On June 20, 1961, President Sinco favorably endorsed Dean
Fonacier's request to the Board of Regents. On July 27, 1961,
G.R. No. L-68709 July 19, 1985
NAPOLEON E. SANCIANGCO vs. JOSE A. ROÑO
FACTS
Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta.
Cruz, Ozamiz City, in the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections.
Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay
Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the
said Association. As the President of the Association, petitioner
was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a member
of the City's Sangguniang Panlungsod.
On March 27, 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis
Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance. He was
not successful in the said election.
ISSUE
Whether or not an appointive member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, who ran for the position of Mambabatas
Pambansa in the elections of May 14, 1984, should be
considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon the
filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
HELD
It may be that Section 13(2), B.P. Blg. 697, admits of more
than one construction, taking into consideration the nature of
the positions of the officials enumerated therein, the legislative
intent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2),
as contrasted to appointive positions in section 13(l) under the
all-encompassing clause reading "any person holding public
appointive office or position," is clear. Although petitioner, by
filing his certificate of candidacy for the Batasan Pambansa
ceased, ipso facto, to be an appointive member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, he remains an elective Barangay
Captain from which position he may be considered as having
been on "forced leave of absence." He also continues as
President of the Association of Barangay Councils but will
need a reappointment by the President, as member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City the law speaks of
"members who may be appointed by the President."
G.R. No. L-19617 October 31, 1969
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS,
ET AL. vs. AUDITOR GENERAL, ET AL.
FACTS
Petitioner Cristino Jamias started service in U.P. on June 26,
1924. At the time the present petition was filed in this Court on
April 3, 1962, he was a Professor of English Language and
Literature and concurrently Head of the University Publications
Department. His service had been unquestionably continuous
for more than fifteen years before he reached the age of 65
years on July 20, 1961.
On June 12, 1961, Dean (now Regent) Tomas S. Fonacier of
the U.P. College of Arts and Sciences — the immediate
superior of Prof. Jamias — having first obtained the latter's
consent, wrote U.P. President Vicente G. Sinco with the
request that Jamias' service be extended for one academic
year ending April 15, 1962.
said board resolved to approve the extension of Prof. Jamias'
services until April 15, 1962.
On December 28, 1961, Auditor Alfredo Liboro, the Auditor
General's representative at U.P., questioned the legality of the
July 27, 1961 resolution of the Board of Regents just adverted
to. U.P. sought reconsideration by the Auditor General.
On February 1, 1962, Auditor General Pedro M. Gimenez
affirmed the U.P. Auditor's ruling. The Auditor General, citing
Opinion 117, dated September 1, 1961, of the Secretary of
Justice, held that the Board of Regents was without power to
extend the services of U.P. professors beyond the compulsory
limit of 65 years.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Board of Regents of the University of the
Philippines (U.P.) may extend the tenure of a professor beyond
the retirement age by law fixed at 65 years.
HELD
U.P. professors are compulsorily covered by the Retirement
Law, Commonwealth Act 186, as amended, which creates a
uniform retirement system for all members of the GSIS. The
applicable retirement law at the time Prof. Jamias reached
retirement age of 65 years on July 20, 1961 was Section 4 (a),
Commonwealth Act 186, as successively amended by
Republic Acts 660 (approved June 16, 1951), 1573 (approved
June 16, 1956) and 1820 (approved June 22, 1957). Section 4,
as amended by said Acts.
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
PATRICIO DUMLAO vs. COMELEC
FACTS
Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who
has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of
Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 provision is directed insidiously against him,
and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely
arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."
Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a
member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner,
Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter,
and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. Petitioners Igot and
Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of Sec 1, 4, 6 & 7 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52.
Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity
as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is
more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit.
ISSUES
Whether or not section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due
process guarantees by the Constitution.
HELD
I. The Procedural Aspect
There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of
the function of judicial review, namely (1) the existence of an
appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by
the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that
the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the
necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in
order to decide the case.
A. Actual case and controversy.
Petitioner Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the
application of the provision of Sec 4. No petition seeking
Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC.
B. Proper party.
Petitioners Igot and Salapantan, has neither been convicted
nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified
from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one
of them has been called to have been adversely affected by
the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as
unconstitutional. Theirs is a generated grievance. They have
no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of
any litigate interest; they can claim no locus standi in seeking
judicial redress.
The statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec.
7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not
directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While,
concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of
public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners
allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in
violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of
legislative power"
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
The present is not an "appropriate case" for either petitioner
Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is
discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that
several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for
local positions based on the challenged provision have already
been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's
Comment). The classification in question being pursuant to that
purpose, cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may
be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical
inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of
the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a
showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned provision. Well
accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. Courts
are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall
not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution
is clear beyond reasonable doubt.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned,
the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52,
and which they challenge, may be divided in two parts. The
first provides:
a. judgment of conviction for any of the
aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive
evidence of such fact ...
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal
principle, "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of
constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as
constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs.
Vera, supra). And this is one such clear case.
G.R. No. L-29131 August 27, 1969
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION vs. MIGUEL D.
TECSON, ET AL.
FACTS
On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered judgment, in Civil Case No. 20520 thereof, entitled
"Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. Copy of this decision was, on
November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said case.
On December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation,
as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses in
action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that
case and judgment creditor therein, filed, with the same court,
a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63701 thereof, against
the same defendants, for the revival of the judgment rendered
in said Case No. 20520.
Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a
judgment "must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues," which, in the language of Art. 1152 of
the same Code, "commences from the time the judgment
sought to be revived has become final." This, in turn, took
place on December 21, 1955, or thirty (30) days from notice of
the judgment — which was received by the defendants herein
on November 21, 1955 — no appeal having been taken
therefrom. The issue is thus confined to the date on which ten
(10) years from December 21, 1955 expired.
ISSUE
Whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment
is barred by the statute of limitations.
HELD
The theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be upheld
without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and
reviving Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code,
thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing
an act of Congress. If public interest demands a reversion to
the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this
may be done through legislative process, not by judicial
decree.
G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, ET AL. vs. PHILEX MINING
CORPORATION
FACTS
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex
Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who,
while working at its copper mines underground operations at
Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-
in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the
complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules
and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the
required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men
working underground.
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex
alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based on an
industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA
772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated
May 27, 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the
causes of action are not based on the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil
Code allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary
damages.
ISSUES
Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of
death have a right of selection or choice of action between
availing themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the
Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary)
from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the
employers
Whether or not they may avail themselves cumulatively of both
actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages
in the regular courts.
HELD
The petition has been dismissed in the resolution of September
7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by Philex
and the said heirs. Although the other petitioners had received
the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such
may not preclude them from bringing an action before the
regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that
Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the
deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the
Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of
government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the
Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy
was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the
choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should
therefore be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in
their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the
Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the
damages that may be decreed in their favor.
The provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, before and after it was amended by Commonwealth Act
No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in favor
of the deceased, ailing or injured employee to the
compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5 was not
accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the
1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA
442) when the court ruled that an injured worker has a choice
of either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by
the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he
cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
G.R. No. 111651 November 28, 1996
ROSMALIK S. BUSTAMANTE, ET AL. vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL
FACTS
On 15 March 1996, the Court (First Division) promulgated a
decision in this case, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated 3 May 1993 is modified in that its deletion
of the award for backwages in favor of petitioners, is SET
ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 26 April 1991
is AFFIRMED with the modification that backwages shall be
paid to petitioners from the time of their illegal dismissal on 25
June 1990 up to the date of their reinstatement. If
reinstatement is no longer feasible, a one-month salary shall
be paid the petitioners as ordered in the labor arbiter's
decision, in addition to the adjudged backwages.
Private respondent moves to reconsider the decision on
grounds that (a) petitioners are not entitled to recover
backwages because they not actually dismissed but their
probationary employment was not converted to permanent
employment; and (b) assuming that petitioners are entitled to
backwages, computation thereof should not start from
cessation of work up to actual reinstatement, and that salary
earned elsewhere (during the period of illegal dismissal) should
be deducted from the award such backwages.
ISSUES
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to computation of
the award of backwages .
HELD
On March 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 took effect, amending
the Labor Code. Article 279 thereof states in part :
Art. 279 Security of Tenure. — . . . An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time
his compensation is witheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement. (emphasis supplied)
In accordance with R.A. No. 6715, petitioners are entitled on
their full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits
or their monetary equivalent, from the time their actual
compensation was withheld on them up to the time of their
actual reinstatement.
G.R. No. L-14129 August 30, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. GUILLERMO MANANTAN
FACTS
Defendant-appellee does not dispute the correctness of this
Court's ruling in the main case. He concedes that a justice of
the peace is covered by the prohibition of Section 54, Revised
Election Code. However, he takes exception to the dispositive
portion of this Court's ruling promulgated on July 31, 1962. It is
now urged by the defendant-appellee that the ultimate effect of
remanding the case to the lower court for trial on the merits is
to place him twice in jeopardy of being tried for the same
offense. He calls the attention of this Court to the fact that
when the charge against him was dismissed by the lower
court, jeopardy had already attached to his person.
ISSUES
Whether or not the defendant-appellee case can be remanded
to the lower court for trial on the merits or be tried twice for the
same offense.
HELD
Defendant-appellee's plea of double jeopardy should be
rejected. The accused cannot now invoke the defense of
double jeopardy. When the government appealed to this Court
the order of dismissal, defendant Manantan could have raised
that issue by way of resisting the appeal of the state. Then
again, when defendant-appellee filed his brief, he could have
argued therein his present plea of double jeopardy. Yet, on
neither occasion did he do so. He must, therefore, be deemed
to have waived his constitutional right thereunder.
G.R. No. 115349 April 18, 1997
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL.
FACTS
Private respondent is a non-stock, non-profit educational
institution with auxiliary units and branches all over the
Philippines. One such auxiliary unit is the Institute of Philippine
Culture (IPC), which has no legal personality separate and
distinct from that of private respondent. The IPC is a Philippine
unit engaged in social science studies of Philippine society and
culture where they received funds and donations to have its
own research institutes.
The petitioner rendered a letter to the respondent for alleged
deficiency income tax but modified it to include the assessment
for deficiency contractor's tax. Denying said tax liabilities;
private respondent sent petitioner a letter-protest and
subsequently filed with the latter a memorandum contesting
the validity of the assessments.
ISSUES
Whether or not private respondent falls under the purview of
independent contractor pursuant to Section 205 of the Tax
Code.
Whether or not private respondent is subject to 3% contractor’s
tax under Section 205 of the Tax Code.
HELD
1. No. Under Section 12 of the Local Tax Code “The term
"independent contractors" include persons (juridical or natural)
(but not including individuals subject to the occupation tax)
whose activity consists essentially of the sale of all kinds of
services for a fee regardless of whether or not the performance
of the service calls for the exercise or use of the physical or
mental faculties of such contractors or their employees.
To fall under its coverage, Section 205 of the National Internal
Revenue Code requires that the independent contractor be
engaged in the business of selling its services.
2. No. it is clear that the funds received by Ateneo's Institute of
Philippine Culture are not given in the concept of a fee or price
in exchange for the performance of a service or delivery of an
object. Rather, the amounts are in the nature of an endowment
or donation given by IPC's benefactors solely for the purpose
of sponsoring or funding the research with no strings attached.
The amounts given to IPC, therefore, may not be deemed, it
bears stressing as fees or gross receipts that can be subjected
to the three percent contractor's tax.
G.R. No.120082 September 11, 1996
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY
vs. HON. FERDINAND J. MARCOS
FACTS
Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA)
was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958, mandated to
"principally undertake the economical, efficient and effective
control, management and supervision of the Mactan
International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug
Airport in Cebu City, . . . and such other Airports as may be
established in the Province of Cebu . . . (Sec. 3, RA 6958).
Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the
privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in
accordance with Section 14 of its Charter.
On October 11, 1994, however, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa,
Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu,
demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land
belonging to the petitioner (Lot Nos. 913-G, 743, 88 SWO,
948-A, 989-A, 474, 109(931), I-M, 918, 919, 913-F, 941, 942,
947, 77 Psd., 746 and 991-A), located at Barrio Apas and
Barrio Kasambagan, Lahug, Cebu City, in the total amount of
P2,229,078.79.
Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless
and unjustified, claiming in its favor the Section 14 of RA 6958
which exempt it from payment of realty taxes. It was also
asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government
performing governmental functions, citing section 133 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 which puts limitations on the
taxing powers of local government units.
ISSUES
Whether or not local government units can levy taxes or fees of
any kind on an instrumentality of the national government,
although, MCIAA is indeed a government-owned corporation; it
nonetheless stands on the same footing as an agency or
instrumentality of the national government.
HELD
The LGC, enacted pursuant to Section 3, Article X of the
constitution as local a government unit and a political
subdivision, has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect
taxes within its jurisdiction. While it may be true that under its
Charter the petitioner was exempt from the payment of realty
taxes, 11 this exemption was withdrawn by Section 234 of the
LGC.
Section 133 of the LGC prescribes the common limitations on
the taxing powers of local government units
(o) TAXES, FEES, OR CHARGES OF ANY KIND ON THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, ITS AGENCIES AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
(emphasis supplied)
Section 193 of the LGC is the general provision on withdrawal
of tax exemption privileges.
Section 234 of LGC provides for the exemptions from payment
of real property taxes and withdraws previous exemptions
therefrom granted to natural and juridical persons, including
government owned and controlled corporations, except as
provided therein.
 G.R. No. L-48605 December 14, 1981
DOMNA N. VILLAVERT vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION
FACTS
The petitioner, Donna N. Villavert, is the mother of the late,
Marcelino N. Villavert who died of acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis on December 12, 1975 employed as a Code
Verifier in the Philippine Constabulary. She filed a claim for
income benefits for the death of her son under P.D. No. 626 as
amended with the Government Service Insurance System on
March 18, 1976. The said claim was denied by the
Government Service Insurance System on the ground that
acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease
and that the petitioner had failed to show that there was a
causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino N.
Villavert and the nature of his employment. The petitioner
appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission which
affirmed on May 31, 1978 the decision of the respondent,
Government Service Insurance System, denying the claim.
It is clear that Marcelino N. Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis which was directly caused or at least aggravated
by the duties he performed as coder verifier, computer
operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. There
is no evidence at all that Marcelino N. Villavert had a "bout of
alcoholic intoxication" shortly before he died. Neither is there a
showing that he used drugs.
ISSUES
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to death claim of his
son from Government Service Insurance System
HELD
The decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission
sought to be reviewed is set aside and judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the Government Service Insurance System
to pay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00)
G.R. No. L-16138 April 29, 1961
DIOSDADO C. TY vs. FIRST NATIONAL SURETY &
ASSURANCE CO., INC.
FACTS
At different times within a period of two months prior to
December 24, 1953, the plaintiff herein Diosdado C. Ty,
employed as operator mechanic foreman in the Broadway
Cotton Factory, in Grace Park, Caloocan, Rizal, at a monthly
salary of P185.00, insured himself in 18 local insurance
companies, among which being the eight above named
defendants, which issued to him personal accident policies,
upon payment of the premium of P8.12 for each policy.
Plaintiff's beneficiary was his employer, Broadway Cotton
Factory, which paid the insurance premiums.
On December 24, 1953, a fire broke out which totally
destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out
of the factory, plaintiff was injured on the left hand by a heavy
object. He was brought to the Manila Central University
hospital, and after receiving first aid there, he went to the
National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment of his injuries.
Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the
reason that there being no severance of amputation of the left
hand, the disability suffered by him was not covered by his
policy. Hence, plaintiff sued the defendants in the Municipal
Court of this City, and from the decision of said Court
dismissing his complaints, plaintiff appealed to this Court.
ISSUES
Whether or not plaintiff's is entitled to claim for indemnity from
the Insurance Company.
HELD
As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that
only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss
thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture
or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would
certainly be unwarranted. WHEREFORE, the decision
appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
plaintiff-appellant.
G.R. No. L-21574 June 30, 1966
SIMON DE LA CRUZ vs. CAPITAL INSURANCE and
SURETY CO., INC.
FACTS
Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and who was
named beneficiary under the policy, thereupon filed a claim
with the insurance company for payment of the indemnity
under the insurance policy. As the claim was denied, De la
Cruz instituted the action in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan for specific performance. Defendant insurer set up
the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his
participation in a boxing contest, was not accidental and,
therefore, not covered by insurance. After due hearing the
court rendered the decision in favor of the plaintiff which is the
subject of the present appeal.
Appellant however, would like to make a distinction between
"accident or accidental" and "accidental means", which is the
term used in the insurance policy involved here.
ISSUES
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to death claim from
insurance company for payment of the indemnity under the
insurance policy.
HELD
Death or disablement resulting from engagement in boxing
contests was not declared outside of the protection of the
insurance contract. Failure of the defendant insurance
company to include death resulting from a boxing match or
other sports among the prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the
conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from
liability for such death.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-34382 July 20, 1983
HOME INSURANCE CO. vs. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES,
ET AL.
Case 1 - L-34382
On or about January 13, 1967, S. Kajita & Co., on behalf of
Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation,
shipped on board the SS "Eastern Jupiter' from Osaka, Japan,
2,361 coils of "Black Hot Rolled Copper Wire Rods." The said
VESSEL is owned and operated by defendant Eastern
Shipping Lines (CARRIER). The shipment was covered by Bill
of Lading No. O-MA-9, with arrival notice to Phelps Dodge
Copper Products Corporation of the Philippines (CONSIGNEE)
at Manila. The shipment was insured with plaintiff against all
risks in the amount of P1,580,105.06 under its Insurance
Policy No. AS-73633.
The coils discharged from the VESSEL numbered 2,361, of
which 53 were in bad order. What the CONSIGNEE ultimately
received at its warehouse was the same number of 2,361 coils
with 73 coils loose and partly cut and 28 coils entangled, partly
cut, and which had to be considered as scrap. Upon weighing
at CONSIGNEE's warehouse, the 2,361 coils were found to
weight 263,940.85 kilos as against its invoiced weight of
264,534.00 kilos or a net loss/shortage of 593.15 kilos,
according to Exhibit "A", or 1,209,56 lbs., according to the
claims presented by the consignee against the plaintiff (Exhibit
"D-1"), the CARRIER (Exhibit "J-1"), and the
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (Exhibit "K- l").
For the loss/damage suffered by the cargo, plaintiff paid the
consignee under its insurance policy the amount of P3,260.44,
by virtue of which plaintiff became subrogated to the rights and
actions of the CONSIGNEE. Plaintiff made demands for
payment against the CARRIER and the TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY for reimbursement of the aforesaid amount but
each refused to pay the same. ...
Case 2 - L-34383
On or about December 22, 1966, the Hansa Transport Kontor
shipped from Bremen, Germany, 30 packages of Service Parts
of Farm Equipment and Implements on board the VESSEL, SS
"NEDER RIJN" owned by the defendant, N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen,
and represented in the Philippines by its local agent, the
defendant Columbian Philippines, Inc. (CARRIER). The
shipment was covered by Bill of Lading No. 22 for
transportation to, and delivery at, Manila, in favor of the
consignee, international Harvester Macleod, Inc.
(CONSIGNEE). The shipment was insured with plaintiff
company under its Cargo Policy No. AS-73735 "with average
terms" for P98,567.79.
The packages discharged from the VESSEL numbered 29, of
which seven packages were found to be in bad order. What the
CONSIGNEE ultimately received at its warehouse was the
same number of 29 packages with 9 packages in bad order.
Out of these 9 packages, 1 package was accepted by the
CONSIGNEE in good order due to the negligible damages
sustained. Upon inspection at the consignee's warehouse, the
contents of 3 out of the 8 cases were also found to be
complete and intact, leaving 5 cases in bad order. The
contents of these 5 packages showed several items missing in
the total amount of $131.14; while the contents of the
undelivered 1 package were valued at $394.66, or a total of
$525.80 or P2,426.98.
For the short-delivery of 1 package and the missing items in 5
other packages, plaintiff paid the CONSIGNEE under its
Insurance Cargo Policy the amount of P2,426.98, by virtue of
which plaintiff became subrogated to the rights and actions of
the CONSIGNEE. Demands were made on defendants
CARRIER and CONSIGNEE for reimbursement thereof but
they failed and refused to pay the same.
In both cases, the petitioner-appellant made the following
averment regarding its capacity to sue:
The plaintiff is a foreign insurance company duly authorized to
do business in the Philippines through its agent, Mr. VICTOR
H. BELLO, of legal age and with office address at Oledan
Building, Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.
In L-34382, the respondent-appellee Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc., filed its answer and alleged that it:
Denies the allegations of Paragraph I which refer to plaintiff's
capacity to sue for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
Respondent-appellee, Angel Jose Transportation, Inc., in turn
filed its answer admitting the allegations of the complaint,
regarding the capacity of plaintiff-appellant. The pertinent
paragraph of this answer reads as follows:
Angel Jose Admits the jurisdictional averments in paragraphs
1, 2, and 3 of the heading Parties.
In L-34383, the respondents-appellees N. V. Nedlloyd Lijhen,
Columbian Philippines, Inc. and Guacods, Inc., filed their
answers. They denied the petitioner-appellant's capacity to sue
for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth thereof.
As earlier stated, the respondent court dismissed the
complaints in the two cases on the same ground that the
plaintiff failed to prove its capacity to sue.
ISSUES
Whether or not the plaintiff-appellant has a legal existence or
capacity.
Whether or not the plaintiff-appellant has the capacity to sue
HELD
Our jurisprudence leans towards the later view. It has long
been the rule that a foreign corporation actually doing business
in the Philippines without license to do so may be sued in our
courts. Section 14, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court makes no
distinction as to corporations with or without authority to do
business in the Philippines. The test is whether a foreign
corporation was actually doing business here. There is no
question that the contracts are enforceable. The requirement of
registration affects only the remedy. Batas Pambansa Blg. 68,
the Corporation Code of the Philippines has corrected the
ambiguity caused by the wording of Section 69 of the old
Corporation Law. The prohibition against doing business
without first securing a license is now given penal sanction
which is also applicable to other violations of the Corporation
Code under the general provisions of Section 144 of the Code.
It is, therefore, not necessary to declare the contract null and
void even as against the erring foreign corporation. The penal
sanction for the violation and the denial of access to our courts
and administrative bodies are sufficient from the viewpoint of
legislative policy.
Our ruling that the lack of capacity at the time of the execution
of the contracts was cured by the subsequent registration is
also strengthened by the procedural aspects of these cases.
In L-34382, respondent Eastern Shipping Lines is ordered to
pay the petitioner the sum of P1,630.22 with interest at the
legal rate from January 5, 1968 until fully paid and respondent
Angel Jose Transportation Inc. is ordered to pay the petitioner
the sum of P1,630.22 also with interest at the legal rate from
January 5, 1968 until fully paid. Each respondent shall pay
one-half of the costs. The counterclaim of Angel Jose
Transportation Inc. is dismissed.
In L-34383, respondent N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen, or its agent
Columbian Phil. Inc. is ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of
P2,426.98 with interest at the legal rate from February 1, 1968
until fully paid, the sum of P500.00 attorney's fees, and costs,
The complaint against Guacods, Inc. is dismissed.
G.R. No. L-12150 May 26, 1960
BENJAMIN CO vs. REPUBLIC
FACTS
Petitioner was born on March 13, 1931 in Bangued, Abra. He
is the son of Go Cham and Yu Suan, both Chinese. He owes
his allegiance to the Nacionalist Government of China. He is
married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated in
the Catholic church of Bangued, Abra. He speaks and writes
English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He
graduated from the Abra Valley College, and finished his
primary studies in the "Colegio" in Bangued, Abra, both
schools being recognized by the government. He has a child
two months old. He presented his alien certificate of
registration, but did not present the alien certificates of
registration of his wife and child. Asked why he did not file his
income tax return, he stated that his father had already filed his
income tax return. He merely promised that he would file his.
ISSUES
Whether or not petitioner has all the qualifications for
naturalization and none of the disqualifications mentioned in
the law.
HELD
From the evidence itself introduced by petitioner it would
appear that he failed to comply with some of the requirements
prescribed by law in order to qualify him to become a Filipino
citizen. Our law also requires that petitioner must have
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in
his relation with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living.
Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced
and strictly construed in favor of the government and against
the applicant" (Co Quing Reyes vs. Republic, 104 Phil., 889),
the Supreme Court are constrained to hold that the trial court
erred in granting the petition for naturalization.
G.R. No. L-14214 May 25, 1960
RICHARD VELASCO vs. REPUBLIC
FACTS
Petitioner was born in the Philippines on May 12, 1932 of
spouses Peter Velasco and Miguela Tiu who became
naturalized citizens in 1956. He alleges that since his birth in
Manila on May 12, 1932 he continuously resided in the
Philippines, particularly at 1441 Magdalena St., Manila;
education in the country, that he is a citizen of the Republic of
China in Formosa; that he has not followed the citizenship of
his father when the latter became naturalized as he was then
already 23 years old; that he is single, although he is engaged
to be married to a Filipino girl by the name of Noemi Eugenio;
that he is at present employed at the Wilson Drug Store since
February, 1957 with a monthly salary of P150.00; that
previously he worked as a salesman of his father with a salary
of P2,400.00 per annum. His qualifications as to moral
character were attested by Santiago Mariano, a sergeant of the
Manila Police Department, and Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a
housekeeper, who admitted that she is the prospective mother-
in-law of petitioner.
ISSUES
Whether or not the petitioner meet the requirements of the
naturalization law.
HELD
Because of the above facts and circumstances, the trial court
declared petitioner not qualified to become a Filipino citizen.
The trial court likewise found that Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a
character witness, is the prospective mother-in-law of petitioner
and such as her testimony is biased. It also found that she and
her companion witness Santiago Mariano were also the
character witnesses of brother of petitioner in his petition for
naturalization, a circumstance which in its opinion indicates
that petitioner has a limited circle of Filipino friends.
It appears from the evidence that petitioner was employed at
the Wilson Drug Store only on February, 1957 with a salary of
P150.00 a month, or barely a month before he filed the instant
petition, and that said store is partly owned by his mother who
has one-fifth capital investment therein. This leads one to
believe that petitioner's employment, even if true, is but a
convenient arrangement planned out by him and his family in
order to show a token compliance with the requirement of the
law that to become a Filipino citizen one must a lucrative
income or occupation.
G.R. No. L-12408 December 28, 1959
LEE CHO vs. REPUBLIC
FACTS
Petitioner was born in Amoy, China, on September 22, 1907,
of Chinese parents. He came to the Philippines sometime in
February, 1921 and was given the corresponding alien
certificate of residence and registration. He settled in the City
of Cebu where he has continuously resided up to the present
time. On December 8, 1929, he married one Sy Siok Bin with
whom he had 13 children, all born in the City of Cebu. All these
children had been issued the corresponding alien certificate of
registration, with the exception of Lourdes Lee who married a
naturalized Filipino citizen named Lim Kee Guan. With the
exception of William Lee who is not of school age, Angelita
who rendered only grade five and Lourdes who stopped in third
year high school, the other children are at present studying in
private schools and colleges recognized by the government.
He has no tax liability to the government. In other respects, he
possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications prescribed by law.
ISSUES
Whether or not the petitioner-appellee meet the requirements
under par. B, Sec. 6 of Naturalization Law.
HELD
No. Based from the given facts the petitioner has failed to
comply with the requirement of the law regarding his duty to
afford primary and secondary education to all his children
because he failed to give such education to his daughters
Angelita Lee and Lourdes Lee.
G.R. No. 107211 June 28, 1996
FRANCISCO GUERRERO vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL
FACTS
ISSUES
Whether or not
HELD