China DA

A. New Chinese leadership creates an opportunity to improve unstable Sino-U.S.

relations
Agence Frane Presse 13 (Retrieved May 24, 2013, from Lexis/Nexis)

Christopher Johnson, a former CIA analyst on China, said that Xi -- thanks in part to his elite background --
consolidated power more quickly than many US policymakers had anticipated. "Xi Jinping is much more relaxed and
cosmopolitan and more likely to go off the talking points. Hu Jintao was very robotic and oftentimes seemed to be
talking more to the Chinese in the room than to his counterpart," said Johnson, now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The
Obama administration has already invested time in cultivating a relationship with Xi, and Vice
President Joe Biden spent an unusually long five days in China in 2011 to mingle with him.
B. The US & China will clash over economic ties to Latin America.
Schimia 12 (Emanuele, journalist and geopolitical analyst, 2012, Retrieved May 30, 2013, from
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/NG18Cb01.html)

The United States keeps on looking to Asia, but it had better watch its back, where China's penetration in Latin America is intensifying.
Meanwhile, region's countries are taking their countermeasures to minimize the Sino-Western dispute, using multilateral regional and sub-
regional institutions as the first line of defense. During her latest roadshow in Asia, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton shifted the
debate over the much-trumpeted United States "pivot" towards the Asian-Pacific region from
military confrontation to trade competition with China. Over the past decade, trade assertiveness has
turned out to be the master key to another, often underestimated, geopolitical pivot: that of Beijing
to Latin America - Washington's historical and geographical backyard. China's drive for enhancing its vested
positions across Central and South America is not without pitfalls, much as those the US faces in its
efforts to protect its strategic interests in East Asia. China is Latin America's third-largest trading
partner, immediately after the United States and European Union (EU). Beijing's commercial exchanges with Latin-
American countries were worth more than US$241 billion in 2011, according to data released by the Chinese Trade Ministry in April. Of
US$153 billion from foreign direct investments which Latin-American and Caribbean nations attracted in 2011, $8 billion came from China
(down $7 billion compared with 2010), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) reported in May. That puts
Beijing well behind the EU, US, Latin America and Caribbean and even Japan. The EU, top investor in this region, has funneled an average of $30
billion a year into Latin America since 2002. Recent trade and economic tensions between the United States,
Canada and Europe on one side, and some Latin-American countries on the other seem to be playing
into Beijing's hands. In May, the EU filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) against Argentina's import barriers,
after it had already challenged Buenos Aires's decision in April to nationalize YPF, the local energy company which until then was controlled by
Spain's oil and gas major Repsol. Left-leaning governments such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador have made numerous nationalizations over
the past years, which have affected mostly North American and European companies.

C. China benefits for the US embargo on Cuba- lifting it will cause tension
Nash 13 (Paul, contributor for the Diplomatic Courier, How the Chinese are Helping to Transform
Cuba, Again May 24, 2013 http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/brics/1465)

China is Cubas second largest trading partner after Venezuela, and Cuba is Chinas largest trading
partner in the Caribbean, with bilateral trade now standing at around $2 billion. Beijing wants to help
Cuba push through market-oriented economic reforms, knowing from its own experience over the past
three decades that private sector entrepreneurial activity can stimulate foreign investment, build national capital and promote domestic
consumption. To this end, China has granted Cuba numerous long-term low or interest-free loans to support
development and maintain financial and social stability through the reform process. It has also
undertaken significant technology transfers and entered into joint ventures in farming, light industry,
and tourism. Cuba has started the reform process focussed on its biggest export industries. It has, for example, begun restructuring its
ailing sugar industry by abolishing the sugar ministry and creating Azcuba, a state holding company consisting of 13 provincial sugar companies
that operate 56 sugar mills and 850 sugarcane farms. Azcuba signed foreign investment agreements with companies from Brazil and Britain in
2012 to modernize harvesting equipment and build biomass energy plants. Cuba exports about 400,000 tonnes of sugar annually to China,
more than half the amount it produces for domestic consumption. Chinas interest in Cuba is, of course, inseparable from the Caribbeans
natural resources and those of Latin America more broadly. The Sino-Cuban economic fraternity, from Beijings
viewpoint, is largely pragmatic rather than idealistic. Beijing has demonstrated that it will conduct business with left-
leaning governments like Venezuela and Ecuador as readily as with right-leaning governments like Chile and Colombia. The Sino-Cuban
partnership may represent a lost opportunity for the United States in promoting liberal democracy in the Western
Hemisphere. But it may also represent a path to normalized relations if China can help Cubas economy reform such that it, like Vietnams, no
longer justifies the continuation of a decades-old U.S. trade embargo on the basis that Cubas economy is dominated or controlled by
international communism.

D. Relations are not stable- increased tensions risk crisis escalation.
Dingli 13 (Shen, professor and associate dean at Fudan Universitys Institute of International Studies,
interviewed by Emeritus Professor Joseph Camilleri, La Trobe University, May 21, 2013, Retrieved from
May 24, 2013, from http://www.thepowerofideas.com/post/50987680565/the-future-of-us-sino-
relations-an-interview-with)

SD: Current Sino-US relations can be described as an interesting mix of necessary cooperation and
increasing competition, with some controlled confrontation. So long as it views itself as a City upon a hill, the United
States will remain fundamentally opposed to the emergence of a multipolar system. In particular the United States will resist
anyone, China included, from sharing its leadership. America may accept certain partnerships as part of a US-centric
world, but not as part of a multipolar one. America may eventually agree to engage with China in the development of a multipolar order, but
out of necessity, not out of choice. There are many examples of expanding China-US cooperation: collaborating
against North Koreas nuclear and missile development; jointly stabilizing the world financial market; and, dispatching large numbers of
students reciprocally to learn from each other etc. But areas of suspicion are increasing even faster when it comes to
perceptions of each others strategic intentions: why the US has moved its pivot to Asia, and how China perceives its interests in the South
China Sea, to name a few. The US is wondering whether Beijing, especially during Chinas military modernization, will follow
through on its international commitment, especially to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of Sea
(UNCLOS) which allows Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia respective exclusive economic zones (EEZs), thereby denying
Chinas claim of the right to tap maritime economic resources in some of these exclusive areas. China, for its part, is deeply concerned about
the US shift to a pro-Japan position in the China-Japan sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. Such deep mutual suspicion
and subsequent hedging, if poorly managed, could lead to serious crisis escalation .
E. Strong US-Sino relations cause political reform and peace in China as well as
prevent several scenarios for global war, disease, terrorism and prolif
Gross 13 (Donald senior associate at the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), a former State Department official, and author of The China Fallacy), Mar. 19, 2013,
Retrieved May 24, 2013 from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-gross/us-china-
relations_b_2891183.html?view=print&comm_ref=false)

Better relations with China would support wide-reaching political reform and liberalization. They
would undercut the repressive internal forces that legitimize one-party authoritarian rule as a means of
protecting the country against foreign military threats, particularly from the United States. In the field of national security, through
an ongoing process of mutual threat reduction, the United States can ensure that China is a future
partner and not a danger to the interests of America and its allies. The greatest benefit is that the U.S. would avoid a
military conflict for the foreseeable future with a country it now considers a major potential adversary. Other critical
security benefits to the United States and its allies include: Significantly reducing China's current
and potential military threat to Taiwan, thus securing Taiwan's democracy; Utilizing China's considerable
influence with North Korea to curb Pyongyang's nuclear weapon and missile development programs;
Increasing security cooperation with China on both regional and global issues, allowing the United States
to leverage Chinese capabilities for meeting common transnational threats such as climate change, energy
insecurity, pandemic disease, cyberterrorism and nuclear proliferation; Curtailing cyberattacks by
the Chinese military on U.S.-based targets as well as enforcing stringent measures against private individuals and groups in China
that engage in cyber-hacking; Having China submit its maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas to an
independent international judicial body to prevent festering conflicts over uninhabited islands and energy resources from
escalating to armed conflict; and Reducing the scope, scale, and tempo of China's military
modernization programs by discrediting the rationale for conducting a focused anti-U.S. buildup,
especially since the country has so many other pressing material needs. In his second term, President Obama should seize the
opportunity created by the emergence of China's new leadership to stabilize U.S.-China relations -- by
pursuing a diplomatic strategy that minimizes conflict, achieves greater mutually beneficial Sino-
American cooperation, and significantly expands trade and investment between the two countries. This
approach would enable the United States to maintain an effective military presence in the Asia Pacific in coming years, despite defense budget
cuts, while also rebalancing economic and political resources to the region to ensure stability and mutual prosperity.

What this means judges is that our impact solves everything the affirmative teams
plan does, without severing relations with China, which are key to multiple more
impact scenarios that Cuba could never solve for. By maintaining relations with China,
the worlds largest economy, the United States, the worlds 2
nd
largest economy, can
improve each others trade while SIMULTANEIOUSLY solving human rights violations
in CHINA, THE COUNTRY WITH 1/5 OF THE WORLDS POPULATION. This then
LANDSLIDES, as the two largest world powers cooperate on security, terror,
proliferation, armed conflict, cyberterrorism, pandemic disease, CLIMATE CHANGE,
and energy insecurity.

Iran

Diplomacy can solve the Iran nuclear issue- new leader proves
Torbati and Hemming- 13
Yeganeh, Jon, ( Journalist for Reuters), Iran, U.S. waiting for other side to make
nuclear compromise, August 7. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/07/us-
iran-nuclear-usa-idUSBRE9760SW20130807. Google. 8/7/13. Euro.
The presidency of moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani has opened a window of opportunity in
Iran's delicate nuclear diplomacy with the West but Tehran-watchers say that window could
close as each side waits for the other to make the first move. Cautious optimism about talks
between Iran and six world powers due to restart in September is a stark contrast to the gloom
over on-off negotiations under eight years of previous President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In that
time, ever more stringent U.N., U.S. and European Union sanctions on Iran's energy, shipping and
banking sectors have helped weaken its currency, contributed to a steep rise in inflation and
nearly halved oil exports since 2011. Meanwhile the Islamic Republic has continued to enrich
uranium, edging towards Israel's "red line" after which it says it will launch military strikes on
Iranian facilities. The leadership of Rouhani, who defeated more conservative rivals in a June 14
election with just over 50 percent of the vote, appears to offer the prospect of an alternative to
the worst case scenario. "We are prepared, seriously and without wasting time, to enter
negotiations which are serious and substantive with the other side," Rouhani said at his first
news conference as president on Tuesday, and in answer to a question did not rule out direct
talks with the United States. The United States, which has said it would be a "willing partner" if
Iran were serious about resolving the problem peacefully, was careful in its response.
American trade in Latin America is used to push back against Iran, disrupts negotiations.
CSIS- 13
(Center for Strategic and International Studies, Brandon Fite and Chloe Coughlin-Schulte). US and Iranian Strategic Competition: Latin
America, Africa, and the Periphery States, July 9. http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic-competition-latin-america-africa-and-
periphery-states. Google. 8/8/13. Euro.
Strategic competition between the US and Iran in Latin America and Africa remains a critical
aspect of any national security discussion. Recent developments in Latin America, Africa, Iran,
and elsewhere necessitate a reevaluation of Irans presence in the region, as well as the threat it
poses to the United States. The Burke Chair in Strategys recently released report, US and Iranian
Strategic Competition: Latin America, Africa, and the Periphery States provides new analysis on
these issues. The death of Hugo Chavez and the end of Mahmoud Ahmadinejads presidency
remove two of the most important figures in the Iranian-Latin America relationship.
Additionally, despite Iranian vows of increased aid to both Africa and Latin America, funds have
been either nonexistent or far smaller than promised. Analysis of such developments and their
implications have been published in an updated report entitled US and Iranian Strategic
Competition: Latin America, Africa, and the Peripheral States, which is now available on the CSIS
website at: http://csis.org/files/publication/130709_Iran_Latinamerica_otherstates.pdf As newly
imposed American and European sanctions begin to take hold on the Iranian economy, the
government in Tehran has sought to mitigate their punitive effect and side-step Western
pressure by seeking partnerships with states on the geographic and strategic periphery of the
US-Iran competition. Iran has worked to build relationships with other politically isolated
governments with which it has somewhat of an ideological connection, like Venezuela and
Zimbabwe. However, Tehran also forged closer ties with states that are drawn to Iran for
economic, rather than political, purposes. Although states such as Argentina and Brazil may not
politically align themselves with the Islamic Republic, both have strong trade partnerships with
Iran. Despite these efforts, however, Irans embrace of these periphery states is limited and has
been hindered by the overwhelming degree of US economic integration in both regions. This
report shows that Iran pursued cooperation with states on the geographic and strategic
periphery. In addition to general trade and diplomatic ties, these peripheral partners also have
served as alternative markets for Iranian oil, provided diplomatic cover for Irans nuclear efforts,
and aided Irans acquisition of goods proscribed by international sanctions. Tehrans strategy
pragmatically subordinated concerns for ideological and religious homogeneity to the goal of
creating a coalition of non- or anti-Western states capable of influencing its competition with the
United States. The states involved have been drawn to Iran by both promises of economic
helpparticularly in the energy sectorand by Iranian appeals to commonly oppose the
Western international system. The Islamic Republic has also characterized its present isolation by
the US and Europe as a continuation of Western imperialism, and drew on its credentials as a
member of the Non-Aligned Movement to elicit support from the disparate states throughout
Africa and the Americas that have preexisting grievances with the Western order and its leading
states. According to Iranian leaders, the IRIs competition with the US and its allies is not a just a
contest between states, but a clash of worldviews. The US represents an exploitative status quo,
and Iran offers the promise of an alternative order geared toward promoting the sovereignty and
interests of developing nations. Though many of the countries Iran has sought cooperation with
are militarily and economically weak, Tehran cast a wide net in trying to build an array of
partners to counterbalance what it sees as Western dominance of the global order. Iran has
sought to be the hub of a non-Western bloc, and worked to frustrate American influence over
Iran and throughout the developing world. US ability to push back against Iran s attempts to
widen its network of such countries is strongest in countries that benefit from US aid, trade, or
that lack a significant basis for ideological disagreement with US practices. While Irans overtures
to peripheral states have the potential to weaken US attempts to contain and isolate Iran,
Tehrans web is fragile and possibly illusory.
Israel will attack if diplomacy fails
Gant Daily- 13
AHN, (online Pennsylvania newspaper), U.S. seeks direct talks with Iran as Israel warns of attack. July
14. http://gantdaily.com/2013/07/14/u-s-seeks-direct-talks-with-iran-as-israel-warns-of-attack/.
Google. 8/7/13. Euro.
Netanyahu said Iran is building faster centrifuges to enrich uranium to 20 percent for nuclear
weapons production. He said he will make the decision to attack Iran by winter if the U.S. fails
to stop Tehran from making nuclear weapons through diplomacy.


Israel first strike goes nuclear this draws in regional powers and escalates.
Russell 2009
James (Russell is a Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Strategic
Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East.
http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf -bg], google, 12/14/11, AW)
The chances of clandestine program development increases as more states enter the nuclear
business. The motivations for clandestine development increase in the region if Iran
successfully crosses the nuclear threshold a situation greatly feared by the Sunni-led states in
the Persian Gulf and Middle East. The emergence of clandestine programs in the region creates
incentives for preventative attack by a number of actors, some of whom may be nuclear armed.
As with the case in the near-term scenarios, any wartime scenarios create the prospect of
escalation and nuclear use. Regional powers might also, under extreme circumstances, be
tempted to resort to nukes with the belief that it can successfully break the will of its opponent,
much like the United States did against its Japanese opponent in 1945. While it currently appears
remote, regime(s) change that brings to power millennial extremists constitute another prospect
that might factor into long-term use scenarios. Extremist religious and/or ideologically motivated
leadership may view nuclear weapons as a useful tool in pursuit of their objectives. The prospect
of use by a clandestinely-armed state cannot be dismissed over the longer-term either as a
calculated attack on an unsuspecting adversary or in the context of a war for national survival.
A nuclear bolt-from-the-blue attack by violent non-state actors or a resort to nuclear use in
the belief that it can successfully break the will of its opponent, much like the United States did
against its Japanese opponent in 1945, is possible both in short- and long-term scenarios, but is
deemed a remote possibility in this analysis. In the Middle East, most terrorist groups fall into the
category of religious nationalists that seek localized political objectives. It is difficult to see how
using a nuclear weapon advances the cause of groups like Hamas or Hezbollah. On the other
hand, millennial extremist groups like Al Qaeda might be more attracted to the possibility of using
a nuclear weapon should they come into possession of one.

Extend gant13, which gives the neg the best timeframe of the entire debate. Israels
PM Netanyahu has PROMISED to bomb Iran, also giving you probability. Then extend
Russell09 which says that any nuclear conflict goes global, thus wnning you
magnitude as well.

On Case

Agriculture/tRADE

They emphasize trade deficite, except the United States trade deficite is huge and will
not be solved by opening our agricultural sector to a small island nation. Emphasize
this solvency defict. THEY CAN NOT SOLVE FOR THE ADVANTAGE.


Cuba is a risky market exports would decrease without cash only provision.
United States International Trade Commission 2007 Estimated Effect on U.S. Sales of
Agricultural Products to Cuba if Restrictions on Financing were Lifted ,
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3932.pdf
Mr. Messina cited Cuban credit risk and the U.S. cash only sales provision, travel
restrictions, and general distrust as potential factors limiting trade. He said the Cuban market
is widely recognized as a very risky market in which to conduct credit sales and other
financial transactions. According to Mr. Messina, some large firms may be willing to take
on this credit risk, which is currently minimized through the cash only sales provision, to
increase exports. Conversely, he could also envision a situation where exports would
decrease without cash only sales as firms would be unwilling to assume such a high risk.
Lifting restrictions wont dramatically increase exports US firms wont issue open
credit to Cuba.
William Messina, Coordinator of Economic Analysis, Department of Food and Resource Economics,
Florida Cooperative Extension Service, 2003 U.S.-Cuban Agricultural Trade: Present Realities and
Future Prospects1 http://www.ilfb.org/media/253618/u_of_florida_testimony_on_cuba.pdf
Cuba's trade flows were more or less in balance until the early 1960s when the economy suddenly had
to adjust to the shock of losing its most important trade partner, the United States.4 The immediate
impact was a rapid growth in Cuba's trade deficit. However, once the Cuban economy began to be
supported and subsidized by the Soviet Union, these trade deficits were not particularly important.
However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent dissolution of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (COMECON),5 Cuba once again lost its most important trading partner and, in
this case, its all-important source of economic support. At this point, the flaws in Cuba's economic
system, which were responsible for generating its large trade deficits, began to manifest themselves.
Foreign investment flows, net revenues from tourism, and even the aforementioned hard currency
remittances from Cuban-Americans are not sufficient to offset trade deficits that increase each
year and totaled nearly 3.3 billion pesos in 2002 (Anuario de Estadstico de Cuba, 2002).6 As a result,
Cuba is considered an extremely high credit risk in global financial markets, with Euromoney
Magazine ranking Cuba 181st out of 184 countries in their 2003 analysis of country credit risk
(Euromoney Magazine, 2003). Only Somalia, Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan ranked lower.
Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that many U.S. firms are going to issue open credit to
Cuba, so allowing credit sales alone likely would not be sufficient to dramatically increase U.S.
agricultural and food exports to Cuba. Following an opening of credit sales to Cuba, the next step
might be for U.S. firms to seek access to U.S. government Export Credit Guarantee programs for
agricultural and food sales to Cuba. However, that would be a very contentious issue and one that
would generate a great deal of animated discussion and debate on Capitol Hill.


No boost to ag sales Cuban economy cant support additional imports, economy in
shambles.
William Messina, Coordinator of Economic Analysis, Department of Food and Resource Economics,
Florida Cooperative Extension Service, 2003 U.S.-Cuban Agricultural Trade: Present Realities and
Future Prospects1 http://www.ilfb.org/media/253618/u_of_florida_testimony_on_cuba.pdf
Some have argued that a relaxation of the cash sale provisions of the TSRA legislation to allow U.S.
firms to offer credit sales would significantly boost U.S. sales of agricultural and food products to
Cuba. However, that fails to take into consideration the economic realities in Cuba. The Cuban
economy is a shambles and it faces serious hard currency shortages as a result of its ever-
escalating trade deficit.


EMPHASIZE THAT THEY ONLY PARTIALLY LIFT THE EMBARGO ON CUBA FOR THEIR
AGRICULTURE. THIS MAKES SOLVING THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS/DEMOCRACY IMPACT
IMPOSSIBLE. WE DENY CUBA MEDICAL SUPPLIES, TECHNOLOGY, AND OTHER VITAL
NECESITTIES TO LIVE.