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http://asj.sagepub.com/content/31/4/319
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DOI: 10.1177/000169938803100403
1988 31: 319 Acta Sociologica
Jukka Gronow
Culture
The Element of Irrationality: Max Weber's Diagnosis of Modern

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319
The Element of
Irrationality:
Max
Webers
Diagnosis
of Modern Culture
Jukka Gronow
Department
of
Sociology. University
of Helsinki
Max Webers
diagnosis
of modern culture as
presented
for
example
in
Science as Vocation includes the idea of differentiation between the
spheres
of science, art, and law and ethics But Weber also claims that all
genuine
values have
gone
from
public
life The
parallel processes
of rationalization
and intellectualization have resulted in a loss of individual freedom and
meaning
This
diagnosis
does
not simply
follow from his over-narrow
concept
of
rationality,
as claimed
by
Habermas To Weber rationalization is not
identical with the increase of instrumental rationality Rather, it is the formal
and
abstract, or
quantifying
nature of the modern
type
of rationality which
is
totally
alien to all value considerations In Webers
opinion
there is thus
an unavoidable element of
irrationally
inherent in the
very process
of
rationalization Weber
obviously
also wanted to
emphasize
the
paradoxical
nature of
legal authority
and formal
bureaucracy
The
legitimacy
of the
modern
type
of domination does not rest on
any
shared norms or values,
but is
by
nature
exclusively procedural
and formal An
analysis
of Webers
views about
modernity
thus reveals a
highly
conscious
critique
of the
Project
of
Enlightenment
1. The modern
polytheism
At the end of his lecture on Science as VocatIOn Max Weber
presented
a
Sumniary
view of his
conception
of the
vptritual dtlI1~
of the times and the
position
of man
in modern culture:
The fate of our time is charactenzed
by
rationalization and rntrllectualrzatrun and, above
all,
by
the disenchantment of the world
Precisely
the ultimate and most sublime values
have retreated from
puhlrc
life other into the transcendental realm ot mBst)c life or into
the brotherliness of direct and
persona)
human relations It m not accrdmtal that our
greatest
art is intimate and not monumental, nor it is accidental that
today only
within
the smallest and mtlmate circles, in
personal
human situations. in
pnuuscrmrr,
that
something
is
pulsatrng
that
corresponds
to the
prophetic prteumu,
which in tormer times
swept through
the
great
communities like a hrehrand.
iiclding
them
together
(Weber
1970a;155 )
It would be
tempting
to
interpet
Webers charactcrization ot the result of the
parallel processes
of rationalization and intellectualization as a Nietzscheaii vtston
of the
dying
out of all
gods
and
la>ting
values. At certain
points
Weber is almost
paraphrasing
Nietzsches On the
GlIlealogy of
Morals. In Webers
thinking
the
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320
vision of a new man
creating
the new values which will
carry
him over into
infinity
is
missing,
however,
as is the
irony
towards a man of modern culture who, in front
of his clothes closet,
puts
on the costumes of various historical
epochs feeling
equally
ill at unease in
every
one of them. Webers alternatives are neither the new
Ubermensch nor the dilettante who
only
makes himself look ridiculous,
but rather
the man of modern culture who
soberly
and without illusions is
willing
to face the
challenge
of our times
following
his own
personal
values or
demons,
fully
aware
that these values are without
any
transcendental
grounds
or
intersubjective validity.
Nevertheless, Weber
clearly thought
that once we have chosen our own values we
should
stay loyal
to them and feel
responsibile
for our actions which we have
committed in accordance with those values.
I
Webers
personal
solution to the
challenge
of our times was
obviously
not
only
motivated
by
his
reading
of Neitzsche,
but also a result of his
analysis
of the
development
of occidental culture, which he understood in terms of a rationalization
process.
Webers idea of a
process
of rationalization was twofold. First in the
process
of rationalization,
a rational and methodical conduct of life
originally
ethically
motivated and imbedded in a
religious
and
metaphysical
world view
becomes detached from the ethics of
calling.
The
spirit
of
capitalism
elevated
by
the ethical
calling
and conviction of the
early
Puntan becomes institutionalized: in
the end a social order rules over the life of men in a
compulsive
manner.
Impersonal
forces thus come to rule over the individual actors. The
development
of modern
capitalism
results in a loss of freedom
(cf. Sguy
1987).
This
diagnosis
was most
pointedly presented by
Weber at the end of his
essay
on The Protestant Ethic and
the
Spirit of Caprtalism:
The Puntan wanted to work for a
calling ;
we are forced to do so For when ascetism was
carned out of monastic cells into
everyday
life,
and
began
to dominate
worldly morality,
it did its
part
m
building
the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order This
order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine
production
which
today
determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism,
not
only
those
directly
concerned with economic
acquisition,
with irresistible force..
To-day
the
spirit
of
religious
ascetism - whether
finally,
who knows? - has
escaped
from
the
cage.
But victorious
capitalism,
since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its
support
no
longer.
(Weber 1970b:181-182)
Second,
during
the occidental
process
of modernization the different
spheres
of life
are detached from each other. Weber seems
especially
to think that science, but
also art,
morality
and law,
are differentiated and become
gradually
detached
from their
metaphysico-religious origins.
On this
point, Jurgen
Habermas has
summarized Webers
conception
as follows: ... reason
splits
itself
up
into a
plurality
of value
spheres
and
destroys
its own
universality
(Habermas 1984:247).
The different
spheres
do not
only
become
independent,
in so
doing
the values
ruling
in them also
change
their
quality
and become
mutually incompatible.
As
Jurgen
Habermas
(1984:229)
and Matti Viikari
(1986:196)
have
pointed
out,
to
Weber
only
values imbedded in
religion
can function as forceful
principles guiding
the conduct of the life of
man,
and in the
process
of modernization it is
religion
which is
destroyed. Consequently,
in Webers modern
world,
ltfe is devoid of
meaning...

,
.
,
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321
Weber is
not, however,
a critic of the
Enlightenment only
in the sense that he
would -
contrary
to the idea common
during Enlightenment -
doubt that the
increase of instrumental
rationality,
technical reason and mans domination over
nature would also
inevitably
lead to the moral
perfectibility
of man and the
development
of
just
and reasonable social relations between men. Webers
critique
is even more serious. To Weber rationalization is not identical with the increase of
instrumental or technical
rationality -
the effective choice of means to achieve
any
goal.
In Webers
thinking
modern forms of
rationality
are
always
connected with
the ideas of
formality,
abstractness and - even
more
importantly -
wth calculation.
It is
primarily
this idea of formal
rationality
which
explains why
rationalization in
Webers
opinion destroys
all
genuine
cultural values m the modern world and
why
it
petrifies
culture into a mechanical
apparatus resembling
that of a machine.
2.
Legality
and
legitimacy
In his
Theory of
Cojnmonrcatioe Action
Jurgen
Habermas
( 198~)
has most
emphati-
cally
criticized Webers
critique
of the
project
of
Enlightenment.
In Habermas
opinion,
Weber did not understand - and in this
respect
he shares the fate of
many
other scholars in Habermas
study -
that connected to the
process
of modernization
there is another kind of cultural rationalization
taking place,
which at least
poten-
tially
is
present
even in
everyday
culture. In its
pure
form it comes into
appearance
in the different
specialist
cultures,
in
science, in art, and in the
spheres
of law and
ethics. It is this second form of
rationality
which, furthermore,
guarantees
that
modern culture is not
irreparably split up
into
competitive
value
spheres struggling
and
competing
with each other as was
supposed by
Weber. Habermas com-
municative
rationality
is to
guarantee -
at least on the formal level of the
argu-
mentative
redemption
of
validity
claims - the
universality
of reason in modern
times.
According
to Habermas,
m
post-traditional
cultures the
validity
claims
concerning
the truth of factual statements, the
rightness
of moral norms and
the
authenticity
of
self-expression
can
always
be
questioned
and
justifications
demanded. In this context one can also
speak
about the
increasing self-reflexivity
of modern culture.
Despite
the obvious
disagreement
Habermas
diagnosis
of modern times
closely
resembles that of Weber and was
certamly
influenced
by
it.
Following
Weber,
Habermas also thinks that the economic
system
and
public
administration have
been differentiated into
independent sub-systems following
their own rules of
functioning.
Within them social action is co-ordinated
by
the
delinguistical
media
of
money
and
power.
Thus,
in a sense, even
according
to Habermas
conception,
economic
system
and
public
administration are in a sense
beyond morality, they
have become
independent
from the
sphere
of
morality.
But as
opposed
to Weber,
Habermas does not think that
morality
has
totally escaped public
life. This dis-
agreement concerning
modern culture and the occidental
process
of rationalization
becomes most
apparent
m Webers and Habermas
respective conceptions
about
modern law and the
legitimacy
of
authority
in a modern state.
Habermas is
certainly
not the first one to have wondered about Webers con-
ceptions
of
legality
and
legitimacy.
In Webers classification of the
types
of
authority
or domination there is a
specific
third
type,
which is the
only
one
regarded
as
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rational
by
Weber. In his introduction to the studies on world
religions
Weber
wrote about this
type
as follows:
.
Our modern associations, above all the
political
ones, are of the
type of legal authority.
That is, the
legitimacy
of the
power
holder to
give
commands rests
upon
rules that are
rationally
established
by
enactment,
by agreement,
or
by imposition
The
legitimation
for
establishing
these rules rests, m turn,
upon
a
rationally
enacted or
interpreted
constitution. Orders are
given
in the name of the
impersonal
norm, rather than m the
name of a
personal authority.,
and even the
gmng
of a command constitutes ohedience
towards a norm rather than an
arbitrary
freedom. favor. or
pnvilege
(Weber
1970a 294-
295) >
And further:
The official
duty ...
is fixed
by rationally
established norms,
by
enactments,
degrees,
and
regulations,
m such a manner that the
legitimacy
of the
authonty
becomes the
legality
of the
general
rule,
which is
purposely thought
out, enacted and announced with formal
correctness.
(Weber
1970a:299)
In
discussing
this
legal type
of Herrschaft Weber
continuously emphasized
that it
is
impersonal by
its nature and its
legitimacy
is based
exclusively
on the obedience
towards
general
norms which have been decreed or enacted
following
some
specific
formal -1,1-s or
procedures.
The
legitimacy
of such a
type
of
authority
is
specific by
its nature if
compared
with
any
other
type
of
legitimacy:
whereas charisma is based
on the dime revelation of the leader and is
always personal
and
exemplary by
its
nature,
and traditional
authority
rests on the
power
of the
tradition,
the
legitimacy
of
legal authority
is rather
peculiar.
It rests on the
legality
of the norms and its
legitimacy
is
procedural by
its nature. Its
legitimacy
rests
solely
on the fact that
those who command do so m the name of
impersonal
rules or
norms,
which have
been enacted
by
an
organ
which has the
nght
to do so and which have been decreed
following
certain
legal procedures.
Such an
authority
is
legitimate simply
because
it is
legal
and it is rational because it rests on a belief in the
legality
of enacted
rules
(Weber 1968:215).
In
discussing
Webers
conception
of
legal authonty
Johannes Wtnckelman
( 195?)
has
already pointed
out that whereas m the classification of the
legitimate validity
of order
(legitime Geltung
einer
Ordnung)
in
Economy
and
Society
there is a
specific
value rational
type
included,
such a
type
is
totally missing
from Webers
catalogue
of the
types
of
legitime authority
(see
Weber
1968:33).
Not a
single
one
of the
legitimate types
of
authority
refers to
legitimacy
which could, m
any
sense,
be
regarded
as value rational and which, thus, would be founded on the belief m
the absolute
validity
of an ethical norm.
Following
Schluchter
(1979),
Habermas has, however,
pointed
out that even
legal authonty
must,
in the last instance,
draw its
legitimacy
from some moral
values.2 Weber is misled in
believing
that
legality
could create
legitimacy
all
by
itself. Schluchter claims that Weber is
nght
m
emphasizing
that modern law has
been differentiated from morals. Weber also
correctly thought
that this kind of law
is first of all functional for the
functioning
of rational economic actors who can
predict
and calculate even the
legal
results and
consequences
of their economic
action and evaluate its costs and benefits,
takmg
into account the
functioning
of an
equally
rational
public
administration and
jurisdiction.
In Schluchters
opinion,
Weber was thus able to show how rational administration and modern law are
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323
functional for market
economies,
but he is mistaken in
believing
that there are
only
two
principal types
of
legal systems:
one that rests on the
following
of certain
absolute ethical
principles
and substantive ethical
postulates,
or a
positive
law. The
first
type
is
incompatible
whith the demands of formal rational action because it
cannot
apply general
norms to
stnctly
determmed and limited individual cases. It
would not be
objective
and
impartial by
its nature
(ohne
Ansehen an
Person).
The second
type,
on the other
hand,
is alien or even hostile to
any
ethical
considerations whatsoever. Positive law and substantive law are
mutually
exclusive
and
opposite types
of
legal systems.
As Schluchter has
put
it, Weber thinks that
the
implementation
of substantive ethical norms would
put
the
legal apparatus -
normally functioning
like a rational machine - out of order
(see
Schluchter
1979:161 ).
In Schluchters
opinion,
Weber did not realize that even
legal
domination and
the
validity
of a
positively
enacted law must be
complemented by morality grounded
on
principles.
In the last instance it must be value rational, too.
Legality
alone can
never create
legitimacy.
In
discussing legitimate
order or domination Weber
always
contrasted them to interest-oriented action or
compulsory
action. Commands are
obeyed
and
regarded
as
legimate exactly
because
they
are
approved
of and
regarded
as valid
by
their
objects.
To be
accepted
as
legimate, authority
must have an
exemplary
and
binding
character, the two characteristics without
which,
so Weber
thought,
there could be no stable and
lasting
order
(see
Schluchter
1979:126).
Thus
legality
could
not,
in
fact,
create
legitimacy
in Webers
sense,
unless it referred to
some basic values which are shared
by
the
participants
of an order.
In Schluchters
opmion,
it is rather
amazing
that Weber did not
comprehend
such
an
elementary
fact. Schluchters
interpretation
is
especially interesting,
however,
because he even
suggests
two
possible
reasons for Webers
misunderstanding.
First,
Weber was
obviously
influenced
by
the doctrines of
legal positivism
of his time
(e.g.
Kelsen),
which he
adopted
in his
thinking,
and, second, there were some
important
limitations in Webers
thinking concerning
the
possible
nature of ethical
systems
in
general.
From Kelsens
legal positivism
Weber had
adopted
the idea
that
legal
norms are
legitimate
if and
only
if
they
have been enacted
by
a
legislature
which has a
right
to decree laws
(see
Schluchter
1979:145).
In modern intellectual
history,
the differentiation of law and ethics took
place alongside
the
disqualification
of the natural law tradition in
legal thinking.
Natural law was the
very predecessor
of modern
positive
law which still had a substantive ethical foundation. In
criticizing
natural
law,
positive legal thinking
revealed
jurisdiction
to be a
pure product
of a
compromise
of interests and a mere technical instrument
serving
some
goals
alien
to it. The
only
remnant from this tradition which was still
regarded
as valid was the
belief in the sacredness of
pure legal
formalism
(see
Schluchter
1979:82-83).
And
this idea of
legal
formalism was then
uncritically adopted by
Weber.
The second reason for Webers
misunderstanding
taken
up by
Schluchter is even
more serious. In
analysing
the differentiation of
morality
and law Weber
thought
in terms of ethics of conviction
(Gesinnungsethik).
And one can
easily agree
with
Weber that ethics of conviction cannot be
complemented
with
legal thinking
which,
at least in
principle,
treats all
legal subjects
in a uniform, neutral, and
impersonal
manner. And
obviously,
whenever Weber discussed the
relationship
of ethics to
law,
he had in mind such a
system
of ethics. Schluchter, on the other hand,
points
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324
out that the
type
of ethics which could be
complementary
to modern law, is the ethics
of
responsibility (Verantwortungsethik)
(see
Schluchter
1979:156).
Schluchters
critique
could then be summarized as follows: Weber made a twofold mistake
concerning
the
development
of both law and ethics. He did not understand that
the
principles
of
positive
law were
inadequate by
themselves, neither did he
understand that
legality
would
always
be in need of an ethical
justification.
Modern
law should be
complemented
with a universal ethics of
responsibility
which would
unite the
principles
of individual freedom with the freedom of
consciousness, and
which would also consist of
general
norms which are
binding
from the
point
of view
of an indtvtdual actor.
Habermas
critique
of Weber follows the same lines of
thought
as Schluchters:
Weber was
only
able to show
why
modern law was functional for the modern
rational economic order. But
functionality
alone does not
guarantee legitimacy.
Weber was
obviously
mistaken in
identifying
the need for
justification
with the
need of enactment of a
legal system
or its
procedure
for enactment.
Consequently,
Webers
thinking
ends
up
in a vicious circle:
The belief m
legality
can
produce legitimacy only
if we
already presuppose
the
legitimacy

of the
legal
order that
lays
down what is
legal.
There is no
way
out of this circle
(Habermas 1984:265)
Habermas
goes
even further and claims that it would be
very astonishing
indeed if
Weber had not noticed this fact:
It would be
astonishing
if Weber had not seen that the rationalization of law has to be
conceived,
m the first mstance, from the
standpoint
of a value-rational transformation
of the institutional
system,
and
only
in the second instance from the
standpoint
of the
estabUshment of
purposive-rational
action orientation.
(Habermas 1984:253)
According
to Habermas, there
really
is
only
one
possible argument
in favour of
Webers
position
which could save his
reasoning -
and this
argument
was
explicitly
rejected by
Weber himself. One could in fact think that the
legitimacy
of
legal
domination could be based on a kind of
secondary
traditionalism or
pseudotraditional ism.
A
person acting according
to rational norms
usually
does not
reflect
upon
their
origins
and he does not
usually
doubt or wonder about their
validity. They
are taken for
granted
like a tradition
(see
Habermas
1984:266-267).
But Weber
obviously
did not have in mtnd such a form of
pseudotraditionalism
white
discussing legal
domination and the
validity
of modern law.
Taken
altogether,
Habermas discussion ends
up
with the same
argument
as
Schluchters: for some odd reason - or
perhaps
rather for the reasons articulated
by
Schluchter - Weber
thought
that the functional differentiation of law from
morals,
which has taken
place dunng
the modernization
process, necessarily
deprives
law of
any
ethical
anchoring
whatsoever. The
sphere
of law is no
longer
in need of
any
ethical
justification
or moral foundation. In
thinking
in accordance
with the
legal positivism
of his
time,
Weber
obviously
believed that
any
law can be
imposed
and will be
regarded
as valid
provided
the correct
procedure
has been
followed in
enacting
it. Thus Weber
emphasized only
the
pnnciple
of
enactment,
and
totally neglected
the
principle
of
justification.
In Habermas
opinion, legality
is
always subjected
to value
rationality
and even
Weber should have been able to understand it had his view not been restricted
by
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325
too narrow a
conception
of instrumental
rationality
(see
also Habermas
1957).
In
Habermas discussion of Weber,<
concept
of
rationality
there is. however,
a reveal-
ing point
which shows that neither Habermas nor
obviously
Schluchter has under-
stood the
peculiarity
of Webers
concept
of formal
rationality
which
is, however,
crucial in
interpreting
Webers ideas about
legality
and
legitimacy.
Habermas
characterizes Webers
concept
of formal
rationality
as follows:
As soon as
subjects
are released from the bonds of tradition or from control
by affects,
to the extent that
they
become conscious of their
preferences
and can choose their
goals
on the basis of clarified
preferences,
action can be evaluated from two
points
of mew:
from the instrumental
standpomt
of
efficacy
of means and from the correctness with
which
goals
are inferred in mew of
gwen preferences,
means, and
boundarn
conditions.
Weber calls these two
aspects
of instrumental
rationality
and the
rationality
of
choice,
taken
together,
formal
rationality,
m contradistinction to substantive evaluation of the
value
systems underlyng
the
preference
(Hibernias 1984.171)
At this
point
there is a
shortcoming
in Habermas
interpretation:
it
simply
does not
pay any
attention to the most
important
characteristics of formal
rationality
in
Webers
thinking.
In all the definitions or characterizations of the ideal
types,
which
in some sense are
formally
rational
( formal
rational action, formal
bureaucracy,
legal
domination),
and which
always
refer to the
specificity
of modern occidental
culture in Webers
analyses,
formal
rationality
is
always primarily
associated with
calculation and
accounting.
Webers
peculiar position concerning legal
domination
was
obviously
not a mistake or a
)apsus:
he was a
highly
conscious critic of the
project
of
Enlightenment,
and, thus, a
potential opponent
of the views
presented
by
Habermas. In
referring
on several occasions to the unavoidable element of
irrationality
in modern
culture, Weber
always
had in mind its
peculiar
formal and
abstract
nature,
which was
expressed
most
condensely by
the
quantitative
nature
of formal
rationality.
Formal
rationality
of an economic order, while
representing
the
peak
of
efficacy
and
calculability,
was irrational in the last instance, because it
rejected
all
genume
substantive value considerations from the
sphere
of economics.
The most rational
type
of action was at the same time the most irrational one.;
3
Similarly,
in his
analyses
of
legal
domination and modern law, Weber
obviously
wanted to
point
out that such
types
of
authority
and
legitimacy
were
paradoxical by
their nature. The modern
type
of
legitimacy
was, in fact, a form of
pseudolegitimacy.
Rational law and
legal authority
were both
morally
or
substantiveiv
irrational.
There
was, thus,
an obvious critical element
present
m Webers
thinking
about
rationality.
3. Formal
rationality
and the
irrationality
of modern culture
In
Economy
and
SOCiety
Weher on a few occasions referred to a fundamental
incompatibility
or
antimony
between substantive and formal
rationality
while
discussing
the
possible
future
perspective
of a socialist economic order
(cf.
Mommsen
1974:175-176).
The contrast between these two
types
of rational action
reveals in Webers view most
clearly
the
peculiarities
of formal
rationality -
or,
more
specifically,
the
peculiarities
of the most
complete types
of formal
rationalitv,
monetary
and
capital accountmg. Firstly,
formal
rationality
is
completely
indtfferent
towards
any
substantive values.
Secondly,
as Weber somewhat
astonishingly pointed
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326
out, there is an ultimate limitation inherent in its structure: such
rationality
is
purely
formal
by
its nature
(see
Weber
1968:108).
Thus, Weber,
clearly
wanted to
emphasize
that formal and substantive
rationality
are in
principle totally separate
and
mutually
exclusive
types
of rational action. In Webers
thinking,
ideal
types
actually always
were
supposed
to be
mutually
exclusive and
complementary - they
are
designated
as
pure types
of action - but for some reason Weber
obviously
wanted
particularly
to
emphasize
this feature while
discussing
the ideal
types
of
formal and substantive
rationaltty. According
to the
methodological
idea of ideal
types,
real action could
correspond
to a
greater
or lesser
degree
either to one of
these
types
or to
any
combination of both of them, but in this
particular
case
Weber
obviously thought
that action oriented
according
to the
principle
of formal
rationality
cannot be combined with
any aspects
of substantive
rationality,
and vice
versa.
Weber
did, however,
admit that on certain occasions these two
types
of action
might
coincide.
Formally
rational economic action
might
lead to a result which
would
satisfy
some ethical
postulates presumed by
substantive
rattonalttv_ ,
but such
is
neigher generally
nor
regularly
the case and such a result would be
totally
contingent by
its nature. Formal rational action never
pays
attention to
any
value
postulates,
and,
on the other hand,
any
action oriented
according
to the
principle
of substantive
rationality
cannot fulfil the demands of economic effectiveness. In
Webers
opinion,
the increase in one
type necessarily
leads to a decrease in the
other
type
of action.
Weber made this idea more concrete
by claiming
that the
degree
of formal
rationality
of an economic order,
in
particular,
never tells us
anything
about the
degree
of the satisfaction of needs in a
particular society.
Thus, a
completely
rational
economy
in the sense of formal
rationality
could be
completelv
irrational
from the
point
of view of the safisfaction of needs, or, in
fact,
according
to
any
criteria of a
just
distribution of
goods.
Webers conclusion to his discussion on the
rational
types
of economic action in this context is as follows:
Substantive and formal
(in
the sense of exact
calculation)
rationality
are, it should be
stated
again,
after all
largely
distinct
problems
This fundamental and. m the last
analysis,
unavoidable element of
irrationalitv
m economic
systems
is one of the
important
source
of all social
problem-,,
and above all, of the
problem
of socialism
(Weber
196x
111 )
In
Economy
and
SOCiety
there is a
parallel
discussion of the
principal opposition
between
monetary accounting
and calculus in kind
(Naturalrechnung) -
Weber
obviously
associates the latter with socialism - and of the
problems
inherent in
any
action oriented
according
to natural
accounting.
The main
problem
with natural
accounting
is that
any
two
goods
are
always qualitatively
different
making
their
intersubjective
and mutual
comparison impossible.
(see
Weber
ly6t;:lU(~11.~)
Weber was
obviously
inclined to think that
only
such an economic action which
is oriented to markets and which
operates
with.
in a sense
objective, money prices
can
guarantee
the effectiveness of an economic
system.4
And Webers serious
reservations
concerning
a socialist
economy
are
closely
related to the difficulties he
associated with
Naturalrechnung.
In
discussing
the
types
of
legitimate authority
and the modern
legal type
of
domination, in
particularly,
Weber also referred to the
principal opposition
between
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327
formal and substantive
rationality.
The
functioning
of a formal
bureaucracy. closely
connected with
legal
domination, is both effective and formal
by
its nature. In this
respect
it is
supenor
to
any
other form of
government.
In Webers
opinion
the
establishment of socialism would
require
an
equally high -
if not
higher - degree
of formal
bureaucracy
than
capitalism:
If this should
prove
not to be
possible,
it would demonstrate the existence of another of
those lundamental elements of
irrat)ona))tB -
a conflict between formal and substantive
ration,ilitn o1 the sort of which
5uciology
so often encounters
(Weber
liy68
225)
In
discussing
the bureaucratic form of administration Weber
reallv
made it sound
the final
destiny
of the modern world.
Bureaucracy
is a
problem
which both
socialism and
capitalism
have to face. To Weber, from a
purely
technical
point
of
view,
bureaucratic administration is the most rational and effective
type
of
administration which both makes
possible
and
guarantees
the
highest possible
degree
of
caIculablllty.
Bureaucratic admrnwtration is
always
the most rationti and
effective one, and the needs of mass administration make it
completely
indispensable.
In Webers own words the choice is
only
that between
bureaucracy
and dilettantism in the field of administration
(Weber lye:223).
Now, Weber
certainly
did thmk that
bureaucracy
is
indispensable onl~
under
certam condrtrons
(mass
administration and masts
consumption)
and it is effective
only according
to certam criteria
(technical
efficiency),
but under these conditions
there is no
escape
from formal
bureaucracy
in modern
society.
Formal
bureaucracy
has thus become an unavoidable and
indispensable
element of modern culture
which, furthermore,
seems to dommate it all the more. After all Weber seems to
think that even
though
there are in
principle
alternatives to modern
capitalism
( like
socialism),
and the further course of
history
is not
predetermined,
these alternatives
do not
challenge capitalism
from the
standpoint
of a
predictable
future, but rather
signalize
a
nostalgia
for an
economy consisting
of autarchic households, an economic
order which - if allowed to
dexelop
at all - would once
agam
face the dual
problems
of formal
rationality
and effects eness.
(For
an
interpretation
with a different
emphasis
see Mommsen
(liy86).)
Even
though
Webers discussion about the
opposite types
of
rationality
is most
explicit
in connection with the
problem
of socialism, it is
by
no means restricted to
the evaluation of the future
develupment
of
capitalism
alone. This
opposition plays
a central role in the whole of Webers
conception
of
history
lint,
in
particular,
in his
diagnosis
of modern culture. To Weber the conflict between formal and substantive
rationality
was an
expression
of the unawrdahle element ot
irrattonalrU
in modern
culture. Weber seemed to think that
any
action which is rational in the formal sense
would be irrational or, at least irrelevant, from the
point
of view of
any
substantive
criteria. And the main
problem
of the modern culture
originates
from the incom-
patihilitv
of these two kinds of
rationalitv.
In this
respect
Webers
very
definition
of formal
rationality
is crucial. As ha,
alread_v
been
pointed
out, Webers
concept
of formal
rationality
cannot be understood as
referring
to instrumental or technical
rationality
in
any
normal sense. It would
namely,
at least in
principle,
be
easy
to
combine action
following
technical or instrumental
rationality
with
rationality
followng
certain ethical value
postulates
or
principle,,.
In fact.
pure
technical
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328
rationality
could
easily
serve
any values
whatsoever. But Webers formal
rationality,
on the
contrary, actively rejects
all values and ethical orientations.
According
to Webers definition formal rational action mll be used to
designate
the extent of
quantitative
calculation or
accounting
which is
technically possible
and which is
actually
used
(Weber 1968:85).
It follows from this definition that
pure
formal rational action is
always
oriented to markets with
money prices using
money
as a medium of
accounting.
But it also
necessarily
entails that the
goals
of
this kind of action are rather
peculiar - they necessarliv
have a
quantitative
and, in
Webers
understanding,
abstract character. Quantification
permeates
both the
means and the ends of this kind of action.
This
quantitative
and abstract nature of rational
economy
is
expressed
most
clearly
in the
followtng
characterization of Webers:
,
A rational
economy
!s a functional
organization
(sachlicher Betrieb)
oriented to
money-
prices
vhich
originate
m the
interest-struggles
of men m the market Calculation is not
possible
without esUmanon m
money prices
and hence without market
struggles Money
is the most abstract and
nmpcrsonal
element that exists m human life. The more the
world of the modern
capitalhst economy
follows is own immanent
laws,
the less accessible
it is to
any imaginable relationship
wnh a
religious
ethic of brotherlmess The more
rational,
and thus
impersonal, capitalism
becomes, the more <s this the case.
(Weber
1970a:331)
Thus,
m Webers
thinking
formal
rationality,
which is
typical
of modern
economy
and administration, is first of all
quantitative,
abstract and
impersonal by
its nature.
This idea was summarized
bv
Herbert Marcuse
(1965)
who claimed that Webers
formal
rationality
reduces all
quality
to
pure quantity.
Substantive
rationality,
on
the
contrary,
is
always
oriented
according
to some
genuine
substantial and ultimate
values,
whatever
they happen
to be in
any particular
case
(see
Weber
1968:85).
And it is this very formal and abstract nature of modern occidental
rationality
which
explains
Webers serious
worry
about the
petrification
of cultural values and the
loss of
genuine meaning
in modern culture. Weber seemed to think that formal
rational action,
by quantifying
even the
unquantifiable, rejects
all ethical values
and thus
expels
them from from
public
life
leading
them to their last resort, intimate
personal
relations,
within which
they
no
longer possess
the same force
capable
of
orienting
and even
potentially
of
changing
culture as did the
genuine
cultural values
of earlier
history
which were
regarded
as
intersubjectively bmdmg
and which were
part
of an ethics of conviction imbedded in a
metaphysico-religious
world view.
This
diagnosis
also
explains why any challenge posed by
alternative movements
to formal
rationality demanding
the
incorporation
of some substantive values or
principles
into the
functioning
of
economy
or
admlI1l~tratIon, is,
in Webers
opinion,
immediately
faced with the demands of the
day,
the
parallel problems
of inter-
subjective comparability, calculability
and effectiveness - at least under the modern
conditions of mass
administration,
mass
consumption
and mass
production,
con-
ditions that
obviously
cannot be
neglected
in our occidental societies.
Some essential features of Webers
analysis
of modern occidental culture can be
made even more understandable
by comparing
them with Simmels
respective
analysis.
As has
already
been
pointed
out it is the
very principle
of calculation
which excludes all considerations of ethical nature whatsoever from such a
type
of action. Quantification
and calculation
destroy
all
qualitative
distinctions and
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329
differences
according
to which the means and ends of action could otherwise be
evaluated. Both to Weber and to Simmel
money
is the most abstract medium of
action or mediator of social relations which can be
imagined.
As Simmel
says,
money destroys
all
genuine
differences; it allows
only quantitative
distinctions.
Money paints everything
with
grey.
(See
also Lichtblau
1984:276).
In his
essay
on
The
Metropolis
and Mental
Life
Simmel wrote:
By being
the
equivalent
to all the manifold
things
m one and the same way.
money
becomes the most
frightful
leveler For
money expresses
all
qualnaUve
differences of
things
in
germs
of how much&dquo;.
Money,
with all it< colorlessness and
mdifference,
becomes the common denominator of all values.
irreparably
it hollows out the core of
things,
their
individuality, their specific
value, and their
mcomparability.
All
things
float
mth
equal specific gravity
m the
constantly momng
stream of
money
(Simmel
1950~.11.1)
In his
Phrlosophy of Money
Simmel charactenzed
money
in similar terms
by writing
that
money
has the
very positive quality
that is
designed by
the
negative concept
of lack of character
(Simmel 1978 :216).
Simmels idea of
monev
also comes close
to Webers idea of formal
rationality,
when Simmel characterizes
money
as a
pure
instrument.
Money
is the
purest
reification of
means,
a concrete instrument which
is
absolutely
identical with its abstract
concept;
it is a
pure
instrument
(Simmel
1978:212).
In
being developed
into a final
purpose
or absolute value
money
governs
the whole of our
practical
consciousness
(see
Simmel
1978:232).
Social relations based on the use of
money (Simmel)
and formal rational action
using money
as a means of
accounting
(Weber)
designate
social
phenomena
which
reject
all
qualitative
distinctions and evaluations:
money,
after
all,
is indifferent
towards all substantive values.
Money
and
money accounting
were neither to Weber
nor to Simmel neutral media - as
they
are to Habermas.
By becoming
the common
denominator of all social values
money
tends to set its
quantifying
label on all the
social relations and on all the instruments and
goals
of social action in modern
society.
Weber most
definitely
was not a critic of instrumental reason in
general
but of
the
quantifying
and formal nature of modern reason. Webers
formally
rational
actor or bureaucrat does not
obediently
serve
any goals
whatsoever; rational action
transforms the
very goals
it is intended to serve. Just as
money
was the
starting
point
for Simmels
analysis
of modern culture in which the
pecuHanty
of this culture
was condensed
(see
Lichtblau
198.I:~76),
so was the
specificity
and
paradoxical
nature of modern culture incarnated m Webers
concept
of formal
rationality.
Notes
.

1 In 1920 Weber dedicated the first volume of his

Gesammelte Aufsatze
zur
Religionssoziologie
to his wife Marianne Weber with the
following
words Marianne Weber - 1893 "bis ins
pianissimo
des hochsten Alters" In the
Ewischenbetrachtung
included in the same volume
he used the same
expression
in
explaining
what he meant
by responsible
love - an
explanation
which
might
even shed some
light
on what he meant
by responsible
action
according
to some
personally binding
values:
From a
purely
inner
worldly point
of
view,
only
the
linkage
of
marriage
with the
thought
of ethical
responsibility
for one another - hence a
category heterogeneous
to
the
purely
erotic
sphere -
can
carry
the sentiment that
something unique
and
supreme
might
be embodied in
marriage;
that it
might
be the transformation of the
feeling
of
by Bhupinder Singh on October 25, 2012 asj.sagepub.com Downloaded from
330
a love which is conscious of
responsibility throughout
all the nuances of the
organic
life
process, up
to the
pianissimo
of old
age,,
and a mutual
granting
of oneself to
another and the
becoming
indebted to each other
(in
Goethes sense
Rarely
does life
grant
such value in
pure
form. He to whom it is
given may speak
of fates fortune and
grace -
not of his own ment.
(Weber 1970a:350)
A
comparison
of Webers ethical views with those of
Georg
Simmels can also make them
more understandable As Lichtblau has
interestingly pointed out, by interpreting
Nietzsches
idea of the eternal return in a
personal way.
Simmet
developed
a
highly
individualistic
version of the ethics of
responsibility,
which was
obviously,
at least to some extent, shared
by
Weber,
too
(see
Lichblau 1984 260-261 and note 99,
p.
280).
According
to this view one
has to take ones actions
seriously
and consider them as if
every single
one of them were
decisively to determine ones future life
(For a
parallel interpretation
of Nietzsches radical
reorientation of ethics see also Nehemas
(1955))
2 As a matter of fact Habermas follows in his
interpretation
the critical ideas
presented by
Schluchter
(1979),
who in turn has received some of his main
interpretative
ideas from
Habermas - a
process
ot mutual influence which is
readily
admitted
by
them
3 Webers idea of the
legitimacy
of
legal
domination has found adherents as different as Carl
Schmitt
( 1932)
and Niklas Luhmann
(1981 ; see
also Habermas
1984:265)
Whereas Luhmann
has
incorporated
Wehers idea of
legal
domination into his
analysis
of modern law, Carl
Schmitt - in the context of
analysing
the Weimar constitution - used it to criticize
par-
hamentary democracy.
It was however
Georg
Lukacs
(1970)
who more
faithfully,
than
any
other took over Webers ideas both in
analysing
modern law in
particular
(see Lukacs
1970:205-206)
and reification in
general
Neither Schmitt nor Luhmann
paid any
attention
to the wider context of Webers analysis (the
process
of
rationalization)
By
combining
Webers thesis of rationalization with Marxs
analysis
of reification Lukacs maintained the
critical nuances of Webers studies. It was the
principle
of calculation which in Lukacs
opinion
was central to the
process
of mechanization and rationalization not
only
in the
world of work but in other social
spheres
of
capitalism,
too Even
though
one can
by
no
means accuse Weber of
taking
over the hawe
concepts
of
Hegelian logic
(the
concept
of
a
totality
and the
teleology
of
history;
see Habermas
1984:362)
as Lukacs
did, one can
reasonably
claim that Lukacs was
only following
Weber in
emphasizing
the element of
irrationality
inherent in the
very process
of occidental rationalization
4 For a discussion of Webers
conception
of
price
formation see Clarke 1953 209-210.
5 For an
interesting
discussion of Simmels
analysis
of
money
and its rotation to Nietzsches
ideas about the Pathos of Distance and Vornehmheit, which would
obviously
be of
great
relevance to the
understanding
of Webers
thinking,
too, see Lichtblau
(1984),
see also
Lepenies (1985).
I
References
Clarke, Simon 1983. Marx,
Marginalism
and Modern
Sociology
From Adam Smith to Max
Weber. London. The Macmillan Press
Habermas
Jurgen
1984. The
Theory of
Communicative Action Vol 1 Boston. Beacon Press.
Habermas,
Jurgen
1987
Legitimitat
durch
Legalitat?
Kritische
Justiz,
Jhg
20,
1987
1,
1-16.
Lepenies,
Wolf 1985 Die drei Kulturen
Soziologie
zwischen Literatur und
Wissenschaft
Munchen Hanser
Lichthlau, Klaus 1984. Das Pathos der Distanz. Praliminarien zur
Nietzsche-Rezeption
bei
Georg
Simmel In Dahme. H-J & Rammstedt, O.
(Hg
): Georg
Simmel und der Moderne :
Neue
Interpretationen
und Materialen Frankturt am Main.
Suhrkamp, pp
231-281.
Luhmann, Niklas 1981 Positivitat des Rechts als
Voraussetzung
einer modernen Gesellschaft
In Luhmann, N.:
Ausdifferenzierung
des Rechts
Beitrage
z&uuml;r
Rechtssoziologie,
und
Rechtstheore. Frankfurt am Main.
Suhrkamp. pp
113-153
Lukacs,
Gcorg
1970 Die
Verdinglichung
und das Bewuztsein des Proletariats. In
Lukacs,
G.: Geschichte und Klassenbewuztsein . Darmstadt & Neuwied: Luchterhand
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Marcuse, Hcrbert 1965.
Industrialisierung
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Kapitalismus
In Stammer, O.
(Hg.):
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