Einstein's Philosophy of

Science
DON HOWARD
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/einsteinphilscience/
1
First published Wed Feb 11, 2004
Albert Einstein (18791955) is well known as the most
prominent physicist of the twentieth century. ess well known!
thou"h of comparable importance! are his contributions to
twentieth#century philosophy of science. Einstein$s own
philosophy of science is an ori"inal synthesis of elements %rawn
from sources as %i&erse as neo#'antianism! con&entionalism!
an% lo"ical empiricism! its %istincti&e feature bein" its no&el
blen%in" of realism with a holist! un%er%eterminationist form of
con&entionalism. (f special note is the manner in which
Einstein$s philosophical thinkin" was %ri&en by an% contribute%
to the solution of problems first encountere% in his work in
physics. E)ually si"nificant are Einstein$s relations with an%
influence on other prominent twentieth#century philosophers of
science! especially *orit+ ,chlick an% -ans .eichenbach.
2
!ontents
1. /ntro%uction0 1as Einstein an Epistemolo"ical
2(pportunist34..........5
6. 7he 8n%er%etermination of 7heory 9hoice by
E&i%ence0 7he :ature an% .ole of 9on&entions in
,cience..........1;
;. ,implicity an% 7heory 9hoice<<<.6;
5. 8ni&ocalness in the 7heoretical .epresentation of
:ature<<<.69
5. .ealism an% ,eparability<<<.;5
=. 7he >rinciple 7heories?9onstructi&e 7heories
@istinction<<<.51
7. 9onclusion0 Albert Einstein0 >hilosopher#
>hysicist<<<.55
Aiblio"raphy
o Einstein$s 1ork<<<.5=
o .elate% iterature<<<.58
(ther /nternet .esources<<<.5=
.elate% Entries<<<.5=
3
". #ntroduction: Was Einstein an
Episte$olo%ical &Opportunist'(
ate in 1955! Albert Einstein recei&e% a letter from .obert
7hornton! a youn" African#American philosopher of science
who ha% Bust finishe% his >h.@. un%er -erbert Cei"l at
*innesota an% was be"innin" a new Bob teachin" physics at the
8ni&ersity of >uerto .ico! *aya"ue+. -e ha% written to solicit
from Einstein a few supporti&e wor%s on behalf of his efforts to
intro%uce 2as much of the philosophy of science as possible3
into the mo%ern physics course that he was to teach the
followin" sprin" (7hornton to Einstein! 68 :o&ember 1955! EA
=157;).
D1E
-ere is what Einstein offere% in reply0
I fully agree with you about the significance and educational
value of methodology as well as history and philosophy of
science. o many people today!and even professional
scientists!seem to me li"e somebody who has seen thousands
of trees but has never seen a forest. # "nowledge of the
historic and philosophical bac"ground gives that "ind of
independence from pre$udices of his generation from which
most scientists are suffering. %his independence created by
philosophical insight is!in my opinion!the mar" of
distinction between a mere artisan or specialist and a real
see"er after truth. &'instein to %hornton, ( )ecember 1*44,
'# +1,-(4.
4
7hat Einstein meant what he sai% about the rele&ance of
philosophy to physics is e&i%ence% by the fact that he ha% been
sayin" more or less the same thin" for %eca%es. 7hus! in a 191=
memorial note for Ernst *ach! a physicist an% philosopher to
whom Einstein owe% a special %ebt! he wrote0
/ow does it happen that a properly endowed natural scientist
comes to concern himself with epistemology0 Is there no
more valuable wor" in his specialty0 I hear many of my
colleagues saying, and I sense it from many more, that they
feel this way. I cannot share this sentiment. When I thin"
about the ablest students whom I have encountered in my
teaching, that is, those who distinguish themselves by their
independence of $udgment and not merely their 1uic",
wittedness, I can affirm that they had a vigorous interest in
epistemology. %hey happily began discussions about the goals
and methods of science, and they showed une1uivocally,
through their tenacity in defending their views, that the
sub$ect seemed important to them. Indeed, one should not be
surprised at this. &'instein 1*1+, 101.
-ow! eFactly! %oes the philosophical habit of min% pro&i%e the
physicist with such 2in%epen%ence of Bu%"ment34 Einstein "oes
on to eFplain0
2oncepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily
achieve such an authority over us that we forget their earthly
origins and accept them as unalterable givens. %hus they
come to be stamped as 3necessities of thought,4 3a priori
givens,4 etc. %he path of scientific advance is often made
impassable for a long time through such errors. For that
reason, it is by no means an idle game if we become practiced
in analy5ing the long commonplace concepts and e6hibiting
those circumstances upon which their $ustification and
usefulness depend, how they have grown up, individually, out
5
of the givens of e6perience. 7y this means, their all,too,great
authority will be bro"en. %hey will be removed if they cannot
be properly legitimated, corrected if their correlation with
given things be far too superfluous, replaced by others if a
new system can be established that we prefer for whatever
reason. &'instein 1*1+, 102.
(ne is not surprise% at Einstein$s then citin" *ach$s critical
analysis of the :ewtonian conception of absolute space as a
para%i"m of what *ach! himself! terme% the 2historical#critical3
metho% of philosophical analysis (Einstein 191=! 1G1! citin" 9h.
6! HH =7 of *ach$s 8echani"! most likely the thir% e%ition!
*ach 1897).
7he place of philosophy in physics was a theme to which
Einstein returne% time an% a"ain! it bein" clearly an issue of
%eep importance to him. ,ometimes he a%opts a mo%est pose! as
in this oft#)uote% remark from his 19;; ,pencer ecture0
If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist anything
about the methods which he uses, I would give you the
following piece of advice9 )on:t listen to his words, e6amine
his achievements. For to the discoverer in that field, the
constructions of his imagination appear so necessary and so
natural that he is apt to treat them not as the creations of his
thoughts but as given realities. &'instein 1*;;, -<+.
*ore typical! howe&er! is the confi%ent pose he struck three
years later in 2>hysics an% .eality30
It has often been said, and certainly not without $ustification,
that the man of science is a poor philosopher. Why then
should it not be the right thing for the physicist to let the
philosopher do the philosophi5ing0 uch might indeed be the
right thing at a time when the physicist believes he has at his
6
disposal a rigid system of fundamental concepts and
fundamental laws which are so well established that waves of
doubt can not reach them= but it can not be right at a time
when the very foundations of physics itself have become
problematic as they are now. #t a time li"e the present, when
e6perience forces us to see" a newer and more solid
foundation, the physicist cannot simply surrender to the
philosopher the critical contemplation of the theoretical
foundations= for, he himself "nows best, and feels more surely
where the shoe pinches. In loo"ing for a new foundation, he
must try to ma"e clear in his own mind $ust how far the
concepts which he uses are $ustified, and are necessities.
&'instein 1*;+, ;4*.
1hat kin% of philosophy mi"ht we eFpect from the philosopher#
physicist4 (ne thin" that we shoul% not eFpect from a physicist
who takes the philosophical turn in or%er to help sol&e
fun%amental physical problems is a systematic philosophy0
%he reciprocal relationship of epistemology and science is of
noteworthy "ind. %hey are dependent upon each other.
'pistemology without contact with science becomes an empty
scheme. cience without epistemology is!insofar as it is
thin"able at all!primitive and muddled. /owever, no sooner
has the epistemologist, who is see"ing a clear system, fought
his way through to such a system, than he is inclined to
interpret the thought,content of science in the sense of his
system and to re$ect whatever does not fit into his system. %he
scientist, however, cannot afford to carry his striving for
epistemological systematic that far. /e accepts gratefully the
epistemological conceptual analysis= but the e6ternal
conditions, which are set for him by the facts of e6perience,
do not permit him to let himself be too much restricted in the
construction of his conceptual world by the adherence to an
epistemological system. /e therefore must appear to the
7
systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous
opportunist9 he appears as realist insofar as he see"s to
describe a world independent of the acts of perception= as
idealist insofar as he loo"s upon the concepts and theories as
free inventions of the human spirit &not logically derivable
from what is empirically given.= as positivist insofar as he
considers his concepts and theories $ustified only to the e6tent
to which they furnish a logical representation of relations
among sensory e6periences. /e may even appear as >latonist
or >ythagorean insofar as he considers the viewpoint of
logical simplicity as an indispensable and effective tool of his
research. &'instein 1*4*, +?;<+?4.
Aut what strikes the 2systematic epistemolo"ist3 as mere
opportunism mi"ht appear otherwise when &iewe% from the
perspecti&e of a physicist en"a"e%! as Einstein himself put it! in
2the critical contemplation of the theoretical foun%ations.3 7he
o&erarchin" "oal of that critical contemplation was! for Einstein!
the creation of a unifie% foun%ation for physics after the mo%el
of a fiel% theory like "eneral relati&ity. Einstein faile% in his
)uest! but there was a consistency an% constancy in the stri&in"
that informe% as well the philosophy of science %e&elopin" han%
in han% with the scientific proBect.
/n%ee%! from early to late a few key i%eas playe% the central!
lea%in" role in Einstein$s philosophy of science! i%eas about
which Einstein e&ince% surprisin"ly little %oubt e&en while
achie&in" an e&er %eeper un%erstan%in" of their implications.
Cor the purposes of the followin" comparati&ely brief o&er&iew!
we can confine our attention to Bust fi&e topics0
7he un%er%etermination of theory choice by e&i%ence.
,implicity an% theory choice.
8
8ni&ocalness in the theoretical representation of nature.
.ealism an% separability.
7he principle theories#constructi&e theories %istinction.
/n emphasi+in" the continuity an% coherence in the %e&elopment
of Einstein$s philosophy of science! / take issue with an account
such as Ieral% -olton$s (19=8)! which claims to fin% a maBor
philosophical break in the mi%#191Gs! in the form of a turn away
from a sympathy for an anti#metaphysical positi&ism an%
towar% a robust scientific realism. -olton sees this turn bein"
%ri&en by Einstein$s alle"e% reali+ation that "eneral relati&ity! by
contrast with special relati&ity! re)uires a realistic ontolo"y. (n
my &iew! Einstein was ne&er an ar%ent 2*achian3 positi&ist!
D6E
an% he was ne&er a scientific realist! at least not in the sense
ac)uire% by the term 2scientific realist3 in later twentieth
century philosophical %iscourse (see -owar% 199;). Einstein
eFpecte% scientific theories to ha&e the proper empirical
cre%entials! but he was no positi&istJ an% he eFpecte% scientific
theories to "i&e an account of physical reality! but he was no
scientific realist. *oreo&er! in both respects his &iews remaine%
more or less the same from the be"innin" to the en% of his
career.
1hy Einstein %i% not think himself a realist (he sai% so
eFplicitly) is %iscusse% below. 1hy he is not to be un%erstoo% as
a positi&ist %eser&es a wor% or two of further %iscussion here! if
only because the belief that he was sympathetic to positi&ism! at
least early in his life! is so wi%esprea% (for a fuller %iscussion!
see -owar% 199;).
7hat Einstein later repu%iate% positi&ism is beyon% %oubt. *any
remarks from at least the early 196Gs throu"h the en% of his life
9
make this clear. /n 195= he eFplaine% what he took to be *ach$s
basic error0
/e did not place in the correct light the essentially
constructive and speculative nature of all thin"ing and more
especially of scientific thin"ing= in conse1uence, he
condemned theory precisely at those points where its
constructive,speculative character comes to light
unmista"ably, such as in the "inetic theory of atoms. &'instein
1*4+, 21.
/s Einstein here also critici+in" his own youthful philosophical
in%iscretions4 7he &ery eFample that Einstein "i&es here makes
any such interpretation hi"hly implausible! because one of
Einstein$s main "oals in his early work on Arownian motion
(Einstein 19G5b) was precisely to pro&e the reality of atoms!
this in the face of the then famous skepticism of thinkers like
*ach an% 1ilhelm (stwal%0
8y principal aim in this was to find facts that would
guarantee as much as possible the e6istence of atoms of
definite si5e.@ %he agreement of these considerations with
e6perience together with >lanc":s determination of the true
molecular si5e from the law of radiation &for high
temperatures. convinced the s"eptics, who were 1uite
numerous at that time &Astwald, 8ach., of the reality of
atoms. &'instein 1*4+, 4-, 4(.
1hy! then! is the belief in Einstein$s early sympathy for
positi&ism so well entrenche%4
7he one piece of e&i%ence stan%ar%ly cite% for a youthful
flirtation with positi&ism is Einstein$s criti)ue of the notion of
absolute %istant simultaneity in his 19G5 paper on special
10
relati&ity (Einstein 19G5c). Einstein speaks there of 2obser&ers!3
but in an epistemolo"ically neutral way that can be replace% by
talk of an inertial frame of reference. 1hat really bothers
Einstein about %istant simultaneity is not that it is
obser&ationally inaccessible but that it in&ol&es a two#fol%
arbitrariness! one in the choice of an inertial frame of reference
an% one in the stipulation within a "i&en frame of a con&ention
re"ar%in" the ratio of the times re)uire% for a li"ht si"nal to "o
from one stationary obser&er to another an% back a"ain.
ikewise! Einstein faults classical *aFwellian electro%ynamics
for an asymmetry in the way it eFplains electroma"netic
in%uction %epen%in" on whether it is the coil or the ma"net that
is assume% to be at rest. /f the effect is the same?a current in
the coil?why! asks Einstein! shoul% there be two %ifferent
eFplanations0 an electrical fiel% create% in the &icinity of a
mo&in" ma"net or an electromoti&e force in%uce% in a
con%uctor mo&in" throu"h a stationary ma"netic fiel%4 7o be
sure! whether it is the coil or the ma"net that is taken to be at
rest makes no obser&able %ifference! but the problem! from
Einstein$s point of &iew! is the asymmetry in the two
eFplanations. E&en the youn" Einstein was no positi&ist.
Cirst "eneration lo"ical empiricists sou"ht to le"itimate their
mo&ement in part by claimin" Einstein as a frien%. 7hey may be
for"i&en their puttin" a force% interpretation on ar"uments taken
out of conteFt. 1e can %o better.
Einstein$s philosophy of science is an ori"inal synthesis %rawin"
upon many philosophical resources! from neo#'antianism to
*achian empiricism an% @uhemian con&entionalism. (ther
thinkers an% mo&ements! most notably the lo"ical empiricists!
%rew upon the same resources. Aut Einstein put the pieces
to"ether in a manner importantly %ifferent from *orit+ ,chlick!
11
-ans .eichenbach! an% .u%olf 9arnap! an% he ar"ue% with
them for %eca%es about who was ri"ht (howe&er much they
obscure% these %ifferences in representin" Einstein publicly as a
frien% of lo"ical empiricism an% scientific philosophy).
8n%erstan%in" how Einstein puts those pieces to"ether therefore
she%s li"ht not only on the philosophical aspect of his own
achie&ements in physics but also upon the lar"er history of the
%e&elopment of the philosophy of science in the twentieth
century.
12
). *he +nderdeter$ination of *heory
!hoice ,y E-idence: *he Nature and
Role of !on-entions in Science
Any philosophy of science must inclu%e an account of the
relation between theory an% e&i%ence. Einstein learne% about
the historicity of scientific concepts from *ach. Aut his
preferre% way of mo%elin" the lo"ical relationship between
theory an% e&i%ence was inspire% mainly by his rea%in" of
>ierre @uhem$s Ba %hCorie physi1ue9 son ob$et et sa structure
(@uhem 19G=). Einstein probably first rea% @uhem! or at least
learne% the essentials of @uhem$s philosophy of science aroun%
the fall of 19G9! when! upon returnin" to Kurich from the patent
office in Aern to take up his first aca%emic appointment at the
8ni&ersity of Kurich! he became the upstairs nei"hbor of his ol%
frien% an% fellow Kurich physics stu%ent! Crie%rich A%ler. Lust a
few months before! A%ler ha% publishe% the Ierman translation
of Ba %hCorie physi1ue (@uhem 19G8)! an% the philosophy of
science became a fre)uent topic of con&ersation between the
new nei"hbors! A%ler an% Einstein (see -owar% 199Ga).
7heoretical holism an% the un%er%etermination of theory choice
by empirical e&i%ence are the central theses in @uhem$s
philosophy of science. -is ar"ument! in brief! is that at least in
13
sciences like physics! where eFperiment is %ense with
sophisticate% instrumentation whose employment itself re)uires
theoretical interpretation! hypotheses are not teste% in isolation
but only as part of whole bo%ies of theory. /t follows that when
there is a conflict between theory an% e&i%ence! the fit can be
restore% in a multiplicity of %ifferent ways. :o statement is
immune to re&ision because of a presume% status as a %efinition
or thanks to some other a priori warrant! an% most any statement
can be retaine% on pain of suitable a%Bustments elsewhere in the
total bo%y of theory. -ence! theory choice is un%er%etermine%
by e&i%ence.
7hat Einstein$s eFposure to @uhem$s philosophy of science soon
left its mark is e&i%ent from lecture notes that Einstein prepare%
for a course on electricity an% ma"netism at the 8ni&ersity of
Kurich in the winter semester of 191GM11. Einstein asks how one
can assi"n a %efinite electrical char"e e&erywhere within a
material bo%y! if the interior of the bo%y is not accessible to test
particles. A 2*achian3 positi&ist woul% %eem such %irect
empirical access necessary for meanin"ful talk of a char"e
%istribution in the interior of a sol%. Einstein ar"ues otherwise0
We have seen how e6perience led to the introd. of the concept
of the 1uantity of electricity. it was defined by means of the
forces that small electrified bodies e6ert on each other. 7ut
now we e6tend the application of the concept to cases in
which this definition cannot be applied directly as soon as we
conceive the el. forces as forces e6erted on electricity rather
than on material particles. We set up a conceptual system the
individual parts of which do not correspond directly to
empirical facts. Anly a certain totality of theoretical material
corresponds again to a certain totality of e6perimental facts.
14
We find that such an el. continuum is always applicable only
for the representation of el. states of affairs in the interior of
ponderable bodies. /ere too we define the vector of el. field
strength as the vector of the mech. force e6erted on the unit of
pos. electr. 1uantity inside a body. 7ut the force so defined is
no longer directly accessible to e6p. It is one part of a
theoretical construction that can be correct or false, i.e.,
consistent or not consistent with e6perience, only as a whole.
&'# ;,00(, '2> ;,11, ;2-.
(ne can har%ly ask for a better summary of @uhem$s point of
&iew in application to a specific physical theory.
EFplicit citations of @uhem by Einstein are rare (for %etails! see
-owar% 199Ga). Aut eFplicit in&ocations of a holist picture of
the structure an% empirical interpretation of theories are not
har% to fin%. An especially interestin" eFample is foun% in a
re&iew that Einstein wrote in 1965 of Alfre% Elsbach$s Dant und
'instein (1965)! one of the floo% of books an% articles then
tryin" to reconcile the 'antian %octrine of the a priori Eucli%ean
character of space with "eneral relati&ity$s postulate of &ariable
spacetime cur&ature. -a&in" asserte% that relati&ity theory is
incompatible with 'ant$s %octrine of the a priori! Einstein
eFplains why! more "enerally! he is not sympathetic with 'ant0
%his does not, at first, preclude one:s holding at least to the
Dantian problematic, as, e.g., 2assirer has done. I am even of
the opinion that this standpoint can be rigorously refuted by
no development of natural science. For one will always be
able to say that critical philosophers have until now erred in
the establishment of the a priori elements, and one will
always be able to establish a system of a priori elements that
does not contradict a given physical system. Bet me briefly
indicate why I do not find this standpoint natural. # physical
theory consists of the parts &elements. #, 7, 2, ), that
15
together constitute a logical whole which correctly connects
the pertinent e6periments &sense e6periences.. %hen it tends
to be the case that the aggregate of fewer than all four
elements, e.g., #, 7, ), without 2, no longer says anything
about these e6periences, and $ust as well #, 7, 2 without ).
Ane is then free to regard the aggregate of three of these
elements, e.g., #, 7, 2 as a priori, and only ) as empirically
conditioned. 7ut what remains unsatisfactory in this is always
the arbitrariness in the choice of those elements that one
designates as a priori, entirely apart from the fact that the
theory could one day be replaced by another that replaces
certain of these elements &or all four. by others. &'instein
1*24, 1+??<1+?*.
Einstein$s point seems to be that while one can always choose to
%esi"nate selecte% elements as a priori an%! hence! non#
empirical! no principle %etermines which elements can be so
%esi"nate%! an% our ability thus to %esi"nate them %eri&es from
the fact that it is only the totality of the elements that possesses
empirical content.
*uch the same point coul% be ma%e! an% was ma%e by @uhem
himself (see @uhem 19G=! part 6! ch. =! sects. 8 an% 9)! a"ainst
those who woul% insulate certain statements a"ainst empirical
refutation by claimin" for them the status of con&entional
%efinitions. E%ouar% e .oy (19G1) ha% ar"ue% thus about the
law of free fall. /t coul% not be refute% by eFperiment because it
functione% as a %efinition of 2free fall.3 An% -enri >oincarN
(19G1) sai% much the same about the principles of mechanics
more "enerally. As Einstein answere% the neo#'antians! so
@uhem answere% this species of con&entionalist0 Oes!
eFperiment cannot refute! say! the law of free fall by itself! but
only because it is part of a lar"er theoretical whole that has
empirical content only as a whole! an% &arious other elements of
16
that whole coul% as well be sai% to be! alone! immune to
refutation.
7hat Einstein shoul% %eploy a"ainst the neo#'antians in the
early 196Gs the ar"ument that @uhem use% a"ainst the
con&entionalism of >oincarN an% e .oy is interestin" from the
point of &iew of Einstein$s relationships with those who were
lea%in" the %e&elopment of lo"ical empiricism an% scientific
philosophy in the 196Gs! especially ,chlick an% .eichenbach.
Einstein share% with ,chlick an% .eichenbach the "oal of
craftin" a new form of empiricism that woul% be a%e)uate to the
task of %efen%in" "eneral relati&ity a"ainst neo#'antian
criti)ues (see ,chlick 1917 an% 1961! an% .eichenbach 196G!
1965! an% 1968J for more %etail! see -owar% 1995a). Aut while
they all a"ree% that what 'ant re"ar%e% as the a priori element
in scientific co"nition was better un%erstoo% as a con&entional
moment in science! they were "rowin" to %isa"ree %ramatically
o&er the nature an% place of con&entions in science. 1ith the
help of new lo"ical tools an% a more sophisticate%
&erificationist semantics! ,chlick an% .eichenbach were
refinin" >oincarN$s i%ea of con&entional %efinitional elements in
science into the classic lo"ical empiricist &iew that the moment
of con&ention was restricte% to con&entional coor%inatin"
%efinitions that en%ow in%i&i%ual primiti&e terms an%! by
eFtension! the in%i&i%ual synthetic propositions constructe% out
of them with empirical content. 7his &iew worke% well as an
answer to the neo#'antian! for it implie% that once one fiFe%
one$s coor%inatin" %efinition?as with a con&entional choice of
a stan%ar% measurin" ro% coor%inate% with the "eometer$s
concept of a 2ri"i% bo%y3?the )uestion of the cur&ature of
space ha% an empirically %eterminate answer. Aut unless the
%i&ision is wholly arbitrary! parsin" theories thus into
coor%inatin" %efinitions an% empirical statements assumes a
17
principle% %ifference in kin% between the two cate"ories of
statements alon" the lines of an analytic#synthetic %istinction.
As ha% been the case with @uhem before him! the assumption of
such a principle% %ifference in kin% %i% not comport well with
the holism about theories that Einstein ha% learne% from
@uhem.
/t was this ar"ument o&er the nature an% place of con&entions in
science that un%erlay Einstein$s "ra%ual philosophical
estran"ement from ,chlick an% .eichenbach in the 196Gs.
,erious in its own ri"ht! the ar"ument o&er con&entions was
entan"le% with two other issues as well! namely! realism an%
Einstein$s famous &iew of theories as the 2free creations of the
human spirit3 (see! for eFample! Einstein 1961). /n both
instances what trouble% Einstein was that a &erificationist
semantics ma%e the link between theory an% eFperience too
stron"! lea&in" too small a role for theory! itself! an% the
creati&e theori+in" that pro%uces it.
/f theory choice is empirically %eterminate! especially if
theoretical concepts are eFplicitly constructe% from empirical
primiti&es! as in 9arnap$s pro"ram in the #ufbau (9arnap 1968)!
then it is har% to see how theory "i&es us a story about anythin"
other than eFperience. As note%! Einstein was not what we
woul% to%ay call a scientific realist! but he still belie&e% that
there was content in theory beyon% mere empirical content. -e
belie&e% that theoretical science "a&e us a win%ow on nature
itself! e&en if! in principle! there will be no one uni)uely correct
story at the le&el of %eep ontolo"y (see below! section 5). An% if
the only choice in theory choice is one amon" con&entional
coor%inatin" %efinitions! then that is no choice at all! a point
stresse% by .eichenbach! especially! as an important positi&e
implication of his position. .eichenbach ar"ue% that if empirical
18
content is the only content! then empirically e)ui&alent theories
ha&e the same content! the %ifference resultin" from their
%ifferent choices of coor%inatin" %efinitions bein" like in kin%
to the %ifference between 2es re"net3 an% 2il pleut!3 or the
%ifference between eFpressin" the result of a measurement in
En"lish or metric units! Bust two %ifferent ways of sayin" the
same thin". Aut then! Einstein woul% ask! where is there any
role for the creati&e intelli"ence of the theoretical physicist if
there is no room for "enuine choice in science! if eFperience
somehow %ictates theory construction4
7he ar"ument o&er the nature an% role of con&entions in science
continue% to the &ery en% of Einstein$s life! reachin" its hi"hest
le&el of sophistication in the eFchan"e between .eichenbach
an% Einstein the ibrary of i&in" >hilosopher$s &olume! #lbert
'instein9 >hilosopher,>hysicist (,chilpp 1959). 7he )uestion is!
a"ain! whether the choice of a "eometry is empirical!
con&entional! or a priori. /n his contribution! .eichenbach
reasserte% his ol% &iew that once an appropriate coor%inatin"
%efinition is establishe%! e)uatin" some 2practically ri"i% ro%3
with the "eometer$s 2ri"i% bo%y!3 then the "eometry of physical
space is wholly %etermine% by empirical e&i%ence0
%he choice of a geometry is arbitrary only so long as no
definition of congruence is specified. Ance this definition is
set up, it becomes an empirical 1uestion which geometry
holds for physical space.@ %he conventionalist overloo"s the
fact that only the incomplete statement of a geometry, in
which a reference to the definition of congruence is omitted,
is arbitrary. &Eeichenbach 1*4*, 2*(.
Einstein$s cle&er reply inclu%es a %ialo"ue between two
characters! 2.eichenbach3 an% 2>oincarN!3 in which
2.eichenbach3 conce%es to 2>oincarN3 that there are no
19
perfectly ri"i% bo%ies in nature an% that physics must be use% to
correct for such thin"s as thermal %eformations! from which it
follows that what we actually test is "eometry plus physics! not
"eometry alone. -ere an 2anonymous non#positi&ist3 takes
2>oincarN$s3 place! out of respect! says Einstein! 2for >oincarN$s
superiority as thinker an% author3 (Einstein 1959! =77)! but also!
perhaps! because he reali+e% that the point of &iew that follows
was more @uhem than >oincarN. 7he 2non#positi&ist3 then
ar"ues that one$s "rantin" that "eometry an% physics are teste%
to"ether contra&enes the positi&ist i%entification of meanin"
with &erifiability0
Fon,>ositivist9 If, under the stated circumstances, you hold
distance to be a legitimate concept, how then is it with your
basic principle &meaning G verifiability.0 8ust you not come
to the point where you deny the meaning of geometrical
statements and concede meaning only to the completely
developed theory of relativity &which still does not e6ist at all
as a finished product.0 8ust you not grant that no
3meaning4 whatsoever, in your sense, belongs to the
individual concepts and statements of a physical theory, such
meaning belonging instead to the whole system insofar as it
ma"es 3intelligible4 what is given in e6perience0 Why do the
individual concepts that occur in a theory re1uire any
separate $ustification after all, if they are indispensable only
within the framewor" of the logical structure of the theory,
and if it is the theory as a whole that stands the test0
&'instein 1*4*, +(?..
7wo years before the Puine$s publication of 27wo @o"mas of
Empiricism3 (1951)! Einstein here makes eFplicit the semantic
implications of a thorou"h"oin" holism.
20
/f theory choice is empirically un%er%etermine%! then an
ob&ious )uestion is why we are so little aware of the
un%er%etermination in the %ay#to#%ay con%uct of science. /n a
1918 a%%ress celebratin" *aF >lanck$s siFtieth birth%ay!
Einstein approache% this )uestion &ia a %istinction between
practice an% principle0
%he supreme tas" of the physicist is @ the search for those
most general, elementary laws from which the world picture
is to be obtained through pure deduction. Fo logical path
leads to these elementary laws= it is instead $ust the intuition
that rests on an empathic understanding of e6perience. In this
state of methodological uncertainty one can thin" that
arbitrarily many, in themselves e1ually $ustified systems of
theoretical principles were possible= and this opinion is, in
principle, certainly correct. 7ut the development of physics
has shown that of all the conceivable theoretical
constructions a single one has, at any given time, proved
itself unconditionally superior to all others. Fo one who has
really gone deeply into the sub$ect will deny that, in practice,
the world of perceptions determines the theoretical system
unambiguously, even though no logical path leads from the
perceptions to the basic principles of the theory. &'instein
1*1?, ;1= my translation.
Aut why is theory choice! in practice! seemin"ly empirically
%etermine%4 Einstein hinte% at an answer the year before in a
letter to ,chlick! where he commen%e% ,chlick$s ar"ument that
the %eep elements of a theoretical ontolo"y ha&e as much claim
to the status of the real as %o *ach$s elements of sensation
(,chlick 1917)! but su""este% that we are nonetheless speakin"
of two %ifferent kin%s of reality. -ow %o they %iffer4
21
It appears to me that the word 3real4 is ta"en in different
senses, according to whether impressions or events, that is to
say, states of affairs in the physical sense, are spo"en of.
If two different peoples pursue physics independently of one
another, they will create systems that certainly agree as
regards the impressions &3elements4 in 8ach:s sense.. %he
mental constructions that the two devise for connecting these
3elements4 can be vastly different. #nd the two constructions
need not agree as regards the 3events4= for these surely
belong to the conceptual constructions. 2ertainly on the
3elements,4 but not the 3events,4 are real in the sense of
being 3given unavoidably in e6perience.4
7ut if we designate as 3real4 that which we arrange in the
space,time,schema, as you have done in the theory of
"nowledge, then without doubt the 3events,4 above all, are
real.@ I would li"e to recommend a clean conceptual
distinction here. &'instein to chlic", 21 8ay 1*1(, '# 21,
+1?, '2> ?,;4;.
1hy! in practice! are physicists unaware of un%er%etermination4
/t is because ours is not the situation of 2two %ifferent peoples
pursuDin"E physics in%epen%ently of one another.3 7hou"h
Einstein %oes not say it eFplicitly! the implication seems to be
that apparent %etermination in theory choice is mainly a
conse)uence of our all bein" similarly sociali+e% as we become
members of a common scientific community. >art of what it
means to be a member of a such a community is that we ha&e
been tau"ht to make our theoretical choices in accor% with
criteria or &alues that we hol% in common.
22
.. Si$plicity and *heory !hoice
Cor Einstein! as for many others! simplicity is the criterion that
mainly steers theory choice in %omains where eFperiment an%
obser&ation no lon"er pro&i%e an unambi"uous "ui%e. 7his! too!
is a theme soun%e% early an% late in Einstein$s philosophical
reflections (for more %etail! see -owar% 1998! :orton 6GGG! an%
&an @on"en 6GG6). Cor eFample! the Bust#)uote% remark from
1918 about the apparent %etermination of theory choice in
practice! contraste% with in#principle un%er%etermination
continues0
Furthermore this conceptual system that is univocally
coordinated with the world of e6perience is reducible to a few
basic laws from which the whole system can be developed
logically. With every new important advance the researcher
here sees his e6pectations surpassed, in that those basic laws
are more and more simplified under the press of e6perience.
With astonishment he sees apparent chaos resolved into a
sublime order that is to be attributed not to the rule of the
individual mind, but to the constitution of the world of
e6perience= this is what Beibni5 so happily characteri5ed as
3pre,established harmony.4 >hysicists strenuously reproach
many epistemologists for their insufficient appreciation of
this circumstance. /erein, it seems to me, lie the roots of the
controversy carried on some years ago between 8ach and
>lanc". &'instein 1*1?, p. ;1.
23
7here is more than a little autobio"raphy here! for as Einstein
stresse% repeate%ly in later years! he un%erstoo% the success of
his own )uest for a "eneral theory of relati&ity as a result of his
seekin" the simplest set of fiel% e)uations satisfyin" a "i&en set
of constraints.
Always a leitmotif! Einstein$s celebration of simplicity as a
"ui%e to theory choice comes clearly to the fore in the early
19;Gs. 1hy then4 7he reason mi"ht well be that his faith in
simplicity ha% been &in%icate% when! seemin"ly with a si"h of
relief! he foun% that he coul% %rop from the "ra&itational fiel%
e)uations the cosmolo"ical constant that he ha% intro%uce% in
1917 for the purpose of blockin" non#static solutions! for the
intro%uction of the cosmolo"ical constant in the first place ha%
represente% to him 2a consi%erable renunciation of the lo"ical
simplicity of the theory3 (Einstein 1959! =85=85). 7hat his
faith in simplicity was reaffirme% is clear. 1itness what he
wrote in his 19;; -erbert ,pencer lecture0
If, then, it is true that the a6iomatic foundation of theoretical
physics cannot be e6tracted from e6perience but must be
freely invented, may we ever hope to find the right way0
Furthermore, does this right way e6ist anywhere other than in
our illusions0 8ay we hope to be guided safely by e6perience
at all, if there e6ist theories &such as classical mechanics.
which to a large e6tent do $ustice to e6perience, without
comprehending the matter in a deep way0
%o these 1uestions, I answer with complete confidence, that,
in my opinion, the right way e6ists, and that we are capable
of finding it. Aur e6perience hitherto $ustifies us in trusting
that nature is the reali5ation of the simplest that is
mathematically conceivable. I am convinced that purely
mathematical construction enables us to find those concepts
24
and those lawli"e connections between them that provide the
"ey to the understanding of natural phenomena. Hseful
mathematical concepts may well be suggested by e6perience,
but in no way can they be derived from it. '6perience
naturally remains the sole criterion of the usefulness of a
mathematical construction for physics. 7ut the actual creative
principle lies in mathematics. %hus, in a certain sense, I ta"e
it to be true that pure thought can grasp the real, as the
ancients had dreamed. &'instein 1*;;, p. 1?;= my
translation.
Another consi%eration reinforcin" Einstein$s con&iction that the
theoretical physicist must trust simplicity is that physics is
mo&in" stea%ily into %omains e&er further remo&e% from %irect
contact with obser&ation an% eFperiment. Aefore the 19=Gs!
"eneral relati&ity! itself! reste% on a famously thin empirical
footin"! an% empirical e&i%ence pro&i%e% e&en less of a "ui%e in
Einstein$s search for a unifie% fiel% theory. (ne year after the
-erbert ,pencer lecture! at a time when he was immerse% in
work on unifie% fiel% theory! Einstein wrote0
%he theory of relativity is a beautiful e6ample of the basic
character of the modern development of theory. %hat is to say,
the hypotheses from which one starts become ever more
abstract and more remote from e6perience. 7ut in return one
comes closer to the preeminent goal of science, that of
encompassing a ma6imum of empirical contents through
logical deduction with a minimum of hypotheses or a6ioms.
%he intellectual path from the a6ioms to the empirical
contents or to the testable conse1uences becomes, thereby,
ever longer and more subtle. %he theoretician is forced, ever
more, to allow himself to be directed by purely mathematical,
formal points of view in the search for theories, because the
physical e6perience of the e6perimenter is not capable of
leading us up to the regions of the highest abstraction.
25
%entative deduction ta"es the place of the predominantly
inductive methods appropriate to the youthful state of
science. uch a theoretical structure must be 1uite thoroughly
elaborated in order for it to lead to conse1uences that can be
compared with e6perience. It is certainly the case that here,
as well, the empirical fact is the all,powerful $udge. 7ut its
$udgment can be handed down only on the basis of great and
difficult intellectual effort that first bridges the wide space
between the a6ioms and the testable conse1uences. %he
theorist must accomplish this /erculean tas" with the clear
understanding that this effort may only be destined to prepare
the way for a death sentence for his theory. Ane should not
reproach the theorist who underta"es such a tas" by calling
him a fantast= instead, one must allow him his fantasi5ing,
since for him there is no other way to his goal whatsoever.
Indeed, it is no planless fantasi5ing, but rather a search for
the logically simplest possibilities and their conse1uences.
&'instein 1*-4, 2;?<2;*= my translation.
1hat warrant is there for thus trustin" in simplicity4 At best one
can %o a kin% of meta#in%uction. 7hat 2the totality of all sensory
eFperience can be Qcomprehen%e%R on the basis of a conceptual
system built on premises of "reat simplicity3 will be %eri%e% by
skeptics as a 2miracle cree%!3 but! Einstein a%%s! 2it is a miracle
cree% which has been borne out to an ama+in" eFtent by the
%e&elopment of science3 (Einstein 195G! p. ;56).
Aut for all that Einstein$s faith in simplicity was stron"! he
%espaire% of "i&in" a precise! formal characteri+ation of how we
assess the simplicity of a theory. /n 195= he wrote about the
perspecti&e of simplicity (here terme% the 2inner perfection3 of
a theory)0
%his point of view, whose e6act formulation meets with great
difficulties, has played an important role in the selection and
26
evaluation of theories from time immemorial. %he problem
here is not simply one of a "ind of enumeration of the
logically independent premises &if anything li"e this were at
all possible without ambiguity., but one of a "ind of
reciprocal weighing of incommensurable 1ualities.@ I shall
not attempt to e6cuse the lac" of precision of ItheseJ
assertions @ on the grounds of insufficient space at my
disposal= I must confess herewith that I cannot at this point,
and perhaps not at all, replace these hints by more precise
definitions. I believe, however, that a sharper formulation
would be possible. In any case it turns out that among the
3oracles4 there usually is agreement in $udging the 3inner
perfection4 of the theories and even more so concerning the
degree of 3e6ternal confirmation.4 &'instein 1*4+, pp. 21,
2;..
As in 1918! so in 195= an% beyon%! Einstein continues to be
impresse% that the 2oracles!3 presumably the lea%ers of the
rele&ant scientific community! ten% to a"ree in their Bu%"ments
of simplicity. 7hat is why! in practice! simplicity seems to
%etermine theory choice uni&ocally.
EFperience Bustifies our trustin" that nature is the reali+ation of
the simplest that is mathematically concei&able. 9an we say
anythin" more about why this mi"ht be so4 A hint is pro&i%e%
by Einstein$s enthusiastically positi&e response to ,chlick$s first
essay on the philosophical si"nificance of relati&ity (,chlick
1915). At this early sta"e in his philosophical career! ,chlick
re"ar%e% himself as a realist an% %efen%e% a &ersion of the
un%er%etermination thesis "roun%e% in his &iew of truth as the
unambi"uous many#to#one coor%ination of propositions to facts
(,chlick 191G). 7heories bein" sets of propositions! se&eral
theories coul% likewise be unambi"uously coor%inate% with a
"i&en set of facts an% thus count as e)ually true representations
27
of those facts. 1hen he took up the )uestion of simplicity!
,chlick %eri%e% those who woul% Bustify simplicity as a criterion
of theory choice by ar"uin" that we shoul% choose simple
theories because nature itself is simple. As ,chlick ri"htly
pointe% out! this is a circular ar"ument! for our only co"niti&e
access to nature is &ia our theories (note that Einstein ar"ues not
that nature! itself! is simple! but that nature is a reali+ation of
simple theoretical constructions! a crucial %ifference). ,chlick
similarly %eri%es a %efense "roun%e% in consi%erations of mental
economy! which he terms 2intellectual in%olence.3 1hy then
choose simple theories4 ,chlick$s answer is that 2the "reater
simplicity of a theory %epen%s on its containin" fewer arbitrary
elements.3 1hy is it better to choose theories with fewer
2superfluous!3 arbitrary elements4 Aecause only the non#
arbitrary elements are likely to correspon% to reality! so in
choosin" the simpler theory 2we are then sure of %i&er"in" from
reality at least no further than is necessitate% by the boun%s of
our knowle%"e as such3 (,chlick 1915! 155155). As an
eFample of an arbitrary element in theory that %oes not
correspon% to reality! ,chlick cite% the ether frame in orent+ian
electro%ynamics (,chlick 1917! =G).
Einstein %oes not eFplicitly commen% ,chlick$s %efense of
simplicity! but he also in no way obBects in the course of a lon"
correspon%ence %urin" the late 191Gs! wherein he stron"ly
commen%s ,chlick$s "eneral philosophical orientation an%
carefully recor%s all points of %isa"reement (for more %etail! see
-owar% 1985). *oreo&er the principle un%erlyin" ,chlick$s
%efense of simplicity! the i%ea that it is the non#arbitrary
elements of our theories that represent the real! playe% a %eep
an% en%urin" role in Einstein$s philosophy of science.
28
/. +ni-ocalness in the *heoretical
Representation of Nature
/n the physics an% philosophy of science literature of the late
nineteenth an% early twentieth centuries! the principle accor%in"
to which scientific theori+in" shoul% stri&e for a uni&ocal
representation of nature was wi%ely an% well known un%er the
name that it was "i&en in the title of a wi%ely#cite% essay by
Loseph >et+ol%t! 27he aw of 8ni&ocalness3 D2@as Ieset+ %er
Ein%euti"keit3E (>et+ol%t 1895). An in%ication that the map of
philosophical positions was %rawn then in a manner &ery
%ifferent from to%ay is to foun% in the fact that this principle
foun% fa&or amon" both anti#metaphysical lo"ical empiricists!
such as 9arnap! an% neo#'antians! such as 9assirer. /t playe% a
maBor role in %ebates o&er the ontolo"y of "eneral relati&ity an%
was an important part of the back"roun% to the %e&elopment of
the mo%ern concept of cate"oricity in formal semantics (for
more on the history! influence! an% %emise of the principle of
uni&ocalness! see -owar% 1996 an% 199=). (ne can fin% no
more ar%ent an% consistent champion of the principle than
Einstein.
7he principle of uni&ocalness shoul% not be mistaken for a
%enial of the un%er%etermination thesis. 7he latter asserts that a
multiplicity of theories can e)ually well account for a "i&en
bo%y of empirical e&i%ence! perhaps e&en the infinity of all
possible e&i%ence in the eFtreme! Puinean &ersion of the thesis.
7he principle of uni&ocalness asserts (in a somewhat
29
anachronistic formulation) that any one theory! e&en any one
amon" a set of empirically e)ui&alent theories! shoul% pro&i%e a
uni&ocal representation of nature by %eterminin" for itself an
isomorphic set of mo%els. 7he unambi"uous %etermination of
theory choice by e&i%ence is not the same thin" as the uni&ocal
%etermination of a class of mo%els by a theory.
7he principle of uni&ocalness playe% a central role in Einstein$s
stru""les to formulate the "eneral theory of relati&ity. 1hen! in
191;! Einstein wron"ly reBecte% a fully "enerally co&ariant
theory of "ra&itation! he %i% so in part because he thou"ht!
wron"ly! that "enerally co&ariant fiel% e)uations faile% the test
of uni&ocalness. *ore specifically! he reasone% wron"ly that for
a re"ion of spacetime %e&oi% of matter an% ener"y?a 2hole3?
"enerally co&ariant fiel% e)uations permit the construction of
two %ifferent solutions! %ifferent in the sense that! in "eneral! for
spacetime points insi%e the hole! they assi"n %ifferent &alues of
the metric tensor to one an% the same point (for more on the
history of this episo%e! see ,tachel 198G an% :orton 1985). Aut
Einstein$s 2hole ar"ument3 is wron"! an% his own %ia"nosis of
the error in 1915 rests a"ain! ironically! on a %eployment of the
principle of uni&ocalness. 1hat Einstein reali+e% in 1915 was
that! in 191;! he was wron"ly assumin" that a coor%inate chart
suffice% to fiF the i%entity of spacetime manifol% points. 7he
application of a coor%inate chart cannot suffice to in%i&i%uate
manifol% points precisely because a coor%inate chart is not an
in&ariant labelin" scheme! whereas uni&ocalness in the
representation of nature re)uires such in&ariance (see -owar%
an% :orton 199; an% -owar% 1999 for further %iscussion).
-ere is how Einstein eFplaine% his chan"e of perspecti&e in a
letter to >aul Ehrenfest of 6= @ecember 1915! Bust a few weeks
30
after the publication of the final! "enerally co&ariant
formulation of the "eneral theory of relati&ity0
In K12 of my wor" of last year, everything is correct &in the
first three paragraphs. up to that which is printed with
emphasis at the end of the third paragraph. From the fact that
the two systems L&6. and LM&6., referred to the same reference
system, satisfy the conditions of the grav. field, no
contradiction follows with the univocalness of events. %hat
which was apparently compelling in these reflections
founders immediately, if one considers that
1. the reference system signifies nothing real
2. that the &simultaneous. reali5ation of two
different g,systems &or better, two different
grav. fields. in the same region of the
continuum is impossible according to the
nature of the theory.
In place of K12, the following reflections must appear. %he
physically real in the universe of events &in contrast to that
which is dependent upon the choice of a reference system.
consists in spatiotemporal coincidences.N IFootnote N9 and in
nothing elseOJ Eeal are, e.g., the intersections of two different
world lines, or the statement that they do not intersect. %hose
statements that refer to the physically real therefore do not
founder on any univocal coordinate transformation. If two
systems of the gPv &or in general the variables employed in the
description of the world. are so created that one can obtain
the second from the first through mere spacetime
transformation, then they are completely e1uivalent. For they
have all spatiotemporal point coincidences in common, i.e.,
everything that is observable.
%hese reflections show at the same time how natural the
demand for general covariance is. &'# *,;+;, '2> ?,1(;.
31
Einstein$s new point of &iew! accor%in" to which the physically
real consists eFclusi&ely in that which can be constructe% on the
basis of spacetime coinci%ences! spacetime points! for eFample!
bein" re"ar%e% as intersections of worl% lines! is now known as
the 2point#coinci%ence ar"ument.3 ,pacetime coinci%ences play
this pri&ile"e% ontic role because they are in&ariant an%! thus!
uni&ocally %etermine%. ,pacetime coordinates lack such
in&ariance! a circumstance that Einstein thereafter repeate%ly
formulate% as the claim that space an% time 2thereby lose the
last &esti"e of physical reality3 (see! for eFample! Einstein to
Ehrenfest! 5 Lanuary 191=! EA 9#;76! E9> 8#18G).
(ne tellin" measure of the philosophical importance of
Einstein$s new perspecti&e on the ontolo"y of spacetime is the
fact that ,chlick %e&ote% his first book! Eaum und Qeit in den
gegenwRrtigen >hysi" (1917)! a book for which Einstein ha%
hi"h praise (see -owar% 1985 an% 1999)! to an eFploration of
the philosophical implications of the claim that space an% time
ha&e thereby lost the last &esti"e of physical reality. *ention
has alrea%y been ma%e of ,chlick$s %efense of an
un%er%etermination thesis base% on his %octrine of truth as
unambi"uous coor%ination. 7hat &iew is here %e&elope% at
consi%erable len"th. Aut what most intereste% Einstein was
,chlick$s %iscussion of the reality concept. ,chlick ar"ue% that
*ach was wron" to re"ar% only the elements of sensation as
real. ,pacetime e&ents! in%i&i%uate% in&ariantly as spacetime
coinci%ences! ha&e as much or more ri"ht to be taken as real!
precisely because of the uni&ocal manner of their %etermination.
Einstein wholehearte%ly a"ree%! thou"h he &enture% the abo&e#
)uote% su""estion that one shoul% %istin"uish the two kin%s of
reality?that of the elements an% that of the spacetime e&ents?
on the "roun% that if 2two %ifferent peoples3 pursue% physics
in%epen%ently of one another they were fate% to a"ree about the
32
elements but woul% almost surely pro%uce %ifferent theoretical
constructions at the le&el of the spacetime e&ent ontolo"y. :ote!
a"ain! that un%er%etermination is not a failure of uni&ocalness.
@ifferent thou"h they will be! each people$s theoretical
construction of an e&ent ontolo"y woul% be eFpecte% to be
uni&ocal.
,chlick! of course! went on to become the foun%er of the Sienna
9ircle! a lea%in" fi"ure in the %e&elopment of lo"ical
empiricism! a champion of &erificationism. 7hat bein" so! an
important )uestion arises about ,chlick$s interpretation of
Einstein on the uni&ocal %etermination of spacetime e&ents as
spacetime coinci%ences. 7he )uestion is this0 @o such uni&ocal
coinci%ences play such a pri&ile"e% role because of their reality
or because of their obser&ability. 9learly the former?the reality
of that which is uni&ocally %etermine%?is important. Aut are
uni&ocal spacetime coinci%ences real because! thanks to their
in&ariance! they are obser&able4 (r is their obser&ability
conse)uent upon their in&ariant reality4 Einstein! himself!
repeate%ly stresse% the obser&able character of spacetime
coinci%ences! as in the 6= @ecember 1915 letter to Ehrenfest
)uote% abo&e (for a%%itional references an% a fuller %iscussion!
see -owar% 1999).
D;E
,chlick! still a self#%escribe% realist in 1917! was clear about the
relationship between obser&ability an% reality. -e %istin"uishe%
macroscopic coinci%ences in the fiel% of our sense eFperience!
to which he %oes accor% a pri&ile"e% an% foun%ational epistemic
status! from the microscopic point coinci%ences that %efine an
ontolo"y of spacetime manifol% points. *appin" the former
onto the latter is! for ,chlick! an important part of the business
of confirmation! but the reality of the spacetime manifol% points
is in no way conse)uent upon their obser&ability. /n%ee%! how!
33
strictly speakin"! can one e&en talk of the obser&ation of
infinitesimal spacetime coinci%ences of the kin% encountere% in
the intersection of two worl% lines4 /n fact! the or%er of
implication "oes the other way0 ,pacetime e&ents in%i&i%uate%
as spacetime coinci%ences are real because they are in&ariant!
an% such obser&ability as they mi"ht possess is conse)uent upon
their status as in&ariant bits of physical reality. Cor Einstein! an%
for ,chlick in 1917! un%erstan%in" the latter?physical reality?
is the "oal of physical theory.
34
0. Realis$ and Separa,ility
As we ha&e seen! ,chlick$s Eaum und Qeit in den
gegenwRrtigen >hysi" promote% a realistic interpretation of the
ontolo"y of "eneral relati&ity. After rea%in" the manuscript
early in 1917! Einstein wrote to ,chlick on 61 *ay that 2the last
section Q.elations to >hilosophyR seems to me eFcellent3 (EA
61#=18! E9> 8#;5;)! Bust the sort of praise one woul% eFpect
from a fellow realist. 7hree years earlier! the Aonn
mathematician! E%uar% ,tu%y! ha% written another well#known!
in%ee% &ery well#known %efense of realism! )ie realistische
Weltansicht und die Behre vom Eaume (1915). Einstein rea% it
in ,eptember of 1918. *uch of it he like%! especially the %roll
style! as he sai% to ,tu%y in a letter of 17 ,eptember (EA 66#
;G1! E9> 8#=18). >resse% by ,tu%y to say more about the points
where he %isa"ree%! Einstein replie% on 65 ,eptember in a
rather surprisin" way0
I am supposed to e6plain to you my doubts0 7y laying stress
on these it will appear that I want to pic" holes in you
everywhere. 7ut things are not so bad, because I do not feel
comfortable and at home in any of the 3isms.4 It always
seems to me as though such an ism were strong only so long
as it nourishes itself on the wea"ness of it counter,ism= but if
the latter is struc" dead, and it is alone on an open field, then
it also turns out to be unsteady on its feet. o, away with the
s1uabbling.
3%he physical world is real.4 %hat is supposed to be the
fundamental hypothesis. What does 3hypothesis4 mean here0
For me, a hypothesis is a statement, whose truth must be
assumed for the moment, but whose meaning must be raised
35
above all ambiguity. %he above statement appears to me,
however, to be, in itself, meaningless, as if one said9 3%he
physical world is coc",a,doodle,doo.4 It appears to me that
the 3real4 is an intrinsically empty, meaningless category
&pigeon hole., whose monstrous importance lies only in the
fact that I can do certain things in it and not certain others.
%his division is, to be sure, not an arbitrary one, but instead
@.
I concede that the natural sciences concern the 3real,4 but I
am still not a realist. &'# 22,;0(, '2>,?,+24.
est there be any %oubt that Einstein has little sympathy for the
other si%e! he a%%s0
%he positivist or pragmatist is strong as long as he battles
against the opinion that there IareJ concepts that are
anchored in the 3# priori.4 When, in his enthusiasm, IheJ
forgets that all "nowledge consists IinJ concepts and
$udgments, then that is a wea"ness that lies not in the nature
of things but in his personal disposition $ust as with the
senseless battle against hypotheses, cf. the clear boo" by
)uhem. In any case, the railing against atoms rests upon this
wea"ness. Ah, how hard things are for man in this world= the
path to originality leads through unreason &in the sciences.,
through ugliness &in the arts.,at least the path that many find
passable. &'# 22,;0(, '2>,?,+24.
1hat coul% Einstein mean by sayin" that he conce%es that the
natural sciences concern the 2real!3 but that he is 2still not a
realist3 an% that the 2real3 in the statement! 2the physical worl%
is real!3 is an 2intrinsically empty! meanin"less cate"ory34
7he answer mi"ht be that realism! for Einstein! is not a
philosophical %octrine about the interpretation of scientific
36
theories or the semantics of theoretical terms.
D5E
Cor Einstein!
realism is a physical postulate! one of a most interestin" kin%! as
he eFplaine% on 18 *arch 1958 in a lon" note at the en% of the
manuscript of *aF Aorn$s 1aynflete ectures! Fatural
>hilosophy of 2ause and 2hance (1959)! which Aorn ha% sent
to Einstein for commentary0
I $ust want to e6plain what I mean when I say that we should
try to hold on to physical reality. We are, to be sure, all of us
aware of the situation regarding what will turn out to be the
basic foundational concepts in physics9 the point,mass or the
particle is surely not among them= the field, in the Faraday ,
8a6well sense, might be, but not with certainty. 7ut that
which we conceive as e6isting &:actualS. should somehow be
locali5ed in time and space. %hat is, the real in one part of
space, #, should &in theory. somehow Te6istS independently of
that which is thought of as real in another part of space, 7. If
a physical system stretches over the parts of space # and 7,
then what is present in 7 should somehow have an e6istence
independent of what is present in #. What is actually present
in 7 should thus not depend upon the type of measurement
carried out in the part of space, #= it should also be
independent of whether or not, after all, a measurement is
made in #.
If one adheres to this program, then one can hardly view the
1uantum,theoretical description as a complete representation
of the physically real. If one attempts, nevertheless, so to view
it, then one must assume that the physically real in 7
undergoes a sudden change because of a measurement in #.
8y physical instincts bristle at that suggestion.
/owever, if one renounces the assumption that what is
present in different parts of space has an independent, real
e6istence, then I do not at all see what physics is supposed to
37
describe. For what is thought to by a TsystemS is, after all, $ust
conventional, and I do not see how one is supposed to divide
up the world ob$ectively so that one can ma"e statements
about the parts. &7orn 1*+*, 22;<224= my translation.
.ealism is thus the thesis of spatial separability! the claim that
spatial separation is a sufficient con%ition for the in%i&i%uation
of physical systems! an% its assumption is here ma%e into almost
a necessary con%ition for the possibility of an intelli"ible
science of physics.
7he postulate of spatial separability as that which un%er"ir%s the
ontic in%epen%ence an%! hence! in%i&i%ual i%entities of the
systems that physics %escribes was an important part of
Einstein$s thinkin" about the foun%ations of physics since at
least the time of his &ery first paper on the )uantum hypothesis
in 19G5 (Einstein 19G5aJ for more %etail on the early history of
this i%ea in Einstein$s thinkin"! see -owar% 199Gb). Aut the true
si"nificance of the separability principle emer"e% most clearly
in 19;5! when (as hinte% in the Bust#)uote% remark) Einstein
ma%e it one of the central premises of his ar"ument for the
incompleteness of )uantum mechanics (see -owar% 1985 an%
1989). /t is not so clearly %eploye% in the publishe% &ersion of
the Einstein! >o%olsky! .osen paper (19;5)! but Einstein %i% not
write that paper an% %i% not like the way the ar"ument appeare%
there. ,eparability is! howe&er! an eFplicit premise in all of
Einstein$s later presentations of the ar"ument for the
incompleteness of )uantum mechanics! both in correspon%ence
an% in print (see -owar% 1985 for a %etaile% list of references).
/n brief! the ar"ument is this. ,eparability implies that spacelike
separate% systems ha&e associate% with them in%epen%ent real
states of affairs. A secon% postulate! locality! implies that the
38
e&ents in one re"ion of spacetime cannot physically influence
physical reality in a re"ion of spacetime separate% from the first
by a spacelike inter&al. 9onsi%er now an eFperiment in which
two systems! A an% A! interact an% separate! subse)uent
measurements on each correspon%in" to spacelike separate%
e&ents. ,eparability implies that A an% A ha&e separate real
physical states! an% locality implies that the measurement
performe% on A cannot influence A$s real physical state. Aut
)uantum mechanics ascribes %ifferent theoretical states!
%ifferent wa&e functions! to A %epen%in" upon that parameter
that is measure% on A. 7herefore! )uantum mechanics ascribes
%ifferent theoretical states to A! when A possesses! in fact! one
real physical state. -ence )uantum mechanics is incomplete.
(ne wants to ask many )uestions. Cirst! what notion of
completeness is bein" in&oke% here4 /t is not %e%ucti&e
completeness. /t is closer in kin% to what is terme%
2cate"oricity3 in formal semantics! a cate"orical theory bein"
one whose mo%els are all isomorphic to one another. /t is closer
still to the principle %iscusse% abo&e?an% cite% as a precursor
of the concept of cate"oricity?namely! the principle of
uni&ocalness! which we foun% %oin" such important work in
Einstein$s )uestion for a "eneral theory of relati&ity! where it
was the premise forcin" the a%option of an in&ariant an% thus
uni&ocal scheme for the in%i&i%uation of spacetime manifol%
points.
7he neFt )uestion is why separability is &iewe% by Einstein as
&irtually an a priori necessary con%ition for the possibility of a
science of physics. (ne reason is because a fiel% theory like
"eneral relati&ity! which was Einstein$s mo%el for a future
unifie% foun%ation for physics! is an eFtreme embo%iment of the
principle of separability0 2Ciel% theory has carrie% out this
39
principle to the eFtreme! in that it locali+es within infinitely
small (four#%imensional) space#elements the elementary thin"s
eFistin" in%epen%ently of the one another that it takes as basic!
as well as the elementary laws it postulates for them3 (Einstein
1958! ;61;66). An% a fiel% theory like "eneral relati&ity can %o
this because the infinitesimal metric inter&al?the careful way
to think about separation in "eneral relati&istic spacetime?is
in&ariant (hence uni&ocally %etermine%) un%er all continuous
coor%inate transformations.
Another reason why Einstein woul% be incline% to &iew
separability as an a priori necessity is that! in thus in&okin"
separability to "roun% in%i&i%uation! Einstein places himself in
a tra%ition of so &iewin" spatial separability with &ery stron"
'antian roots (an%! before 'ant! :ewtonian roots)! a tra%ition in
which spatial separability was known by the name that Arthur
,chopenhauer famously "a&e to it! the principium
individuationis (for a fuller %iscussion of this historical conteFt!
see -owar% 1997).
A final )uestion one wants to ask is0 21hat %oes any of this
ha&e to %o with realism43 (ne mi"ht "rant Einstein$s point that
a real ontolo"y re)uires a principle of in%i&i%uation without
a"reein" that separability pro&i%es the only concei&able such
principle. ,eparability to"ether with the in&ariance of the
infinitesimal metric inter&al implies that! in a "eneral relati&istic
spacetime! there are Boints e&erywhere! meanin" that we can
car&e up the uni&erse in any way we choose an% still ha&e
ontically in%epen%ent parts. Aut )uantum entan"lement can be
rea% as implyin" that this libertarian scheme of in%i&i%uation
%oes not work. 9an )uantum mechanics not be "i&en a realistic
interpretation4 *any woul% say! 2yes.3 Einstein sai%! 2no.3
40
1. *he Principle *heories2
!onstructi-e *heories Distinction
7here is much that is ori"inal in Einstein$s philosophy of
science as %escribe% thus far. At the &ery least! he rearran"e% the
bits an% pieces of %octrine that he learne% from others?'ant!
*ach! @uhem! >oincarN! ,chlick! an% others?in a strikin"ly
no&el way. Aut Einstein$s most ori"inal contribution to
twentieth#century philosophy of science lies elsewhere! in his
%istinction between what he terme% 2principle theories3 an%
2constructi&e theories.3
7his i%ea first foun% its way into print in a brief 1919 article in
the %imes of on%on (Einstein 1919). A constructi&e theory! as
the name implies! pro&i%es a constructi&e mo%el for the
phenomena of interest. An eFample woul% be kinetic theory. A
principle theory consists of a set of in%i&i%ually well#confirme%!
hi"h#le&el empirical "enerali+ations. EFamples inclu%e the first
an% secon% laws of thermo%ynamics. 8ltimate un%erstan%in"
re)uires a constructi&e theory! but often! says Einstein! pro"ress
in theory is impe%e% by premature attempts at %e&elopin"
constructi&e theories in the absence of sufficient constraints by
means of which to narrow the ran"e of possible of constructi&e.
/t is the function of principle theories to pro&i%e such constraint!
an% pro"ress is often best achie&e% by focusin" first on the
establishment of such principles. Accor%in" to Einstein! that is
how he achie&e% his breakthrou"h with the theory of relati&ity!
which! he says! is a principle theory! its two principles bein" the
relati&ity principle an% the li"ht principle.
41
1hile the principle theories#constructi&e theories %istinction
first ma%e its way into print in 1919! there is consi%erable
e&i%ence that it playe% an eFplicit role in Einstein$s thinkin"
much earlier. :or was it only the relati&ity an% li"ht principles
that ser&e% Einstein as constraints in his theori+in". 7hus! he
eFplicitly mentions also the Aolt+mann principle! T " lo" W!
as another such0
%his e1uation connects thermodynamics with the molecular
theory. It yields, as well, the statistical probabilities of the
states of systems for which we are not in a position to
construct a molecular,theoretical model. %o that e6tent,
7olt5mann:s magnificent idea is of significance for theoretical
physics @ because it provides a heuristic principle whose
range e6tends beyond the domain of validity of molecular
mechanics. &'instein 1*1-, p. 2+2..
Einstein is here allu%in" the famous entropic analo"y whereby!
in his 19G5 photon hypothesis paper! he reasone% from the fact
that black bo%y ra%iation in the 1ien re"ime satisfie% the
Aolt+mann principle to the conclusion that! in that re"ime!
ra%iation beha&e% as if it consiste% of mutually in%epen%ent!
corpuscle#like )uanta of electroma"netic ener"y. 7he )uantum
hypothesis is a constructi&e mo%el of ra%iationJ the Aolt+mann
principle is the constraint that first su""este% that mo%el.
7here are anticipations of the principle theories#constructi&e
theories %istinction in the nineteenth#century electro%ynamics
literature! Lames 9lerk *aFwell! in particular! bein" a source
from which Einstein mi"ht well ha&e %rawn (see -arman 1998).
At the turn of the century! the 2physics of principles3 was a
subBect un%er wi%e %iscussion (see! for eFample! >oincarN 19G5J
for further %iscussion! see Iie%ymin 1986). Aut howe&er
eFtensi&e his borrowin"s (no eFplicit %ebt was e&er
42
acknowle%"e%)! in Einstein$s han%s the %istinction becomes a
metho%olo"ical tool of impressi&e scope an% fertility. 1hat is
pu++lin"! an% e&en a bit sa%! is that this most ori"inal
metho%olo"ical insi"ht of Einstein$s ha% comparati&ely little
impact on later philosophy of science or practice in physics.
43
3. !onclusion: Al,ert Einstein:
PhilosopherPhysicist
Einstein$s influence on twentieth#century philosophy of science
is comparable to his influence on twentieth#century physics.
1hat ma%e that possible4 (ne eFplanation looks to the
institutional an% %isciplinary history of theoretical physics an%
the philosophy of science. Each was! in its own %omain! a new
mo%e of thou"ht in the latter nineteenth century! an% each
finally be"an to secure for itself a soli% institutional basis in the
early twentieth century. /n a curious way! the two mo&ements
helpe% one another. >hilosophers of science helpe% to le"itimate
theoretical physics by locatin" the si"nificant co"niti&e content
of science in its theories. 7heoretical physicists helpe% to
le"itimate the philosophy of science by pro&i%in" for analysis a
subBect matter that was ra%ically reshapin" our un%erstan%in" of
nature an% the place of humankin% within it. /n some cases the
help was e&en more %irect! as with the work of Einstein an%
*aF >lanck in the mi%#196Gs to create in the physics
%epartment at the 8ni&ersity of Aerlin a chair in the philosophy
of science for .eichenbach (see -echt an% -artmann 1986).
An% we shoul% remember the eFample of the physicists *ach
an% u%wi" Aolt+mann who were the first two occupants of the
new chair for the philosophy of science at the 8ni&ersity of
Sienna at the turn of the century.
Another eFplanation looks to the e%ucation of youn" physicists
in Einstein$s %ay. :ot only was Einstein$s own youthful rea%in"
hea&ily focuse% on philosophy! more "enerally! an% the
philosophy of science! in particular (for an o&er&iew! see
44
Einstein 1989! FFi&FF&J see also -owar% 1995b)! in which
respect he was not unlike other physicists of his "eneration! but
also his uni&ersity physics curriculum inclu%e% a re)uire%
course on 27he 7heory of ,cientific 7hou"ht3 (see Einstein
1987! @oc. 68). An ob&ious )uestion is whether or not the early
culti&ation of a philosophical habit of min% ma%e a %ifference in
the way Einstein an% his contemporaries approache% physics.
As in%icate% by his :o&ember 1955 letter to .obert 7horton
)uote% at the be"innin" of this article! Einstein thou"ht that it
%i%.
45
4i,lio%raphy
Einstein's Wor5
19G5a 2Uber einen %ie Er+eu"un" un% Serwan%lun" %es ichtes
betreffen%en heuristischen Iesichtspunkt.3 #nnalen der
>hysi" 1701;6158.
19G5b 2Uber %ie &on %er molekularkinetischen 7heorie %er
1Vrme "efor%erte Aewe"un" &on in ruhen%en
ClWssi"keiten suspen%ierten 7eilchen.3 #nnalen der
>hysi" 170 5595=G.
19G5c 2Kur Elektro%ynamik bewe"ter 'Xrper.3 #nnalen der
>hysi" 170 891961.
1915 27heoretische Atomistik.3 /n )ie Dultur der Legenwart.
Ihre 'ntwic"lung und ihre Qiele. >aul -inneber"! e%. >art
;! 8athemati", Faturwissenschaften, 8edi5in. ,ection ;!
#norganischen Faturwissenschaften. E. echer! e%. Sol.
1! @ie >hysik. Emil 1arbur"! e%. eip+i" an% Aerlin0 A.
I. 7eubner! 6516=;.
191= 2Ernst *ach.3 >hysi"alische Qeitschrift 170 1G11G5.
1918 2*oti&e %es Corschens.3 /n Qu 8a6 >lanc"s sech5igstem
Leburtstag. #nsprachen, gehalten am 2+. #pril 1*1? in
der )eutschen >hysi"alischen Lesellschaft. 'arlsruhe0
9. C. *Wller! pp. 69;6. En"lish translation0 2>rinciples
of .esearch.3 /n Einstein 1955! 665667.
1919 27ime! ,pace! an% Ira&itation.3 %imes (on%on). 68
:o&ember 1919! 1;15. .eprinte% as 21hat is the
7heory of .elati&ity43 /n Einstein 1955! 6676;6.
46
1961 Leometrie und 'rfahrung. 'rweiterte Fassung des
Festvortrages gehalten an der >reussischen #"ademie
der Wissenschaften 5u 7elin am 2(. Uanuar 1*21. Aerlin0
Lulius ,prin"er. En"lish translation0 2Ieometry an%
EFperience.3 /n Einstein 1955! 6;665=.
1965 .e&iew of Elsbach 1965. )eutsche Biteratur5eitung 55!
1=881=89.
19;; An the 8ethod of %heoretical >hysics. 7he -erbert
,pencer ecture! %eli&ere% at (Ffor%! 1G Lune 19;;.
(Ffor%0 9laren%on >ress. :ew translation by ,onBa
Aar"mann in Einstein 1955! 67G67=.
19;5 2@as .aum#! Yther# un% Cel%#>roblem %er >hysik.3
En"lish translation0 /n Einstein 1955! 67=685.
19;5 with Aoris >o%olsky an% :athan .osen! 29an Puantum#
*echanical @escription of >hysical .eality Ae
9onsi%ere% 9omplete43 >hysical Eeview 570 77778G.
19;= 2>hysik un% .ealitVt.3 Uournal of %he Fran"lin Institute
6610 ;1;;57. En"lish translation0 2>hysics an%
.eality.3 Lean >iccar%! trans. Uournal of the Fran"lin
Institute 6610 ;58;86. .eprinte% in Einstein 1955! 69G
;6;.
195= 2Autobio"raphical :otes.3 /n ,chilpp 1959! 195.
Puotations are taken from the correcte% En"lish
translation in0 #utobiographical Fotes9 # 2entennial
'dition. >aul Arthur ,chilpp! trans. an% e%. a ,alle!
/llinois0 (pen 9ourt! 1979.
1958 2Puanten#*echanik un% 1irklichkeit.3 )ialectica 60
;6G65.
1959 2.emarks 9oncernin" the Essays Arou"ht to"ether in
this 9o#operati&e Solume.3 /n ,chilpp 1959! ==5#=88.
195G 2(n the Ienerali+e% 7heory of Ira&itation.3 cientific
47
#merican 186! April! 1;17. .eprinte% in Einstein 1955!
;51;5=.
1955 Ideas and Apinions. :ew Oork0 Aonan+a Aooks.
1987 %he 2ollected >apers of #lbert 'instein. Sol. 1! %he
'arly Vears, 1?(*<1*02. Lohn ,tachel! et al.! e%s.
>rinceton! :L0 >rinceton 8ni&ersity >ress.
1989 %he 2ollected >apers of #lbert 'instein. Sol. 6! %he
wiss Vears9 Writings, 1*00<1*0*. Lohn ,tachel! et al.!
e%s. >rinceton! :L0 >rinceton 8ni&ersity >ress.
Related 6iterature
Aorn! *aF (1959). Fatural >hilosophy of 2ause and
2hance. (Ffor%0 (Ffor% 8ni&ersity >ress.
! e%. (19=9). #lbert 'instein,/edwig und 8a6 7orn9
Friefwechsel, 1*1+<1*--. *unich0 :ymphenbur"er.
9arnap! .u%olf (1968). )er logische #ufbau der Welt.
Aerlin#,chlachtensee0 1eltkreis#Serla". En"lish
translation0 %he Bogical tructure of the World W
>suedoproblems in >hilosophy. .olf A. Ieor"e! trans.
Aerkeley an% os An"eles0 8ni&ersity of 9alifornia
>ress! 19=9.
@uhem! >ierre (19G=). Ba %hCorie physi1ue9 son ob$et et
sa structure. >aris0 9he&alier Z .i&i[re. En"lish
translation of the 6n%. e%. (1915)0 %he #im and tructure
of >hysical %heory. >. >. 1iener! trans. >rinceton! :L0
>rinceton 8ni&ersity >ress! 1955. .eprint0 :ew Oork0
Athaneum! 19=6.
48
(19G8). Qiel und tru"tur der physi"alischen
%heorien. Crie%rich A%ler! trans. Corewor% by Ernst
*ach. eip+i"0 Lohann Ambrosius Aarth.
Elsbach! Alfre% (1965). Dant und 'instein.
Hntersuchungen Xber das YerhRltnis der modernen
'r"enntnistheorie 5ur EelativitRtstheorie. Aerlin an%
eip+i"0 1alter %e Iruyter.
Cine! Arthur (198=). 2Einstein$s .ealism.3 /n %he ha"y
Lame9 'instein, Eealism, and the Zuantum %heory.
9hica"o0 8ni&ersity of 9hica"o >ress! 8=111.
Crie%man! *ichael (198;). Foundations of pace,%ime
%heories9 Eelativistic >hysics and >hilosophy of
cience. >rinceton! :L0 >rinceton 8ni&ersity >ress.
Iie%ymin! Ler+y (1986). 27he >hysics of the >rinciples
an% /ts >hilosophy0 -amilton! >oincarN an% .amsey.3 /n
cience and 2onvention9 'ssays on /enri >oincarC:s
>hilosophy of cience and the 2onventionalist
%radition. (Ffor%0 >er"amon! 5689.
-arman! >. *. (1998). %he Fatural >hilosophy of Uames
2ler" 8a6well. 9ambri%"e0 9ambri%"e 8ni&ersity
>ress.
-echt! -artmut an% -offmann! @ieter (1986). 2@ie
Aerufun" -ans .eichenbachs an %ie Aerliner
8ni&ersitVt.3 )eutsche Qeitschrift fXr >hilosophie ;G0
=51==6.
-olton! Ieral% (19=8). 2*ach! Einstein! an% the ,earch
for .eality.3 )aedalus 970 =;==7;. .eprinte% in
%hematic Arigins of cientific %hought9 Depler to
49
'instein. 9ambri%"e! *A0 -ar&ar% 8ni&ersity >ress!
197;! 619659.
-owar%! @on (1985). 2.ealism an% 9on&entionalism in
Einstein$s >hilosophy of ,cience0 7he Einstein#,chlick
9orrespon%ence.3 >hilosophia Faturalis 610 =18=69.
(1985). 2Einstein on ocality an% ,eparability.3
tudies in /istory and >hilosophy of cience 1=0 171
6G1.
(1989). 2-olism! ,eparability! an% the *etaphysical
/mplications of the Aell EFperiments.3 /n >hilosophical
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(199Ga). 2Einstein an% @uhem.3 ynthese 8;0 ;=;
;85.
(199Gb). 2$:icht sein kann was nicht sein %arf!R or
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1orries about the Puantum *echanics of 9omposite
,ystems.3 /n i6ty,%wo Vears of Hncertainty9 /istorical,
>hilosophical, and >hysical In1uiries into the
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50
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>erspectives on cience9 /istorical, >hilosophical,
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Empiricism.3 /n Banguage, Bogic, and the tructure of
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(1995b). 2$A kin% of &essel in which the stru""le for
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>aradigms9 cience and the >rocess of Intellectual
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(199=). 2.elati&ity! Ein%euti"keit! an%
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Arigins of Bogical 'mpiricism. .onal% :. Iiere an%
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(1997). 2A >eek behin% the Seil of *aya0 Einstein!
,chopenhauer! an% the -istorical Aack"roun% of the
9onception of ,pace as a Iroun% for the /n%i&i%uation
51
of >hysical ,ystems.3 /n %he 2osmos of cience9 'ssays
of '6ploration. Lohn Earman an% Lohn @. :orton! e%s.
>ittsbur"h#'onstan+ ,eries in the >hilosophy an%
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(1998). 2Astri%e the @i&i%e% ine0 >latonism!
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(pportunism.3 /n Ideali5ation in 2ontemporary >hysics.
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the ,ciences an% the -umanities! &ol. =;. Amster%am
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(1999). 2>oint 9oinci%ences an% >ointer
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IY9 %he '6panding Worlds of Leneral Eelativity. Aase%
upon the Courth /nternational 9onference! Aerlin!
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-owar%! @on an% :orton! Lohn (199;). 2(ut of the
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52
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(19GG). )ie #nalyse der 'mpfindungen und das
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Lena0 Iusta& Cischer. D6n% e%. of *ach 188=.E En"lish
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ensations and the Eelation of the >hysical to the
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9oncei&able *athematical /%eas$0 Einstein an% the
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53
>et+ol%t! Loseph (1895). 2@as Ieset+ %er Ein%euti"keit.3
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Dnowledge. *aria .eichenbach! trans. an% e%. Aerkeley
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54
#6iomati5ation of the %heory of Eelativity. *aria
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%er mo%ernen o"ik.3 Yiertel$ahrsschrift fXr
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Amster%am.
Other #nternet Resources
Einstein >apers >roBect (maintaine% by the 9alifornia
/nstitute of 7echnolo"y)
56
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