Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
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L-63630; 6 Apr
1990]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Patrolmen
Silverio
and
Romeo
Punzalan
were
present case,
found
to
have
been
enter
the
house.
Police Officers had an information that the petitioners residence was being
used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with
the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was
not present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner Ma. Luisa
was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero
to ask permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly
being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Petitioner
Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the
search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of
Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long
time
family
friend
of
the
Veroys.
recommended.
Issue: Whether or Not Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third
door leading to the children's room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then
due
process
and
equal
protection
clauses
of
the
Constitution.
entered the children's room and conducted the search. Capt. Obrero
recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) live
bullets in a blackclutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full
jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the
been laid to rest in the case of Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January
30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held that the declaration of
revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted polo shirts, men's brief,
two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped gray polo.sweat shirt,
two (2) pairs men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small
found in the master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was instructed by Capt.
construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure
house.
terms. The terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or "possess" are capable of
21,
1991
[193
SCRA
122]).
None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for
searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used
as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero
City while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were
was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because he did
being charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole
not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that
circumstance that the house wherein the items were found belongs to them.
he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not
persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to
Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel
seizure. Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero
had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their
had
ample
time
to
procure
search
warrant
but
did
not.
residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence
of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority
to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The items taken
prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily
were,
their
illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this
kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are
them.
prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been
therefore, products of
an
illegal
search,
violative
of
seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule
Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was
absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search
criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the
knowledge
or
voluntariness
there
is
no
crime.
?
Two civilian informants informed the PNP Narcom that one Jun
was engaged in illegal drug activities and the Narcom agents decided to
entrap and arrenst Jun in a buy-bust operation.
?
On the day of entrapment, PO3 Manlangit handed Jun the marked
bills and Jun instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him while he got the
marijuana from his associate.
?
When they met up, Jun gave PO3 something wrapped in plastic
upon which PO3 arrested Jun. They frisked Jun but did not find the
marked bills on him. Jun revealed that he left the money at the house of
his associate named neneth
?
They wen to Neneths house. PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box
under the dinin table and noticed something wrapped in plastic inside the
box.
?
Suspicious, PO3 entered the house and took hold of the box and
found that it ha 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
?
Simultaneously, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from
Neneth. The policemen arrested Neneth and took both her and Jun, together
with the coz, its contents and the marked bill and turned them over to the
investigator at headquarters,
?
Jun was then learned to be Florencio Doria while Neneth is Violata
Gaddao.
?
They were both convicted feloniously selling, administering and
giving away to another 11 plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,
in violation of R.A 6425, as amended by RA 7659
Issue: WON Violeta Gaddao is liable
?
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense that can be raised by an
accused & partakes the nature of a confession & avoidance.
?
American federal courts and state courts usually use the subjective
or origin of intent test laid down in Sorrells v. U.S. to determine whether
entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accuseds
predisposition to commit the offense is charged, his state of mind and
inclination before his initial exposure to government agents.
?
Another test is the objective test where the test of entrapment is
whether the conduct of the law enforcement agenst was likely to induce a
normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to
commit the offense.
?
The objective test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of
the purported transaction must be clearly & adequately shown. Courts
should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to
P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he
successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the
NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From
his position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the
house
what
he
wanted. Ani
said he
wanted
more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into
the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaperwrappers containing
dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a
signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested
Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not
find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt.
Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to thekitchen and found a cellophane colored
white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa
about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found
dried marijuanaleaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.
PEOPLE VS. MUSA [217 SCRA 597; G.,R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN 1993]
Issue: Whether
or
Not
the
seizure
of
the plastic
bag and
Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be
admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to
Facts:
a suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested
to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
named ACCUSED without being lawfully authorized, did then and there
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the purpose of selling the same from
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
from
the
plain
view
of
the
Issues:
object.
a)Whether or not the accused is also liable Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425 aside
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police.
They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in
search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore,
the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the
plain
view
of
said
object.
Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized
Held:
Yes. In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was
established only by the accused herself. Moreover, it is a well-established
rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony. The judgment
appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Sec. 4, Art II of R.A. 5425
Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat.
Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan,
Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with
kakawati leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled
goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was
driven by Rudy Caballes y Taio. When asked what was loaded on the jeep,
he did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes
consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles
of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by
National Power Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed
700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires
came from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town
approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes
and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan
Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded
with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of
Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal
jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an information dated
16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and
hence, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of
Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November
1998, the trial court denied Caballes motion for reconsideration. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes
appealed the decision by certiorari.
Issue: Whether Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt.
Noceja that the latter will look at the contents of his vehicle and he
answered in the positive be considered as waiver on Caballes part on
warrantless search and seizure.
Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to
be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and
seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary
rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of
certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of
moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by
the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with.
In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a
warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is
purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the
articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and seizure
conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a search warrant.
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police
officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without
warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of
probable cause. Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual
search or visual inspection of Caballes vehicle. They had to reach inside
the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they
were able to see the cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple
routine check. Also, Caballes vehicle was flagged down because the police
officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that
the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according
to them, was unusual and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked
suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with
kakawati leaves does not constitute probable cause as would justify the
conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do
not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that
petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could
otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete
with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause
to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the
present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally
surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which
the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them
to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When Caballes vehicle
was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and told him I will
look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive. By
uttering those words, it cannot be said the police officers were asking or
requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of
Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing
upon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The consent given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of
the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where the Court upheld the
Appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga were charged
of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. It appears from the evidence adduced by the
prosecution that in August of 1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting
surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned
from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion
from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks.
SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two
female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the appellant
Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga.[3] In front of them was
a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy behavior
when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to
Kabayan Center No.2 located at the same barangay. They brought with
them the black bag.
ISSUE:
RULING:
NO.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San
Fernando, Pampanga on October 23, 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu
conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the
articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos
During their arraignment, both entered a plea of Not Guilty. Trial on the
merits ensued.
Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account
the object and documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latters
failure to formally offer them. Absent any formal offer, she argues that they
again must be deemed inadmissible.
After trial, the court convicted appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga,
thus:
SO ORDERED.
Likewise, we find nothing improbable in the failure of the police officers to
note and remember the name of the tricycle driver for the reason that it was
unnecessary for them to do so. It was not shown that the driver was in
complicity with the appellant and her co-accused in the commission of the
crime.
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen
and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the
team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate
No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport
documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them
at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to
gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. 2
The special Action and nvestigation Division of DENr also procured a
search warrant from Jusge Adriano Osorio of RTC Valenzuela, by virtue of the
warrant, the team seized for truckloads of narra woods including almaciaga and
supa. Moreover, the lumberyard of the petitioner was also placed under
administrative seizure. For failure to produce certificates of lumber origins, auxiliary
invoices, tally sheets and delivery receipts.
Subsequently, the Sec of DENR Factoran issued an order confiscating the
woods seized in the truck of the petitioner as well as those found in their
lumberyard.
Thus, the petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari and prohibition
contending that the search and seizure operation by the respondents is a violation
under Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution for not having a valid search warrant.
Second case:
People vs. Capulong et al
This case deals with whether the Forestry Code where the petitioner
allegedly violated refers to either timber or lumber
Issue:
Was the warrantless search and seizure invalid?
Held:
No. It is a valid warrantless search being one of the statutory instances that
accepted.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted
exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search and seizure shall be made
except by a virtue of a warrant. Thus a search could be lawfully conducted on a
moving vehicle without a search warrant.
In the case at bar, the conducted search and seizure is indeed without a
valid warrant, however, it was conducted to search the materials that can be found
in a moving vehicle, which is the truck of the first case.
People vs. Figueroa
Facts:
The accused was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions and and of RA 645 and subsequently convicted by the RTC Br. 23 of
Trece Martires in Cavite.
While serving the warrant of arrest, the officers noticed, strewn around,
aluminum foil packages of different sizes in the sala. Suspecting thus the presence
of "shabu" in the premises, the arresting officers requested appellant, as well as his
brother and sister, to acquiesce to a search of the house. The search yielded a .45
caliber pistol, a magazine, seven live ammunitions, and a match box containing an
aluminum foil package with "shabu." Confronted, Figueroa denied ownership of the
items. An inventory was conducted by the PC team, attested to by Barangay
Captain Bigornia, of the seized items.
The accused questions the admissibility in evidence of the firearm and
confiscated ammunition for it was discovered during a warrantless search.
Issue:
Was their an unlawful warrantless search and seizure.
Held:
No. the search and seizure of the articles sought is a valid being a search
incidental to an arrest.
The .45 caliber pistol, magazine and rounds of ammunition were not
unlawfully obtained. While the SC might concede difficulty in readily accepting the
statement of the prosecution that the search was conducted with consent freely
given by appellant and members of his household, it should be pointed out, in any
case, that the search and seizure was done admittedly on the occasion of a lawful
arrest.
A significant exception from the necessity for a search warrant is when the
search and seizure is effected as an incident to a lawful arrest.
As a doctrine in jurisprudence, the warrantless search and seizure, as an
incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surrounding under his immediate control.
Objects in the `plain view' of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence."