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LegalReasoningasPracticalReasoningRichardPosner

I.WhatisPracticalReason?
Thetermpracticalreasonlacksastandardmeaning.However,itismostoftenusedtodenotethe
methodsthatpeopleusetomakeapracticalorethicalchoice...Itisourprincipalsetoftoolsfor
answeringquestions,largeandsmall.
Practicalreasonisactionorientedandinvolvessettingagoalandchoosingthebestmeanstoreach
thatgoalinotherwords,itisamethodologyfordecidingwhattodo
Neotraditionalistsdefinepracticalreasonasamethodologyforreachingconclusionswhichrelyheavily
onthetraditionsofaparticularfieldofinquiryandissuspiciousofwhatweusuallythinkofasreason.
Lawusesmanymethodsofpracticalreasonbutthetwotackledinthechapterarerelianceon
authorityandreasoningbyanalogy

II.ReasoningbyAuthority
Thetermauthorityinlawdiffersfromhowitisusedinscience.Authorityinscienceisbasically
epistemicinnatureitdealswithknowledgeandthepeoplewhodeterminewhatcanbeclassifiedas
knowledge.Forinstance,webelievethattheearthrevolvesaroundthesunbecauseagroupofscientists
andlaypeoplewhoareexpertsintheirfieldclaimittobeso.Theauthority,inthissense,stemsfroma
consensusofpeopleandcannotbesaidtobemerelyamanifestationofblindobedience.Authorityis
thescienceshassurvivalvalue.
Authorityinlaw,ontheotherhand,comesfromwhoeverisatthetopofthejudicialhierarchya
consensusamonglawyers(orevenjudgesinsomecases)doesnotgiveauthoritativeforcetolegal
decisions.Inasystemlikethis,itisassumedthatdecisionsmadeatthetopofthehierarchyaremore
likelytobecorrectthatthosewhichcomefromthelower.However,thispresumptionisweak
decisionsmadebyjudgeshavelessintrinsicpersuasivenessthanunanimousscientificjudgmentsbecause
themethodsjudgesusearefeeblerthanthemethodwhichscientistsuse.Theimagewhichthecourts
projectofthembeingtotallyimpartial,neutral,andcold,isanillusion.Judicialdecisionsareauthoritative
becausetheyemanatefromapoliticallyaccreditedsource.
Thelawtriestoaccommodatedoctrinetoalteredconditionswithaslittlechangeaspossible(stare
decisis/caselaw/commonlaw)thisisthepolicyofgenerallyabidingbytheprecedent
Theultimaratiooflawisforcelawreliesonforceaswellaspersuasion.
III.ReasoningbyAnalogy
Reasoningbyanalogydenotesanunstableclassofdisparatereasoningmethods.Theauthorclaims
thatitisinductiveinnatureandnotsyllogistic.
Anotherwaylawyersviewreasoningbyanalogyisthatanalogiesareviewedsimplyasinstances
similartotheproblemathandwhereinaninductiveinferencemaybebasedforhowtodecideonwhat
todo.Forinstance,previouslydecidedcasescansupplylawyersandjudgeswithawealthoffacts,
reasons,andtechniquespertinentonhowanewsimilarcaseshouldbedecided.
Reasoningbyanalogyisamethodofundermininglegalcertituderatherthanofestablishingit.
Establishedprinciplesinoldcasesaresubjectedtocontinualretestinginnewcases.

IV.ANoteonLegalEducation
TheSocraticmethodfamiliarizesthestudentoflawwithlegalmaterialswhichexaggeratethe
uniquenessandpoweroftheanalyticalmethodsthatlawyersandjudgesuse.Itimmersesthestudentin
judicialopinionsandotherlegalmaterialsthatisthehallmarkofalegaleducationandprovideshimwith
asimulacrumofthelegalpracticeitself.
Whatthinkinglikealawyermeansisnottheuseofspecialanalyticpowersbutanawarenessofhow
plasticthelawisneithertoorigidnortooflimsybutchangingmoreorless.

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