Respondeat Superior

Philippine Airlines V. CA
Facts:
Private respondent, Jesus V. Samson, was a licensed pilot employed by
petitioner. He had complained on previous occasions to petitioner that hisco-pilot was
slow in reacting and was having lapses of poor judgment during flights. PAL however
still allowed the co-pilot to fly despite repeated complaints. On a certain flight, the plane
crashed while being maneuvered by the co-pilot causing brain injury to private
respondent.
ssue! "hether or petitioner is liable for damages.
Held!
#es. $nder the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is responsible or
liable for the actions of employees performed within the course of their employment.
n the case at bar, there was gross negligence on the part of petitioner because
despite the %nowledge of the co-pilots condition it still allowed him to continue flying.
&he law provides that a common carrier should e'ercise e'traordinary diligence in the
supervision of their employees and utmost diligence in bringing passengers to their
destination.
As Proximate Cause
(c%ee v.ntermediate Appeliate )ourt
*acts!
&wo boys suddenly darted before (c+ee,s car forcing (c+ee to swerve the car
to avoid hitting the boys and in the process entered into the opposite lane and collided
with the oncoming cargo truc% in the opposite lane.
ssue! "hether or not petitioner was negligent.
Held!
-o. t is provided that negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do. the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person,
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such person suffers injury.
However, there is an e'ception to the rule. &he emergency rule states that one
who suddenly finds himself in a place danger, and is re/uired to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence, if he fails not to adopt what subse/uently and upon reflection may appear
to be the better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about
by his own negligence.
n the case at bar, (c%ee had no opportunity to select a better means to avoid an
impending danger. &hus, he was not guilty of negligence.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
)ebu 0hipyard v. "illiam Lines
*acts!
Petitioner was engaged in the repairs of marine vessels. 1espondent is the owner
of (23 (anila )ity, a lu'ury passenger-cargo vessel, which caught fire and san% while
under repair at petitioner,s premises.
ssue! "hether or not the doctrine of res ipsa lo/uitur applies against respondent.
Held!
#es. *or the doctrine of res ipsa lo/uitur to apply to a given situation, the
following conditions must concur! 456 the accident was of a %ind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent. and 476 that the instrumentality or agency
which caused the injury was under the e'clusive control of the person charged with
negligence.
&he facts and evidence reveal the presence of these conditions. *irst, the fire
would not have happened in the ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence
had been e'ercised. 0econd, the agency charged with negligence, as found by the trial
court and the )A and as shown by the records, is the petitioner, which had control over
subject vessel when it was doc%ed for annual repairs.
&hus, petitioner is liable.