Ch apt er 4

The Soviet/Warsaw Pact

Ground Forces Threat
to Europe
CONTENTS
Page
Sovi et Mi l i tary Doctri ne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Warsaw Pact Forces i n the Western Theater of Mi l i tary Operati ons . . . . . 57
Pri nci pl es of Sovi et Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Sovi et/Warsaw Pact Ground Offensi ve I nto Europe:
A Noti onal Scenari o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Sovi et and Warsaw Pact Vul nerabi l i ti es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Areas of Controversy and Uncertai nty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Tabl es
Table No. Page
4-1. Structure of Sovi et Motori zed Ri fl e and Tank Di vi si ons . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4-2. Vehi cl es Sovi et Tank and Motori zed Ri fl e Di vi si ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Figures
Figure No. Page
4-l . NATO/Warsaw Pact Force Compari sons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4-2. Warsaw Pact Concept of Empl oyment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4-3. Sovi et/Warsaw Pact Warti me Command Organi zati on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4-4. Exampl e of Sovi et Front-Loadi ng of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Chapter 4
The Soviet/Warsaw Pact
Ground Forces Threat to Europe
I n 1984, SACEUR General Rogers descri bed
FOFA as an attempt to come to gri ps wi th
the real i ti es presented by Sovi et doctri ne for
offensi ve operati ons and the conti nui ng mas-
si ve Sovi et conventi onal force bui l d-up. Thi s
chapter exami nes some of these real i ti es, both
what we know about a potenti al Sovi et ground
offensi ve i n Central Europe, and the uncertai n-
ti es surroundi ng those real i ti es.
The Sovi ets have massed i n Europe a l arge
number of ground forces wi th an enormous
amount of fi repower: at present, the strength
of the i n-pl ace Warsaw Pact forces i n the Cen-
tral Regi on-i n terms of di vi si ons, tanks, and
arti l l ery-i s i n each category cl ose to twi ce that
of NATOs i n-pl ace forces, and Warsaw Pact
forces possess a good deal more strategi c depth,
for defensi ve purposes and to bri ng more forces
to bear .
2
NATO, bei ng a defensi ve al l i ance,
General Bernard W. Rogers, Fo11ow on Forces Attack
\~~~A~: ~l ~ths and Real i ti es,
,Vato Retriew, No. 6, December
J$hi l e the ter r i tor y of the J$arsaw Pact extends thousands
of ki l ometers back i nto the U. S. S. R., NATO has l i ttl e depth
must be prepared to react to however the So-
vi ets mi ght choose to use those forces shoul d
a confl i ct ari se. But how the Sovi ets mi ght ac-
tual l y l aunch an offensi ve has generated a good
deal of controversy.
Thi s chapter, therefore, exami nes what we
know and do not know about those aspects of
Sovi et strategy, operati onal pl anni ng and tac-
ti cs of si gni fi cance for FOFA: the rol e of con-
venti onal forces i n Sovi et doctri ne; the Sovi et
ground forces faci ng NATO; the pri nci pl es whi ch
govern Sovi et mi l i tary pl anni ng and strategy;
the way a Sovi et conventi onal offensi ve i nto
Western Europe mi ght be waged; and i mpl i -
cati ons for FOFA.
for defensi ve purposes: i t i s l ess than 500 ki l ometers from the
i nter-German border to the Engl i sh channel ; and the i mportance
of Germany as a NATO l and power i n the Central Regi on makes
i t more di ffi cul t for NATO to trade space for ti me than i t woul d
be for Warsaw Pact forces to fal l back when attacked to reor-
gani ze and counterattack. The U.S.S.R. i s al so better pl aced
than NATO to bri ng addi ti onal forces forward to sustai n those
at the front l i ne, as a good porti on of NATOs rei nforcements
of men and equi pment woul d have to come across the Atl anti c
from North Ameri ca.
SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
Among Western anal ysts, one of the most
controversi al aspects of Sovi et mi l i tary pl an-
ni ng i s the rol e of conventi onal weapons i n an
offensi ve. Thi s i s due l argel y to di fferent assess-
ments of Sovi et mi l i tary doctri ne and mi l i -
tary thought.
Sovi et mi l i tary doctri ne l i es at the heart of
the overal l Sovi et approach to war, whi ch i s
qui te di fferent from that of the West. War, as
the Sovi ets see i t, i s a sci ence, somethi ng gov-
erned by certai n l aws and pri nci pl es refl ected
i n mi l i tary hi story, and past and present wars,
tests, maneuvers, and the l i ke. Sovi et mi l i tary
doctri ne compri ses a set of vi ews defi ni ng
the goal s and nature of a possi bl e war, and how
the U.S.S.R. shoul d prepare for and conduct
such a war shoul d i t be deemed necessary. I t
provi des a context for deci di ng the si ze and
composi ti on of the Sovi et Armed Forces, and
for i ntegrati ng thei r organi zati on, tacti cs,
trai ni ng and equi pment i nto a cohesi ve fi ght-
i ng force. Al though vi ewed as sci enti fi c, mi l i -
tary doctri ne i s not ri gi d or fi xed; i nstead, i t
has proven to be qui te dynami c but, once
deci ded on, i s rarel y questi oned except at the
hi ghest l evel s.
I t i s general l y accepted among Western ob-
servers that a major shi ft i n Sovi et doctri ne
occurred i n the mi d-1960s, from a near total
rel i ance on nucl ear weapons i n Sovi et mi l i tary
pl anni ng, to a more bal anced approach to de-
55
56 G New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack
vel opi ng nucl ear and conventi onal forces. From
the l ate 1950s unti l the mi d 1960s, the Sovi ets
bel i eved any potenti al war woul d begi n wi th
massi ve nucl ear stri kes that woul d total l y, and
i rreparabl y, destroy the l osi ng si des enti re so-
ci al and pol i ti cal system. Wi th the ouster of
Khrushchev, however, and the adopti on of a
strategy of Fl exi bl e Response i n the West, the
Sovi ets began to consi der the possi bi l i ty of a
war remai ni ng conventi onal . Al though they
conti nued to bel i eve that nucl ear weapons
woul d be deci si ve i n any confl i ct, the Sovi et
mi l i tary no l onger contended that a confl i ct
woul d i nevi tabl y escal ate to al l -out nucl ear
war. Si nce the mi d 1960s, then, the Sovi ets
have emphasi zed the need to be abl e to wi n
at al l l evel s of confl i ct, and have devel oped the
capabi l i ti es to fi ght wi th or wi thout nucl ear
weapons.
These devel opments have l ed to a good deal
of controversy i n the West regardi ng current
Sovi et doctri ne and possi bl e i ntenti ons. Some
observers contend that the Sovi ets sti l l pl ace
great wei ght on a nucl ear opti on so that,
shoul d mi l i tary confl i ct start, nucl ear weap-
ons woul d pl ay a rol e from the begi nni ng of
that confl i ct. Accordi ng to thi s vi ew, the
Sovi ets percei ve a total l y i ntegrated nucl ear-
conventi onal operati on, wi thi n the framework
of whi ch nucl ear and conventi onal weapons
suppl ement and rei nforce each other, creati ng
the synergi sti c effect deemed necessary for the
attai nment of vi ctory.3
A more common vi ew among Western observ-
ers, however, i s that shoul d war be preci pi tated,
the Sovi ets woul d want to keep the confl i ct con-
venti onal and regard nucl ear rel ease onl y as
a l ast resort. They bel i eve that the Sovi ets have
become i ncreasi ngl y skepti cal about the use-
ful ness of nucl ear weapons i n combat today
3
1. Kass and M. Deane, The Rol e of Nucl ear Weapons i n the
Modem Theater Battl efi el d: The Current Sovi et Vi ew, Comp-
arati ve Str ategy 4(3):212, 1984.
both for i deol ogi cal reasons, and for operati onal
ones.
4
These observers vi ew the conti nued So-
vi et bui l dup of nucl ear capabi l i ti es not as
meant necessari l y to wage a nucl ear offensi ve,
but i nstead: 1) to di scourage i ni ti al NATO nu-
cl ear use; and 2) shoul d NATO cal l for nucl ear
rel ease, to be prepared to wi n at whatever l evel
of nucl ear confl i ct mi ght ensue.
5
The fact that these di fferi ng vi ews are de-
ri ved from Sovi et sources and acti ons suggests
the possi bi l i ty of some degree of debate among
Sovi et mi l i tary pl anners themsel ves. For now,
the Sovi ets are apparentl y keepi ng thei r op-
ti ons open, wi th Sovi et doctri ne sti pul ati ng
that any potenti al wars coul d begi n wi th ei-
ther conventi onal or nucl ear weapons. I f they
are i ni ti ated wi th conventi onal weapons, i t
sti pul ates that they may sti l l escal ate to a nu-
cl ear exchange.
6
What thi s means for FOFA, and for NATO
as a whol e, i s that NATO cannot rul e out, and
thus ought to be prepared for, a conventi onal
phase i n any potenti al Sovi et offensi ve. What
it also suggests is thatwhatever strategies
the West may adopt, or whatever systems we
may buy today--evidence for assessing Soviet
concepts is patchy and controversial, and So-
viet strategy and tactics may change. Si nce
thi s report deal s wi th the conventi onal defense
of Europe, the remai nder of thi s chapter ex-
ami nes how the Sovi ets mi ght conduct a con-
venti onal offensi ve today shoul d such an ac-
ti on be preci pi tated.
4
Nucl ear weapons woul d l ower the Sovi et rate of advance and
greatl y confuse the battl efi el d, di srupti ng troop control and
fai rl y preci sel y defi ned operati onal pl ans. See, for exampl e, Lt.
Col . John Hi nes and Phi l Li p Petersen, The Sovi et Conventi on~
Offensi ve i n Europe, I kfi l i tary Revi ew, Apri l 1985, p. 3.
See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 1. Vol ume 2 contai ns the cl assi fi ed
appendi ces to thi s report.
6See, for exampl e, Capt. 1st Rank A. Bel yayev, Sci enti fi c
Concepts of Modern Warfare-An I mportant El ement i n the
Awar eness of the Sovi et Fi ghti ng Man, Komrnuni st
Vooruzhemykh Sil, No. 7, 1985, as translated i n Joi nt Publ i ca-
ti on Research Servi ce, JPRS-UMA-85-050, Aug. 29, 1985, pp.
17-22.
Ch. 4 The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe G 57
WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE WESTERN THEATER OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS
The Sovi et threat faci ng Western Europe i s
a matter both of the numbers and equi pment
of Warsaw Pact forces, and of Sovi et strategy
for empl oyi ng those forces. The mai n non-nu-
cl ear threat comes from the conti nental forces
of the Warsaw Pact, concentrated i n Central
Europe al ong the eastern border of West Ger-
many i n what the Warsaw Pact desi gnates as
i ts Western Theater of Mi l i tary Operati ons
(TVD).
7
Thi s regi on contai ns general l y-al though
by no means excl usi vel yfl at terrai n (espe-
ci al l y northern Germany), wel l sui ted to the
movement of armored combat uni ts, and the
road to the key economi c and pol i ti cal centers
of Western Europe.
The Warsaw Pacts Western TVD consi sts
of Sovi et and non-Sovi et Warsaw Pact (NSWP)
forces i n Pol and, East Germany, and Czecho-
sl ovaki a, and the Bal ti c, Bel orussi an and Car-
pathi an mi l i tary di stri cts of the U.S.S.R. Wi th
a standi ng force of roughl y 4 mi l l i on person-
nel faci ng Europe, thi s area houses the War-
saw Pact l argest, most ready, and most mod-
ern force, whi ch far outnumbers NATOs i n-pl ace
forces.
8
The Sovi et forces i ncl ude roughl y 19
di vi si ons i n the Group of Sovi et Forces Ger-
many (GSFG) i n East Germany, fi ve di vi si ons
i n the Central Group of Forces (CGF) i n Czech-
osl ovaki a, and two di vi si ons i n the Northern
For pl anni ng purposes, the Sovi ets have di vi ded the areas
conti guous wi th thei r borders i nto fi ve theaters of mi l i tary
operati ons or TVDs--the Northwest, the Western, the South-
western, the Southern, and the Far Easterni n whi ch they
woul d expect mi l i tary acti on on a strategi c scal e; the mi l i tary
assets empl oyed i n each TVD vary, but the strongest force i s
consi dered to be i n the Western TVD. The Sovi et Uni on i tsel f
i s di vi ded i nto 16 mi l i tary di stri cts.
The Sovi et termteatr voennykh dei stvhas been vari ousl y
transl ated i n Western wri ti ngs as Theater of Mi l i tary Opera-
ti ons (TMO), Theater of Strategi c Mi l i tary Acti ons (TSMA),
and Theater of Mi l i tary Acti ons (TMA). Thi s report fol l ows
DODs current usage of theaters of mi l i tary operati ons. and
the acronym taken from the Russi an, TVD.
Accordi ng to a 1984 NATO force compari son, the Warsaw
Pact countri es have a standi ng force of about 6 mi l l i on person-
nel , of whi ch about 4 mi l l i on face NATO i n Europe. The stand-
i ng force of the NATO countri es compri se about 4.5 mi l l i on per-
sonnel , of whi ch about 2.6 mi l l i on are stati oned i n Europe. See
NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons, NATO I n-
formati on Servi ce, Brussel s, 1984, p. 4.
Group of Forces (NGF) i n Pol and. NSWP forces
i ncl ude somewhere around 6 East German, 15
Pol i sh, and 10 Czech di vi si ons. Another 38 So-
vi et di vi si ons l i e i n the three western mi l i tary
di stri cts of the U. S.S.R.
9
Al l of the Sovi et Groups of Forces stati oned
i n Eastern Europe are consi dered ready
forces, i .e., are hi ghl y manned, wel l -equi pped
and trai ned, and are at l east mi ni mal l y pre-
pared for combat wi th l i ttl e or no mobi l i zati on
and preparati on. Most of the approxi matel y
38 di vi si ons i n the western mi l i tary di stri cts
of the U.S.S.R. are characteri zed as not-
readyi .e., they woul d requi re extensi ve
mobi l i zati on and are not avai l abl e for i mme-
di ate combat operati ons. The Warsaw Pact
forces i n the Western TVD are equi pped wi th
cl ose to 30,000 tanks and 20,000 arti l l ery and
mortar pi eces. About two-thi rds of these tanks
and about three-fourths of al l arti l l ery i s con-
centrated i n the Sovi et di vi si ons, wi th the re-
mai nder i n the NSWP di vi si ons.
11
By contrast,
NATO forces compri se far fewer ready di vi -
si ons i n Central Europe,
12
and roughl y hal f as
many tanks, arti l l ery and mortars, armored
personnel carri ers and attack hel i copters. Fi g-
ure 4-1 presents some rough compari sons of
NATO and Warsaw Pact strengths i n the Cen-
tral Regi on as publ i shed by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense. There are di sagreements,
however, among publ i shed esti mates due to
di fferences such as state of mobi l i zati on, whi ch
forces are counted, and age of data.
See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 2. For an uncl assi fi ed di scussi on,
see Laurence Marti n, NATO and the Defense of the Wrest, New
York: Hol t, Ri nehart & Wi nston, 1985, p. 24.
See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 3.
U.S. Department of Defense, Sovi et Militar~ Power , 1986,
p. 12. See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 4.
Uncl assi fi ed esti mates vary on the number of NATO and
Warsaw Pact di vi si ons i n the Central Regi on, and there are many
di fferencesi n personnel and equi pmentbetween NATO and
WP di vi si ons. These numbers, therefore, provi de the basi s for
a rough force compari son, but shoul d not be vi ewed as a com-
pari son of equi val ent uni ts. See Soviet Military Power, 1987,
esti mates from the I nternati onal I nsti tute for Strategi c Studi es
(11SS), London, and L. Marti n, NATO and the Defense of the
Wrest, pp. 24-25.
58 G New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack
Figure 4-1 .NATO/Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons
a
Fighter-bomber
ground-attack
aircraft
Total military
including naval forces
KEY
570
380
Reconnaissance
aircraft
Division
equivalents
75
0
Bombers
Main
battle tanks
41,000
18,600
Artillery/mortar
WARSAW PACT
forces and rapidly forces and rapidly
deployable forces deployable forces
aE~tlmate~ vary ,n the n~la~~,fled IIterature regarding all of these force comparisons The above should be taken onl Y as a 9ulde as viewed by he
u s
epartment
f
Defense The chart reflects U.S est!mates of 1985 data NATO estimates exclude France and Spain
SOURCE Sov/ef A4///fary Power, 7986, pp 89, 91
Ch. 4The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe G 59
Phofo cred~t U S Deoartmen( of Defense
Soviet mi ssi l e l auncher s.
60 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack
The mai n el ements of the Sovi et ground forces
are the tank, motori zed ri fl e, and ai rborne di -
vi si ons.
13
Each of the tank and motori zed ri fl e
di vi si ons contai ns a si mi l ar compl ement of ar-
ti l l ery, anti -ai rcraft guns and mi ssi l es, tacti -
cal surface-to-surface mi ssi l es, and support
uni ts, wi th the chi ef di fference between them
l yi ng i n the number of motori zed ri fl e regi ments
and tank regi ments i n each: a Sovi et tank di -
vi si on (esti mated at about 11,000 men) i ncl udes
three tank regi ments and one motori zed ri fl e
regi ment; the motori zed ri fl e di vi si on, sl i ghtl y
l arger (an esti mated 13,000 men), has three
motori zed ri fl e regi ments and one tank regi -
ment
14
(tabl e 4-l ). An i mportant poi nt to note
wi th regard to FOFA, however, i s the overal l
rati o of armored to non-armored vehi cl es: i n
both tank and motori zed ri fl e di vi si ons, there
are more than twi ce as many trucks and other
l i ght vehi cl es as there are armored vehi cl es
15
(tabl e 4-2). The ai rborne di vi si ons i ncl ude three
ai rborne regi ments and combat support and
servi ce uni ts. I n addi ti on to the regul ar ai r-
borne di vi si ons, the Sovi ets have al so formed
ai r assaul t bri gades and battal i ons.
Accordi ng to prel i mi nary research from the
Royal Mi l i tary Academy, Sandhurst, the So-
vi ets may now be movi ng toward a more fl exi -
bl e organi zati on of thei r forces as wel l , by turn-
i ng more toward the corps/bri gade structure
as a possi bl e al ternati ve to the focus on di vi -
si ons and regi ments. Researchers at Sandhurst
bel i eve the reorgani zati on of some Sovi et di -
vi si ons i nto corps may presage a l arger reorga-
ni zati on of the Sovi et force structure overal l .
Such changes woul d onl y rei nforce the bel i ef
of the U.S. DoD that these forces have been
.

3
See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 5.
See Sovi et Mihtary Power 1986, p. 65, and U.S. Department
of the Army, Soviet Army Operations, Apri l 1978, I AG-13-U-
78, pp. 2-10-2-13.
KSee vol . 2, app. 3A, footnote 6.
and are bei ng expanded and reorgani zed to cre-
ate a l arger, more capabl e and hi gher-speed
fi ghti ng force for a conventi onal or nucl ear bat-
tl efi el d.
Table 4-1 .Structure of Soviet Motorized Rifle
and Tank Divisions
MR Tank
T o t a l p e r s o n n e l 12,695 11,470
Division HQ & HQ company 245 245
T a n k r e g i m e n t s 1 regiment 3 regiments, each
1,145 personnel w/1 ,575 personnel
MR r e g i me n t s ( B MP) 1 regiment 1 regiment
2.225 personnel 2,225 personnel
MR regi ment s (BTR) 2 regiments, each
w/2,31 5 personnel
Ar t i l l er y r egi ment . 1,030 1,030
SAM regiment (SA-6) 480 480
FROG bat t al i on 170 170
Multiple rocket launcher
bat t al i on 255 255
An t i t an k b at t al i o n 195

Reconnaissance battalion 340 340

Engineer battalion 395 395
Signal battalion 270 270
Motor transport battalion 370 370
Maintenance battalion 230 250
Chemical defense battalion 225 225
Me d i c a l b a t t a l i o n 175 175
Artillery command battery 70 70
Mobile field bakery 45 45
Helicopter squadron 200 200
SOURCE Oefense Intelligence Agency Sowel DwmorM/ Orgm/zaf/on Gude OOB-I 100333-82
Jul y 1982, repr(nted May 1985 pp. 9 80
Table 4-2.Vehicles Soviet Tank and Motorized
Rifle Divisions
Motorized Rifle Division Tank Division
Tot al combat vehi cl es 1,029 976
of which
Tanks 220 238
Armored personnel
c a r r i e r s 649 488
A r t i l l e r y 108 108
Air defense 52 52
T r u c k s 2,501 2,427
SOURCE Oefense Int el l i gence Agency Swef L7w/s/ona/ Orgamzahon Gude OOB-1 100-33382
Jul y 1982 repr(nted May 1985
PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET STRATEGY
I n assessi ng Sovi et strategy, the extent to
saw Pact: al l Warsaw Pact armi es are orga-
whi ch the Warsaw Pact i s domi nated by the
ni zed al ong the same l i nes, have hi ghl y stand-
U.S.S.R. means that what the Sovi ets thi nk
ardi zed equi pment, and have l argel y the same
and do wi l l general l y appl y to the enti re War- tacti cs and doctri ne as i n the U.S.S.R. Duri ng
Ch. 4The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe G 61
warti me, the NSWP forces woul d be compl etel y
subordi nated to the Sovi et Supreme Hi gh
Command through i ntermedi ate-l evel theater
commands.
Sovi et wri ti ngs outl i ne a number of pri nci -
pl es whi ch woul d govern the use of these forces
i n any Warsaw Pact conventi onal offensi ve
i nto Western Europe. The overri di ng pri nci -
pl e woul d be to adopt a strategy, operati onal
pl ans and tacti cs that woul d al l ow Sovi et forces
to penetrate and neutral i ze NATOs defenses
very qui ckl y, whi l e at the same ti me: 1) mi ni -
mi zi ng the ri sk of escal ati on to a nucl ear catas-
trophe, and 2) keepi ng the confl i ct off the ter-
ri tory of the U.S.S.R. The Sovi et ai m woul d
be to get rapi dl y i nto NATOs depths and sei ze
key objecti vesNATOs nucl ear arsenal s, C
3
I
assets, ai r force assets, l ogi sti c el ements,
etc.before NATO woul d have a chance to
ful l y mobi l i ze, before rei nforcements woul d be
abl e to arri ve from the Uni ted States, and be-
fore NATO coul d reach a deci si on to use nu-
cl ear weapons.
Of key i mportance i n achi evi ng thi s pri nci -
pl e, the Sovi ets emphasi ze, are the two factors
of speed and surprise. I n order to reach thei r
objecti ves qui ckl yi .e., before Western coun-
tri es coul d prepare thei r defenses ful l y or agree
to use nucl ear weaponsthe Sovi ets bel i eve
that a European war must start suddenl y, tak-
i ng NATO by surpri se. Thi s does not neces-
sari l y mean total surpri se, or even mi l i tary sur-
pri se, but pol i ti cal surpri sei .e., an offensi ve
whi ch woul d catch off guard those NATO
l eaders who make the pol i ti cal deci si on to mobi -
l i ze, prepare defenses, or rel ease nucl ear weap-
ons. Al though there coul d never be total surpri se,
a reasonabl e degree i s regarded as essenti al ,
l argel y as an i mportant force mul ti pl i er: a cer-
tai n degree of surpri se woul d make i t possi bl e
to reach objecti ves wi th fewer forces than
woul d be needed agai nst an enemy prepared
for battl e.
To achi eve thi s speed and surpri se, a Sovi et
offensi ve woul d probabl y be accompani ed by
some ki nd of deception scheme to make troop
movements and mobi l i zati ons appear to be
occurri ng for reasons other than pl anned ag-
gressi on. Many bel i eve that NATO woul d be
far l ess l i kel y to react i f any Sovi et prepara-
ti ons for war were ambi guous. And once an
offensi ve i s i ni ti ated, the Sovi ets emphasi ze
the i mportance of speedi .e., of seizing and
holding the initiative, retai ni ng the offensive,
and maintaining a high rate of advance. The
Sovi ets pl ace overri di ng stress on the offen-
si ve as the onl y deci si ve and therefore the
onl y possi bl e form of war.
I n an i ni ti al offensi ve, the Sovi ets woul d
l i kel y concentrate their efforts al ong certai n
fronts, attempti ng deep, heavy thrusts al ong
narrow sectors, and woul d l ook to exploit the
enemy weaknesses. The purpose woul d be to
confront NATO wi th an overwhel mi ng attack
on a few smal l areas whi ch NATO woul d not
be abl e to match. Wi th the di fferent NATO
corps at di fferent states of readi ness, the Sovi ets
are expected to expl oi t the gaps i n NATOs
defense, and to pl ace the mai n wei ght of at-
tack on the more vul nerabl e areas-i . e., on the
U. K., Bel gi an, Dutch and Dani sh conti ngents.
(The U.S. and German corps are consi dered to
be the most formi dabl e forces i n NATO, so i t
i s consi dered unl i kel y that the Sovi ets woul d
attack them head-on. ) Thi s concentrati on of
power i n narrow sectors woul d be conducted
as part of an overal l pl an that woul d be de-
si gned to l ead to a rapi d penetrati on of NATO
defenses and NATOs col l apse.
The Sovi ets woul d di vi de thei r forces i nto
theater l evel forcesconsi sti ng of fronts and
armi es-and tacti cal uni ts, consi sti ng of di vi -
si ons, regi ments, battal i ons, and smal l er. I n
other words, fronts woul d be compri sed of ar-
mi es; armi es are compri sed of di vi si ons; di vi -
si ons, of regi ments; regi ments, of battal i ons;
and battal i ons, of compani es and pl atoons.
Fronts have no fi xed organi zati on. Anywhere
from one to si x fronts mi ght be put together
to parti ci pate i n a speci fi c strategi c operati on
i n a TVD (Sovi et mi l i tary theater).
16
Ar mi es
consi st of two mai n types: the Tank Army,
(compri sed of mai nl y tank di vi si ons), and the
For a ful l er descri pti on, see Sovi et Army Operations, De-
partment of the Army, U.S. Army I ntel l i gence and Securi ty
Command, and U.S. Army I ntel l i gence and Threat Anal ysi s
Center, I AG-13-u-78, Apri l 1978.
62 . New Technology for NATO: Impl ementi ng Follow-On Forces Attack
Combi ned Arms Army, (wi th more motori zed
ri fl e di vi si ons). When tai l ored for combat oper-
ati ons, ei ther type of Army woul d normal l y
i ncl ude: three to seven di vi si ons; SSM bri gade;
several arti l l ery bri gades; anti tank uni ts; AAA
uni ts; SAM regi ments; si gnal regi ment; com-
bat engi neer uni ts; pontoon uni ts; assaul t
crossi ng uni ts; transport uni ts; suppl y faci l -
i ti es; evacuati on and repai r uni ts; medi cal uni ts
and faci l i ti es.
17
Sovi et forces are al so di vi ded
i nto corps and bri gades; corps are general l y
compri sed of two or three di vi si ons, for opera-
ti ons whi ch woul d not requi re a ful l army.
I n order to threaten a qui ck breakthrough
and a rapi d, conti nuous penetrati on deep i nto
NATO terri tory, these forces have been orga-
ni zed i nto successi ve waves, or echel ons, di s-
persed i n great depth. The purpose i s to be abl e
to bri ng fresh forces agai nst the adversary at
the ri ght ti mes to bui l dup pressure and force
and sustai n a breakthrough. Thus, Sovi et forces
throughout the enti re force structure down to
the battal i on l evel are di vi ded i nto echel ons--
fi rst, second, and perhaps even thi rd-and re-
serves. Each regi ment contai ns fi rst and sec-
ond echel on battal i ons; each di vi si on, fi rst and
second echel on regi ments; each army, fi rst and
second echel on di vi si ons; each front, fi rst and
second echel on armi es; and the enti re theater
of operati ons woul d l i kel y have fi rst and sec-
ond echel on fronts. As fi gure 4-2 i l l ustrates,
NATO Central Regi on ground forces i n thei r
mai n defensi ve posi ti ons woul d l i kel y have to
contend wi th three di fferent second eche-
i ons, or waves of enemy forces fol l owi ng the
l ead di vi si ons of the assaul t armi es: the Sec-
ond Tacti cal Echel on, or the fol l ow-on di vi si ons
of the assaul t armi es; the Second Operati onal
Echel on, or the fol l ow-on armi es depl oyi ng
from Pol and, Czechosl ovaki a and Western Mi l -
i tary Di stri cts; and the Second Strategi c Eche-
l on, or Second Echel on Front, consi sti ng of the
fol l ow-on armi es from the western mi l i tary di s-
tri cts (WMD). As i l l ustrated bel ow, however,
the Sovi ets have demonstrated a good deal of
fl exi bi l i ty i n how echel onment may be carri ed
out, and these waves woul d not necessari l y
be of equal wei ght or si gni fi cance.
I bi d, pp. 2.7-2.10.
Each Warsaw Pact uni t woul d probabl y be
assi gned a sector to attack and, i f of di vi si on
si ze or l arger, a mai n and secondary axi s of
advance wi thi n that sector. I n addi ti on, al l
uni ts of bri gade si ze or l arger woul d be as-
si gned a depth of attack whi ch contai ns an i m-
medi ate and subsequent objecti ve or mi ssi on.
I n thi s sense, therefore, second echel ons woul d
not be reserves i n the usual sense, but rather
i tted reserves that woul d woul d act as precomm
have been assi gned thei r pre-pl anned mi ssi ons
before the offensi ve begi ns. The reserves, a
smal l proporti on of Warsaw Pact forces,
18
woul d
be conti ngency forces to use agai nst unanti ci -
pated threats and to take advantage of unex-
pected opportuni ti es.
To expl oi t these breakthroughs, the Sovi ets
have revi ved the Worl d War I I concept of mo-
bi l e groups, whi ch woul d take advantage of any
breakthrough to move i nto NATOs rear. I t
i s bel i eved that these i ndependent di vi si ons,
armi es, or regi ments-wi th thei r new capabi l -
i ti es, now commonl y cal l ed Operational Ma-
neuver Groups (OMGs)woul d be assi gned to
operate on thei r own to capture key objecti ves
i n the NATO rear that woul d both pave the
way for the fol l ow-on forces and neutral i ze
NATOs theater nucl ear threat. I n thi s way,
thei r task woul d be to create the condi ti ons
for turni ng a tacti cal successi .e., an i ni ti al
breakthrough of NATO defensesi nto an op-
erati onal success, by pavi ng the way for the
second echel ons of the army or front of whi ch
they are a part to achi eve thei r preassi gned
objecti ves.
The Sovi ets expect a battl efi el d that woul d
be very confused. There woul d be no cl earl y
di scerni bl e front l i ne, forces woul d mi ngl e i n
depth and woul d engage pri mari l y i n battl es
of encounter (i .e., when both si des engage whi l e
on the move).
19
The Sovi ets pl an to wi n a deci -
si on qui ckl y, but are prepared to fi ght a l ong
war i f they have to.
*See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 7.
see Chri stopher N. Donnel l y, The Warsaw Pact Vi ew of
the Future Battl efi el d, 120A National Security Report (Royal
Mi l i tary Academy, Sandhurst, A68), pp. 11-14.
Ch. 4The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe 63
L
Figure 4-2.Warsaw Pact Concept of Employment
-
KEY
XX Division boundary XXXXX (Front boundary)
I
XXXX Ar my boundar y XXXXXX Theat er boundar y
In place forces
NOTE It IS Import ant to keep In mind that this diagram is highly schematic, fOr IIlustratlve PurPoses only The Warsaw Pact f orces have demonst rat ed flexlblllty In
echelomng forces Ftrst and second echelons whether tactlcali Operational. or strate91c would Ilkely not be of equal we19ht or slgnlflcance (See text]
SOURCE Gener al Ber nar d W Roger s, Fol l ow-On Forces At t ack (FOFA) Myt h and Realltles, NATO Rev/ew, No 6, December 1984 p 2
Sovi et pl anners bel i eve that thei r system of si ze a top down command and control sys-
command and control , or troop control , has tern, wi th commanders at the TVD establ i sh-
been structured i n the best way to meet the i ng concrete strategi c goal s, and then movi ng
demands of such an offensi ve. The Sovi et the- parti cul ar mi ssi ons and requi rements down the
ater command structure i s hi ghl y central i zed, hi erarchy, to the front, the army, di vi si on, and
wi th al l Warsaw Pact forces under a si ngl e, so on (fi gure 4-3). The Sovi ets al so engage i n
central i zed mi l i tary command authori ty, the a good deal of pre-pl anni ng of operati ons,
Sovi et Supreme Hi gh Command (VGK) and i .e., anti ci pati ng what future operati ons mi ght
the Sovi et General Staff.
20
The Sovi ets empha- l ook l i ke, and provi di ng speci fi c norms by
whi ch commanders woul d make deci si ons. Thus,
)For a compari son of the Warsaw Pact and NATO command
l ess i ni ti ati ve woul d be expected of Warsaw
and control systems, see John Hi nes and Phi l Petersen,
4
I s
NATO Thi nki ng Too Smal l ? A Compari son of Command Struc-
Pact commanders at the tacti cal l evel s than
tures, Znternati mml Defense Review, No. 5, 1986, pp. 563-572. i n the West.
64 G New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack
Figure 4-3.Soviet/Warsaw Pact Wartime Command Organization
Supreme High Command (VGK)
(Moscow)
I
B f
Soviet General Staff
I
Strategic Forces
Aviation
Missiles
Naval
Air/Space/Missile
Defense
1 J
I I
I
Battalion
I
Operational
Forces
In time of war, the NSWP forces would be brought
Soviet fronts.
acounter a[r and deep Interdiction
bcounter alr and deepInterdiction and air SuPPOrt for front
cAir support for army
under direct Soviet command and integrated with the various
SOURCES Adapted from Phil Petersen and John Hines, Changing the Soviet System of Control, /rrterrratiorra/ Defense Review, No 3, 1966, and Science Applications,
Inc., SovieV?Varsaw Pact EJatflefleld Planning Procedures, Draft, SAIC-W6064FSRC, May 26, 1966.
Ch. 4The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe . 65
SOVIET/WARSAW PACT GROUND OFFENSIVE INTO EUROPE:
A NOTIONAL SCENARIO
Al though there i s a good deal of uncertai nty
about how the Sovi ets mi ght put these pri nci -
pl es i nto practi ce shoul d war i n Europe occur,
the fol l owi ng noti onal scenari o suggests what
a Sovi et offensi ve i nto Europe mi ght entai l .
Shoul d hosti l i ti es be i ni ti ated, the organi za-
ti on of forces i n the Sovi et Western TVD woul d
probabl y i ncl ude three fi rst echel on fronts: a
Northern Front, compri sed mai nl y of Pol i sh
forces, wi th i ts headquarters drawn from the
Pol i sh Mi ni stry of Defense; a Central Front,
formed from the GSFG, NGF, and East Ger-
man forces, wi th i ts headquarters staff drawn
from the staff of the GSFG headquarters; and
a Czech Front, consi sti ng of Czech forces and
the Sovi et CGF, wi th i ts headquarters drawn
from the Czechosl ovak Western Mi l i tary Di s-
tri ct headquarters.
21
Duri ng warti me, the North-
ern Front woul d l i kel y be depl oyed to the north-
ern GDR, tasked to attack northern West
Germany, the Netherl ands, and Denmark and,
al ong wi th ai rborne and amphi bi ous opera-
ti ons, to take the Dani sh strai ts. The Central
Front woul d conduct the mai n theater attack
across West Germany and i nto Bel gi um, the
southern Netherl ands and Luxembourg. The
Czech Fronts mi ssi on woul d l i kel y be to at-
tack from Czechosl ovaki a i nto the southern
FRG to the FRG-Swi ss-Austri an border. I n
addi ti on, a Danube Front, formed from the So-
vi et Southern Group of Forces (SGF) i n Hun-
gary and from the Hungari an Army, mi ght be
tasked to attack through Austri a i nto the
Southern FRG. Sovi et forces i n the Bel orus-
si an and Carpathi an Mi l i tary Di stri cts mi ght
compri se two second echel on fronts, wi th the
Bal ti c Mi l i tary Di stri ct provi di ng theater re-
serves.
As di scussed above, the Warsaw Pact ground
forces vary wi del y i n thei r peaceti me l evel s of
readi ness, wi th a good number of di vi si ons
manned at l evel s wel l bel ow thei r warti me au-
thori zati ons; these forces woul d requi re exten-
si ve preparati on for war. The preparati on
woul d i ncl ude mobi l i zi ng personnel , trai ni ng
and prepari ng them to conduct combat opera-
ti ons, movi ng uni ts from thei r di spersal l oca-
ti ons, maki ng fi nal preparati ons, and, fi nal l y,
depl oyi ng uni ts to combat.
22
Because the Sovi ets woul d l i kel y want some
of thei r fol l ow-on forces to be prepared to ex-
pl oi t any successes at the FLOT, i t i s expected
that they woul d mobi l i ze parti al l y and begi n
depl oyment before they woul d attack NATO.
Most of the Warsaw Pacts fi rst and second
operati onal echel ons are at hi gh states of read-
i ness i n peaceti me. Accordi ngl y, these uni ts
can be rapi dl y depl oyed from thei r peaceti me
l ocati ons i nto assembl y areas. For many of
those forces i n the rear, however, i t woul d take
a good deal l onger, dependi ng on what l evel
of profi ci ency the Sovi ets woul d want them to
reach before hosti l i ti es begi n. Because of the
Sovi et emphasi s on surpri se, and on depri v-
i ng NATO of any unambi guous warni ng of an
attack, NATO pl anners bel i eve that the bul k
of Sovi et forces woul d be wel l back from the
border between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
before hosti l i ti es woul d start. Accordi ng to one
source, NATOs strategy for meeti ng a Sovi et
conventi onal attack i s based on the assump-
ti on of at l east some 96 hours warni ng ti me,
al though some bel i eve i t mi ght wel l be shorter.
Sovi et doctri ne for depl oyi ng these forces
woul d pose some demandi ng requi rements on
the ti mi ng of movement of the second echel on
di vi si ons, armi es and fronts. These woul d be
depl oyed accordi ng to a careful l y coordi nated
pl an, where each succeedi ng echel on woul d be
commi tted at the ti me and pl ace consi dered
most effecti ve for expl oi ti ng the success of i ts
predecessor and advanci ng deeper i nto NATO
terri tory. Thus, second echel on di vi si ons of the
fi rst echel on armi es woul d start at a parti cu-
21
However, esti mates vary on the number and composi ti on
of fronts, and how they woul d l i kel y be depl oyed duri ng war.
22
See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 8.
23
Laurence Marti n, op. ci t., p. 50.
24
See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 9
66 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack
l ar di stance behi nd the forces at the FLOT,
to be commi tted to battl e to achi eve objecti ves
a certai n di stance beyond the FLOT accord-
i ng to schedul e. Second echel on armi es woul d
be schedul ed to arri ve a few days l ater, hav-
i ng started some di stance behi nd i n Warsaw
Pact terri tory and wi th an objecti ve deeper i nto
NATO terri tory. Second echel on fronts woul d
l i kewi se start even farther back, wi th a sched-
ul e for attai ni ng objecti ves even farther i nto
NATOs depths. OMGsparts of armi es or
fronts desi gned to carry out deep penetrati ons
and rai ds as the opportuni ti es ari se on the mai n
axes of the attackwoul d be commi tted earl y
and woul d operate wel l i nto NATOs rear areas
on thei r own, wi thout the support of the usual
suppl y l i nes.
25
Thus, dependi ng on l evel s of readi ness and
how they fi t i nto the overal l Sovi et offensi ve
pl an, the fol l ow-on forces woul d start anywhere
from just behi nd the i ni ti al attack forces, to
farther back i n East Germany, Pol and, Czech-
osl ovaki a, and then the U.S.S.R. i tsel f. Those
farthest back woul d be transported across a
rel ati vel y sparse hi ghway and rai l network i n
eastern Pol and. Accordi ng to one set of cal cu-
l ati ons, the Sovi ets mi ght bri ng forward an
average of two di vi si ons per day by rai l ,
26
and
up to one di vi si on per day by road.
27
I t i s esti -
mated that at l east 140 trai ns woul d be needed
per day to transport forces across the seven
25
See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 10.
*The actual number may wel l be hi gher.
Those forces bei ng transported by trai n woul d arri ve at trans-
l oadi ng compl exes near the Russi an/Pol i sh border, where they
woul d change from broad gauge to narrow gauge before start-
i ng across most of Pol and. There are about ei ght compl exes al ong
the Russi an/Pol i sh border where equi pment i s off-l oaded from
Russi an broad gauge to East European narrow-gauge; ti me for
transl oadi ng i s esti mated at about 4 hours per trai n.
East-West rai l l i nes i n Pol and. Accordi ng to
these cal cul ati ons, thi s woul d suggest about
20 trai ns departi ng al ong each rai l l i ne per day,
departi ng just about every hour wi th an aver-
age maxi mum spaci ng of about 35 ki l ometers
between trai ns.
28
After crossi ng most of Po-
l and, uni ts woul d proceed to Forward Assem-
bl y Areas.
Cl oser i n, the fol l ow-on forces woul d group
i nto combat uni ts and conti nue under thei r own
power toward the battl e. Tanks and other ar-
mored vehi cl es woul d fi rst be l oaded onto trac-
tor-trai l er transporters before bei ng unl oaded
to move under thei r own power. An armored
combat di vi si on woul d, i f possi bl e, move on
two, three, or four paral l el routes; thus, any
one di vi si on movi ng over roads coul d stretch
wel l over 40 ki l ometers.
29
A di vi si on on the move woul d stop from ti me
to ti me i n assembl y areas: to reorgani ze, mai n-
tai n vehi cl es, and rest. Sovi et doctri ne cal l s
for short or l ong stops, dependi ng on the rea-
sons, the di stance from the FLOT, and the di -
vi si ons schedul e. Upon arri val i n the i mmedi -
ate battl e area, a di vi si on woul d assembl e i n
fi nal assembl y areas, or departure areas
before formi ng i nto a tacti cal march formati on
to be commi tted to battl e. At thi s poi nt, the
majori ty of support vehi cl es woul d move away
to thei r own assembl y areas, so that col umns
movi ng forward from thi s poi nt on woul d con-
si st mai nl y of armored vehi cl es. Havi ng been
commi tted, a di vi si ons regi ments woul d agai n
stop cl oser i n somewhere i n the range of 5
to 30 ki l ometers from the FLOTi n regi ment
assembl y areas for thei r fi nal move forward
i nto battl e.
30

a
See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 11.
*
e
See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 12.
30
See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 13.
SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT VULNERABILITIES
The above scenari o i mpl i es some potenti al l y
seri ous vul nerabi l i ti es i n the Warsaw Pact
systemsuch as ri gi di ty i n Sovi et pl anni ng,
thei r C3 system, the vul nerabi l i ty of l arge
col umns of Warsaw Pact troops on the march,
and the fact that Warsaw Pact troops wi l l have
Ch. 4The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe G 67
to move thr ough cr i ti cal chokepoi nts --
whi ch coul d suggest i mportant targets for
FOFA.
For exampl e, some argue that the l arge num-
ber of Warsaw Pact fol l ow-on forces, and the
preci se ti mi ng wi th whi ch they woul d move
forward, woul d l eave l i ttl e room for fl exi bi l i ty
i n a Sovi et offensi ve; i f thi s i s true, a chang-
i ng si tuati on i n the movement of fol l ow-on
forces, such as mi ght be caused by FOFA,
coul d si gni fi cantl y di srupt the Warsaw Pact
ti metabl e for war.
31
Li kewi se, they contend, a
hi ghl y structured pl an coul d strai n Sovi et com-
mand and control , whose di srupti on woul d al so
cause Warsaw Pact pl anners seri ous probl ems.
The si ze of the Warsaw Pact col umns coul d
compri se another major weakness, l eavi ng
Warsaw Pact forces vul nerabl e to ai r attack.
.
See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 14.
And potenti al chokepoi nts, such as at bri dges
over the Oder and El be Ri vers, woul d al so be
potenti al l y major vul nerabi l i ti es; creati on of
these chokepoi nts woul d del ay and di srupt
Warsaw Pact fol l ow-on forces, and as the de-
l ayed forces bunch up, woul d offer good tar-
gets for fol l ow-up attacks. As Sovi et rear
servi ces central l y control al l l ogi sti c support
acti vi ti es and suppl i es, di srupti ng ammuni ti on
resuppl y and del ayi ng the arri val of the sec-
ond echel on coul d al so di srupt Sovi et oper-
ati ons.
Thus, wi thi n the framework of thi s general
scenari o, key targets for FOFA mi ght i ncl ude
not onl y fi xed targets-such as bri dges across
the Oder and El be/Vl tava ri vers, rai l yards,
depots, etc.but the Warsaw Pact forces them-
sel ves, i ncl udi ng col umns of second-echel on ar-
See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 15.
Photo credit U S Department of Defense
Soviet tanks.
68 G New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack
mored and support vehi cl es (movi ng both by tacki ng these targets woul d l i kel y del ay the
rai l and by road), uni ts i n assembl y areas, enemy rei nforcement and resuppl y at the FLOT,
chokepoi nts, and Warsaw Pact headquarters and mi ght so erode moral e i n the rear, that the
and command posts. I denti fyi ng OMGs pri or Sovi et offensi ve woul d be degraded and made
to thei r commi tment to battl e i s al so some- more manageabl e for NATO forces at the front.
ti mes consi dered a major task for FOFA. At-
AREAS OF CONTROVERSY AND UNCERTAINTY
Thi s overal l scenari o, however, has rai sed a
number of seri ous questi ons among Western
observers. I n general , these questi ons concern
how fl exi bl e the Sovi ets mi ght be i n i mpl ement-
i ng thi s overal l pl an, and thus what i t woul d
take to del ay or di srupt Warsaw Pact fol l ow-
on forces enough to have a si gni fi cant effect
on the overal l war. I n the above scenari o, the
val ue of FOFA woul d depend on two i mportant
condi ti ons:
1.
2.
that there wi l l be fol l ow-on forces, and that
these fol l ow-on forces wi l l be i mportant
to Warsaw Pact strategy; and
that NATOs attack on the fol l ow-on forces
can have a si gni fi cant effect on thei r uti l i ty
i .e., enough l osses can be i nfl i cted to
matter; del ays cannot be suffi ci entl y com-
pensated for; Warsaw Pact C2 can be de-
graded enough to make a di fference; mo-
ral e can be eroded enough to si gni fi cantl y
affect the cohesi on of Warsaw Pact troops.
Each of these condi ti ons, however, i s contro-
versi al .
Wi th regard to the fi rst, al though Sovi et doc-
tri ne may cal l for the echel onment of forces,
there i s not necessari l y a prescri bed formul a
or parti cul ar mi x of forces necessary for thi s,
and the Sovi ets have demonstrated a good deal
of fl exi bi l i ty i n how echel onment may be car-
ri ed out. I n an offensi ve i nto Western Europe,
the Sovi ets may wel l frontl oad thei r forces
i n the fi rst echel on, and Sovi et fi el d commanders
may wel l echel on thei r forces di fferentl y from
each other. These deci si ons woul d probabl y de-
pend on: 1) how ready the NATO forces are
faci ng them, and how much surpri se they coul d
expect; and 2) over what ki nd of terrai n they
woul d have to depl oy. Especi al l y gi ven l ong
mobi l i zati on ti mes, the Sovi ets coul d front
l oad thei r forces, enhanci ng the threat at the
FLOT and reduci ng the i mportance of the fol -
l ow-on forces
33
(fi gure 4-4).
The questi on i s how much the Warsaw Pact
mi ght front l oad i ts forces, and what thi s
woul d mean for the val ue of the fol l ow-on
forces. However fl exi bl e Sovi et pl anni ng may
be, i t sti l l makes sense that any front l oad-
i ng of forces woul d be l i mi ted by certai n phys-
i cal and doctri nal constrai nts. Terrai n i s l i m-
i ted; and pl aci ng a good deal more forces up
front woul d compl i cate l ogi sti cs probl ems, re-
duce the amount of surpri se, and woul d make
Warsaw Pact forces more vul nerabl e to NATOs
nucl ear or hi gh-accuracy conventi onal weap-
ons. Thus, i t i s expected that there wi l l al ways
be a certai n number of fol l ow-on forces com-
i ng up behi nd. As stated by General Rogers:
. , . cri ti cs . . . err i n assumi ng that we are un-
aware that under certai n ci rcumstances the So-
vi ets mi ght press thei r second echel on forces
up agai nst, or among, those forces of the fi rst
echel on. Not onl y are we aware of thi s possi -
bi l i ty, we al so take account of the fact that ter-
rai n can onl y accommodate a fi ni te number of
Warsaw Pact battal i ons abreast, thus causi ng
the rest to be out of contact, i .e., to be fol l ow-
on forces.
34
I ndeed, some contend that the Sovi ets woul d
fi nd i t di ffi cul t to si gni fi cantl y front l oad thei r
forces beyond those al ready i n pl ace wi thout
exceedi ngl y l ong mobi l i zati on ti mes.
35
I t i s
l i kel y that i f the Sovi ets were prepari ng to i ni -
ti ate an offensi ve, they woul d provi de a good
33
See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 16.
General Bernard W. Rogers, op. ci t., p. 4.
35
See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 17.
Ch. 4The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe G 69
Figure 4-4.Example of Soviet Front-Loading of Forces
Structure in anticipation of no surprise
1st Army
2nd Army
Structure in anticipation of surprise: Front-Loading
I
I
1st Army
2nd Army
3rd
4th
Army
Army
SOURCE Soviet Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK
deal of trai ni ng for newl y mobi l i zed, not ready
uni ts, and conduct rel ati vel y comprehensi ve
preparati ons before bri ngi ng them up to the
FLOT. But doi ng so woul d take a good deal
of ti me.
Physi cal constrai nts, however, woul d sti l l al -
l ow the Sovi ets to pl ace many more forces for-
ward than are now esti mated to be there,
36
and

b
Accordi ng to one observer, current Warsaw Pact organi za-
ti on and operati onal doctri ne suggests that there woul d l i kel y
be around 20 to 25 di vi si ons i n the fi rst echel on of an attack
agai nst NATOs Central Regi on. Anal ysi s of the terrai n i n West-
ern Europe, however, suggests that thi s regi on coul d support
wel l over 30 di vi si ons i n the fi rst echel on. I n order to i ncrease
many Western observers contend that doi ng
so mi ght wel l l ower the target val ue of the
fol l ow-on forces for the overal l offensi venot
just quanti tati vel y, but qual i tati vel y. Thi s was
refl ected by U.S. Ai r Forces Headquarters i n
Europe, i n a bri efi ng whi ch spel l ed out the fol -
l owi ng concern wi th FOFA (as di sti nct from
i nterdi cti on):
the combat power of the fi rst echel on by at l east 20 percent,
therefore, thi s observer suggests that the Warsaw Pact need
do l i ttl e more than make changes i n operati onal pl ans-a rel a-
ti vel y qui ck fi x opti on. See Boyd D. Sutton, et al ., Deep
Attack Concepts and the Defence of Central Europe, Survi val ,
March/Apri l 1984, pp. 64-65.
Sovi et doctri ne cal l s for the wave, or eche-
l on, attack arrangement. We here at USAFE
do not bel i eve thi s i s the onl y possi bl e scenari o.
A mi nor shi ft i n Sovi et empl oyment concept
and/or change i n thei r rei nforcement pl an may
l eave us wi th attack capabi l i ti es for whi ch
there are few targets. Few targets, that i s, that
wi l l produce tangi bl e returns i n a l i mi ted span
of ti me.
37
Others have poi nted out si mi l ar concerns.
For exampl e, some poi nt out that a concept
that consi ders attacki ng forces i n transi t across
Pol and taci tl y assumes that those forces woul d
be mobi l i zed and moved after D-Day. Shoul d
these forces be mobi l i zed earl i er, however, and
thus be i n East Germany when the war starts,
i nterdi cti on i n Pol and woul d be futi l e. Even
i f fol l ow-on forces are present, many bel i eve
thei r val ue woul d be l i mi ted i n terms of affect-
i ng the overal l war. I t i s the extended fi rst
37FOFA: USAFE View, Bri efi ng to OTA staff, HQ USAFE,
Apr. 16, 1986.
echel on that i s now cri ti cal . . . The rei nforc-
i ng formati ons from the Western mi l i tary di s-
tri cts . . . serve a vi tal functi on, but they are
redundant i n numbers and they are mostl y not
fi rst-l i ne combat uni ts . . . I t i s the GSFG i t-
sel f that must be destroyed . . . I f these are not
contai ned, they wi l l col l apse NATOs abi l i ty
(and wi l l ) to defend.
38
These questi ons are compl i cated by uncer-
tai nti es over what i t woul d take for attacks
on i ndi vi dual fol l ow-on forces to have a si gni f-
i cant i mpact on thei r effecti veness. How pre-
ci sel y ti med woul d a Sovi et offensi ve be? I f
a Sovi et second-echel on di vi si on i s del ayed a
certai n number of hours, woul d i ts mi ssi on
have been obvi ated? Or mi ght i t make up that
ti me el sewhere, for exampl e, by stayi ng for
shorter ti mes i n assembl y areas? At what l evel
38
See Steven L. Canby, The New Technol ogi es, November,
1983, p. 25. These senti ments were repeated to OTA staff by
West Europeans i n the FRG and Bel gi um, Apri l 1986.
Ch. 4 The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe . 71
of damage woul d the performance of a Sovi et
uni t-at any l evel be degraded enough to si g-
ni fi cantl y affect the overal l war? And what
woul d i t take to target OMGs or command
posts?
As menti oned, some suggest that Warsaw
Pact operati ons are so preci sel y ti med that di s-
rupti on of that pl an coul d throw thei r enti re
operati on off course.
39
But Sovi et wri ti ngs sug
-
gest that the Sovi ets may bui l d a good deal
of sl ack ti me i nto operati onal pl ansfor ex-
ampl e, i nto wai ti ng ti mes i n assembl y areas
to compensate for del ays. Si mi l arl y, i t i s un-
certai n how cri ti cal del ay of l ogi sti cs support
mi ght be, gi ven that the Sovi ets keep a good
amount of thei r stocks al ready forward.
40
Whi l e
del ayi ng the fol l ow-on forces woul d cl earl y
have an effect, therefore, there i s a good deal
of debate concerni ng how hi gh a l evel of dam-
age there woul d have to be for del ayi ng these
forces to have a si gni fi cant effect on the over-
al l war.
A si mi l ar debate surrounds the rel evance of
the OMG to a fol l ow-on forces attack concept.
The OMG has commonl y been vi ewed as com-
pri si ng a speci al i zed formati on, speci fi c i n i ts
structure and mi ssi on, so that an OMG mi ght
wel l be an i denti fi abl e target i n the enemys
rear.
41
Accor di ng to Gener al Roger s:
We consi der the OMG to be a hi gh pri ori ty
target for FOFA . . . Much of the new target
detecti on and sensi ng capabi l i ty we seek to ac-
qui re i s necessary for us to i denti fy whi ch fol -
l ow-on forces are organi zed as OMGs so they
can be attacked earl y on.
42
But others emphasi ze that the OMG may
al so be consi dered as a task, a concept of oper-
ati ons, wi thout necessari l y any defi ni te struc-
ture. I n thi s sense, the OMG woul d not com-
pri se somethi ng that coul d be targeted i n
depth, but rather somethi ng that woul d not
be i denti fi abl e unti l depl oyedi .e., unti l rel a-
ti vel y near the FLOT. Vi ewed thi s way, i ndi -
vi dual di vi si ons or armi es woul d not neces-
%ee vol . 2, app. 4A, note 18
]See VO1. 2, app. 4A, note 19
See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 20
General Bernard Rogers, op. ci t., p. 4
sari l y be structured i n advance to work as an
OMG, but rather resources woul d be al l ocated
as necessary to expl oi t breakthroughs and get
i nto NATOs rear. The Sovi ets may be provi d-
i ng capabi l i ti es i n such a way that perhaps any
group of regi ments, combi ni ng fi re power, ai r
assets, and mobi l e forces, coul d be put together
as an expl oi tati on force, or OMG, as deemed
necessary.
There i s al so debate over the degree to whi ch
di srupti on of Warsaw Pact C
3
I i n the rear
mi ght di srupt Sovi et forces as a whol e. The
i nherent di ffi cul ti es i n detecti ng and target-
i ng Warsaw Pact command posts are many:
1) Sovi et command posts are wel l defended and
camoufl aged; 2) they are di spersed wi del y; 3)
there i s a good deal of redundancy i n command
posts and i n vari ous communi cati ons modes;
4) command posts at the front and army l evel
are l argel y prepared i n advance and therefore
are bunkered or hardened; and 5) because trans-
mi tter antennas are general l y several ki l ome-
ters from command posts, i t woul d be di ffi cul t
to determi ne the preci se l ocati ons of command
posts.
43
Asi de from these di ffi cul ti es, there i s di ffer-
ence of opi ni on over how much damage coul d
be done shoul d certai n uni ts be decapi tated,
and how much fl exi bi l i ty may be worked i nto
the Sovi et deci si onmaki ng process. Some ar-
gue that because the Sovi et command and con-
trol system i s so hi ghl y central i zedwhere
commands pass down a stri ctl y hi erarchi cal
system and where, at the tacti cal l evel , i nfor-
mati on i s l i mi ted and i ni ti ati ve di scouraged
di srupti ng command and control woul d be the
most effecti ve way to stop a Warsaw Pact of-
fensi ve. But Sovi et wri ti ngs al so refl ect a good
deal of effort to i ntroduce more fl exi bi l i ty i nto
thei r deci si onmaki ng process to take any po-
tenti al di srupti ons i nto account.
44
I t i s uncl ear
how fl exi bl e Sovi et troop control woul d prove
to be i n combat.
A fi nal area of contenti on concerns the ef-
fect of FOFA on the cohesi on among Sovi et
and Warsaw Pact forcesi .e., the effect of
43
See v~ 2, app. 4A, note 21
44
See vol . 2, app. 4A, note 22
72 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack
FOFA operati ons on Sovi et and Warsaw Pact
moral e, and how that mi ght affect the capa-
bi l i ti es of thei r troops for i mpl ementi ng Sovi et
operati onal pl ans. FOFA coul d wel l have a pro-
found psychol ogi cal effect on the enemys
forces, by extendi ng the battl efi el d i nto the
enemys depths. Accordi ng to one mi l i tary hi s-
tori an, hi tti ng uni ts whi l e they are sti l l on
the l i ne of march, and do not expect i t, wi l l have
a far more seri ous effect than hi tti ng them
harder l ater, when they are depl oyed and ex-
pecti ng casual ti es.
45
Most peopl e, thi s hi sto-
ri an suggests, can face terrors, such as goi ng
i nto battl e, on a predi ctabl e basi s; they become
psychol ogi cal l y prepared. But FOFA woul d
make the l i ne of battl e unpredi ctabl e. And wi th
a mi l i tary doctri ne that emphasi zes the i mpor-
tance of taki ng the offensi ve from the fi rst
shot, Sovi et troops mi ght qui ckl y acqui re a
profound l oss of confi dence or sense of defeat.
I t i s by usi ng i ndi rect fi re to breed thi s fear,
i t i s by ki l l i ng the moral e of 90 percent of the
enemy i n addi ti on to ki l l i ng the bodi es of 10
percent of hi s sol di ers, that we can make our
most effecti ve contri buti on to the defence of
the Central Front.
46
Many bel i eve that these psychol ogi cal effects
mi ght onl y be compounded i n the Warsaw Pact,
gi ven the al ready questi onabl e l oyal ty among
many Sovi ets and East Europeans toward
Moscow. Questi ons have been rai sed as to
whose si de the East Europeans woul d fi ght on
shoul d hosti l i ti es begi n, and whether FOFA
woul d further erode the cohesi on of an al ready
tenuous al l i ance. Li kewi se, demographi c change
i n the U. S. S. R., and the growth i n the number
and proporti on of non-Russi ans i n the Sovi et
armed forces, has rai sed i mportant questi ons
about l oyal ty and performance i n the USSRs
Ri chard Hol mes, The Psychol ogi cal Effects of Arti l l ery
Fi re, l ecture presented to a DRA (Di rector Royal Arti l l ery)
tacti cal semi nar, June 1983. Quoted wi th permi ssi on of the
author.
I bi d.
own forces. For exampl e, the fact that an esti -
mated one-fourth to one-thi rd of al l Sovi et con-
scri pts are projected to be of Musl i m descent
wi thi n the next 10 to 15 years-wi th l ower edu-
cati onal and techni cal trai ni ng, often severe
l ack of Russi an l anguage ski l l s, and questi on-
abl e l oyal ty-has rai sed seri ous questi ons
about the potenti al performance of the non-
Russi an nati onal i ti es i n combat. Evi dence of
recent ri ots among Sovi et conscri pts who
refused to go to Afghani stan, and defecti ons
of Central Asi ans and Russi ans wi thi n Af-
ghani stan i tsel f, have onl y hi ghl i ghted these
concer ns.
But the Sovi ets are al so aware of these prob-
l ems, and have taken steps to deal wi th them.
Moscow has ti ghtened i nsti tuti onal control s
over i ts Warsaw Pact al l i es-e. g., by creati ng
peaceti me TVD Hi gh Commands i n the l ate
1970s, whi ch creates a cl earl y defi ned, pre-
pl anned warti me command structure i n whi ch
Eastern Europe i s cl earl y subordi nate to Mos-
cow; and by assuri ng that procedures, C2 sys-
tems and equi pment are al l standardi zed, and
that Russi an i s the l anguage of command. At
home, Sovi et di scussi ons focus on the need to
trai n al l of thei r nati onal i ty groups to be bet-
ter sol di erse.g., through i ncreased Russi an
l anguage trai ni ng, better techni cal trai ni ng,
and retai ni ng mi xed nati onal i ty uni ts for bet-
ter control and for restructuri ng thei r own
forces to take account of the changi ng compo-
si ti on of the conscri pt pool . On the evi dence
avai l abl e, i t woul d be i mpossi bl e to gauge thei r
l evel of success on ei ther count.
Al l of these questi ons remai n compl ex and
controversi al . Several efforts are now under-
way to attempt to resol ve them, or at l east to
narrow the margi n of uncertai nty, but many
of the answers cannot be known. At present,
these questi ons remai n at the heart of the de-
bate over how much emphasi s shoul d be pl aced
on FOFA i n the West, and how i t shoul d be
i mpl emented.