100%(1)Il 100% ha trovato utile questo documento (1 voto)
68 visualizzazioni15 pagine
This document discusses the distinction between internalism and externalism in epistemology. It addresses some common confusions regarding which theories are considered internalist versus externalist. The author argues that there are three components of epistemic justification - what constitutes a justified belief, the subject's justification for holding that belief, and the relationship between justification and truth. Accordingly, internalism and externalism can be defined along three corresponding dimensions. Clarifying these multiple dimensions can help resolve apparent contradictions in how certain theories have been classified.
Descrizione originale:
bcbcv
Titolo originale
KIM, Kihyeon - Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology
This document discusses the distinction between internalism and externalism in epistemology. It addresses some common confusions regarding which theories are considered internalist versus externalist. The author argues that there are three components of epistemic justification - what constitutes a justified belief, the subject's justification for holding that belief, and the relationship between justification and truth. Accordingly, internalism and externalism can be defined along three corresponding dimensions. Clarifying these multiple dimensions can help resolve apparent contradictions in how certain theories have been classified.
This document discusses the distinction between internalism and externalism in epistemology. It addresses some common confusions regarding which theories are considered internalist versus externalist. The author argues that there are three components of epistemic justification - what constitutes a justified belief, the subject's justification for holding that belief, and the relationship between justification and truth. Accordingly, internalism and externalism can be defined along three corresponding dimensions. Clarifying these multiple dimensions can help resolve apparent contradictions in how certain theories have been classified.
Author(s): Kihyeon Kim Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 1993), pp. 303-316 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014469 . Accessed: 12/12/2013 07:50 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . University of Illinois Press and North American Philosophical Publications are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Philosophical Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 30, Number 4, October 1993 INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY Kihyeon Kim A HE distinction between internalism and externalism has been one of the most widely used distinctions in current epistemology, one that has been applied both to accounts of epistemic justification and to accounts of knowledge. Unfortunately, there are some confusions over which theories are internal? ist and which theories are externalist. The main goal of this paper is to show that there are three components of epistemic jus? tification and that the internalism/external ism distinction can be made on three corresponding dimensions. Once the three di? mensions are acknowledged, we will be able to see that most confusions over internalism and externalism arise from conflating the three dimensions. I shall begin my discussion by con? sidering some examples of the confusions. I. SOME EXAMPLES OF THE CONFUSION The distinction between internalism and externalism usually goes hand in hand with a contrast between traditional epistemology and a new trend in epistemology. Roderick Chisholm says that "the usual approach to the traditional questions of theory of knowl? edge is properly called "internal" or "inter nalistic."1 Laurence Bonjour echoes this claim when he says: "When viewed from the general standpoint of the western epistemo logical tradition, externalism represents a very radical departure."2 Epistemologists usually agree to regard D. M. Armstrong, Alvin Goldman, Fred Dretske, and Robert Nozick as the leading externalist radicals.3 According to the simplest definition of ex? ternalism, as offered by Armstrong4 and Bon Jour5, externalism is the view that what makes a true belief knowledge is some rela tion (e.g., causal relation, nomological rela? tion, or counterfactual relation) that holds between the belief state and the situation which makes the belief true.6 As we shall see, this criterion classifies most of the above mentioned accounts as ex? ternalist.7 However, according to it, Gold? man's process reliabilism would not be an externalist account. Process reliabilism as? serts that a person, S, is justified in believing that p only if S's believing that p is produced by a reliable cognitive process.8 Goldman re? stricts the extent of belief-forming processes to cognitive events, i.e., events within the or? ganisms' nervous system. Thus, epistemic jus? tification of a belief is defined by him without reference to the fact that makes the belief true. The Armstrong-BonJour definition, therefore, classifies process reliabilism as an internalist analysis of epistemic justification.9 Many epistemologists would be unhappy about this consequence.10 This unhappiness seems to stem from one strong intuition about externalism. The intuition is that, if the epistemic justification of a belief is analyzed in a way that entails a high objective prob? ability of the beliefs being true, then the analysis is externalist. From the internalist's perspective, a belief's epistemic justification is a purely internal matter in that it is to be described without reference to any connec? tion with the outside world. This is clearly ex? pressed in Chisholm's view of internalism: "According to this traditional conception of 'internal' epistemic justification, there is no logical connection between epistemic justifi? cation and the truth."11 In process reliabilism, a justified belief is a belief produced by a re? liable cognitive process, where the reliability 303 This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 304 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY of a cognitive process is a propensity of pro? ducing more true beliefs than false beliefs. Therefore, in this account, a connection with the external world in terms of truth (or like? lihood of being true) plays a crucial role in the analysis of epistemic justification. For this reason, many epistemologists think that proc? ess reliabilism is an externalist account of epistemic justification. Unfortunately, defining externalism in terms of the truth connection causes a prob? lem elsewhere. Keith Lehrer and Laurence BonJour both view the truth connection of beliefs as being necessary for epistemic justi? fication. According to Lehrer, If S knows that p, then S is completely justified in accepting that p in some way that is not defeated by any false statement...Undefeated justification provides a truth connection be? tween the mind and the world, between accep? tance and reality. BonJour says: And, if our standards of epistemic justifica? tion are appropriately chosen, bringing it about that our beliefs are epistemically justi? fied will also tend to bring it about, in the per? haps even longer run and with the usual slippage and uncertainty which our finitude mandates, that they are true. If epistemic justi? fication were not conducive to truth in this way, if finding epistemically justified beliefs did not substantially increase the likelihood of finding true ones, then epistemic justification would be irrelevant to our main cognitive goal and of dubious worth. The truth-connection criterion of the exter? nal world, therefore, classify the accounts by Lehrer and BonJour as externalist. However, they are two of the severest critics of exter? nalism. Naturally, their own accounts of epistemic justification often count as models of internalism. This is another confusion. II. THE INTERNAL AND THE EXTERNAL What should we conclude from the discus? sion so far? Should we conclude that "inter? nalism" and "externalism" are so ambiguous that it is hopeless to classify diverse episte mological accounts in terms of them? I be? lieve that this is a hasty conclusion. I will show that there is a clear concept of the in? ternal in the relevant epistemological sense. "Being internal" and "being external" are relative concepts. For example, the earth is external to Venus, but it is internal to the so? lar system. This suggests that any classifica? tion of the internal and the external must define a unit antecedently, relative to which the classification would be made. The question is, then, what is an epistemo? logical unit that should dictate the definition of the internal and the external in an epistemologi cally relevant sense. We can approach an answer to this question by considering a motivation behind traditional epistemology. Epistemology is interested in distinguish? ing, in a principled manner, justified beliefs from unjustified beliefs, and instances of knowledge from instances of non-knowledge. In specifying the conditions of epistemic jus? tification and knowledge, the goal of maxi? mizing truth while minimizing falsehood plays a predominant role. A very rough guideline for the analysis of epistemic justifi? cation and knowledge is that a belief is justi? fied for a person if and only if her belief is desirable from the viewpoint of seeking the above goal.14 That is, epistemic evaluation governing the analyses of justified belief and knowledge is guided by the goal of maximiz? ing truth and minimizing falsehood. Setting up the goal of epistemological evaluation this way reveals the underlying di? chotomy not only of traditional epistemology, but also of traditional philosophy in general, namely, the world outside a cognitive agent versus a human mind that strives to acquire a correct picture of it. Given this standard metaphysical realist assumption, the way the world is and the way the world is believed to be by a cognitive agent can diverge. Once our fallibility is recognized, a truth-seeker has to determine which of her beliefs are acceptable from the truth-seeking point of view. That is how epistemology, seen as an analysis of epistemic justification and knowledge, gets started. As Quine says, Doubt has oft been said to be the mother of philosophy. This has a true ring for those of us who look upon philosophy primarily as the theory of knowledge. For the theory of knowl This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY / 305 edge has its origin in doubt, in scepticism. Doubt is what prompts us to try to develop a theory of knowledge. The above sketchy outline of the general framework of traditional epistemology sug? gests that the human cognitive system rather than the external world, which is its target, is the entity relative to which the internal has to be defined in epistemology. This suggests the following definition: X is internal to a cognitive agent S from an epistemic point of view if and only if x is something that hap? pens within the cognitive system of S. Unfortunately, this definition is both too vague and too broad. It is hard to determine what exactly is within a cognitive system. Does this include only those happenings within the brain, or does it also include the proximal stimuli such as retinal stimulation and tactile stimulation? More importantly, the above definition is too broad because not all the things that happen in one's cognitive system provide clues for the way the world is. Notice, for example, that neuro-physiological processes involved in cognition are clearly within the cognitive system. However, they are not internal to S from an epistemic point of view. As we have seen, epistemology en? dorses the dichotomy between the way the world is and the way the world is perceived, believed, or thought to be. The properties pertaining to the neuro-physiological aspect of cognition may be an ontological or causal foundation for the existence of states like be? liefs, but in themselves they are not a part of the epistemic perspective of a cognitive agent on the world. Neurological properties cannot be grasped by S's reflection, and therefore they cannot provide any internal clues for a cognitive subject about the way the world is. It emerges from the above discussion that not everything that happens within the cog? nitive system of a cognitive agent should count as internal to her from an epistemic point of view. Among the happenings within her cognitive system, only those that are graspable by her introspection should count as internal. The following definition matches the idea of the internal in traditional epistemology: (I) X is internal to a cognitive agent from an epistemic point of view if and only if X is introspectible by her. The categories of the internal and the exter? nal are intended to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Thus, we can derive the definition of the external very easily from (I): (E) X is external to a cognitive agent from an epistemic point of view if and only if X is not internal to her. Many epistemologists embrace (I). Here are some examples: Internalism is the view that the justification making properties of any justified belief must be (epistemically) internal to the mind of the subject who holds that belief, that he could always know such properties of his belief by reflection', that is, through mere introspection, memory, and reason (intuitive and deductive). The internalist assumes that, merely by reflect? ing upon his own conscious state, he can for? mulate a set of epistemic principles that will enable him to find out, with respect to any possible belief he has, whether he is justified in having that belief. The "internal," in the relevant sense, is that to which one has introspective, thus internal, ac? cess; it includes beliefs, visual and other sen 18 sory impressions, and thoughts. What confers justification must be "internal" to the subject in that she has a specially direct cognitive access to it. It must consist of some? thing like a belief or an experience, something that the subject can typically spot just by turn? ing her attention to the matter. So far we have seen that the definition of the internal in an epistemologically relevant sense can be given quite clearly in terms of introspectibility, and that this definition is supported by the fact that many epistemolo? gists accept this definition. Let us now ask what sorts of things would be internal and what sorts of things would be external ac? cording to (I). The classification I will propose in the rest of this section is by no means conclusive. A conclusive classification would require philo? sophical and psychological research on the capacity of human introspection and on the This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 306 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY nature of the things to be classified. Obvi? ously, this goes beyond the scope of this pa? per. But this inconclusiveness of the classification will not affect the main point of this essay. Let us consider why. The next section will argue that an episte? mological theory consists of three different ingredients, each of which resides on a differ? ent dimension. Depending on the introspec tibility of the three ingredients, the theory can be classified either as internalist or as ex? ternalist on three different dimensions. The main thesis of this essay is that, even if epistemologists agree on what is internal and what is external, a confusion over the use of "internalism" and "externalism" will con? tinue to arise when they conflate the three dimensions on which the internalism/exter nalism distinction can be made. Moreover, most confusions with regard to the use of "in? ternalism" and "externalism" are due to the conflation of one or more of these dimen? sions, rather than the lack of a proper under? standing of what is introspectible and what not. This is why the inconclusiveness of my classification of the internal things and the external things will not affect the central the? sis of this paper. Let us now turn to the clas? sification of the internal. Many of our cognitive states such as beliefs and thoughts, conative states such as inten? tions and desires, and sensory states such as visual impressions and auditory impressions are prototypical examples of what is internal to a cognitive subject. Some of these psycho? logical states may be hard to detect by intro? spection. Some may be even impossible to detect by introspection. This is an empirical question that remains to be answered, but whatever the answer to it turns out to be, psy? chological states that can be detected by in? trospection are internal to a cognitive agent. For simplicity, I will talk as though all psycho? logical states are introspectible, and are therefore internal to a cognitive agent.20 In contrast, proximal stimuli of a cognitive system such as retinal stimulations do not seem to be introspectible, and are therefore external to a cognitive subject. Facts of the world are also external to her because they in themselves are not introspectible by her even though they might be observable. Truth is also external to her. A belief has a propo sitional content. According to well-known ac? counts of truth, the truth-value of the content of a given belief depends either on its corre? spondence with the fact or on its coherence relation with the contents of other beliefs. Either way, the truth of a belief goes beyond the introspection of a cognitive subject.21 It is controversial whether causal relations among psychological states can be in? trospected. The view that for external events causal relations are not observable is com? mon in the Humean tradition. However, many philosophers dispute this.22 Moreover, even if causal relations among external events are not observable, it may be that causal relations among internal psychological states can still be detected by inner observa? tion, that is, by introspection. The non-ob servability^of causal relations among external events may be due to some feature of their being external. For these reasons, it is danger? ous to make a sweeping claim that all causal relations among psychological states are not introspectible. However, again to have a con? crete example for later discussion, I will talk as if all causal relations are not introspectible. The rationale for doing so is that those who argue for the observability or introspectibil ity of causal relations appeal to very rare in? stances of causal relations. This suggests that most, if not all, causal relation may be not observable or introspectible. How about cognitive processes? They are the most recalcitrant cases for the classifica? tion. Suppose that a reasoning process is de? fined as a sequence of belief states with introspectible psychological properties. Thus, on this view, reasoning processes are in? trospectible, and therefore internal to a cog? nitive subject. However, vision, which is a robust example of a cognitive process, seems to include retinal stimulation as one compo? nent. Thus, it includes a part that is not in? trospectible and which is, therefore, external to a cognitive subject. Moreover, it is unclear that a cognitive process can be defined with? out reference to the causal relations among its component psychological states. For these reasons, it is hard to say whether a given psy This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY / 307 chological process is internal or external. It is even harder to argue for the introspectibility of psychological processes in general. So, I shall suspend any definite judgment on the introspectibility of psychological processes and, therefore, on whether psychological processes of a cognitive subject are internal to her. Here again, I will talk as though psy? chological processes of a cognitive subject are internal to her. The rationale for doing so is that most her psychological states are in? ternal to her and, therefore, her psychological processes that are sequences of her psycho? logical states are mostly introspectible by S. III. THREE DIMENSIONS OF THE INTERNALISM/ EXTERNALISM DISTINCTION So far, I have been talking about theories of epistemic justification and theories of knowledge indiscriminately. In this section, I will talk just about theories of epistemic jus? tification. This does not mean that what I am going to say from now on applies only to theories of epistemic justification. The frame? work I will develop in this section is general enough to apply to theories of knowledge as well.23 A simple intuition about epistemic justifi? cation is that a person, S, is justified in believ? ing that p only if S's belief that p is based on adequate grounds. This suggests that a theory of epistemic justification has to explain what it is for a belief to be based on adequate grounds. The expression "being based on adequate grounds" makes reference to three different epistemic concepts: ground, ade? quacy, and being based on. Therefore, a the? ory of epistemic justification that tries to analyze "being based on adequate grounds" must include three different parts that an? swer the following questions: (1) What sort of things in general can be grounds for the justification of beliefs (e.g., external facts, non-doxastic psychological states, doxastic psychological states, psycho? logical processes)? (2) What is the criterion (or criteria) of ade? quacy that a ground (grounds) has (have) to satisfy in order to yield justification for a particular belief? (3) What is the proper basing relation that must hold between the belief in question and its adequate grounds? A theory of epistemic justification can give either an internalist or an externalist answer to each of the three questions. Moreover, an answer to one question is independent of its answers to other questions. This suggests that the internalism/externalism distinction with regard to a theory of epistemic justification can be made on three different dimensions. Let us consider these three dimensions in turn: First Dimension: The Ground of Epistemic Justification Theories of epistemic justification differ on what sorts of things can be grounds for the justification of beliefs. One famous contro? versy focuses on whether only beliefs can be grounds for the justification of beliefs, or whether non-doxastic psychological states, e.g., experience variously characterized as sense data, the "given," etc., can be grounds as well. This dispute arises because some epistemolo gists claim that something can justify a belief only if it has a propositional content. Accord? ing to their view, since the experience itself does not have such a propositional content, only a belief about the experience, not the experience itself, can be grounds for justifica? tion of experiential beliefs.24 This controversy is a domestic dispute within the family of views that identify justi? fying grounds as psychological states, doxas? tic or non-doxastic. They all assume that the evidential relation between justifying psy? chological states at ground level and the be? lief in question is crucial for the epistemic justification of the belief. This evidential relation is always assumed to be some type of content relation. Let us call any doctrine that incorpo? rates this basic assumption evidentialism. This contrasts with the view of other epistemologists who argue that what is cru? cial for epistemic justification of a belief is not its evidential relation to its grounds, but how the belief is produced (i.e., which cogni? tive process is responsible for the production of the belief). According to process reliabi? lism, the psychological processes of a cogni This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 308 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY tive agent, as opposed to her psychological states, are the source of epistemic justifica? tion.25 Therefore, on this account, the sorts of things that can be grounds for justification are cognitive processes.26 Let us call the doc? trine that a cognitive process?the one that is responsible for the production of a belief? determines the justification of the belief processism.21 The views I have considered so far con? cerning the nature of grounds of epistemic justification differ in their details, but they agree that the ground of epistemic justifica? tion is something internal. As we have seen in section 2, doxastic psychological states, non-doxastic psychological states, and cogni? tive processes may all count as being internal according to the introspectibility criterion. For these theories, the sorts of things that are grounds for justification are internal, and so we may call them ground internalism. Ground internalism covers a wide range of theories of epistemic justification that some epistemologists regard as externalist theo? ries.28 There are two things to notice before we consider some examples of ground exter? nalism. First, ground externalism does not claim that only the external can be grounds of justification of beliefs. It grants that grounds for inferential beliefs, i.e., beliefs jus? tified by other beliefs, can be something in? ternal (grounding beliefs). However, ground externalism is distinguished from ground in? ternalism in that it allows that, for some be? liefs, their justifying grounds can be something external such as an external fact. Second, most ground externalists seem to be interested not in analyzing epistemic justifi? cation, but only in describing the conditions under which a true belief qualifies as knowl? edge. They include D. M. Armstrong, the "early" Goldman of "A Causal Theory of Knowing," Nozick, Dretske and Peter Unger. According to Armstrong, S's belief that p is knowledge only if there is some specifica? tion of S such that, if any person is so speci? fied and he further believes that p, then p is the case. What is crucial for knowledge in this account is that the belief is related, in terms of a nomological relation, to the fact that makes the belief true.29,30 The nomological relation in Armstrong's account is replaced by a causal relation in Goldman's account and by a counterfactual relation in Nozick's31 and Dretske's32 accounts. Finally, according to Unger, "[F]or any sentence value of p, a man knows that p if and only if it is not an accident that the man is right about its being the case that p."33 He says that in his analysis a complete absence of the accidental has to obtain in a certain relation concerning the man and the fact?4 Here is a table that shows a distinction be? tween internalist theories and externalist theories on the ground dimension: Internalism Externalism Evidentialism Armstrong, Dretske, Processism Nozick, Unger, Goldman in "A Causal Theory of Knowing" Second Dimension: The Adequacy of Grounds The general information concerning the sorts of things that can be grounds is insuffi? cient to determine whether a particular be? lief is justified for a believer. Any theory of epistemic justification must include not only an account of the sorts of things that can be grounds for the justification of beliefs, but also an account of which grounds are ade? quate with respect to the justification of a particular belief. One question that arises is what a theory of epistemic justification takes as the locus of the criterion (criteria) of justificatory ade? quacy of grounds for a particular belief. The second way of distinguishing internalism from externalism arises from the different loci in which the adequacy criterion of a theory resides. First, consider, for example, a theory that claims that some grounds are adequate for justification of the belief that p because those grounds in fact make the belief that p likely to be true. In this theory, the adequacy crite This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY / 309 rion is the objective probability that the con? tent of the belief in question is true given the contents of its grounds. Even though the proper analysis of objective probability is still in dispute, it is clear that any adequate ac? count would treat it as being independent of the perspective of a cognitive agent. After all, it should be objective. Therefore, such a the? ory is externalist with regard to the adequacy criterion. I will call such a theory, which de? fines adequacy criterion independently of the mental dimension of a cognitive agent, ade? quacy externalism. Next, consider a theory that claims that some grounds are adequate with respect to the justification of the belief that p, because the believer thinks they make the belief that p likely to be true. In this the? ory the locus of the adequacy criterion is the thought of a cognitive agent. Therefore, ac? cording to my criterion of the internal, this theory is internal with respect to the ade? quacy of grounds because thoughts are psy? chological states that are supposedly introspectible. I will call this type of theory adequacy internalism. Now let us see how this distinction can be applied to current theories of epistemic justification. Goldman's process reliabilism claims that a cognitive process is an adequate ground for the justification of the belief produced by it only when the process is reliable. So, accord? ing to process reliabilism, the ground of jus? tification is a cognitive process and the adequacy criterion is the reliability of the process. The reliability of a cognitive process is defined in terms of its propensity of pro? ducing more true beliefs than false ones. Ob? viously, this propensity is not introspectible by a cognitive agent.35 Therefore, Goldman's process reliabilism is an adequacy externalist theory.36 This explains why many epistemolo gists think of process reliabilism as external? ist. It also explains why Chisholm associates externalism with the invocation of truth in the analysis of epistemic justification and why that leads him to think of process reli? abilism as being externalist.37 Lehrer's and BonJour's coherence theories are also adequacy externalist. They assert that a belief is justified for a cognitive agent only if it is likely to be true.38 Therefore, their theories are adequacy externalist for the same reason that Goldman's process reliabi? lism is an adequacy externalist account. Fur? thermore, according to coherentism, the criterion of the adequacy of the grounds for the justification of a belief is the coherence relation between the belief and the ground? ing beliefs, which comprise all the rest of the cognitive agent's beliefs. Even though the no? tion of a coherence relation is unclear, it is supposed to be a logical and explanatory re? lation. If it is, the traditional coherence the? ory of justification is an adequacy externalist theory. According to BonJour, one of the most prominent coherentists, the minimal condition for coherence is logical consistency.39 The logical consistency of a set of beliefs is de? termined by whether it is possible that all the beliefs are true, regardless of what a cognitive agent thinks of the relations among them. Some evidentialist accounts claim that a piece of evidence is adequate for the justifi? cation of a belief only if it makes the belief objectively probable. These accounts include the theories by Swain and Alston.40 On this view, grounds for the justification of a belief are some other psychological states and these grounds are adequate for the justification of the belief only if they stand in the objective probabilifying relation to the belief. Some foundationalist theories assert that some grounds are adequate for the justifica? tion of the belief that p because, if those grounds had not existed, then the belief that p would not have been held. The theories by Nozick and Dretske I introduced earlier are the examples of this type of theories. These foundationalist accounts are also adequacy externalist theories. For the truth-conducivity relation expressed by the counterfactual is defined independently of the introspection of a cognitive agent and, moreover, is not in? trospectible. It is not hard to see that other ground externalist theories such as the ones by Armstrong and "early" Goldman are also ade? quacy externalist theories. In them, a nomologi? cal implication or a proper causal relation between a belief and an external fact are crite? ria of adequacy and they are not introspectible. On the other hand, a foundationalist the? ory that claims that some grounds are ade? quate with respect to the justification of the belief that p because the believer thinks that This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 310 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY those grounds make the belief that p likely to be true would be an adequacy internalist the? ory. For the criterion of adequacy depends on the thought, therefore, on something that is supposedly introspectible by the believer. Richard Foley's theory is an example of foun? dationalist adequacy internalism. According to him, S is justified in believing that p just in case it is uncontroversial to assume that p. This "requires S to believe that p and re? quires him to believe it with more confidence than he believes propositions that can be used to argue against it. In addition, p must be such that S, on reflection, would believe that in most relevant possible situations in which he believes p his belief would be true" [my emphasis].41 Other examples of adequacy internalist theories, that refuse to define the adequacy criterion for epistemic justification in terms of truth-connection with the external world as expressed by objective probability, in? clude the theories of Chisholm and Pollock: The internalist assumes that, merely by reflect? ing upon his own conscious state, he can for? mulate a set of epistemic principles that will enable him to find out, with respect to any possible belief he has, whether he is justified in having that belief. The epistemic principles that he formulates are principles that one may come upon and apply merely by sitting in one's armchair, so to speak, without calling for any assistance. In a word, one needs only consider one's own state of mind. ...the internalist maintains that epistemic norms must be formulated in terms of rela? tions between beliefs or between beliefs and nondoxastic internal states (e.g., perceptual states), and he denies that these norms are subject to evaluations in terms of external con? siderations. The following table shows a distinction be? tween internalist theories and externalist theories on the adequacy dimension: Internalism Externalism Adequacy Chisholm, Ground Externalists, Foley, Process Reliabilism, Pollock Lehrer, BonJour, Swain, Alston Third Dimension: The Basing Relation A cognitive agent's having adequate grounds for the belief that p is still not suffi? cient to make her justified in believing that p. The belief that p must be properly based on its adequate grounds. This relational compo? nent constitutes the third factor of epistemic justification. Since it was pointed out by Roderick Firth, most epistemologists have ac? cepted it as a necessary condition of epistemic justification.441 will discuss this factor in terms of an example given by Pollock: A man might have adequate evidence for be? lieving that his wife is unfaithful to him, [but] he might systematically ignore that evidence. However, when his mother, whom he knows to be totally unreliable in such matters and bi? ased against his wife, tells him that his wife is unfaithful to him, he believes it on that basis. The belief is defective, because it is not properly based on adequate grounds for it. However, the husband's belief could have been epistemically worse if he had not had any evidence at all for the belief. For this rea? son, Firth and Foley say that the belief of the man in the example is oropositionally, but not doxastically, justified. By propositional jus? tification, they mean the presence of ade? quate evidence, and by doxastic justification, they mean the presence of adequate evidence and a proper basing relation between the be? lief in question and the adequate evidence. However, to make such a distinction be? tween two different senses of epistemic justi? fication is misleading. For, according to our common intuition concerning the use of the term "epistemic justification," it is more natural to say that the husband's belief in the example is plainly unjustified. We have a strong intuition that, even if he has adequate grounds for the belief that p, if he believes that p on some odd basis, then he is not justified in believing that p. For this reason, Pollock's distinction between justifiable belief and jus? tified belief captures the intended distinction more naturally than the one between propo? sitional justification and doxastic justifica? tion. And a theory of epistemic justification is interested in the analysis of justifiedness of a belief rather than in the analysis of This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY / 311 justifiability of a belief. This is why I intro? duce the proper basing relation between a belief and its adequate grounds as a factor (necessary condition) of its epistemic justifi? cation. Theories of epistemic justification can be divided into two groups, depending on how they account for the basing relation. The first group claims that what is problematic about the husband's belief in Pollock's example is the lack of a causal relation between the be? lief and its adequate grounds; therefore, the required basing relation is a causal one. The second group alleges that what is problematic about the husband's belief is not the absence of the right sort of a causal relation. Instead, the problem lies in the fact that the husband fails to assess the support of the belief in question in light of its adequate grounds. Therefore, on this view, the required basing relation is a (higher-level) belief about the support relation between the belief in ques? tion and its adequate grounds. According to the first group of theories, the required basing relation is a causal relation between the belief in question and its ade? quate grounds. If a causal relation is not in? trospectible as I suggested in section 2, these theories have an externalist analysis of the basing relation. On the other hand, according to the second group of theories, the required basing relation is a cognitive agent's higher level belief about the support relation be? tween the belief in question on the lower-level and its adequate grounds. A be? lief is an introspectible psychological state. For this reason, these two groups of theories can be classified respectively as internalist and as externalist theories on the same ground on which the distinction between in? ternalism and externalism was made in the previous cases. I will call any theory that con? strues a higher-level belief as the analysis of the required basing relation connection in? ternalism, and any theory that construes a causal relation as the analysis of the required basing relation connection externalism. Connection internalism includes the theo? ries by Lehrer, Foley and (perhaps) Bon Jour.47 Foley provides the clearest example of a connection internalist account of epistemic justification. He recognizes the necessity of a proper basing relation for epistemic justifica? tion. This recognition, together with his an? other view that causality is irrelevant to epistemic justification, leads him to posit a higher-level belief about the support relation between a given belief and the latter's ade? quate grounds as an analysis of the required basing relation.48 According to Lehrer, what distinguishes human knowledge from other sorts of knowl? edge is that, when S knows that p, S has a recognition that the belief that p is correct.49 Lehrer incorporates this necessary condition of knowledge as a necessary condition for epistemic justification. According to him, for me to be justified in believing that p on the basis of grounds, G, I must believe that, in the given situation, it is likely to be true that p given G. This is a higher-level belief about the support relation between the belief that p and its adequate grounds. Moreover, Lehrer denies the necessity of the above sort of causal relation for the justification of be? liefs.50 Lehrer can be regarded, then, as inter? nalist with respect to the basing relation. That is, given the necessity of the basing relation for epistemic justification, the denial of the relevance of causation to epistemic justifica? tion leaves Lehrer with no choice but to be a connection internalist. This is so, whatever the motivation behind the introduction of the higher-level belief about the support relation might be. BonJour's commitments to connection in? ternalism or externalism are not so clear. He claims that for a belief to be justified for a particular per? son it is necessary not only that there be true premises or reason somehow available in the situation that could in principle provide a basis for justification, but also that the believer in question know or at least justifiably believe some such set of premises or reasons and thus be himself in a position to offer the corre? sponding justification. This is enough to interpret him as a connec? tion internalist. However, he neither ad? dresses the connection factor of epistemic justification, nor denies the necessity of being caused by adequate grounds for the justifica This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 312 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 52 tion of beliefs. For this reason, we cannot tell whether BonJour is also a connection ex? ternalist or not. Connection externalism includes all the theories by Ground Externalists and the theories by Firth, Goldman, Feldman and Conee, and Alston.53 In Ground Externalist theories, a belief is connected to an external fact in terms of a nomological relation, a counterfactual relation, or a causal relation. These relations are not introspectible as we have seen already. Any processist account, including Gold? man's process reliabilism, has a built-in exter? nalist analysis of the basing relation. On that view, justified belief is a belief that is pro? duced by an adequate cognitive process and, therefore, the connection between the belief and its adequate grounds is a production re? lation. Production is a causal process. Hence, any processist account is a connection exter? nalist account. Alston, and Feldman and Conee offer ex? amples of connection internalist accounts from evidentialism. According to them, the required basing relation that must hold be? tween evidential psychological states? grounds of epistemic justification?and the belief in question is a causal relation. Alston says, "The ground of a belief is what it is based on.... And presumably these are rela? tions of causal dependence"54 [my emphasis]. Feldman's and Conee's view, interpreted in the way relevant to our current discussion, is that S is justified in believing that p only if the adequate evidence is S's basis for believ? ing that p in the sense that S uses the evi? dence to form the belief that p.55 However, when an evidentialist account is a connection-externalist account, it can also count as a processist account. According to an evidentialist account that is connection externalist, a belief is justified just in case the belief is caused by adequate evidence for the belief. "Being caused by adequate evidence" is equivalent to "being produced (or sus? tained) by a cognitive process that takes the adequate evidence as an input." This is why evidentialist accounts that are connection-ex? ternalist are processists as well. One important lesson we can learn from the above discussion is that evidentialism and processism are not mutually exclusive. An ac? count that is evidentialist in its analysis of grounds of epistemic justification can be? come processist, when it adopts an externalist analysis of the basing relation. Summarizing my discussion of the internal ism/externalism distinction on the connec? tion dimension, all the Ground Externalist theories are connection externalist and all the processist account are connection exter? nalist as well. Evidentialist accounts can be either connection internalist or externalist. However, when they become connection ex? ternalist, they can also count as processist. The following table shows the distinction be? tween connection internalist theories and connection externalist theories across all three dimensions of the internalism/externalism distinction: Internalism Externalism Ground Adequacy Evidentialism, Processism, including all AI theories and all CI theories Chisholm, Foley, Pollock Armstrong, Dretske, Nozick, Unger Goldman in "A Causal Theory of Knowing" All GE theories, Process Reliabilism, Lehrer, BonJour, Swain, Alston Connection Evidentialism Proper (Foley, Lehrer, BonJour) All GE theories, Processism proper, Evidentialist Processism (Alston, Swain, Feldman and Conee) This table suggests that the classification of internalism and externalism can be a matter of degree. If a theory is externalist across all three dimensions, it is the most externalist. A theory that is externalist on two dimensions will be more externalist than the one that is externalist only on one dimension. According to This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY / 313 this criterion, theories by Armstrong, Dret ske, Nozick, and Goldman are the most ex? ternalist theories. This explains why their theories are usually regarded as paradigms of externalist theories. Goldman's process reli? abilism is externalist to a high degree because it is externalist on two dimensions. On the other hand, Foley's theory is on the other extreme. His theory is internalist throughout all three dimensions. This out? come seems to go very well with Foley's own claim that his theory is purely subjective in the sense that everything about epistemic justification is determined by what is given to the perspective of a cognitive agent.56 Lehrer's and BonJour's theories are less in? ternalist than Foley's, but they are highly in? ternalist because they are internalist on two dimensions. One advantage of understanding the three dimensions of the internalism/externalism distinction as expressed in the above table is to help clarify some confusions that have af? flicted current epistemology. Let us go back to the examples of the definitions of internal? ism and externalism which we considered at the beginning of this paper. We have seen that Armstrong and BonJour defined exter? nalism as the view that analyzes the condi? tions of knowledge or epistemic justification in terms of a relation between a belief state and the fact that makes the belief true. This definition seemed to have a problem because process reliabilism, which many epistemolo gists think of as an externalist theory, turns out to be internalist according to this definition. Now we can see that the above problem is only apparent. It stems from the conflation of two dimensions of epistemic justification, namely the ground dimension and the ade? quacy dimension. Armstrong and BonJour provide a definition of externalism that fo? cuses on whether a relation to an external fact plays a crucial role in a theory's analy? sis of knowledge or epistemic justification. With the same focus, Goldman himself was inclined to see his process reliabilism as in? ternalist.57 On the other hand, those who are unhappy about classifying process reliabilism as internalist focus on the adequacy dimen? sion. Seen from that dimension, epistemic theories that invoke a truth-connection as a necessary condition for epistemic justifica? tion or knowledge are externalist. This makes process reliabilism externalist. Chisholm's definition of externalism in terms of truth con? nection is a clear example of this attitude.58 An analogous dilemma arises when the adequacy dimension is conflated with the di? mension of basing relation. If the truth con? nection, which is the outcome of applying the introspectibility to the adequacy dimension, is taken as the universal criterion of external? ism, Lehrer's and BonJour's theories of epistemic justification are classified as exter? nalist. However, their theories are usually mentioned as typical examples of internalism in current epistemology. Here again, the di? lemma is merely apparent. One of the most controversial issues in current epistemology is whether a recognition of the support rela? tion between a belief and its adequate grounds is necessary for the justification of the belief. This issue is often addressed as the debate between internalism and externalism. Clearly, this distinction concerns the connec? tion factor of epistemic justification. Seen from this perspective, Lehrer's and BonJour's theories are internalist. Whether they are in? ternalist or externalist on the adequacy di? mension is another question. IV. SUMMARY I argued that introspectibility is the proper epistemological criterion of the internal. I also argued that theories of epistemic justifi? cation or knowledge can diverge on three dif? ferent dimensions. This depends on how one analyzes the three different components of epistemic justification or knowledge, namely, the grounds for a belief, the adequacy of the grounds for the belief, and the basing relation between the belief and its grounds. I argued, on this basis, that internalism and externalism can be distinguished in accordance with each component on three different dimensions.59 University of Oklahoma Received February 4,1993 This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 314 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY NOTES 1. Roderick Chisholm, "The Indispensability of Internal Justification," Synthese, vol. 64 (1988), pp. 285-96 (see p. 285). 2. Laurence BonJour, "The Internalist Conception of Epistemic Justification," in Peter A. French et al. eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy vol. 5: Studies in Epistemology (Minneapolis: University of Minne? sota Press, 1980), p. 56. 3. D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth, and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Alvin Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 64 (1967), pp. 355-72; Fred Dretske, "Conclusive Reasons," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol.49 (1971), pp. 1-22, reprinted in Marshall Swain and George Pappas eds., Essays on Knowledge and Justification (Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 1978) and Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981); Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), chapter 3. 4. D. M. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 157. 5. L. BonJour,op. cit., p. 55. 6. The well-known minimal condition for knowledge is that a person, S, knows that p only if S believes that p and it is true that p. Given this, modern epistemology has focused on other conditions that must be satisfied for a true belief to qualify as an instance of knowledge. Epistemic justification has been the most popular candidate for this third condition of knowledge, but a number of epistemologists have attempted to analyze knowledge without invoking epistemic justification. In this paper, I will discuss diverse episte? mological theories without worrying very much about whether or not they are theories of epistemic justification. 7. See section 3. 8. Alvin Goldman, "What is Justified Belief?," in Justification and Knowledge, ed. George Pappas (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979). 9. Actually, this is what Goldman wants. See, ibid., p. 182. 10. See, for example, L. BonJour, op. cit., p. 57, especially fn. 7. U.R.Chisholm,op. cit.,p.286. 12. Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 138-43. 13. L. BonJour, op. cit., p. 8. 14. I am not making the controversial claim that a belief is justified only if it has an objectively high probability of being true. (See Stewart cohen, "Justification and Truth," Philosophical Studies, vol. 46 (1984), pp. 279-96 and John Pollock, "Reliability and Justified Belief," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 14 (1984), pp. 103-14). What I say is compatible with the subjectivist claim that S is justified in the belief that p if and only if S does her best in seeking truth with respect to believing that p, regardless of the actual probability of p's being true. 15. W. V. O. Quine, "The Nature of Natural Knowledge," in Mind and Language ed., Samuel Guttenplan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 67. 16. Ernest Sosa, "The Coherence of Virtue and the Virtue of Coherence," Synthese, vol. 64 (1985), pp. 3-28, reprinted in Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 193. 17. R. Chisholm, op. cit., p. 285. 18. Robert Audi, "Causalist Internalism," American Philosophical Quarterly,\o\.26 (1989),pp.309-20,p. 309. 19. William Alston, Epistemic Justification (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 4-5. 20. For an example of a view that takes psychological states as internal, see the quotations from Audi and Alston on p. 9 of this essay. 21. For the claim that detecting coherence among beliefs goes beyond human cognitive capacity, see Hilary Kornblith, "The Unattainability of Internalist Coherentism," in John Bender ed., The Current State of the Coherence Theory: Critical Essays on the Epistemic Theories of Keith Lehrer and Laurence BonJour, with Replies (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), p. 209 and Christopher Cherniak, Minimal Rationality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), chapter 3. This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY / 315 22. See D. M. Armstrong,^ Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), pp. 97-99. See also Evan Fales, Causation and Universals (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 42-46. 23. When necessary, I will point out some features that pertain uniquely to current theories of knowledge. 24. See, Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," reprinted in his Science, Perception, and Reality (New York: Humanities Press, 1963), and Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), chapter 4. However, John Pollock denies the above claim. This denial is the basis for his foundationalist account of epistemic justification. See, J. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (PLACE, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986). 25. Here is Alvin Goldman's initial formulation of his account of epistemic justification: "(5) If S's believing that p at t results from a reliable belief-forming process (or set of processes), then S's believing that p at t is justified." [A. Goldman, "What Is Justified Belief?," p. 182.] 26.1 am using the term "ground" more broadly than the term, "evidence." According to my usage of the term, not only evidential psychological states, but also cognitive processes responsible for the production of a belief, can be grounds for the justification of the belief. 27. Strictly speaking, evidentialism and processism are not mutually exclusive. For example, a view that justified beliefs are produced by a cognitive process that takes the evidential psychological states as inputs seems to be evidentialist and processist at the same time. However, most of the traditional evidentialist theories deny the relevance of the genesis of a belief to its justification and think of epistemic justification of a belief solely as a function of psychological states of the believer at the time of holding the belief. This shows that, even if evidentialism and processism are logically compatible, most of the traditional eviden? tialist theories have been anti-processist. However, as we will see in the discussion of the third factor of epistemic justification, there is a reason to push evidentialism toward processism. 28. Process reliabilism is the most distinct example of a ground internalist account that most epistemolo gist think of as externalist. 29. "A's non-inferential belief that p is a case of non-inferential knowledge if, and only if: 0) P (n) (3H)[Ha & there is a law-like connection in nature (x) if Hx, then (if Bxp, then p)]." D. M. Armstrong,op. cit., p. 168. 30. However, in some places Armstrong makes some remarks that suggest that his externalist analysis can be used as an analysis of epistemic justification. For example, he says with regard to the implication of his externalist analysis, "The subject's belief is not based on reasons, but it might be said to be reasonable (justifiable), because it is a sign, a completely reliable sign, that the situation believed to exist does in fact exist" [D. M. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 183]. And he says, "even where we do not have knowledge, we may still have rational belief. If BaJc is a reliable pointer to the high probability of c's being J, then the belief that c is J may be called rational (whether or not the believer knows it is rational)" [ibid., p. 189]. 31. Nozick talks about methods that are used for the formation of beliefs. Maybe, he is claiming that a belief is justified for S if and only if it is produced by a cognitive method and the method is used in the way that the above counterfactual relation holds. If so, he would be a processist. And if the method in his terminology means a cognitive process, he would be a ground internalist. For more detailed presentation of his theory, see R. Nozick, op. cit., Ch. 3. 32. This is not exactly correct for Dretske. In Dretske, the counterfactual relation necessary for knowledge must hold not between a belief in question and the fact that makes the belief true, but between a ground for the belief and the fact that makes the belief true. See: Dretske, "Conclusive Reasons," The Aus? tralasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 49 (1971), pp. 1-22. 33. Peter Unger, "An Analysis of Factual Knowledge," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 65 (1968), pp. 157-170 (see p. 161). 34. Ibid., p. 159. 35. Propensity is one of the well-known accounts of objective probability, together with relative frequency and nomic probability. This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 316 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 36. There can be processist accounts that are adequacy internalist, viz., a theory that claims that S's believing that p is justified only if it is produced by a cognitive process that S thinks is reliable. 37. See p. 303 of this essay. 38. See pp. 304 of this essay. 39. BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, p. 95. 40. W. Alston, "An Internalist Externalism," Synthese,\o\. 74 (1988), pp. 265-83, reprinted in Epistemic Justification (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) and M. Swain, Justification and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981). 41. R. Foley, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 68. Also see the more detailed definition of epistemic justification given by Foley, op. cit., p. 65. For an attempt to refute adequacy externalism with respect to epistemic justification, see Stewart Cohen, "Justification and Truth," Philosophical Studies, vol. 46 (1984), pp. 279-96. 42. Roderick Chisholm, "The Indispensability of Internal Justification," pp. 285-86. 43. John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (PLACE, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986), p. 126. According to Pollock, the justification of a belief is determined by a cognitive process responsible for its production. But, Pollock denies any attempt to define a criterion of adequacy for cognitive processes in terms of externalist considerations such as truth-conducivity. [Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986), pp. 123-49.] However, it is not clear what criterion he endorses to make a distinction between cognitive processes that yield justified beliefs and those that do not. For this reason, I only assume that he is an adequacy-internalist. 44. Roderick Firth, "Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Ones?," in A. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim eds., Values and Morals (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), pp. 215-229; A. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, M A: Harvard University Press, 1986), ch. 5; Pollock, op. cit., p. 81, and "A Plethora of Epistemological Theories," in George Pappas ed., Justification and Knowledge (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), pp. 93-113; R. Foley, op. cit., pp. 175-86; Hilary Kornblith, "Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory," The Journal of Philosophy, vol.77 (1980), pp. 597-611, and Marshall Swain, "Justifi? cation and the Basis of Belief," in G. Pappas, ed., op. cit., pp. 25-49. 45. J. Pollock,op. cit.,p.81. 46. R. Foley, op. cit., pp. 175-86. 47. Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge; R. Foley, op. cit.; L. BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. 48. Richard Foley, op. cit., especially chapter 4. 49. K. Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, especially p. 4 and p. 64. 50. K. Lehrer, op. cit., pp. 168-72 and "How Reasons Give Us Knowledge, or the Case of the Gypsy Lawyer," The Journal of Philosophy, vol.68 (1971),pp.311-13. 51. L. BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, pp. 42-43. The same point is expressed very clearly in p. 31 as well. 52. The point of the series of counterexamples he provides for the refutation of reliabilist accounts of epistemic justification is to deny the sufficiency of the reliabilist account. 53. Firth, op. cit. ; Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing" and "What is Justified Belief?"; Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, "Evidentialism," in Philosophical Studies, vol. 48 (1985), pp. 334-345; Alston, op. cit. 54. W. Alston, "An Internalist Externalism," in Epistemic Justification, pp. 211-IS. 55. Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, op. cit., p. 340. See also Swain, Reasons and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), chapter 2. 56. Foley, op. cit., chapter 1. 57. We have seen on pp. 8-9 that Sosa and Alston also provide the definition of externalism with a focus on ground dimension. 58. See section I above. 59.1 thank Monte Cook, Ray Elugardo, Alvin Goldman, Chris Swoyer, and Russ Shafer-Landau for their helpful comments. This content downloaded from 143.107.87.191 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 07:50:49 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions