MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Hon.

Secretary of Labor Leonardo Quisumbing and Meralco

Employees and Workers Association (MEWA), respondents.
G.R. No. 127598 | 2000-02-22
In the Decision promulgated on January 27, 1999, the Court disposed of the case as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor dated August 19, 1996
and December 28, 1996 are set aside to the extent set forth above. The parties are directed to execute a Collective
Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions contained in the unaffected portions of the Secretary of
Labor's orders of August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, and the modifications set forth above. The retirement
fund issue is remanded to the Secretary of Labor for reception of evidence and determination of the legal personality
of the Meralco retirement fund."1 [Decision promulgated January 27, 1999, G. R. No. 127598 penned by Justice
Antonio Martinez (now retired) with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and Justices Jose Melo, Santiago Kapunan and
Bernardo Pardo, concurring.]

The modifications of the public respondent's resolutions include the following:

January 27, 1999 decision Secretary's resolution

Wages -P1,900.00 for 1995-96 P2,200.00

X'mas bonus -modified to one month 2 months

Retirees -remanded to the Secretary granted

Loan to coops -denied granted

GHSIP, HMP

and Housing loans -granted up to P60,000.00 granted

Signing bonus -denied granted

Union leave -40 days (typo error) 30 days

High voltage/pole -not apply to those who are members of a team

not exposed to the risk

Collectors -no need for cash bond, no

need to reduce quota and MAPL

CBU -exclude confidential employees include

Union security -maintenance of membership closed shop

Contracting out -no need to consult union consult first

All benefits -existing terms and conditions all terms

Retroactivity -Dec 28, 1996-Dec 27, 199(9) from Dec 1, 1995

Dissatisfied with the Decision, some alleged members of private respondent union (Union for brevity) filed a motion
for intervention and a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision. A separate intervention was likewise made by
the supervisor's union (FLAMES2 [First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees.]) of petitioner
corporation alleging that it has bona fide legal interest in the outcome of the case.3 [Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to treat this as Movant's Intervention filed by FLAMES, p. 4; Rollo, p. 2476.] The Court required the "proper
parties" to file a comment to the three motions for reconsideration but the Solicitor-General asked that he be excused
from filing the comment because the "petition filed in the instant case was granted" by the Court.4 [Solicitor-General's
Manifestation and Motion dated August 10, 1999, p. 2; Rollo, p. 2506.] Consequently, petitioner filed its own
consolidated comment. An "Appeal Seeking Immediate Reconsideration" was also filed by the alleged newly elected
president of the Union.5 [Rollo, p. 2495.] Other subsequent pleadings were filed by the parties and intervenors.

The issues raised in the motions for reconsideration had already been passed upon by the Court in the January 27,
1999 decision. No new arguments were presented for consideration of the Court. Nonetheless, certain matters will be
considered herein, particularly those involving the amount of wages and the retroactivity of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) arbitral awards.

Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the Secretary is allowed, it would
simply pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers through an increase in the rate of electricity. This is a
non sequitur. The Court cannot be threatened with such a misleading argument. An increase in the prices of electric
current needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory government agency and does not automatically result from a
mere increase in the wages of petitioner's employees. Besides, this argument presupposes that petitioner is capable
of meeting a wage increase. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position regarding
the wage issue can not be an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of
Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:

"Commercial lists and the like. - Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation
contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of
any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them therein."

Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only "if that compilation
is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein."
As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and not even
a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this
case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said
that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented
that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as
trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible.6 [20 Am. Jur. 819.]
In the same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when the source of the
reports is available.7 [20 Am. Jr. 819-820.] With more reason, mere analyses or projections of such reports cannot be
admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily made available considering that the same is
necessary for compliance with certain governmental requirements.

Nonetheless, by petitioner's own allegations, its actual total net income for 1996 was P5.1 billion.8 [Petitioner's
Comment to Motions for Reconsideration and Motion for Intervention, p. 6; Rollo, p. 2514.] An estimate by the All
Asia financial analyst stated that petitioner's net operating income for the same year was about P5.7 billion, a figure
which the Union relies on to support its claim. Assuming without admitting the truth thereof, the figure is higher than
the P4.171 billion allegedly suggested by petitioner as its projected net operating income. The P5.7 billion which was
the Secretary's basis for granting the P2,200.00 is higher than the actual net income of P5.1 billion admitted by
petitioner. It would be proper then to increase this Court's award of P1,900.00 to P2,000.00 for the two years of the
CBA award. For 1992, the agreed CBA wage increase for rank-and-file was P1,400.00 and was reduced to
P1,350.00, for 1993; further reduced to P1,150.00 for 1994. For supervisory employees, the agreed wage increase
for the years 1992-1994 are P1,742.50, P1,682.50 and P1,442.50, respectively. Based on the foregoing figures, the
P2,000.00 increase for the two-year period awarded to the rank-and-file is much higher than the highest increase
granted to supervisory employees.9 [See the January 27, 1999 Decision.] As mentioned in the January 27, 1999
Decision, the Court does "not seek to enumerate in this decision the factors that should affect wage determination"
because collective bargaining disputes particularly those affecting the national interest and public service "requires
due consideration and proper balancing of the interests of the parties to the dispute and of those who might be
affected by the dispute."10 [Manila Electric Company v. Quisumbing, 302 SCRA 173, 196 (1999).] The Court takes
judicial notice that the new amounts granted herein are significantly higher than the weighted average salary currently
enjoyed by other rank-and-file employees within the community. It should be noted that the relations between labor
and capital is impressed with public interest which must yield to the common good.11 [Article 1700, New Civil Code
(NCC).] Neither party should act oppressively against the other or impair the interest or convenience of the public.12
[Article 1701, NCC.] Besides, matters of salary increases are part of management prerogative.13 [See National
Federation of Labor Unions v. NLRC, 202 SCRA 346 (1991).]

On the retroactivity of the CBA arbitral award, it is well to recall that this petition had its origin in the renegotiation of
the parties' 1992-1997 CBA insofar as the last two-year period thereof is concerned. When the Secretary of Labor
assumed jurisdiction and granted the arbitral awards, there was no question that these arbitral awards were to be
given retroactive effect. However, the parties dispute the reckoning period when retroaction shall commence.
Petitioner claims that the award should retroact only from such time that the Secretary of Labor rendered the award,
invoking the 1995 decision in Pier 8 case14 [Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. v. Roldan-Confesor, (2nd
Div), 311 Phil. 311 penned by Justice Puno with Chief Justice Narvasa (ret.) and Justices Bidin (ret.), Regalado (ret.)
and Mendoza, concurring, p. 329.] where the Court, citing Union of Filipino Employees v. NLRC,15 [192 SCRA 414
(1990).] said:

"The assailed resolution which incorporated the CBA to be signed by the parties was promulgated on June 5, 1989,
the expiry date of the past CBA. Based on the provision of Section 253-A, its retroactivity should be agreed upon by
the parties. But since no agreement to that effect was made, public respondent did not abuse its discretion in giving
the said CBA a prospective effect. The action of the public respondent is within the ambit of its authority vested by
existing law."

On the other hand, the Union argues that the award should retroact to such time granted by the Secretary, citing the
1993 decision of St Luke's.16 [St. Luke's Medical Center v. Torres, (3rd Div), 223 SCRA 779 (1993), penned by
Justice Melo with Justices Feliciano (ret.), Bidin (ret.), Davide (now Chief Justice) and Romero (ret.), concurring, pp.
792-793.]

"Finally, the effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must retroact to the date of the expiration of the previous
CBA, contrary to the position of petitioner. Under the circumstances of the case, Article 253-A cannot be properly
applied to herein case. As correctly stated by public respondent in his assailed Order of April 12, 1991 dismissing
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration---

Anent the alleged lack of basis for the retroactivity provisions awarded, we would stress that the provision of law
invoked by the Hospital, Article 253-A of the Labor Code, speaks of agreements by and between the parties, and not
arbitral awards . . .

"Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public
respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof."

In the 1997 case of Mindanao Terminal,17 [In Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Confesor, (2nd Div),
338 Phil. 671 penned by Justice Mendoza with Justices Regalado (ret.), Romero, (ret.), Puno and Torres (ret.),
concurring, p. 679.] the Court applied the St. Luke's doctrine and ruled that:

"In St. Luke's Medical Center v. Torres, a deadlock also developed during the CBA negotiations between
management and the union. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and ordered the retroaction of the CBA to
the date of expiration of the previous CBA. As in this case, it was alleged that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused
its discretion in making his award retroactive. In dismissing this contention this Court held:

"Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactive of the effectivity of arbitral awards
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public
respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof."

The Court in the January 27, 1999 Decision, stated that the CBA shall be "effective for a period of 2 years counted
from December 28, 1996 up to December 27, 1999." Parenthetically, this actually covers a three-year period. Labor
laws are silent as to when an arbitral award in a labor dispute where the Secretary had assumed jurisdiction by virtue
of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code shall retroact. In general, a CBA negotiated within six months after the expiration
of the existing CBA retroacts to the day immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter, the effectivity
depends on the agreement of the parties.18 [Article 253-A, Labor Code, as amended..] On the other hand, the law is
silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the
parties but by intervention of the government. Despite the silence of the law, the Court rules herein that CBA arbitral
awards granted after six months from the expiration of the last CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both
employer and the employees or their union. Absent such an agreement as to retroactivity, the award shall retroact to
the first day after the six-month period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA should there be one. In the
absence of a CBA, the Secretary's determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over
arbitral awards shall control.

It is true that an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties
because it requires the interference and imposing power of the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes
jurisdiction. However, the arbitral award can be considered as an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement
which would otherwise have been entered into by the parties.19 [Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v.
Confesor, 338 Phil. 671.] The terms or periods set forth in Article 253-A pertains explicitly to a CBA. But there is
nothing that would prevent its application by analogy to an arbitral award by the Secretary considering the absence of
an applicable law. Under Article 253-A: "(I)f any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shal!
agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof." In other words, the law contemplates retroactivity whether the
agreement be entered into before or after the said six-month period. The agreement of the parties need not be
categorically stated for their acts may be considered in determining the duration of retroactivity. In this connection, the
Court considers the letter of petitioner's Chairman of the Board and its President addressed to their stockholders,
which states that the CBA "for the rank-and-file employees covering the period December 1, 1995 to November 30,
1997 is still with the Supreme Court,"20 [Rollo, p. 2347.] as indicative of petitioner's recognition that the CBA award
covers the said period. Earlier, petitioner's negotiating panel transmitted to the Union a copy of its proposed CBA
covering the same period inclusive.21 [Annex "C" of the Petition.] In addition, petitioner does not dispute the
allegation that in the past CBA arbitral awards, the Secretary granted retroactivity commencing from the period
immediately following the last day of the expired CBA. Thus, by petitioner's own actions, the Court sees no reason to
retroact the subject CBA awards to a different date. The period is herein set at two (2) years from December 1, 1995
to November 30, 1997.

On the allegation concerning the grant of loan to a cooperative, there is no merit in the union's claim that it is no
different from housing loans granted by the employer. The award of loans for housing is justified because it pertains
to a basic necessity of life. It is part of a privilege recognized by the employer and allowed by law. In contrast,
providing seed money for the establishment of the employee's cooperative is a matter in which the employer has no
business interest or legal obligation. Courts should not be utilized as a tool to compel any person to grant loans to
another nor to force parties to undertake an obligation without justification. On the contrary, it is the government that
has the obligation to render financial assistance to cooperatives and the Cooperative Code does not make it an
obligation of the employer or any private individual.22 [See Section 2, R.A. No. 6838 (Cooperative Code of the
Philippines) which provides: "It is the declared policy of the State to foster the creation and growth of cooperative as a
practical vehicle for promoting self-reliance and harnessing people power towards the attainment of economic
development and social justice. The State shall encourage the private sector to undertake the actual formation of
cooperatives and shall create an atmosphere that is conducive to the organizational growth and development of the
cooperatives.

Towards this end, the Government and all its branches, subsidiaries, instrumentalities, and agencies shall ensure the
provision of technical guidelines, financial assistance, and other services to enable said cooperative to development
into viable and responsive economic enterprises and thereby bring about a strong cooperative movement that is free
from any conditions that might infringe upon the autonomy or organizational integrity of cooperatives.]

Anent the 40-day union leave, the Court finds that the same is a typographical error. In order to avoid any confusion,
it is herein declared that the union leave is only thirty (30) days as granted by the Secretary of Labor and affirmed in
the Decision of this Court.

The added requirement of consultation imposed by the Secretary in cases of contracting out for six (6) months or
more has been rejected by the Court. Suffice it to say that the employer is allowed to contract out services for six
months or more. However, a line must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding business operations
per se and those which affect the rights of employees, and in treating the latter, the employer should see to it that its
employees are at least properly informed of its decision or modes of action in order to attain a harmonious labor-
management relationship and enlighten the workers concerning their rights.23 [Philippine Airlines v. NLRC, 225
SCRA 259 (1993).] Hiring of workers is within the employer's inherent freedom to regulate and is a valid exercise of
its management prerogative subject only to special laws and agreements on the matter and the fair standards of
justice.24 [Tierra International Construction Corporation v. NLRC, 256 SCRA 36 (1996); Business Day Information
Systems v. NLRC, 221 SCRA 9 (1993); Philtread Tire v. NLRC, 218 SCRA 805 (1993); San Miguel Corporation v.
Ubaldo, 218 SCRA 293 (1993); San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union v. Ople, 170 SCRA 25 (1989).] The
management cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what units are
essential for its operation. It has the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its personnel
or contracted to outside agencies. While there should be mutual consultation, eventually deference is to be paid to
what management decides.25 [Shell Oil Workers Union v. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., 39 SCRA 276
(1971).] Contracting out of services is an exercise of business judgment or management prerogative.26 [De Ocampo
v. NLRC, 213 SCRA 652 (1992).] Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court
will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer.27 [Asian Alcohol Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No.
131108, March 25, 1999 cited in Serrano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000.] As mentioned in the
January 27, 1999 Decision, the law already sufficiently regulates this matter.28 [See also Metrolab Industries v.
Roldan-Confesor, 254 SCRA 182 (1996).] Jurisprudence also provides adequate limitations, such that the employer
must be motivated by good faith and the contracting out should not be resorted to circumvent the law or must not
have been the result of malicious or arbitrary actions.29 [Manila Electric Company v. Quisumbing, 302 SCRA 173,
196 (1999) citing De Ocampo v. NLRC, 213 SCRA 652 (1992).] These are matters that may be categorically
determined only when an actual suit on the matter arises.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is partially granted and the assailed Decision is modified as follows: (1)
the arbitral award shall retroact from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997; and (2) the award of wage is
increased from the original amount of One Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P1,900.00) to Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) for the years 1995 and 1996. This Resolution is subject to the monetary advances granted by petitioner
to its rank-and-file employees during the pendency of this case assuming such advances had actually been
distributed to them. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

[G.R. Nos. 115338-39. September 16, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale in the Regional Trial Court
of Makati on a complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. In addition, she
was indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in the same court, the offended party being Elenita Marasigan
alone.
The information in the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale in Criminal Case No. 92-6153 reads as follows:
That in or about the period comprised from June 1992 to August 1992, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, falsely representing
herself to have the capacity and power to contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment abroad did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously collect for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to
the following persons, to wit: 1) Rosamar del Rosario; 2) Elenita Marasigan; 3) Imelda Generillo, without first securing
the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, thus amounting to illegal recruitment
in large scale, in violation of the aforecited law. i[1]
The information in the charge for estafa in Criminal Case No. 92-6154 alleges:
That in or about or sometime in the month of August, 1992, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of false
pretenses executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, falsely pretending to have the
capacity and power to send complainant Elenita Marasigan to work abroad, succeeded in inducing the latter to give
and deliver to her the total sum of P23,000.00, the accused knowing fully well that the said manifestations and
representation are false and fraudulent and calculated only to deceive the said complainant to part with her money,
and, once in possession thereof, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate,
apply and convert the same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Elenita
Marasigan, in the aforementioned amount of P23,000.00. ii[2]
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges and the cases were tried jointly in Branch 145 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Of the three complainants in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale, Marasigan was the only one who testified
at the trial. The two other complainants, Generillo and Del Rosario, were unable to testify as they were then abroad.
Marasigan testified that she was a 32 year-old unmarried sales representative in 1992 when she was introduced to
appellant by her co-complainants. iii[3] Appellant promised Marasigan a job as a factory worker in Taiwan for a
P5,000.00 fee. At that time, Marasigan had a pending application for overseas employment pending in a recruitment
agency. Realizing that the fee charged by appellant was much lower than that of the agency, Marasigan withdrew
her money from the agency and gave it to appellant. iv[4]
Marasigan paid appellant P5,000.00, but she was later required to make additional payments. By the middle of the
year, she had paid a total of P23,000.00 on installment basis. v[5] Save for two receipts, vi[6] Marasigan was not
issued receipts for the foregoing payments despite her persistence in requesting for the same.
Marasigan was assured by appellant that obtaining a Taiwanese visa would not be a problem. vii[7] She was also
shown a plane ticket to Taiwan, allegedly issued in her name. viii[8] Appellant issued Marasigan a photocopy of her
plane ticket, ix[9] the original of which was promised to be given to her before her departure. x[10]
Marasigan was never issued a visa. xi[11] Neither was she given the promised plane ticket. Unable to depart for
Taiwan, she went to the travel agency which issued the ticket and was informed that not only was she not booked by
appellant for the alleged flight, but that the staff in the agency did not even know appellant.
Later, Marasigan proceeded to the supposed residence of appellant and was informed that appellant did not live
there. xii[12] Upon verification with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), it was revealed that
appellant was not authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. xiii[13] Marasigan wanted to recover her
money but, by then, appellant could no longer be located.
The prosecution sought to prove that Generillo and Del Rosario, the two other complainants in the illegal recruitment
case, were also victimized by appellant. In lieu of their testimonies, the prosecution presented as witnesses Lilia
Generillo, the mother of Imelda Generillo, and Victoria Amin, the sister of Del Rosario.
Lilia Generillo claimed that she gave her daughter P8,000.00 to cover her application for placement abroad which
was made through appellant. xiv[14] Twice, she accompanied her daughter to the residence of appellant so that she
could meet her; however, she was not involved in the transactions between her daughter and appellant. xv[15]
Neither was she around when payments were made to appellant. Imelda Generillo was unable to leave for abroad
and Lilia Generillo concluded that she had become a victim of illegal recruitment.
The prosecution presented Victoria Amin, the sister of Rosamar Del Rosario, to show that the latter was also a victim
of illegal recruitment. Victoria Amin testified that appellant was supposed to provide her sister a job abroad. She
claimed that she gave her sister a total of P10,000.00 which was intended to cover the latters processing fee. xvi[16]
Victoria Amin never met appellant and was not around when her sister made payments. She assumed that the
money was paid to appellant based on receipts, allegedly issued by appellant, which her sister showed her. xvii[17]
Del Rosario was unable to leave for abroad despite the representations of appellant. Victoria Amin claimed that her
sister, like Marasigan and Generillo, was a victim of illegal recruitment.
The final witness for the prosecution was Riza Balberte, xviii[18] a representative of the POEA, who testified that
appellant was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment, POEA certificate
certification. xix[19]
Upon the foregoing evidence, the prosecution sought to prove that although two of the three complainants in the
illegal recruitment case were unable to testify, appellant was guilty of committing the offense against all three
complainants and, therefore, should be convicted as charged.
On the other hand, appellant, who was the sole witness for the defense, denied that she recruited the complainants
for overseas employment and claimed that the payments made to her were solely for purchasing plane tickets at a
discounted rate as she had connections with a travel agency. xx[20]
She denied that she was paid by Marasigan the amount of P23,000.00, claiming that she was paid only P8,000.00,
as shown by a receipt. She further insisted that, through the travel agency, xxi[21] she was able to purchase
discounted plane tickets for the complainants upon partial payment of the ticket prices, the balance of which she
guaranteed. According to her, the complainants were supposed to pay her the balance but because they failed to do
so, she was obliged to pay the entire cost of each ticket.
The evidence presented by the parties were thus contradictory but the trial court found the prosecutions evidence
more credible. On December 17, 1993, judgment was rendered by said court convicting appellant of both crimes as
charged. xxii[22]
In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court adopted a previous decision of Branch 78
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque as a basis for the judgment. Said previous decision was a conviction for
estafa promulgated on July 26, 1993, xxiii[23] rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 74852-53, involving the same
circumstances in the instant case, wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with two
counts of estafa. This decision was not appealed and had become final and executory.
In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment case, the decision therein of the Regional Trial Court stated that
the facts in the foregoing estafa cases were the same as those in the illegal recruitment case before it. It, therefore,
adopted the facts and conclusions established in the earlier decision as its own findings of facts and as its rationale
for the conviction in the case before it. xxiv[24]
In Criminal Case No. 92-6153, the Makati court sentenced appellant to serve the penalty of life imprisonment for
illegal recruitment in large scale, as well as to pay a fine of P100,000.00. Appellant was also ordered to reimburse
the complainants the following payments made to her, viz.: (a) Marasigan, P23,000.00; (b) Generillo, P2,500.00; and
(c) Del Rosario, P2,500.00.
In the same judgment and for the estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 92-6154, the Makati court sentenced appellant
to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of
prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
In the instant petition, appellant seeks the reversal of the foregoing judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
convicting her of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa. Specifically, she insists that the trial court erred in
convicting her of illegal recruitment in large scale as the evidence presented was insufficient.
Moreover, appellant claims that she is not guilty of acts constituting illegal recruitment, in large scale or otherwise,
because contrary to the findings of the trial court, she did not recruit the complainants but merely purchased plane
tickets for them. Finally, she contends that in convicting her of estafa, the lower court erred as she did not
misappropriate the money paid to her by Marasigan, hence there was no damage to the complainants which would
substantiate the conviction.
We uphold the finding that appellant is guilty but we are, compelled to modify the judgment for the offenses she
should be convicted of and the corresponding penalties therefor.
Appellant maintains that her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale is erroneous. It is her view that in the
prosecution of a case for such offense, at least three complainants are required to appear as witnesses in the trial
and, since Marasigan was the only complainant presented as a witness, the conviction was groundless.
The Solicitor General also advocates the conviction of appellant for simple illegal recruitment which provides a lower
penalty. The Court finds the arguments of the Solicitor General meritorious and adopts his position.
The Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as x x x any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not x x x. xxv[25]
Illegal recruitment is likewise defined and made punishable under the Labor Code, thus:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. -
(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of
this Code. x x x.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
x x x Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
Art. 39. Penalties. -
(a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) shall be imposed if
Illegal Recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein;
x x x
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating any provision thereof
or its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than four (4) years nor more than eight (8) years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00, or
both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court. x x x xxvi[26]
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, was passed increasing the penalty for illegal recruitment. This new law, however, does not
apply to the instant case because the offense charged herein was committed in 1992, before the effectivity of said
Republic Act No. 8042. Hence, what are applicable are the aforecited Labor Code provisions.
It is evident that in illegal recruitment cases, the number of persons victimized is determinative. Where illegal
recruitment is committed against a lone victim, the accused may be convicted of simple illegal recruitment which is
punishable with a lower penalty under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code. Corollarily, where the offense is committed
against three or more persons, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which provides a higher penalty under
Article 39(a) of the same Code.
The position of the Solicitor General is that the conviction of appellant should be merely for the lesser offense of
simple illegal recruitment. He submits that the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in convicting appellant of illegal
recruitment in large scale because the conviction was based on an earlier decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Paraaque where appellant was found guilty of estafa committed against Generillo and Del Rosario.
It is argued that the Makati court could not validly adopt the facts embodied in the decision of the Paraaque court to
show that illegal recruitment was committed against Generillo and Del Rosario as well. Illegal recruitment was
allegedly proven to have been committed against only one person, particularly, Elenita Marasigan. Appellant,
therefore, may only be held guilty of simple illegal recruitment and not of such offense in large scale.
He further submits that the adoption by the Makati court of the facts in the decision of the Paraaque court for estafa
to constitute the basis of the subsequent conviction for illegal recruitment is erroneous as it is a violation of the right of
appellant to confront the witnesses, that is, complainants Generillo and Del Rosario, during trial before it. He cites
the pertinent provision of Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:
x x x
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its
evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot, with due diligence be found in the Philippines,
unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
x x x
It will be noted that the principle embodied in the foregoing rule is likewise found in the following provision of Rule
130:
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or
unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of confrontation. Such right has two
purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the
deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. xxvii[27]
This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness
who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is made admissible as a
distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. xxviii[28] The previous testimony is made
admissible because it makes the administration of justice orderly and expeditious. xxix[29]
Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in the decision of the Paraaque trial court
does not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers only the
utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of
previous decisions or judgments.
In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in
the previous estafa case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence, and utilized as a basis for the conviction
in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was the previous decision in the estafa case.
A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously
convicted of a crime. xxx[30] It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a
subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous decision is
hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the
right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.
As earlier stated, the Makati courts utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of the Paraaque court must
be rejected. Every conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its appreciation
of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of another court, especially
where what is presented is only its decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein
and upon which the decision is based.
Furthermore, this is not the only reason why appellant may not be held liable for illegal recruitment in large scale. An
evaluation of the evidence presented before the trial court shows us that, apart from the adopted decision in the
previous estafa case, there was no other basis for said trial courts conclusion that illegal recruitment in large scale
was committed against all three complainants.
The distinction between simple illegal recruitment and illegal recruitment in large scale are emphasized by
jurisprudence. Simple illegal recruitment is committed where a person: (a) undertakes any recruitment activity
defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Articles 34 and 38 of the Labor Code; and
(b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. xxxi[31] On
the other hand, illegal recruitment in large scale further requires a third element, that is, the offense is committed
against three or more persons, individually or as a group. xxxii[32]
In illegal recruitment in large scale, while the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial, it is
necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons.
This Court agrees with the trial court that the evidence presented sufficiently proves that illegal recruitment was
committed by appellant against Marasigan, but the same conclusion cannot be made as regards Generillo and Del
Rosario as well.
The testimonies of Generillos mother, Lilia Generillo, and Del Rosarios sister, Victoria Amin, reveal that these
witnesses had no personal knowledge of the actual circumstances surrounding the charges filed by Generillo and Del
Rosario for illegal recruitment in large scale. Neither of these witnesses was privy to the transactions between
appellant and each of the two complainants. The witnesses claimed that appellant illegally recruited Generillo and
Del Rosario. Nonetheless, we find their averments to be unfounded as they were not even present when Generillo
and Del Rosario negotiated with and made payments to appellant.
For insufficiency of evidence and in the absence of the third element of illegal recruitment in large scale, particularly,
that the offense is committed against three or more persons, we cannot affirm the conviction for illegal recruitment in
large scale. Nonetheless, we agree with the finding of the trial court that appellant illegally recruited Marasigan, for
which she must be held liable for the lesser offense of simple illegal recruitment.
Appellants defense that she did not recruit Marasigan but merely purchased a plane ticket for her is belied by the
evidence as it is undeniable that she represented to Marasigan that she had the ability to send people to work as
factory workers in Taiwan. Her pretext that the fees paid to her were merely payments for a plane ticket is a
desperate attempt to exonerate herself from the charges and cannot be sustained.
Furthermore, no improper motive may be attributed to Marasigan in charging appellant. The fact that Marasigan was
poor does not make her so heartless as to contrive a criminal charge against appellant. She was a simple woman
with big dreams and it was appellants duplicity which reduced those dreams to naught. Marasigan had no motive to
testify falsely against appellant except to tell the truth. xxxiii[33]
Besides, if there was anyone whose testimony needed corroboration, it was appellant as there was nothing in her
testimony except the bare denial of the accusations. xxxiv[34] If appellant really intended to purchase a plane ticket
and not to recruit Marasigan, she should have presented evidence to support this claim. Also, in her testimony,
appellant named an employee in the travel agency who was allegedly her contact person for the purchase of the
ticket. She could have presented that person, or some other employee of the agency, to show that the transaction
was merely for buying a ticket. Her failure to do the foregoing acts belies her pretensions.
The Court likewise affirms the conviction of appellant for estafa which was committed against Marasigan. Conviction
under the Labor Code for illegal recruitment does not preclude punishment under the Revised Penal Code for the
felony of estafa. xxxv[35] This Court is convinced that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
violated Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that estafa is committed:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The evidence is clear that in falsely pretending to possess power to deploy persons for overseas placement,
appellant deceived the complainant into believing that she would provide her a job in Taiwan. Her assurances made
Marasigan exhaust whatever resources she had to pay the placement fee required in exchange for the promised job.
The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present, hence the conviction for estafa in
Criminal Case No. 92-6154 should be affirmed.
Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused found guilty of estafa shall be sentenced to:
x x x The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount
of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos
x x x. xxxvi[36]
The amount involved in the estafa case is P23,000.00. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
penalty shall be taken from the maximum period of the foregoing basic penalty, specifically, within the range of
imprisonment from six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years.
On the other hand, the minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree to that provided by law, without considering the incremental penalty for the amount in excess of
P22,000.00. xxxvii[37] That penalty immediately lower in degree is prison correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, with a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. On these
considerations, the trial court correctly fixed the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate sentence in the
estafa case.
While we must be vigilant and should punish, to the fullest extent of the law, those who prey upon the desperate with
empty promises of better lives, only to feed on their aspirations, we must not be heedless of the basic rule that a
conviction may be sustained only where it is for the correct offense and the burden of proof of the guilt of the accused
has been met by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. 92-6153) and estafa (Criminal
Case No. 92-6154) is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
1) Accused-appellant is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple illegal recruitment, as defined in Article
38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended. She is hereby ordered to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years,
as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P100,000.00.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-6154 for estafa, herein accused-appellant is ordered to serve an indeterminate sentence
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to reimburse Elenita Marasigan the sum of P23,000.00.
In all other respects, the aforestated judgment is AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellant in both instances.