THE POLITICAL CRITIQUE OF IDENTITY.

LINDA MARTIN ALCOFF

"Any man who carries a hyphen about him carries a dagger which he is
ready to plunge into the vitals of the Republic."
-Woodrow Wilson, 11!
"Not everyone is male, white, hearing, heterosexual. Very well. But what is
a eft if it is not, plausibly at least, the voice of a whole people! ... "f there
is no people, but only peoples, there is no eft."
-Todd "i#lin $1%, 1&%'
#olitical concerns about the importance of social identity are voiced e$ually
across left, liberal, and right wing perspectives. %oreover, the suspicion of
identity is not relegated to the discourse of intellectuals but is also manifest
in the mainstream as a widespread public attitude, and not only among
white communities.
&ithout doubt, the criti$ue of identity has wor'ed effectively, and
(ustifiably, against some of the problematic interpretations of identity
politics, where identity is construed in reductionist and simplistic fashion
and where its lin' to politics is rendered overly determinist. Nonetheless, "
believe the more significant effect of the criti$ue has been a negative one,
in discrediting all identity)based movements, in blaming minority
movements for the demise of the left, and especially in wea'ening the
prospects for unity between ma(ority and minority groups, contrary to the
beliefs of such theorists as *chlesinger and +itlin. Although the criti$ue
purports to be motivated by (ust this desire for unity, it wor's to undermine
the credibility of those who have "obvious" identities and significantly felt
identity)attachments from being able to represent the ma(ority, as if their
very identity attachments and the political commitments that flow from
these attachments will inhibit their leadership capabilities. "t also inhibits
their ability to participate in coalition politics as who they fully are. "n this
way, the criti$ue of identity has operated to vindicate the broad white
public,s disinclination to accept political leadership from those whose
identity is minority in any respect- .atholic or /ewish, Blac' or atino, Asian
or Arab American
0he suspicion against ethnic identity has a long tradition in 1.*. history, as
*ilvio 0orres)*aillant has shown. "n the early 2344,s, the new immigrants
from southern and central 5urope who were less easily assimilated to the
dominant Anglo culture were seen as a threat to the nation. 0eddy
Roosevelt declared that cultural assimilation, and the demise of the specific
cultural ways of these ethnic groups, was a condition of patriotism- "0he
man who becomes completely Americani6ed...is doing his plain duty to his
adopted land." 0his view gained strength during the first world war, when
many in the 1.*. expressed concern, sometimes violently, about the
5uropean allegiances of 1.*. citi6ens who were of +erman or Austrian
extraction. By 2327, when the 1.*. was beginning to enter the war,
Roosevelt insisted that the country,s "crucible" ought to turn "our people out
as Americans, of American nationality and not as dwellers of a polyglot
boarding house,...we have room for but one loyalty and that is a loyalty to
the American people." &oodrow &ilson even pressured his party in 2328 to
condemn ethnic associations as subversive, and went so far as to state that
"any man who carries a hyphen about him carries a dagger which he is
ready to plunge into the vitals of the Republic."9:ic'er ;<= *tubbs and
Barnet 7>>= %c.lymer 38= ?uoted in 0orres *aillant, nd@
&ilson and Roosevelt,s concerns that ethnic identity would inevitably create
conflicting loyalties was based on the assumption that ethnicity and
nationality are permanently coextensive or co)determining, that is, that
one,s ethnicity determines one,s nationality. 0his is a mista'e few theorists
or politicians would ma'e today. Aowever, strongly felt identities are still
blamed for increasing conflict among various social groups by emphasi6ing
differences at the expense of commonalities and thus wea'ening the
prospects for an inclusive nationalism. And as the &en Ao ee case recently
illustrated, certain ethnicities, especially Asian)American ones, are still
suspected of harboring a primary loyalty to their countries of originBno
matter how many generations bac'. &en Ao ee, a naturali6ed 1.*. citi6en,
came here as a student in 237C to 0exas A D % 1niversity, met his wife at
the Rose Bowl, got a (ob at os Alamos, and for over thirty years en(oyed
bridge, classical music, and reading .harles :ic'ens before he was racially
profiled and arrested for suspected treason 9&u E44E, 2>8@. ee,s arrest
occurred shortly after the Aouse *elect .ommittee on 1.*. National *ecurity
issued a report in %ay of 2333 which argued that every individual of
.hinese ancestry in the 1nited *tates is a "potential spy"9&u E44E, 2>3@
Aere, raciali6ation mediates ethnic identity and national origin to produce
the specter of an identity that is viewed as beyond assimilation or even
rationality. As Fran' &u shows in his comprehensive study of contemporary
anti)Asian pre(udice, the idea that ethnicity determines nationality continues
to operate in some casesBmainly for Asian Americans and atinosBwhere
ethnic identity has been raciali6ed.
The Liberals
"n classical liberal political theory, the initial state of the self is
conceptuali6ed as an abstract individual without, or prior to, group
allegiance. "t is from this "initial position" that the self engages in rational
deliberation over ends and thus achieves autonomy by freely choosing,
rather than blindly accepting, its doxastic commitments, including its
cultural and religious traditions. As Gant developed this idea, a person who
cannot gain critical distance from and thus ob(ectify their cultural traditions
cannot rationally assess them and thus cannot attain autonomy. "n Gant,s
view, an abstract or disengaged self is for this reason necessary for full
personhood. %oreover, the process of modernity, which was conceptuali6ed
as analogous on the societal level to the process of individual maturation,
became defined as (ust this increased ability to distance oneself from one,s
cultural traditions. "n this way this distancing ability also became a 'ey part
of the global, 5uropean)centered teleology of intellectual and moral
development, defining the terms by which societies were to be labeled
advanced or bac'ward.
0he norm of rational maturity, then, re$uired a core self stripped of its
identity. +roups too immature to practice this 'ind of abstract thought or to
transcend their ascribed cultural identities were deemed incapable of full
autonomy, as individuals or as groups, and their lac' of maturity was often
"explained" via racist theories of the innate inferiority of non)5uropean
peoples. But liberal social theorists attempted to develop non)racist
explanations for the inability or unwillingness of some to let go of their
identities.
"n the 2374,s an influential account of ethnicity was developed by Nathan
+la6er and :aniel #atric' %oynihan according to which people develop a
strong sense of ethnic identity as a result of being excluded from the
melting pot and from political participation 9+la6er and %oynihan 237;@.
According to this account, if individuals are shunned or segregated off to
themselves, whether because they are "talian, "rish, or African American,
they will develop a powerful sense of group identity and internal solidarity
as a defense mechanism. +la6er and %oynihan thought that social steps
toward inclusion, then, would wor' as the "solution" to ethnic identity. A
'ind of analogous position has more recently surfaced in feminist theory,
suggesting that gender identity is also something produced entirely by
conditions of oppression that would wither away under conditions of e$ual
empowerment. For these feminists, feminism is the "solution" to gender
identity.
&hy is it assumed that social identities re$uire a "solution"! 0his only
ma'es sense given the liberal conception of the self as re$uiring autonomy
from identity in order to have rationality. After all, the fact that a social
identity was created under conditions of exclusion or oppression does not by
itself entail that its features are pernicious- oppression can produce
pathology without a doubt but it can also produce strength, perseverance,
and empathy, and certainly solidarity is not an inherent evil. %oreover, the
desire to be free of oppressive stereotypes does not necessarily lead to the
desire to be free of all identity= it can (ust as easily lead to the desire to
have more accurate characteri6ations of one,s identity and to have the
collective freedom to develop the identity through developing culture and
community as well as the individual freedom to interpret its meaning in
one,s own life.
Nonetheless, strongly felt social identities are considered by many to
harbor inherent political liabilities. iberal political theorists such as Arthur
*cheslinger 92332@, :avid Aollinger 9233<@, /ean Beth'e 5lshtain9233<@,
and others have argued that a strong sense of group solidarity and group
identification endanger democratic processes and social cohesion= that they
will inhibit the ability to form political coalitions= that they will ground
"'nowledge and moral values in blood and history" 9Aollinger, ;@ and in this
way substitute the determination of group membership for critical reflection,
thus producing what .ornel &est 9233C@ calls "racial reasoning."
5lshtain provides an especially clear articulation of the argument that
identity politics derails democracy, and her account shows how this view is
connected to the conception of rational autonomy s'etched above. *he
holds that when private identity ta'es precedence over public ends or
purposes...the citi6en gives way before the aggrieved member of a self)
defined or contained group. Because the group is aggrieved)))the word of
choice in most polemics is enraged)))the civility inherent in those rule)
governed activities that allow a pluralist society to persist falters. 0his
assault on civility flows from an embrace of what might be called a
politici6ed ontology)))that is, persons are to be (udged not by what they do
or say but what they are. 95lshtain 233<, pp. <E)<;@.
5lshtain contrasts, as if they were mutually exclusive, 9a@ the citi6enry that
advances public or common purposes and 9b@ self)defined identity groups or
"private identities" that are concerned with group)related grievances. *he
holds that the determination of public ends should not or cannot be
developed through associations or actions that are organi6ed around
identity. "n her view, public citi6ens and private identities are two separate
'inds of things, even though instantiated in the same individual. "n so far as
that individual reasons and acts as a citi6en, it cannot be thin'ing of itself
primarily in terms of this private identity, and one that has been aggrieved
and is enraged. "dentities must be left aside so that individuals can enter
the arena of public debate and action as anonymous or dispassionate
reasoners, weighing evidence on the basis of its merit no matter its
implications for the future of one,s own social group.
5lshtain,s argument that "only behavior, not identity, should be
critici6ed"9<;@ is persuasive as an argument that one should not be
critici6ed merely for one,s identity. 0his is precisely the argument against
racial profiling, which put identities themselves into suspect categories
independently of behavior. 0hus, she is correct insofar as she is asserting
that, in assessing someone,s behavior or ideas, we should never reduce the
assessment to a mere $uestion of identity. Aowever, re(ecting a reduction to
one,s identity does not re$uire or imply re(ecting the salience of identity
under any circumstance. A police officer, for example, might legitimately
ta'e a person,s apparent identity into account, not for the purposes of
assuming criminal behavior, but for the purposes of ensuring that the
person can understand the officer,s commands given in 5nglish.

"n the 'inds of cases 5lshtain is consideringBpublic spaces of deliberation or
debateBthe $uestion is whether (udgement can be realistically disentangled
from identity. &e appear in public spaces (ust as much fully identified
persons as we do in the private sphere, although because we are 'nown
less well in public than in private relationships, those identity categories
may loom even larger in public. As anthropologist Renato Rosaldo has
argued,
.an women disguise their gender in the public sphere! "f they must appear
as women, and not as universal unmar'ed citi6ens, then one can as', who
has the right to spea' in public debates conducted in the s$uare! Are men
or women more li'ely to be interrupted with greater fre$uency! Are men or
women more li'ely to be referred to as having had a good idea in these
discussions! 9Rosaldo 233>, E8@ 0he point is that identities are constantly
used to lend or withhold credence from participants in almost any public
exchange. "deas are assessed in relation to who expresses them, and
indeed, will be expressed in variable ways depending on the spea'er and
the context. For example, we can sometimes gain a clearer interpretation
and assessment of someone,s claims by understanding it in relation to their
identity. A young athlete tells me in)line s'ating is easy to learn, and " ta'e
his words with a grain of salt. "n an argument over how easy the 1nited
*tates is on foreigners living here, an Anglo claims its very easy while a
foreigner claims it is not= their identities don,t prove their points but they
are relevant to consider as " assess their li'ely 'nowledge on the matter.
Foucault recommends that we reconceptuali6e discourse as an event, which
would incorporate into the analysis not only the words spo'en but also the
spea'ers, hearers, location, language, and so on, all as a part of what
ma'es up meaning. 0his neither reduces meaning to identity nor assumes a
priori that it is in every case irrelevant.2 0hus there are good reasons to
contest 5lshtain,s claim that it is possible to separate private identities and
public citi6ens as well as the claim that it would always be desirable to do
so. " will return to this issue to develop this argument further at the end of
this chapter.
5lshtain,s and *chlesinger,s views represent a common liberal
understanding that believes that ethnic attachments are legitimate only
when circumscribed to the private realm. "f one,s ethnicity is allowed to be
the site from which to launch grievances or antagonisms in public debate,
liberals thin' this will reduce the latter to polemic and "war by other
means." 0hus, for liberals, a strong sense of ethnic or racial identity poses
an a priori problem for a democratic state- for 5lshtain because it conflicts
with the development and assessment of public ends, for +la6er and
%oynihan because it has been created by exclusion and thus is the obverse
of democracy, and for Roosevelt and &ilson 9and the Aouse *elect
.ommittee on 1.*. National *ecurity@ because it threatens the security of
the 1nited *tates. From this point of view, the movement toward a more
perfect union is by definition a movement away from social and ethnic
identity. "dentities may be championed and their right to exist defended by
political policies but they are not to play a constitutive role in policy
formulation without ris' of derailing the possibilities for rational deliberative
democratic procedures.
The Left
"n recent years the left has also played a prominent role in the criti$ue of
identity politics. eftist writers such as 0odd +itlin, "mmanuel &allerstein,
Richard Rorty, Nancy Fraser and others have critici6ed what they see as the
turn to identity politics that occurred sometime after the New eft revival of
progressivism in the 2374,s. "t is important to remember that this position
has not been uniform among all left)wing, socialist or communist
organi6ations, here or elsewhere. For example, the .ommunist #arty 1*A of
the 23;4,s demanded "*elf)determination for the Afro)American Nation" in
its basic party platform, and supported blac' nationalist demands even unto
the right of separation 9Aaywood 23>7, 23>8= Foner and *hapiro 2332@. "n
the early 23>4,s, a ma(or difference between the groups that evolved out of
*tudents for a :emocratic *ociety was over the $uestion of whether race
and gender should be emphasi6ed in present day organi6ing or held off until
"after the revolution," and several groups vigorously critici6ed the latter
position.E And wor'er,s parties in atin America have differed sharply over
their attitude toward indigenismo and blac' consciousness movements, with
the very successful Bra6ilian &or'er,s #arty strongly supporting the
struggles of ethnic groups. 5ven the labor movement in the 1.*. has come
around to recogni6ing the importance of addressing ethnic and gender
differences, and leading unions such as the *ervice 5mployees "nternational
1nion 9*5"1@ have adopted diversity $uotas for national conventions, put
out multi)language newsletters, and now hold regular wor'shops for union
stewards on $uestions of racism, sexism, and homophobia.
Nonetheless, most prominent 9white@ leftists in the 1.*. today are critical in
varying degrees of movements that ma'e identity their organi6ing basis,
and are worried about "overemphasi6ing" difference. 0he debate over multi)
culturalism that raged throughout the 2334,s was instructive in this regard.
%ost leftists wanted to carefully distinguish good and bad forms of multi)
culturalism, and were very critical of forms that they felt reified identity and
promoted a politics of visibility without an agenda of class struggle. 0he
forms of multi)culturalism that they approved of were defined as those that
characteri6ed ethnic, racial, gender, and cultural differences as produced or
created by structures of oppression 9Ganpol and %caren 233<@. 0o avoid
the pe(orative label "liberal" a form of multi)culturalism needed to argue not
only for the inclusion of diverse cultural groups but also for the inclusion of
narratives explaining the relations of exploitation and oppression that
existed between dominant and subordinate groups. 0hat is, it needed to
explain the relationship between identity formations and power structures.
0his brings out the most radical implications of identity struggles, showing
the incoherence of an all)inclusive pluralism that would e$uate identities
forged as tools of domination 9whiteness, masculinity@ and identities created
to target ppulations for exploitation 9blac'ness@.
Few would context the lin' between identity formation and power
structures, given the historical context of colonialism in which all of our
identities have been shaped. 0he issue of contention here is whether
identities that have been historically sub(ect to oppression are reducible to
that oppressive genealogy. %any leftists insisted that cultural differences
can be explained mainly in reference to oppression, thus suggesting that
without oppression, difference might well wither away. " will ta'e issue with
this view in what follows.
eftist concerns with identity politics have been in many cases the same
concerns that the liberals have, such as *chlesinger and 5lshtain, but they
also have some of their own worries. "n his boo' 0he 0wilight of .ommon
:reams- &hy America is &rac'ed with .ulture &ars, +itlin echoes many of
the liberal worries listed earlier- that identity politics fractures the body
politic= that it emphasi6es difference at the expense of commonalities= and
that its focus on identity offers only a reductivist politics, one that would
reduce assessment of political position to the process of ascertaining
identity. But as a leftist, +itlin,s main worry is that the focus on identities
and thus differences inhibits the possibility of creating a progressive political
ma(ority based on class. Rather than building from common interests, he
thin's identity politics ma'es "a fetish of the virtues of the minority." And in
his view this is not true of (ust some versions of identity politics, but of all-
"all forms of identity politics" are reductive- they are all "overly clear about
who the insiders are...and overly dismissive of outsiders."9+itlin 233<, 2E>@
Ae thus finds the emphasis on identities "intellectually stultifying and
politically suicidal." "f we want to ma'e genuine social revolution, he argues
that ethnic and racial based political organi6ing must be minimi6ed.
*imilar to +la6er and %oynihan, +itlin attempts to offer a 'ind of
therapeutic diagnosis to explain the current attachment that so many in our
society have to their identities. "0he contemporary passion for difference
is...the conse$uence of unsettled psychological states. 0he American pace
of change constantly eats away at identity...0he search for hard)edged
social identities is surely an overcompensation."9274@ "n other words,
identity)based movements are forms of resistance against capitalism which
has caused a fragmentation of the extended family, the brea'up of
community, and the lost significance of history and tradition. Americans are
pining for fixities of identity to cure the vertigo produced by so much
postmodern disarray. For the participants of identity politics, "the benefits of
the pursuit of identity HareI manifold- a sense of community, an experience
of solidarity, a prefabricated reservoir of recruits...0ry telling someone who
feels" as he puts it "the hunger for wholeness that this is a totalitarian
principle, that he or she had better get used to the overlap and complexity
of attachments."92C>@ +itlin thus tries to sympathetically explain the
motivations for identity attachments, even while he criti$ues the
construction of identity as a 'ind of mista'e. Ae believes that a strong
sense of group identification may be understandable but that an insistence
on identity,s political salience is ultimately irrational, often opportunist, and
strategically disastrous.
+itlin,s account thus returns us to an outdated view of class as an
essentially homogeneous entity rather than a cluster concept with internal
contradictions. By separating class demands from identity struggles he
implies that there are generic class demands rather than the demands of
s'illed or uns'illed wor'ers, of the trades or the service professions, of
minority wor'ers, of women wor'ers, of immigrant wor'ers, and so on, that
is, of groups whose interests sometimes coincide and at other times collide.
+itlin implies that the labor movement can only maintain a united front if it
ignores internal differences.
"n my experience, maintaining unity re$uires a careful attending to
difference. For example, in a recent contract negotiation that " observed at
a hospital in *yracuse, New Jor', the issue of preferences for internal hiring
or in)house advancement came up for discussion among members of the
*5"1 bargaining committee, each of whom was an elected representative
from a particular sector of the hospital. "n the process of preparing the
negotiating points that the union will put forward to management, priorities
have to be set and some issues must be left aside, and the $uestion on the
table was, how much of a priority would the union give the issue of in)house
advancement in its negotiations! 0he members of the professional
tradesBelectricians, plumbers, and so forth, who are almost entirely white
menBinitially saw no reason to fight for this provision in the contract or to
ma'e it a priority. Aowever, an African American woman on the bargaining
team spo'e up for the importance of in)house advancement, pointing out
that almost all of the minorities in the hospital wor'ed at the relatively
lower s'illed and lesser paid (obs. +iven the difficulty minorities still have in
entering the trades, the outside hiring of minorities is a slim bet. "t is much
more li'ely that a minority person will be hired into house'eeping or dietary
departments, for example, but be stuc' in those departments unless
preferences are given for in)house hiring into the trainee positions available
in the more lucrative departments. "n this particular bargaining sub)
committee, if the tradesmen had voted as a bloc against this woman,s
proposal, and if the mostly white male union leaders had supported them,
then the conditions of wor' for nonwhite wor'ers at that hospital would
continue to be unrelievedly at the bottom of the hierarchy during the next
three or five year contract period. Fortunately, in this case the white
wor'ers united in supporting in)house advancement because they came to
recogni6e the relevance that racial difference made to union members, wor'
lives.; 0hese 'inds of discussions are an everyday occurrence in labor
organi6ing and contract battles. "t is no accident that *5"1 is today the
largest union in the 1nited *tates, the fastest growing, and that it has the
most pro)active policies in support of racial and gender democracy.
0hus, one cannot either imaginatively or practically pursue "class demands"
as if the wor'ing class has one set of united and homogeneous material
interests. "t ma'es neither political or theoretical sense to imagine an
undifferentiated wor'ing class demanding a larger share of the pie, to be
divided among them with the same ratios of remuneration as currently exist
based on racism and sexism. /ust as blac' wor'ers cannot stand in for the
whole, neither can s'illed white wor'ers. 5ach group is exploited in a
specific manner, and to different degrees. .ertainly, there is a motivation for
unity, but unity will have to be negotiated in piecemeal terms, such as the
bargaining committee in *yracuse discovered. Redistribution demands will
either reproduce or subvert the ine$ualities among wor'ers, or, what is
often the case, do some of both.C 0hus, neither class demands nor class
identity can be understood apart from the differences of social identity.
0he very possibility of unity that +itlin aims for will re$uire that, for
example, the minority members of a union feel connected to it and feel that
it is addressing their conditions. But this re$uires the exploration and
recognition of difference, as well as ma'ing a space in union meetings for
sometimes extensive discussions about the different situation of the various
wor'ers, and accommodating their different demands, interests, and needs.
"n her recent boo's, /ustice "nterruptus and Redistribution or Recognition!,
Nancy Fraser offers a less polemical and arguably more persuasive criti$ue
of identity politics that tries to accommodate a recognition of difference.
0hough she is very critical of identity)based politics, she is also critical of
those who use the excuse of its failures to retreat from the struggles
against racism and sexism, turning bac' to class reductionism, economism,
or the old fashioned 'ind of un)self)conscious universalism that existed prior
to social struggles around identity.
Fraser develops a broad mapping of contemporary social struggles and
political movements with many points of reference but essentially one ma(or
divide, between struggles for recognition 9women, oppressed minorities,
gays and lesbians@ and struggles for redistribution 9labor, the poor, welfare
rights@. *he argues that there is an analytical as well as a practical
distinction between these types of movements because struggles for
recognition tend toward promoting "group differentiation" while struggles
for redistribution tend to "promote group de)differentiation." "n other
words, gays and lesbians, for example, are fighting for the very right to
exist free of violence and discrimination, while the poor would rather
eradicate their identity as poor.
Fraser explains that "Recognition claims often ta'e the form of calling
attention to, if not performatively creating, the putative specificity of some
group and then of affirming its value. 0hus they tend to promote group
differentiation. Redistribution claims, in contrast, often call for abolishing
economic arrangements that underpin group specificity....0hus, they tend to
promote group dedifferentiation...0hus, the two 'inds of claims stand in
tension with each other= they can interfere with, or even wor' against, each
other."9Fraser 233>, 27@ *he views this conflict of aims between recognition
and redistribution as one of the central problems of political mobili6ation
today. 1nli'e other leftist critics such as +itlin, Fraser holds that we should
attempt to bring these two sorts of struggles together, and that both 'inds
ma'e legitimate political demands. But, li'e +itlin, Fraser is highly critical of
the effects of interpreting the need for recognition in terms of a recognition
of identities.
Fraser,s criti$ue of identity politics is the most perspicuous and clearly
articulated to date, and thus well worth a careful reading.< Aer account is
also worth addressing because, unli'e many others, she not only
sympathi6es with the aims of recognition movements but attempts to
reformulate them in such a way so as to lessen what she considers their
problematic effects. "n what follows, " will explore Fraser,s arguments in
some detail. After this, " will summari6e the main points of the political
criticism of identity, tease out the assumptions behind these criticisms, and
then offer counter)arguments that address each ma(or point.
Fraser's critique
Fraser divides the forms that struggles for recognition can ta'e into two
camps- the first involving the struggle for an affirmation of identity, and the
second involving the struggle for e$ual participation.9Fraser E444, E44;@
Aer main criticism is directed toward this first form, which she calls a
"culturalist" struggle that aims at self)reali6ation. "t is this form of the
struggle for recognition that she associates with identity politics. "dentity
politics by her definition, then, is a struggle in which the political goal is
articulated as an affirmation, including self)affirmation, of previously
denigrated identities.7
"n part because she is critical of this form of recognition struggles, Fraser
has endeavored to develop and articulate the second form 9the struggle for
e$ual participation@, and in this way salvage the pro(ect of recognition from
the deleterious effects of identity politics. " will consider this second option
in a moment, but " will turn first to her concerns with the struggle to affirm
identities.
Fraser argues that a politics that understands itself to be aiming at the
affirmation of identities will have the following effects, even if unintended-
9a@ displacing redistribution struggles, 9b@ tending toward separatism and
away from coalition, and 9c@ reifying identities, which she ob(ects to not on
metaphysical grounds but on the grounds that it leads to a policing of
authenticity, the promotion of conformism, and some form of, again to use
&est,s phrase, "racial reasoning." 0he struggle to affirm identities will tend
toward these effects because, according to Fraser, these struggles tend to
view identity based forms of discrimination as "free standing" rather than
caused by a complex array of social institutions.
argely silent on the sub(ect of economic ine$uality, the identity model
treats misrecognition as a free)standing cultural harm= many of its
proponents simply ignore distributive in(ustice altogether and focus
exclusively on efforts to change culture...H"tI casts misrecognition as a
problem of cultural depreciation. 0he roots of in(ustice are located in
demeaning representations, but they are not seen as socially
grounded....Aypostati6ing culture, they both abstract misrecognition from
its institutional matrix and obscure its entwinement with distributive (ustice.
9Fraser E444, 224@ Neither here nor elsewhere does Fraser provide
examples of groups that hold such views.
Aere one might be tempted immediately to argue that the real problem is
(ust these mista'en views about cultures and identities rather than identity
politics per se. "dentity based political organi6ing will not divert attention
from redistribution, as she predicts, unless it also imagines that identity
based hatreds occur within a completely autonomous cultural sphere. But it
is not at all clear that such beliefs are an intrinsic feature of identity politics
or of identity based political organi6ing which aims at the affirmation and
self)affirmation of identities. Kne could desire to affirm identities even if one
held non)hypostasi6ed accounts of cultures and identities. Nor does the
affirmation of identities itself entail a commitment to a particular social
theory about oppressive causes. For example, the various media watch
groups that report on minority representation in the media and that demand
more and better representation are organi6ed simply around media
representation, and offer no full blown theory about social change nor do
they imply that this reform will have a greater impact on society than other
reforms. Jet they are clearly motivated by the goal of affirming presently
denigrated identities.>
Fraser seems to accept that some forms of identity politics entail no
commitment to a mono)causal theory of identity)based forms of oppression.
But she says that even when the proponents of identity politics "appreciate
the seriousness of maldistribution and genuinely want to address it" they
still result in "displacing redistributive claims" through an orientation of
practice toward recognition rather than redistribution.9Fraser E444, 224@ "
suspect many more people share her concern with recognition struggles on
these grounds, that is, because they believe that redistribution is a more
important goal, and because they believe that redistribution has a more
lasting value on society when its goals are achieved.
But we should note that, if the problem here is one of relative weight or
importance, this is not an intrinsic problem with identity politics itself. 0he
problem of relative weight only arises if one puts more importance on
recognition than redistribution. Kne could also as', if one truly believes that
both the redistributive and recognition struggles are warranted, as Fraser
claims, why is it the case that the recognition struggles are problematic
because they may divert energy and attention from redistribution struggles,
but not vice versa!
%ore importantly, we need to $uestion the assumption that recognition can
be separated from redistribution, which is an assumption necessary to
generate the $uestion Fraser addresses of whether it should be. "n actual
fact, identity based political organi6ing does not exist in necessary
opposition to the struggle for redistribution of resources because
redistribution demands are part and parcel of virtually all identity)based
organi6ing. African)American political organi6ations, li'e the NAA.# and the
Blac' Radical .ongress, have called for reparations for slavery= women,s
organi6ations li'e NK& have demanded an end to gender)based pay
ine$uities and NARA 9the National Abortion Rights Action eague@ has
demanded access to abortion for poor women. 0he National .ouncil of a
Ra6a has organi6ed for welfare rights, home loans for atinos, and
improvement in public schools, and the National +ay and esbian 0as' Force
has fought for an end to (ob and housing discrimination and universal
access to A":* medication as well as health insurance for domestic
partners. 0hese are demands that would effect significant redistributions of
income and resources and would benefit not only the middle class
individuals mar'ed by these identities but also the wor'ing class and poor
members. %oreover, the organi6ing among immigrant women garment
wor'ers, as recounted in the wonderful boo' *weatshop &arriors by %iriam
.hing Joon ouie, has largely developed from ethnic)based community
centers, such as the Asian "mmigrant &omen Advocates organi6ation,
Gorean "mmigrant &or'ers Advocates, both in .alifornia, and the .hinese
*taff and &or'ers Association in New Jor' 9ouie E442@. 0he languages and
cultural bac'grounds of immigrant wor'ers significantly affects not only the
possibility of communication but also the possibility of developing the high
levels of trust re$uired in organi6ing efforts that involve the ris' of not only
(ob loss but also deportation. "n these cases, identity based organi6ing is
simply a necessity, and has in no way bloc'ed the coalition efforts made
between these ethnic organi6ations of wor'ers and various labor unions
9unless the unions themselves are bac'ward@. 0hese examples may not
establish a logical necessity to the connection between recognition and
redistribution demands, but they establish the historical fact that in the
leading groups organi6ed around identity, redistribution demands are their
raison d,etre. "dentity)based organi6ing is one way, and sometimes the only
way, to mobili6e and frame demands for redistribution and is an integral
part of class transformation.8
Fraser may wish to characteri6e these sorts of groups as aiming, not at the
affirmation of identities, but for e$ual participation, and thus to place them
in her "safe" category distinct from identity politics. "n this alternative
approach, she says, "recognition is a $uestion of social status" and "what
re$uires recognition is not group)specific identity but the status of individual
group members as full partners in social interaction."9Fraser E444, 22;@ 0he
language of recognition used here is meant to apply to the individual
capacity and right of moral reasoning and political (udgement, both of which
are denied by identity based forms of discrimination. But in her view,
instead of focusing on getting recognition for an identity that has the right
of full participation, we should be focusing on the right of full participation
directly. By articulating the demand in this way, Fraser argues, we will put
the focus where it really needs to be.
"n /oel Klsen,s criti$ue of her argument, he reminds us of :u Bois,s
demonstration in Blac' Reconstruction that addressing antiblac' racism is
not a diversion to class struggle but, in the context of the 1nited *tates,
centrally necessary for the very possibility of class struggle. &hite identity
was created as a recompense, and distraction, to white wor'ers for their
economic disenfranchisement. .lass consciousness has been stymied in the
1nited *tates more so than in any other industriali6ed country through the
racial ideology of white supremacy. 0his is precisely why, Klsen argues, that
"the great American struggles for Lrecognition,BAbolition, Reconstruction,
and the civil rights movementBhave inaugurated the nation,s most
significant efforts toward redistribution."9Klsen E442, 2><@
Nonetheless, the 'ey aspect of Fraser,s alternative approach to recognition
is clearly its ability to de)center and even efface any concern with identity.
"dentities may enter in only in so far as they affect participation= otherwise
we will be on the slippery slope toward affirming identities for their own
sa'e, and this promotes further differentiation rather than de)
differentiation. Rather than seeing the attainment of e$ual status as bound
up with identity, Fraser contrasts the recognition of identity with the
recognition of status, as when she explains that on her model a claim for
recognition should be "aimed not at valori6ing group identity but rather at
overcoming subordination..."9E444, 22C@
Kn the face of it, this alternative formulation may be persuasive in that it
seems to be going after the real target and thus avoiding all the problems of
the identity approach. But it is essentially a mischaracteri6ation of the
nature of oppression and a proposal that will ris' ma'ing it very difficult for
group differences or group interests to be articulated in the public sphere.
et me explain.
"n separating redistribution from recognition, Fraser implies (ust as +itlin
did that class can be conceptuali6ed apart from identity. 0hus, she provides
us with an example of a "pure distribution demand" as the case of a white
male s'illed wor'er who becomes unemployed due to a factory closing
resulting from a speculative corporate merger. "n this case, she tells us,
"the in(ustice of maldistribution Hthat is, the wor'er becoming unemployedI
has little to do with misrecognition. "t is rather a conse$uence of
imperatives intrinsic to an order of speciali6ed economic relations whose
raison d,etre is the accumulation of profits. 0o handle such cases, a theory
of (ustice must reach beyond cultural value patterns to examine the
structure of capitalism. "t must as' whether economic mechanisms that are
relatively decoupled from structures of prestige and that operate in a
relatively autonomous way impede parity of participation in social
life."9E44;, ;<@
But the reality here is that it is profitable to transfer production 9or
outsource it@ from one class segment to another B i.e. from white male
wor'ers to a lower paid segment of the labor force either within a given
nation or outside of itB because of the segmentation of the labor mar'et by
race, ethnicity, gender, cultural identity, nationality, and geographical
location. .orporate reorgani6ing increases profit when it lowers labor costs,
and labor costs are lowered by transferring production to a different labor
segment. &ithout an account that can couple an analysis of "cultural value
patterns" with the "structure of capital," we have no way to explain why
certain labor segments are thrown out of wor', even if, as in this case, it is
the segment of white male s'illed wor'ers.
National minorities often form, willingly or unwillingly, an "ascriptive class
segment" which the Ber'eley economist %ario Barrera defines as a "portion
of a class which is set off from the rest of the class by some readily
identifiable and relatively stable characteristics of the persons assigned to
that segment, such as race, ethnicity, or sex, and whose status in relation
to the means and process of production is affected by that
demarcation."9Barrera 23>3, 242@ Besides developing the general concept
of ascriptive class segments more than two decades ago, Barrera also
developed concepts of coloni6ed class segments in which segmentation in
the labor mar'et is based on race and ethnicity. Barrera defines colonialism
as "a structured relationship of domination and subordination, where the
dominant and subordinate groups are defined along ethnicMracial lines, and
where the relationship is established and maintained to serve the interests
of all or part of the dominant group."923>3, 23;@ Neither race nor gender
determines class position= such identity groups almost always include
persons from multiple classes. Jet this fact in no way obviates Barrera,s
point that social identities operate to organi6e and segment the wor'ing
class, differentiating its structure of wages and benefits as well as it
conditions of wor'. #icturing class formations as ideal types without race or
gender disenables our ability to use the concept of class as an explanatory
concept in social theory.
Fraser,s hope that the demand for e$ual participation can bypass $uestions
of the value of cultural and social identities is in vain. 0he reason why
certain social actors are denied full participation in this context is their
identity, as Fraser herself ac'nowledges when she says that "0o be
misrecogni6ed...is not simply to be thought ill of, loo'ed down upon or
devalued in others, attitudes, beliefs or representations. "t is rather to be
denied the status of a full partner in social interaction, as a conse$uence of
institutionali6ed patterns of cultural value that constitute one as
comparatively unworthy of respect or esteem." 9E444, 22;)C@ 0hus, the
denial of e$ual status is organi6ed around and (ustified on the basis of
identity. "t is therefore unwor'able to struggle for e$ual social status
without contesting the basis upon which such status has been denied, which
involves the negative attributions made about specific identities. &e must
tac'le the issue of identity because it is, in an important respect, the 'ey to
the problem and to the solution. %inorities and white women are not denied
e$uality because they are seen one by one as deficient, but because their
group identity status is interpreted as deficient. 0hey are "denied the status
of full partner in social interaction" precisely because of their identities.
0here are actually two separate reasons used to (ustify denying full
partnership because of group identity- 92@ because the particular group that
the individual belongs to is argued to be inferior in some significant and
relevant way, andMor 9E@ because any strongly felt group identity is argued
to be an obstacle to reasoned (udgement, since it will conflict with the
individual,s autonomy. "f we can eliminate, in a utopian thought)
experiment, the occurrence of sexism and racism and thus 92@, this in no
way decreases the possibility that 9E@ will continue to obstruct full
participation. 0hat is, one might have a strong attachment to an identity
that is not denigrated, being Norwegian, for example, but this very
attachment will itself be viewed with suspicion as li'ely leading to a
distortion of (udgement. *uch an argument will seem to be a much more
rational concern with the person,s identity attachment, more rational than
the simple denigration of their Norwegian specific identity, and for that
reason may be even harder to dislodge. 0hus, even if the individuals are
saved in the struggle for e$ual social status, their identities will remain
outlawed from the public realm of deliberation. 0his solution is no different
from the liberal approach *artre excoriated in Anti)semite and /ew when he
said, the liberal wants to save the man but leave the /ew behind.3
0he goal of redistributing resources, which Fraser claims to be her main
concern, re$uires addressing all of the causes of the problem, which include
9a@ structural and institutional based forms of discrimination, 9b@ ideologies
among dominant groups that legitimate their exploitation of, or inattention
to, the plight of the subordinate groups, but also 9c@ the internali6ation of
such ideologies among the oppressed themselves, among the effects of
which is the reticence to demand redistribution. "nternali6ations of self)
hatred and inferiority cannot simply be solved after redistribution, but must
be addressed and at least partially overcome in order to ma'e possible
effective collective action. 5very successful progressive and revolutionary
movement has 'nown this, and has then given expression to artistic,
literary, and other forms of positive self)images as well as ways of wor'ing
through and beyond the internali6ations, from *oviet social realism to first
world feminist art to the %exican muralists to the A":* $uilt.

.onsider Fraser,s analysis in light of the recent battle at the 1niversity of
North :a'ota over the name of the school mascot, the "Fighting *ioux." "t is
not only the use of the name that has been opposed, but the highly
demeaning images used around the local sports events, including portrayals
of American "ndians performing fellatio on buffalo. Although similar battles
have occurred across the country for nearly three decades now, the battle
at North :a'ota had some unusual aspects. First, this is a university that
houses E< American "ndian programs, including a $uarterly student
maga6ine, a program on American "ndian life and culture, and a program in
medicine that reportedly trains a fifth of the "ndian doctors in the 1nited
*tates. 0hus, one might argue that here is a case that was truly about the
affirmation of identities rather than redistribution, since the demands of
redistribution seem to have already been met.

But the second unusual aspect of this case reveals that there is more to the
story. 0he battle came to a peremptory climax when a donor who pledged
N244 million gift to the university for a new sports arena threatened to
withdraw his gift and close down construction if the school logo or slogan
were changed to omit the "ndian name. "f one is tempted to thin', li'e
some of the white students were reported as saying, that this is a trivial
issue, a returned chec' for a N244 million dollars would suggest that for
some it is indeed not trivial at all.

" would suggest that the identity politics at play in this case is white
identity, in which whiteness is associated with the privilege to name others,
to choose one,s own form of discursive banter with total autonomy, as well
as with the vanguard narratives of Anglo)5uropean cultures which portray
the rest of the world as existing in various stages of "bac'wardness." .an
we really ma'e a neat separation between racial ideology, psychic processes
of internali6ed superiority, and the economic hierarchy of resource
distribution! .learly these are bound up together, mutually reenforcing.
5urocentric vanguard narratives are critical tools used to (ustify the existing
hierarchies of ascriptive class segments. According to Fraser, the *ioux need
to understand their long)term goal as a deconstruction of their identities.
But this is simply an extension of the privilege associated with whiteness to
name and signify difference and to determine its place in a progressive
narrative of united struggle. 0hus the lesson " ta'e from the struggle at
North :a'ota is that redistribution and recognition demands are interwoven
not only at the level of the resource allocations for the marginali6ed groups,
as evidenced by the redistribution demands made by identity based political
groups, but also at the level of the resources under the control of dominant
groups.

Fraser certainly does not deny the need to combat negative images, but on
her view, given the inherent problems associated with struggles organi6ed
around the affirmation of identities, the better strategy is still to fight for
e$uality as persons rather than for respect as groups. +iven her criti$ue of
the affirmation of identities, individual group members can only achieve
e$ual status by transcending their group membership, at least in the
domain of social interaction. 0o divorce identity affirmation from a struggle
for social redemption is to encourage a move from group to individual
interpellation. "t appears then that, li'e 5lshtain, Fraser would have the
participants of public deliberation act and be seen primarily as individuals
without their social identity, which is also suggested by her description of
the future form of socialism- "For both gender and Lrace,, the scenario that
best finesses the redistribution)recognition dilemma is socialism in the
economy plus deconstruction in the culture. But for this scenario to be
psychologically and politically feasible re$uires that all people be weaned
from their attachment to current cultural constructions of their interests and
identities."9Fraser 233>, ;2= emphasis added@

0hus far " have argued that recognition struggles do not necessarily pull
against redistribution struggles, and that Fraser,s preferred alternativeBthe
fight for e$ual statusBcan not be successful without paying attention to the
need for affirmation. Aer "solution" leads away from groups and toward
individualism despite the fact that she has not shown that group identities
per se are problematic. Aer two main remaining arguments against identity
politics are its tendency toward separatism and toward reification. 0hese
two issues can be found across the literature on identity politics, and " will
address them in some depth in the following section. But " want first to turn
briefly to one fairly idiosyncratic argument Fraser uses that is independent
of the arguments about separatism and reification but that is also
representative of some of the common concerns about identity politics.

Fraser claims that identity politics, though it is generally theoretically
grounded in a tradition of social theory that understands identities as the
product of social interaction, operates with a "monologic" approach to
identity affirmation. "n other words, Fraser charges identity politics with the
view that those outside the designated identity have no right to say
anything about it. *he says-

#aradoxically, moreover, the identity model tends to deny its own
premisses. Aaving begun by assuming that identity is dialogical, constructed
via interaction with another sub(ect, it ends by valori6ing
monologismBsupposing that misrecogni6ed peoples can and should
construct their own identity on their own. "t supposes, further, that a group
has the right to be understood solely in its own termsBthat no one is ever
(ustified in viewing another sub(ect from an external perspective or in
dissenting from another,s self)interpretation.9Fraser E444, 22E@

Aere Fraser is referring to the sort of view that says that only African
Americans can define African American identity or that only /ews can say
who counts as a /ew.

Fraser,s argument concerns two distinct claims designating two different
processes- one is the widely agreed upon fact that identity is constructed
through recognition from another at a 'ind of deep psychological level= the
other is the claim that the process of reassessing and reconstructing
identities that have been denigrated and misrecogni6ed should be done by
those so misrecogni6ed themselves. Fraser claims that, if one holds the first
of these claims, one cannot hold the second. But this doesn,t follow. Kne
can hold both claims without contradiction, as, for example, Frant6 Fanon
did when he argued that blac' people need to redirect their ga6e from the
white man and instead toward each other in see'ing recognition, that they
needed to give up on winning recognition from the imperialist forces and
instead wor' on developing a sense of identity that can yield self)respect
because it is recogni6ed as worthy of respect by other blac' people 9Fanon
237>@. Fanon did not believe that individuals can go about identity
construction by themselves= if they could, withstanding racist insults would
be much easier. But he did believe that the social interactions necessary for
identity formation need not be dominated by the oppressor culture. Aaving
a more accurate and loving recognition from within one,s community can
bolster a strong sense of self and a positive sense of identity, as many
people have experienced.
" doubt that Fraser would hold, against Fanon, that oppressed groups
re$uire recognition from oppressor groups. " suspect that her concern is
with group solipsism, in which all open critical dialogue with those outside
the group is preempted. But it is clear that group solipsism does not follow
from Fanon,s position. "n fact, in the utopian last lines of Blac' *'in, &hite
%as's, Fanon himself holds out the hope for an "authentic communication"
between whites and blac's. Ae says, "*uperiority! "nferiority! &hy not the
$uite simple attempt to touch the other, to feel the other, to explain the
other to myself! ...At the conclusion of this study, " want the world to
recogni6e, with me, the open door of every consciousness."9237>, E;2)E;E@

Fraser,s argument ta'es a familiar form of the slippery slope. First we
repudiate the right of oppressor cultures to define us, and then, she
surmises, we end in group solipsism impervious to outside input. " agree
that group solipsism is to be avoided, but this does not re$uire a
repudiation of the political salience of identity. *olipsism can be avoided by
the recognition that all group identities are internally heterogeneous, that
group members will belong to a diversity of other groups as well, and thus,
dialogical encounters across group differences occur always within groups.
*econdly, solipsism can be argued against on the grounds that some other
groups have experienced oppression also and may well have wise counsel.
"n the positive reconstruction " will give of the concept of identity in chapter
four, it will become clearer why solipsism is not only avoidable, it is strictly
spea'ing impossible, no less for groups than for individuals.

&hat about the favoring of intragroup processes of identity construction and
recognition! "s this either feasible or a good idea! "t does not preclude
productive inter)group interactions around common political goals, or in
other words, political coalition. And favoring intragroup processes ma'es a
lot of sense within a climate of intense, daily denigration of one,s cultural
identity by the dominant society. Kne can perhaps relate this view to the
commonly voiced idea that "Jou don,t have to li'e me, ",m not loo'ing to be
li'ed, " (ust want my rights." 0his is surely motivated by the entirely
plausible sense that, if the oppressed have to wait for love and
understanding from dominant groups, the struggle for social (ustice will be
unnecessarily stymied. But, again, re(ecting the goal of gaining recognition
from oppressor cultures does not re$uire re(ecting input from any and every
external source.

Fraser,s concern with identity politics is not simply based on inter)group
relations but also, and e$ually, intra)group dynamics. *he argues that
identity politics "encourages the reification of group identities"9E444, 22;@
which in turn leads to "conformism, intolerance, and patriarchalism."9E444,
22E@ 0here is no doubt that these problems can occur, as well as defining
authenticity arbitrarily 9e.g. as male, straight, etc.@, and discouraging open
debate by casting aspersions on the authenticity or loyalty of internal critics.
But are such problems intrinsic to identity based political movements! &ill
identity based political organi6ing inevitably devolve in these ways! Kr are
such problems more li'ely under certain 'inds of contextual conditions that
we might identify! For example, it might be the case that identity politics
tend toward reification when the group is so embattled that a mista'en trust
could cost lives. "t is well 'nown that social movements operating under
conditions of intense state repression and surveillance are prone to paranoia
and commandist forms of leadership. "n order to analy6e when, and why,
social movements go wrong, we need careful attention to contextual
conditions, specific histories, economic analyses, and so on.

0he $uestion that remains is why identity itself is ta'en to be the problem
here when one might give see' out other explanations about the
development of the problems Fraser and others identify. &e can all agree
that the internal policing for conformity, de)historici6ed and rigid accounts
of identity, the refusal to consider the possibility of coalition across
differences, and the separation of cultural from economic processes are
mista'es and serious problems in political struggle. But do these mista'es
follow necessarily from ta'ing the political relevance of identity seriously, or
from the desire to affirm identities, or from a notion of utopia in which
social identity still exists!

0he argument against identity launched by Fraser and others clearly has
some missing premises, since the conclusion does not follow from the
evidence presented. &e need to see more precisely what the assumptions
are behind the wholesale criti$ue of identity. "n the following sections " will
summari6e the 'ey arguments, the assumptions behind these arguments,
and then examine the plausibility of each claim.
The Key Arguments
0he political arguments behind the criti$ue of identity can be boiled down to
the following three-
1. (#ron)l* +,l# ,#-ni. or ./l#/r0l id,n#i#i,s will in,1i#02l* 3rod/., 0
3ro2l,4 o+ .on5i.#in) lo*0l#i,s wi#-in 0 l0r),r )ro/3in), s/.- 0s 0 n0#ion, in
w-i.- 40n* s/.- id,n#i#i,s 0r, in.l/d,d6 (.-l,sin),r +or ,7043l, #0r),#s
w-0# -, .0lls #-, 8./l# o+ ,#-ni.i#*8 2,.0/s, i# 8,70)),r0#,s di9,r,n.,s,
in#,nsi:,s r,s,n#4,n#s 0nd 0n#0)onis4s, dri1,s ,1,r d,,3,r #-, 0w+/l
w,d),s 2,#w,,n r0.,s 0nd n0#ion0li#i,s.8$(.-l,sin),r 11, ;;&' I+ id,n#i#*
2* i#s,l+ in#,nsi:,s .on5i.#, #-,n id,n#i#* 20s,d 4o1,4,n#s will w,0<,n #-,
3ossi2ili#* o+ .o0li#ion 0nd l,0d #o s,30r0#is4. C0ll #-is #-, s,30r0#is4
3ro2l,4.
2. A s,.ond .ri#i.is4 o+ id,n#i#* 3oli#i.s is #-0# i# 8,n.o/r0),s #-,
r,i:.0#ion o+ )ro/3 id,n#i#i,s8, 0s Fr0s,r 0r)/,s, w-i.- in #/rn l,0ds #o
8.on+or4is4, in#ol,r0n.,, 0nd 30#ri0r.-0lis4.8$Fr0s,r ;===, 11;-11>' W-,r,
#-, s,30r0#is4 3ro2l,4 worri,s 02o/# r,l0#ions 2,#w,,n )ro/3s, #-is
.ri#i.is4 worri,s 02o/# #-, <inds o+ 3ro2l,4s #-0# ,7is# in in#r0)ro/3
r,l0#ions? #-, 3oli.in) +or .on+or4i#*, #-, 0r2i#r0r* d,:nin) o+ 0/#-,n#i.i#*,
#-, d,-,43-0sis 0nd dis.o/r0),4,n# o+ in#,rn0l di9,r,n.,s, 0nd #-,
3r,,43#in) o+ o3,n d,20#, 2* .0s#i)0#in) in#,rn0l .ri#i.s 0s l,ss 0/#-,n#i.
0nd dislo*0l. T-/s, id,n#i#* 3oli#i.s ./r#0ils #-, indi1id/0l@s 02ili#* #o
.r,0#i1,l* in#,r3r,# #-,ir id,n#i#* 0s w,ll 0s #o d,#,r4in, i#s d,)r,, o+
r,l,10n.,, or irr,l,10n.,, in #-,ir own li1,s. A,.0/s, i# r,i:,s id,n#i#*, #-,n,
id,n#i#* 3oli#i.s .ons#r0ins indi1id/0l +r,,do4. C0ll #-is #-, r,i:.0#ion
3ro2l,4.
And finally
3. #-,r, is #-, 3ro2l,4 id,n#i#i,s 3os, +or r0#ion0l d,li2,r0#ion,
,s3,.i0ll* o1,r 3/2li. ,nds. R0#ion0li#* 40nd0#,s #-0# w, 4/s# 2, 02l, #o
s/2B,.# #-, .l0i4s ,42,dd,d in ./l#/r0l #r0di#ions #o r0#ion0l r,5,.#ion, 0nd
#-is r,C/ir,s 0.-i,1in) ,no/)- dis#0n., +ro4 o/r so.i0l id,n#i#i,s s/.- #-0#
w, .0n o2B,.#i+* 0nd #-/s ,10l/0#, #-,4. Indi1id/0ls n,,d #o 2, 02l, #o
,n#,r #-, 0r,n0 o+ 3/2li. d,20#, 0nd 0.#ion 0s dis30ssion0#, r,0son,rs,
w,i)-in) ,1id,n., on #-, 20sis o+ i#s 4,ri# no 40##,r i#s r,l0#ions-i3 or
i43li.0#ions +or #-, +/#/r, o+ on,@s own so.i0l )ro/3. C0ll #-is #-, r,0sonin)
3ro2l,4.
0hese three problems involve 9at least@ three important corresponding
assumptions, without which the above claims would not be convincing. " am
classifying these as assumptions because they are deep)seated beliefs in
the western philosophical and political traditions rarely given explicit
articulation or defense. " will list them here and then examine them more
carefully in the following, final section.

92a@ 0he separatism problem follows from the assumption that strongly felt
identity is necessarily exclusivist. 0his is what is behind Roosevelt and
&ilson,s arguments against the hyphenated citi6en, but it is also behind
more recent claims that identity politics exacerbates differences. "dentities
are thought to represent a set of interests and experiential 'nowledge or
perspective that differentiates them from other identities, thus creating
difficulties of communication as well as political unity.

.all this the assumption of exclusivity. 0his assumption is also operative in
the reification problem, but the main assumption behind the reification
problem is the following.

9Ea@&hatever is imposed from the outside as an attribution of the self is
necessarily a constraint on individual freedom. *ocial identities, by the very
fact that they are social and thus imposed on the individual, inherently
constrain individual freedom. 5ven if the individual is allowed to interpret
the meaning of their identity, they are forced to do so, in so far as they are
forced to engage with the identities imposed on them by the arbitrary
circumstances of their birth. &e are generally born into social identities,
after all, we don,t choose them. %any thus believe that even those who are
given identities involving privilege are made less free by this despite the
fact that their privilege increases their options vis)a)vis others= privileged
persons are forced to have privilege whether they want it or not and this
constitutes a constraint. "f one considers identities associated with
oppression that carry the weight of discrimination, fear, and hatred, and
that did not even exist prior to the conditions of oppression 9li'e blac'
identity@, it can seem even more odd that anyone would wilfully choose to
be constrained by such an identity.

Kn this view, then, identities are constraining, tout court, no matter
whether privileged or oppressed. 0he problems of conformism et al that are
associated with reification follow from identity per se, and not only some
forms of it. .onformism is itself a 'ind of social imposition= one cannot be a
conformist in a class of one. +iven this, if a political organi6ation or
movement is based on and therefore emphasi6es identity, those constraints
will be emphasi6ed and even maximi6ed for the individuals involved in that
organi6ation or movement. .all this the assumption of the highest value
being individual freedom.

9;a@ 0he reasoning problem associated with identity follows from the
assumption that identities involve a set of interests, values, beliefs and
practices. 0herefore, the sort of reasoning that one is called on to do as a
political leader or simply as a citi6en engaging with public issues of concern
re$uires transcendence of one,s identity, or as much transcendence as
possible, in order to be able to weigh the evidence rationally and without
pre(udice, interpret the relevant data, and give order to conflicting values.
Reasoning, since the 5nlightenment, is defined by (ust this sort of
ob(ectivi6ing, reflective operation, in which one detaches oneself from one,s
assumptions, or "fore'nowledge," in order to put them to the test of
rationality. 0o the extent that identities are li'e containers that group sets of
beliefs and practices across categories of individuals, and to the extent that
a strongly felt identity is defined by its commitment to these beliefs and
practices, then it follows that the strength of identity will exist in inverse
proportion to one,s capacity for rational thought. .all this the ob(ectivi6ing
assumption.

0hese assumptionsBthat identities are exclusivist, imposed from outside
and therefore constraining on individuals, and that their substantive content
provides a counterweight to rationality)))are hardwired into western Anglo
traditions of thought= by that " mean that they are rarely argued for or even
made explicit. "n the remainder of this chapter, " will provide some reasons
that should, at least prima facie, call these assumptions into $uestion.
A More Realistic View
0he criti$ue of identity politics is based on a certain picture of what identity
is, a picture that begins to become visible once from the three assumptions
listed above. 0his picture, however, does not actually correspond to either
the actual lived experience of identity or its politically mobili6ed forms. "n
this section " will begin to develop an alternative account of identity, and
will further develop this in the following two chapters. 0his alternative
account will be used to show the inade$uacy of the assumptions behind the
criti$ue of identity.

et,s start with the assumption that identities are inherently exclusive and
thus tend toward separatism. &hen one goes beyond the anecdotal to the
empirical, there is simply not sufficient evidence for the absoluteness with
which the critics of identity have assumed that strongly felt identities always
tend toward separatism. Kf course there are problems with essentialist
constructions of identity and overly narrow formulations of political
alliances, and there are serious problems with the view that identity itself
constitutes innocence or culpability or that only those sharing an identity
can unite together in common cause. But these positions are the result of
certain 'inds of construals of identity rather than the automatic effect of a
strong sense of group solidarity and group cohesiveness.

"n the National Blac' #olitics *urvey conducted in 233;)233C, the first
survey of mass political opinion among African Americans conducted in the
1nited *tates, one of the most stri'ing findings was a very high degree of
belief in what political theorists call "lin'ed fate"- the belief that what
generally happens to people in your identity group, in this case your racial
group, will significantly affect your life.9:awson 233C= Aolliman and
Brown233>@ Researchers found that over 84O of respondents felt a strong
sense of lin'ed fate with African Americans as a whole. 0he idea of lin'ed
fate means that African)Americans will tend to use group data as a 'ind of
proxy to understand how a given event might impact them or to predict
how a given choice might wor' out for them as individuals.

A belief in lin'ed fate has obvious political ramifications for alliances,
organi6ing, and one,s ability to trust the analyses of political leaders. Jet
researchers also found that less than C4O of their respondents agreed with
such proposals as "blac's should control the economy in mostly blac'
communities," or "blac's should control the government in mostly blac'
communities." 5ven fewer than this 9by about a third@ agreed with the
proposal that "blac's should have their own separate nation." 0hus, the
very high level of group identification that exists among African Americans
showed no evidence of having a correlation to a racially separatist political
approach or a tendency to re(ect coalition efforts.

#olitical scientist /ose 5. .ru6 recently published an important ethnography
of #uerto Rican politics in Aartford .onnecticut 92338@. "n particular, he
analy6ed Aartford,s #uerto Rican #olitical Action .ommittee as a case study
of identity politics in action, in relation both to #R#A.,s effect on the #uerto
Rican community and on that community,s relationship to the dominant
Aartford political scene. 0he #uerto Rican community in Aartford is the
oldest and largest concentration in the 1nited *tates, and by 2334 they
comprised over E<O of the city,s population. Jet they had almost no
political representation in city government. 0he #R#A. too' up ethnic
mobili6ation as "a way of achieving representation and a means to negotiate
individual and group benefits" 9.ru6 2338, 7@, once again, uniting the
demands for recognition with the demands for redistribution. And in fact,
identity based organi6ing led not toward separation but was precisely the
'ey to the enhanced political mobili6ation and involvement of #uerto Ricans
in Aartford politics 9.ru6 2338, 2E@

.ru6 concludes from his study that the focus on their #uerto Rican identity
was not a re(ection of "Americanism" but "a code that structured their
entrance into mainstream society and politics" 9.ru6 2338, 7@. "dentity
politics did not "reify victimi6ation" but "encouraged individuals to overcome
passivity" precisely through a rearticulated "self)image" and the demand of
"e$ual access to positions of responsibility within the civil and political
society" 92E@. Although identity politics there as elsewhere had its problems,
according to .ru6 these "should be seen as cautionary rather than
invalidating."923@ Kn balance, he argues that the identity based political
organi6ing of the #R#A. resulted in significantly increased voter turnout and
in the political representation for #uerto Ricans not only in the city but in
the state. 0he very possibility of coalitions with the blac' and white
communities of Aartford re$uires this political mobili6ation and involvement.
.ru6 concludes that the view that identity politics bal'ani6es the political
landscape and threatens the viability of the political order is more in tune
with simplistic and misinformed apprehensions about the role of conflict in
politics than with the more reasoned and well)established political science
axiom that societal integration and political power are inextricably bound.
As #hilip +ourevitch suggests, the threat of conflict often lies in the inability
of those who feel threatened to ascertain what the conflict is exactly about.
0his is, in no small measure, true of identity politics and the feelings of
distress that it causes among those who see only chaos and instability in its
wa'e.923@

.ru6,s study provides further support for the argument of "cultural
citi6enship" advanced by anthropologist Renato Rosaldo and developed by
the interdisciplinary group of scholars involved in the atino .ultural *tudies
&or'ing +roup, who have led research teams in .alifornia, 0exas, and New
Jor' 9see Flores and Benmayor 233>@. 0he concept of cultural citi6enship is
meant to counter a model of the abstract individual citi6en who participates
in civil society as a rational agent imagined to have no gender, race, or
cultural bac'ground. Rosaldo argued that this model is ineffective in
addressing the pre(udices that beset white women and people of color when
they enter the public arena, such as the interrupting of their speech,
dismissal of arguments, and peremptory re(ections. "n actuality, the public
arena is a space where women and men of various races and cultures
negotiate with one another, and the concept of the cultural citi6en allows us
to understand those specific identities as an integral part of one,s activity as
a citi6en, the basis, in some cases, of the 'nowledge they bring and very
rights they are claiming, rather than that which must be "left at the door."
Rosaldo points out that part of the problem here has been a view that
"regards culture as a relic, an inert heirloom handed down wholecloth from
time immemorial" rather than as a 'ind of social practice always involving
"innovation and change" 9Rosaldo 238<, E@. A more accurate understanding
of what cultures are will yield a more realistic account of cultural identity
and its impact on politics.

Another relevant study is being conducted by Kmar 5ncarnacion on civil
society and the impact of identity)based organi6ing in *outh America.
95ncarnacion E444@ 5ncarnacion argues that in Bra6il, where since the
2374,s there has been a virtual explosion of identity politics in the form of
the Blac' consciousness movement, the result of this explosion has been an
expansion of popular participation in politics, of notions of citi6enship, of the
boundaries of the policy arena, and a flourishing of political associations.
0his has visibly empowered civil society vis)a)vis the state. Rather than
crippling the progressive movement, then, identity politics has expanded its
base, its agenda, and its effectivity.24

5ncarnacion has hypothesi6ed that identity politics had these effects in
Bra6il)))which has not been the case in every country where identity politics
has emerged in *outh America)))because of the existence of what he calls a
"progressive left" in the form of the Bra6ilian &or'er,s #arty, which has
consistently emphasi6ed classic concerns of social liberalism such as
women,s e$uality, environmental protection, and an end to racial
discrimination. 0hus, the critical factor for an effective left was not whether
there were identity)based political movements, but whether the left labor
organi6ations understood these movements as a diversion from or an
integral part of their own struggle for a better society.

0hese empirical findings clearly suggest that we need a better account of
the nature of identity itself than the sorts of accounts one finds among the
critics. *trongly felt identities in reality do not uniformly lead to the political
disasters the critics portend because identities in reality are not what the
critics understand them to be. &hat we need to understand, then, is how it
is possible that identities that are strongly felt and considered to have
political relevance can be such that they do not lead to separatism.

0he notion that identities lead to separatism or mutually exclusive political
agendas seems to be based on the idea that identities represent discrete
and specifiable sets of interests. "dentities, it is assumed, must therefore
operate on the model of interest group politics- a specific set of interests is
represented by lobbyists or movement leaders in order to advance that
specific agenda. 0hat agenda may, naturally, come into conflict with other
agendas put forward, or even with the "ma(ority,s interests," and thus there
will be a conflict that can be addressed through compromise but never
completely resolved. 0he notion of interest groups has gotten a very bad
reputation in 1.*. political discourse, where "special interest groups" are
viewed as single)mindedly advancing one agenda and as incapable of
considering other points of view or a larger frame of reference in which the
"common good" is considered. "*pecial interest groups" have particular pre)
set agendas for the promotion of which reason becomes attenuated to the
instrumental calculation of advancing that cause, without the possibility of
calling the cause into $uestion or of modifying it in light of larger public
concerns. %inority constituencies have often been characteri6ed as li'e
special interest groups in these ways.

*ocial identities can and sometimes do operate as interest groups, but that
is not what identities essentially are. Kn the basis of analy6ing a wide
sample of identity based movements, sociologist %anuel .astells, describes
identity as a generative source of meaning, necessarily collective rather
than wholly individual, and useful as a source of agency as well as a
meaningful narrative.9.astells 233>, >@. 0his account accords with the
research by .ru6, 5ncarnacion, and Rosaldo as well. "n analy6ing identity
based political movements, .astells offers a typology of identity
constructions corresponding to a variety of political agendas and historical
contexts. Ais wor' provides a model for the 'ind of contextual analysis "
called for earlier that would analy6e the operation of concepts within
contexts rather than assuming that concepts operate uniformly across
contexts. " will turn to .astells later on for more help in developing an
empirically ade$uate description of identity, but here it is enough to note
that .astells, wor' also strongly counters the view that identity politics
always tends toward the same political forms or that the political relevance
of identity always is cashed out in similar fashion.

"n a more philosophical account based more in his readings of contemporary
literature, *atya %ohanty argues that identity constructions provide
narratives that explain the lin's between group historical memory and
individual contemporary experience, that they create unifying frames for
rendering experience intelligible, and thus they help to map the social
world.9%ohanty 233>@ 0o the extent that identities involve meaning)ma'ing,
there will always be alternative interpretations of the meanings associated
with identity, %ohanty explains, but he insists that identities refer to real
experiences.

Kf course, identities can be imposed on people from the outside. But that is
more of a brand than a true identity, or more of an ascription than a
meaningful characteri6ation of self. "dentities must resonate with and unify
lived experience, and they must provide a meaning that has some
purchase, however partial, on the sub(ect,s own daily reality. *upporting
%ohanty,s realism about identity, Anuradha :ingwaney and awrence
Needham explain identity,s lived experience as that which "signifies
affective, even intuitive, ways of being in, or inhabiting, specific cultures....it
is perceived as experience that proceeds from identity that is given or
inherited...but it is also, and more significantly, mediated by what *atya
%ohanty calls Lsocial narratives, paradigms, even ideologies.,"9:ingwaney
and Needham 2337, E2@ "n other words, although experience is sometimes
group)related 9and thus identity)related@, its meaning is not unambiguous.
:ingwaney and Needham go on to say, following *tuart Aall, that- &hat we
have are events, interactions, political and other identifications, made
available at certain historical con(unctures, that are then wor'ed through in
the process of constructing, andMor affiliating with, an identity. Aowever, to
say that identity is constructed is not to say that it is available to any and
every person or group who wishes to inhabit it. 0he voluntarism that
inheres in certain elaborations of the constructedness of identity ignores, as
Aall also notes... Lcertain conditions of existence, real histories in the
contemporary world, which are not exclusively psychical, not simply
(ourneys of the mind,= thus it is incumbent upon us to recogni6e that
Levery identity is placed, positioned, in a culture, a language, a history., "t
is for this reason that claims about Llived experience, resonate with such
force in conflicts over what does or does not constitute an appropriate
interpretation of culturally different phenomena.9:ingwaney and Needham
E4)E2= ?uoted from Aall 238>, CC)C<@.

0his is an account of identity that holds both that identity ma'es an
epistemic difference and that identity is the product of a complex mediation
involving individual agency in which its meaning is produced rather than
merely perceived or experienced. "n other words, identity is not merely that
which is given to an individual or group, but is also a way of inhabiting,
interpreting, and wor'ing through, both collectively and individually, an
ob(ective social location and group history.

&e might, then, more insightfully define identities as positioned or located
lived experiences in which both individuals and groups wor' to construct
meaning in relation to historical experience and historical narratives. +iven
this view, one might hold that, when " am identified, it is my hori6on of
agency which is identified. 0hus, identities are not lived as a discrete and
stable set of interests, but as a site from which one must engage in the
process of meaning)ma'ing and thus from which one is open to the world.
0he hermeneutic insight is that the self operates in a situated plane, always
culturally located with great specificity even as it is open onto an
indeterminate future and a reinterpretable past, not of its own creation. 0he
self carries with it always this hori6on as a specific location, with substantive
contentBas, for example, a specifiable relation to the holocaust, to slavery,
to the encuentro, and so on)))but whose content only exists in
interpretation and in constant motion. 0he holocaust is one dramatic
example that not only exists as an aspect of every contemporary /ewish
person,s hori6on but also of every .hristian 5uropean. But there will be a
difference in the way that these two groups are situated vis)a)vis this
narrative- the one as 'nowing that he or she could have been the target of
the "final solution," and the other as 'nowing that this event occurred
within the broad category of their culture. 5ach must react to or deal with
this event in some way, but to say this does not presuppose any pre) given
interpretation either to the event or to its degree of significance in forming a
contemporary identity. 0here is even a vibrant debate over the degree of
significance the holocaust holds for /ewish identity today. But, obviously, for
some time to come, it will remain a central feature of the map of our
collective /ewish and +entile hori6ons.

"n what sense are identities grouped then, if they are to be a meaningful
political category, if not by mutual interests and shared experiences which
must form each individual at least to some extent in the same way!
Although meanings are made and remade, the "internal" agency of the
individual to (udge, to choose, or to act operates within and in relation to a
specific hori6on, and thus one is open to an indeterminacy but from a
specifiable position. Recogni6ing the openness of identity and historical
experience to interpretation must be tempered, however. 0here remains a
certain amount of uniformity of experience within an identity group, though
only in regard to a more or less small sector of their experience, for
example, that sector involving being treated in the society as a certain
identity, or having a common relationship to social power and specific
historical events.

0here is also an important epistemic implication of identity, which %ohanty
describes as follows- "...social locations facilitate or inhibit 'nowledge by
predisposing us to register and interpret information in certain ways. Kur
relation to social power produces forms of blindness (ust as it enables
degrees of lucidity."9%ohanty 233>, E;C@ Kn this account, identity does not
determine one,s interpretation of the facts, nor does it constitute fully
formed perspectives, but rather, to use the hermeneutic terminology once
again, identities operate as hori6ons from which certain aspects or layers of
reality can be made visible. "n stratified societies, differently identified
individuals do not always have the same access to points of view or
perceptual planes of observation. 0wo individuals may participate in the
same event, but have perceptual access to different aspects of that event.
*ocial identity is relevant to epistemic (udgement, then, not because
identity determines (udgement but because identity can in some instances
yield access to perceptual facts that themselves may be relevant to the
formulation of various 'nowledge claims or theoretical analyses. As %ohanty
and others have also argued, social location can be correlated with certain
highly specific forms of blindness as well as lucidity. 0his would ma'e sense
if we interpret his account as correlating social identity to a 'ind of access
to perceptual facts- to claim that some perceptual facts are visible from
some locations is correlatively to claim that they are hard to see from
others. *ocial identity operates then as a rough and fallible but useful
indicator of differences in perceptual access.

0his 'ind of hermeneutic descriptive account of social identities is more true
to lived experience and more helpful in illuminating their real epistemic and
political implications. As a located opening out onto the world, different
identities have no a priori conflict. Aspects of hori6ons are naturally shared
across different positions, and no aspect comes with a stable ready)made
set of political views. &hat is shared is having to address in some way, even
if it is by flight, the historical situatedness and accompanying historical
experiences of a given identity group to which one has some concrete
attachment. Because of this, and because identities mar' social position,
the epistemic differences between identities are not best understood as
correlated to differences of 'nowledge, since 'nowledge is always the
product in part of bac'ground assumptions and values that are not always
grouped by identity categories. Rather, the epistemic difference is in, so to
spea', what one can see, from one,s vantage point. &hat one can see
underdetermines 'nowledge or the articulation of interests, but the
correlation between possibilities of perception and identity mandates the
necessity of ta'ing identity into account in formulating decision ma'ing
bodies or 'nowledge producing institutions. *uch an idea is implicit in the
concept of representative government. 0he second assumption at wor' in
the identity criti$ue that " listed in the last section was the idea that social
identity is inherently constraining on individual freedom because it is
imposed from the outside. /udith Butler ma'es this point in 0he #sychic ife
of #ower- "Vulnerable to terms that one never made, one persists Hi.e.
continues as a sub(ectI always, to some degree, through categories, names,
terms, and classifications that mar' a primary alienation in sociality."9Butler
233>, E8@

&estern thought has developed two sharply conflicting lines of argument
over the last E44 years. Kn the one hand, the enlightenment calls on
individuals to thin' for themselves, and holds that autonomy and thus the
capacity of reason 9which re$uires autonomy@ necessitates that the
individual be able to separate from all that is externally imposed on it in
order to evaluate and consider these imposed ideas. 0o the extent that one
has features that are dependent on others, in the way Butler describes for
example, this is necessarily a wea'ening of the self and a loss of freedom.
Kn the other hand, since Aegel every ma(or psychological account of the
self has placed its dependence on the other at the center of self)formation.
For Aegel, one needs the Kther to recogni6e one,s status as a self)directing
sub(ect in order to create the conditions for the self)directing activity= one,s
self image is mediated through the self)other relation not only in terms of
its substantive content but also in terms of the self as bare capacity. For
Freud, the other is internali6ed to become a central organi6ing principle for
one,s desire, one,s needs, and one,s life plans. Feminist and postcolonial
theories have emphasi6ed the deformations of the self in hostile
environments. 0hus, on the one hand freedom re$uires reason which
re$uires the ability to separate from the other, while on the other hand, the
self is ineluctably dependent on the other,s interpellations. "f both of these
traditions are broadly correct, it would seem that we are doomed to
unfreedom, because freedom is defined as precisely that which we cannot
have. " will loo' at these traditions in some detail in the next chapter.

A hermeneutic account again has advantages here. 0he Kther is internal to
the self,s substantive content, a part of its own hori6on, and thus a part of
its own identity. 0he mediations performed by individuals in processes of
self)interpretation, the mediations by which individual experience comes to
have specific meanings, are produced through a fore)'nowledge or historical
a priori that is cultural, historical, politically situated, and collective. "n this
sense, it is less true to say that " am dependent on the Kther)))as if we are
clearly distinguishable)))than that the Kther is a part of myself. %oreover,
one,s relation to this fore'nowledge is not primarily one of negation= it
ma'es possible the articulation of meanings and the formulation of
(udgement and action. Kne,s relation is better characteri6ed precisely as
absorption, generation, and expansion, a building from rather than an
imposition that curtails preferred possibilities.

&hether this fact about the self necessarily limits our capacity for reason
brings us to the final assumption " listed, that the capacity of reason
re$uires a transcendence of identity. Kne way to approach this would be to
say that transcendence is simply impossible, and there is abundant
evidence that because reasoning in all but deductive arguments 9and even
those have to start with a premise@ involves phronesis or a (udgement call
which invo'es bac'ground assumptions and values, identity is always
operative in reasoning. 0he wholesale repudiation of identity attachments is
often itself a form of tribalism under cover, as in *chlesinger,s argument
against multiculturalist "cults of ethnicity" on the grounds of 5urope,s
uni$ue cultural values. &hen 0eddy Roosevelt painted a contrast between
"Americanness" on the one hand, and polyglot hyphenated ethnic
associations on the other, he failed to reali6e that his view of
"Americanness" was (ust as ethnic as those he opposed.

Aowever, the very notion that transcendence of identity is necessary for
reason is itself a mista'e. 5lshtain argues that social identities are and
should be private, even though they are obviously constructed largely
through social relations. And she assumes that private identities cannot
follow rules of civility or pursue public ends but are reduced to narrow self)
interest group calculations. For 5lshtain, the importance that ieberman
attaches to his identity might well render him a problematic political
candidate.

But the reason why identity is argued to be in conflict with reason is
because identity is conceptuali6ed as coherent, uniform, and essentially
singular, as if what it means to be %exican American is a coherent set of
attributes and dispositions shared by all members of the group and
essentially closed or stable. "f this were the case, and to the extent there
are people who believe this to be the case and who act on that belief, there
is indeed a conflict, since the closed nature of such an identity will close one
off to the new possibilities that rational deliberation can ma'e evident. But
once one understands identity as hori6on, an opening out, a point from
which to see, there is no conflict. Aow could there be reason without sight,
without a starting place, without some bac'ground from which critical
$uestions are intelligible!

0he mista'e made by Richard Rorty and some others li'e him, who do
accept the importance of cultural identity in setting out bac'ground for
thought, is to thin' that, because hori6ons can be mapped onto identities,
we are bereft of communication across the expanse, doomed to
incommensurable paradigms= in short, we will never be able to understand
one another, and therefore we will never be able to resolve conflict through
dialogue. 0his is simply a profound mis)characteri6ation of culture and of
identity, as if they were closed systems with no intersections. Kf course
there will always exist some common ground from which to chart a
disagreement. Kf course understanding across wide differences will never
be complete, but of course it will always be partially possible. %oreover,
given the dynamic nature of identity, existing gulfs are not li'ely to remain
forever. 0he true route to understanding across difference is a literal
movement of place, which will re$uire a change of social institutions and
structures.

" have endeavored to ma'e a case in this chapter that there is yet a case to
be made about the nature of identity and its political and epistemic
implications. "t is certainly not the case that the wor' we need to do is
finished= there are numerous "authentic" problems of identity that need
attending, but we don,t need to overcome as much as to more deeply
understand identity.

et me end with another example that illustrates the practical implications
of my claim that the recognition of the political relevance of identities is
re$uired for, rather than opposed to, unity and effective class struggle. 0he
attempt to form a abor #arty in the 1.*. in the 2334,s was heralded by
many of us who maintain hopes in deconstructing the two)party bloc on
1.*. electoral politics. But " decided not to wor' for the party for the
following reason. 0he national leadership organi6ation of the party was
being organi6ed exclusively through union membership. 0hus, it would be
composed only of representatives from unions.22 0his might appear to
ma'e sense for a party calling itself a abor #arty. But in reality, not only is
it the case that less than twenty per cent of 1.*. wor'ers are organi6ed, but
also, a number of nonwhite wor'ers do not necessarily see their union as
the most reliable spo'esperson for their needs. 0hey may see the local
NAA.# chapter, their church or other community organi6ation based around
a shared ethnic identity as more reliable and also as a place where they
have more of a voice. By refusing to seat such groups at the top, the abor
#arty was not effective in brea'ing from the traditional white dominance of
the abor movement. By refusing to recogni6e the salience of social
identities li'e race and gender, they undermined the possibility of unity and
wea'ened class struggle in the 1nited *tates.