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Matthew Klein
5/11/14
Lidke
REL 350
Derrida(s) Mysticism
Derrida has been the subject of analysis of those versed in mystical thought since he
stormed onto the scene in the early 70s. His application of Nietzschean and Heideggarian
thought brought a fresh approach to language by questioning its objectivity, its origin, and its
application. As we will see in this brief analysis, not only did Derrida himself engage in texts with
an almost mystical intent, his understanding of deconstructing or perhaps decentering Western
Metaphysics idea of centering has been applied in many settings, across cultural, religious, and
disciplinary boundaries.
Derridas mysticism truly does begin in his first work. Appropriately enough for him, even
though he did not address it openly, language for Derrida has timelessly been mystical. The
infinite chain of substitutions acts as the center of language, it is a nothing before a something.
(Derrida, 212) The nothingness and lack of history upon which the gift of language
demonstrates that is constantly given, not deriving from an essence or a being. (Derrida, 310).
Language is then this play of meanings, our willingness to speak and believe out over nothing
and because of nothing; we have now have freedom because there is no absolute meaning that
is not discovered and made. (Derrida, 315)
Yet this is not a call to nihilism, but rather to a mystical idea of discipline and
achievement that cannot be categorized but must instead be sought. Greatness cannot be seen
at its source, but rather in the world (Derrida, 10) Thus by 1994, when we get to the gift of
death, Derrida realized what was already occurring (see the similarity to differance?). He now
claims That the Other of the mystical beginning to language is similar to the silent
transcendence of God, that is both completely within us and absolutely outside of us. (Derrida,
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110) The otherness of God is similar to the otherness within ourselves that we use to discover
both our own mysticism as well as how it is only a realization of God himself. (Derrida, 145)
Derrida also applied this mystical understanding to law. In a speech given at Johns
Hopkins that was eventually written into a book along with other thinkers on the topic, Derrida
proposed that there is a difference between law and Justice. The law cannot perfectly represent
law, and yet we depend our belief to make our laws. There is no essence to justice that can be
accessed, yet he claims that law derives its authority from this inaccessible source. This is the
binary opposition of deconstruction: undeconstructability. (Derrida, 47) It is the claim that ethics,
justice, and the ideas upon which our society runs and functions cannot be reduced but at the
same time act as our standards for these ideas. A mystical silence that is always spoken about
that cannot be accessed or disassembled acts as the essence of justice, and in Derridas
terms this idea deconstructs itself (Derrida 70)
Derridas own focus on law piqued the interest of many scholars following him.
His idea that law is able to grant itself its own speechless, a historical objectivity has as laws
create an essence in themselves has caused other thinkers to question his supposed Nihilism.
John Mcormick at Yale University took this inquiries upon himself, and used it defend Derridas
thinking against allegations of Post Modern Relativism. He realizes that Derrida proposal that
we must take a stand without an absolute beginning does not result in arbitrary ideas of justice
send around power, but simply an idea that justice and law cannot be absolutely equalized. If a
law could condense all of justice into itself, a perfect legal system would have already come to
be (Mcormick, 401).
Just as Derrida gave this speech in English, the violence of language is similar to but not
equal to this inaccessible mystical violence. (Mcormick, 405) This is a mystical violence that
opposes institutions without an exact law, but with the spirit of justice that must not and cannot
be condensed. It does not just encounter Jewish and Christian thought, but also McCormick
uses it to defend Derrida from critiques that inaccessible justice makes for arbitrary justice.
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(Mcormick, 409) Systematic Justice is now something that must be carefully considered,
analyzed and perused historically, instead of allowing it to mindlessly change shape with the
passing of time. To prevent relativism, all perspectives must be considered for we do not have
the final answer.
Derrida does not only call us to cultural acceptance, but also to our understanding of
epistemology in general as explored by a comparison of modern plays done by De Vries. With
this silent origin of language, we cannot understand entirely what it is we are addressing with
language. Our mysticism starts with our desire to understand and the mystery involved, not
because we misunderstand the object of our search. Vries is able to comment upon this
starting point, what he calls the originary yes (De Vries, 452). It is our willingness to speak
without knowing our object that becomes important; it is our willingness to speak not to
encompass an object but to speak about what is with all the confidence that western empiricism
has about its claims. If even language itself is a gift (De Vries, 455), our life and our ideas of
language become not about enslaving ourselves to reality (and vice versa) but simply
encountering it.
One of the foremost scholars on Derridas theoretical application to Christianity was
John Caputo, He spent his life trying to discover what he called the religion without religion
(Caputo, 17) of Derrida, and how this can affect our ideas of scripture, interpretation, and
otherwise. If deconstruction can also not be submitted to absolute understanding, to an
essence, and to a method, then this has given us (or returned us) to a more holistic view of the
transcendent God. Truly the mystical depth of humans is nothing next to the indescribable
nature of God that cannot be seen touched, or even truly worshiped if our structure and
methods are final idea of veneration. (Caputo, 25)
The name of God can now be excluded from his worship, not so he can be ignored or
reduced to arbitrary nothing, but rather to willfully remain blinded to his holiness. When every
other is absolutely other ( the name of God is hidden from us out of respect, and so we must no
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longer attempt to move it into our understanding ( Caputo 43) Our silence is that of respect, of
acknowledging the infinite distance between us and God, while simultaneously realizing that he
filled this gap with his presence and with Agape. (Marion, 153)
Yet it is not only western texts that Derrida is undoing that have begun to see how
valuable his work really is. Harold Coward tried to understand it in terms of Indian Philosophy,
and saw much potential for Derridas end of the west as an opportunity for meeting the east.
Derridas freedom of language from structure and permanence yet not from value is seen by
Coward as the coming into being of the Sabdatattva, or an experience of the temporality of
Brahman. It is the passage of time which is not simply a progression from the past to the
present onwards into the future, but rather the appearance of the many faces, forms, and
freedom of Brahman. (Coward, 44) It is not an essence that is appealed to, with absolutes and
structures and essence from which all else is drawn, but rather is recreated in every moment,
and thus the world is full of wonder whilst that we interact with and encounter. Just as the
mystical silence of tusnimbhava (referencing Nagarjunas buddhism) that is ultimate truth and
reality, so Derrida places the foundation of language outside of itself (Coward, 135)
The Chinese understanding of Zen buddhism also carries parallels to Derridas thoughts.
The word Tantra literally means to weave. In a similar way to how this tradition drew lines
between Taoism and Buddhism, so does it describe the Buddhist idea of the universe, a
symbiosis of patterns that cannot exist without each other (Odin, 144). One is not more central
than the other, and one pattern cannot be seen without being girded in every other. The Other is
now as central as I (Odin, 146) This idea of being woven together is founded upon a similar
nothingness as is the trace, the Derridiean center of formlessness that motivates language.
This can physically be experienced in Buddhism as the void, a Satori that is encountered in
meditation. A PCE as Foreman might have called it, this event cannot be called an event, an
object within history, but an activity encountered throughout all of ones life. (Odin, 147)
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As we have seen Derrida does not simply want to destroy western conventions, but can
be used to Enhance and help us understand those of the East as well. It is not a call to
mindlessness or a lack of discipline, but a call to cognitive and spiritual discernment as we are
called to choose regardless, without history and from the outside of absolute meaning. Derridas
mysticism runs deeper than any of his texts could encompass (even as they all must point to
this), yet this is the infinite breadth of the trace, of differance, of the nothingness of our
understanding that is mysticism.



















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Bibliography

Derrida, Jacques. Limited Inc. Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1988. Print

Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976. Print.

Derrida, Jacques. The Gift of Death. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1995. Print.

Cornell, Drucilla, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Carlson. Deconstruction and the Possibility of
Justice. New York: Routledge, 1992. Print.

McCormick, John P. "Derrida on law; or, poststructuralism gets serious."Political Theory (2001): 395-423.

Coward, Harold G. Derrida and Indian Philosophy. New York: State U of New York, 1990.
Print.

Caputo, John D. The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion.
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1997. Print.

De Vries, Hent. Religion and violence: Philosophical perspectives from Kant to Derrida. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2003.

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Marion, Jean-Luc. God without Being: Hors-texte. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1991. Print.

Odin, Steve. "Derrida & the decentered universe of chan/zen buddhism." Journal of Chinese Philosophy
17.1 (1990): 61-86.


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