EMETERIO CUI, plainti-app!llant, "#. $RELL$NO UNI%ER&IT', (!!n(ant-app!ll!!. G.$.&. &ipin, )*., o* plainti-app!llant. E. %oltai*! Ga*+ia o* (!!n(ant-app!ll!!. CONCE,CION, ).- Appeal by plaintif Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, absolving defendant Arellano University from plaintif's complaint, ith costs against the plaintif, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insu!ciency of proof thereon" In the language of the decision appealed from# $he essential facts of this case are short and undisputed" As established by the agreement of facts E%hibits & and by the respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by the parties, it appears conclusive that plaintif, before the school year '()*+'()( too, up preparatory la course in the defendant University" After -nishing his preparatory la course plaintif enrolled in the College of .a of the defendant from the school year '()*+'()(" /laintif -nished his la studies in the defendant university up to and including the -rst semester of the fourth year" 0uring all the school years in hich plaintif as studying la in defendant la college, Francisco 1" Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintif, as the dean of the College of .a and legal counsel of the defendant university" /laintif enrolled for the last semester of his la studies in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle 0ean Francisco 1" Capistrano having severed his connection ith defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the College of .a of Abad 2antos University, plaintif left the defendant's la college and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year la in the college of la of the Abad 2antos University graduating from the college of la of the latter university" /laintif, during all the time he as studying la in defendant university as aarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees ere returned to him after the ends of semester and hen his scholarship grants ere aarded to him" $he hole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintif to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the -rst semester up to and including the -rst semester of his last year in the college of la or the fourth year, is in total /',344"*5" After graduating in la from Abad 2antos University he applied to ta,e the bar e%amination" $o secure permission to ta,e the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano University" /laintif petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts" $he defendant refused until after he had paid bac, the /',344 *5 hich defendant refunded to him as above stated" As he could not ta,e the bar e%amination ithout those transcripts, plaintif paid to defendant the said sum under protest" $his is the sum hich plaintif see,s to recover from defendant in this case" 6efore defendant aarded to plaintif the scholarship grants as above stated, he as made to sign the folloing contract covenant and agreement# 7In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby aive my right to transfer to another school ithout having refunded to the University 8defendant9 the e:uivalent of my scholarship cash" 82gd"9 Emeterio Cui7" It is admitted that, on August ';, '()(, the 0irector of /rivate 2chools issued Memorandum <o" 4*, series of '()(, on the sub=ect of 72cholarship,7 addressed to 7All heads of private schools, colleges and universities,7 reading# '" 2chool catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, 6ureau sho that some schools ofer full or partial scholarships to deserving students > for e%cellence in scholarship or for leadership in e%tra+curricular activities" 2uch inducements to poor but gifted students should be encouraged" 6ut to stipulate the condition that such scholarships are good only if the students concerned continue in the same school nulli-es the principle of merit in the aard of these scholarships" ?" @hen students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships are merited and earned" $he amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subse:uently charged to the recipient students hen they decide to :uit school or to transfer to another institution" 2cholarships should not be ofered merely to attract and ,eep students in a school" 4" 2everal complaints have actually been received from students ho have en=oyed scholarships, full or partial, to the efect that they could not transfer to other schools since their credentials ould not be released unless they ould pay the fees corresponding to the period of the scholarships" @here the 6ureau believes that the right of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves the right to authoriAe such transfer" that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandumB that plaintif as,ed the 6ureau of /rivate 2chools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript of his record in defendant University, ithout being re:uired to refund the sum of /',344"*5B that the 6ureau of /rivate 2chools upheld the position ta,en by the plaintif and so advised the defendantB and that, this notithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said refund ere made, and even recommended to said 6ureau that it issue a ritten order directing the defendant to release said transcript of record, 7so that the case may be presented to the court for =udicial action"7 As above stated, plaintif as, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, said sum of /',344"*5, in order that he could ta,e the bar e%amination in '(C4" 2ubse:uently, he brought this action for the recovery of said amount, aside from /?,333 as moral damages, /C33 as e%emplary damages, /?,333 as attorney's fees, and /C33 as e%penses of litigation" In its anser, defendant reiterated the stand it too,, vis+a+ vis the 6ureau of /rivate 2chools, namely, that the provisions of its contract ith plaintif are valid and binding and that the memorandum above+referred to is null and void" It, li,eise, set up a counterclaim for /'3,333"33 as damages, and /4,333 as attorney's fees" $he issue in this case is hether the above :uoted provision of the contract beteen plaintif and the defendant, hereby the former aived his right to transfer to another school ithout refunding to the latter the e:uivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not" $he loer court resolved this :uestion in the a!rmative, upon the ground that the aforementioned memorandum of the 0irector of /rivate 2chools is not a laB that the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in natureB and that, although the contractual provision 7may be unethical, yet it as more unethical for plaintif to :uit studying ith the defendant ithout good reasons and simply because he anted to follo the e%ample of his uncle"7 Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementioned memorandum of the 0irector of /rivate 2chools is null and void because said o!cer had no authority to issue it, and because it had been neither approved by the corresponding department head nor published in the o!cial gaAette" @e do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the loer court did, the :uestion hether plaintif had su!cient reasons or not to transfer from defendant University to the Abad 2antos University" $he nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching efects, transcend personal e:uations and demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane" <either do e deem it essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum <o" 4*, for, regardless of the same, e are of the opinion that the stipulation in :uestion is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void" $he aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy" As the 0irector of /rivate 2chools correctly pointed, out in his letter, E%hibit 6, to the defendant, $here is one more point that merits refutation and that is hether or not the contract entered into beteen Cui and Arellano University on 2eptember '3, '(C' as void as against public policy" In the case of Deigel vs" Illinois $rust and 2avings 6an,, ?)C Ill" '*3, '( Ann" Case '?5, the court said# 'In determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the =udicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government o!cers"' It might ta,e more than a government bureau or o!ce to lay don or establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but courts consider the practices of government o!cials as one of the four factors in determining a public policy of the state" It has been consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the la of contracts, courts of =ustice ill not recogniAe or uphold a transaction hich its ob=ect, operation, or tendency is calculated to be pre=udicial to the public elfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty 81itter vs" Mutual .ife Ins" Co", ';( U"2" '4(B Eeding vs" Fallaghere ;) ."1"A" *''B GeaAy vs" Allen, '54 <"H" 4C(9" If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives hich prompted this o!ce to issue Memorandum <o" 4*, s" '()(, it should have not entered into a contract of aiver ith Cui on 2eptember '3, '(C', hich is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the 0irector of /rivate 2chools because the contract as repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty" And -nally, in Fabriel vs" Monte de /iedad, If" FaAette 2upp" 0ec" ;, '()', p" ;5 e read# 'In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must -nd that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent ith sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights" $he policy enunciated in Memorandum <o" 4*, s" '()( is sound policy" 2cholarship are aarded in recognition of merit not to ,eep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige" In the understanding of that university scholarships aard is a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution" $hus conceived it is not only inconsistent ith sound policy but also good morals" 6ut hat is moralsJ Manresa has this de-nition" It is good customsB those generally accepted principles of morality hich have received some ,ind of social and practical con-rmation" $he practice of aarding scholarships to attract students and ,eep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some ,ind of social and practical con-rmation e%cept in some private institutions as in Arellano University" $he University of the /hilippines hich implements 2ection C of Article &IG of the Constitution ith reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not re:uire scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools" 2o also ith the leading colleges and universities of the United 2tates after hich our educational practices or policies are patterned" In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to ,eep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reard merit or help gifted students in hom society has an established interest or a -rst lien" 8Emphasis supplied"9 @EE1EFI1E, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintif the sum of /',344"*5, ith interest thereon at the legal rate from 2eptember ', '(C), date of the institution of this case, as ell as the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim" It is so ordered" 6engAon, C"K", /adilla, .abrador, 1eyes, K"6".", 6arrera, /arades, 0iAon, 0e .eon and <atividad, KK", concur" 6autista Angelo, K", reserves his vote" G.R. No. L-20175 O+to.!* 30, 1967 M$RI$ $. G$RCI$, ET $L., p!tition!*#, "#. RIT$ LEG$R/$, INC., *!#pon(!nt. ,i+a0o an( $1+aoili o* p!tition!*#. G*!1o*io 2a3a*(o o* *!#pon(!nt. /I4ON, ).- Appeal ta,en by the spouses Maria A" Farcia and Marcelino A" $imbang > hereinafter referred to as petitioners > from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA+F"1" <o" ?5'()+1 reversing the one rendered on Kanuary (, '(;3 by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case <o" '(;? entitled 7Maria A" Farcia, et al" vs" 1ita .egarda, Inc"7 $he latter is a corporation organiAed under /hilippine las, and is engaged in the sale and resale of residential lots in Manila and suburbs" @e shall refer to it hereinafter as the respondent" In May ?3, '(C4 the petitioners instituted the civil case mentioned above against the respondent to have certain contracts numbered 4??, 4?), and (;C declared as e%isting and subsistingB to compel the respondent to accept payments tendered by themB and to recover moral and e%emplary damages and attorney's fees in the amounts of /;,333"33 and /',C33"33, respectively" $he three causes of action alleged in their complaint involved the three parcels of land sub=ect matter of the contracts aforesaid" Each had an area of about 'C3 s:uare meters, and formed part of the 1ita .egarda Estate situated in Manila, and subdivided into lots sold on installment basis" 8'9 Contract to 2ell <o" 4?? 8E%hs" A and A+'9 covering .ot )3, 6loc, *+CC, as e%ecuted by the respondent in favor of Emiliano Irellana on March ', '()5" In Kune ?;, '()5, the latter transferred all his rights, and interest thereunder to Encarnacion Gito ho, in turn, on <ovember 4 of the same year, made a similar transfer of rights in favor of 0el-n 6acho" Finally, on May ?(, '()*, 6acho also transferred all his rights and interest to the petitioners" 8?9 In March ', '()5, Contract to 2ell <o" 4?) 8E%h" ?9 covering .ot <o" ?3, 6loc, C+CC as e%ecuted by respondent in favor of Kesusa Feli%" $o months later, Feli%, ith the ritten consent of the respondent, sold her rights and interest to petitioners" 849 Contract to 2ell <o" (;C 8E%h" 49 covering .ot <o" ?5, 6loc, C+CC as e%ecuted by the respondent in favor of Angela AlvareA 2olomon on Kanuary *, '()*" @ith the ritten consent of the former, 2olomon also sold her rights and interest to the petitioners on May '', '()*" In its anser to the complaint, the respondent averred that in relation to the Contracts to 2ell <os" *??, (;C and 4?), petitioners paid on <ovember 5, '(C' the C4rd, )4rd and C4rd installments, respectively, corresponding to the installments for the month of Kuly, '(C'B that the petitioners, as of Kune '', '(C?, had failed to pay the stipulated monthly installments for Contracts <os" 4?? and 4?) corresponding to the period from August, '(C' through Kune, '(C?, and in the case of Contract <o" (;C, from August, '(C' through May, '(C?B that despite several demands for payment of arrears made beteen 0ecember, '(C' and Kune, '(C? by the respondent, the petitioners had failed to pay the amounts dueB and that upon the e%piration of the (3+day grace period on Kune '', '(C? stipulated in the si%th paragraph of the contracts, the respondent had cancelled them" $he anser also prayed for an aard of damages and attorney's fees in the sum of /?,333"33" In April ?3, '(C) the petitioners -led a reply denying that they ere in arrears as to their obligations under the three contracts and, further averred as a!rmative defense that the cancellation thereof as unlaful and arbitrary" After trial the Court rendered =udgment declaring Contracts <os" 4??, 4?) and (;C as e%isting and subsistingB ordering the respondent to accept the payments tendered by the petitioners and to pay attorney's fees in the sum of /',C33"33" but denied the aard of moral and e%emplary damages" From this decision the respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals from hose decision > reversing that of the loer court > the instant appeal as ta,en" /etitioners no urge Us, in turn, to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, claiming that the latter had committed the folloing errors# I" $he Eonorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the respondent 1ita .egarda, Inc" had not aived its rights to cancel its contracts ith the petitioners on the ground that it had previously accepted late payments of the installments due on such contracts" II" $he Eonorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring that par" ( of the contracts in :uestion is not in violation of Art" '43* of the <e Civil Code" III" $he Eonorable Court of Appeals erred in not declaring that the respondent 1ita .egarda, Inc", after having tolerated and accepted previously late payments on the installments due on the contracts, suddenly and ithout suitable arning and giving of further opportunity to pay the same could not and should not have precipitously decided to forfeit, as it actually forfeited, all the payments hich have already been made to it by petitioners" IG" $he Eonorable Court of Appeals erred in reversing and in not a!rming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its entirety" $he second assignment of error is based on petitioners' contention that the :uestioned stipulations of the contracts are in violation of the provisions of Article '43* of the <e Civil Code, hile the -rst and third are based on the claim that the respondent having previously accepted late payments of installments due on the contracts aforesaid, must be deemed to have aived its right to cancel said contracts on the ground of late payment of installments, and that, at any rate, after having tolerated and accepted said late payments, it as arbitrary on its part to cancel the contracts suddenly and ithout suitable arning" $he -fth and last assignment of error is merely a conse:uence of the others" Article '43* of the <e Civil Code reads as follos# $he contract must bind both contracting partiesB its validity or compliance cannot be left to the ill of one of them" $he above legal provision is a virtual reproduction of Article '?C; of the old Civil Code but it as so phrased as to emphasiAe the principle that the contract must bind both parties" $his, of course, is based -rstly, on the principle that obligations arising from contracts have the force of la beteen the contracting parties and secondly, that there must be mutuality beteen the parties based on their essential e:uality to hich is repugnant to have one party bound by the contract leaving the other free therefrom 8* Manresa CC;9" Its ultimate purpose is to render void a contract containing a condition hich ma,es its ful-llment dependent e%clusively upon the uncontrolled ill of one of the contracting parties" /aragraph ; of the contracts in :uestion > hich is the one claimed to be violative of the legal provision above :uoted > reads as follos# 2I&$E > In case the party of the 2ECI<0 /A1$ fails to satisfy any monthly installments, or any other payments herein agreed upon, he is granted a month of grace ithin hich to ma,e the retarded payment, together ith the one corresponding to the said month of graceB it is understood, hoever, that should the month of grace herein granted to the party of the 2ECI<0 /A1$ e%pire, ithout the payments corresponding to both months having been satis-ed, an interest of '3L per annum ill be charged on the amounts he should have paidB it is understood further, that should a period of (3 days elapse, to begin from the e%piration of the month of grace herein mentioned, and the party of the 2ECI<0 /A1$ has not paid all the amounts he should have paid ith the corresponding interest up to that date, the party of the FI12$ /A1$ has the right to declare this contract cancelled and of no efect, and as conse:uence thereof, the party of the FI12$ /A1$ may dispose of the parcel or parcels of land covered by this contract in favor of other persons, as if this contract had never been entered into" In case of such cancellation of this contract, all the amounts paid in accordance ith this agreement together ith all the improvements made on the premises, shall be considered as rents paid for the use and occupation of the above mentioned premises, and as payment for the damages sufered by failure of the party of the 2ECI<0 /A1$ to ful-ll his part of this agreementB and the party of the 2ECI<0 /A1$ hereby renounces all his right to demand or reclaim the return of the same and obliges himself to peacefully vacate the premises and deliver the same to the party of the FI12$ /A1$" $he above stipulation, to our mind, merely gives the vendor 7the right to declare this contract cancelled and of no efect7 upon ful-llment of the conditions therein set forth" It does not leave the validity or compliance of the contract entirely 7to the ill of one of the contracting parties7B the stipulation or agreement simply says that in case of default in the payment of installments by the vendee, he shall have 8'9 7a month of grace7, and that 8?9 should said month of grace e%pire ithout the vendee paying his arrears, he shall have another 7period of (3 days7 to pay 7all the amounts he should have paid7, etc", then the vendor 7has the right to declare this contract cancelled and of no efect"7 @e have heretofore upheld the validity of similar stipulations" In $aylor vs" My $ieng /iao, etc", )4 /hil" *54, *5;+*5* the ruling as that a contract e%pressly giving to one party the right to cancel, the same if a resolutory condition therein agreed upon > similar to the one under consideration > is not ful-lled, is valid, the reason being that hen the contract is thus cancelled, the agreement of the parties is in reality being ful-lled" Indeed, the poer thus granted can not be said to be immoral, much less unlaful, for it could be e%ercised > not arbitrarily > but only upon the other contracting party committing the breach of contract of non+ payment of the installments agreed upon" Ibviously, all that said party had to do to prevent the other from e%ercising the poer to cancel the contract as for him to comply ith his part of the contract" And in this case, after the maturity of any particular installment and its non+payment, the contract gave him not only a month grace but an additional period of (3 days" Eaving arrived at the above conclusions, @e no come to the :uestion of hether or not by having previously accepted payments of overdue installments the respondent had aived its right to declare the contracts cancelled and of no efect" In this connection the record shos that on Kune '', '(C? hen the Contracts to 2ell <os" ?4) and (;C ere cancelled, the vendees ere ten months in arrears and that in the case of contract to 2ell <o" 4?? the vendees had never resumed payment of a single installment from the date hen, upon their petition, said contract as reinstated on 2eptember ?*, '(C?" $he contracts under consideration are not of absolute sale but mere contracts to sell > on installment" $hey give the respondent's 8vendor9 the right to declare the contracts cancelled and of no efect > as in fact it did > upon ful-llment of certain conditions" All said conditions > so the record shos > have been ful-lled" Conse:uently, respondent's 8vendor9 right to cancel the contracts can not be doubted" $hat prior to the cancellation it had in fact accepted payment of installments in arrears as but another act of forbearance on its part to give the petitioners an additional opportunity to ,eep the contracts alive" 1ather than give rise to the presumption that by such act of humanity it aived its right to cancel the contracts, it strengthens its right to do so, considering that even after such act of accommodation bene-cial to the petitioners, the latter subse:uently defaulted again and again in the ful-llment of their obligation" It is, of course, painful for the petitioners to lose not only the right they had ac:uired under the contracts but also hatever amounts they had already paid thereunder, but such conse:uences had been foreseen by the contracting parties" $o avoid them, all that petitioners had to do > as already said heretofore > as to comply ith their part of the bargain" Eaving failed to do so, they really have no valid reason to complain" $hat one contracting party appears to have made a poor bargain is no reason for setting aside the agreement 8FernandeA vs" Manila 1ailroad, ') /hil" ?5), ?*59" @EE1EFI1E, the appealed =udgment being in accordance ith la and the facts of the case, the same is hereby a!rmed" Concepcion, C"K", 1eyes, K"6".", Ma,alintal, 6engAon, K"/", Daldivar, 2ancheA, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, KK", concur" G.R. No. L-27696 &!pt!5.!* 30, 1977 MIGUEL 2LORENTINO, RO&$RIO ENC$RN$CION (! 2LORENTINO, M$NUEL $RCE, )O&E 2LORENTINO, %ICTORINO 2LORENTINO, $NTONIO 2LORENTINO, REME/ION ENC$RN$CION an( &E%ERIN$ ENC$RN$CION, p!tition!*#-app!llant#, "#. &$L%$/OR ENC$RN$CION, &R., &$L%$/OR ENC$RN$CION, )R., an( $NGEL ENC$RN$CION, oppo#ito*# to !n+65.*an+!-p!tition!*#-app!ll!#. )o#! 2. &in1#on an( Mi16!l 2lo*!ntino o* app!llant#. ,!(*o &in1#on o* app!ll!!#.
FUE11E1I, K"# Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos 2ur, acting as a land registration court, in .and 1egistration case <o" <+4'3" In May ??, '(;), the petitioners+appellants Miguel Florentino, 1emedios Encarnacion de Florentino, Manuel Arce, Kose Florentino, Gictorino Florentino, Antonio Florentino, 1emedior, Encarnacion and 2everina Encamacion, and the /etitiners+appellees 2alvador Encamacion, 2r", 2alvador Encamacion, Kr" and Angel Encarnacion -led ith the Court of First Instance of ilocos 2ur an application for the registration under Act )(; of a parcel of agricultural land located at 6arrio .ubong 0ac:uel Cabugao Ilocos 2ur" $he application alleged among other things that the applicants are the common and pro+indiviso oners in fee simple of the said land ith the improvements e%isting thereonB that to the best of their ,noledge and belief, there is no mortgage, lien or encumbrance of any ,ind hatever afecting said land, nor any other person having any estate or interest thereon, legal or e:uitable, remainder, reservation or in e%pectancyB that said applicants had ac:uired the aforesaid land thru and by inheritance from their predecessors in interest, lately from their aunt, 0oNa Encarnacion Florentino ho died in Gigan, Ilocos 2ur in '()', and for hich the said land as ad=udicated to them by virtue of the deed of e%tra=udicial partition dated August ?), '()5B that applicants 2alvador Encarnacion, Kr" and Angel Encarnacion ac:uired their respective shares of the land thru purchase from the original heirs, Kesus, Caridad, .ourdes and 0olores surnamed 2ingson one hand and from Asuncion Florentino on the other" After due notice and publication, the Court set the application for hearing" <o Ipposition hatsoever as -led e%cept that of the 0irector of .ands hich as later ithdran, thereby leaving the option unopposed" $hereupon, an order of general default as ithdran against the hole orld" Upon application of the asets the Cler, If court as commission ill and to have the evidence of the agents and or to submit the for the Court's for resolution" $he crucial point in controversy in this registration case is centered in the stipulation mar,ed E%hibit I+' embodied in the deed of e%tra=udicial partition 8E%hibit I9 dated August ?), '()5 hich states# .os productos de esta parcela de terreno situada en el 6arrio .ubong 0ac:uel Cabugao Ilocos 2ur, se destination para costear los tos de procesio de la $ercera Caida celebration y sermon de 2iete /albras 2eis Estaciones de Cuaresma, procesion del <ino Kesus, tilaracion y conservacion de los mismos, construction le union camarin en conde se depositan los carros mesas y otras cosas :ue seven para lot leiracion de 2iete /alabras y otras cosas mas .o :ue sobra de lihos productos despues de descontados todos los gastos se repartira nosotros los herederos" In his testimony during the trial, applicant Miguel Florentino as,ed the court to include the said stipulation 8E%hibit I+'9 as an encumbrance on the land sought to be registered, and cause the entry of the same on the face of the title that ill -nally be issued" Ipposing its entry on the title as an encumbrance, petitionersappellee 2alvador Encamacion, 2r", 2alvador Encarnaciori, Kr" and Angel Encarriacion -led on Ictober 4, '(;; a manifestation see,ing to ithdra their application on their respective shares of the land sought to be registered" $he ithdraal as opposed by the petitioners+appellants" $he Court after hearing the motion for ithdraal and the opposition thereto issued on <ovember '5, '(;; an order and for the purpose of ascertaining and implifying the issues therein stated that all the applicants admit the truth of the folloingB 8'9 $hat =ust after the death of Encarnacion FIorentino in '()' up to last year and as had alays been the case since time immomorial the products of the land made subiect matter of this land has been used in ansering for the payment for the religious functions speci-ed in the 0eed E%tra=udicial /artition belated August ?), '()5# 8?9 $hat this arrangement about the products ansering for the comment of e%perisence for religions functions as mentioned above as not registered in the o!ce of the 1egister of 0eeds under Act <o 44)), Act )(; or and, other system of registrationB 849 $hat all the herein applicants ,no of the e%istence of his arrangement as speci-ed in the 0eed of E%tra =udicial /artition of A ad=ust ?), '()5B 8)9 $hat the 0eed of E%tra=udicial /artition of August ?), '()+, not signed by Angel Encarnacion or 2alvador Encarnacion, Kr," $he court denied the petitioners+appellee motion to ithdra for lac, of merit, and rendered a decision under date of <ovember ?(, '(;; con-rming the title of the property in favor of the f appoints ith their respective shares as follos# 2pouses Miguel Florentino and 1osario Encarnacion de Florentino, both of legal age, Filipinos, and residents of Gigan, Ilocos 2ur, consisting of an undivided 4'O?(5 and *"?CO?(5 portions, respectivelyB Manuel Arce, of legal age, Filipino, married to 1emedios /ichay and resident of Gigan, Ilocos 2ur, consisting of an undivided ;;O?(5 portionB 2alvador Encarnacion, Kr", of legal age, Filipino, married to Angelita <agar and resident of Gigan, Ilocos 2ur, consisting of an undivided ;;O?(5B Kose Florentino, of legal age, Filipino, married to 2alvacion Florendo and resident of '; 2outh <inth 0iliman, PueAon City, consisting of an undivided 44O?(5 portionB Angel Encarnacion, of legal age, Filipino, single and resident of 'C') Milagros 2t", 2ta" CruA, Manila, consisting of an undivided 44O?(5 portionB Gictorino Florentino, of legal age, Filipino, married to Mercedes ." Encarnacion and resident of Gigan, Ilocos 2ur, consisting of an undivided '5"CO?(5 portionB Antonio Florentino, of legal age, Filipino, single and resident of Gigan, Ilocos 2ur, consisting of an undivided '5"CO?(5B 2alvador Encarnacion, 2r", of legal age, Filipino, married to 0olores 2ingson, consisting of an undivided *"?CO?(5B 1emedios Encarnacion, of legal age, Filipino, single and resident of Gigan, Ilocos 2ur, consisting of an undivided *"?CO?(5 portionB and 2everina Encarnacion, of legal age, Filipino, single and resident of Gigan, Ilocos 2ur, consisting of *"?CO?(5 undivided portion" $he court, after ruling 7that the contention of the proponents of encumbrance is ithout merit bemuse, ta,ing the self+imposed arrangement in favor of the Church as a pure and simple donation, the same is void for the that the donee here has riot accepted the donation 8Art" 5)C, Civil Code9 and for the further that, in the case of 2alvador Encarnacion, Kr" and Angel Encarnacion, they had made no oral or ritten grant at all 8Art" 5)*9 as in fact they are even opposed to it,7 ' held in the /ositive portion, as follos# In vie of all these, therefore, and insofar as the :uestion of encumbrance is concerned, let the religious e%penses as herein speci-ed be made and entered on the undivided shares, interests and participations of all the applicants in this case, e%cept that of 2alvador Encarnacion, 2r", 2alvador Encarnacion, Kr" and Angel Encarnacion" In Kanuary 4, '(;5, petitioners+appellants -led their 1eply to the Ipposition reiterating their previous arguments, and also attac,ing the =unction of the registration court to pass upon the validity or invalidity of the agreement E%hibit I+', alleging that such is speci-ed only in an ordinary action and not proper in a land registration proceeding" $he Motion for 1econsideration and of <e $rial as denied on Kanuary '), '(;5 for lac, of merit, but the court modi-ed its earlier decision of <ovember ?(, '(;;, to it# $his Court believes, and so holds, that the contention of the movants 8proponents of the encumbrance9 is ithout merit because the arrangement, stipulation or grant as embodied in E%hibit I 8Escritura de /articion E%tra=udicial9, by hatever name it may be 8called, hether donation, usufruct or ellemosynary gift, can be revo,ed as in fact the oppositors 2alvador Encarnacion, 2r", ho is the only one of the three oppositors ho is a party to said E%hibit I 8the to others, 2alvador Encarnacion, Kr" and Angel Encarnacion no parties to it9 did revo,e it as shon by acts accompanying his refusal to have the same appear as an encumbrance on the title to be issued" In fact, legally, the same can also be ignored or discararded by ill the three oppositors" $he reasons are# First, if the said stipulation is pour bodies in E%hibit I+' is to be vieed as a stipulation pour autrui the same cannot no be enforced because the Church in hose favor it as made has not communicated its acceptance to the oppositors before the latter revo,ed it" 2ays the ?nd par" of Art" '4'' of the <e Civil Code# 7If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person he may demand its ful-llment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation" A mere incidental bene-t or interest of a person is not su!cient" $he contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person"7 <o evide nee has ever been submitted by the Church to sho its clear acceptance of the grant before its revocation by the oppositor 2alvador Encarnacion, 2r" 8or of the to other oppositors, 2alvador Encarnacion, Kr" and Angel Encarnacion, ho didn't even ma,e any giant, in the -rst place9, and so not even the movants ho have o!ciously ta,en into themselves the right to enforce the grant cannot no maintain any action to compel compliance ith it" 86an, of the /"I" v" Concepcion y Ei=os, Inc", C4 /hil" *3;9" 2econd, the Church in hose favor the stipulation or grant had apparently been made ought to be the proper party to compel the herein three oppositors to abide ith the stipulation" 6ut it has not made any appearance nor registered its opposition to the application even before Ict" '*, '(;C hen an order of general default as issued" $hird, the movants are not, in the contemplation of 2ection ?, 1ule 4 of the 1ules of Court, the real party in interest to raise the present issueB and Fourth, the movants having once alleged in their application for registration that the land is ithout encumbrance 8par" 4 thereof9, cannot no be alloted by the rules of pleading to contradict said allegation of theirs" 8Mc0aniel v" Apacible, )) /hil" ?)*9 2I I10E1E0" ? After Motions for 1econsideration ere denied by the court, the petitioners+ appellants appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 1ule ) ', 1ules of Court, raising the folloing assign of error# I" $he loer court erred in concluding that the stipulation embodied in E%hibit I on religious e%penses is =ust an arrangement stipulation, or grant revocable at the unilateral option of the cooners" II" $he loer court erred in -nding and concluding that the encumbrance or religious e%penses embodied in E%hibit I, the e%tra=udicial partition beteen the co+heirs, is binding only on the appoints Miguel Florentino, 1osario Encarnacion de Florentino, Manuel Arce, Kose Florentino, Antonio Florentino, Gictorino Florentino, 1emedios Encarnacion and 2everina Encarnacion" III" $he loer court as a registration court erred in passing upon the merits of the encumbrance 8E%hibit I+'9 as the sanie as never put to issue and as the :uestion involved is an ad=udication of rights of the parties" @e -nd the -rst and second assignments of error impressed ith merit and, therefore, tenable" $he stipulation embodied in E%hibit I+' on religious e%penses is not revocable at the unilateral option of the co+oners and neither is it binding only on the petitioners+appellants Miguel Florentino, 1osario Encarnacion de Florentino Manuel Arce, Kose Florentino, Gictorino Florentino Antonio Florentino, 1emedios Encarnacion and 2everina E It is also binding on the oppositors+appellees Angel Encarnacion, $he stipulation 8E%hibit )''9 in pan of an e%tra=udicial partition 8E%h" I9 duly agreed and signed by the parties, hence the sanie must bind the contracting parties thereto and its validity or compliance cannot be left to the ith of one of them 8Art" '43*, <"C"C"9" Under Art '4'' of the <e Civil Code, this stipulation ta,es efect beteen the parties, their assign and heirs" $he article provides# Art" '4''" > Contracts ta,e efect only beteen the parties, their assigns and heirs, e%cept in cases here the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of la" $he heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent" If a contract should contain a stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its ful-llment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation" A mere incidental bene-t or interest of a person is not su!cient" $he contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person" $he second paragraph of Article '4'' above+:uoted states the la on stipulations pour autrui" Consent the nature and purpose of the motion 8E%h" I+'9, @e hold that said stipulation is a station pour autrui" A stipulation pour autrui is a stipulation in favor of a third person conferring a clear and deliberate favor upon him, and hich stipulation is merely a part of a contract entered into by the parties, neither of hom acted as agent of the third person, and such third person and demand its ful-llment provo,ed that he communicates his to the obligor before it is revo,ed" 4 $he re:uisites are# 8'9 that the stipulation in favor of a third person should be a part, not the hole, of the contractB 8?9 that the favorable stipulation should not be conditioned or compensated by any ,ind of obligation hateverB and 849 neither of the contracting bears the legal represented or authoriAation of third person" $o constitute a valid stipulation pour autrui it must be the purpose and intent of the stipulating parties to bene-t the third and it is not su!cient that the third person may be incidentally bene-ted by the stipulation" $he fairest test to determine hether the interest of third person in a contract is a stipulation pour autrui or merely an incidental interest, is to rely upon the intention of the parties as disclosed by their contract" In applying this test, it meters not hether the stipulation is in the nature of a gift or hether there is an obligation oing from the promisee to the third person" $hat no such obsorption e%ists may in some degree assist in determining hether the parties intended to bene-t a third person") In the case at bar, the determining point is hether the co+ oners intended to bene-t the Church hen in their e%tra=udicial partition of several parcels of land inherited by them from 0oNa Encarnacion Florendo they agreed that ith respect to the land situated in 6arrio .ubong 0ac:uel Cabugao Ilocos 2ur, the fruits thereof shall serve to defray the religious e%penses speci-ed in E%hibit I+'" $he evidence on record shos that the true intent of the parties is to confer a direct and material bene-t upon the Church" $he fruits of the aforesaid land ere used thenceforth to defray the e%penses of the Church in the preparation and celebration of the Eoly @ee,, an annual Church function" 2u!ce it to say that ere it not for E%hibit I+', the Church ould have necessarily e%pended for this religious occasion, the annual relisgious procession during the Eoly @oc, and also for the repair and preservation of all the statutes, for the celebration of the 2even .ast @ord" @e -nd that the trial court erred in holding that the stipulation, arrangement or grant 8E%hibit I+'9 is revocable at the option of the co+oners" @hile a stipulation in favor of a third person has no binding efect in itself before its acceptance by the party favored, the la does not provide hen the third person must ma,e his acceptance" As a rule, there is no time at such third person has after the time until the stipulation is revo,ed" Eere, @e -nd that the Church accepted the stipulation in its favor before it is sought to be revo,ed by some of the co+oners, namely the petitioners+ appellants herein" It is not disputed that from the time of the ith of 0oNa Encarnacion Florentino in '()', as had alays been the case since time immemorial up to a year before the -ring of their application in May '(;), the Church had been en=oying the bene-ts of the stipulation" $he en=oyment of bene-ts Qoing therefrom for almost seventeen years ithout :uestion from any :uarters can only be construed as an implied acceptance by the Church of the stipulation pour autrui before its revocation" $he acceptance does not have to be in any particular form, even hen the stipulation is for the third person an act of liberality or generosity on the part of the promisor or promise" C It need not be made e%pressly and formally" <oti-cation of acceptance, other than such as is involved in the ma,ing of demand, is unnecessary" ; A trust constituted beteen to contracting parties for the bene-t of a third person is not sub=ect to the rules governing donation of real property" $he bene-ciary of a trust may demand performance of the obligation ithout having formally accepted the bene-t of the this in a public document, upon mere ac:uiescence in the formation of the trust and acceptance under the second paragraph of Art" '?C5 of the Civil Code" 5 Eence, the stipulation 8E%hibit I+'9 cannot no be revo,ed by any of the stipulators at their on option" $his must be so because of Article '?C5, Civil Code and the cardinal rule of contracts that it has the force of la beteen the parties" * $hus, this Court ruled in Farcia v" 1ita .egarda, Inc", ( 7Article '43( is a virtual reproduction of Article '?C; of the Civil Code, so phrased to emphasiAe that the contract must bind both parties, based on the principles 8'9 that obligation arising from contracts have the force of la beteen the contracting partiesB and 8?9 that there must be mutuality beteen the parties based on their principle e:uality, to hich is repugnant to have one party bound by the contract leaving the other free therefrom"7 Conse:uently, 2alvador Encarnacion, 2r" must bear ith E%hibit I+', being a signatory to the 0eed of E%tra=udicial /artition embodying such bene-cial stipualtion" .i,eise, ith regards to 2alvador, Kr" and Angel Encarnacion, they too are bound to the agreement" 6eing subse:uent purchasers, they are privies or successors in interestB it is a%iomatic that contracts are enforceable against the parties and their privies" '3 Furthermore, they are shon to have given their conformity to such agreement hen they ,ept their peace in '(;? and '(;4, having already bought their respective shares of the sub=ect land but did not :uestion the enforcement of the agreement as against them" $hey are also shon to have ,noledge of E%hibit I+' as they had admitted in a 0eed of 1eal Mortgage e%ecuted by them on March *, '(;? involving their shares of the sub=ect land that, 7$his parcel of land is encumbered as evidenced by the document <o" )?3, page (), 6oo, ', series '()5, e%ecuted by the heirs of the late Encarnacion Florentino, on August ?;, '()5, before M" Francisco Ante, <oty /ublic of Gigan, Ilocos 2ur, in its page '3 of the said document of partition, and also by other documents"7 $he annotation of E%hibit I+' on the face of the title to be issued in this case is merely a guarantee of the continued enforcement and ful-llment of the bene-cial stipulation" It is error for the loer court to rule that the petitioners+ appellants are not the real parties in interest, but the Church" $hat one of the parties to a contract pour autrui is entitled to bring an action for its enforcement or to prevent its breach is too clear to need any e%tensive discussion" Upon the other hand, that the contract involved contained a stipulation pour autrui ampli-es this settled rule only in the sense that the third person for hose bene-t the contract as entered into may also demand its ful-llment provo,ed he had communicated his acceptance thereof to the obligor before the stipulation in his favor is revo,ed" '' /etitioners+appellants' third assignment of error is not ell+ ta,en" Firstly, the otherise rigid rule that the =urisdiction of the .and 1egistration Court, being special and limited in character and proceedings thereon summary in nature, does not e%tend to cases involving issues properly litigable in other independent suits or ordinary civil actions, has time and again been rela%ed in special and e%ceptional circumstances" 82ee Fovernment of the /hil" Islands v" 2era-ca, ;' /hil" (4 8'(4)9B Caoibes v" 2ison, '3? /hil" '( 8'(C59B .una v" 2antos, '3? /hil" C** 8'(C59B CruA v" $an, (4 /hil" 4)* 8'(C49B Furba% 2ingh /abla R Co" v" 1eyes, (? /hil" '55 8'(C?9" From these cases, it may be gleaned and gathered that the peculiarity of the e%ceptions is based not only on the fact that .and 1egistration Courts are li,eise the same Courts of First Instance, but also the folloing premises 8'9 Mutual consent of the parties or their ac:uired in submitting the at aforesaid determination by the court in the registrationB 8?9 Full opportunity given to the parties in the presentation of their respective s,ies of the issues and of the evidence in support theretoB 849 Consideration by the court that the evidence already of record is su!cient and ade:uate for rendering a decision upon these issues" '? In the case at bar, the records clearly sho that the second and third premism enumerated abo are fully mt" @ith regards to -rst premise, the petioners+appellants cannot claim that the issues anent E%hibit I+' ere not put in issue because this is contrary to their stand before the loer court here they too, the initial step in praying for the court's determination of the merits of E%hibit I+' as an encumbrance to be annotated on the title to be issued by such court" In the other hand, the petitioners+appellees ho had the right to invo,e the limited =urisdiction of the registration court failed to do so but met the issues head+on" 2econdly, for this very special reason, @e in uphold the actuation of the loer court in determining the conQicting interests of the parties in the registration proceedings before it" $his case has been languishing in our courts for thirteen tong years" $o re:uire that it be remanded to the loer court for another proceeding under its general =urisdiction is not in consonance ith our avoed policy of speedy =ustice" It ould not be amiss to note that if this case be remanded to the loer court, and should appeal again be made, the name issues ill once more be raised before us hence, Iur decision to resolve at once the issues in the instant petition" I< GIE@ IF $EE FI1EFII<F, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos 2ur in .and 1egistration Case <o" <+ 4'3 is a!rmed but modi-ed to allo the annotation of E%hibit I+' as an encumbrance on the face of the title to be -nally issued in favor of all the applications 8herein appellants and herein appellees9 in the registration proceedings belo" <o pronouncement as to cost" 2I I10E1E0" $eehan,ee 8Chairman9, MuNoA /alma, FernandeA, KK", concur" G.R. No. L-25797 )6n! 17, 1972 NICOL$& &$NC8E4, plainti-app!ll!!, "#. &E%ERIN$ RIGO&, (!!n(ant-app!llant. &antia1o 2. 9a6ti#ta o* plainti-app!ll!!. )!#6# G. %illa5a* o* (!!n(ant-app!llant.
CONCE,CION, C.).-p Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of <ueva Eci=a to the Court of Appeals, hich certi-ed the case to Us, upon the ground that it involves a :uestion purely of la" $he record shos that, on April 4, '(;', plaintif <icolas 2ancheA and defendant 2everina 1igos e%ecuted an instrument entitled 7Iption to /urchase,7 hereby Mrs" 1igos 7agreed, promised and committed """ to sell7 to 2ancheA the sum of /',C'3"33, a parcel of land situated in the barrios of Abar and 2ibot, municipality of 2an Kose, province of <ueva Eci=a, and more particularly described in $ransfer Certi-cate of $itle <o" <$+'?C?* of said province, ithin to 8?9 years from said date ith the understanding that said option shall be deemed 7terminated and elapsed,7 if 72ancheA shall fail to e%ercise his right to buy the property7 ithin the stipulated period" Inasmuch as several tenders of payment of the sum of /l,C'3"33, made by 2ancheA ithin said period, ere re=ected by Mrs" 1igos, on March '?, '(;4, the former deposited said amount ith the Court of First Instance of <ueva Eci=a and commenced against the latter the present action, for speci-c performance and damages" After the -ling of defendant's anser > admitting some allegations of the complaint, denying other allegations thereof, and alleging, as special defense, that the contract beteen the parties 7is a unilateral promise to sell, and the same being unsupported by any valuable consideration, by force of the <e Civil Code, is null and void7 > on February '', '(;), both parties, assisted by their respective counsel, =ointly moved for a =udgment on the pleadings" Accordingly, on February ?*, '(;), the loer court rendered =udgment for 2ancheA, ordering Mrs" 1igos to accept the sum =udicially consigned by him and to e%ecute, in his favor, the re:uisite deed of conveyance" Mrs" 1igos as, li,eise, sentenced to pay /?33"33, as attorney's fees, and other costs" Eence, this appeal by Mrs" 1igos" $his case admittedly hinges on the proper application of Article ')5( of our Civil Code, hich provides# A1$" ')5(" A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally demandable" An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price" In his complaint, plaintif alleges that, by virtue of the option under consideration, 7defendant agreed and committed to sell7 and 7the plaintif agreed and committed to buy7 the land described in the option, copy of hich as anne%ed to said pleading as Anne% A thereof and is :uoted on the margin" ' Eence, plaintif maintains that the promise contained in the contract is 7reciprocally demandable,7 pursuant to the -rst paragraph of said Article ')5(" Although defendant had really 7agreed, promised and committed7 herself to sell the land to the plaintif, it is not true that the latter had, in turn, 7agreed and committed himself 7 to buy said property" 2aid Anne% A does not bear out plaintif's allegation to this efect" @hat is more, since Anne% A has been made 7an integral part7 of his complaint, the provisions of said instrument form part 7and parcel7 ? of said pleading" $he option did not impose upon plaintif the obligation to purchase defendant's property" Anne% A is not a 7contract to buy and sell"7 It merely granted plaintif an 7option7 to buy" And both parties so understood it, as indicated by the caption, 7Iption to /urchase,7 given by them to said instrument" Under the provisions thereof, the defendant 7agreed, promised and committed7 herself to sell the land therein described to the plaintif for /',C'3"33, but there is nothing in the contract to indicate that her aforementioned agreement, promise and underta,ing is supported by a consideration 7distinct from the price7 stipulated for the sale of the land" 1elying upon Article '4C) of our Civil Code, the loer court presumed the e%istence of said consideration, and this ould seem to be the main factor that inQuenced its decision in plaintif's favor" It should be noted, hoever, that# 8'9 Article '4C) applies to contracts in general, hereas the second paragraph of Article ')5( refers to 7sales7 in particular, and, more speci-cally, to 7an accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell"7 In other ords, Article ')5( is controlling in the case at bar" 8?9 In order that said unilateral promise may be 7binding upon the promisor, Article ')5( re:uires the concurrence of a condition, namely, that the promise be 7supported by a consideration distinct from the price"7 Accordingly, the promisee can not compel the promisor to comply ith the promise, unless the former establishes the e%istence of said distinct consideration" In other ords, the promisee has the burden of proving such consideration" /laintif herein has not even alleged the e%istence thereof in his complaint" 849 Upon the other hand, defendant e%plicitly averred in her anser, and pleaded as a special defense, the absence of said consideration for her promise to sell and, by =oining in the petition for a =udgment on the pleadings, plaintif has impliedly admitted the truth of said averment in defendant's anser" Indeed as early as March '), '(3*, it had been held, in 6auermann v" Casas, 4 that# Ine ho prays for =udgment on the pleadings ithout ofering proof as to the truth of his on allegations, and ithout giving the opposing party an opportunity to introduce evidence, must be understood to admit the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the opposing party, and to rest his motion for =udgment on those allegations ta,en together ith such of his on as are admitted in the pleadings" 8.a Hebana Company vs" 2evilla, ( /hil" ?'39" 8Emphasis supplied"9 $his vie as reiterated in Evangelista v" 0e la 1osa ) and Mercy's Incorporated v" Eerminia Gerde" C 2:uarely in point is 2outhestern 2ugar R Molasses Co" v" Atlantic Fulf R /aci-c Co", ; from hich @e :uote# $he main contention of appellant is that the option granted to appellee to sell to it barge <o" '3 for the sum of /43,333 under the terms stated above has no legal efect because it is not supported by any consideration and in support thereof it invo,es article ')5( of the ne Civil Code" $he article provides# 7A1$" ')5(" A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally demandable" An accepted unilateral promise to buy or sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promisor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price"7 In the other hand, Appellee contends that, even granting that the 7ofer of option7 is not supported by any consideration, that option became binding on appellant hen the appellee gave notice to it of its acceptance, and that having accepted it ithin the period of option, the ofer can no longer be ithdran and in any event such ithdraal is inefective" In support this contention, appellee invo,es article '4?) of the Civil Code hich provides# 7A1$" '4?)" @hen the oferer has alloed the oferee a certain period to accept, the ofer may be ithdran any time before acceptance by communicating such ithdraal, e%cept hen the option is founded upon consideration as something paid or promised"7 $here is no :uestion that under article ')5( of the ne Civil Code 7an option to sell,7 or 7a promise to buy or to sell,7 as used in said article, to be valid must be 7supported by a consideration distinct from the price"7 $his is clearly inferred from the conte%t of said article that a unilateral promise to buy or to sell, even if accepted, is only binding if supported by consideration" In other ords, 7an accepted unilateral promise can only have a binding efect if supported by a consideration hich means that the option can still be ithdran, even if accepted, if the same is not supported by any consideration" It is not disputed that the option is ithout consideration" It can therefore be ithdran notithstanding the acceptance of it by appellee" It is true that under article '4?) of the ne Civil Code, the general rule regarding ofer and acceptance is that, hen the oferer gives to the oferee a certain period to accept, 7the ofer may be ithdran at any time before acceptance7 e%cept hen the option is founded upon consideration, but this general rule must be interpreted as modi-ed by the provision of article ')5( above referred to, hich applies to 7a promise to buy and sell7 speci-cally" As already stated, this rule re:uires that a promise to sell to be valid must be supported by a consideration distinct from the price" @e are not oblivious of the e%istence of American authorities hich hold that an ofer, once accepted, cannot be ithdran, regardless of hether it is supported or not by a consideration 8'? Am" Kur" C?*9" $hese authorities, e note, uphold the general rule applicable to ofer and acceptance as contained in our ne Civil Code" 6ut e are prevented from applying them in vie of the speci-c provision embodied in article ')5(" @hile under the 7ofer of option7 in :uestion appellant has assumed a clear obligation to sell its barge to appellee and the option has been e%ercised in accordance ith its terms, and there appears to be no valid or =usti-able reason for appellant to ithdra its ofer, this Court cannot adopt a diferent attitude because the la on the matter is clear" Iur imperative duty is to apply it unless modi-ed by Congress" Eoever, this Court itself, in the case of At,ins, Mroll and Co", Inc" v" Cua Eian $e,, * decided later that 2outhestern 2ugar R Molasses Co" v" Atlantic Fulf R /aci-c Co", ( sa no distinction beteen Articles '4?) and ')5( of the Civil Code and applied the former here a unilateral promise to sell similar to the one sued upon here as involved, treating such promise as an option hich, although not binding as a contract in itself for lac, of a separate consideration, nevertheless generated a bilateral contract of purchase and sale upon acceptance" 2pea,ing through Associate Kustice, later Chief Kustice, Cesar 6engAon, this Court said# Furthermore, an option is unilateral# a promise to sell at the price -%ed henever the oferee should decide to e%ercise his option ithin the speci-ed time" After accepting the promise and before he e%ercises his option, the holder of the option is not bound to buy" Ee is free either to buy or not to buy later" In this case, hoever, upon accepting herein petitioner's ofer a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensued, and the respondent ipso facto assumed the obligation of a purchaser" Ee did not =ust get the right subse:uently to buy or not to buy" It as not a mere option thenB it as a bilateral contract of sale" .astly, even supposing that E%h" A granted an option hich is not binding for lac, of consideration, the authorities hold that# 7If the option is given ithout a consideration, it is a mere ofer of a contract of sale, hich is not binding until accepted" If, hoever, acceptance is made before a ithdraal, it constitutes a binding contract of sale, even though the option as not supported by a su!cient consideration" """ " 855 Corpus Kuris 2ecundum, p" ;C?" 2ee also ?5 1uling Case .a 44( and cases cited"9 7It can be ta,en for granted, as contended by the defendant, that the option contract as not valid for lac, of consideration" 6ut it as, at least, an ofer to sell, hich as accepted by letter, and of the acceptance the oferer had ,noledge before said ofer as ithdran" $he concurrence of both acts > the ofer and the acceptance > could at all events have generated a contract, if none there as before 8arts" '?C) and '?;? of the Civil Code9"7 8Dayco vs" 2erra, )) /hil" 44'"9 In other ords, since there may be no valid contract ithout a cause or consideration, the promisor is not bound by his promise and may, accordingly, ithdra it" /ending notice of its ithdraal, his accepted promise parta,es, hoever, of the nature of an ofer to sell hich, if accepted, results in a perfected contract of sale" $his vie has the advantage of avoiding a conQict beteen Articles '4?) > on the general principles on contracts > and ')5( > on sales > of the Civil Code, in line ith the cardinal rule of statutory construction that, in construing diferent provisions of one and the same la or code, such interpretation should be favored as ill reconcile or harmoniAe said provisions and avoid a conQict beteen the same" Indeed, the presumption is that, in the process of drafting the Code, its author has maintained a consistent philosophy or position" Moreover, the decision in 2outhestern 2ugar R Molasses Co" v" Atlantic Fulf R /aci-c Co", '3 holding that Art" '4?) is modi-ed by Art" ')5( of the Civil Code, in efect, considers the latter as an e%ception to the former, and e%ceptions are not favored, unless the intention to the contrary is clear, and it is not so, insofar as said to 8?9 articles are concerned" @hat is more, the reference, in both the second paragraph of Art" ')5( and Art" '4?), to an option or promise supported by or founded upon a consideration, strongly suggests that the to 8?9 provisions intended to enforce or implement the same principle" Upon mature deliberation, the Court is of the considered opinion that it should, as it hereby reiterates the doctrine laid don in the At,ins, Mroll R Co" case, and that, insofar as inconsistent thereith, the vie adhered to in the 2outhestern 2ugar R Molasses Co" case should be deemed abandoned or modi-ed" @EE1EFI1E, the decision appealed from is hereby a!rmed, ith costs against defendant+appellant 2everina 1igos" It is so ordered" 1eyes, K"6".", Ma,alintal, Daldivar, $eehan,ee, 6arredo and Ma,asiar, KK", concur" Castro, K", too, no part"
2eparate Ipinions
A<$I<II, K", concurring# I concur in the opinion of the Chief Kustice" I fully agree ith the abandonment of the vie previously adhered to in 2outhestern 2ugar R Molasses Co" vs" Atlantic Fulf and /aci-c Co", ' hich holds that an option to sell can still be ithdran, even if accepted, if the same is not supported by any consideration, and the rea!rmance of the doctrine in At,ins, Mroll R Co", Inc" vs" Cua Eian $e,, ? holding that 7an option implies """ the legal obligation to ,eep the ofer 8to sell9 open for the time speci-edB7 that it could be ithdran before acceptance, if there as no consideration for the option, but once the 7ofer to sell7 is accepted, a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensues, and the oferee ipso facto assumes the obligations of a purchaser" In other ords, if the option is given ithout a consideration, it is a mere ofer to sell, hich is not binding until accepted" If, hoever, acceptance is made before a ithdraal, it constitutes a binding contract of sale" $he concurrence of both acts > the ofer and the acceptance > could in such event generate a contract" @hile the la permits the oferor to ithdra the ofer at any time before acceptance even before the period has e%pired, some riters hold the vie, that the oferor can not e%ercise this right in an arbitrary or capricious manner" $his is upon the principle that an ofer implies an obligation on the part of the oferor to maintain in such length of time as to permit the oferee to decide hether to accept or not, and therefore cannot arbitrarily revo,e the ofer ithout being liable for damages hich the oferee may sufer" A contrary vie ould remove the stability and security of business transactions" 4 In the present case the trial court found that the 7/laintif 8<icolas 2ancheA9 had ofered the sum of /l,C'3"33 before any ithdraal from the contract has been made by the 0efendant 82everina 1igos9"7 2ince 1igos' ofer sell as accepted by 2ancheA, before she could ithdra her ofer, a bilateral reciprocal contract > to sell and to buy > as generated"
2eparate Ipinions A<$I<II, K", concurring# I concur in the opinion of the Chief Kustice" I fully agree ith the abandonment of the vie previously adhered to in 2outhestern 2ugar R Molasses Co" vs" Atlantic Fulf and /aci-c Co", ' hich holds that an option to sell can still be ithdran, even if accepted, if the same is not supported by any consideration, and the rea!rmance of the doctrine in At,ins, Mroll R Co", Inc" vs" Cua Eian $e,, ? holding that 7an option implies """ the legal obligation to ,eep the ofer 8to sell9 open for the time speci-edB7 that it could be ithdran before acceptance, if there as no consideration for the option, but once the 7ofer to sell7 is accepted, a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensues, and the oferee ipso facto assumes the obligations of a purchaser" In other ords, if the option is given ithout a consideration, it is a mere ofer to sell, hich is not binding until accepted" If, hoever, acceptance is made before a ithdraal, it constitutes a binding contract of sale" $he concurrence of both acts > the ofer and the acceptance > could in such event generate a contract" @hile the la permits the oferor to ithdra the ofer at any time before acceptance even before the period has e%pired, some riters hold the vie, that the oferor can not e%ercise this right in an arbitrary or capricious manner" $his is upon the principle that an ofer implies an obligation on the part of the oferor to maintain in such length of time as to permit the oferee to decide hether to accept or not, and therefore cannot arbitrarily revo,e the ofer ithout being liable for damages hich the oferee may sufer" A contrary vie ould remove the stability and security of business transactions" 4 In the present case the trial court found that the 7/laintif 8<icolas 2ancheA9 had ofered the sum of /l,C'3"33 before any ithdraal from the contract has been made by the 0efendant 82everina 1igos9"7 2ince 1igos' ofer sell as accepted by 2ancheA, before she could ithdra her ofer, a bilateral reciprocal contract > to sell and to buy > as generated" G.R. No. L-16957 $p*il 25, 1962 $RMINIO RI%ER$, in :i# +apa+ity $# $(5ini#t*ato* o t:! Int!#tat! E#tat! o t:! (!+!a#!( R$2$EL LIT$M, plainti-app!ll!!, "#. LIT$M an( COM,$N', INC., GREGORIO /' T$M, ;ILLI$M T$M, LUI& LIT$M, LI 8ONG 8$, an( 8ENR' LIT$M, (!!n(ant#-app!llant#. /! lo# &anto# an( /! lo# &anto# o* plainti-app!ll!!. 9!n3a5in 8. $<6ino, $*t6*o C. Mo3i+a an( $l.!*t C. M!n(o0a o* (!!n(ant#-app!llant#. L$9R$/OR, ).- Arminio 1ivera brought this action in his capacity a administrator of the estate of the deceased 1afael .itam to recover from the defendants some C)O?3) shares of stoc, belonging to the deceased in the .i $am R Co", Inc", or their value, alleging that the said shares have been fraudulently transferred by the defendants, and to render an accounting of the income or dividends that have accrue to said shares of stoc,, ith attorneys' fees and costs" $he material allegations of the complaint are > $hat 8'9 1afael .itam died intestate in Manila on Kanuary ', '(C' and plaintif as appointed administrator of his estateB 8?9 the ife of 1afael .itam, Marcosa 1ivera, -led a claim against his estate for the sum of /?C?,;C*"44 hich the Court of First Instance approvedB 849 believing that the properties of the deceased ere in the possession of .i $im R Co", Inc", the administrator -led a motion in the probate court demanding that the /resident and Manager, Mr .ee Chu, be re:uired to render an account of the income of the C)O?3) shares of the deceased in said company, but said /resident and Manager and Fregorio 0y $am opposed the motion, claiming that the entire assets or properties of the deceased ere transferred on Kanuary ?C, '(C3 to @illiam .itam, .uis .itam, Eenry .itam and .i Eong Eap, and to sho such transfer said defendants furnished photostat copies of the said shares of stoc, and the transfer thereofB 8)9 said transfers are -ctitious, unsupported by any ade:uate or valuable consideration, and fraudulent, and defendants unlafully and fraudulently conspired to bring about the said transfersB said transfers had been made to enrich themselves to the pre=udice of othersB said transfers ere made in fraud of creditorsB 8C9 the value of such shares is at least /433,333B and the probate court, upon motion of administrator, has authoriAed him to -le the suit against the defendants" All the defendants -led a common anser hich their attorneys, 2ycip, 2alaAar, et al", presented" In said anser the defendant corporation alleged that it has no ,noledge or information su!cient to form a belief as to the truth of all the allegations and denied the same" $he other defendants also denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged that the allegations of the complaint are conclusions of laB that the transfers of the shares of stoc, to defendants are null and void" $hey also denied the authority of the plaintif to -le the actionB and as a!rmative defenses they alleged that the shares of stoc, in :uestion ere disposed of by the intestate for good, su!cient and ade:uate consideration ithout intent of committing fraudB that the corporation in hich 1afael .itam had shares of stoc, is no longer e%isting and the present corporation, .i $am R Company, Inc", is formed by diferent incorporationsB that the defendant corporation does not have in its possession any of the properties belonging to the intestate estate of 1afael .itamB and that the complaint states no cause of action against the individual defendants, said defendants not having received any sum from the deceased on Kanuary ?C, '(C3" $he case as set for hearing on April ?, '(C; but the trial had to be postponed because to cases involving the same parties, F"1" <o" .+5;)) and .+5;)C, ere still pending before the 2upreme Court" In March 4', '(C5 attorney for the plaintif informed the court that the said cases had already been decided so he prayed that the case be set for hearing ane in Kune '(C5B this as done but the case as again postponed to August C, '(C5" Garious other postponements too, place until 2eptember ?), '(C5 hen the attorneys for the defendants informed the court that they ere ithdraing from the case but that they had not as yet secured the conformity of their clients to their ithdraal" $he court again postponed the case to <ovember ??, '(C5 notifying the parties of the postponement" @hen the case as called for hearing on <ovember ??, '(C5, all the defendants failed to sho upB so the court authoriAed the cler, of court to hear the evidence for plaintif ithout the presence of the defendants" $he case, hoever, as actually heard, ithout the presence of defendants, only on February ; and '(, '(C(" In Kuly ';, '(C( after the plaintif had submitted his memorandum, the court rendered =udgment, the dispositive part of hich reads as follos# /1EMI2E2 CI<2I0E1E0, this Court -nds the complaint to be substantiated by the evidence on record and =udgment is hereby rendered thus# 8'9 $he transfer on Kune ?C, '(C3 of the certi-cates of stoc, of 1afael .itam to it# <os" G+?, G+4, G+(, G+'3, G+'', G+'?, G+ '4, G+'), all of .i $am R Co", Inc", in favor of the respective transferees is hereby declared null and void and of no legal efect and the estate of 1afael .itam remains the oner or the above mentioned certi-cates of stoc,B 8?9 6ecause of the dissolution of .i $am R Co", Inc" in '(C?, the successor defendant corporation is hereby directed either to cause the issuance in favor of the estate of 1afael .itam of the e:uivalent number of its shares of capital stoc, or should that be not possible for one reason or another, to pay to said estate, =ointly and severally ith the other defendants, the value of said C)O?3) shares of stoc, hich is hereby -%ed at /433,333"B and 849 All the defendants are ordered to pay =ointly and severally the herein plaintif the sum of /;,333"33 as attorney' fees and e%penses of litigation" 8pp" (C+(;, 1"I"A"9 Against the above =udgment the defendants have prosecuted this appeal" 2ome antecedent facts constituting the bac,ground is necessary to an understanding of the evidence on the main issue, namely, the validity of the transfer of the C)O?3 shares of the deceased 1afael .itam to the defendants @illiam, Eenry, and .uis .itam and .i Eong Eap" 1afael .itam as married to Marcosa 1ivera on Kune '3, '(??" Ee died on Kanuary '3, '(C3 hile a resident of Eulong 0uhat, Malabon, 1iAal" Upon his death intestate proceedings ere instituted for the settlement of his estate by Fregorio 0y $am, ho alleged that he and the others namely, @illiam, Eenry, and .uis .itam and .i Eong Eap are his 8of 1afael .itam9 children by a Chinese ife, ith hom he had contracted marriage in China in '(''" In the petition Fregorio 0y $am as proposed as administrator" $he ife of the deceased, Marcosa 1ivera, proposed Arminio 1ivera, a nephe" $his proposal as opposed by the petitioner Fregorio 0y $am on the ground that Marcosa 1ivera had a claim against the intestate" $he loer court approved the appointment of Arminio 1ivera, and the case having come to this Court in F"1" <o" .+;?(5, @e held that the appointment as proper as the administrator ould have the duty of protecting the estate against the pretending heirs" 82ee E%hibit 7E79" 0uring the pendency of the intestate proceedings Marcosa 1ivera, incompetent, -led a claim for a total sum of /?C?,;C*"44 against the intestate" 8E%hibit 7F79 $he claim as approved upon the strength of a deed dated February ?), '(); here the deceased 1afael .itam ac,noledged a ne indebtedness of /'(5,333"33 plus interest of /;?,333 for the previous year 8E%hibit 7F+?79" $he order as appealed to this Court in F"1" <o" .+5*);, but @e dismissed the appeal for the reason that in to cases 8F"1" <os" .+5;))+ )C9 @e had held that hen 1afael .itam as married to Marcosa 1ivera, 1afael as not married to the mother of Fregorio 0y $am and his four brothers and three sisters" 8E%h" 7E79 " In <ovember 'C, '()) Arminio 1ivera, administrator of the intestate, moved the court to re:uire the president and manager of .i $am R Company, Inc", to give an account of the Income derived from the C)O?3) shares of stoc, of the intestate 8E%hibit 7I79" In anser .ee Chu alleged that at the time of his death, 1afael .itam as no longer a stoc,holder, having transferred his shares to various persons 8E%hibit 7K79" Upon the -ling of this anser the probate court authoriAed the -ling of this action against Eenry .itam, .i Eong Eap, .uis .itam and @illiam .itam and others 8E%hibit 7M79" $he photostat copies of the original shares of stoc, 8E%hibits ., .+' to .+59 of 1afael .itam sho the folloing transfers of the stoc,# " ; shares to .uis .itam ; shares to .uis .itam ; shares to .uis .itam ) shares to .uis .itam ? to @illiam .itam ' shares to .i Eong Eap ; shares to @illiam .itam ; shares to @illiam .itam * shares to @illiam .itam ( shares to Eenry .itam 8E%hs" 7., .+', to .+579" In Civil Case <o" ?35' of the Court of First Instance of 1iAal, Fregorio 0y $am, sought to recover certain properties in <avotas, 1iAal, Malabon, 1iAal and in Ibando, 6ulacan, alleging that 1afael .itam as survived by .i Eong Eap, .i Mo, Fregorio 0y $am, Eenry .itam, 6eatriA .ee $am, Elsa .ee $am, @illiam .itam and .uis .itam by a marriage in China in '('' ith 2ia Mhin" $he Court of First Instance dismissed the action and declared the properties to be e%clusive, separate paraphernal properties of Marcosa 1ivera 8E%hibit 7M79" Upon appeal to Us, in F"1" <o" .+5;)), @e a!rmed the decision ith a slight modi-cation" 8E%hibit 7<79" $he evidence for plaintif consists of the testimony of himself and various documents" $he gist of the testimony is as follos# 1afael .itam died on Kanuary '3, '(C', and his ife, on 2eptember '?, '(C5" 0uring his lifetime, 1afael .itam as /resident and Feneral Manager of the .i $am and Company, Inc", and had C)O?3) shares thereinB that upon plaintif's :uali-cation as administrator he inspected the properties of the deceased in the 6icol 1egion and during the inspection he met defendant Eenry .itam at Casiguran, 2orsogon and Eenry told him that the properties ere still intact in diferent places" Ee further testi-ed that he met the defendants several times in '()* in their o!ce at (?* 2an Fernando, 2an <icolas, Manila and he as told that 1afael .itam oned shares in the company valued at /433,333B that hen he ent to collect the debt of 1afael .itam to his aunt, he as told not to orry as they did not claim the shares as their on" $hese facts ere not contradicted is defendants did not appear in person or by attorney on the dates of the trial" $he main basis of the action are to documents, identi-ed at the trial as E%hibits 7I7 and 7/7" $hey are as follos# " MA2U.A$A< 2A /AFMAMAU$A<F " A.AMI< <F .AEA$ <A MAMA6A6A2A <I$I# <a a,ong si 1AFAE. .I$AM, ciudadano chino, may sapat na gulang, may asaa at naninirahan sa Malabon, 1iAal, /ilipinas, ay malaya at ,usang loob na " <AF2A2AH2AH <F 2UMU2U<I0# '" > <a bago magsi,lab ang ,atatapos na digmaan sa /aci-co, a,o may pag,a,autang sa a,ing asaang si MA1CI2A 1IGE1A ng halagang I2A<F 0AA< A$ $A$.I<F/U$ .IMA<F .I6I<F /I2I 8/'4C,333"339, ,ualtang pilipino, na tinanggap ,o ng boong ,asiyahang loob sa nasabi ,ong asaa, at siya ,ong ginamit sa a,ing negocio" Ang nasabing halaga ay salaping sarili ng a,ing asaa, at hanggang sa sandaling ito ay hindi ,o pa nababayaran sa ,anya ,ahi't bahagi nito" ?" > <a noong i,a ) ng Enero ng taong ito, sa hangad ,ong maitayong muli ang a,ing negocio na nasira ng digmaan, ay napangahasan ,ong galain at ,unin sa ,inatataguan ang halaga pang A<IM<A/U'$ 0A.A@A<F .I6I<F /I2I 8/;?,333"339, ,ualtang pilipino, na salapi ding sarili ng a,ing asaang si Marcosa 1ivera, ,aya't sa ngayon a,o ay may pag,a,autang sa ,anya ng halagang I2A<F 0AA< A$ 2IHAM<A/U'$ /I$I<F .I6I<F /I2I 8/'(5,333"339 ,ualtang pilipino, at sa pamamagitan nito ay ipinanganga,o ,ong babayaran sa ,anya, u orden, ang nasabing halaga pati ng pa,inabang na '3L isang taon ng huling halagang /;?,333"33, sa ganitong paraan# " 2a dati ,ong utang na /'4C,333"33 a,o ay maghuhulog ng halagang I2A<F .I6I<F /I2I 8/',333"339 isang buan simula sa buan ng MarAo, '();, hanggang sa buan ng 0isyembre, '()5B at .IMA<F .I6I<F /I2I 8/C,333"339 isang buan simula sa buan ng Enero, '()*, hanggang sa matapusan ang nasabing halagaB " 2a huling halagang /;?,333"33 a,o ay maghuhulog ng /4',333"33 sa buan ng 0isyembre, '();, o bago dumating ang nasabing petsa, at /4',333"33 sa buan ng 0isyembre, '()5 o bago dumating ang nasabing petsa, at ang pa,inabang na '3L isang taon ay nasabing halagang /;?,333"33 ay huhulugan ,o buan+buan por mensualidades vencidos at ang unang hulog ay gagampanan ,o sa buan ng MarAo, '();"'SphT'"NUt 4" > Mung sa,aling hindi ,o matupad ang alin man sa mga condiciones na nasaad sa ,asulatang ito, ang ,abuoan ng a,ing pag,a,autang ay magiging vencido at maaaring singilin lahat ng may haa, ng ,asulatang ito" )" > 6ilang garantia ng a,ing pag,a,autang na ito ay ipinanganga,o ,ong sa loob ng lalong madaling panahon ay gagaa a,o ng isang escritura de hipoteca ng lahat ng a,ing mga propiedades sa 2orsogon favor sa a,ing asaang Marcosa 1ivera" 2A MA$U<AHA< <F .AEA$ <F I$I, a,o ay lumagda sa ibaba nito, dito sa Malabon, 1iAal, /ilipinas, ngayong i,a ?) ng Febrero, '();" 82gd"9 1afael .itam 1AFAE. .I$AM <I.AF0AA< 2A EA1A/ <I# " MACA1II 6" A2I2$II I..EFI6.E" $AFI2 U<I0I2 0E AME1ICA CIMMI<@EA.$E 0E FI.I/I<A29 2" 2" /1IGI<CIA 0E 1IDA. En el Municipio de Malabon, /rovincia de 1iAal, Filipinas, hoy a ?C de Febrero de '();, A" 0" comparecio personalmente anmi el 2r" 1afael .itam, con su certi-cado de residencia <o" A+?;*'*4, e%pedido en Malabon, 1iAal, et ?C de Febrero de '();, de :uien hoy fe :ue conoAco por ser la misma persona :ue otorgo el preinserto documento y :ue rati-co haberlo otorgado libre y espontancamente, el cual se compone de dos paginas, inclusive la :ue contiine esta rati-cacion, la segunda de las cual+es ha sido -rmada en el margen iA:uierdo por el otorgante y sus testigos, y sellada con mi timbre notarial" Anti mi, 82gd"9 I..EFI6.E" <I$A1II /U6.ICI Mi commission e%pira el 4' de 0ic", '(); " Asiento <o" ;B /ag" <o" ?B .ibro IIB 2erie de '();"7 8E%hibit 7I79 " E%hibit 7/7 " Ang ,abu+uan nang ,ualtang natangap ,o na galing sa a,ing asaang si Marcosa 1ivera simula nang a,o ay pumaso, sa Ispital ay .A6I<F 0A.A@A<F .I6I<F /I2I 8/'?,;33"339" 82gd"9 1afael .itam 1AFAE. .I$AM <oviembre ?*, '(C3" Manila" $he court belo found that the transfer of the shares of stoc, to defendants as simulated, -ctitious and ithout considerationB that it as in fraud of creditors and the conduct of the defendants at the time the transfer of the properties of the deceased as being made, renders the alleged sale doubtful" $he peculiar circumstances, such as the fact that defendants claimed to be children of the deceased, and claimed various real properties as belonging to 1afael .itam hen as a matter of fact they ere the e%clusive paraphernal properties of his ife > both of hich facts ere found in the decisions of the 2upreme Court > reveal hy the transfer of the shares as disclosed only in the year '(C), hen as a matter of fact the transfers too, place purportedly at the same time on Kuly ?C, '(C3" $he above -ndings as to the e%istence of fraud, the lac, of consideration, etc", are disputed by the appellants in their -rst assignment of error, it being contended by them that the premises are insu!cient to prove lac, of a consideration, as defendants had no duty to ma,e public the transfer and disclose the consideration therefor, etc" Ansering the above contention, e state that defendants did not prove that they ever paid any price or consideration for the transfer, or that they had the means to pay for the price, or that the deceased had ever received any payment for the transfer, as it as shon that he as so short of funds soon after the date of the supposed transfer that he had to borro the sum of /'?,333"33 from his ife on <ovember ?*, '(C3 8E%hibit 7/79" @hen in '()( and '(C3 plaintif 1ivera sa the defendants @illiam .itam, .uis .itam and Eenry .itam, these defendants admitted that 1afael .itam oned shares in the corporation valued at /433,333 8t"s"n", p" ?49" And even after the death of 1afael .itam, in the year '(C?, hen plaintif ent to the 6icol region to chec, up the properties left by the intestate for the purpose of preparing the inventory thereof, he met Eenry .itam in Casiguran, 2orsogon" Eenry .itam then did not say that the properties did not belong to the deceased 8t"s"n", p" 4?9, hen the supposed endorsement of the shares bears date of Kuly ?C, '(C3" In the year '(C?, before plaintif -led the inventory, he too, up ith .ee Chu the matter of the interest of 1afael .itam in the corporation, .i $am and Company, Inc" .ee Chu, ho as then president, admitted that the deceased 1afael .itam oned C) shares of the entire stoc, 8t"s"n", p" 449" Iur conclusion from all the above facts and from these admissions in '(C? of .ee Chu, then president of .i $am and Company, Inc", and of Eenry .itam, one of the defendants, is that in '(C? the shares ere still oned by 1afael .itam and had not yet been endorsed or transferred on the boo,s of the corporation to the defendants" Iur e%amination of the certi-cates of stoc, shos that the deceased 1afael .itam's signatures to the indorsement ere authentic, but the dates of indorsement and the names are notB so e believe, 1afael must have signed the indorsement not on Kanuary ?C, '(C3 but before, and the shares actually transferred in the boo,s already after '(C?" From these circumstances e conclude that the certi-cates of stoc, must have been delivered, already signed by the deceased, before his death, in secret, to his alleged children, the defendants herein, ho, after 1afael .itam's death in Kanuary '(C', rote their names on the shares as endorsees, in secret also" $heir purpose is evident > so that upon 1afael's death his Filipino ife ould not be able to claim the shares of stoc, as part of 1afael's assets and same 8shares9 ould not be sub=ect to the payment of his debts" $hese debts at the time of his death in '(C3 reached more than /?C3,333" $he fact that the real properties, presumably of the deceased, in the 6icol region ere also in the name of the corporation, not in 1afael's on, must have been part of the scheme to insure that his 8the deceased9 assets ould pass to his children, the defendants, free from the claims of his ife" It appears, therefore, that the deceased 1afael .itam had been getting money from his Filipina ife 8to distinguish her from the Chinese ife by hom he had his children, the defendants bearing his name9, borroing from her big sums hich he put in the company, .i $am and Company, Inc", in shares of stoc, of this corporation, later endorsing the certi-cates evidencing transfer thereof, ithout date, and delivering the shares to his children, also investing the funds of the company, in the purchase of real estate also in the name of the corporation, thus depriving his ife, from hom the money came, of the legal means to get bac, the money loaned" And to complete the fraudulent scheme and in order to ma,e the properties more invulnerable to the claims of 1afael .itam's creditors, the defendants for no apparent reason, dissolved the old corporation and formed the ne .i $am and Company, Inc", on Ictober 4, '(C?, the defendants, children of the deceased being the ne stoc,holders 8see E%hibit 7&79" $he fact that in the ne corporation the respective shares of the incorporators do not e%actly coincide ith the shares each had received from 1afael .itam, according to the endorsements of the original shares, prove that 1afael .itam's children actually divided his assets among themselves, not according to the endorsements of the shares" $he fraudulent character of the transfer of all his shares of stoc, by 1afael .itam is clearly inferable from the folloing circumstances# namely, the transferees are his on childrenB no consideration or price as given or received for the transferB the shares of stoc, ere the only properties of 1afael .itamB there as no apparent need for him to dispose of all of them as the corporation as the only source of business that he hadB and he had an outstanding indebtedness of more than /?C3,333 ith his ife ith hom he had no issue" It has been said that 7the fertility of man's invention in devising ne schemes of fraud is so great that courts have declined to de-ne it, reserving to themselves the liberty to deal ith it under hatever form it may present itself"7 In the case at bar the fraudulent scheme is evidenced by a series of related acts committed one after another, silently, :uietly and surreptitiously" Iur =urisprudence abounds ith cases here fraud had been held to e%ist but e have found none in hich all the circumstances above indicated are present, the circumstances being varied as the men ho schemed the fraud in each case" $he nearest to the case at bar is Ayles vs" 1eyes and 1eyes, '* /hil" ?)4, here the 2upreme Court held that fraud as proved here it as shon that the debtor ent into insolvency and, conniving ith his parents, sold part of his property to them and the sales ere simulated, and only for the purpose of frustrating liabilities contracted" Ine last point needs consideration, and this is the claim made by the defendant corporation that its obligation to transfer the shares of stoc, to the estate could not be inferred from the Articles of Incorporation 8E%hibit 7&79, because the to corporations are distinct and separate, and under the authorities cited by it, even if the ne succeeded the old corporation" $his claim ould have been correct had not the defendant corporation e%pressly ac:uired the assets and properties of the old .i $am and Company, Inc", and assumed its obligations and liabilities in the articles of incorporation" 8E%h" 7&7, /ar" 7d79" $he trial court, therefore, correctly held defendant corporation liable to the estate for the e:uivalent number of shares of stoc,, otherise, said corporation ould be enriching itself at the e%pense of the estate" In vie of the fraud and all the foregoing, the transfer of the shares must be declared null and void and of no efect 8Article ')3(, Civil Code9, and the transferees, as ell as the corporation hich consented to the transfer, must all be held liable for the return of the properties, that the shares represented, or their values 8Article '4C?, Civil Code9" Another ob=ection to the =udgment raised by the appellants is that they should not be re:uired to pay the amount of /433,333 as ell as the attorney's fees" $he =udgment for /433,333 is an alternative relief aforded the plaintif in case the shares of stoc, can not be recovered" Attorney's fees should be aarded because the plaintif has been forced to various litigations in order to enforce the payment of plaintifs claim" Art" '4**" > @hoever ac:uires in bad faith the things alienated in fraud of creditors, shall indemnify the latter for damages sufered by them on account of the alienation, henever, due to any cause, it should be impossible for him to return them"7 8Civil Code of the /hilippines9" Art" ''53" > $hose ho in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those ho in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages" .iability for <on+/erformance" > In general, every debtor ho fails in the performance of his obligations is bound to indemnify for the losses and damages caused thereby" 80e la CruA vs" 2eminary of Manila, '* /hil" 443B Municipality of Moncada v" Ca=uigan, ?' /hil" '*)B 0e la Cavada vs" 0iaA, 45 /hil" (*?B Maluenda v" Enri:ueA, ); /hil" (';B /ampanga 2ugar Mills v" Chong, )( /hil" '334B /ando v" FimeneAB C) /hil" )C(B Acme Films v" $heaters 2upply, ;4 /hil" ;C59" $olentino's $he <e Civil Code Annotated, p" 4')9" $herefore the damages sustained by the plaintif by reason of the fraudulent transfer of the shares of stoc, are the value thereof and the e%penses of litigation, hich plaintif has testi-ed to be /;,333, for these defendants+appellants are liable by reason of the above+:uoted provisions" @e, therefore, -nd ithout merit the second and last assignment of errors of appellants and e, thereby, dismiss the same" As their third assignment of error, it is claimed on behalf of the appellants that defendants @illiam .itam, .uis .itam and .i $am and Company, Inc", did not receive notice of the hearing on February ;, and '(, '(C(B that the reason for their failure to receive said notice is because they had already transferred their places of residenceB that they failed to notify the court of the changes of address because they did not ,no that is re:uired of themB that if alloed to present evidence, they ould substantially prove the allegations in their anser" $he arguments presented by appellants are the same as those contained in their motion for ne trial andOor reconsideration, hich the loer court denied" $he rule in this =urisdiction is that a petition for ne trial is addressed to the discretion of the court and this Court ill not disturb the same on appeal, unless there is grave abuse thereof 8.a I v" 0ee, et al", .+4*(3, Kanuary ?4, '(C?9" @e are only to e%amine the record of the case, to determine if the denial constitutes an abuse of discretion" $here is no :uestion that defendants Eenry .itam, Fregorio 0y $am and .i Eong Eap actually received their copies of the order of the loer court setting the case for hearing on February ; and '(, '(C(" Insofar as they are concerned, therefore, they cannot claim denial of their day in court" Are the other defendants, namely, .uis and @illiam .itam and .i $am and Company, Inc", guilty of e%cusable negligence for their failure to appear during the trialJ $he record discloses that as early as August C, '(C5, defendants' counsel, the la o!ce 2ycip, et al", as already ithdraing from the case and this ithdraal as reiterated in another motion for continuance of the hearing scheduled for 2eptember ?), '(C5" As early as August C, '(C5, therefore, defendants must have ,non that they ould be ithout counsel" $hey should have, therefore, ta,en steps to secure the services of another" Again on <ovember ?', '(C5, defendant .uis .itam agreed to the ithdraal of their counsel, and .uis .itam signed the conformity to said ithdraal in his on behalf and in those of the other defendants" $here is nothing in the record, especially in the a!davit of .uis .itam supporting defendants' motion for ne trial, that the other defendants did not authoriAed him to sign for them" Eaving no layer to assist them in the proceedings, and ,noing that the case as then ready for hearing, defendants should have ta,en the necessary precaution of hiring a ne layer for any subse:uent hearing or hearings" $hose ho had changed their addresses should also have informed the court thereof" $hey failed to do so, and it as only hen they received a copy of the decision that they hired their present counsel" $heir neglect in doing so is certainly ine%cusable" $he defendants admit their places of residence alleged in the complaint in their anser" As no notices of the changes of address as sent by them to the court, naturally notices of hearing and orders of the court had to be sent to their former addresses" @ith respect to defendant corporation, it is alleged in the a!davit of .uis .itam that it had transferred its o!ce to 2orsogon as early as '(C4, but in their anser dated Ictober '3, '(CC, they admit that the o!ce of the defendant corporation is at (?* 2an Fernando, 2an <icolas, Manila, the same place here the notice of hearing as sent" $his admission strengthens the impression that defendants had deliberately refused to accept the notices of hearing" $he record also discloses that the order setting the case for hearing as sent to defendants .uis and @illiam .itam and .i $am and Company, Inc", ho failed to get said order inspite of the to notices sent to them" Inasmuch as defendants failed to get their registered letters service upon them of said order as deemed completed, -ve days from the date of the -rst notice, in accordance ith the provisions of 2ec" *, 1ule ?5 of the 1ules" Conse:uently, defendants can not no claim that they have not been given their day in court" Furthermore, the petition for ne trial could not be granted because there is no shoing that defendants have valid defenses to the complaint" $he a!davit of .uis .itam supporting defendants' motion for reconsideration and ne trial do not sho any such valid defense" Conse:uently, the trial court correctly denied defendants' motion for ne trial andOor reconsideration" FI1 A.. $EE FI1EFII<F CI<2I0E1A$II<2 the =udgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, a!rmed" @ith costs" 2o ordered" 6engAon, C"K", 6autista Angelo, Concepcion, 1eyes, K"6".", /aredes and 0iAon, KK", concur" G.R. No. L-217=9 an( L-2162= May 19, 1966 MIGUEL M$,$LO, ET $L., p!tition!*#, "#. M$>IMO M$,$LO, ET $L., *!#pon(!nt#. ,!(*o ,. T6a#on o* p!tition!*#. ,*i5i+ia# an( /!l Ca#tillo o* *!#pon(!nt#. 9ENG4ON, ).,., ).- $he spouses Miguel Mapalo and Candida Puiba, simple illiterate farmers, ere registered oners, ith $orrens title certi-cate I"C"$" <o" );C34, of a ',;4C+s:uare+meter residential land in Manaoag, /angasinan" 2aid spouses+ oners, out of love and afection for Ma%imo Mapalo > a brother of Miguel ho as about to get married > decided to donate the eastern half of the land to him" I"C"$" <o" );C34 as delivered" As a result, hoever, they ere deceived into signing, on Ictober 'C, '(4;, a deed of absolute sale over the entire land in his favor" $heir signatures thereto ere procured by fraud, that is, they ere made to believe by Ma%imo Mapalo and by the attorney ho acted as notary public ho 7translated7 the document, that the same as a deed of donation in Ma%imo's favor covering one+half 8the eastern half9 of their land" Although the document of sale stated a consideration of Five Eundred 8/C33"339 /esos, the aforesaid spouses did not receive anything of value for the land" $he attorney's misbehaviour as the sub=ect of an investigation but its result does not appear on record" Eoever e too, note of the fact that during the hearing of these cases said notary public as present but did not ta,e the itness stand to rebut the plaintifs' testimony supporting the allegation of fraud in the preparation of the document" Folloing the e%ecution of the afore+stated document, the spouses Miguel Mapalo and Candida Puiba immediately built a fence of permanent structure in the middle of their land segregating the eastern portion from its estern portion" 2aid fence still e%ists" $he spouses have alays been in continued possession over the estern half of the land up to the present" <ot ,non to them, meanhile, Ma%imo Mapalo, on March 'C, '(4*, registered the deed of sale in his favor and obtained in his name $ransfer Certi-cate of $itle <o" '?*?( over the entire land" $hirteen years later on Ictober ?3, '(C', he sold for /?,C33"33 said entire land in favor of Evaristo, /etronila /aci-co and Miguel all surnamed <arciso" $he sale to the <arcisos as in turn registered on <ovember C, '(C' and $ransfer Certi-cate of $itle <o" ''4C3 as issued for the hole land in their names" $he <arcisos too, possession only of the eastern portion of the land in '(C', after the sale in their favor as made" In February 5, '(C? they -led suit in the Court of First Instance of /angasinan 8Civil Case <o" ''('9 to be declared oners of the entire land, for possession of its estern portionB for damagesB and for rentals" It as brought against the Mapalo spouses as ell as against Floro Fuieb and 1osalia Mapalo Fuieb ho had a house on the estern part of the land ith the consent of the spouses Mapalo and Puiba" $he Mapalo spouses -led their anser ith a counterclaim on March '5, '(;C, see,ing cancellation of the $ransfer Certi-cate of $itle of the <arcisos as to the estern half of the land, on the grounds that their 8Mapalo spouses9 signatures to the deed of sale of '(4; as procured by fraud and that the <arcisos ere buyers in bad faith" $hey as,ed for reconveyance to them of the estern portion of the land and issuance of a $ransfer Certi-cate of $itle in their names as to said portion" In addition, the Mapalo spouses -led on 0ecember ';, '(C5 their on complaint in the Court of First Instance of /angasinan 8Civil Case <o" U+'449 against the aforestated <arcisos and Ma%imo Mapalo" $hey as,ed that the deeds of sale of '(4; and of '(C' over the land in :uestion be declared null and void as to the estern half of said land" Kudge Amado 2antiago of the Court of First Instance of /angasinan located in the municipality of Urdaneta tried the to cases =ointly" 2aid court rendered =udgment on Kanuary '*, '(;', as follos# @EE1EFI1E, =udgment is hereby rendered as follos, to it# 8a9 dismissing the complaint in Civil Case <o" ''(('B 8b9 declaring E%hibit A, plaintifs in Case <o" ''((' and E%hibit ', defendants in Case <o" U+'44 as a donation only over the eastern half portion of the above+described land, and as null and void ith respect to the estern half portion thereofB 8c9 declaring as null and void and ithout legal force and efect $ransfer Certi-cate of $itle <o" '?*?( issued in favor of Ma%imo Mapalo as regards the estern half portion of the land covered thereinB 8d9 declaring as null and void $ransfer Certi-cate of $itle <o" ''4C3 in the names of the <arcisos insofar as the estern half portion of the land covered therein is concernedB 8e9 ordering the spouses Mapalo and Puiba and the <arcisos to have the above+described land be subdivided by a competent land surveyor and that the e%penses incident thereto be borne out by said parties pro rataB 8f9 ordering the 1egister of 0eeds of /angasinan to issue in lieu of $ransfer Certi-cate of $itle <o" ''4C3 to ne titles upon completion of the subdivision plan, one in favor of the spouses Miguel Mapalo and Candida Puiba covering the estern half portion and another for the <arcisos covering the eastern half portion of the said land, upon payment of the legal feesB meanhile the right of the spouses Mapalo and Puiba is hereby ordered to be annotated on the bac, of $ransfer Certi-cate of $itle <o" ''4C3B and 8g9 sentencing Ma%imo Mapalo and the <arcisos to pay the costs" I$ I2 2I I10E1E0" $he <arcisos appealed to the Court of Appeals" In its decision on May ?*, '(;4, the Court of Appeals reversed the =udgment of the Court of First Instance, solely on the ground that the consent of the Mapalo spouses to the deed of sale of '(4; having been obtained by fraud, the same as voidable, not void ab initio, and, therefore, the action to annul the same, ithin four years from notice of the fraud, had long prescribed" It rec,oned said notice of the fraud from the date of registration of the sale on March 'C, '(4*" $he Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals are therefore unanimous that the spouses Mapalo and Puiba ere de-nitely the victims of fraud" It as only on prescription that they lost in the Court of Appeals" From said decision of the Court of Appeals, the Mapalo spouses appealed to this Court" And here appellants press the contention that the document dated Ictober 'C, '(4;, purporting to sell the entire land in favor of Ma%imo Mapalo, is void, not merely voidable, as to the estern portion of the land for being absolutely simulated or -ctitious" 2tarting ith fundamentals, under the Civil Code, either the old or the ne, for a contract to e%ist at all, three essential re:uisites must concur# 8'9 consent, 8?9 ob=ect, and 849 cause or consideration"' $he Court of Appeals is right in that the element of consent is present as to the deed of sale of Ictober 'C, '(4;" For consent as admittedly given, albeit obtained by fraud" Accordingly, said consent, although defective, did e%ist" In such case, the defect in the consent ould provide a ground for annulment of a voidable contract, not a reason for nullity ab initio" $he parties are agreed that the second element of ob=ect is li,eise present in the deed of Ictober 'C, '(4;, namely, the parcel of land sub=ect matter of the same" <ot so, hoever, as to the third element of cause or consideration" And on this point the decision of the Court of Appeals is silent" As regards the eastern portion of the land, the Mapalo spouses are not claiming the same, it being their stand that they have donated and freely given said half of their land to Ma%imo Mapalo" And since they did not appeal from the decision of the trial court -nding that there as a valid and efective donation of the eastern portion of their land in favor of Ma%imo Mapalo, the same pronouncement has become -nal as to them, rendering it no longer proper herein to e%amine the e%istence, validity e!cacy of said donation as to said eastern portion"'SphT'"NUt <o, as to the estern portion, hoever, the fact not disputed herein is that no donation by the Mapalo spouses obtained as to said portion" Accordingly, e start ith the fact that liberality as a cause or consideration does not e%ist as regards the estern portion of the land in relation to the deed of '(4;B that there as no donation ith respect to the same" It is reduced, then, to the :uestion hether there as an onerous conveyance of onership, that is, a sale, by virtue of said deed of Ictober 'C, '(4;, ith respect to said estern portion" 2peci-cally, as there a cause or consideration to support the e%istence of a contrary of saleJ $he rule under the Civil Code, again be it the old or the ne, is that contracts ithout a cause or consideration produce no efect hatsoever"? <onetheless, under the Ild Civil Code, the statement of a false consideration renders the contract voidable, unless it is proven that it is supported by another real and licit consideration"4 And it is further provided by the Ild Civil Code that the action for annulment of a contract on the ground of falsity of consideration shall last four years, the term to run from the date of the consummation of the contract") Accordingly, since the deed of sale of '(4; is governed by the Ild Civil Code, it should be as,ed hether its case is one herein there is no consideration, or one ith a statement of a false consideration" If the former, it is void and ine%istentB if the latter, only voidable, under the Ild Civil Code" As observed earlier, the deed of sale of '(4; stated that it had for its consideration Five Eundred 8/C33"339 /esos" In fact, hoever, said consideration as totally absent" $he problem, therefore, is hether a deed hich states a consideration that in fact did not e%ist, is a contract ithout consideration, and therefore void ab initio, or a contract ith a false consideration, and therefore, at least under the Ild Civil Code, voidable" According to Manresa, hat is meant by a contract that states a false consideration is one that has in fact a real consideration but the same is not the one stated in the document" $hus he says# En primer lugar, nor interesa recordar la diferencia entre simulacion y el contrato con proposito fraudulento" Este aun:ue ilicito es realB mas el primero es falso en realidad, aun:ue se le presente como verdadero" 8Manresa, Codigo Civil, $omo GIII, Gol" II, p" 4C)"9 And citing a decision of the 2upreme Court of 2pain on the matter, Manresa further clari-es the diference of false cause and no cause, thus# Insiste en el distingo con mas detenida descripcion la sentencia de ?C de mayo de '()), en la :ue se argumenta# 2i bien es elemento fundamental de todo negocio, la declaracion de voluntad substracto de una voluntad efectiva, y la e%istencia de una causa :ue lecon-era signi-cado =uridico seNalando la -nalidad :ue con este se persigue, no ha de deducirse de esta doctrina, fundamentalmente recogida en el articulo '"?;' y concordantes del Codigo civil, :ue cual:uier falta de adecuacion entre cual:uier incongruencia entre la causa e%presada y la verdadera, y, en general, entre la estructuracion y la -nalidad economicaB hayan de producir la ine-cacia del negocio, pues por el contrario, puede este ser valido y producir sus efectos tanto en el caso de la mera disonancia entre el medio =uridico adoptado y el -n practico perseguido, por utiliAacion de una via oblicua o combinacion de formas =uridicas entrelaAadas :ue permita la obtencion de un resultado no previsto en los cuadros de la ley > negocios indirectos y negocios -duciarlos, validos cuando no envuelven fraude de ley, como en el caso de la verdadera disconformidad entre la apariencia del acto y su real contenido, preparada deliberadamente por las partes > negocio simulado > , ya :ue, cuando esta divergencia implica no una ausencia total de voluntad y de acto real, sino mera ocultacion de un negocio verdadero ba=o la falsa apariencia de un negocio -ngido 7sirulacion relativa7, la ine-cacia de la forma e%terna simulada, no es obstaculo para la posible valideA del negocio disimulado :ue contiene, en tanto este ultimo sea licito y reuna no solo los re:uisitos generales, sino tambien los :ue corresponden a su naturaleAa especial, doctrina, en obligada aplicacion de los preceptos de nuestra .ey civil, especialmente en su art" '"?5;, :ue, al establecer el principio de nulidad de los contratos en los :ue se hace e%presion de una causa falsa, de=a a salvo el caso de :ue esten fundados en otra verdadera y licita" 8Manresa, Codigo Civil, $omo GIII, Gol" II pp" 4C5+4C*9 2ancheA 1oman says# Ha hemos dicho :ue la intervencion de causa en los contratos es necesaria, y :ue sin ellos son nulosB solo se concibe :ue un hombre perturbado en su raAon pueda contratar sin causa" """ /or la misma raAon de la necesidad de la intervencion de causa en el contrato, es preciso :ue esta sea verdadera y no supuesta, aparente o -gurada" Pue la falsedad de la causa vicia el consentimiento y anula el contrato, es, no solo doctrina indudable de 0erecho Cienti-co sino tambien de antiguo 0erecho de Castilla, :ue en multitud de leyes asi lo declararon" 82ancheA 1oman, 0erecho Civil, $omo IG, p" ?3;"9" In a clearer e%position of the above distinction, Castan states# ?"V" .a causa ha de ser verdadera" .a causa falsa puede ser erronea o simulada" Es erronea como dice Fiorgi, la causa :ue tiene por base la credulidad en un hecho no e%istenteB y simulada la :ue tiene lugar cuando se hace aparecer arti-ciosamente una distinta de la verdadera" .a erronea produce siempre la ine%istencia del contratoB la simulada no siempre produce este efecto, por:ue puede suceder :ue la causa oculta, pero verdadera, baste para sostener el contrato" 0e acuerdo con esta doctrina, dice el art" '"?5; de nuestro Codigo :ue 7la e%presion de una causa falsa en los contratos dara lugar a la nulidad, si no se probase :ue estaban fundados en otra verdadera y licita7" 8Castan 0erecho Civil EspaNol, $omo II, pp" ;'*+;'(9 From the foregoing it can be seen that here, as in this case, there as in fact no consideration, the statement of one in the deed ill not su!ce to bring it under the rule of Article '?5; of the Ild Civil Code as stating a false consideration" 1eturning to Manresa# Figurando en nuestro 0erecho positivo la causa, como un elemento esential del contrato, es consecuencia ineludible, se reputar simulada la entrega del precio en la compraventa de autos, el :ue haya :ue declararla nula por ine%istente haciendose aplicacion indebida de art" '"?5; por el $ribunal sentenciador al cohonestar la falta de precio admitiendo se pueda tratar de una donacion, ya :ue la recta aplicacion del citado precepto e%ige :ue los negocios simulados, o sea con causa falsa, se =usti-:ue la verdadera y licita en :ue se funda el acto :ue las partes han :uerido ocultar y el cumplimiento de las formalidades impuestas por la .ey y, cual dice la sentencia de 4 de marAo de '(4?, esta rigurosa doctrina ha de ser especialmente impuesta en la donaciones puras y simplesB de los :ue deduce :ue la sentencia recurrida al no decretar la nulidad instada por falta de causa, incide en la infraccion de los articulos '"?;', '"?5), '"?5C y '"?5; del Codigo Civil" 82entencia de ?? de febrero de '()39" 8Manresa, Codigo Civil, $omo GIII, Gol" II, p" 4C;9 In our vie, therefore, the ruling of this Court in Ice=o, /ereA R Co" vs" Flores, )3 /hil" (?', is s:uarely applicable herein" In that case e ruled that a contract of purchase and sale is null and void and produces no efect hatsoever here the same is ithout cause or consideration in that the purchase price hich appears thereon as paid has in fact never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor" <eedless to add, the ine%istence of a contract is permanent and incurable and cannot be the sub=ect of prescription" In the ords of Castan# 7.a ine%istencia es perpetua e insubsanable no pudiendo ser ob=ecto de con-rmacion ni prescripcion 8Ip" cit", p" ;))"9 In Eugenio v" /erdido, (5 /hil" )', )?+)4, involving a sale dated '(4?, this Court, spea,ing through Kustice Cesar 6engAon, no Chief Kustice, stated# Under the e%isting classi-cation, such contract ould be 7ine%isting7 and 7the action or defense for declaration7 of such ine%istence 7does not prescribe7" 8Art" ')'3, <e Civil Code9" @hile it is true that this is a ne provision of the <e Civil Code, it is nevertheless a principle recogniAed since $ipton vs" Gelasco, ; /hil" ;5 that 7mere lapse of time cannot give e!cacy to contracts that are null and void7" Anent the matter of hether the <arcisos ere purchasers in good faith, the trial court in its decision resolved this issue, thus# @ith regard to the second issue, the <arcisos contend that they are the oners of the above+described property by virtue of the deed of sale 8E%h" 6, plaintifs in ''((' and E%h" ?, defendants in U+'449 e%ecuted in their favor by Ma%imo Mapalo, and further claim that they are purchasers for value and in good faith" $his court, hoever, cannot also give eight and credit on this theory of the <arcisos on the folloing reasons# Firstly, it has been positively shon by the undisputed testimony of Candida Puiba that /aci-co <arciso and Evaristo <arciso stayed for some days on the estern side 8the portion in :uestion9 of the above+ described land until their house as removed in '()3 by the spouses Mapalo and PuibaB secondly, /aci-ca <arciso admitted in his testimony in chief that hen they bought the property, Miguel Mapalo as still in the premises in :uestion 8estern part9 hich he is occupying and his house is still standing thereonB and thirdly, said /aci-co <arciso hen presented as a rebuttal and sub+rebuttal itness categorically declared that before buying the land in :uestion he ent to the house of Miguel Mapalo and Candida Puiba and as,ed them if they ill permit their elder brother Ma%imo to sell the property" Aside from the fact that all the parties in these cases are neighbors, e%cept Ma%imo Mapalo the foregoing facts are e%plicit enough and su!ciently reveal that the <arcisos ere aare of the nature and e%tent of the interest of Ma%imo Mapalo their vendor, over the above+described land before and at the time the deed of sale in their favor as e%ecuted" Upon the aforestated declaration of /aci-co <arciso the folloing :uestion arises# @hat as the necessity, purpose and reason of /aci-co <arciso in still going to the spouses Mapalo and as,ed them to permit their brother Ma%imo to dispose of the above+described landJ $o this :uestion it is safe to state that this act of /aci-co <arciso is a conclusive manifestation that they 8the <arcisos9 did not only have prior ,noledge of the onership of said spouses over the estern half portion in :uestion but that they also have recogniAed said onership" It also conclusively shos their prior ,noledge of the ant of dominion on the part of their vendor Ma%imo Mapalo over the hole land and also of the Qa of his title thereto" Under this situation, the <arcisos may be considered purchasers in value but certainly not as purchasers in good faith" """ 8pp" (5+(*, 1ecord on Appeal"9 And said -nding > hich is one of fact > is found by us not a bit disturbed by the Court of Appeals" 2aid the Court of Appeals# In vie of the conclusion thus reached, it becomes unnecessary to pass on the other errors assigned" 2u!ce it to say that, on the merits the appealed decision could have been upheld under Article '44? of the ne Civil Code and the folloing authorities# Ayola vs" Galderrama .umber Manufacturers Co", Inc", )( I"F" (*3, (*?B $rasporte vs" 6eltran, C' I"F" ')4), ')4CB CorteA vs" CorteA, CA+F"1" <o" '*)C'+1, August *, '(;'B Castillo vs" .aberinto, CA+F"1" <o" '*''*+1, 0ecember ?3, '(;'B and '4 C"K" 45?+454, as ell as the several facts and circumstances appreciated by the trial court as supporting appellees' case" thereby in efect sustaining > barring only its ruling on prescription > the =udgment and -ndings of the trial court, including that of bad faith on the part of the <arcisos in purchasing the land in :uestion" @e therefore see no need to further remand this case to the Court of Appeals for a ruling on this point, as appellees re:uest in their brief in the event e hold the contract of '(4; to be ine%istent as regards the estern portion of the land" In vie of defendants' bad faith under the circumstances e deem it =ust and e:uitable to aard, in plaintifs' favor, attorneys' fees on appeal, in the amount of /',333"33 as prayed for in the counterclaim" @herefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and set aside, and another one is hereby rendered a!rming in toto the =udgment of the Court of First Instance a :uo, ith attorney's fees on appeal in favor of appellants in the amount of /',333"33, plus the costs, both against the private appellees" 2o ordered" 6engAon, C"K", 6autista Angelo, Concepcion, 1eyes, K"6".", 6arrera, 0iAon, 1egala, Ma,alintal, Daldivar and 2ancheA, KK", concur" [G.R. No. L-23213. October 28, 1977.] WESTERN MINDANAO LM!ER "O., IN"., Plaintiff-Appellant, #. NATI$IDAD M. MEDALLE %&' ANTONIO MEDALLE, Defendants-Appellees. (%)%&'o&* + (%,*r -or Appellant. .er&%&'e/ L%0 O--*ce -or Appellee. D E " I S I O N "ON"E1"ION, (R., J.2 $pp!al *o5 t:! o*(!* o t:! Co6*t o 2i*#t In#tan+! o 4a5.oan1a City (i#5i##in1 t:! +o5plaint 6pon t:! 1*o6n( t:at t:! +lai5 on ?:i+: it i# o6n(!( i# 6n!no*+!a.l! 6n(!* t:! &tat6t! o 2*a6( an( #p!+ial la?. T:! +o5plaint, il!( on /!+!5.!* 16, 1960, all!1!# t:at-31+-+:an*o.l!#.+o5.p: @2. A T:! ,lainti i# !n1a1!( in lo11in1 op!*ation# in C6*6an, 4a5.oan1a City an( in +onn!+tion ?it: t:! #ai( lo11in1 op!*ation it o.tain!( on &!pt!5.!* =, 1955 a *i1:t-o-?ay t:*o61: t:! #ai( Lot 2136 o t:! Ca(a#t*al &6*"!y o 4a5.oan1a *o5 M*. L6+iano 8!*nan(!0, t:!n t:! *!1i#t!*!( o?n!*, a +opy o t:! a1*!!5!nt .!in1 !n+lo#!( a# $nn!B C$DE @3. A T:! o*5!* o?n!*# o t:! lo11in1 +on+!##ion op!*at!( .y t:! ,lainti +on#t*6+t!( an( 5aintain!( t:! #ai( *oa( t:*o61: Lot 2136, .6t t:! ,lainti i5p*o"!( t:! #ai( *oa(, payin1 to t:! *!1i#t!*!( o?n!* o* all t:! i5p*o"!5!nt# (a5a1!( .y t:! i5p*o"!5!nt o t:! *oa(E @7. A Lon1 .!o*! t:! !B!+6tion o t:! *i1:t-o-?ay a1*!!5!nt on &!pt!5.!* =, 1955, #in+! t:!n an( 6p to t:! p*!#!nt ti5! t:! #ai( *oa( :a# .!!n 5aintain!( an( 6#!( not only .y t:! p*!(!+!##o* o t:! ,lainti an( t:! ,lainti, .6t al#o .y t:! p6.li+E @5. A T:! #ai( Lot 2136 ?a# p6*+:a#!( .y t:! (!!n(ant# in 195= an( t:! #ai( *oa( t:!n !Bi#t!( an( ?a# in p6.li+ 6#! an( t:! (!!n(ant# (i( not oppo#! .6t in#t!a( allo?!( t:! +ontin6!( 6#! an( 5aint!nan+! o t:! *oa( .y t:! ,lainti an( t:! p6.li+E @6. A T:! #ai( *oa( i# in(i#p!n#a.l! to t:! .6#in!## op!*ation# o t:! ,lainti, .!+a6#! it i# t:! only a++!## *o5 t:!i* +on+!##ion to t:! :i1:?ayE @7. A T:at (!!n(ant# :a"! no? #!nt to t:! ,lainti a noti+! F$nn!B C9DG o t:!i* int!ntion to +lo#! t:! *oa(E an( @=. A T:! ,lainti :a# t:! *i1:t to t:! +ontin6!( 6#! o #ai( *oa(, t:! +lo#in1 o ?:i+: ?ill +a6#! in36#ti+! an( i**!pa*a.l! (a5a1!# to t:! ,lainti an( t:! ,lainti i# ?illin1 to po#t a .on( o* t:! i##6an+! o a ?*it o p*!li5ina*y in36n+tion to #top t:! (!!n(ant# *o5 +lo#in1 t:! *oa(.@+*ala? "i*t6a1a? li.*a*y x x x ;:!*!o*!, t:! plainti p*ay!( t:at a ?*it o p*!li5ina*y in36n+tion .! i##6!( *!#t*ainin1 t:! (!!n(ant# *o5 +lo#in1 t:! #ai( *oa(, an( at!* :!a*in1, 5aH! t:! in36n+tion p!*5an!nt. It al#o p*ay!( t:at t:! (!!n(ant# .! (i*!+t!( to *!+o1ni0! an( *!#p!+t t:! #ai( *oa( *i1:t- o-?ay a1*!!5!nt. 1 Copi!# o t:! *oa( *i1:t-o-?ay a1*!!5!nt an( t:! l!tt!* o t:! (!!n(ant# a("i#in1 t:! plainti o t:! +lo#6*! o t:! *oa( ?!*! atta+:!( t:!*!to. 2 Upon t:! ilin1 o a .on( in t:! a5o6nt o ,1,000.00, a ?*it o p*!li5ina*y in36n+tion ?a# i##6!(, *!#t*ainin1 t:! (!!n(ant# *o5 +lo#in1 t:! *oa(. 3 In#t!a( o a *!#pon#i"! pl!a(in1, t:! (!!n(ant# il!( a 5otion to (i#5i## t:! +o5plaint on )an6a*y 7, 1961, 6pon t:! 1*o6n( t:at t:! +lai5 on ?:i+: t:! a+tion o* #6it i# o6n(!( i# 6n!no*+!a.l! 6n(!* t:! p*o"i#ion# o t:! &tat6t! o 2*a6(# an( #p!+ial la?, in t:at t:! i*#t pa1! o t:! #ai( *oa( *i1:t-o-?ay a1*!!5!nt ?a# not #i1n!( .y .ot: pa*ti!# an( t:!*! in#t*65!ntal ?itn!##!#E pa1! t?o t:!*!o i# not (at!(, an( t:! #i1nat6*! o t:! plaintiD# +o*po*at! a1!nt (o!# not app!a*, an( t:at #ai( a1*!!5!nt i# not a+Hno?l!(1!( .!o*! a p!*#on a6t:o*i0!( to a(5ini#t!* oat:#. 7 T:! plainti oppo#!( t:! 5otion, #tatin1 t:at t:! a1*!!5!nt .!t?!!n plainti an( L6+iano 8!*nan(!0 i# not on! o t:o#! a1*!!5!nt# #p!+ii!( in t:! &tat6t! o *a6(#. 5 N!"!*t:!l!##, t:! t*ial +o6*t 1*ant!( t:! 5otion to (i#5i## on )an6a*y 17, 1961 an( (i#5i##!( t:! +a#!#. 6 T:! plainti il!( a 5otion o* *!+on#i(!*ation o t:! #ai( o*(!*, in#i#tin1 t:at t:! *oa( *i1:t-o-?ay a1*!!5!nt i# not +o"!*!( .y t:! &tat6t! o *a6(#. 7 T:!n, on Ma*+: 7, 1961, t:! plainti il!( an $5!n(!( Co5plaint, a++o5pani!( .y a 5otion o* it# a(5i##ion. T:! plainti t:!*!in p*ay!(, a5on1 ot:!*#, t:at t:! (!!n(ant# .! o*(!*!( to H!!p t:! *oa( op!n an( to *!#p!+t t:! *i1:t-o- ?ay a1*!!5!nt, an( @#:o6l( it .! a#+!*tain!( t:at 6n(!* t:! la? t:! plainti i# .o6n( to pay +o5p!n#ation o* t:! *i1:t-o-?ay to t:! /!!n(ant#, it i# p*ay!( t:at t:! *!a#ona.l! a5o6nt o #6+: +o5p!n#ation .! iB!(.@ = $t!* :!a(in1 t:! pa*ti!#, t:! t*ial +o6*t i##6!( an o*(!* on &!pt!5.!* 6, 1961, (!nyin1 t:! 5otion o* *!+on#i(!*ation. 9 ;:!*!6pon, t:! plainti p!*!+t!( an app!al to t:! Co6*t o $pp!al#. 10 T:! app!llat! +o6*t, in(in1 t:at only <6!#tion# o la? a*! *ai#!(, !l!"at!( t:! app!al to t:i# Co6*t. 11 T:! plainti-app!llant 5a(! t:! ollo?in1 a##i1n5!nt o !**o*# in it# 9*i!-31+-+:an*o.l!#.+o5.p: @1. T:! t*ial +o6*t !**!( in (i#5i##in1 t:! +o5plaint on t:! 1*o6n( t:at t:! +lai5 on ?:i+: t:! a+tion o* #6it i# o6n(!( i# 6n!no*+!a.l! 6n(!* t:! p*o"i#ion# o t:! &tat6t! o 2*a6(# an( #p!+ial la?E an( @2. T:! t*ial +o6*t !**!( in (!nyin1 plaintiD# 5otion o* *!+on#i(!*ation.@+*ala? "i*t6a1a? li.*a*y T:! app!al i# 5!*ito*io6#. T:! &tat6t! o *a6(# *!!*# to #p!+ii+ Hin(# o t*an#a+tion# an( +annot apply to any t:at i# not !n65!*at!( t:!*!in. 12 T:! t*an#a+tion# o* a1*!!5!nt# +o"!*!( .y #ai( #tat6t! a*! t:! ollo?in1-31+-+:an*o.l!#.+o5.p: @FaG $n a1*!!5!nt t:at .y it# t!*5# i# not to .! p!*o*5!( ?it:in a y!a* *o5 t:! 5aHin1 t:!*!oE @F.G $ #p!+ial p*o5i#! to an#?!* o* t:! (!.t, (!a6lt, o* 5i#+a**ia1! o anot:!*E @F+G $n a1*!!5!nt 5a(! in +on#i(!*ation o 5a**ia1!, ot:!* t:an a 56t6al p*o5i#! to 5a**yE @F(G $n a1*!!5!nt o* t:! #al! o 1oo(#, +:att!l# o* t:in1# in a+tion, at a p*i+! not l!## t:an i"! :6n(*!( p!#o#, 6nl!## t:! .6y!* a++!pt an( *!+!i"! pa*t o #6+: 1oo(# an( +:att!l#, o* t:! !"i(!n+!#, o* #o5! o t:!5, o #6+: t:in1# in a+tion, o* pay at t:! ti5! #o5! pa*t o t:! p6*+:a#! 5on!yE .6t ?:!n a #al! i# 5a(! .y a6+tion an( !nt*y i# 5a(! .y t:! a6+tion!!* in :i# #al!# .ooH, at t:! ti5! o t:! #al!, o t:! a5o6nt an( Hin( o p*op!*ty #ol(, t!*5# o #al!, p*i+!, na5!# o p6*+:a#!*# an( p!*#on on ?:o#! a++o6nt t:! #al! i# 5a(!, it i# #6i+i!nt 5!5o*an(65E @F!G $n a1*!!5!nt o* t:! l!a#in1 o* a lon1!* p!*io( t:an on! y!a*, o* o* t:! #al! o *!al p*op!*ty o* o an int!*!#t t:!*!inE @FG $ *!p*!#!ntation a# to t:! +*!(it o a t:i*( p!*#on.@ 13 O."io6#ly, an a1*!!5!nt +*!atin1 an !a#!5!nt o *i1:t- o-?ay i# not on! o t:o#! +ont*a+t# +o"!*!( .y t:! #tat6t! o *a6(# #in+! it i# not a #al! o *!al p*op!*ty o* o an int!*!#t t:!*!in. T:! t*ial +o6*t, t:!*!o*!, !**!( in (i#5i##in1 t:! +a#! 6pon t:! (!!n(ant#D +lai5 t:at t:! *oa( *i1:t-o-?ay a1*!!5!nt in <6!#tion i# 6n!no*+!a.l! 6n(!* t:! #tat6t! o *a6(#. 9!#i(!#, t:! +o5plaint, a# a5!n(!(, 5ay .! "i!?!( not only a# a +lai5 o* t:! *!+o1nition o t:! !Bi#t!n+! o an !a#!5!nt o *i1:t-o-?ay on (!!n(ant#D !#tat!, .6t al#o a (!5an( o* t:! !#ta.li#:5!nt o an !a#!5!nt o *i1:t-o-?ay, i non! !Bi#t#, p6*#6ant to $*t. 679 o t:! Ci"il Co(!, in "i!? o t:! plaintiD# o!* to pay *!a#ona.l! +o5p!n#ation o* t:! 6#! o t:! lan(. ;8ERE2ORE, t:! 36(15!nt app!al!( *o5 i# :!*!.y *!"!*#!( an( t:! o*(!*# o )an6a*y 17, 1961 an( &!pt!5.!* 6, 1961 #!t a#i(!. Co#t# a1ain#t t:! (!!n(ant#-app!ll!!#.+*ala?na( &O OR/ERE/. 2!*nan(o FChairmanG, 9a**!(o, $<6ino an( &anto#, JJ., +on+6*. $ntonio, J., +on+6*# in t:! *!#6lt.
MOTION TO LEAVE TO AMEND TROY CHILDERS VS THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA Chesapeake Juvenile And, Domestic Relations District Court Judge Larry D. Wills Sr. Corruption