MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)

Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the
year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the
remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.
The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her
assumption of office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.
Held:
YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and
assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof.
The protestant abandoned her determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the
electorate.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992
presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from
her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest indication that
she no longer intends to do so.

Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary
FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in
83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No.
284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his
primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate
official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the
constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in
the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary
of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions
that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the
express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in
the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from
holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase unless otherwise
provided by the Constitution in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to
the legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to particular instances of allowing the
VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O
284 as null and void.

Elpidio Valencia vs Macario Peralta Jr.
8 SCRA 692 Law on Public Officers Ad Interim Appointment vs Appointment in Acting Capacity

In October 1961, Valencia was designated as acting chairman of the board of directors of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
(NAWASA) by then President Carlos Garcia. He took his oath of office and in April 1962, the Commission on Appointments (COA) confirmed
Valencias appointment. His tenure was set to expire in July 1967. But in June 1962, when President Diosdado Macapagal took power, he appointed
Macario Peralta, Jr. as chairman of the board of NAWASA. Valencia now assails the appointment of Peralta on the ground that the office was not
vacant and he was the incumbent chairman when Peralta was appointed. Valencia further contends that his appointment (by Garcia) is permanent
because it was an ad interim appointment; that the oath he took was even for an ad interim appointment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Peralta is valid.

HELD: Yes. Valencias appointment is merely temporary because he was designated as acting chairman only. This designation, being of revocable
and temporary character, could not ripen into a permanent appointment, even if it was subsequently confirmed by the COA, because confirmation
presupposes a valid nomination or recess appointment, of which there is no trace. His claim that his appointment is ad interim lacks proof. He did
not show proof but he merely claimed that his appointment was ad interim. On the other hand, it was shown that apparently, there was found, in
the Malacanang Palace, a draft purportedly for the ad interim appointment of Valencia however, said draft was never released hence Valencia was
never appointed ad interim. Also, the oath he took is not valid because it did not correspond to his temporary appointment.

Commissioner of Customs and Collector of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading
3 SCRA 351 Political Law Constitutional Law Treaties vs Executive Agreements

Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of
Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The
said circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and Financial Agreements,
an executive agreement, entered into between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive agreement states, among others, that all import
transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from Japan were not
invoiced in dollar.

EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement that the EO was implementing was never concurred upon by the
Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.


ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the Senate.

HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate.
Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in
our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of
notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols.

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive
agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to
discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those
entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show
that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant
precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate.

They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs
matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them
were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general
subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were
concluded independently of any legislation.