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ANGELITA GLOR, SERILINA JAMON, EMELITA G. MADELA, EMAN G. MANALO, MYRNA GLOR and FELIPE GLOR are the petitioners in this appeal. The case involves an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust. This Court has ruled a number of times before that an action prescribes in ten years.
ANGELITA GLOR, SERILINA JAMON, EMELITA G. MADELA, EMAN G. MANALO, MYRNA GLOR and FELIPE GLOR are the petitioners in this appeal. The case involves an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust. This Court has ruled a number of times before that an action prescribes in ten years.
ANGELITA GLOR, SERILINA JAMON, EMELITA G. MADELA, EMAN G. MANALO, MYRNA GLOR and FELIPE GLOR are the petitioners in this appeal. The case involves an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust. This Court has ruled a number of times before that an action prescribes in ten years.
OLVIGA, VIRGILIO OLVIGA, LOLITA OLVIGA, CARMENCITA O. ALPUERTO and JEANETTE OLILA,petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELITA R. GLOR, SERILINA G. JAMON, EMELITA G. MADELA, EMAN G. MANALO, MYRNA GLOR, FELIPE GLOR, GAUNDENCIO GLOR and CORNELIO GLOR, respondents. SYLLABUS 1. CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION; RULE IN CASE OF AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF A PARCEL OF LAND BASED ON IMPLIED OR CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST; EXCEPTION. With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, doe not prescribe. 2. ID.; ID.; RULE FOR ACTIONS TO QUIET TITLE OVER A PROPERTY; SAPTO vs. FABIANA, (103 PHIL. 683) CITED. In Sapto vs. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683, 686-687, appellants' predecessors sold to appellees in 1931 a parcel of land. The sale was approved by the Provincial Governor of Davao but was never registered. Possession of the land was, however, transferred to Fabiana and the latter has been in possession thereof from 1931 up to the present. The widow and children of Samuel Sapto filed an action to recover the land. This Court in affirming the validity of the sale in favor of appellee (Fabiana) held: "No enforcement of the contract is in fact needed, since the delivery of possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title to the purchaser, registration of the contract not being indispensable as between the parties. Actually the action for conveyance was one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud cast upon appellee's ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors. This action accrued only when appellants initiated their suit to recover the land in 1954. Furthermore, it is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rea, 39 L.R.A. 930; Inland Empire Land Co. vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14)." 3. ID.; POSSESSION; ACTUAL POSSESSOR OF A PIECE OF LAND CLAIMING TO BE OWNER THEREOF MAY WAIT UNTIL HIS POSSESSION IS DISTURBED OR HIS TITLE IS ATTACKED; REASON THEREFOR. In Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441, 446, this Court likewise reiterated the ruling that: ". . . There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. No better situation can be conceived at the moment for Us to apply this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners whose mother, Felipa Faja, was in possession of the litigated property for no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted with a claim that the land she had been occupying and cultivating all these years, was titled in the name of a third person. We hold that in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only from the time the one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only then that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against such possessor." In the case at bar, private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest were in actual possession of the property since 1950. Their undisturbed possession gave them the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of petitioners, who in 1988 disturbed their possession. 4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURTS; RULE AND EXCEPTION. The Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly based their findings of fact on the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses. It can be said therefore that those conclusions are based on substantial evidence. No cogent reason exists to disturb them. As reiterated in a long line of decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to make its own findings of facts different from those of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals (Vda. de Cailles vs. Mayuga, 170 SCRA 347; New Owners/Management of TML Garments, Inc. vs. Zaragosa, 170 SCRA 563). In petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of this Court is confined to a review of questions of law, except when the findings of fact are not supported by the records or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 307; Samson vs. CA, 141 SCRA 194; Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 705). The case at bar does not fall under the exceptions.
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30542, affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon ordering the defendants, heirs of Jose Olviga (petitioners herein), to reconvey the land in dispute to the plaintiffs, heirs of Cornelia Glor (now private respondents), and to pay attorney's fees and the costs of suit. LexLib This case started as an action (Civil Case No. C-883) filed in the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon by Angelita Glor and her children against the heirs of Jose Olviga for reconveyance of a parcel of land, measuring 54,406 square meters (5.44 has), more or less, known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of the Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision. LLphil The court, after due trial, rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads: 2
"WHEREFORE, and considering the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the PLAINTIFFS and against the defendants as heirs of Jose Olviga to reconvey the land in dispute to the plaintiffs as heirs of Cornelio Glor Sr.; condemning the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs attorneys fees of P5,000.00 plus the costs of the suit. The counterclaim interposed by the defendants is dismissed." (p. 12, Rollo.) The judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals by the defendants who raised several factual issues regarding possession and fraud, as well as legal issues involving prescription and purchaser in good faith, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. LexLib It was established by the evidence on record that the land in question was, in 1950, still forest land when Eutiquio Pureza, then only twelve years old, and his father cleared and cultivated it. In 1954, they introduced improvements such as, coconut trees, jackfruit, mangoes, avocado and bananas. When the area was released for disposition, the Bureau of Lands surveyed the same in 1956 in the name of Eutiquio Pureza. Since then, the land has been known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of the Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision. Godofredo Olviga, a son of Jose Olviga then living with the latter, protested the survey but only with respect to a one- half-hectare portion "sa dakong panulukan ng Amihanan- Silanganan." This protest or "tutol" (Exh. B) of Godofredo Olviga, brother of petitioners Virgilio Olviga and Lolita Olviga Olila, is of public record in the Bureau of Lands (Exh. B). In said document, Godofredo Olviga expressly admitted that the lot belonged to Eutiquio Pureza, except the 1/2 hectare portion claimed by him (Godofredo) which was included in the survey of Pureza's Lot 13. In 1960, Eutiquio Pureza filed a homestead application over Lot 13. Without his application having been acted upon, he transferred his rights in said lot to Cornelio Glor in 1961. Neither the homestead application of Eutiquio nor the proposed transfer of his rights to Cornelio Glor was acted upon by the Director of Lands for reasons that the records of the Bureau of Lands do not disclose. LLpr In 1967, Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for said lot in a cadastral proceeding, in fraud of the rights of Pureza and his transferee, Cornelio Glor and his family, who were the real and actual occupants of the land. What must have happened, as found by the Court of Appeals, is that since Cornelio Glor, Sr. was sickly, and his wife (now widowed) Angelita Glor, was unschooled, they failed to follow up Pureza's homestead application over Lot 13 in the cadastral proceedings in the Municipal Court of Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision, Pls-84, Case 1 (Philcusa-Foa). In fact, they were not aware of the proceedings. Angelita Glor testified that no notice was ever posted on Lot 13 about the proceedings nor did anyone, not even the barangay captain, tell her about them. Neither did she receive any notice from the court sheriff or any court employee. This non-posting of the notice of the cadastral hearing on the land, or in the barangay hall, was confirmed by petitioner Virgilio Olviga himself who testified that he did not notice any papers posted on the property in question (tsn., October 18, 1990, pp. 83-84). On the other hand, petitioners' father, Jose Olviga, claimed both Lots 12 and 13, which are adjoining lots, in the same cadastral proceedings. He falsely omitted in his answer mention of the fact that other persons were in possession of, and claiming adverse interest in, Lot 13 and that the land had been surveyed for Eutiquio Pureza, the former occupant who sold his interests to private respondents' parent, Cornelio Glor, in 1961. Glor was Olvigas' neighbor. As a result, both Lots 12 and 13 were declared as uncontested in the name of Jose Olviga (Exh. 7), and were registered in his name in 1967 in Original Certificate of Title, No. 0-12713 (Exh. 5). In 1971, Olviga requested that OCT No. 0-12713 be split into two (2) TCT's, one each for the two (2) lots. TCT Nos. T-103823 and T-103824 were issued for lots 12 and 13, respectively. Jose Olviga later transferred Lot 13 to his son-in-law, Jaime Olila and daughter, Lolita Olviga resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. T-03824 and the issuance of TCT No. T-241314 in the names of the spouses (Exh. 3).
It was also established that the spouses Jaime Olila and Lolita Olviga Olila, were not innocent purchasers for value of the land from their father, and have never been in possession. The Glors and their predecessors-in-interest (Cornelio Glor Sr., and Eutiquio Pureza) were the ones found to be in possession of the property. From said findings and conclusions, the appellate court in its decision dated January 13, 1992, resolved the issues presented, thus: ". . . whether or not plaintiffs' action is really one for quieting of title that does not prescribe; or assuming that their demand for the reconveyance of the lot in question prescribes in ten years, being based on an implied trust, whether their cause of action should be counted from the date of the issuance of the late Jose Olviga's title over said lot in 1967 and has, therefore, already prescribed, or whether the prescriptive period should be counted from the date plaintiffs acquired knowledge of said title sometime in 1988. "The first question should be answered in the affirmative . . . "xxx xxx xxx "But even assuming that plaintiffs' action for reconveyance, being based on an implied or constructive trust, prescribes in ten years, the lower court again correctly ruled that their cause of action should be considered to have accrued not from the date of registration of the title of Jose Olviga, defendants' predecessor-in-interest, over the lot in question in 1967, but only from the time plaintiffs learned of such title in 1988 . . . "xxx xxx xxx "All in all, therefore, the court a quo did not err in holding that plaintiffs' action against defendants- appellants for the reconveyance of the lot in question filed on April 10, 1989, or in less than a year after they learned of the issuance of a title over said lot to Jose Olviga, predecessor-in-interest of defendants, has not yet prescribed. 3
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against defendants- appellants." (pp. 48-51, Rollo.) Petitioners now seek a review of the above decision. They allege that: (1) the present action has already prescribed; (2) the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the private respondents' cause of action accrued not in 1967 but in 1988; (3) that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider that private respondents as mere homestead transferees cannot maintain an action for reconveyance; (4) that the Faja and Caragay-Layno cases have no bearing and direct application to the case at bar; and (5) that private respondents have not proven by preponderance of evidence their ownership and possession of the disputed land. With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. In Sapto vs. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683, 686-687, appellants' predecessors sold to appellees in 1931 a parcel of land. The sale was approved by the Provincial Governor of Davao but was never registered. Possession of the land was, however, transferred to Fabiana and the latter has been in possession thereof from 1931 up to the present. The widow and children of Samuel Sapto filed an action to recover the land. This Court in affirming the validity of the sale in favor of appellee (Fabiana) held: cdphil "No enforcement of the contract is in fact needed, since the delivery of possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title to the purchaser, registration of the contract not being indispensable as between the parties. Actually the action for conveyance was one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud cast upon appellee's ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors. This action accrued only when appellants initiated their suit to recover the land in 1954. Furthermore, it is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 39 L.R.A. 930; Inland Empire Land Co. vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14)." In Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441, 446, this Court likewise reiterated the ruling that: ". . . There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. No better situation can be conceived at the moment for Us to apply this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners whose mother, Felipa Faja, was in possession of the litigated property for no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted with a claim that the land she had been occupying and cultivating all these years, was titled in the name of a third person. We hold that in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only from the time the one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only then that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against such possessor." Cdpr In the case at bar, private respondents and their predecessors-in- interest were in actual possession of the property since 1950. Their undisturbed possession gave them the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of petitioners, who in 1988 disturbed their possession. The other issues raised in the petition are factual. The Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly based their findings of fact on the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses. It can be said therefore that those conclusions are based on substantial evidence. No cogent reason exists to disturb them. As reiterated in a long line of decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to make its own findings of facts different from those of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals (Vda. de Cailles vs. Mayuga 170 SCRA 347; New Owners/Management of TML Garments, Inc. vs. Zaragosa, 170 SCRA 563). In petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of this Court is confined to a review of questions of law, except when the findings of fact are not supported by the records or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 307; Samson vs. Ca, 141 SCRA 194; Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 705). The case at bar does not fall under the exceptions. WHEREFORE, findings no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for review is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. LibLex SO ORDERED. ||| (Heirs of Olviga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104813, October 21, 1993)
4
[G.R. No. 102909. September 6, 1993.] SPOUSES VICENTE and LOURDES PINGOL, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO N. DONASCO, namely: MELINDA D. PELAYO, MARIETTA D. SINGSON, MYRNA D. CUEVAS, NATIVIDAD D. PELAYO, YOLANDA D. CACERES and MARY DONASCO, respondents. DAVIDE, JR., J p: An action denominated as one for specific performance and damages was brought by the private respondents against the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City which, after due trial, rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the respondent Court reversed the trial court's decision. It is from this judgment that the petitioners have appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari. The material facts of this case are simple and undisputed. Petitioner Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223 of the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan, with an area of 549 square meters, located at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7435 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. On 17 February 1969, he executed a "DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND" in favor of Francisco N. Donasco which was acknowledged before a notary public. The parcel of land referred to therein is Lot No. 3223 and the pertinent portions of the document read as follows: "That for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY (P20,530.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, the VENDOR hereby these presents SELL, CONVEY AND CONVEY by way of Absolute Sale the one-half (1/2) portion, equivalent to Two Hundred Seventy Four and point Fifty (274.50) square meters, to the VENDEE, the above-mentioned property, his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest; That the VENDOR hereby confesses and acknowledges the receipt of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS from VENDEE as advanced (sic) and partial payment to the above-cited consideration of the Sale herein mentioned, leaving therefor a balance of Eighteen Thousand and Five Hundred Thirty (P18,530) Pesos to be paid in several equal installments within a period of six (6) years, beginning January, 1970; That after computing the above-mentioned equal installments, the VENDEE agrees and undertakes to pay unto the VENDOR a monthly amount equivalent to Two Hundred Fifty Seven (sic) and Thirty Six Centavos (P257.36) within a period of Seventy One (71) months and on the Seven Two [sic] (72) month, the amount of (P257.44) as the last and final installment thereof; That the VENDEE agrees that in case of default in the payment of the installments due the same shall earn a legal rate of interest, and to which the VENDOR likewise agrees; That the VENDEE undertakes to pay unto the VENDOR the herein monthly installment within the first five (5) days of each month and the same shall be made available and to be paid at the residence of the VENDOR, payment to be made either directly to the VENDOR, his wife or his authorized representative or factor; That in case of partition of the above-described property between herein VENDOR and VENDEE, the same shall be divided into two (2) equal parts, the VENDOR gets the corner facing J. De Jesus and Malolos Avenue and the VENDEE shall get the portion with fifteen (15) meters frontage facing J. De Jesus Street only." 1 Pursuant to the contract, Donasco paid P2,000.00 to Pingol. The one-half portion, designated as Lot No. 3223-A, was then segregated from the mother lot, and the parties prepared a subdivision plan (Exhibit "C") which was approved by the Land Registration Commission. 2 Francisco Donasco immediately took possession of the subject lot and constructed a house thereon. In January 1970, he started paying the monthly installments but was able to pay only up to 1972. On 13 July 1984, Francisco Donasco died. At the time of his demise, he had paid P8,369.00, plus the P2,000.00 advance payment, leaving a balance of P10,161.00 on the contract price. 3 Lot No. 3223-A remained in the possession of Donasco's heirs. On 19 October 1988, the heirs of Francisco Donasco filed an action for "Specific Performance and Damages, with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against the spouses Vicente and Lourdes Pingol (petitioners herein) before the RTC of Caloocan City. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. 13572 and raffled off to Branch 125 of the said court. In their complaint, 4 the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) averred that after the death of their father, they offered to pay the balance of P10,161.00 plus the stipulated legal rate of interest thereon to Vicente Pingol but the latter rebuffed their offer and has "been demanding for a bigger and unreasonable amount, in complete variance to what is lawfully due and payable." They stated that they had "exerted earnest efforts to forge or reach an amicable and peaceful settlement with the defendants" for the payment of the property in question but to no avail. They further alleged that the defendants were committing "acts of forcible entry and encroachment" upon their land and asked that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the defendants from the acts complained of. Plaintiffs then prayed that the defendants be ordered, inter alia: "a. . . . to accept the amount of P10,161.00, more or less, plus the stipulated legal rate of interest due thereon, as full and complete payment of the balance for the agreed price/consideration on the one-half (1/2) portion of the parcel of land . . .; [and] 5
b. . . . to execute the final deed of sale on the one-half (1/2) portion of the lot . . . in accordance with the partition reflected in the survey and subdivision plan, . . ." 5 In their answer with counterclaim, 6 defendants admitted the execution of the aforementioned deed of sale, the segregation of the portion sold and the preparation and approval of the subdivision plan, but set up the following special and affirmative defenses: (1) the plaintiffs' cause of action had already prescribed; (2) the deed of sale embodied a conditional contract of sale "as the consideration is to be paid on installment basis within a period of six years beginning January, 1970"; (3) the subdivision plan was prepared on the assumption that Francisco Donasco would be able to comply with his obligation; (4) when Francisco died, he had not fully paid the total consideration agreed upon; and (5) considering the breach by Francisco of his contractual obligation way back in 1976, the sale was deemed to have been cancelled and the continuous occupancy of Francisco after 1976 and by his heirs thereafter was by mere tolerance of Vicente Pingol. They then asked that the plaintiffs be ordered to vacate the premises and to pay them attorney's fees and a reasonable compensation for the use of the land. In their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim, 7 the plaintiffs pointed out that there is no provision in the deed of sale for its cancellation in case of default in the payment of the monthly installments and invoked Article 1592 of the New Civil Code. They specifically denied the allegations in the counterclaim. The issues having been joined, the case was then tried on the merits. On 22 January 1990, the trial court rendered a decision 8 dismissing the complaint and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants P350.00 as reasonable monthly rental for the use of the premises from the filing of the complaint, P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. It held that: (1) the deed of absolute sale in question, marked and offered in evidence as Exhibit "A," is a contract to sell, not a contract of sale, since Vicente Pingol had no intention to part with the ownership of the lot unless the full amount of the agreed price had been paid; (2) the contract was deemed to have been cancelled from the moment the late father of the plaintiffs defaulted in the payment of the monthly installments; (3) title and ownership over the lot did not pass to Francisco Donasco and his heirs since the contract to sell was never consummated; and (5) assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiffs have a cause of action for specific performance, such action had already prescribed since the complaint was filed only on 19 October 1988 or more than ten years from the time that they could have lawfully demanded performance. 9 Plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 25967. On 12 November 1991, the said court rendered a decision 10reversing the appealed decision and decreeing as follows: "WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one is rendered: (1) Ordering appellee-vendor Vicente Pingol to accept the sum of P10,161.00, plus the legal interest due thereon from the date of institution of this action on October 19, 1988; (2) Upholding the validity of the 'DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) (of) AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND' (Exh. A), and by virtue and on the strength of which declaring the 'Heirs of the Deceased Francisco N. Domingo' as the owners of the 274.50 sq. m. land, denominated as Lot 3223-A, (LRC) Psd-146255 under the technical description (exh. D) and reflected in the Plan of Subdivision Survey which was approved By Commissioner of Land Registration on August 13, 1971 (exh. C), representing one-half portion [of] lot 3223, situated at the corner of Malolos Avenue and G. de Jesus St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, and covered by TCT No. 7435 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City (exh. B); and (3) Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay the costs. SO ORDERED." 11 The Court of Appeals ruled that the deed of sale in question reveals the clear intention of Vicente Pingol to part with the ownership of the one-half portion of the land by way of an absolute sale; that the failure to fully pay the agreed price was not a ground for the cancellation of the sale; and that the plaintiffs' action is imprescriptible since it is akin to an action to quiet title to property in one's possession. 12
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the defendants, hereinafter referred to as the petitioners, filed this petition for certiorari on 9 January 1992. Plaintiffs, hereinafter referred to as the private respondents, filed their comment thereto on 10 September 1992 to which the petitioners filed a reply on 11 November 1992. We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, 13 which they subsequently complied with. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred: "I IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCUMENT (EXHIBIT "A") DENOMINATED AS 'ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND' IS AN ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE SUFFICIENT TO CONFER OWNERSHIP ON THE VENDEE AND HIS SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST, DESPITE THE FACT THAT BY ITS TERMS AND CONDITIONS, LIKE THE PRICE BEING PAYABLE ON INSTALLMENTS WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD, THE SAME IS A CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE. II IN HOLDING THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE VENDEE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT (EXHIBIT "A") SPECIFICALLY TO COMPLETE THE PAYMENT OF THE CONSIDERATION ON THE DATE STIPULATED IN THE CONTRACT WHICH 6
WAS SUPPOSED TO BE IN JANUARY 1976, COMPLETE PAYMENT THEREOF CAN STILL BE ENFORCED IN AN ACTION INSTITUTED BY THE HEIRS OF THE VENDEE FILED ON OCTOBER 19, 1988 OR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS FROM THE TIME COMPLETE PAYMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE; III IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' ACTION IS ONE WHICH IS AN OFFER TO COMPLETE THE PAYMENT LEFT UNPAID BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' FATHER WHICH DOES NOT PRESCRIBE; IV IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' CAUSE OF ACTION HAS NOT PRESCRIBED." 14 The decisive issue in this case is whether Exhibit "A" embodies a contract of sale or a contract to sell. The distinction between the two is important for in a contract of sale, the title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold, whereas in a contract to sell, by agreement, ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until the full payment of the price. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded, whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective. 15 A perusal of Exhibit "A" leads to no other conclusion than that it embodies a contract of sale. The plain and clear tenor of the "DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND" is that "the VENDOR hereby . . . SELL, CONVEY AND CONVEY by way of Absolute Sale the one-half (1/2) portion . . . to the VENDEE . . . his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest." That the vendor, petitioner Vicente Pingol, had that clear intention was further evidenced by his failure to reserve his title thereto until the full payment of the price. In Dignos vs. Court of Appeals, 16 we held that a deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated as a "Deed of Conditional Sale" where there is no stipulation in the deed that title to the property sold is reserved in the seller until the full payment of the price, nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period. Exhibit "A" contains neither stipulation. What is merely stated therein is that "the VENDEE agrees that in case of default in the payment of the installments due the same shall earn a legal rate of interest, and to which the VENDOR likewise agrees." Furthermore, as found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of the parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show that an absolute deed of sale was intended by the parties and not a contract to sell: "[P]ursuant to the deed, the vendor delivered actual and constructive possession of the property to the vendee, who occupied and took such possession, constructed a building thereon, had the property surveyed and subdivided and a plan of the property was prepared and submitted to the Land Registration Commission which approved it preparatory to segregating the same and obtaining the corresponding TCT in his name. Since the sale, appellee continuously possessed and occupied the property as owner up to his death on July 13, 1984 and his heirs, after his death, continued the occupancy and possession of the property up to the present. Those contemporaneous and subsequent events are demonstrative acts that the vendor since the sale recognized the vendee as the absolute owner of the property sold. All those attributes of ownership are admitted by defendants in their answer, specifically in paragraphs 7 and 9 of their special and affirmative defenses." 17 The contract here being one of absolute sale, the ownership of the subject lot was transferred to the buyer upon the actual and constructive delivery thereof. The constructive delivery of the subject lot was made upon the execution of the deed of sale 18 while the actual delivery was effected when the private respondents took possession of and constructed a house on Lot No. 3223-A. The delivery of the object of the contract divested the vendor of the ownership over the same and he cannot recover the title unless the contract is resolved or rescinded pursuant to Article 1592 of the New Civil Code which provides that: "In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial act. After the demand, the court may not grant him a new term." Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not find that a notarial or judicial rescission of the contract had been made. Although Vicente Pingol asserts that he had declared to Francisco Donasco that he was cancelling the contract, he did not prove that his demand for rescission was made either judicially or by a notarial act. Petitioners fault the respondent Court for holding that the action of the petitioners is not barred by the statute of limitations. They argue that the private respondents' action, being based upon a written contract, has prescribed since it was brought only in 1988 or more than ten years from the time when the latter could have lawfully demanded performance. 19 We disagree. Although the private respondents' complaint before the trial court was denominated as one for specific performance, it is in effect an action to quiet title. In this regard, the following excerpt from Bucton vs. Gabar 20 is apropos: "The real and ultimate basis of petitioners' action is their ownership of one-half of the lot coupled with their possession thereof, which entitles them to a conveyance of the property. In Sapto, et al. v. Fabiana [103 Phil. 683, 686-87 (1958)], this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, 7
explained that under the circumstances no enforcement of the contract is needed, since the delivery of possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title to the purchaser, and that, actually, the action for conveyance is one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud upon the appellee's ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors." That a cloud has been cast on the title of the private respondents is indubitable. Despite the fact that the title had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object of the contract, the petitioners adamantly refused to accept the tender of payment by the private respondents and steadfastly insisted that their obligation to transfer title had been rendered ineffective. A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof, entered upon the land and had made valuable improvements thereon, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor who had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the vendee has an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title. 21 Prescription thus cannot be invoked against the private respondents for it is aphoristic that an action to quiet title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible. 22 The rationale for this rule has been aptly stated thus: "The owner of real property who is in possession thereof may wait until his possession is invaded or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. A person claiming title to real property, but not in possession thereof, must act affirmatively and within the time provided by the statute. Possession is a continuing right as is the right to defend such possession. So it has been determined that an owner of real property in possession has a continuing right to invoke a court of equity to remove a cloud that is a continuing menace to his title. Such a menace is compared to a continuing nuisance or trespass which is treated as successive nuisances or trespasses, not barred by statute until continued without interruption for a length of time sufficient to affect a change of title as a matter of law." 23 Private respondents shall, however, be liable to pay the legal rate of interest on the unpaid balance of the purchase price from the date of default or on 6 January 1976, when the entire balance should have been paid, pursuant to the provision in the deed of sale. WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. As modified, the interest on the unpaid balance of P10,161.00, at the legal rate, shall be computed from 6 January 1976. Upon the payment by the private respondents to the petitioners of the said amount and the interest thereon, the latter are ordered to deliver Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7435 to the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City who shall cancel the same and issue two new transfer certificates of title in lieu thereof, one of which shall be in the name of the herein private respondents covering Lot No. 3223-A and the other in the name of the petitioners covering the remainder of the lot.
SO ORDERED. ||| (Spouses Pingol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102909, September 06, 1993)
8
[G.R. No. 111141. March 6, 1998] MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division), VICTORICO LAURIO and ANGELES LAURIO,respondents. D E C I S I O N ROMERO, J .: Like a priceless treasure coveted by many, but capable of ownership by only one, this 20,592 square-meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titong, Masbate, Masbate is claimed by two contestants in this petition for review on certiorari. Unfortunately, legal title over the property can be vested in only one of them. The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44 [1] ruled in favor of private respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio, adjudging them as the true and lawful owners of the disputed land. Affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes to us for a favorable reversal. Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and declared for taxation purposes in his name. He claims that on three separate occasions in September 1983, private respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area of approximately two (2) hectares, and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, [2] Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981. In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner [3] , asserting that no controversy had sprouted between them for twenty years until the latter sold Lot No. 3479 to private respondent Victorico Laurio. [4] This was corroborated by Ignacio Villamor, who had worked on the land even before its sale to Espinosa in 1962. The boundary between the land sold to Espinosa and what remained of petitioners property was the old Bugsayon river. When petitioner employed Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in 1962, he instructed Lerit to change the course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at the southern portion of petitioners property, thus converting the old river into a riceland. [5]
For his part, private respondent anchors his defense on the following facts: He denied petitioners claim of ownership, recounting that the area and boundaries of the disputed land remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands. According to him, petitioner first declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2916, [6] which showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was bounded on the North by the Bugsayon River; on the East by property under the ownership of Lucio Lerit; on the South by property owner by Potenciano Zaragoza; and on the West by property owned by Agapito de la Cruz. [7] Private Respondent then alleges that, on December 21, 1960, petitioner sold this property to Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug, after which Tax Declaration No. 5339 [8] was issued in her favor. In compliance with their mutual agreement to repurchase the same, petitioner reacquired the property by way of sale [9] on August 24, 1962 and then declared it for taxation purposes in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5720. [10] However, the property remained in petitioners hands for only four (4) days because, on August 28, 1962, he sold it to Espinosa [11] who then declared it in his name under Tax Declaration No. 12311. [12] Consequently, the property became a part of the estate of Pablo Espinosas wife, the late Segundina Liao Espinosa. On August 10, 1981, her heirs executed an instrument denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale whereby the 5.5-hectare property under Tax Declaration No. 12311 was sold to private respondent [13] in consideration of the amount of P5,000.00. Thereafter, Tax Declaration No. 12738 was issued in the name of private respondent. In all these conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those appearing in Tax Declaration No. 2916 under petitioners name. It was proved at the proceedings in the court a quo that two (2) surveys were made of the disputed property. The first survey [14] was made for petitioner, while the second was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court. As anticipated, certain discrepancies between the two surveys surfaced. Thus, contrary to petitioners allegation in his complaint that he is the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of Lot Nos. 3918, 3918- A and 3606. On the other hand, Lot No. 3479 pertaining to Espinosa, was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by petitioner to him. Apprised of the discrepancy, private respondent filed a protest [15] before the Bureau of Lands against the first survey, likewise filing a case for alteration of boundaries before the municipal trial court, the proceedings of which, however, were suspended because of the instant case. [16]
Private respondent testified that petitioner is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of the deceased Leonida Zaragoza, [17] the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6- hectare property of the deceased. The property involved is described in the instrument as having been declared under Tax Declaration No. 3301 [18] and as bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by the Bugsayon River and on the West by Benigno Titong. On September 9, 1969, Tax Declaration No. 8723 was issued to petitioner for his corresponding share in the estate. However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share in the extrajudicial settlement [19] petitioners share was bloated to 2.4 hectares. It therefore appeared to private respondent that petitioner encroached upon his (Laurios) property and declared it a part of his inheritance. [20] The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by property owner Espinosa, and on the West by property owner Adolfo Titong. [21] Private respondent accordingly denied that petitioner had diverted the course of the Bugsayon River after he had repurchased the land from Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug [22] because the land was immediately sold to Espinosa shortly thereafter. [23]
9
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, declaring him as the true and absolute owner of the litigated property and ordering petitioner to respect private respondents title and ownership over the property and to pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses, costs and moral damages. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. On motion for reconsideration, the same was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. At the outset, we hold that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the lower court should have outrightly dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code: ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein. Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owners title to or interest in real property. [24] The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding. Under the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action. [25]
Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no other course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding beclouded the plaintiffs title over the property involved. Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants (respondents herein), together with their hired laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered the southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same: He then proceeded to claim damages and attorneys fees. He prayed that, aside from issuing a writ or preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents and their hired laborers from intruding into the land, the court should declare him the true and absolute owner thereof. Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to the property were private respondents alleged acts of physical intrusion into his purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for an action for forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title. When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it would have become apparent to the court that the case was a boundary dispute. The answer alleged, among other matters, that petitioner, in bad faith, surreptitiously, maliciously and fraudulently had the land in question included in the survey of his land which extends to the south only as far as the Bugsayon River which is the visible and natural and common boundary between the properties. [26] Moreover, during the hearing of the case, petitioner proved that it was actually a boundary dispute by evidence showing what he considered as the boundary of his property which private respondents perceived as actually encroaching on their property. In this regard, the following pronouncements of the Court are apropos: x x x (T)he trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for quieting of title, order the determination of the boundaries of the claimed property, as that would be tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed property in an action where the sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners interest or title in and to said property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate in adversarial proceedings where possession or ownership may properly be considered and where evidence aliunde, other than the `instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding itself, may be introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out. [27]
Nonetheless, even if the complaint below were to be considered as a valid one for quieting of title, still, the instant petition for review on certiorari must fail. As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Such factual findings shall not be disturbed normally unless the same are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. [28] Upon an examination of the records, the Court finds no evident reason to depart from the general rule. The courts below correctly held that when petitioner sold, ceded, transferred and conveyed the 5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo Espinosa, his rights of ownership and possession pertaining thereto ceased and these were transferred to the latter. In the same manner, Espinosas rights of ownership over the land ceased and were transferred to private respondent upon its sale to the latter. This finds justification in the Civil Code, as follows: ART. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent. A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional. In other words, a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing sold. [29] In the case at bar, petitioners claim of ownership must of necessity fail because he has long abdicated his rights over the land when he sold it to private respondents predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession for more than twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that (o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession 10
of ten years, this provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that x x x (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe(with color of title and good faith). [30] The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. [31] For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. [32]
Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiffs admitted acts of converting the boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of others and therefore tantamount to bad faith. [33] To allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code states that (o)wnership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. Petitioners alleged possession in 1962 up to September 1983 when private respondents entered the property in question spanned twenty-one (21) years. This period of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Art. 1137. Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan prepared upon his request, [34] the tax declaration in his name, [35] the commissioners report on the relocation survey, [36] and the survey plan. [37] Respondent court correctly held that these documents do not conclusively demonstrate petitioner's title over Lot Nos. 3918-A and 3606. A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained and also a paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land. [38] A survey under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition; a customary mode in which a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of the common estate. [39] Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to ownership as it may refer only to a delineation of possession. [40]
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private surveyors send their original field notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval. [41] A survey plan not verified and approved by said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence without any objection as to its due execution and authenticity does not signify that the courts shall give probative value therefor. To admit evidence and not to believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each other. This Court cannot alter the conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the credibility accorded to evidence presented by the parties. [42]
Similarly, petitioners tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership. [43] It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. [44] Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in proving ones ownership. [45] Moreover, the incompatibility in petitioners tax declaration and the commissioners report as regards the area of his claimed property is much too glaring to be ignored. Tax Declaration No. 8717 states that petitioners property has an area of 3.2800 hectares while the totality of his claim according to the commissioned geodetic engineers survey amounts to 4.1385 hectares. There is therefore a notable discrepancy of 8,585 square meters. On the other hand, private respondents claimed property, as borne out by Tax Declaration No. 12738, totals 5.5 hectares, a more proximate equivalent of the 5.2433-hectare property as shown by the commissioners report. There is also nothing in the commissioners report that substantiates petitioners claim that the disputed land was inside his property. Petitioner capitalizes on the lower courts statement in its decision [46] that as reflected in the commissioners report dated May 23, 1984 (Exhibit 3-3-A), the area claimed is inside lot 3918 of the defendants (Exhibit 2) [47] or the private respondents. A careful reading of the decision would show that this statement is found in the summary of defendants (herein private respondents) evidence. Reference to Lot No. 3918 may, therefore, be attributed to mere oversight as the lower court even continues to state the defendants assertion that the 2-hectare land is part of their 5.5-hectare property. Hence, it is not amiss to conclude that either petitioner misapprehended the lower courts decision or he is trying to contumaciously mislead or worse, deceive this Court. With respect to the awards of moral damages of P10,000.00 and attorneys fees of P2,000.00, the Court finds no cogent reason to delete the same. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings to the effect that where fraud and bad faith have been established, the award of moral damages is in order. [48] This pronouncement finds support in Art. 2219 (10) of the Civil Code allowing the recovery of moral damages for acts enumerated in Art. 21 of the same Code. This article states that (a)ny person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The moral damages are hereby increased to P30,000.00. We agree with the respondent court in holding that the award of attorneys fees is justified because petitioner filed a clearly unfounded civil action. [49]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
11
Spouses RICARDO and FERMA PORTIC, petitioners, vs. ANASTACIA CRISTOBAL, respondent. An agreement in which ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price is known as a contract to sell. The absence of full payment suspends the vendors' obligation to convey title. This principle holds true between the parties, even if the sale has already been registered. Registration does not vest, but merely serves as evidence of, title to a particular property. Our land registration laws do not give title holders any better ownership than what they actually had prior to registration. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the January 29, 2002 Decision 2 and the November 18, 2002 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 66393. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: "WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby entered ORDERING defendant-appellant to pay the unpaid balance of P55,000.00 plus legal interest of 6% per annum counted from the filing of this case. The ownership of defendant-appellant over the subject property is hereby confirmed. "No pronouncement as to costs." 4 In the challenged Resolution, 5 the CA denied petitioners' Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The Facts The facts were summarized by the appellate court as follows: "Spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam were the original registered owners of a parcel of land with three-door apartment, located at No. 9, 1st Street BBB, Marulas, Valenzuela City. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-71316 was issued in the names of spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam. "On October 2, 1968, spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam sold the subject property in favor of [petitioners] with the condition that the latter shall assume the mortgage executed over the subject property by spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam in favor of the Social Security System. "[Petitioners] defaulted in the payment of the monthly amortizations due on the mortgage. The Social Security System foreclosed the mortgage and sold the subject property at public auction with the Social Security System as the highest bidder. ACSaHc "On May 22, 1984, before the expiration of the redemption period, [petitioners] sold the subject property in favor of [respondent] in consideration of P200,025.89. Among others, the parties agreed that [respondent] shall pay the sum of P45,025.89 as down payment and the balance of P155,000.00 shall be paid on or before May 22, 1985. The parties further agreed that in case [respondent] should fail to comply with the conditions, the sale shall be considered void and [petitioners] shall reimburse [respondent] of whatever amount already paid. "On the same date, [petitioners] and [respondent] executed a 'Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage' whereby [petitioners] sold the subject property in favor of [respondent] in consideration of P80,000.00, P45,000.00 thereof shall be paid to the Social Security System. "On July 30, 1984, spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam, the original owners of the subject property, sold the subject property in favor of [respondent] for P50,000.00. "On the same date, [respondent] executed a 'Deed of Mortgage' whereby [respondent] constituted a mortgage over the subject property to secure a P150,000.00 indebtedness in favor of [petitioners]. "[Respondent] paid the indebtedness due over the subject property to the Social Security System. "On August 6, 1984, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 71316 in the names of spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-113299 was issued in the name of [respondent]. "On May 20, 1996, [petitioners] demanded from [respondent] the alleged unpaid balance of P55,000.00. [Respondent] refused to pay. "On June 6, 1996, [petitioners] filed this instant civil case against [respondent] to remove the cloud created by the issuance of TCT No. T-113299 in favor of [respondent]. [Petitioners] claimed that they sold the subject property to [respondent] on the condition that [respondent] shall pay the balance on or before May 22, 1985; that in case of failure to pay, the sale shall be considered void and [petitioners] shall reimburse [respondent] of the amounts already paid; that [respondent] failed to fully pay the purchase price within the period; that on account of this failure, the sale of the subject property by [petitioners] to [respondent] is void; that in spite of this failure, [respondent] required [petitioners] to sign a lease contract over the apartment which [petitioners] occupy; that [respondent] should be required to reconvey back the title to the subject property to [petitioners]. "[Respondent] on her part claimed that her title over the subject property is already indefeasible; that the true agreement of the parties is that embodied in the Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage; that [respondent] had fully paid the purchase price; that [respondent] is the true owner of the subject property; that [petitioners'] claim is already barred by laches." 6 After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City rendered this judgment in favor of petitioners: 12
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates on this case as follows: 1.) The Court hereby orders the quieting of title or removal of cloud over the [petitioners'] parcel of land and three (3) door apartment now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-113299 of the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City and Tax Declaration Nos. C- 018-00235 & C-031-012077 respectively, of Valenzuela City; 2.) The Court hereby orders the [respondent] to reconvey in favor of the [petitioners] the parcel of land and three (3) door apartment now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-113299 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City after reimbursement by the [petitioners] of the amount actually paid by the [respondent] in the total amount of P145,025.89; 3.) The Court hereby DENIES damages as claimed by both parties." 7 Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals opined that the first Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) embodied the real agreement between the parties, and that the subsequent Deeds were executed merely to secure their respective rights over the property. 8 The MOA stated that Cristobal had not fully paid the purchase price. Although this statement might have given rise to a cause of action to annul the Deed of Sale, prescription already set in because the case had been filed beyond the ten-year reglementary period, 9 as observed by the CA. Nonetheless, in conformity with the principle of unjust enrichment, the appellate court ordered respondent to pay petitioners the remaining balance of the purchase price. 10 In their Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioners contended that their action was not one for the enforcement of a written contract, but one for the quieting of title an action that was imprescriptible as long as they remained in possession of the premises. 11 The CA held, however, that the agreement between the parties was valid, and that respondent's title to the property was amply supported by the evidence. 12 Therefore, their action for the quieting of title would not prosper, because they failed to show the invalidity of the cloud on their title. ACaDTH Hence, this Petition. 13 The Issue In its Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration: "(1) Whether or not the [petitioners'] cause of action is for quieting of title. "(2) Whether or not the [petitioners'] cause of action has prescribed." 14 The main issue revolves around the characterization of the parties' agreement and the viability of petitioners' cause of action. This Court's Ruling The Petition has merit. Main Issue: Nature of the Action: Quieting of Title or Enforcement of a Written Contract Petitioners argue that the action they filed in the RTC was for the quieting of title. Respondent's demand that they desist from entering into new lease agreements with the tenants of the property allegedly attests to the fact of their possession of the subject premises. 15 Further, they point to the existence of Civil Case No. 7446, an action for unlawful detainer that respondent filed against them, 16 as further proof of that fact. Being in continuous possession of the property, they argue that their action for the quieting of title has not prescribed. 17 On the other hand, respondent joins the appellate court in characterizing the action petitioners filed in the RTC as one for the enforcement of the MOA. Being based on a written instrument, such action has already prescribed, respondent claims. 18 She adds that petitioners could not have been in continuous possession of the subject property because, under a duly notarized lease agreement, they have been paying her a monthly rental fee of P500, which was later increased to P800. Two questions need to be answered to resolve the present case; namely, (1) whether Cristobal's title to the property is valid; and (2) whether the Portics are in possession of the premises, a fact that would render the action for quieting of title imprescriptible. Validity of Title The CA held that the action for the quieting of title could not prosper, because Cristobal's title to the property was amply supported by evidence. Article 476 of the Civil Code provides as follows: "Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. "An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein." Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem. 19 Technically, they are neither in rem nor in personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant. 20 However, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties. 21 Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an action to quiet title. However, it has been held that this remedy may also be availed of by a person other than the registered owner because, in the Article reproduced above, "title" does not necessarily refer to the original or transfer certificate of title. 22 Thus, lack of an actual certificate of title to a property does not necessarily bar an action to quiet title. As will be shown later, petitioners have not turned over and have thus retained their title to the property. On the other hand, the claim of respondent cannot be sustained. The transfer of ownership of the premises in her favor was subject 13
to the suspensive condition stipulated by the parties in paragraph 3 of the MOA, which states as follows: "3. That while the balance of P155,000.00 has not yet been fully paid the FIRST PARTY OWNERS shall retain the ownership of the above described parcel of land together with its improvements but the SECOND PARTY BUYER shall have the right to collect the monthly rentals due on the first door (13-A) of the said apartment;"23 The above-cited provision characterizes the agreement between the parties as a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. Ownership is retained by the vendors, the Portics; it will not be passed to the vendee, the Cristobals, until the full payment of the purchase price. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition, and failure to comply with it is not a breach of obligation; it is merely an event that prevents the effectivity of the obligation of the vendor to convey the title. 24 In short, until the full price is paid, the vendor retains ownership. TICDSc The mere issuance of the Certificate of Title in favor of Cristobal did not vest ownership in her. Neither did it validate the alleged absolute purchase of the lot. Time and time again, this Court has stressed that registration does not vest, but merely serves as evidence of, title. Our land registration laws do not give the holders any better title than that which they actually have prior to registration. 25 Under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, mere registration is not enough to acquire a new title. Good faith must concur. 26 Clearly, respondent has not yet fully paid the purchase price. Hence, as long as it remains unpaid, she cannot feign good faith. She is also precluded from asserting ownership against petitioners. The appellate court's finding that she had a valid title to the property must, therefore, be set aside. Continuous Possession The issue of whether the Portics have been in actual, continuous possession of the premises is necessarily a question of fact. Well- entrenched is the rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. 27 This Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the CA's findings sustaining those of the trial court, which held that petitioners had been in continuous possession of the premises. For this reason, the action to quiet title has not prescribed. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the RTC of Valenzuela City in Civil Case No. 4935-V-96, dated September 23, 1999, is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. ||| (Spouses Portic v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 156171, April 22, 2005)
07-11-20 Samaan V Zernik (SC087400) at The Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Court File - "Volume IV-Continued" - Evidence of Judicial Fraud On The Court and Racketeering S