SAIMUN 2014

UNITED
NATIONS
HISTORIC
COUNCIL



BACKGROUND GUIDE











CHAIRPERSON-
SHAZEEB M
KHAIRUL
ISLAM

VICE
CHAIRPERSON-
SOWDAMINI
POGARU



NOTE FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Dear delegates,
Welcome! Its our pleasure to welcome you to the Historic Security Council at
SAI MUN 2013. My name is Shazeeb M Khairul Islam and Im going to serve
as your Chairperson for this session and Ill be joined by Sowdamini Pogaru
who will be serving as the Vice Chairperson. We are both available at any time
to answer any queries or put to rest any concerns that you may have regarding
the council.

Firstly, a little about myself; for those who dont know Im currently pursuing
a MBA Degree at University of Dhaka. I have been associated with 11 Model
United Nations and this is for the first time I will be chairing in an International
Model United Nations. I am very excited to meet you all. I will make sure MUN
is fun when it is SAIMUN.


And our Vice Chairperson, Sowdamini Pogaru is delighted to have you all at
SAIMUN 2014. She assures you, delegates, that it is a MUN that stays in your
memory no matter what and that youve made the right choice by choosing to
attend.

As for council, Ill deal with certain obvious questions right now. For the sake
of the environment, laptops will be allowed in council though Id greatly
appreciate it if your nose wasnt buried in it the entire time. The use of internet,
need I say it, is strictly forbidden inside council and any infringement of this
rule will have dire consequences. The proof you need to submit when it comes
to the validity of any claim is in this order of priority: Reuters reports> UN
reports> Government reports.

Also delegates, try to broaden your minds somewhat with this council. It is true
that we are bound by time restraints and certain occurrences but we also have
the power of hindsight and retrospect to aid us so it would be brilliant to see you
change the course of history. However, it is equally crucial to remember the
setting in which you find yourself. The freeze date is June 4th, 1967. How the
council proceeds, well, youll see that once were in our council room. The
geopolitical scene was vastly different from what we see today and it will be
important to take all of these changes into account if we are to simulate this
council successfully.
I hope youll all arrive well researched and excited to enter three days of
dynamic debating, name calling and various other tantrums that well witness
before our time together is done. Were greatly looking forward to seeing you
all in July.

Cheers!
Executive Board.





































HISTORY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the organ of the United
Nations charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Its
powers, outlined in the United Nations Charter, include the establishment of
peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions regimes,
and the authorization for military action. Its powers are exercised through
United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

Under Chapter Six of the Charter, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", the Security
Council "may investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to
international friction or give rise to a dispute". The Council may "recommend
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" if it determines that the
situation might endanger international peace and security. These
recommendations are not binding on UN members.

Under Chapter Seven, the Council has broader power to decide what measures
are to be taken in situations involving "threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, or acts of aggression". In such situations, the Council is not limited to
recommendations but may take action, including the use of armed force "to
maintain or restore international peace and security". This was the basis for
UN armed action in Korea in 1950 during the Korean War. Decisions taken
under Chapter Seven, such as economic sanctions, are binding on UN members.
The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House,
London.

Though the council has met at many locations since its first meeting, the seat of
the UNSC is at the UN headquarters in New York City, where the Security
Council members are always present so they can meet at any time to deal with
any crisis. The basic structure of the UNSC is set out in Chapter V of the UN
Charter. The role of president of the Security Council involves setting the
agenda, presiding at its meetings and overseeing any crisis. It rotates in
alphabetical order of the Security Council member nations' names in English.

There are two categories of membership in the UN Security Council: permanent
members and elected members. The Council seated five permanent members
who were originally drawn from the victorious powers after World War II:

The Republic of China
The French Republic
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The United States of America
It is significant to note that at the time of the Six Day War, Chinas interests
were represented by the Republic of China not the Peoples Republic of China,
which didnt take its seat in the SC until 1971.
The Russias interests, of course, were represented by the USSR, not the
Russian Federation, which didnt take its seat in the SC until 1991.

These were two of the three times when the SCs composition has changed, the
first and most important one being in 1965 when amendments to articles 23 and
27 came into effect to increase the number of elected members from six to ten.

Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, Security Council decisions on all
substantive matters require the affirmative votes of nine members. A negative
vote, or veto, by a permanent member prevents adoption of a proposal, even if it
has received the required number of affirmative votes.

Abstention is not regarded as a veto despite the wording of the Charter.

A state that is a member of the UN, but not of the Security Council, may
participate in Security Council discussions in matters by which the Council
agrees that the country's interests are particularly affected. In recent years, the
Council has interpreted this loosely, enabling many countries to take part in its
discussions or not depending on how they interpret the validity of the
country's interest. Non-members are routinely invited to take part when they are
parties to disputes being considered by the Council.















BACKGROUND ON THE SIX DAY WAR

History is witness to the frequent wars that have been waged over the territory
of Palestine whose ownership has passed from the First Jews to the Assyrians,
the Babylonians, the Persians, the Romans and finally the Turks.
However, despite all the strife in the region, the Jews never gave up their hope
of the Promised Land, which they believed was their ancient homeland given
to them by God. They continued to migrate there in small numbers. Palestine
remained central to Jewish culture and worship even if it wasnt theirs. Thus, a
century ago the Jews never even dreamt of actually establishing their homeland
there. The Jewish connection was mostly messianic redemption and a vague
notion of deliverance.
When AntiSemitism took a violent streak (at about the end of the 19th century)
a large number of Jews had left their earlier places of stay and had migrated
elsewhere. It was during this time, in the year 1914, that the concept of Israel
actually evolved. This was strongly promoted by men such as Theodor Herzel a
leading proponent of the Zionist movement.
Arab rights over Palestine arise from the fact that they were the last conquerors
of Palestine (albeit under the aeges of the Turkish Empire which had absorbed
most Arab lands). Thus by 1914, two rival groups had settled in Palestine with
each of them beginning to view the territory as their homeland. The Arabic
population had been estimated to be around 650,000 and the Jews at 85,000 (a
minority that would become significant in the years to come).
In the sunny year of 1915, a series of letters were exchanged between the then
Sharif of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in
Egypt. The subject of the letters was the future division of the Ottoman Empire
territories with regard to the Arab land. These were later known as the
HusseinMcMahon correspondences. The Turks had just allied with Germany in
the First World War and the British were looking for help from the Arabs to
topple them. Hussein demanded land for the Arabs where they could form their
own independent nations. McMahon responded in kind stating that, after the
War would get over, their demands would be met, subject to certain conditions.
It is this that forms the basis of Arabic argument for Palestine.
However, when through the Balfour Declaration Britain supported the
establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the Arabs cried foul. The
British countered by saying that they had not included the territory of Palestine
in the correspondence. The Arabs had no choice but to accept the rising influx
of Jewish people into Palestine (this was the time when the idea of Israel was
gaining popularity among Jews).
Earlier in 1916, the French and the British had made secret plans for dividing
the Ottoman Empire after the First World War for their own benefit. This was
known as the SykesPicot Agreement. When this came to light, it further
deteriorated the image of Britain. The Arabs were particularly angered with this
because they considered this in direct violation of the Hussein McMahon
correspondence. Many historians consider this the turning point of ArabWestern
relations.
The Palestine problem became an international issue towards the end of the
First World War with the disintegration of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. The
League of Nations was established at a historic meeting in the French suburb of
Versailles. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations established the
Mandates system and the area of Palestine, promised to both the Jews and the
Arabs by the British were eventually returned to the British.
The primary aim of the Mandates system was to facilitate the movement
towards freedom of the Mandatory Territories, and, as expected all but one
achieved their goal. The exception was Palestine. Instead of being limited to
"the rendering of administrative assistance and advice" the Mandate had as a
primary objective the implementation of the "Balfour Declaration" issued by the
British Government in 1917, expressing support for "the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people".
The period between the two World Wars was one of unrest, violence and
hostility. Arabic and Jewish communities openly fought against each other and
between the years of 193639 a massive Arabic rebellion took place against the
British. The extremist Jews too were frustrated with Britains doublestandards
and targeted the British. Inter communal fighting broke out with Arabs targeting
Jews and the Jews forming a Jewish Defense Force. Despite the upheavals and
increasingly fragile political situation, the British continued to try to find a
solution.
However each of their proposed solutions either managed to anger one or other
of the conflicting sides or made no difference at all. Adding to all this was the
everincreasing influx of Jewish immigrants trying to escape Nazi persecution in
a war-torn Europe, which only worsened the situation.
By 1947, Britain decided it had had enough. It abruptly decided to hand over the
problem to the newly formed United Nations. The UNO decided to partition the
land of Palestine into two nations, one Jewish and the other Arabic. The Arabs
rejected the idea because they were given lesser territory despite being the
majority. On the last day of the mandate, that fateful day of May 15, 1948,
Israel declared its independence.


ISRAELI INDEPENDENCE
Immediately after this proclamation, Israel was attacked by five Arab
countriesLebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Egypt and Iraq. Despite the nascent
nature of the State of Israel, it managed to win a resounding victory against all
five nations and captured more territory than what was originally allocated to
them. The Arabs were humiliated.
The Israeli victory and the establishment of a Jewish state did not put a rest to
the Palestinian issue. A colossal amount of Arab Palestinians (estimated at
about 726,000) fled Israel to form refugee camps in the neighboring countries.
The refugee crisis exists to the present day. Further, these camps became centers
for antiIsraeli movements and recruitment of fighters.
Egypt, Jordan and Syria, as well as Iraq and other Arab states (for the most part
the same as those who fought in the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948) were
however not willing to give up on Palestine so easily.
Rhetoric in the days leading up to the Six-Day War echoed that from 1948. For
example, on May 15, 1948, the day Arab states launched their attack on Israel,
Arab League Secretary General Azzam Pasha announced that "[t]his will be a
war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like
the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades." Almost exactly nineteen years
later, on May 18, 1967, Egypts government-controlled Voice of the Arabs
radio station mimicked this language, announcing that "the sole method we shall
apply against Israel is total war, which will result in the extermination of Zionist
existence." Two days later, Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Assad declared: "I,
as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of
annihilation."
Another of the central factors that pushed the region to war other than the
animosity over the territory of Palestine, the status of international waterways
leading to Israel also had its roots in the decades before 1967. In the late 1940s
and early 1950s, Egypt blockaded the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran to
shipping destined for Israel. These restrictions not only harmed the nascent
Jewish state, but were considered a violation of the 1949 armistice resolution
signed by Egypt and Israel, the Constantinople Convention of 1888, Security
Council Resolution 95, and, in the words of historian Howard Sachar,
"international legal precedents for gulfs and bays flanked by the territories of
more than one littoral state".
It wasnt until 1956 after Israel, France and the United Kingdom invaded and
then quickly withdrew from Egypts Sinai peninsula that passage through the
Straits of Tiran (but not the Suez Canal) was opened to Israeli shipping. The
presence of a United Nations Emergency Force stationed in the Sinai between
1956 and 1967 helped deter Egypt from re-imposing its blockade.
By the summer of 1967, however, the UN troops would be gone, old threats and
blockades would reappear, and the drift to war would reach its climax.
Yet, though the antagonism of earlier fighting remained firmly in the
background, war was hardly expected or pre-planned. Before 1964 there was, in
the words of Mideast scholar Nadav Safran, "eight years of nearly perfect
quiescence of the Arab-Israeli conflict" despite the unwavering Arab position
that Israel must be destroyed. Even after 1964, when attacks against Israel by
the Palestinian Fatah organization and skirmishes along the Israeli-Syrian
border occurred with increasing regularity, neither Israel nor its neighbors
(excepting maybe Syria) were itching to rush to war.
But this all changed in May 1967. The deterioration was rooted in several
factors, not the least of which was geopolitics of the Cold War. As American
relations with Egypt soured, the Soviet Union stepped up its influence in the
Arab world, working to build (pro-Soviet) Arab unity by focusing Arab
attention on their common enemy, Israel. The prospect of fighting against
America had a deterrent effect on Egyptian President Gamal Nasser, just as fear
of the Soviet Union weighed on Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol.
But as the weight of the Soviets shifted more firmly behind the Arabs' anti-
Israel positions, an emboldened Nasser moved to reclaim Egypt's position as
leader of the Arab world a position that had eroded in part because of the
Nasser's stance that the Arabs should hold off on outright confrontation with
Israel until the Arab world could successfully marshal its collective resources
against the Jewish state. Any show of military strength against Israel, then,
would help the Egyptian president regain his lost stature. The atmosphere in the
spring of 1967 convinced Nasser that the time was ripe to flex his muscles.
In the spring of 1967, tensions between Syria and Israel ran high, with
flashpoints including terrorist raids against Israel originating from Syria and the
Syrian diversion of water from the Jordan River. Following an attack on the
water pump at Kibbutz Misgav Am, Israeli Prime Minister and Defense
Minister Levi Eshkol resolved that after the next act of belligerence, Israel
would position armored tractors deep into the demilitarized zones, wait to be
hit, and then fire back. The plan went into effect accordingly and resulted in a
large-scale dogfight on April 7 over Syrian skies, in which the Israeli Air Force
shot down several Syrian planes. In the next month, Fatah, the Palestinian
terrorist organization, launched more than a dozen attacks on Israel and planted
mines and explosives on Israel's borders with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. On
May 5, violence escalated as Palestinian fighters shelled Kibbutz Manara. All
the while, Israel continued with its forays into the demilitarized zones and Israel
launched a diplomatic campaign to set the groundwork for retaliation.
An Israeli appeal to United Nations Secretary General U Thant led to
unprecedented UN censure of the Arabs. On May 11, U Thant condemned the
Arab attacks; but a proposed Security Council debate on the matter was derailed
by Soviet obstructionism. The United States, meanwhile, refused Israel's request
for tanks and jets and suggested that its naval fleet in the region would remain
neutral in case of war. Israeli statements about answering Syrian aggression
were reported in the international press and goaded additional Syrian backing of
Fatah operations.

SOVIET MEDDLING
In mid-May, Soviet meddling severely escalated the brewing conflict. On May
15, Israel Independence Day, plans for a parade involving large numbers of
Israeli troops in western Jerusalem drew outrage in Arab countries. Wishing to
defuse the situation, Eshkol forbade bringing heavy weapons into the capital.
This decision was used by the Soviets to stoke tensions; on May 15, Anwar al-
Sadat, then speaker of the National Assembly, visited Moscow, where he was
warned (falsely) by the Soviets that Israel was planning to invade Syria
sometime between the dates of May 16 and May 22. The Soviets cited the
absence of weapons in the Jerusalem parade as proof that the Israelis were
preparing for war and falsely claimed that Israel was massing brigades along its
northern border with Syria.
Syria also quickly passed the disinformation to Egypt's President Nasser, who
on May 14 declared a state of emergency and made a show of parading his
troops through Cairo on their way to Sinai. During this period, Arab leaders and
the media spoke daily of eliminating Israel.

CLAIMS OF ISRAELI TROOP BUILDUP DEBUNKED BUT
EVIDENCE IGNORED
On May 14, Gen. Muhammad Fawzi, the Egyptian chief of the general staff,
visited Damascus and toured the Syrian border with Israel, where he saw no
Israeli troop buildup. Fawzi's findings, which were confirmed by the chief of
Egypt's military intelligence, the U.S. embassy in Cairo, and the CIA, were
shared with Nasser, who nevertheless decided to proceed in his menacing troop
buildups.
In response to the Egyptian troop buildup, Eshkol put the army on a first-level
alert and authorized the placement of several tank companies in the south.
Reluctant to send a message that Israel was eager for war, he did not call up the
reservists. Israeli diplomats went into service on all fronts inviting UN
Observer Odd Bull to the north to confirm troops were not gathered there,
seeking to relay to Egypt that Israel was not interested in war, and sending
international warnings about the gravity of Egypt's actions.
Between the nights of May 15 and 16, the Egyptian and Palestinian troop
presence in the Sinai tripled. On May 17, Egyptian planes entered Israeli
airspace to carry out an unprecedented reconnaissance of Israel's nuclear reactor
in Dimona, prompting the Israelis to heighten the alert of their army and air
force. Syria announced that its forces were deployed in the Golan Heights.
Israeli Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin called up 18,000 troops and ordered the
laying of mines along parts of the Egyptian border. General Murtagi, the
Egyptian Commander of forces in the Sinai, declared an Order of the Day,
which was broadcasted on Cairo Radio May 18: "The Egyptian forces have
taken up positions in accordance with our predetermined plans. The morale of
our armed forces is very high, for this is the day they have so long been waiting
for, for this holy war."


EGYPT EVICTS UN FORCES
In the evening of May 16, Egypt presented the United Nations Emergency
Force, which had been deployed in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip to
discourage hostilities between Egypt and Israel, with a demand to withdraw
from key locations. Without consulting with the General Assembly, as required
by a commitment made in the UN in 1957, UN Secretary General U Thant
decided to withdraw all of the UN forces. By May 19, UNEF officers
relinquished their posts to the Egyptians and the Palestine Liberation Army.
The Americans again rebuffed Israeli diplomatic appeals, refusing to approve
any preemptive actions, provide assurances regarding Israeli security or transfer
tanks and jets Israel had requested. Efforts to obtain from France and the United
Kingdom expressions of support for Israel's security similarly failed. By May
20, Israel had called up 80,000 reservists.

STRAITS OF TIRAN CLOSED
On May 22, Egypt blocked the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping for the first
time since the 1956 war, an act of war under international law. (Israel had long
made clear that blocking the Israeli port of Eilat was cause for war.) Nasser's
decision to close the strait set off activity across the Arab world. Lebanon,
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia all activated their militaries. Iraqi troops
reportedly approached the Syrian and Jordanian borders while Jordan moved
tanks towards the West Bank.

U.S. REJECTS ISRAELI APPEALS
Up north, the Syrians blocked UN observers from reaching a critical road and
began pouring troops into Golan Heights. At that point, the Israelis received a
message from President Lyndon Johnson stating that they should not initiate fire
or take any action without first consulting with the United States. Eshkol
therefore argued against entering into war at that time, and on May 23 the
government agreed to accept an American proposal in which the U.S. would
weigh the possibility a multinational escort of Israeli ships through Tiran (in the
wake of the 1956 war, the United States had committed itself to guaranteeing
Israel's access to the Straits of Tiran).
That night, Chief of Staff Rabin, suffering from anxiety, pressure, exhaustion,
depression and perhaps nicotine poisoning, secretly withdrew from his duties
for a two day period. His operations chief, Ezer Weizman, filled in for him and
expanded upon Rabin's limited war plan with a more aggressive plan called
Operation Axe.
However, Eshkol did not approve the operation, as foreign minister Abba Eban
was in the middle of what proved to be an unsuccessful diplomatic campaign in
France, Britain and the United States, where he asked for an American
commitment that any attack on Israel would be equivalent to an attack on the
U.S. Although Johnson had condemned the blocking of Tiran as "illegal" and
"potentially disastrous to the cause of peace," and sent word to Egypt that its
aggression would meet "gravest international consequences," he nevertheless
held firm in his opposition to unilateral Israeli action. The French and Soviets
also warned Israel against starting a war.

OPERATION DAWN
Egyptian Field Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amer, a onetime close confidant of
Nasser whose growing power eventually came to threaten the president, was
largely able to wrest control of the country's armed forces from the Supreme
Headquarters. He developed a war plan, called "Dawn," whose goal
capturing the whole Negev desert far exceeded the more limited plan to
isolate Eilat and bomb specified targets. Nasser didn't intervene with Amer's
orders, despite the fact that they wrought chaos among the poorly-equipped
troops pouring into Sinai, and contradicted Egypt's longstanding three-pronged
defense strategy, dubbed "Conqueror."
In a tense meeting of Israeli leadership, Eshkol agreed to call up the remaining
reservists, though he and Rabin again decided against going to war in favor of
waiting for positive results to Eban's ongoing diplomacy trip. In France, Eban
received a stern warning from Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle to refrain from
attacking Egypt. Britain's response was less hostile and included promises to try
to bring an end to the blockade.

THE AMERICAN ROLE
Starting on May 24, the U.S., for its part, attempted to sell the Israelis on the
"Regatta" plan, which involved an international convoy affirming free passage
through the Straits of Tiran. Within two days, international enthusiasm for the
plan waned, but the Americans withheld this discouraging information from the
Israelis.
Furthermore, the plan to ensure free passage seemed irrelevant by May 25,
when Eban, then in Washington, received a cable from Jerusalem emphasizing
that Israel faced an existential danger. "An all-out Egyptian-Syrian attack is
imminent and could occur at any moment," it read. Eban, however, at times
downplayed the Egyptian threat in discussions with American statesmen, much
to the consternation of his colleagues in Israel.
Perhaps soothed by Eban, Washington initially stalled on providing any direct
guarantees or commitments, and continued to promise progress regarding an
international convoy. Johnson appears to have hoped that, by stringing the
Israelis along, he could buy time to either solve the situation via the United
Nations or possibly convince the Israelis to agree to the placement of UNEF on
their territory, an unthinkable option to Israel. On May 26, Eban met with
Johnson, who said the U.S. "will support a plan to use any or all measures to
open the straits." At the same time, Johnson continued to warn against Israel
taking preemptive action.
Eban returned to Israel and joined a strongly polarized Cabinet debate about
whether or not to strike preemptively. During the meeting, communications
from Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk reiterated the American
commitment to opening the Straits as well as U.S. opposition to an Israeli
attack. The Israelis decided to keep their army mobilized but to hold off on war
so as to give the Americans an opportunity to work their diplomacy.
The strain on the Israeli leadership was tremendous. A May 28 radio address, in
which an exhausted Eshkol bumbled through a speech about the choice to rely
on American diplomacy, left the nation in a state of panic. The army had been
biding time until Eban's return, developing various contingency plans, but
keeping everything on hold, resulting in confused troop movements in the
Negev desert. Concerned about the deteriorating situation, army commanders
were furious at the government's decision to withhold from war. The public
responded similarly, expressing impatience for formation of a national unity
government and preparing itself for war.

THE SOVIET POSITION
In Moscow, the Egyptians sought to clarify the Soviet position in case of war,
and like the Israelis vis-a-vis the United States, received an ambiguous
response. The Soviet ambassador in Cairo informed Nasser about a cable sent
from Washington containing a warning of an imminent Egyptian attack and
urged Nasser not to strike. As a result, Operation Dawn was called off.
Although some in the Soviet Union had urged caution, Shams Badran, the
Egyptian defense minister, returned from Moscow with the message that the
Soviets would stand by the Egyptians in battle.

THE DEFENSE PACT
On May 30, King Hussein of Jordan and Nasser signed a mutual defense pact in
which Egypt gained joint command of the Jordanian army. Iraq joined a
military alliance with Syria, Egypt and Jordan. In the context of the pact, Jordan
permitted the reopening of PLO offices in Amman and essentially relinquished
control of its army to the Egyptians, who transferred two Egyptian battalions to
Jordanian territory. By this point, Israel was surrounded by some 500,000
troops, more than 5,000 tanks, and almost 1,000 fighter planes.
Alarmed by this development and succumbing to public pressure, Eshkol
stepped down as defense minister on June 1 and named popular war hero Moshe
Dayan as a replacement, which buoyed public spirit. Eshkol also formed a
national unity government, appointing Menachem Begin minister without
portfolio.
In the first several of days of June, the Israeli government began to receive
signals from the Americans that the U.S. no longer opposed a preemptive strike,
and Dayan oversaw final preparations of Israel's war plan.

ARAB PREPARATIONS
As for the Egyptians, their troops continued to pour into Sinai. Despite some
disorganization, shortages and exhaustion among his forces, Nasser was sure of
victory. On the Jordanian front, battalions from the Arab Legion, under the
control of Egyptian General 'Abd al-Mun'im Riyad, were largely spread out
across West Bank Palestinian villages instead of being concentrated in more
strategically important locales.
Confident of victory, the Jordanians resolved to cut off western Jerusalem by
attacking Israeli positions in the north and south of the city at the start of the
fighting. As for Syria, it failed to coordinate with Egypt despite their defense
pact. Like the Jordanians, the Syrians adopted ambitious war plans, opting for
an offensive operation as opposed to a more limited plan to fend off Israeli
attacks on the Golan Heights. Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia all
sent troops to the Sinai. With the Arab nations united like never before, Arab oil
companies pledged to boycott any country that supported Israel and Nasser
threatened to close the Suez Canal. The Soviets, too, lent a hand of support by
way of 10 warships which arrived in the eastern Mediterranean.

ISRAEL DECIDES
In the weeks leading up to the Six Day War, Arab leaders repeatedly threatened
Israel with annihilation. Together with Egypt's ejection of United Nations
forces, the closing of the Straits of Tiran, and the massing of troops on Israel's
northern and southern borders, the fiery rhetoric created a state of existential
fear in Israel.
In addition, Israel received word from France, the nation's major arms supplier,
that De Gaulle had issued a complete ban on weapons sales and transfers to
Israel. And in a June 4 meeting, the newly formed Cabinet, received a cable
from President Johnson seeming to contradict the earlier
American softening on the issue of pre-emption. It warned that "Israel will not
be alone unless it decides to go it alone." Nevertheless, the Cabinet, in a 12-to-2
vote, opted for war, scheduled to begin early the next morning, Monday, June 5,
1967.







DETAILED TIMELINE

Jan - March 1967
In the first quarter of 1967 there were over 270 border "incidents", mainly
emanating from Syria, which caused rising concern in Israel.
April 7th 1967
Syrian gunners fired from their Golan Heights position on an Israeli tractor
farming in the demilitarised zone. Artillery fire was exchanged and the fight
escalated. Israel sent airplanes against the Syrian gun positions and several
Syrian villages. The Syrians sent up MiG jets and an all-out dogfight ensued
Israel downed six Syrian MiG 21 fighters and chased the remainder all the way
back to Damascus.
May 13th 1967
Anwar Sadat arrives back from Moscow, primed with misinformation he gives
to Nasser that Israel is massing 10-12 brigades in preparation for an attack on
Syria, supposedly to take place May 17.
May 14th 1967
Israel learns that Egyptian troops have been put on alert and begun reinforcing
units in the Sinai .
May 15th 1967
Israel responds by ordering some regular armoured units to reinforce the Sinai
front and drafted a message to ensure Egypt understood that Israel was
responding to Egyptian actions and not massing troops on its own initiative:
Israel wants to make it clear to the government of Egypt that it has no
aggressive intentions whatsoever against any Arab state at all
May 16th 1967
Nasser demands withdrawal of 3,400 man UN Emergency Force (UNEF).
Egypt now has a further 30,000 troops to the 30-35 thousand permanently
stationed on the peninsula, plus 200 tanks, and it was continuing to pour in more
troops all the time.
May 17th 1967
A series of emergency meetings was held by the Cabinet in Israel. There was
great apprehension when head of Israeli military intelligence, Major General
Aharon Yariv, reported to army headquarters, apparently mistakenly, that the
Egyptian army was equipped with poison gas (Israel was unprepared for
chemical warfare).
All Egypt is now prepared to plunge into total war which will put an end to
Israel - Cairo Radio
May 18th 1967
The Zionist barrack in Palestine is about to collapse and be destroyed. Every
one of the hundred million Arabs has been living for the past nineteen years on
one hope to live to see the day Israel is liquidatedThere is no life, no peace
nor hope for the gangs of Zionism to remain in the occupied land.
As of today, there no longer exists an international emergency force to protect
Israel.The sole method we shall apply against Israel is a total war which will
result in the extermination of Zionist existence. - Cairo Radios Voice of the
Arabs broadcast
UN Secretary General U Thant sent cable to Cairo advising that UNEF would
be withdrawn. He added the rider: Irrespective of the reasons for the actions
you have taken, in all frankness, may I advise you that I have serious misgivings
about it forI believe that this Force has been an important factor in
maintaining the relative quiet in the area of its deployment during the past ten
years and that its withdrawal may have grave implications for peace. - Charles
W Yost "How it Began", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1968
The UK were deeply upset at the U Thant caving in without bringing the matter
to the UN General Assembly: It really makes a mockery of the peacekeeping
work of the United Nations if, as soon as the tension rises, the United Nations
force it told to leave. Indeed the collapse of UNEF might well have
repercussions on other United Nations peacekeeping forces, and the credibility
of the United Nations in this field are thrown into question.
UNEF was established with the full concurrence of the United Nationsany
decision to withdraw the force should be taken in the United Nations after full
consultation with all the countries involved it should not be taken as the result
of some unilateral decision. -
George Brown (British Foreign Secretary), speaking at United Nations
Association annual dinner in London
May 19th 1967
I do not want to cause alarm but it is difficult for me not to warn the Council
that, as I see it, the position in the Middle East is more disturbingindeed more
menacing than at any time since the fall of 1956. - UN Secretary General U
Thant, Security Council meeting. - U.N. S/7906 26th May 1967
Now there are an estimated 40 thousand Egyptian troops and 500 tanks in the
Sinai. Israel ordered an immediate large-scale mobilization of reserves.
May 20th 1967
Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression, but to
initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the
Arab homeland. - Syrias Defence Minister Hafez Assad (later to be Syrias
President).
Egypt and Israel faced each other directly tonight as the United Nations
Emergency Force, which had stood between them for more than ten years,
began its official withdrawal.
May 22nd 1967
Egypts President Nasser announced: The Israeli flag shall not go through the
Gulf of Aqaba. Our sovereignty over the entrance to the Gulf cannot be
disputed.
"We want a full scale, popular war of liberation to destroy the Zionist enemy"
- Syrian president Dr. Nureddin al-Attasi speech to troops
"Israel today proposed a mutual reduction in troop concentrations in the Middle
East, while its Arab neighbours laid plans to strengthen still further their forces
round her borders" - The Times
May 23rd 1967
Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran (Gulf of Aqaba) to Israeli shipping, thereby
cutting off Israels only supply route with Asia and stopping the flow of oil
from its main supplier, Iran. By international law, this was an act of war.
(Reported that day in every newspaper in the world - see report in The Times)

President Johnson tonight condemned the Arab blockade of Israel shipping in
the Gulf of Aqaba as "illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace"
"The purported closing of the Gulf of Aqaba has brought a new and grave
dimension to the crisis. The United States considers the gulf to be an
international waterway." Mr Johnson condemned the "hurried withdrawal" of
the United Nations emergency force from Gaza and Sinai, and the "recent build-
up of military forces in the area". - Times May 24th 1967
May 24th 1967
Israels foreign minister Abba Eban met with UK Prime Minister Harold
Wilson at 10 Downing Street. Wilson revealed that the Cabinet had met that
morning and concluded that Egypts blockade must not be allowed to triumph;
Britain would join with others in an effort to open the Straits.
May 26th 1967
Taking over Sharm el Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel (and) also meant
that we were ready to enter a general war with Israel. The battle will be a
general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel - Gamal Abdel
Nasser speech to the General Council of the International Confederation of Arab
Trade Unions - broadcast in Arabic by Cairo Radios Voice of the Arabs, Gamal
Abdel Nasser, 19.35 GMT, 26th May 1967 (the speech made front page news in
The Times May 27th)
May 27th 1967
Nasser cancels a planned Egyptian attack on Israel (Operation Fajr - Dawn),
planned for following day, after it became obvious that the Israelis knew about
the plan.
The NY Times reported that Jordan would admit Saudi and Iraqi forces into its
country to do battle with Israel
May 28th 1967
The existence of Israel is in itself an aggressionwhat happened in 1948 was
an aggression an aggression against the Palestinian people (the crisis had
developed because) Eshkol threatened to march on Damascus, occupy Syria and
overthrow the Syrian regime. It was our duty to come to the aid of our Arab
brother. It was our duty to ask for the withdrawal of UNEF. When UNEF went,
we had to go to the Gulf of Aqaba and restore things to what they were when
we were in Aqaba in 1956 - Gamel Abdel Nasser at a press conference for
several hundred of the Worlds press.


We will not accept anycoexistence with Israel.Today the issue is not the
establishment of peace between the Arab states and Israel.The war with Israel
is in effect since 1948. - Gamel Abdel Nasser press conference
May 29th 1967
Now, eleven years after 1956 we are restoring things to what they were in
1956The issue now at hand is not the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran or
the withdrawal of UNEF, but the rights of the Palestinian people. - Nasser
speech to General Assembly in Cairo: - Vance, Vick, and Pierre Lauer: Hussein
of Jordan. London: Peter Owen, 1968
May 30th 1967
Jordan signed a mutual defense treaty with Egypt, thereby joining the military
alliance already in place between Egypt and Syria. Jordanian forces were given
to the command of an Egyptian General.
"The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of
Israel ... to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq,
Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation. This act will astound the
world. Today they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical
hour has arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action and not of more
declarations." - Gamal Abdel Nasser speech
Israel called upon Jordan numerous times to refrain from hostilities. Hussein,
however, was caught on the horns of a galling dilemma: allow Jordan to be
dragged into war and face the brunt of the Israeli response, or remain neutral
and risk full-scale insurrection among his own people. Army Commander-in-
Chief General Sharif Zaid Ben Shaker warned in a press conference that "If
Jordan does not join the war a civil war will erupt in Jordan".
May 31st 1967
The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is our
opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948. Our
goal is clear - to wipe Israel off the map - President Aref of Iraq
June 1st 1967
Brethren and sons, this is the day of the battle to avenge our martyred brethren
who fell in 1948. It is the day to wash away the stigma. We shall, God willing,
meet in Tel Aviv and Haifa - Radio broadcast by Iraqi President Abdel
Rahman Aref - 11.00 GMT June 1st 1967, Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic
, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Those who survive will remain in Palestine. I estimate that none of them will
survive. - Ahmed Shukairy, chairman of PLO in Jordanian Jerusalem, asked in
news interview what will happen to the Israelis if there is a war.
Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister of Israel, sent message to Russian Premiere
Kosygin: "... I invited your Ambassador in Israel to visit the frontier to find out
for himself that there was no truth in this allegation. To my regret, the
Ambassador did not respond to our invitation. The Chief of Staff of the UNTSO
checked these claims and informed the Secretary-General of the UN and the
capitals of the region that there were no Israel concentrations on the Syrian
border."
June 3rd 1967
MILITARY BUILD-UP: By this time Egypt had 210,000 troops ready for
deployment, with 100,000 of them with 930 tanks ready in the Sinai. They had
30 Tu-16 Russian-made bombers, which were a threat to Israels cities. Overall
the Egyptian Air Force, by far the largest and the most modern of all the Arab
air forces, consisting of about 450 combat aircraft, all Soviet-built and relatively
new.
Syria had 63,000 troops and Jordan 55,000 totalling 328,000 troops ready to
fight Israel. The Arabs had twice the number of tanks compared to Israel (2,330
against 1000) and far more combat aircraft too (682 compared to Israels 286);
They had 1,845 armoured personnel carriers compared to Israels 1,500.
However, by fully mobilizing Israel could muster 250,000 men. Israel would
need to rely on the training and motivation of this largely civilian army to
counter the numeric superiority of the Arabs in manpower and weaponry.
Israels newly-appointed Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, wishing to confine
hostilities if possible to the imminent battles against Egypt, ordered the Israeli
Army not to open a second front with Jordan in the West Bank in the event of
war. He instructed the head of the Israeli Army Central Command: You must
not do anything to entangle Israel with the Jordanians...
June 4th 1967
Secret resolution passed by the Israeli Cabinet:
After hearing a report on the military and political situation from the Prime
Minister, the Foreign minister, the Defence Minister, the Chief of Staff and the
head of military intelligence the Government ascertained that the armies of
Egypt, Syria and Jordan are deployed for immediate multi-front aggression,
threatening the very existence of the State. The Government resolves to take
military action in order to liberate Israel from the strangle hold of aggression
which is progressively being tightened around Israel.
The Government authorizes the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister to
confirm to the General Staff of the IDF the time for action.
Members of the Cabinet will receive as soon as possible the information
concerning the military operation to be carried out.
The Government charges the Foreign Minister with the task of exhausting all
possibilities of political action in order to explain Israels stand and to obtain the
support of the powers.
King Husain of Jordan today warned Britain and the United States that they
stood to lose their friends in the Arab world for ever if they fell into the Zionist
trap of supporting Israel in the present crisis.
"There are no words I can use to express my disappointment at the attitude that
the British Government has taken with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba", he told a
crowded press conference at his palace in Amman. - The Times, June 5th 1967
p4, Nicholas Herbert, Amman "WARNING TO BRITAIN BY KING HUSAIN:
Danger of losing Arab friends"





























RECOMMENDED READING


http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/19%2
0Statement%20to
%20the%20Security%20Council%20by%20Foreign%20Mi.aspx
http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136
http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/1967-
40yearsofoccupation/2007/06/2008526113146572296.html











Sample Position Paper





Country: The United States of America
Committee: United Nations Human Rights Council
Agenda 1: Ensuring ethical working environment in the RMG sector of Bangladesh

Promoting freedom and democracy and protecting human rights around the world are central
to U.S. foreign policy. The values captured in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and in other global and regional commitments are consistent with the values upon
which the United States was founded centuries ago. The United States supports those who
long to live in freedom and under democratic governments that protect universally accepted
human rights. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor leads the U.S. efforts to
promote democracy, protect human rights and international religious freedom and advance
labor rights globally.

In a country like Bangladesh where the Ready Made Garments sector contributes around 76
percent to the total export earnings, it is truly disappointing to see Human Rights being
violated on such a large scale - the severity of which were exemplified in the tragedies of the
November 2012 Tazreen Fashions factory fire and the April 2013 Rana Plaza building
collapse. The United States being the largest importer of the RMG sector of Bangladesh and
as Bangladesh is the 4th largest apparel exporter in USA, the States has always been deeply
concerned about the issue.
On June 27, 2013, President Obama announced his decision to suspend Bangladeshs trade
benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in view of insufficient progress
by the Government of Bangladesh in affording Bangladeshi workers internationally
recognized worker rights. The suspension of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
facilities for Bangladesh by the USA is not any stand by the US government against
Bangladesh but to press the country to address workers safety.
24 September 2013 Nearly 3.5 million garment workers in Bangladesh recently beset by
industrial accidents and a staggering loss of life got essential support to improve working
conditions, strengthen labor inspection and upgrade building and fire safety at their
workplaces, thanks to a new program in partnership with the United Nations. The Plan is
supported by other parallel initiatives focused on the RMG sector in Bangladesh, namely the
Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh signed by over 80 leading clothing
brands and retailers and the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, a binding five-year
initiative undertaken by North American apparel companies and retailers to improve safety in
more than 500 factories.
On 14 May 2013 The United Nations labor agency welcomed an agreement signed by
International fashion brands and retailers, and trade unions to prevent workplace disasters.
The signatories to the Accord on Building and Fire Safety commit to the goal of a safe and
sustainable Bangladeshi Ready Made Garment (RMG) industry in which no worker needs to
fear fires, building collapses, or other accidents that could be prevented with reasonable
health and safety measures according to the ILO website. The companies that sign on, such as
Zara and H&M, have 45 days from the signing to develop and agree on an implementation
plan to monitor their textile production in Bangladesh. ILO stands ready to provide
appropriate support to this initiative in response to the requests of the signatory parties, to
help ensure effective implementation and coordination with national organizations.

The United States is also pleased to associate itself with the July 8, 2013 European Union
(EU)-Bangladesh-International Labor Organization (ILO) Sustainability Compact for
Continuous Improvements in Labor Rights and Factory Safety in the Ready-made Garment
and Knitwear Industry in Bangladesh. The United States Government encourages the
Government of Bangladesh to take significant actions to provide a basis for reinstating
Bangladeshs Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits, by implementing
commitments under the "National Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire Safety and Structural
Integrity."
The US and Bangladesh have a common interest in ensuring growth of the exports from
Bangladesh, but not at the expense of safe and healthy working conditions or fundamental
labor rights.



References:

www.reuters.com

www.bbc.com
www.wikipedia.org
www.cnn.com
www.cia.gov
www.ilo.org
Sample Working Paper

The purpose of the Working Paper is to clearly communicate the interests of one or more countries.
Please note that there is no set format for working papers; the following is just one example of a
possible working paper. To facilitate the process, working papers should include the name and topic
of the committee and should list the countries which wrote the paper. Pending the approval of the
Director, working papers may be copied and distributed to the committee.

Committee: UN Conference on Trade and Development

Topic A: Generalized System of Preferences

Submitted by Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador believe that a GSP should be set
up so that lesser-Developed Countries (LDCs) receive preferential treatment from

Developed Countries (DCs). To that end we propose:

1. Each DC reduce their tariffs to the lowest level possible. This level will be determined by the below
created subcommittee,

2. Bilateral trade agreements should be pursued for further reductions in tariffs.

3. Trade preferences should be granted in the following areas:

Agriculture
Manufactures
Semi-manufactures
Raw materials

4. Decisions on product coverage by preference giving nations be made in consultation with the
affected LDC. Annual reevaluation of coverage shall take place with the LDC with disputed going to
the below-created subcommittee.

5. A subcommittee of UNCTAD should be created with equal membership of developed and
developing countries. This subcommittee would have the following powers:
To mediate disputes between preference givers and receivers
Make recommendations which all countries should follow
Serve as a forum for airing grievances relating to the GSP
Report regularly to the Secretary-General

Membership should be as follows:
Five permanent nations from the DCs
Five permanent nations from the LDCs and LLDCs
Ten members elected annually by UNCTAD

Voting rights will have to be worked out, but the UN format for subcommittees seems best. Of course,
we are amenable to change.



Resolution Format Guide Heading

The title should be in capital letters, above the main body of the resolution. The title consists
of a number (signifying the first or second topic area being discussed), followed by another
number (identifying the individual resolution). For example, the first draft resolution on the
first topic area discussed would be titled Draft Resolution 1.1 accordingly. The committee
Director will assign the number once the resolution has been approved.

On the left margin and two lines below the title should be:
(1) The committee name
(2) The topic addressed by the resolution, and
(3) The signatories of the resolution.
NOTE: There are no sponsors of a resolution.

Body

The resolution is written in the format of a long sentence. Just as grammatical rules make a
language more uniform in its usage, so is the resolution in its format. The resolution begins
with The General Assembly, for all GA committees and with The Economic and Social
Council, for all ECOSOC committees. The Regional Bodies and the Security Council use
their own names as the introductory line. The rest of the resolution consists of phrases and
clauses with the first word of each phrase/clause underlined. The next section, consisting of
Perambulatory Phrases, describes the problem being addressed, recalls past actions taken,
explains the purpose of the resolution, and offers support for the operative clauses that
follow. Each clause in the preamble begins with an underlined word and ends with a comma.
Operative Clauses are numbered and state the action to be taken by the body. These clauses
all begin with present tense active verbs, which are generally stronger words than those used
in the Preamble. Each operative clause is followed by a semi-colon except the last, which
ends with a period. Any sub-operative clauses (or sub-sub-clauses, etc,) also should end with
a semi-colon. There should be no periods in the body of the resolution.

Content

Of course, the most important characteristic of the final resolution is the content, which will
be carefully scrutinized by the Director before approval. A well-written resolution
demonstrates:

Familiarity with the problem. Relevant background information and previous United
Nations actions are included.
Recognition of the issues. Arguments on the topic are specified early. At a minimum, the
resolution should address in some form all the issues listed in the Questions a Resolution
Must Answer section of the Study guide.
A clear and concise style. Every clause and phrase should have a purpose.
Good form. Each phrase and clause should follow the exact format described above.



Perambulatory Phrases
Affirming
Alarmed by
Approving
Aware of
Guided by
Having adopted
Having considered
Having considered further
Having devoted attention
Having examined
Believing
Bearing in mind
Cognizant of
Confident
Contemplating
Convinced
Declaring
Deeply concerned
Deeply conscious
Deeply convinced
Deeply disturbed
Deeply regretting
Desiring
Emphasizing
Expecting
Expressing its appreciation
Expressing its satisfaction
Fulfilling
Fully aware
Fully alarmed
Fully believing
Further deploring
Further recalling
Having heard
Having received
Having studied
Keeping in mind
Noting further
Noting with regret
Noting with satisfaction
Noting with deep concern
Noting further
Noting with approval
Observing
Realizing
Reaffirming
Recalling
Recognizing
Referring
Seeking
Taking into account
Taking note
Viewing with appreciation
Welcoming

Operative Clauses
Accepts
Affirms
Approves
Authorizes
Calls for
Calls upon
Confirms
Considers
Declares accordingly
Deplores
Draws attention
Designates
Emphasizes
Encourages
Endorses
Expresses its appreciation
Expresses its hope
Further invites
Further proclaims
Further reminds
Further recommends
Further requests
Further resolves
Has resolved
Notes
Proclaims
Reaffirms
Recommends
Reminds
Regrets
Requests
Resolves
Solemnly affirms
Strongly condemns
Supports
Takes note of
Trusts
Urges



Sample Resolution

DRAFT RESOLUTION 1.1

Committee: Commission on Information Regulation
Topic: International News flow Imbalance

The Economic and Social Council,

Recalling its Resolution A/36/89 of 16 December 1981, The Declaration on Fundamental Principles
Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International
Understanding,

Further recalling Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Everyone has the right
to...receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers,

Recognizing that the problem of news flow imbalance is that two-way information among countries
of a region is either nonexistent or insufficient and information exchanged between regions of the
world is inadequate,

Realizing the need for all sovereign nations to maintain their integrity and still play an active role in
the international system,

1. Recommends that a three-level information interchange system be established on the national,
regional, and international levels to ameliorate the current problems of news flow imbalance, to
operate as follows:
Each regions member nations will report their national information and receive the
information of other nations in their region from the regional level of this interchange system;
Nations will decide the character of the news flow media best suited to the need of their
sovereign territory, be this printed, audio, or audio-visual;
Regional News Gathering Agencies will serve to gather information from the nations in their
region, and these boards will have no editorial discretion and will serve to forward all
information to the International Board;
Each regional agency will be composed of representatives from every member nation of the
nation of the region;
The primary function of the International Board will be to translate information accumulated
from the regional news gathering agencies;
The secondary purpose will be to transmit all information gathered back to the member
nations via the regional news gathering agencies;
In order to expedite the transfer of information from the international to regional level the
international board will utilize a UN frequency on a European Economic Community
satellite;

2. Urges the establishment of the University of International Communications, which will be based in
Geneva, Switzerland, with the following aims:
The University and branches will be established with the express purpose of bringing together
world views and facilitating the transfer of technology;
All member nations of the United Nations will be equally represented at the University;
Incentives will be offered to students of journalism and communications at the University to
return to their countries to teach upon completion of instruction;
The instructors of the regional education centers will be comprised of a multi-partisan
coalition of educators from throughout the world;

3. Calls for the continued use of funds from the International Program for the Development of
Communications, Special Account, The United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), the UN Development Programme, and other sources of funding including
national governments and private donors;
4. Recommends that the distribution of funds be decided by the International Programme for the
development of Communication (IPDC).