G.R. No.

L-19650 (September 29, 1966)

Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Enrico Palomar in his capacity as The Postmaster General
FACTS:
Caltex (Philippines) Inc. launched "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" in the year 1960. The contest
was about the participants to estimate to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at
each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Every motor vehicle owner and / or licensed
drivers are welcome to participate to the said contest, however, employees of the Caltex (Philippines)
Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families are not allowed to participate.
There is no fee or a requirement to purchase of their product. Entry forms are made available upon
request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry
stubs. There will be seven (7) regions participating to the contest.
Caltex have foreseen extensive use of mails for promoting the contest, thus Caltex sent
representative to Post Office to request advance clearance for using the mail for the contest. However,
the postal authorities denied their request in view of sections 1954 (a), 1982, and 1983 of the Revised
Administrative Code (Anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law), which prohibits the use of mail in
conveying any information concerning non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or similar
scheme.
Caltex sought for a reconsideration and stressed that there was no consideration involved in the
part of the contestant(s) but the Postmaster General maintained their view and even threatened Caltex
that if the contest was conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its
representatives. This leads to Caltexs filing of this petition for declaratory relief.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Caltex (Philippines) Inc. proposed Caltex Hooded Pump Contest violates the
postal law?
HELD:
NO. The court held that Caltex proposed contest did not violate the Postal Law. The court finds no
obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. Court is persuaded to hold that, under the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar
schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of
consideration. The "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the appellee
does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.

National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma
GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

FACTS:
The National Federation of Labor, together with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (Labor
Relations Division, Zamboanga City), filed a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plant of the
Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. on 5 March 1982. Such employees charged their employer for
underpayment of monthly living allowances on April 17 of same year.
On 3 May 1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of
Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living
allowances; and employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. The
strike began on 23 May 1982.
On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and
members of the union, for damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order. The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution
of the restraining order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending
that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to
Batas Pambansa 227 (Labor Code, Article 217).
ISSUES:
(1) Whether Labor Arbiter or Court have jurisdiction to the case
HELD:
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.
The Court held that Labor Arbiter has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case.
Batas Pambasa Blg. 227 Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original
jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly.
Paat v. CA
GR 111107, 10 January 1997 (266 SCRA 167)
Second Division, Torres Jr. (p): 4 concurring

FACTS:
On 19 May 1989, Victoria de Guzmans truck was seized by Department of Environment and
Natural Resources personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya while on its ways to Bulacan from San Jose,
Baggao, Cagayan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products
found concealed in the truck. On May 23 of same year, Jovito Layugan (CENRO of Aritao) issued an
order for the confiscation of the said truck. De Guzman, respondent, were given fifteen (15) days to
submit an explanation why her truck must not be confiscated. However, respondent failed to submit any
explanation within the prescribed period. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June
28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a
subsequent order of July 12, 1989.

Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the
Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents' statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that
in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should be considered as an
appeal to the Secretary."


ISSUES:
(1) Whether Court or Secretary of DENR and his representatives have authority to confiscate
and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products
(2) Whether or not the truck was used in the commission of an offense under Section 68 of
Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277
HELD:
(1) The suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of
confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D.
705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the
Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law
are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions
of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
(2) The language of the amendatory executive order, when it eliminated the phrase shall be
guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, meant that the act of cutting, gathering,
collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct
offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code.
People v. Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
FACTS:
Mario Mapa was charged for the illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, a violation of
Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4. The accused admits of the
possession and that he is a secret agent of Hon. Feliciano Leviste, Governor of Batangas, and was
appointed to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City for a confidential mission
ISSUES:
Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is exempt
from the requirement of having a license of firearm
HELD:
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt.
The lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to
pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the
Government."
Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas
GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)
Second Division, Padilla (p): 4 concurring
FACTS:
Spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos on March 23, 1971.
However, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father, filed a petition to oppose the
said adoption. They contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter
named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses were
disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under
paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code
HELD:
When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word descendant, found in the Spanish
Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to children. The children thus mentioned have a
clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren.
Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy,
cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys. The Supreme Court
denied the petition.


Paras v. Comelec (Resolution)
GR 123169, 4 November 1996 (264 SCRA 49)
En Banc, Francisco (p): 14 concurring

FACTS:
Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during
the 1994 barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered
voters of the barangay, which was approved by the Comelec. Petition signing was scheduled on 14
October 1995. The Comelec also set the recall election on 13 November 1995, but which was deferred to
16 December 1995 due to the petitioners opposition.
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall
election on 13 January 1996. The petitioner contends that no recall can take place within one year
preceding a regular local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan elections slated on the first Monday of May
1996.
ISSUES:
Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a regular local election in a
recall proceeding
HELD:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. The too literal interpretation of
the law leads to absurdity which the Court cannot countenance.
The Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a regular election, as this would
render inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.





































































Floresca v. Philex Mining
GR L-30642., 30 April 1985 (136 SCRA 142)
En Banc, Makasiar (p): 7 concurring, 1 on leave, 2 took no part, others dissenting

FACTS:
Forty-eight (48) mine workers who were then working at Philex Mining Corporation (Philex, while
working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, were buried in
the tunnels of the mine, that out of 48, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were
rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number, were left mercilessly to their fate due to
defendant Philex's decision to abandon rescue operations.
The heirs of the miners were able to recover under the Workmans Compensation Act (WCA). A
report of Special Committee indicated that the company failed to provide the necessary security for the
protection of its miners. Because of this, the heirs decided to file a complaint for damages before the
Court of First Instance (CFI).
Philex filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was based on an industrial
accident which is covered under the WCA and, therefore, the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case.
Amici curiae submitted their respective memoranda, pursuant to the resolution of 26 November
1976, involving the issue whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case
of his death under the WCA is exclusive, selective or cumulative. The opinions of the amici curiae are
divergent.

ISSUES:
Whether the Supreme Court, in determining the action to be selective, is guilty of judicial
legislation.

HELD:
The Court does not legislate in the instant case. The Court merely applies and gives effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article
XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by
Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.
Under Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. "
The Court ruled that Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These
decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application
or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the
said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect"
Even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain
instances, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all
human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor
has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.

Republic v. CA and Molina
GR 108763, 13 February 1997
En Banc, Panganiban (p): 8 concur, 3 concur in result

FACTS:
Reynaldo Molina married Roridel Olaviano on April 14, 1985 and gave birth to a son a year after.
Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, it was
observed that he has the tendency to spend time with his friends and he squanders his money with
them, dependent to his parents, and his dishonesty in regards money matters or his finances. He was
relieved in his job in the year 1986 and that made Roridel the sole breadwinner of their family. In March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their
child a week later. The couple are separated-in-fact for more than three years.
Roridel filed a petition to declare her marriage with Reynaldo null. Roridel filed evidences
consisting of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only
during the pre-trial conference, however, his answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that
he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridels strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridels refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridels failure to run the household and handle their
finances.

ISSUES:
Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

HELD:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, psychological incapacity.
Since the Codes effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages
void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity
in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in
applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled -- exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration -- Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world. Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the court ruled that psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal
of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

Aisporna v. CA
GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

China Bank v. Ortega (J)
GR L-34964, 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA 355)
Second Division, Makalintal (p): 7 concur, 2 took no part

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista
GR L-37867, 22 February 1982 (112 SRCA 59)
First Division, Guerrero (p): 5 concurring

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Salvatierra v. CA
GR 107797, 26 August 1996 (261 SCRA 45)
First Division, Hermosisima (p): 3 concur, 1 on leave

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Company
GR L-25316, 28 February 1979 (88 SCRA 616)
Second Division, Fernando (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Abellana v. Marava [GR L-27760, 29 May 1974]
Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concur, 1 concur based on paragraph 2 & 3 of opinio

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations
GR L-43760, 21 August 1976 (72 SCRA 396)
Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concurring

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Philippine Apparel Workers Union v. NLRC
GR L-50320, 31 July 1981 (105 SCRA 444)
First Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concurring

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong
GR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663)
Second Division, Makasiar (p): 3 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 took no part

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople
GR L-44717, 28 August 1985 (138 SCRA 273)
En Banc, Gutierrez, Jr. (p): 10 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Victorias Milling v. Social Security Commission
GR L-16704, 17 March 1962 (4 SCRA 627)
En Banc, Barrera (p): 9 concurring

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Sarmiento v. Mison [GR L-79974, 17 December 1987]
En Banc, Padilla (p): 8 concur

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Perfecto v. Meer
GR L-2348, 27 February 1950 (85 Phil 552)
First Division, Bengzon (p): 8 concur.

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Endencia v. David
GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Resolution)
GR L-78780, 23 July 1987
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 1 on leave

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Aglipay v. Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
GR 122156, 3 February 1997
En banc, Bellosillo (p): 6 concur, others dissent

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Tanada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 24 April 1985 (136 SCRA 27)
En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur with reservation, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Tanada v. Tuvera (Resolution)
GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)
En Banc, Cruz (p) : 8 concurring

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

Primicias v. Urdaneta
GR L-26702, 18 October 1979 (93 SCRA 462)
First Division, de Castro (p): 8 concurring, 1 on leave, 1 did not take part.

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD:

La Carlota Sugar Central v. Jimenez
GR L-12436, 31 May 1961 (2 SCRA 295)
En Banc, Dizon (p): 10 concurring, 1 took no part.

FACTS:
ISSUES:
HELD: