,
tragedy
erotic art (er otike techne)
and characters of interlocutors , :::, :,,
,, :o:, ::, :,o, :c,, :;:,
components of o;
contrasted with art (techne) in sense of
craft-knowledge :,:, ,, :,, :c;,
:::, :::
contrasted with practice without art :,,
:c;,, :::
daimonic qualities of xixiii, ;:,, :;:, ::,
:, ;,, ,o, :::, :,o, :o,, :,:, :,,,
:,, :o:
and Eros :, ,;, ,, :::, :o, :,oc, :,,
:o:,
in erotic dialogues, overview of passim Preface,
Introduction, Conclusion; (in Alc. I)
,,o; (in Lys.) o,, ;:,; (in Phdr.) :,,,
:::, :;, :,o;, :;c:; (in Symp.) :::,
::,:c, :,oc, :,,
and friendship passim ch. :; ;, :;, :::, :,
:, o,, ;:, ;,, :, ,::, ,o, :c, :,,
:c:c, ::o, :::, :,,,, :;
and true belief :;, ,, :o, :,o, :cc:,
:c
see also dialectic, shame
erotic dialogues, compared and contrasted
overview ::,, :;:,
Alc. I and Phdr. o::, o,, oo;, :,,, :,
Lys. and Alc. I. ;:, , ,,, :c,;
Lys., Alc. I and Phdr. ,o, o;
Lys. and Symp. ,c:
Phdr. and Symp. :;, :,,, :,,, :,::c, :,o,
:,, :o:,
Symp. and Alc. I :;,;
see also erotic art, in erotic dialogues
,cc Index
Euripides
chariot and horses in Hipp. of :,;,, :o,
:;:
Cyclops of :oc
desire for glory in Alc. I of :,;
Dionysus in Bacch. of :,, :o,
on er os :,
er os and friendship in Alc. I of ::
er os in Hipp. of :::, :,o, :,,, :, :;,
Euthydemus
initiation in :o,
setting of :
Euthyphro
and erotic dialogues :,o
setting of :
Ferrari, John :, :,:
Fisher, Nicholas :o, :o,
Forms, Platos theory of ::
Frede, Michael xii
Friedl ander, Paul o:, ,,
friendship (philia) passim ch. :
within family ;;, ;,, , :c;, :c,, :::,,
::o, ::;:,
and interpersonal love ;, :::,, o;, ;,, ,,
::, :,c, :;, :,,, :,, :c:c, :::,,
between Socrates and Phaedrus :c:, :c,, :c,,
:,,,
within soul passim ch. o, ::, ::,, :,c, :,,,
::, :,, :;,c, :,o, :o,, :;c
see also erotic art
Frontisi-Ducroux, Francoise :,
Gill, Christopher ,,oc
god(s)
competition with :oo, :oc
gifts to Socrates of :, ,, :;, ,,, ;:, ;,, ,c,
,,o, :o, :,,, :c:
as guardian of Socrates, in Alc. I ,o, ,;, ,, ,,,
,,, oc, o;
images of, in Alcibiades speech in Symp.
:o::, :,,o
Socrates devotion to , o, :,, :o
and the soul, in Alc. I ,oo,
wisdom of :,, :, :, ,, , ,c, :,, :,, :o,
:,:, :,,, :co
see also charioteer and horses, daimonion,
Phdr., specic gods
good will (eunoia), of lover ::, ::,, :,:,, :,o
Gorgias (Grg.)
experience (empeiria) in :o
Socrates as lover of Alcibiades in o;
Gorgias (the sophist) ::,, :,;, :;,
Gorgon, and Socrates ::;, :,;c, :;,
see also Homer, Pindar
Halliwell, Stephen :,o
Hera, in Phdr. ::,
Heraclitus ::,,:, :,
Hesiod
Aphrodite, in Th. of ::o;
daimones, in Op. of :;, :;n
on Eros :,o
Eros, in Theog. of ::,
on friendship ,
as poet :
Hestia, in Phdr. :o
Hippothales, as lover , ;:, ,o, ,:, ,,, ,o,
,:c,
Homer
Aphrodite, in Il. of ::o
Aphrodite and Ares, in Ody. of :,,
courage, in Il. of ::,
and the term daim on :;
use of term er os by ,
Giants in :,,
Gorgon, in Ody. of :,;
as poet :
and Socrates :,;
Thersites, in Il. of :oo
use of, by Agathon :,,
see also Achilles
honor and renown, love of
by Alcibiades ,, ,c, ,:, :;,, :,, :;
in Diotimas speech in Symp. :, :,,
in myth of charioteer and horses ::, :,,,
:,:
in Phaedruss speech in Symp. :::,, ::,
and Socrates o
see also Euripides
horse, in Greek literature :,;, :;:
see also charioteer and horses
hybris
and black horse, in myth of charioteer and
horses :,:, :,o, :o:
and er os :::, ::,, ::;, ::o:;, ::c,
Greek concept of :o,
and laughter :,c, :o, :oo;
and shame :o,,, :oo
and Socrates, in Phdr. :c:, :, :,o, :o:
Socrates charged with, in Alc. I :, ,,
Socrates charged with, in Symp. :c:, :::,
:o:;c, :;,, :;,, :;o, :;c, :,, :,,
:,,, :,,
see also Aristotle, aid os, Demosthenes, satyrs
Ibycus, on er os :,;
impasse see aporia
initiation
and er os, in Platos erotic dialogues ::, :;:
in Greek ritual :oc
Index ,c:
in Laws :oc, :o,, :o,
in Lys. ,,, :c
in Phdr. :,, :::, ::,, ::, ::o, ::,:, :,,
:o:, :o,o, :;c
in Platos trial and death dialogues :,, :;
in Symp. ::, :,, :o,,, :,, :,
see also Euthydemus, Lucian
interpersonal love passim ch. :
and desire for the good see also Lysis o, :c,,
:co
in erotic dialogues, overview of :c:,
in rst two speeches of Phdr. :::::
in myth of charioteer and horses :c::,
::,,, :,,
role of, in Diotimas speech :;, :,:, :c::
see also er os, friendship, Hippothales, Socrates
Isocrates, in Phdr. :c, ::,
Jackson, Darrell B. :o,
Johnson, David o:
Kahn, Charles ::
Kirk, G. S., J. E. Raven, and M. Schoeld
::,,c
Konstan, David ;o, :o
Landfester, Manfred ;,
Lane, Melissa :,
laughter and ridicule
in Greek literature :oo;
Socrates as object of o, :,, :o;, :,, :,
by Socrates, at others :c:, :o,, :o,;c
by Socrates, at self :,o, :,c, :o, :;, :;;,
:
in Symp. ::, ::o, :,:, :,o
see also comic elements, hybris
Laws
er os in :, ,
psychology in ,, :,,c, :oo;c
see also aid os, initiation, Phdr.
love see er os, interpersonal love
Lucian, on initiation :o,
Ludwig, Paul ,
Lycurgus :
Lysias
as orator :c, :c;, :c, :::
and Phaedrus :c:, :c,, :o:
speech attributed to, in Phdr. :,, :c,, :c,,
::::,, ::,
Lysis
as beloved ,,o, :c,
compared with Alcibiades :c,;, :;o
philosophia of ;,, o, :co
Lysis passim ch. :
desire in ,, ;:, ;,c, ::, ,,:
rst friend (proton philon) in ;, ;
genuine lover in ;:, o, ,,, ,,, :c,, :c;
interpretations of o,
oikeion (the kindred) in ::, ;, ,,
see also aporia, Lysis, Hippothales
Mackenzie, M. M. o,n,
madness
of children :o,
and er os :
of Hippothales ,,
of lover, in Phdr. ::, :c;, :c, :::;, ::, :,:,
:,,, :;, :,,, :,,, :,, :oo
philosophical :,, ::,:, ::,, :, :oo
in ritual ::, :o;
magic
and Socrates :;c, :,c, :,,
and Eros :,c, :,, :,,
Marsyas :oo
see also Apollo, aulos, satyrs
Meno
aporia in o,
Socrates described in :o:
Midas :oc
Mikkos :cc, :c:
mirror
and Greek theories of vision ,;,
image of, in Alc. I and Phdr. , ,;o,, :::,
:,,o
moderation see sophr osyne
Muses :cc, :::
Mysteries see initiation
myth passim ch. o
and allegory :,,, :,c
conveys true belief :cc
and Diotimas speech :,,
and Socrates long speech in Alc. I :
and Socrates recantation, in Phdr. ::
see also charioteer and horses, myth of;
Republic
Nails, Debra xii, ::
Nehamas, Alexander :,,
Nightingale, Andrea ;cn,
North, Helen :oo
Nussbaum, Martha :
Nymphs :::, :, :oc, :o,
OConnor, David ,
Olympiodorus ,,
Pan :c, :,, :oc, :o,
Parmenides :,o, :,
Parmenides :,;
Pericles :
,c: Index
Penner, Terry and Christopher Rowe ::, ;
Persia ::, o,
Phaedo, Socrates in Zopyrus of ::, :;:
Phaedo
er os in :, :c, :;
and erotic dialogues :;
initiation in :,, :;
psychology in :;, :,,
see also Phaedrus
Phaedrus
characterization of, in Phaedrus :c,, :,,,
in Symposium :::
see also friendship, Lysias, Phaedrus
Phaedrus (Phdr.) passim Part III
compared with Laws :,, :oo;c
compared with Phaedo ::;, :,,
compared with Resp. :,,, :,
compared with Sts. :,
psychology in :cc, :::,,, :;,c, :,,,
:oo;c; passim ch. o
recollection in ::,,, ::,n:,
Socrates prayer to Eros in :, ,, ,, :,, :c,,
:c;, :,,, :,, :o,, :;c, :;:
see also charioteer and horses, dialectic, erotic
dialogues; compared and contrasted,
Phaedrus, rhetoric, specic topics
phil-terms
in Greek usage on:, ,:
in Lys. ;:,, ;
in Symp. :,,
see also philosophia, philosophos
philia see friendship
philosophia passim Introduction
and er os, in erotic dialogues ,, ,, ;,, :,
:,,, :,, ::;
in Resp. :c
see also Lysis
philosophos, meaning of term ;,, ,:, ,:n;o, :,,,
:c,;, ::,, :o,
Pindar
gods of agora in :o,
Gorgons in :,,
Plato
beliefs of, and dialogues xii, ::, :c:
dialogues of, as dramatic works xii, :::,
;c:, ;,, ;,, ::c:o, :,:, :c:,, ::,,
:;c:
as narrator ::c
philosophical purposes of ::, :;:,
works of see specic dialogues
Plutarch, on Periander :,,c
poets and poetry
Alcibiades use of, in Symp. :
in Alc. I :, o
and rst ve speeches in Symp. :,, ::c,;
in Lys. ,, ,,, :c:
Socrates use of, in Phdr. :,,, :cc, :::, ::,;,
:,c, :,:, ::, :,, :,o,, :o,, :;:
Socrates use of, in Symp. :,;,, :;,c,
:,;, :,,, :oc
see also er os, specic poets
Protagoras, on poetry :::
reproduction
Greek terms for :,, :,:, :,,
imagery of :::, :,, :o,,, :oc, :c:, ::o,
:,,
see also women
Republic (Resp.)
er os in :, ,, :c
force and persuasion in :;
imitators of Socrates in ::,
likers of listening in :co
myth in :cc
psychology in :,,, :,
on superior natures :c
see also Phaedrus, philosophia
reverence see aid os
rhetoric
in Socrates rst speech, in Phdr. ::c:
in speech attributed to Lysias, in Phdr. :c,
::::,
theory and practice of, in Phdr. :,, :c,,
::c, ::
see also dialectic
Romilly, Jacqueline de :,;, :,
Rowe, Christopher ::,n:,
Rudebusch, George
Sappho, on er os o, :::
satyr play :oo, :o;, :oc, :o:, :;:
satyrs and sileni
Alcibiades statues of, in Symp. :o:,, :oo,
:,o, :o:,; passim ch.
as daimones , :,, :,, :oc:
and Eros :,,,, :o:,
in Greek art and literature :,,oc
and hybris :o:, :oo, :,,, :,,o:
and sex :oo, :,, :,,
and Socrates , ::, :,, :o:,, :oo, :;,,,
:,, :o:,
see also ambiguity, charioteer and horses,
Dionysus, Marsyas, Zeus
Schleiermacher, Friedrich :
Scott, G. A. and W. A. Welton ;n:,, ;n:;
Seaford, Richard :oc
shame and the shameful
and Agathon :o, :;::
and Alcibiades ::, ,:, :, ,, ;, ,c, o:,
;c, :o:, :o,, :;,, :c, :, :o
Index ,c,
and black horse in Phdr. :,:, :,,, :,o
and children :o,
and er os :::,, ::,o, ::,, :,:
and erotic art ,:, :cc
and Lysis ;c
and Phaedrus in Phdr. ::, ::,
and Socrates ::, :o, ,,, :::, ::, :,,, :o,
:o:
and Socratic shame cn:,, c:
and the symposium :o,;c
and white horse in Phdr. :,,
see also hybris
Shefeld, Frisbee :,
Sier, Kurt ::
skill see art
Slings, S. R. o,
Socrates
as beloved, in Alc. I ::, :c, ,:,, ,, ;, ,c:,
o, o,;
as beloved, in Symp. :,, ::, ::,:o, :;,, :,
:,, :,::, :,,o
characterization of, in erotic dialogues
xiiixiv, o, :::, ,:, :;:,
characterization of, in Phdr. :c:, :::::,
:,,o
characterization of, in trial and death
dialogues :
characterization of self, in Lys. ;:,,
,,
as competitor :::, ::;:c, :;:, :,, :,,, :c,,
:,
disclaims wisdom (in erotic dialogues)
xiixiii, o, ::, ::; (in trial and death
dialogues) :,, :o, :; (in Alc. I) ,, ;
(in Lys.) o,, ,; (in Phdr.) :,, :,,, :c:,
:c;, ::c, :,, :o:; (in Symp.) :::, :,o,
:,c,, :;c, :;, :, :,::, :,,, :,o
and human virtue :,:, :,,
as lover ,, ;, :::,, , ,:,, :;, :;,, ::;,
:,, :c, :o:; passim ch. :
physical characteristics of :o::
portrayal of, by Alcibiades in Symp.
:;;,o
portrayal of, by narrators within Symp.
::c:o, :o:, :,o
see also specic topics
Solon :
sophists
absence of, from erotic dialogues :, :,
contrasted with Socrates o, :cc
and Diotima :,, :,
see also Gorgias
Sophocles
on er os, in Ant. :::
Thyestes of :,
s ophrosyne (moderation)
and beauty, in Phdr. :o:
denition of, in Phdr. ::
of Eros ::, :,
opposed to hybris :on,
and self-knowledge o, ,,c
of Socrates ::c, :;,, :, :,:, :,:
and the symposium :o,
and white horse, in Phdr. :,:, :o
Sparta
in Alc. I ::
and the dance :oo;
Statesman (Sts.)
er os in :c
madness in :,
psychology in :,
symposium
of Agathon ::c, ::;, :oc, :o;c
competition at :::
imagery of :,
as renewal of education :o;, :o,;c
see also aulos, Dionysus, shame, sophr osyne
Symposium (Symp.) passim Part II
inuence of :oc
interpretations of ::o, :o::, :,
narrative structure of ::c::, :::o
puns in :;,o
subject of :::::
see also specic topics
Taylor, A. E. ,
techne see art
Theaetetus (Tht.)
er os in :c
midwifery in ,o, :c:
Socrates described in :o:
Theocritus, Pan in Idylls of :o,
Timaeus
er os in :
theory of vision in ,;
tragedy
and comedy, composition of ::;, :,,,
:,
Eros in :::
see also Aeschylus, Agathon, Euripides,
Sophocles
Vlastos, Gregory xiixiii
women
in Alc. I :
Greek attitudes toward :,
in Symp. ::c, :;
see also Diotima, reproduction
Woodruff, Paul cn:,
,c Index
Xenophon, Socrates in Symp. of :o:
Zanker, Paul :o:
Zeus
in Aristophanes speech in Symp. :,:, :,:, :,,
and the dance :o
in Eur. Bacch. :,
of friendship :, :c
and Ganymede :,
and philosophers ::,, ::, ::
and satyr chariot, in visual arts :oc
Zopyrus see Phaedo