1 DEFENDANTS REPLY TO

PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT
(Case No. 14-cv-02323)
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Andrew B. Gordon, IL Bar No. 6309109
GORDON LAW GROUP, LTD.
1 1
st
Bank Plz, Suite 302
Lake Zurich, IL 60047
abg@gordonlawltd.com

Seth Weinstein, CA Bar No. 279625)
LAW OFFICES OF SETH WEINSTEIN
15260 Ventura Blvd. Suite 1200
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Telephone: (310) 707-7131
Facsimile: (818) 475-1945
sweinsteinlaw@gmail.com

Attorneys for Defendant
Martin Grunin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

FACEBOOK, INC., | Case No. 3:14-cv-02323-WHA
|
Plaintiff, | DEFENDANT MARTIN GRUNINS
| REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS
| OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS
| MOTION TO SET ASIDE
v. | ENTRY OF DEFAULT
|
MARTIN GRUNIN, |
| [Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c)]
Defendant. |
| Date:
| Time:
| Judge: Hon. William H. Alsup
| Location: Courtroom 8 19
th
Floor
______________________________ |



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I DEFENDANTS REPLY TO
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT
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TABLE OF CONTENTS


Page
I. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................2
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY........................................................2
III. ARGUMENT....................................................................................................................................3
A. Grunin Has Demonstrated His Delay in Responding to the Lawsuit was Not Culpable............4
B. Grunin Has Submitted a Meritorious Legal Defense to the Court..............................................9
C. Plaintiff Will Not Suffer Prejudice if Entry of Default is Set Aside..........................................11
IV. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................12


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DEFENDANTS REPLY TO
II PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT
(Case No. 14-cv-02323)
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright,
862 F.2d 1388 (9
th
Cir. 1988)...........................................................................................................5, 7

Audio Toys, Inc. v Smart AV Pty Ltd.,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44078 (N.D. Cal. J une 6, 2007).................................................................9,11

Bateman v. United States Postal Service,
231 F.3d 1220 (9
th
Cir. 2000)............................................................................................................ 11

Benny v. Pipes,
799 F.2d 489 (9
th
Cir. 1986).............................................................................................................5,8

Bonita Packing Co. v. OSullivan,
165 F.R.D. 610 (C.D. Cal. 1995)........................................................................................................4

Continental Leasing Corp. V. Zimmerman,
485 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Cal. 1980)................................................................................................9,11

Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc.,
840 F.2d 685 (9
th
Cir. 1988)...........................................................................................................5,7

Falk v. Allen,
739 F.2d 461 (9
th
Cir. 1984)...........................................................................................................4, 7

Franchise Holding II, LLC v. Huntington Rest. Group, Inc.,
375 F.3d 922 (9
th
Cir. 2004)...............................................................................................................3

Hawaii Carpenters Trust Funds v. Stone,
794 F.2d 508 (9
th
Cir. 1986)..............................................................................................................9

Meadows v. Dominican Republic,
817 F.2d 517 (9
th
Cir. 1987)........................................................................................................4,5.6

Meehan v. Snow,
652 F. 2d 274 (2d Cir. 1981)............................................................................................................6

Mendoza v. Wright Vineyard Mgmt.,
783 F.2d 941 (9
th
Cir. 1986)...........................................................................................................4,5,8

Pena v. Seguros La Comercial,S.A.
770 F.2d 811 (9
th
Cir. 1985)............................................................................................................5.8

Schwab v. Bullocks Inc.,
508 F.2d. 353 (9
th
Cir. 1974)..............................................................................................................4
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DEFENDANTS REPLY TO
III PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT
(Case No. 14-cv-02323)
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Page
TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber,
244 F.3d 691 (9
th
Cir. 2001)......................................................................................................4,5,7,11

Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Zimmerman,
485 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Cal. 1980)......................................................................................................9

United States v. Signed Pers. Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle,
615 F.3d 1085 (9
th
Cir. 2010)..........................................................................................................4,6

United States v. Scharringhausen,
224 F. Appx 611 (9
th
Cir. 2007).....................................................................................................11

RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c)................................................................................................................................3,4,6

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)..................................................................................................................................3,4


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PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Facebook (Facebook) is seeking a quick and easy resolution to this
matter. To this end, the Plaintiff spends the majority of their Opposition to Motion to
Set aside Default (Docket 47, hereinafter referred to as Opposition) doing two
things: submitting irrelevant propaganda regarding Defendant Martin Grunins
Instagram account as exhibits to the Court and exploring Grunins (Grunin)
actions while he was being advised by Brian Robert Costello (Costello). Pictures
Grunin allegedly posted in the past are completely irrelevant to the three factor test of
whether there is cause to set aside entry of default in this lawsuit. The fact of the
matter is that Grunin acted in good faith by retaining Costello to defend him. Grunin
believed Costello could and would adequately represent his interests in this matter and
accordingly followed Costellos advice when filing documents with the Court. The
fact that Grunin failed to file an answer or otherwise plead in this matter is due to
excusable neglect on his part. In addition, despite Facebooks contention, Grunin has
set forth a meritorious legal defense in his Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default
(Docket 44, hereinafter referred to as Motion). Finally, Facebook failed to
successfully demonstrate that it would be in any way prejudiced if the Default is set
aside.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Facebook filed a lawsuit against Grunin on May 20, 2014 (Dkt. 1). On
May 27, 2014 Grunin retained the services of Brian Robert Costello. At the time of
retention, Grunin was under the belief that Costello had the requisite authority to
represent his interests before this Court. On May 29, 2014 Costello filed a NOTICE
RE Special Limited Power of Attorney (Dkt. 8, Stricken) with what appeared to
Grunin to contain legal allegations and defenses to Facebooks lawsuit. Grunin is
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currently 22 years old with no legal education or training; he mistakenly concluded
that Mr. Costello had both filed an Appearance on his behalf and had timely responded
to the requirements of filing answering or pleading to the Complaint. Declaration of
Martin Grunin in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default Entered on J une 23, 2014
(Grunin Decl.) 5. Throughout the entirety of the litigation process, Grunin believed
he was adequately represented by counsel. Having no legal background, Grunin did
not understand the notion of a default entry on J une 23, 2014 (Dkt. 22). As such,
Grunin continued to believe that Costello was his legal representative. It was not until
Grunin received the Order Granting Plaintiff Facebooks Motion for an Order
Prohibiting Brian Robert Costello From Appearing on Behalf of Defendant and to
Strike Dockets 8,10 and 17 (Dkt. 33) that he realized he was not adequately
represented. Grunin Decl. 6. At that time, Grunin immediately started his search to
find new representation. Grunin Decl. 7. Grunin retained Andrew Gordon on August
4, 2014, less than two weeks after he learned he needed new counsel. Id. Mr. Gordon
then engaged the services of California attorney Seth Weinstein so that Mr. Gordon
could secure pro hac vice admission.
III. ARGUMENT
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) provides that entry of default may be set
aside upon a showing of good cause. Fed R. Civ. P. 55(c). The Ninth Circuits good
cause standard for setting aside entry of default is the same as that for setting aside
default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but the test for setting
aside entry of default is less rigid and is more generous to the party in default.
Franchise Holding II, LLC v. Huntington Rest. Group, Inc., 375 F.3d 922, 925 (9
th
Cir.
2004).
The Court considers three factors when deciding whether to set aside default: (1)
whether the defendants culpable conduct led to the default; (2) whether the defendant
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has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether setting aside default would prejudice the
plaintiff. Id. At 925-26. In addition, [t]he law does not favor defaults, and
therefore, any doubts as to whether a party is in default should be decided in favor of
the defaulting party. Bonita Packing Co. v. OSullivan, 165 F.R.D. 610, 614 (C.D.
Cal. 1995).
The Ninth Circuit has also stated, The court may set aside an entry of default
for good cause. Rule (55(c). Our court of appeals has held that a district courts
discretion is especially broad where a party is asking that mere entry of default,
rather than a default judgment, be set aside. Mendoza v. Wright Vineyard Mgmgt.,
783 F.2d 941, 945-46 (9
th
Cir. 1986) (stating that [w]here timely relief is sought from
a default ... and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved
in favor of the motion to set aside the [default] so that cases may be decided on their
merits. Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir.1974) (quoting 7 J .
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 60.19, at 23233). Our rules for determining
when a default should be set aside are solicitous towards movants, especially those
whose actions leading to the default were taken without the benefit of legal
representation. United States v. Signed Pers. Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle,
615 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2010); see Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th
Cir.1984); TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 69598 (9th
Cir.2001). In this matter, the mere entry of default is all Grunin is attempting to have
set aside so he may adjudicate his dispute on the merits.
A. Grunin Has Demonstrated His Delay in Responding to the Lawsuit
was Not Culpable
In the Ninth Circuit, analysis of culpability for the purposes of demonstrating
good cause under Rule 55(c) overlaps with the standard for excusable neglect
under Rule 60(b)(1). TCI Group Life ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244F.3d 691, 696 (9
th
Cir.
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2001)(questioned on other grounds); also see Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817
F.2d 517, 522 (9
th
Cir. 1987) (finding that the conduct of defendants in district court
was culpable because defendants were aware of federal law, and their intentional
failure to respond to the action was not excusable neglect). The Ninth Circuit finds a
negligent failure to respond excusable if the defaulting party offers a credible, good-
faith explanation for the delay that negates any intention to take advantage of the
opposing party, interfere with the judicial decision-making, or otherwise manipulate
the legal process. Knoebber, 244 F.3d at 697-98. Further, in analyzing culpability,
the Court may consider a defendants exigent personal matters, his mental state, and
his lack of familiarity with legal matters. See Id at 699 (finding defendants delay in
response not culpable because she was grieving the death of her husband and was not
familiar with the legal system).
In its Opposition, Facebook cites to several cases in a disingenuous attempt to
compare Grunins conducts to other defaulting defendants. These cases which
include, Meadows, Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs, Inc., 840
F.2d 685 (9
th
Cir. 1988), Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388 (9
th
Cir.
1988), Benny v. Piper, 799 F.2d 489 (9
th
Cr. 1986), and Pena v. Seguros La Comercial,
S.A. 770 F.2d 811 (9
th
Cir. 1985), can be distinguished in fact, but most importantly in
legal standard, from the present matter. As mentioned above, the Mendoza Court
states that the standard for a district court to have a mere default set aside is much
more broad then overturning a default judgment. Mendoza at 945-946. In each of the
cases relied upon by Facebook, the Court is evaluating a default judgment rather than a
default. As such, each case, although factually distinguishable in its own right, should
be given less weight, as each employed a more exigent standard for determining
whether to relieve the affected parties of default. The appellate courts in those cases
were analyzing whether or not district court judges used abuse of power in not setting
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aside default judgments as opposed to analyzing district court decisions for abuse of
power analyzed under the broader, more lenient scope of not setting aside mere
defaults. See Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 277 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that [t]he
lenient standard of Rule 55(c) for determining whether to relieve a party of a
default was simply not applied in this case (emphasis added)).
As mentioned in both Grunins Motion to Set Aside and Facebooks Opposition,
the Meadows Court found the defendants to be culpable of failing to appear. The case
is easily distinguishable from the present matter. In addition to attempting to
overcome the heightened legal standard of setting aside a default judgment as opposed
to a default, when the Meadows defendants claimed they were relying on advice of
counsel, the defendants counsel denied responsibility for the failure to respond.
Meadows at 522. In addition, the Meadows Court found that the defendants expansive
dealings in other United States Courts showed that they were sufficiently
sophisticated and experienced in the requirements of American law to protect its
interest. Id.
While Grunin did not file a response with the Court in time, Grunins conduct
was excusable because he believed that he engaged a licensed representative before
this Court and followed requisite legal procedure. Grunin Decl. 5. In fact, Costello
has never denied that he advised Grunin with respect to this lawsuit while he was
representing him, and ensured Grunin that he would handle all legal matters arising out
of the proceeding. Also unlike the Meadows defendants, Grunin himself does not have
working knowledge of the Federal legal system. Grunin Decl. 3. Additionally,
particular emphasis should be placed upon Costellos incompetent and fraudulent
representation of Grunin, as such behavior had the practical effect of leaving
Grunin without counsel, during the period in which the circumstances for default
arose. United States v. Signed Pers. Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d
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1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that [o]ur rules for determining when a default
should be set aside are solicitous towards movants, especially those whose actions
leading to the default were taken without the benefit of legal representation
(emphasis added) (see Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir.1984); TCI Group
Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 69598 (9th Cir.2001). Taken
cumulatively, Grunins reliance on Costello for legal representation, Costellos
ignorance of the law, Costellos fraudulent misrepresentation to and of Grunin, and the
lessened legal standard, are sufficient to distinguish the present matter from Meadows.
The Court in Direct Mail Specialist also found the defendant culpable and thus
refused to overturn a default judgment. Direct Mail Specialist at 690. In addition to
attempting to overcome the heightened legal standard of setting aside a default
judgment as opposed to a default, the defendant in this case was a corporation who had
an attorney as its president. Id. The Court stated Mr. Bujkovsky, as a lawyer,
presumably was well aware of the dangers of ignoring service of process. Id. Again,
this fact pattern does not coincide with the present matter. Grunin is an individual and
not a corporation. Costello - contrary to his representations to Grunin has no legal
training, is not licensed to practice law, and is wholly unaware of the dangers of
ignoring service of process. Grunin Decl. 3.
In Alan Neuman Productions, the Court found the defendant culpable of failing
to timely respond to a lawsuit and upheld the district courts finding for a default
judgment. Alan Neuman Productions at 1392. Again, this case turns on whether or
not the defendant intentionally failed to answer. Id. However, once again the facts
show that the defendants interest was represented by an attorney. Id. In the present
matter, Grunin believed he was being represented by someone who would in fact
represent his interests. Grunin Decl. 5. Because he is not an attorney, and because he
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has no legal training, Grunin was unaware of precisely how unorthodox Costellos
methods were.
In Benny v. Pipes, the Court was again reviewing whether it was proper to
overturn a default judgment based on the lower courts abuse of discretion. Benny v.
Pipes at 494. Here, the defendants filed motions to extend their time to answer the
complaint. Id. The district court entered default judgments against the defendants
when no answer was filed. Id. at 491. Here again, the present case differs in that only
a default has been entered against Grunin, which demands a more lenient standard of
review than that of a default of judgment. Mendoza at 945-946; see Meehan v. Snow,
652 F.2d 274, 277 (2d Cir. 1981). Grunin has not filed any motions for time to
extend, or acknowledging the need for an answer at all. In the larger sense, until
Grunin was represented by present counsel, Grunin was not actually aware of the
requirements of being the defendant in a lawsuit.
Finally, the turning point in the analysis of culpability in Pena v. Seguros La
Comercial centers on whether or not the defendant had received actual or constructive
notice of the filing of the lawsuit when seeking to have its default judgment
overturned. See Pena v. Seguros La Commercial at 815. The Pena Court found that
because the defendant was deemed to have both actual and constructive notice of the
suit that the defendant was culpable for failing to respond. See Id. In the present
matter, Grunin does not challenge that he was served a copy of the Facebook
complaint. As such, the Pena decision should not influence this Court in its analysis of
culpability versus excusable neglect.
Facebooks Opposition dives into great depth about its belief that Grunin had
intent to delay proceedings and interfere with the judicial system. Opposition at 7-10.
Grunin in fact had no intent to gain an advantage over the opposing party or to delay
legal proceedings. Grunin Decl. 10. As stated in his Motion, when Grunin learned
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of the Court order striking the appearance of Costello, he immediately began the
search and retained new counsel less than two weeks later. Grunin Decl. 7. Grunin
is a young man with no legal training; he does not know what differentiates legal
tactics from practice prohibited by the Court. Costello fraudulently misrepresented
himself as a capable legal advocate and promised Grunin that he would oversee the
paperwork for the current proceedings. While ascertaining a persons state of mind is
never an easy task, the fact that Grunin was fraudulently duped by Costello must be
given particular emphasis, as it supports the notion that Grunins conduct was not
culpable, but due to excusable neglect.
B. Grunin Has Submitted a Meritorious Legal Defense to the Court
A defense is considered meritorious if there is some possibility that the
outcome of the suit after a full trial will be contrary to the result achieved by the
default. Hawaii Carpenters Trust Funds v. Stone, 794 F.2d 508, 513 (9
th
Cir. 1986).
All that is required is an assertion of a factual or legal basis that is sufficient to raise a
particular defense; the question of whether a particular factual allegation is true is
resolved at a later stage. Audio Toys, Inc. v. Smart AV Pty Ltd., 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 44078, *8 (N.D. Cal. J une 6, 2007)
In its Opposition, Facebook takes issue with the fact that Grunins declaration
only states that he has both factual and legal defenses to the lawsuit. Opposition at 13.
While Grunin believes he has factual defenses to this lawsuit that will be explored
more prior to an answer or discovery, Grunin did in fact state a legal defense.
Facebooks cites Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. V. Zimmerman to stand for the
proposition that conclusory allegations are insufficient to set aside default. Tri-
Continental Leasing Corp. V. Zimmerman, 485 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
However, Facebook mistakenly takes from Continental Leasing Corp. that the Court
required that a party provide both an adequate factual and legal bases for defense in its
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Motion to Set Aside a Default. See Id at 497. Rather, that party only carries the
burden of producing competent evidence that establishes a factual or legal basis for the
tendered defense. Id (emphasis added). Defendant believes this language to state that
establishing a factual or legal defense is sufficient to have a default set aside.
In his Motion, Grunin raised a meritorious legal defense to this lawsuit. Motion
at 6 25. To reiterate the claims asserted, Facebook has alleged a Breach of Contract
claim, along with three claims of Fraud against Grunin. (Dkt. 1 at 10(3), 10(19),
11(14), 12(6)). Essential to each individual cause of action raised in its Complaint,
Facebook must demonstrate that it was in fact Grunin who committed the acts alleged
in the Complaint. In the Complaint Facebook relies on the proposition that 1) Grunin
actually controlled the original Martin Grunin Facebook account and therefore
consented to its terms of service. (Dkt. 1 at 12 and 19) and 2) that Grunin himself
impersonated various individuals in order to gain access to Facebook advertising space
(Dkt. 1 at 31- 48).
What Facebook does not allege, however, is that it ever tried to verify Martin
Grunins identity. Facebook never once alleges that anyone from its company ever
met Grunin face to face. Facebook never even alleges that anyone ever spoke with an
individual representing himself as Grunin over the phone. All of Facebooks claims
rely on the notion that Grunin, the individual they have sued, has wronged them in
some way; however Facebook has failed to prove, or even allege, that Grunin is in fact
the Martin Grunin with a Facebook account they seek.
Given the exclusively online nature of Facebooks claims, linking Grunins
identify with the alleged unauthorized access is an evidentiary task requiring complex
internet sourcing methods. Absent such evidence, Facebooks claims make an
unfounded logical leap and arbitrarily impute liability without proof of proximate
causation. Therefore, Grunins defense as to Facebooks failure to verify his identify
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and associate him with each of the alleged instances of unauthorized access thus
presents a sufficient factual and legal basis to set aside default and try this case on its
merits. See Continental Leasing Corp. at 497.
Grunin has set forth a meritorious legal defense and satisfies the second good
cause factor.
C. Plaintiff Will Not Suffer Prejudice if Entry of Default Is Set Aside.
Prejudice is determined by whether a party will be hindered in pursuing its
claim. See Knoebber, 244 F.3d at 701. The fact that a party may be denied a quick
victory is not sufficient to deny relief from default judgment. Bateman v. United
States Postal Service, 231 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9
th
Cir. 2000). The delay must result in
tangible harm such as loss of evidence, increased difficulties of discovery, or greater
opportunity for fraud or collusion. Audio Toys, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *9.
Facebook alleges that it will be prejudiced in this matter because In the absence
of a swift judgment and entry of a permanent injunction, Facebook is without recourse
for Grunins bad acts. Opposition at 13. Grunin proffers that had Facebook really
believed this to be true, there were other swift actions Facebook could have taken.
When the lawsuit was initiated back in May 2014, Facebook could have asked for a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction in this matter. Facebook
chose not to take this action. Further, Grunin has been in default in this matter since
J une 23, 2014. Facebook had ample time to prove up its case and request a default
judgment; this never occurred.
Facebook offers United States v. Scharringhausen to stand for the notion that if
a defendant might be concealing assets and could prejudice the plaintiff, the default
should not be overturned. United States v. Scharringhausen 224 F. Appx 611(9th Cir.
2007). In truth, the Court in Scharringhausen had already determined that because the
defendant had waited over a year to respond to the default that he was culpable. See
Case3:14-cv-02323-WHA Document51 Filed09/09/14 Page14 of 15

12 DEFENDANTS REPLY TO
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT
(Case No. 14-cv-02323)
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Id. at 611. In addition, the Court stated he had not provided a meritorious defense. Id.
The Court certainly did not turn its decision on whether or not reopening the default
judgment would prejudice the plaintiff. In fact, the sentence Facebook includes in its
Opposition is the only sentence the Court spends on the topic in its opinion. Id. at 613.
As it stands, Facebook is not prejudiced from setting aside the default because
they have yet to prove up any damages owed from Grunin to them. Facebooks
overreaching concern about not being able to locate assets of Grunins is entirely
premature.
IV. Conclusion
Grunin is ready and willing to litigate this lawsuit. Grunins delay in responding
was not culpable, Grunin has meritorious defenses, and Facebook will not suffer any
prejudice in pursuing its claims if default is set aside. Therefore, Grunin has met the
good cause standard of Rule 55(c) and this Court should set aside the entry of default
against him. Based on the above reasons, this Court should grant Grunins Motion to
Set Aside Default.

DATED: September 9, 2014 ANDREW GORDON
Appearance pro hac vice
By: /s/ Andrew Gordon

Andrew Gordon, Bar No. 6309109
abg@gordonlawltd.com

Seth Weinstein, Bar No. 279625
Sweinsteinlaw@gmail.com

Attorneys for Defendant
Martin Grunin

Case3:14-cv-02323-WHA Document51 Filed09/09/14 Page15 of 15