ASSOC OF PHIL DESSICATORS VS PHIL COCONUT AUTHORITY
FACTS: PCA was created by PD 232 as independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law. PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. On 24 March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut- based commodities. The APCD then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018- 93. ISSUE: Whether or not PCA ran in conflict against the very nature of its creation. HELD: Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest so requires. 44. OPLE VS TORRES FACTS: Administrative Order No.
308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System," was issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996. Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate A.O. No. 308 on several grounds. One of them is that: The establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of congress. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308 was issued within the executive and administrative powers of the president without encroaching on the legislative powers of congress. ISSUE: Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate. RULING: Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution has vested this power in the Congress. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. Any power deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. From these precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law. functional and procedural principles of governance and embodies changes in administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the people. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. the choice of policies.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of national security.The Administrative Code of 1987 provides: Sec. etc. The Code is a general law and incorporates in a unified document the major structural. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. No. Administrative Orders.O. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. .O. No. 308 is declared null and void for being unconstitutional. the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government. It cannot be simplistically argued that A. 3. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. Petition is granted and A. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. The Court rejects the argument that A.
44. PHIL BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS VS SOMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE FACTS: Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a commercial banking corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first and second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00 by applying PBCom's tax credit memos for P3,401,701.00 and P1,615,253.00, respectively. Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered net loss of P25,317,228.00, thereby showing no income tax liability in its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended December 31, 1985. For the succeeding year, ending December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year. But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from leased properties. The lessees withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in 1986. On August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985. Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69. Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner instituted a Petition for Review on November 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The petition was docketed as CTA Case No. 4309 entitled: "Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue." The CTA decided in favor of the BIR on the ground that the Petition was filed out of time as the same was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period. A motion for Reconsideration was denied and the appeal to Court of Appeals was likewise denied. Thus, this appeal to Supreme Court.
Issues: a) Whether or not Revenue Regulations No. 7-85 which alters the reglementary period from two (2) years to ten (10) years is valid. b) Whether or not the petition for tax refund had already prescribed.
Ruling: RR 7-85 altering the 2-year prescriptive period imposed by law to 10-year prescriptive period is invalid.
Administrative issuances are merely interpretations and not expansions of the provisions of law, thus, in case of inconsistency, the law prevails over them. Administrative agencies have no legislative power.
When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress.
It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Further, fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. As pointed out by the respondent courts, the nullification of RMC No. 7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an administrative interpretation which is not in harmony with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC, for being contrary to the express provision of a statute. Hence, his interpretation could not be given weight for to do so would, in effect, amend the statute. By implication of the above, claim for refund had already prescribed. Since the petition had been filed beyond the prescriptive period, the same has already prescribed. The fact that the final adjusted return show an excess tax credit does not automatically entitle taxpayer claim for refund without any express intent. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED, with COSTS against the petitioner. 46. CHINA BANKING CORP VS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, HOME DEVELOPLMENT MUTUAL FUND Facts: China Banking Corp. and CBC Properties and Computer Center Inc. are both employers granted certificates of waiver from participation in theHome Development Mutual Fund [granted by the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF)]. These certificates of waiver were issued to thembecause they had aSuperior Retirement Plan Such waivers are granted pursuant to Sec. 19 of PD 1752 (Home Development Mutual FundLaw of 1980). This law provided: O Employers who have their own existing provident AND/OR employees-housing plans may register for annual certification for waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Home Development Mutual Fund. June 1994: RA 7742 amending PD 1752 was approved. A year later, Sept. 1995, HDMF Board issued an amendment to the Rules andRegulations Implementing RA 7742 (The Amendment), and pursuant to the amendment, the Board issued a circular Revised Guidelinesand Procedure for filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under PD 1752 (Guidelines). O Under the Amendment and the Guidelines, a company must have a provident/retirement AND housing plan superior to that provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund to be entitled to exemption/waiver from fund coverage China Banking and CBC Properties applied for renewal of waiver, but the applications were disapproved because their retirement plan wasfound to be not superior to Pag-IBIG. China Banking and CBC Properties then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC seeking to annul the Amendment andGuidelines for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. They claim: O That the HDMF Board exceeded its rule-making power in requiring the employer to have both a retirement/provident plan and an employee housing plan in order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage from the HDMF. The Board filed an MTD in the RTC. Granted. Grounds:1. That the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction in denying the applications because denial or grant is within the power and authority of the HDMF Board2. The petitioners have lost their right to appeal bec of their failure to appeal within the periods provided in the Rules China Banking and CBC Properties filed an MFR. Denied. Hence this appeal contending: oThat it does not question the power of HDMF, as an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations to implement PD 1752 andSec.5 of RA 7742; oHowever, the Amendment and Guidelines issued should be set aside for being inconsistent with the enabling law (PD 1752, asamended by RA 7742) which merely the existence of either a superior provident (retirement) plan or a superior housing plan, andnot the concurrence of both plans.
The Board argue: O The interpretation of the "and/or" is not purely a legal question and it is susceptible of administrative determination. O In denying the application for, the Board was exercising its quasi-judicial function O The use of the words "and/or" in Sec 19 of PD 1752, which words are "diametrically opposed in meaning", cannot be used together.The option of making it either both or any one belongs to the Board, which has the power and authority to issue rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. O Also, the Amendment and the Guidelines are consistent with the enabling law, which is intended to provide a savings generationand a house building program. [Note: The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words "and/or".] Issue/Held: Did the Board act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the Amendment and Guidelines in imposing the requirement of both a superior housing plan and a provident plan? YES (the Board acted in excess of jurisdiction) Ratio: The rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated power to create new/additional legal provisions that have the effect of law,should be within the scope of the authority granted by the legislature to the Administrative agency. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The rule making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it was enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements.RE: The law There is no question that the Board has rule-making powers: O Sec 5 of RA 7742 provides that within 60 days from the approval of the Act, the Board of Trustees of the HDMF shall promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for the effective implementation. O So the Board did promulgate the rules and regulations. In this case, the legal meaning of the wordsand/or should be taken in its ordinary signification (meaning: either and or which means butter and/or eggsmeansbutter and eggsor butter or eggs) . The intention of the legislature in using and/or is that the word and and the word or are to be used interchangeably. It is clear that Sec19 of PD 1752, intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the Pag-IBIG fund may obtain exemption. If the law had intended that the employee should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words and instead of and/or. The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption. To require the existence of both would impose a more stringent condition for waiver which was not envisioned by the law. By removing the dis junctive word or in the Guidelines, the Board has exceeded its authority. Dispositive: The Amendment and the Guideline, insofar as they require that an employer should have both a provident/retirement plan superior to that of the Pag-IBIG housing program are declared null and void.