Intelligence Doctrine for Land Forces

DOCTRINE
C.D.E.F
Forces Employment
Doctrine Center
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09
DOCTRINE
Contact Intelligence in the Kingdom of Insolence
>>
Lessons learned
2006
#09
general military review
DOCTRINE
Ground Intelligence
Future and Stakes
FOREIGN STUDIES
Intelligence Lessons Learned
Leveraging the Practical Experience
of Operation Iraqi Freedom
Operation Enduring Freedom
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Terrorism and
Ground Intelligence
INTELLIGENCE
for Land Forces
INTELLIGENCE
for Land Forces
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Doctrine
The New Conditions of Military Efficiency p. 4
Ground Intelligence Future and Stakes p. 9
New Techniques, New Threats p. 13
The Threat Continuity - From National Territory to Theaters of Operations p. 16
The Land Forces Synthetic OPFOR p. 20
GLAISE Army p. 24
The New Threats: the Challenge for Military-Oriented Intelligence p. 26
Collecting Intelligence - Adapting our Capabilities p. 30
Future Intelligence: Stakes and Digitization p. 35
Collective Training for Intelligence - A New Organisation Framework p. 38
Training for intelligence - Evolutions to be Expected for Army Officers p. 41
Main Abbreviations and Acronyms in the intelligence Area p. 44
Bibliography p. 49
Foreign studies
Intelligence Lessons-learned - Leveraging the Practical Experience
of Operation Iraqi Freedeom/Operation Enduring Freedom p. 45
Intelligence in Iraq within the Spanish Brigade Plus Ultra p. 59
The ISTAR Capability of the Canadian Forces p. 63
The Dutch Approach of ISTAR concept during NRF-4 p. 65
Freedom of speech
Additional opinions on the topic dealt with in this 09 issue
Terrorism and Ground Intelligence p. 70
Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Expectations and Problems p. 74
Asymmetrical Threat and Ground Intelligence p. 78
The All sources Analysis Cell: An improved Way to Process Information p. 82
Other contributions to doctrinal thought
Doctrine and Command in the British Army an Historical Overview p. 86
French Practice in Getting Prepared to Overseas Operations p. 95
Lessons learned
Intelligence in Indochina p.100
Contact Intelligence in the Kingdom of Insolence p.103
A Battalion Intelligence Officer in Afghanistan p.107
LICORNE or the Challenge to Reality p. 111
The First Computerized Application for Intelligence: the Ideliance Project p. 115
Directeur de la publication :
Gnral (2s) Jean-Marie Veyrat
Rdacteur en chef :
Capitaine Stphane Carms
Tl. : 01 44 42 35 91
Traductions :
Colonel (CR) Robert Travaillot
LCL (CR) Jean-Claude Laloire
LCL (CR) Daniel Sillon
LCL (CR) Jacques de Vasselot
LCL (CR) Alain Prignon
LCL (CR) Donatien Lebastard
Relecture des traductions :
Colonel (ER) Philippe Jolly
Maquette : Christine Villey
Tl. : 01 44 42 59 86
Schmas - PAO :
Nathalie Dujardin
Anne Laporte
Cration : amarena
Crdits photos :
SIRPA Terre
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Diffusion : bureau courrier du CDEF
Impression : Point dimpression
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Tirage : 2 000 exemplaires
Dpt lgal : parution
ISSN : 1293-2671 - Tous droits
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Revue trimestrielle
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DOCTRINE a fait lobjet dune
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Mel : doctrine@cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr
Summary # 09
Summary # 09
The progress accomplished since 2000 is impressive, even if it was too slow compared to
the theaters J2 personnel expectations. This dissatisfaction must be relativized: if it is
(rather) easy to define tomorrows MBT from todays MBT, the definition of a completely
new tool is another ambition. In addition, when it is a tool performing an intellectual task,
the challenge is somewhat more difficult, especially when from the start, as in the MBT
case, there exists no expertise center such as the one existing within the Armor School to
animate the definition and trials. The Land Forces Command is and will therefore be
taking full responsibility for this definition and evaluation effort of an intelligence data
handling system.
The Land Forces Command is rather confident of succeeding to achieve in the short term
an efficient document intelligence processing tool that will have its place within the
whole SORA program. It is also conscious that the expected performance requires a
higher qualification level, which will undoubtedly require specialized training that should
obviously be carried out within the Army Intelligence Training and Studies Center.
The main point now is that the intelligence community as a whole acknowledges the
need, whatever the final selected technical solution will be, and resolutely commits itself
in the fine-tuning of the product.
new computer would then go along with
the relief, thus warranting a well-
mastered tool for analysts. At the same
time, a similar tool would be deployed
within the Ground Intelligence
Processing Center, to be used as mirror-
database and evaluation tool in the
national territory.
The fielding time of the product under
definition thanks to the detailed
requirements description document will
be defined later, depending on the
selected level of requirements and on
allocated funding.
1 France had neither fielded nor under
development any equivalent to the NATO JOIIS
(Joint Operations Intelligence & Information
System).
2 CERT: Centre dexploitation du renseignement
terrestre.
3 Systme doptimisation du renseignement de
lavant. (Forward Intelligence Optimization
System).
4 Systme dinformation gographique.
(Geographic Information System).
5 Improvised Explosive Device.
6 Organized Crime Analysis Software.
7 The LICORNE Joint Taskforce CP is already of a
joint nature, even if land actions prevail.
8 Generic expression, the official name has not
yet been approved.
JUNE 2006 DOCTRINE N 09 119
lessons learned
lessons learned
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CDEF
editorial
R
ealities shatter; today they bring us back
from virtual warfare and its perfect vision of
the transparent space of battles on scopes to
terrain requirements. A new awareness is
taking place.
B
ecause the end result of armed engagement
changes, their conditions transform
themselves: from the simple obviousness of the
known enemy, material targets, strategic
visions, military objectives and open spaces, we
are switching to the uncertainties of the
permanently changing chameleon opponent, of
the human environment, of combat occurring in
immaterial battlefields, of low level tactical
micro-actions and partitioned spaces. Today, it
is no longer the case of organizing the success
of the common action of a limited number of
units acting against an identified opponent
carrying out a finalized action, but of seeing to it
that the combination of the actions of a great
number of small teams concurs to the success
of the whole, although they are acting in a very
decentralized manner, facing a badly known
enemy, in a discontinued area of operation. The
contested areas
1
where land engagements
take place today are marked by a great physical
and human heterogenei ty; where the
information superiority is of less importance,
where communication systems show their
limits, whilst the physical and human roughness
of the environments renders observation and
interpretation difficult. For a great part and in a
way, intelligence has switched from an objective
nature to a subjective one. Yesterday, focus was
placed on collecting concrete information and
the intelligence general picture could fairly
easily present itself under the format of tables,
organization charts and sketches; now, the real
objective of intelligence is intentions that cannot
easily anymore be derived from situations.
U
nder t hose condi t i ons, i t i s an
understatement to say that the intelligence
function has increased its importance as well as
its complexity. It is an understatement to say
that the equipment and the systems of systems
conceived for the past conditions are now often
insufficient, sometimes out of date, despite all
their modernity and their technology. It is a
revolution and one must discuss about it. Today,
not taking its dimension into consideration
would lead our forces to fight blindly tomorrow,
only able to react against an opponent having
the initiative and, from this standpoint, all the
useful information for its punctual action.
Obviousness imposes itself: the mutation of the
military action entails a parallel evolution of
intelligence. General Fast, commanding the US
Army intelligence school clearly states it
2
:
The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
imposed a re-balancing of an approach
centered upon sensors towards a system
firstly aiming at providing an optimized direct
support to those who need the most
information: the soldier and the small unit
commander.
G
lobally, the issue is complex: what was
necessary yesterday remains so for a great
deal - as one must still be prepared for
conventional warfare if one wants to push back
its occurrence - but now come in addition new
requirements for a new type of conflicts in
which our land forces are engaged for a long
time. The new adversary appears as being more
and more difficult to detect, therefore difficult to
locate, therefore much less possibly subject to
accurate strikes. Yesterday, the essential part of
the military action was destruction and
intelligence consisted primarily in target
intelligence whilst, now, the essential part lies
in the situation awareness and intelligence, the
perception of micro-situations and micro-
objects; the transparency of the battlefield
appears to be a more and more erroneous good
theoretical idea. Yesterday, we thought we
fought thanks to information; we realize today
that we are more and more condemned to fight
for information.
T
he priority of levels swings over: strategy
gives precedence to tactic and we are
switching from a top down approach to a
down towards top approach where troops at
contact give the multitude of uncertain terrain
indications from which the operative synthesis
will be built. As a result, processes and layouts
reverse themselves, the low tactical echelons
must imperatively be reinforced with acquisition
assets and analysis capabilities; as a result,
digitization must thought over again as, in this
domain, it had been conceived for the
conventional warfare of the past and now brings
much less than when we were thinking of
carrying warfare against material targets.
1 BG Robert E. Schmidle & LCL Franck G. Hoffman, Commanding the Contested Zones, Proceedings, September 2004.
2 See Foreign Studies columns, page 52.
3 JUNE 2006 DOCTRINE # 09
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CDEF
ditorial
T
he fog of warfare has become thicker
again on the battlefield. The US Army,
directly confronted in Iraq to the new conflict
reality, today realizes that there is an obvious
risk of knowing more and more about friendly
forces and in proportion less and less about the
enemy; it feels the risk, at the now tactical
prevailing level, of the impossibility of merging
computerized blue picture - always exact and
accurate - with the red picture - always
inaccurate and out of time. This leads it to
naturally doubt about the COP (Common
Operational Picture), which it now differentiates
from the ROP, or Real Operational Picture,
although the whole system is not yet stabilized.
I
n the same way, the concept of precision
action keeps its pertinence as the efficiency of
action within human environments to which is
compelled the land forces soldier, requires to
avoid uncertain actions and human collateral
damages that ruin very quickly the patient work
of conquering hearts and minds. But this sort of
precision action can only be built upon
intelligence acquired by men and about men:
and we see there all the new and important
place that not only HUMINT will have but also
the action of scout units and of the common
sensors that all the soldiers are. Our Anglo-
Saxon friends rightly assert: Every soldier a
Sensor. The present operational environment
undoubtedly underlines the soldiers role in the
intelligence process
3
. Inexorably also, the idea
that one can no longer be content with thinking
about the adversary: it is necessary to think
as the adversary. The adversary is not inert, he
is not a simple subject for planning; endowed
with a creative and free mind, he has no
intention of thinking like us and to give in to our
views. One really has to place oneself in the
adversarys shoes; facing the Iraqi difficulties,
the Anglo-Saxon have understood that and they
have created red cells within their operational
staffs and developed courses in which one is
taught to think as the adversary.
C
onflicts of today, conflicts of tomorrow, will
be better conducted if they are really
conceived as intelligence and information
operations and not as maneuvers or processes
of destruction... Therefore, an intellectual, but
also human and material effort has to be made
in favor of intelligence, and this will imply re-
balances between the contact/destruction
functions and the intelligence function, with
most probably the availability of significant
intelligence organic assets at brigade level
4
.
Beyond unfruitful debates about the respective
roles of specialists and of non-specialists,
beyond the purely technical visions focused on
equipments and networks, an in-depth thinking
has to be carried out about our capabilities as
well as about our methods and our courses of
action in order to place our objectives and
available assets in sync.
I
f our ambition in future engagements is to
employ limited force able to set the basis for
the accomplishment of the strategic goal,
undoubtedly we probably have to accept to have
a limited action capability of rethought force for
the benefit of a more complete and re-oriented
reconnaissance and intelligence capability
warranting an efficient, targeted and mastered
employment of the armed force, necessary for
the new military efficiency.
Brigadier General Vincent DESPORTES
Commander, Forces Employment Doctrine Center
3 On this subject see Lessons Learned article (RETEX) by generals Fast and Le Bot as well as the article by general Fleury.
4 Simple example, but meaningful example. The future new structure of the FCS brigades (US Army) is now known; there will be one scouts
cavalry troop, in addition to one intelligence company and one recon and acquisition battalion organic to each of the three combined arms
battalions task forces.
4 DOCTRINE # 09 JUNE 2006
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The New Conditions
of Military Efficiency
Y
esterday, facing the state controlled uniformity of the threat corresponded a model of forces
still recently consolidated by the characteristics of blocks confrontation. Today, although it is
imperative to keep the capability to conduct conventional warfare in order to reduce its occurrence
thanks to the preservation of superiority and the production, as much as needed, of constraining
and deterring violence, it is all the more so necessary to adapt the defense capabilities to the new
commitment conditions of forces.
T
o a world marked by the coexistence of several conflicting logics must correspond renewed
models of forces, without any homothetic link with those that prevailed before.
BY BRIGADIER GENERAL VINCENT DESPORTES, COMMANDER OF THE FORCES EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE CENTER
P.5-8 doctrine 26/07/06 8:59 Page 5
The new relativity
of the destruction capability
A reshaped role
For the systems of force, the destruction capability
remains high in itself, even if it is significantly less in
proportion. In most cases destruction remains essential
to win the battle of intervention, which is
the indispensable phase although now intermediary
towards the accomplishment of the strategic objective.
The stabilization phases are now decisive as they are
the ones that will enable or not to reach the required
political effect; during these phases, the coercion
capability must still support other forms of action
and power and be able to face the unavoidable
resurgences of violence.
Besides, although the sole destruction will,
in the future much less than in the past, be able to lead
to the political solutions for the crises justifying
the employment of armed force, it keeps a fundamental
reinsurance role. In fact there is no doubt that, facing
a new enemy, protean and having few modern
capabilities, the technological power - displayed, for
example, by the air force or the navy - plays an ultimate
insurance role for troops in contact. Thanks to the
insurance it provides, it increases their own capabilities
and, to a certain extent, deters the opponent, by denying
him to carry out aggressions of a certain level or against
certain objectives. The rustic army of a great power
having real joint capabilities is in no way comparable,
even with equivalent specific capabilities, to a rustic
army that would be lacking them. Indeed, the projection
of an army at contact necessarily supposes a multiform
joint capability that itself requires tremendous financial
and technological investments.
Operational limits
However, the fading out of the state control upon
warfare depreciates nowadays the destruction
capability that, effective or potential, has traditionally
up till now represented the central course of action
of the armed force facing its peer.
The technological superiority no longer deters the non-
conventional adversary and the capability logic,
opposing capabilities to capabilities, does not impress
him; he no longer looks for superiority as he knows that
military victory - in the classic meaning and with classic
assets -is no longer the condition of political victory.
Facing him, striking at security range, along the fire and
forget principle is often vain. In fact, it is no longer
the case of reaching conventional objectives, but of
attaining results of another nature, falling under
cognitive and psychological aspects. Giving way to
simplicity by acting in using classic assets within the
traditional physical space in order to materially destroy
the non-conventional adversary rarely leads to
the achievement of the political goal.
As long as it is no longer the case of reducing the ability
of a State to stand in the way of the will of a third party,
the destruction assets of the States confrontation
capabilities lose their sense. They even lose much more
sense, as asymmetrical violence assets are much less
vulnerable to conventional strikes; they no longer offer
numerous targets for high technological fires. Therefore,
classic strategies and weapons are partially struck with
uselessness, whilst the ability to produce non-solely
military effects becomes one of the usefulness criteria
of the systems of forces.
A certain de-legitimization
Similarly to the gradual depreciation of destruction
as military and political tool, it can be noticed that it
becomes gradually de-legitimized. This evolution
is based upon two phenomena. The first one is
the information revolution. Today, any act of destruction -
and its unavoidable collateral damages - is rapidly
taken to the court of international public opinion, quick
to judge based upon criteria that are very far from
political logics; indeed, advanced societies are fragile
in front of losses and violence shown endlessly on home
TV screens. The second phenomenon lies in the fact that,
today, the forces are often committed for interests that
are no longer vital for the nations or, at least, that do
not appeal as such for their citizens; although, whilst
the vital nature authorized by itself, in the spirit of
national defense legitimacy, the destruction action,
the relative nature of the defended interest now
withdraws from this latter one, in the international
conscience, its morality. In a certain way, destruction
diminishes the legitimacy of the action that today has
itself become the condition of freedom of action.
The rules
of the new military efficiency
The concomitant criteria
The evolution of society and of the context of
employment of forces, together with immediate
availability of information all over the world, has
reinforced three acceptance essential criteria for
military violence, and therefore for the freedom
of action of politic executives.
The first one is the respect of the essential values
of the intervening societies. These values, often at
the root of the decision of using force, make up the base
of the right to war as well as the laws of warfare.
The second criterion is legality; the multiplication
of legal instruments and special international courts
compels the military action to develop itself within
a clear legal context. The third criterion, an enriched
synthesis of the first two, is the legitimacy of action,
P.5-8 doctrine 26/07/06 8:59 Page 6
intrinsic or to be constructed; closely related to the
selection of ways and assets, to modalities and intensity
of the force, to rules of engagement, it is fragile.
Permanently having to be protected and consolidated,
it closely depends on communication strategies, even
in the cases when it seems to be obvious, as in the
contemporary minds, fair war doesnt necessarily
coincide with legitimate war.
Upstream of this last criterion, the idea of strict
necessity or strict proportionality reinforces itself:
it imposes a permanent capability of modulation and
adjustment, a capability of reversibility of the courses of
action and assets, in accordance with a subtle perception
of the environment and of its changes necessarily
acquired in contact.
In this way, the credibility of the security system is no
longer based on forces ratios as they were conceived at
the time of interstate war, but on the capability to meet
the adversary on his own terrain by sticking as closely as
possible to his changing reality. The traditional top
down approach of interstate conflicts (attacking
the State, favoring from now on action from the third
dimension), is now replaced by the down towards top
approach, as it is most often the case of starting from
the ground and from the population to rebuild the State.
Through the remoteness from the terrain it is looking for,
the revolution in military affairs seems from then
onwards to be out of touch with the recent evolution
of conflicts and unable, in most situations, to bring an
appropriate answer.
A protracted action
As weve seen it, modern conflicts may be characterized
by a psychological action - through the winning over of
minds and wills - as well as a material action, and from
this point of view they require a protracted action. Facing
the new threats and environments, looking for an
immediate or even rapid result is a mistake in most
cases due to reasons coming from duration and can only
be dealt with on this scale. The idea of first in, first
out, falsely attracting but regularly rejected idea by
experience, i.e. the idea of an intervention in first
conceived to be punctual and followed by a withdrawal
planned from the start as fast as possible even before
the political resolution of conflicts, is not compatible -
unless the responsibilities are subject to a transfer
to others - with the reality of crises, or with
the indispensable tune that only the armies are able to
play in the process of crises resolution. Indeed, success
of a crisis management is assessed after long months
or years after the beginning of the intervention and not
on the efficiency of the coercion initial action that is
never the decisive action directly leading to the expected
strategic result.
It is more the case of persuading in time, thanks to
dialog and contact, than of imposing in the short term
using constraint and destruction capability. What counts
is the accompaniment as well as the intervention.
In this sense, the trend, born with the technological
improvements of the Cold War, consisting in placing
the soldier farther from the battlefield cannot favor
durable solutions.
One may notice that the very nature of new conflicts
lessens for them the capability to be fenced in time.
In fact, limited warfare supposes a dialog between
players that is no longer permitted by the loss of control
by states and the voluntarily disorganized scattering
of an opponent often lacking political unity. Although
the deliquescence of States is often nowadays at
the root of crises, it is all the more responsible for
the difficulty to solve them.
Acting in the same space
as the adversary
Facing the classic
overpower of its opponent,
the adversary is only left
with the choice of refusing
combat on equal terms
and of looking for
confrontations within
operational spaces where
he hopes to reach political
results without needing
large scale military
successes. Rational and
classic warfare, reinforced
by the bad habits of the
Cold War, uses the four
spaces land, sea, air
and electromagnetic;
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the new opponent neglects them and concentrates on his
own advantages in the sphere of information - or space
of information communication - and the human space
that is very marked by its affective and irrational
dimensions.
It is within the sphere of information - where the battle
between the weak and the strong nowadays takes place -
that the adversary tries to play upon public opinions. As
the sphere of information organizes the disconnection
between the strategic and tactical spaces, progresses
in the field of communications enable
the adversary to project himself outside the physical
battlefield, to transpose tactical successes at strategic
levels and from them directly build political victories.
In this way, by playing upon the sensitiveness and
versatility of public opinions, communication - broker
of the pity market - has become the terrain of victory
or defeat; using it, the grandstand turning into a court,
the action bets its results and its acceptance thanks
to the image it shows.
Today, reaching political result is to become conscious
that power is under control of the opinion and that
victory supposes to carry out combat within the spaces
in which the adversary is fighting.
Acting in contact
Due to the very changing context of new conflicting
situations, a good awareness of these latter ones is
a key factor of efficiency, thanks to the capability
of continuous adaptation to events that it brings.
As the identification of the adversary proves to be
uncertain, and as the discrimination between friends
and foes can generally come only from human intelligence
at contact, understanding the threat requires a vision
coming from the field rather than from technique; it is
no longer the case of detecting masses of tanks and of
localizing potential targets, but of understanding social
environments, behaviors, psychologies.
The military leader will have to carefully grasp
the sensitiveness of a complex and changing
environment, and that can only be carried out on
the field, at contact, being in wait of micro-fluctuations
of circumstances. This will enable him to graduate
the employment of force and ensure the smooth
reversibility of layouts in accordance with situations,
whilst thus warranting the continuity of the link between
tactical action and political action.
Acting within the physical continuity
The fluidity and ubiquity of the threats, now
emancipated from the territorial framework, the
globalization of behaviors and contestations depreciate
the strongholds in which advanced societies thought
they were efficiently protected.
In fact, this threat continuity imposes that of retaliation
and valorizes the force systems able to act continuously
if necessary, with tools and according to methods almost
identical, on either side of the border: a continuum of
capabilities of action in space and at the same level
must answer the continuum of threats.
At the center of new conflicts, fighting against
international terrorism is a particular case, which
has to however be taken into account over time, as it
is likely that this plague will continue to feed itself
over a long period from disparities and imbalances
coming from differentiated access to wealth and
knowledge. In this field, the destruction of terrorists
and, possibly of their sanctuaries - as essential it may
be - is only one part of success.
As terrorism is more a communication mode than a
way of fighting, one must place oneself in the same
space whilst avoiding sending messages - of
destruction for example - that consolidate
the terrorist action and enrich its environment.
The key of the fight against terrorism may be found
in the combination of direct action and in-depth
action, over time, with the requirement of acting
preferably on the causes and the minds than on
the symptoms. In this way and outside the national
territory, fighting against terrorists directly falls from
now on under the direct responsibility of trained but
trivial land forces.
Within this framework, the armed forces must play
an active role in accompanying the fight against
terrorists or, directly, in counter-terrorism - which is
aiming at preventing an action and acting on the very
causes of the threat - preferably to anti-terrorism,
which directly gives an answer to an attack:
prevention is better than cure, and the former
benefits from the action of troops in contact.
However, the duality of the forces on the ground
allows them to combine these two types of actions
over time and to directly and very efficiently
participate, for the benefit of the security of
the French people, in the anti-terrorism fight, now
occurring outside the national territory, tomorrow
in it if, alas, that would become necessary.
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A collection process
fitted to human behavior
understanding
In the French concept and at
a time when there are only
few major commitment
hazards possibly leading to
a direct hit of wills - likely to
carry things to extremes -,
any land commitment should
be considered within
the framework of a limited
use of force in order to keep
it at a level of violence just
necessary to reach political-
military objectives.
Ground Intelligence
Future and Stakes
T
he Intelligence function is one among the four transverse operational functions in the French
Army. Its purpose consists in identifying the enemy, the threats and environment hazards as best
as possible in order to enable decision-makers to better draw up, plan and carry out their operations
at any commitment level. It is one of the factors enabling to master information.
In front of an increasingly sophisticated political-military commitment framework and of threats that
diversify and sometimes seam to be elusive, this function is subject to an obvious critical sight and
to a strong development pressure - at least at announcement level. However, a significant change
has already started that takes place by stages; and the following articles will show the way these
changes occur according to areas and circumstances.
Without featuring current threats - presented under various aspects in other articles - the different
evolving ways to gather information will be presented as well as the processing methods and tools.
It will end with some explanations about the organizational aspects for this function; at a time when
the French Army is more in a situation of strengthening what has been achieved, these explanations
will remain all-encompassing.
In this article, ground capabilities will be highlighted; but it is obvious that land forces commitments
can be thought of within a joint and most often multinational framework only; and this is
permanently shown in the intelligence area. Incidentally, several articles in this issue will make a
reference to it.
BY COLONEL JEAN-FRANOIS COPPOLANI,
CHIEF INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, FORCES EMPLOYMENT & COMMAND STRUCTURES DIVISION, FORCES EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE CENTER
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During stabilization phases,
which, in the short-term,
are likely to be the most
frequent and the most
plausible kind of
commitment for the French
Army, it will be highly
necessary to understand the
human environment. First of
all, it is necessary to detect
hostility factors towards
the land force that will be
deployed and to identify
the various potentially
hostile actors; then,
according to requirements,
track them and provide
intelligence enabling to
neutralize or to destroy
them. It is also useful to
estimate the receptivity
of populations to our action
(support and co-operation
capabilities) and to be able
to feel these populations
requirements - among
others, for assistance
operations that are to be
found in all the phases of
the operation continuum.
All this results into two
operational fields for
intelligence; they differ from
each other in the way they
are carried out but they
complement each other as
regards their consequences.
On the one hand, accurate
intelligence about
the enemy to be
overpowered (the enemy
and not his neighbors
likely to become collateral
victims) and about
the areas of activity for
the force: enemy
vulnerabilities, armament/
equipment/logistics/
infrastructure to be
destroyed. All this will
enable to carry out an
accurate commitment,
which, for example, is
necessary when carrying
out counter-terrorism
operations; and fortunately,
the development of
accurate ammunition
enables to do it.
On the other hand,
environment intelligence
in order to get and
assimilate cultural, political,
religious, social and
economic factors enabling
to understand the
commitment environment.
Thus, this understanding
will enable the commander
to anticipate actions carried
out by human groups and,
among others, to apply
immaterial effects to
direct them towards
the intended direction.
This prerequisite results
into several improvement
requirements.
First of all, all the actors of a
land force should carry out a
more significant action as
regards vigilance towards
commitment environment,
the research and gathering
of warning information, its
early dissemination within a
tactical unit and its early
reporting to G2s in order
to grant combined-arms
commanders with the current
situation information they
need. This action starts from
the beginning; and actions
carried out to highlight and
recognize the battalion S2s
role illustrate it. As far as
the Land Forces Commander
is concerned, he stressed
the importance of collective
intelligence training and
the crux value of battalion
S2s in his training guidance
for operational readiness.
This intelligence culture
is also to be spread to any
level of responsibility.
Indeed, each commander is
responsible for information
research and processing at
his own level; and he should
give himself the means to
take on this responsibility.
Then, we have to think about
increased HUMINT
capabilities to be able to
understand this human
environment; to date, the
HUMINT sensor is the best
tool to this end. Everybody
can take part in this effort:
from the most specialized to
the least specialized one,
from scout and
reconnaissance units to
people dealing with source
processing. However, it is
necessary not to make
confusion between anyones
know-how and field of
activity; they are the best
proofs for the required
professionalism in
increasingly more sensitive
jobs. When facing a
particularly difficult
commitment framework, our
American allies were able to
set up a quick and efficient
Lessons Learned (LL)
process; it resulted into
concrete and important
measures, thus enabling to
take important corrective
measures in this field,
despite obstacles. Indeed, for
them as for us, interpreters
availability remains a
problem; but solutions still
must be looked for.
Modern people - also in
remote parts of the world -
have a need to communicate;
and they are enticed to do so
as modern civilian
communication systems are
easily used. To some extent,
this is also true for
asymmetrical threat actors -
whoever they are: guerrilla
warfare, partisans, terrorist
or other movements; and
they are granted with huge
possibilities compared to
their former members;
but it also grants them with
vulnerabilities that can be
exploited by our electronic
warfare and SIGINT (Signal
Intelligence) assets.
Thus, technical intelligence
is still relevant and the role it
plays in the awareness of
enemy networks is essential:
the press regularly tells us
how some elements were
located and neutralized
through communication
interception - for instance
in Tchechnia or Palestine.
As for cloak and dagger
warfare, we can be sure that
it results into successes that
are not mentioned. Thus, our
interception and analysis
capabilities change to meet
the threat despite
encountered difficulties; and
they increasingly require a
technical support - within a
joint framework - monitored
by the Military Intelligence
Directorate (in French DRM),
which is formalized in the
tactical SIGINT concept -
currently in development.
IMINT collection keeps
developing and
the forthcoming fielding of
the Contact-Reconnaissance
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(in French DRAC
1
) will provide
combined arms and support
units with a capability for
stand-off observation
beyond crest-lines, thus
providing them with a slight
increase in their scouting and
reconnaissance capability.
As a matter of fact, all these
capabilities are necessary
and they increase each
other in value thanks to
the multisensor synergy
that has already been used
by the intelligence brigade
since several years. It will
be fully operational when
implementing the ISTAR
2
principle, which will be
possible when achieving
Battlespace Digitization
within intelligence and
fielding analysis-support -
and if possible merging -
software.
The development of our
processing capabilities
However, if looking for
information is good, being
aware of what to do with it
is better. Even more today
than yesterday, the actual
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difficulty regarding
intelligence consists in
processing the information
collected. In former high
intensity operations,
rebuilding the enemy
disposition by wondering
where the famous
Independent Tank Battalion
3
-
assumed to represent
the axis of advance of
the CARMINE Motorized
Rifle Division - was located
resulted into many
Intelligence officers sweating.
Today, it seems easy
in comparison with the mere
description of an
asymmetrical threat
in theatres where it actually
exists; and a fortiori if we
have to issue possible
Enemy Courses of Action
(ECOAs), whatever they are
called. Yet, encountered
intelligence difficulties in
the Ivory Coast, in Iraq and in
Afghanistan for example, are
already within intelligence
collection. They are also
pertaining to processing
to a large extent, i.e.
understanding populations,
rebuilding hostile networks,
identifying their maneuvers
and spotting riots they are
likely to prepare.
For our intelligence-
headquarters qualified
officers, a significant training
effort is in progress, thanks
to what has been done by
the CEERAT (Army Intelligence
Study and Training Center);
currently, it is responsible for
all Army intelligence training
courses and, in the future, it
will result into increased
know-how for this branchs
staff. It is completed with
lessons learnt during
exercises and operations,
what enables to enrich
thought. However, a good
definition of expertise to
possess and of processing
methods to be used is still an
ambition. Anyway, one of
the human capabilities to be
developed consists in being
able to sort what is useful
and what is useless in an
over informed world.
The lack of it could lead
commanders to indecision
or to blindness when facing
actual issues.
If ever improvement is one
of the sources for this
information flood, it could
also provide us with
solutions. Indeed, modern
information flows are
increasingly electronic flows.
The progressive
implementation of
Battlespace digitization into
the forces in general, and its
specific applications to
intelligence in particular, will
lead to a significant increase
in flows arriving at a G2 cell,
as well as in documentation
intelligence quantities that
will have to be dealt with for
processing purposes.
A significant part of this
information will be composed
of open source information;
though they include much
noise, they are
nevertheless an increasing
source of information.
In comparison, available
tools to meet these flows
and these stocks are
significantly insufficient, both
with specialized
Computerized Document
Management appliances and
with software applications
aiming at supporting G2s in
their analysis work.
Command, Control and
Information Systems (CCIS =
French SICF) expected
capabilities - including SICF
V3 - are very limited; and it is
difficult to know today - and
with current budget estimates
- what we can expect from
the Forward intelligence
optimization system
(French : SORA
4
initiative).
Some experience has been
gained by the Land Forces
G2s, in particular by
the Technical intelligence
exploitation center within
the framework of its standing
support mission to B2s
Operational Readiness
Training
5
among others
thanks to tests conducted
with the IDELIANCE
application; but much work
is still ahead for operational
capabilities to meet the new
requirements.
When facing this flood
of electronic information
on the one hand and
the requirement to take
warfare against asymmetrical
threats into account
(including participating in
limited counter-terrorism
warfare) on the other hand -
which means being able to
look for low signals - do we
have manpower fitted to this
need? We certainly dont.
There again, [information]
harvest is abundant and
workers are few. Indeed,
our G2s are very busy with
current operations; during
these operations, they set
up G2s with strengths much
higher than those planned
in homeland Tables of
Organization and
Equipment but they do not
have all the required
capabilities and expertise.
Adapting capabilities
and organizations
Then, these deep changes in
targets and trades should
have an impact on
organizations, which are
not everlasting
cathedrals, but structures
enabling the Army to carry
out its mission in
the best conditions.
Indeed, the intelligence
function has taken
advantage of a first set
of measures following
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the 2001 function review;
among these, the most
important ones are:
extending this
specialization field;
setting up a comprehensive
training for intelligence
officers to begin right after
graduating from branch
schools;
any training in the
intelligence area taken into
account by the Army
Intelligence Study and
Training Center (CEERAT),
which completed its
building-up in late 2005;
The creation of the Ground
Intelligence Processing
Center (CERT) within
the Land Forces Command.
Once this experience is
settled - which should be
a significant improvement
in the near future
regarding manpower
professionalization in
this area, other measures
should certainly be
considered and all the more
as 2001 changes stopped
halfway on numerous
issues. So, there is still
much room for thinking in
order either to carry on in the
same direction or to influence
the course of events in the
light of lessons learnt.
More basically, we have to
think about the balance of
capabilities of our forces
regarding the most probable
commitment framework; and
we have to wonder whether
looking for accurate
commitments is not likely
to downsize forceful-action-
devoted capabilities to
the benefit of an increase in
information collecting
capabilities. And this,
whatever this information is:
part - or not - of what we call
specialized research today
and especially to the benefit
of a significant increase in
our information processing
capabilities considering the
implementation of the ISTAR
principle - agreed by France
at Army and joint levels. Of
course, all this is to be set
within the framework of Army
rebalancing, regularly
allowed/compelled by
military programming laws.
The new responsibilities
of the French Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces will
necessarily have an influence
in this field: if some
intelligence required by
the Army is well the Armys
province, on the one hand
the Army takes part into joint
intelligence and on the other
hand if takes advantage
of what the latter does.
The example of our allies
shows that different solutions
are possible.
However, without waiting
for this term, we can already
mention an area within which
improvements can be
achieved rapidly: namely,
co-operation with the other
actors tasked to defend our
country. Indeed, the sundry
variety of threats heading
towards security-increasing
threats - i.e. security that
police forces and services
are regularly coping with -
may, in the near future, result
into changes in Army trades;
but it already requires
reinforcing co-operation
in the theatres of operation:
co-operation among
Services;
land/military intelligence
directorate co-operation
and land / military counter-
intelligence agency
co-operation;
co-operation between the
Services and Ministry of
defenses other services;
Co-operation between
the Ministry of defense
and other Departments.
A Defense Ministers
instruction issued in January
2006 already leads the way
in this field.
As for the Army, it would
take advantage of a
clarification of its
requirements and of the
limits of its trade when
considering what must
remain other actors job;
then, it should draw up its
policy with related doctrine
and procedures without
mentioning equipment and
coordination structures that
are sometimes entailed.
1 Fielding planned in 2007.
2 SA2R in the French Army.
3 Independent Tank Battalion (ITB).
4 SORA: (Systme doptimisation du
renseignement aroterrestre) =
Air-land Intelligence Optimization
System.
5 CERT - (Centre dexploitation du
renseignement terrestre).
Being careful to the slight evolution of threats that are likely to jeopardize our committed forces, the ground intelligence
function has taken into account the stakes that this change meant as regards its role when land forces are being committed.
According to the impulses regularly sent by the Army Staff it has begun a progressive evolution that should slightly increase
its efficiency in the future. Yet, this important challenge is still increasing and it seems to be necessary to make new steps for
thoughts that come up here and there to materialize:
in order to be more able to assess human environment for operations; among others, to understand and, if possible,
anticipate when dull or hazardous threats may become true;
in order to provide information at the lowest required level in due time, and ideally in reflex time in the future;
in order to develop the integration of the intelligence chain, including with joint components, highly required to control
information;
In order to increase its capabilities in comparison with requirements.
This way, it will keep providing the joint commander with assets enabling him to keep the freedom of action he needs to carry
out an ever more sophisticated mission, within a commitment framework that requires an increasing control of the use of force
and of the effect of force.
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New Techniques,
New Threats
T
he threats that the Military Intelligence Directorate (DRM) has to assess naturally take place
within the framework of symmetrical - even dysymmetrical - conflicts. However, to meet
forces needs, the boundary for the DRMs missions has extended to some threats pertaining
to asymmetrical warfare.
Symmetrical conflicts are characterized by enemies endeavoring to achieve superiority by using
structures and doctrines complying with the same rules. Dissymmetry relies on a qualitative or
quantitative superiority from one of the opponents but it meets the same logic. It is trickier to
determine the asymmetry concept that cannot be limited to armaments and to their use by
guerillas and terrorists. Any conflict is asymmetrical when two enemies close with each other in
different areas to make the other ones action illegitimate. Then, psychology and information are
new fields to be explored and to be taken over not to become overwhelmed by the enemy
1
.
If the threat is currently linked to the implemented weapon systems - or in development among
foreign armed forces - it is also linked to the most various and unexpected assets used by non-
governmental armies and it increases because of the infospheres permeability. From now on,
the armed forces are compelled to do a balancing act between the Network Centric Warfare (NCW)
concept- in which technological superiority is overwhelming - and the stand-off use of force - a
critical trump card - on the one hand, and the entanglement between armed forces and civilian
populations - that have to be sometimes protected, sometimes controlled - on the other hand.
Therefore, the threat is less within the last 300 meters than in the first 10 ones.
In a democracy, as
the psychological field for conflicts
and information control cannot be
entrusted to militaries only - who,
besides, have only very limited
means to get into both these fields -
we are going to deal only with new
pieces of equipment that come up
into asymmetrical conflicts and
that are at the core of DRMs
concerns.
BY COLONEL CHOLLEY, HEAD OF THE ARMAMENTS AND PROLIFERATION DIVISION AT THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (DRM) 2
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Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs)
Booby traps have always
been used by soldiers or
insurgents. They are not
new. Until now, they used to
be one among many hazards
facing soldiers in operations.
An unpinned grenade under
a corpse or a trip-wire across
a path triggering an
explosive are usually part
of harassing or delaying
actions. Experience and
common sense were often
enough to protect ourselves
against them and their
influence was negligible
towards other hazards.
Yet, the employment
of Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) has become
a favored COA (Course
of Action) in asymmetrical
crises. Their diversity, the
large dissemination of their
manufacturing process and
of their implementation
through modern media and
the Internet, their relatively
easy setting-up and
triggering, their destructive
power and their impact
within human and
information environments
are such that they are truly
a threat from now on.
Therefore, we have to set up
the most comprehensive list
as regards implementation
techniques, used materials,
packaging to conceal them
and frequency bands used to
trigger them. Their evolution
is steady and is in the
aftermath of available
cutting-edge technologies.
Their diversity is limited only
by the imagination of their
developers and the
availability of explosives.
They easily fulfill
conventional weapons such
as small-caliber weapons,
anti-tank rockets or mortars.
Fighting against IEDs
requires a decisive action
from intelligence services
in order to set up the above
list, the fielding of new
equipment (jammers,
armor...), the adaptation
of doctrines of use (MOUT -
Military Operations on
Urbanized Terrain,
protection of logistic flows,
preventive posture...) and
relevant training for the
highest number of people
(from SOF - Special
Operation Forces -
committed in theaters
to units deployed on
the homeland territory
within the framework of
Vigipirate
3
). Only the
combination of all these
measures is likely to lead
to a significant threat
decrease. A single - tactical
or technical - solution
would be nonsense as it
would rapidly be foiled and
circumvented by those who
develop them or use them.
Thermobaric explosives
Thermobaric explosives are
a technological breakdown
in the field of military
warheads and their
dissemination is worrying.
The word thermobaric
was introduced by Russian
engineers, who have a long
experience and a robust
know-how in this field.
Coming from the Greek
language, it associates
the concepts of warmth
and pressure. Compared
to conventional explosives
(burst), the efficiency or
a thermobaric weapon is
linked to secondary aerobic
reactions that increase the
thermal effect and the blast
effect.
There are several possible
techniques to develop
thermobaric explosives, the
oldest and the best known of
which is fuel air explosive
with the famous BLU-82B
Daisy Cutter bomb.
What is really new is
the reduction in size of
launchers and their diversity
that perfectly fit guerrilla
warfare: in addition to
bombs dropped from aircraft,
we now have rockets of the
PG-7 or RPO-A type, mortar
shells and even grenades.
According to the size
and the architecture of
the military head and
of the kind of thermobaric
explosive, the ammunition
will be more dedicated to
open space targets or set
within confined space
(vehicles, buildings, bunkers
or tunnels). In this last case,
the ammunition will either be
fired through an aperture, or
integrated into an armored-
piercing device to further
explode inside. Then,
conventional protections
are useless towards the blast
effect.
New calibers
The lethality of small caliber
ammunition can be defined
by the equality:
P
kill
= P
hit
x P
kill/hit
where
P
hit
is the Probability of Hit
(PH) and P
kill/hit
is the enemy
combat ineffectiveness
probability if he is hit, what
is usually termed stopping
power. The first factor is
critical and it mainly relies
on the weapon-shooter pair.
The second factor mainly
relies on the ammunition
and on the Point of Impact
(PI) (impact location
and presence of protection
or not).
The latest lessons learnt
from US soldiers committed
in Iraq show a lack of end
efficiency for the 5.56 x 45
ammunition. However,
the Probability of Hit (PH) P
hit
has increased as most
shootings are MOUT
shootings at distances
ranging from 20 to 30
meters; and the use
of sighting aid devices of
the red point type has spread
to a large extent.
On the reverse, the 5.56 x 45
standard has a lack of
stopping power. Indeed, this
projectile is too light and its
residual energy is not
sufficient enough to
neutralize at the first hit.
Now the choice of this caliber
in the 60s mainly relied on
two criteria: a rapid projectile
with important after-impact
secondary effects and
increasing twofold the
infantrymans firepower in
comparison with the NATO
7.62 or the venerable 30-06.
New standards are
appearing, such as the SPC
(Special Purpose Cartridge)
6.8 mm shot by the Barrett
M468 assault rifle.
These new cartridges both
have the advantage of the
5.56 x 45 (high Muzzle
Velocity, flat trajectory,
small maximum ordinate)
but also the same trajectory
stability as for the 7.62 x 51
(heavy projectile with high
energy on impact) while
piercing most of
infantrymans protections,
either with additional armor
plates or without them.
MANPADS
Shoulder Man-Portable Air-
Defense Systems
(MANPADS) should also be
linked to new threats owing
to the technological changes
they take advantage of, but
also owing to their small
size, which eases their
scattering and their
transportation. No helicopter
is sheltered from them, as
well during overseas
operations as on the
homeland territory. Spotting
them is illusory as their
deployment meets no
conventional organization.
The diversity of these
systems (in Afghanistan only,
the presence of SA-7B, SA-
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14, HN-5, Blowpipe and
Stinger is established),
whose homing heads have
different characteristics and
whose IRCCM (Infrared
Counter Counter-Measures)
capabilities keep improving,
makes protection measures
trickier and trickier. For the
time being, the threat is still
to be kept in perspective as
MANPADS have so far been
served by poorly trained
personnel.
The proliferation
of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMDs)
At last, armed forces are
likely to close with enemies
possessing chemical or
biological, even nuclear
weapons tomorrow. It has
now been established that
Al Qaeda endeavored to
develop a quite organized
program of biological
weapons in Afghanistan
and tested chemical agents.
We are now attending a
privatization of proliferation,
whose nature and
the scope of transfer
are not completely grasped,
like Dr. A.Q. Khan networks;
most of his customers are
not known.
In overseas theaters, armed
forces rear bases, such as
the Green Zone in Baghdad,
with heavy concentrations of
troops, would be as many
possible targets for the
insurgents that would have
got this kind of weapons.
Deployed armies at the heart
of hostile populations would
then be deprived of a safe
haven for reconstitution and
of a unique home base to
launch and conduct
operations.
1 To improve our understanding of
these concepts, see the excellent
book by Jacques Baud:
asymmetrical war or the defeat
of the winner, ditions du Rocher.
2 DRM - Direction du
renseignement militaire.
3 Translators note: government
watch and security program
towards terrorist threats.
The above mentioned threats are not exhaustive.
They have been chosen because of their relatively
old features in technical terms (IEDs, light infantry
weapons, MANPADS...) and their innovative aspect
as for their impact on the human and information
environments. This way, they highlight the difficulty
for Western armed forces to do a balancing act
between a compulsory modernization to keep up
with their technological and doctrinal advance in
front of emerging powers that are likely to hit their
vital interests one day and to clash with them in
symmetrical warfare, and the requirement to tackle
new environments featuring asymmetrical conflicts.
Eventually, these threats take place within what
is usually called military intelligence, which
is at the heart of military-oriented intelligence.
Other threats, more difficult to grasp - because
they are less direct but as heavy - are the province
of environment intelligence, which has no limits,
and for which the human and technical capabilities
of intelligence services appear to be currently
insufficient.
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What threat?
The main interferences that
a land force has to face are
terrorism, espionage,
sabotage, subversion and
organized crime (TESSOC
2
).
Terrorismconsists in
illegally using or
threatening to use force or
violence in order to
constrain or intimidate
governments and
societies in order to reach
political, ethnical,
religious or ideological
objectives. It is aimed at
striking the minds, at
subjecting them and at
imposing a minority will
thanks to the horror it
intentionally provokes.
Espionage is the secret
method used by a foreign
power or other groups of
interests in order to
secure information to
which they do not have
access.
Sabotage consists in
the destruction or
the neutralization of critical
materials for the friendly
forces operations aiming
at jeopardizing their
maneuver.
Subversion is defined as
an action conceived at
weakening the military,
economical or political
strength of a nation by
undermining its citizens
morale, fidelity or
reliability. On operations,
the aim is to demoralize
the force thanks to
operations conceived at
neutralizing or weakening
the force combat
effectiveness. A subversive
attack is difficult to detect
and to counter.
Organized crime may be
described as an action of
organizations of a criminal
nature aiming at illegally
attaining some kind of
power thanks to influence
or money, and by
disregarding the
democratic laws of
the countries in which
they operate. On
operations, the various
traffickings (drugs,
prostitution, counterfeit or
smuggled materials or
products, weapons)
directly appeal to the
members of the force and
can weaken its potential
and even jeopardize its
credibility.
The threat mainly consists
in the action of the enemy
intelligence services or
the special forces of
the opponents or fighting
parties, of organizations,
terrorist groups or
individuals, subversive
groups or individuals
or criminal organizations
or groups.
Up till the collapse of
the former USSR, this threat
was mainly represented
by the action of the USSR
services, as well as that
of its official allies (Eastern
countries for example) or
objective ones; either they
were being financed by it,
or they were simple fellow
travelers even objective
allied groups or individuals
(various Middle-East
terrorist organizations,
some pacifist or anti-
nuclear organizations); but
now this threat has become
widely diversified.
The decaying of the former
USSR and the development
of the serious criminality it
has generated in this area
on the one hand, the
development of Islamic
fundamentalism and of
fanatic terrorist groups that
claim to draw their
inspiration from it on the
other hand, have totally
diversified this threat and
made it difficult to
understand and master.
The Threat Continuity -
From National Territory to
Theaters of Operations
O
n overseas operations, land forces are subject to threats from organizations or individuals trying to
undermine them by other means than military confrontation. These threats are qualified as interferences.
These interferences or attempts of the like, already existing in normal periods, are reinforced on operations,
be it on the given theater, or even outside the theater. They can even carry on through hostile actions on
the national territory, especially from the part of organizations or groups that have a multinational settlement
or a multinational capability of action.
This article will propose a statement about these threats then several reflections about the present situation
evolution to conclude on a few recommendations.
BY MAJOR GENERAL DENIS SERPOLLET, DEFENSE PROTECTION AND SECURITY DIRECTOR (DPSD
1
)
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A permanent threat
over the theaters
This threat is no longer
anecdotic or even secondary
for our forces on operations.
It can be further detailed
by taking the conventional
presentation of operations
drawn from the notion of
continuum of operations,
developed by NATO
3
and
complemented by the French
vision expressed through
the stabilization concept.
Unlike classic warfare which
encompasses an intense
combat phase followed
by the signature of peace
and a complete halt in
violence, the present
operations can be broken
down into three phases:
intervention, stabilization
and normalization. Within
this context, the TESSOC
threat is always there but
at various levels, depending
on the phases of the
operation.
The diagram below shows
in a theoretical manner,
the threat characterization:
Whatever the phase of
the operation may be,
the terrorist threat is
the most flagrant and will
take an important part on
further operations. However,
one can think that the forces
are in a better position to
fight against it during
the intervention phase in
the coercion actions, as
the rules of engagements
at the moment and the force
posture allow a better
defensive capability.
On the other hand, the threat
is greater during
the stabilization phase, as
dramatically shown today in
Iraq: the force has been
compelled to deploy and
intermingle at least partially
with local populations,
the rules of engagement are
lighter, the acceptance of
the force by the local players
is far from being complete
and armed groups remain.
However, other threats
should not be neglected
especially espionage that is
systematically used by local
intelligence services thanks
to the recourse to native
citizens of the country
employed by the force.
This threat is the base of all
interferences, as none of
them can be carried out
against a force without
the collection of information.
An action of terrorism or
sabotage is, in fact, always
preceded by the collection of
the information necessary for
targeting and for selecting
the course of action,
as the terrorist action is,
in fact, a precisely targeted
action aimed at acting
against our vulnerabilities,
which are more of a
psychological nature than
of a real military one.
Similarly, a subversive action
can only prove efficient if
the opponent knows
the morale status of
the members of the force
and their weaknesses.
It will therefore translate
into collection actions
of the opponent on our
organization, our
motivations, the
understanding of the true
motivations of the force. It
will also try to identify how
the force commanders or
their opinion leaders could
be discredited, as well as to
detect the force members it
could convert/subvert and
use as a relay.
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INTERVENTION
STABILIZATION NORMALIZATION
Time ->
Threat
Terrorism
Sabotage
Espionage
Subversion
The threat continuum
Terrorism
Espionage
Subversion
Sabotage
Organised Crime
Terrorisme
Espionage
Subversion
Organised
Crime
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Criminal organizations can
only develop their trafficking
activities within a force if
they know how it works.
They will also look for
the weak links to corrupt
them and use them for their
benefit.
We must also notice that
the various players do not
exclusively act within their
preferred TESSOC domain:
without probably using this
vocabulary, they have
understood and used before
the armies the principles
of versatility, info-value
and even synergy of
effects!
In this way some terrorist
organizations find their
funds thanks to criminal
practices (drug dealing,
bank robberies,...); some
criminal organizations do
not hesitate to carry out
terrorist acts to weaken
states (for example:
cartels in Columbia).
In the past, intelligence
services used terrorist
movements to counter
their opponents
(i.e. the attack against
the pope attributed to
Soviet intelligence services).
In Iraq, it is difficult to make
the difference between
the criminal and the terrorist
part in hostage-takings.
An important difficulty
that a force is confronted
with is that services,
organizations and
individuals using TESSOC
benefit from an active
support or, at least, from
the neutrality of all or part
of the local population, be it
in a national operation as in
the Ivory Coast or a
multinational one as in
Afghanistan. They move
about within their
environment and are all
the more so difficult to
detect and to neutralize.
A threat without
geographical borders
Another characteristic of
modern interferences lies in
the fact that the time-space
framework of the operation
does not limit them.
The development of
communication, physical or
telecommunication assets,
the significant influence role
played by the media, have
blown up the geographical
and state frameworks.
Although this is probably not
the case for the action of our
forces limited by rules of law
and treaties, this is certainly
the case for the studied
threat that frees itself from
these limits without any
difficulty.
The activities linked to
interferences can thus be
launched outside the area
of operation, and even
before it starts. These
preceding interferences can
participate to opponents
deterrence, and contribute
to its own intelligence before
large-scale actions within
the political-military play
that precedes and goes
along with the military
commitment. Nowadays, it
is not conceivable to imagine
military operations that
would not have
consequences over
the national territory or
anywhere in the world where
France has some interests.
The October 6 2002 attack
against the French tanker
Limburg in the Yemenite
waters and that of May 8
2004 against the personnel
of the Navy Shipbuilding
Direction at Karachi perfectly
illustrate this. France has
been targeted because it
participates actively to
operations in Afghanistan.
Although the terrorist threat
is the most flagrant on
theaters of operations, other
threats should indeed not be
neglected.
In this way, during the air
campaign against Serbia in
1999, a French officer, posted
with NATO, gave targeting
information to the Serbians.
Some defense personnel
are approached by foreign
intelligence services and as
always in this kind of affair,
for one discovered, how
many remain secret?
The most insidious threat
remains subversion. It is also
the most difficult one to fight
against, insofar as it rarely
translates into actions likely
to be legally qualified as
crimes or offences. Over
the national territory, it is
targeted against the public
opinion. In our hyper-media
societies, the smallest piece
of news benefits from a
phenomenal resonance
chamber amplified by
Internet. The broadcast
of the Abu Ghraib jail images
illustrates this point very
well. Subversive
organizations or individuals
benefit, in their fight, from
the help of influence agents
active or not, the first rank
of them being television
channels. In Vietnam,
the American public opinion
mainly switched against war
due to reports that showed
in quasi real time the
realities of the conflict.
This type of information,
appropriately manipulated
by disinformation
technicians, will have effects
entailing some consequences
on the theaters.
In order to perpetrate their
acts far from their bases,
the organizations and
services must be able to
benefit from some support
in the countries in which
they operate. On of
the characteristics of our
Western democratic
societies, including France,
is the extreme and
especially ethnical diversity
of their population, due to
the presence of more or
less important communities
coming from countries of
the area of operation;
the corollary of this is a wide
religious or ideological
diversity. It is within these
communities that activists
are recruited and that
sleeping or support
networks are developing
themselves.
Countering the threat
As the African wise man
says the foreigner only
sees what he knows.
Knowing the threat is
the first step of counter-
interference. The other two
steps are its detection
and its neutralization.
Detecting the threat consists
in collecting the security
intelligence and in gathering
the facts and evidences, in
exploiting them in order to
give the force commander
an assessment of the threat.
Neutralizing the threat
consists for the commander,
in a first step, in taking
measures enabling the
achievement of a state of
security.
This means reaching a
satisfactory level of
protection of information,
materials and installations
that are sensitive to
terrorism, espionage
and sabotage, and also
the protection of personnel
against subversion
and organized crime.
Countering interferences on
operations is one of the
missions of the Defense
Protection and Security
Agency. However, the action
that has to be carried out is
not only limited to that of
specialists, to those who
could be considered as the
professionals of suspicion.
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Organizationally speaking,
the coordination of counter-
interference actions within
a projected multinational
unit is deemed to be carried
out by the G2X structure,
taking advantage of the
concept developed in the
AJP 2.1
4
; it is a doctrine that
has been approved by
France but that should have
to be translated into facts,
by identifying the structures
and by drafting the
appropriate procedures.
Our organizations would
then be in sync with those
of our Allies with whom we
are bound to be most
frequently committed.
The DPSD has trained
personnel that are prepared
to staff the corresponding
cells of this G2X.
When specific cases are
identified pertaining to
national citizens, the
multinational chain hands
them over to the national
chain, which then takes the
appropriate measures. On
the theater, this chain is
represented by the Defense
Protection and Security
detachment deployed
together with the force. It
brings its assistance to
the various levels of
national elements command
for exercising their
responsibilities as far as
security is concerned and
firstly to the Force
Commander in case of a
national operation or to
the French Senior Officer
in case of a multinational
operation.
1 DPSD - Directeur de la protection
et de la scurit de la dfense.
2 In French: TESSCO - Terrorisme,
lespionnage, le sabotage, la
subversion et le crime organis.
3 AJP 3.2, Chap. 1.6
4 AJP: Allied Joint Publication.
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However, the behavior of each of us must be the first line of defense facing the opponents threat : compliance to
security rules, no angelism even vis--vis native citizens of an angelic faade. One should not hesitate to raise the
question of the opponents intention and of its likely courses of action, etc. If intelligence partly concerns each of
us with reference to the culture everybody should have and to the contribution of all the personnel involved
in the collection of information, counter-interference cannot solely rely upon the competence of a limited number
of specialists.
It must be part of a culture of discretion, of security and vigilance.
P.16-19 Doctrine 26/07/06 9:03 Page 19
It thus appeared
indispensable to remedy
these problems if we
wanted our army to be
ready to be confronted
to the new conditions
of engagement. Allies
operations in Iraq or our
own involvement in the
Ivory Coast were to
reinforce that requirement.
It has thus been proposed
to the Army Chief of Staff to
initiate comprehensive
studies about different
possible options, and the
first objective was to define
the stabilization operations
concept and then a doctrine
related to those operations.
An action has then been
initiated in common with
CFAT
2
to redefine the Land
Forces synthetic scenario
that would support
exercises from level 1 to 3.
This action, which is about
to be finished, should
provide the force with a
significant training support
means for getting ready to
the stabilization phases of
operations.
And last, in June 2004,
CDEF initiated a study on
the upgrading of the Land
Forces exercise and training
synthetic enemy. An enemy
that should serve as a
reference for building up
the OPFOR to be used during
the exercises implementing
the new generic scenario
which would guarantee
the coherence of the entire
set of training tools selected
by the Army.
That endeavor had been
initiated in a very favorable
period:
- NATO had no generic
enemy (AJP 2.4 - Generic
OPFOR was still a project
at the time);
- CDEF was believing that
this was a European
common requirement,
beyond our own borders;
- DRM
3
s willingness to get
involved in drafting AJPs
and in particular to start
working on a new
synthetic OPFOR.
Moreover an additional
specific requirement existed
and that was a concern for
FAT
4
and CDEF, the fine
tuning of SCIPIO, the new
simulation system to be
used for CAX within the FAT.
This program has been
developed by France under
CDEF/DSROs
5
authority.
By the end of 2006, it
should replace BBS, the US
provided tool. SCIPIO is
much more sophisticated
than BBS, it uses
automated elements to
portray basic units at lower
level than company. This
constitutes a definite plus
for friendly representation
since it allows a significant
economy of personnel
(LOCON). It was thus
necessary to define a
precise OPFOR doctrine
that could be implemented
within SCIPIO for
portraying OPFOR
automated basic units.
This led to initiating the
study whose result is now
well known within most of
FAT units and training
centers. This is what this
article will develop before
drawing some lessons for
the future.
The product
It has been developed
keeping in mind a key
word, realism, that could
actually be split into three
main ideas:
The Land Forces
Synthetic OPFOR
Taking New Threats into Account
The requirements
T
he threat that western forces had to be prepared to confront has evolved a lot since
the vanishing of the Warsaw Pact. However, in spite of the fact that real world engagements,
potential threats and even the strategic thinking had all changed, the synthetic training and
exercise OPFOR had only drifted very slightly from the good old Red-Army type one. This issue
appeared particularly vividly during the OPERA 3T exercise, in November 2003 which portrayed
a Fulda Gap type of threat without any asymmetrical dimension whatsoever.
BY COLONEL ERIC ROUSSEL, CDEF/DEO
1
P.20-23 Doctrine 26/07/06 10:39 Page 20
- The taking into account
of the diversity of our
forces frameworks of
engagement,
- The integration of
conventional forces which
could still constitute a
potential threat,
- Integration of asymmetric
threat (guerilla and
terrorist organizations).
The solution selected is a
toolbox concept. There
is no single enemys
description but a variety
of potential OPFOR which
would allow FAT/FLT
6
exercises directors and
chiefs of G3/S3 exercises
in schools or battalions to
make their selection, that
they would organize and
integrate in exercises to
better fit their objectives.
No country books were
developed, it would have
been an error: when we
want a product evolutionary
and adaptable to various
specific requirements, the
documentation should not
be fully drafted and fixed.
The CDEF commanding
general has already
validated and published
Book I which includes 12
scenarios - as a matter of
fact, it is rather 12 scenarios
nuclei - that cover all
potential types of
frameworks into which
the Army could be engaged
in the short term to respond
to the current operational
contract. They have been
developed jointly with DRM
but they are not a carbon
copy of the real world
although any knowledgeable
reader will be able to
recognize actual or potential
crisis. The number of
scenarios selected
represents a sufficient
diversity of frameworks of
engagement for the limited
number of exercises or
training sessions that can
be organized. Book I has
been published in English
and offered to our European
partner through the FINABEL
forum.
Of course, there still
remains a possibility that
an engagement against
conventional forces occur.
Three types of forces have
been selected (which we
believe to be enough)
according to the following
criteria:
- GLAISE armed forces
constitute the level 1
force. This is the force
of a major regional power.
It has a modern
equipment that has
been bought on
the international market
and it is able to conduct
coordinated actions,
at least, at division level.
- TOURBE constitute
the second level force.
It serves a local power
but which has however a
significant role at regional
level. Its equipment is
outdated and not highly
performing. In spite of
the personnels high
morale, it is unable to
conduct coordinated
actions at a level higher
than combined arms
battalion task force; but
they master quite well
that level.
- HUMUS is the third level.
This is the force of a poor
country. Very weakly
equipped, it is however
very efficient for what
regards Infantry
warfighting. It is able to
conduct locally dreadful
commando type of
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actions. It is unable to
conduct coordinated
actions at a level higher
than combined arms
company task force.
These forces reflect real
ones because the objective
was to drift from the Soviet
template and to get closer
to existing or potential
conflict areas, however
those have been slightly
transformed in order to
make them less easy to
recognize.
Up to this day, the main
effort was the development
of GLAISE, which is
intended to be used as
the main support to build
the SCIPIOs first OPFOR
modelization. This work
was achieved by the end
of 2005, it is now validated,
translated into English,
and readable online by
everybody via the CDEF
website on INTRATERRE
(Book II/1). It will be
presented in this magazine
in a separate article.
HUMUS has been
the following force to be
developed: its an African
type synthetic OPFOR.
Its the one thats the most
different from GLAISE and
that corresponds the most
to our current requirements.
This synthetic OPFOR
document has recently been
distributed to the forces
and to the Army Training
Command (CoFAT
7
) for
being commented before
validation.
It is to be noted that it will
be presented differently
from GLAISE. As a matter
of fact, on the opposite to
GLAISE which could be
more or less defined with
constants, i.e. a doctrine
and an organization that are
valid at all time and in any
place, HUMUS doctrine,
organization and behavior
are supposed to be
adaptable to circumstance
There is thus more
emphasis put on HUMUS
style, even though the
presented doctrine is
understandably a more
basic one.
Two more specificities are
worth to be noted. First
HUMUS can incorporate a
highly performing private
military firm, capable by
itself to give hard time to
friendly forces and to
become a force multiplier
for HUMUS. And second,
courses of action specific
to local environment have
been developed: offensive
actions in desert
environment, actions in rain
forest, actions in urbanized
areas as well as courses of
actions that include support
provided by civilian rioters
and also crowd
manipulation. These
innovations remain however
described in a very simple
way and will have to be
formalized and refined as
lessons learned are
reported after this OPFOR
has been used in exercises;
AAR from actual operations
will also be used.
The initiation of TOURBE
study has been delayed,
due, in particular to
commitments taken within
the FINABEL framework,
a topic that will be
developed later.
The main innovation of that
study lies in the
description of asymmetric
threats, which, as this is
clearly demonstrated
especially in the Middle
East, represent a serious
threat against which it is
vital to get ready.
A preparatory in-depth
study analyzing, since
the 30s, all revolutionary
and guerilla movements,
has been conducted by
the Foundation for Strategic
Research at the CDEF
request, to find out what
were the main trends and to
draw some standardization
data. It appeared that,
although they seem to be
apparently diverse, several
constants can be identified.
It is thus possible to draw
out of that study and to
the greatest benefit of all
officers in charge of
preparing exercises
(without having to study at
Che Guevaras or Ben
Ladens schools) an
irregular forces doctrine,
with notions of maneuver,
desired effects, courses
of action, all ingredients
allowing the exercises
preparing teams to develop
scenarios and MEL/MIL.
The corresponding
theoretical elements are
described at the beginning
of Book III; they can be
regarded as being too
schematic and not complete
enough but they however
allow serious studies to be
conducted about the OPFOR
behavior.
A guerilla organization
(the theological liberation
movement) and a terrorist
movement (the true faith
combatants) have been
created out of that study;
those organizations that
are well adapted to the
scenario 2 framework of
engagement, can also be
exported towards other
scenarios provided a few
adaptations are brought by
the preparation team. As a
matter of fact, and more
than with a conventional
force, the description as
well as the shaping of an
asymmetric OPFOR are
very much dependant
on the scenario and
the adaptations have to be
carefully made in order to
keep the OPFOR realistic.
This OPFOR is also in the
process of being validated
and available on the
INTRATERRE network.
An archipelagic type of
guerilla, similar to
the pirates of Sunda Straits,
is currently being defined. It
could become an interesting
joint OPFOR but still
requires a lot of work before
being usable. The document
has not been distributed.
For the moment, the studies
on other asymmetric types
of OPFOR have stopped
while waiting for the results
of multinational
cooperation (see below).
What should now follow
these studies?
Prospects
and developments
First, the Army should take
the time to get acculturated
to these studies. After a
rather gradual start, these
studies are now well
publicized since they have
been the object of several
pedagogical presentations
at different levels.
A major step has been
the presentation of the
studies to the senior
commanders during their
periodic conference in
January 2006. COMFAT
and CoFAT have both issued
guidances to have this new
synthetic OPFOR well taken
into account by their
subordinate commands.
However this work is not
something that the Army
discovers out of the blue
since the study has not
been conducted by CDEF
alone: it is the result of a
lasting and well developed
collaboration: DRM
providing the foundations
(several models of crisis
served as a basis for
building up the scenarios,
models of real armed
forces, and participation
P.20-23 Doctrine 26/07/06 10:39 Page 22
of experts in all drafting
seminars); CFAT wrote a
GLAISE first draft; the Army
brought an important
participation to GLAISE and
HUMUS follow on drafts
(April - December 2005).
It has to be noted that many
Directorates for Combat
Developments got involved
significantly - which was
vital - in the development
of that study, this is a very
noticeable sign that threat
evolution is well advanced
in our training
organization.
To write is one thing, but
now one has to implement
what has been written.
CDEF DSRO is currently
translating organization
and doctrine into digitized
code. This will be a
protracted project due to
the vastness of the task:
digitization of GLAISE
organization is already
finished, the doctrine is
now being processed. The
first AURIGE exercise using
GLAISE full capabilities
could be conducted early
in 2007; HUMUS should
follow. CEPC
8
will of course
include GLAISE in its
exercises as DSRO delivers
the product components.
In addition there will be
further developments to
the study itself. During
the FINABEL Chiefs of
Army Staffs meeting,
the French Chief of staff
offered to exploit that
study which he offered
to our partners, aiming
thus at developing a
European combined
synthetic exercise
OPFOR. This was a very
natural proposal since
our engagement are
always more
multinational,
the same for our
exercises starting from
level 2 on,
and in addition
the requirements for
multinational
interoperability increase
regularly. That offer has
been positively received
by the other chiefs who
decided to make that
study a priority for the
year 2006, with, as a
goal, to make it an
operational product for
training (which is an
innovation for FINABEL).
Corresponding studies
have started, under
the conduct of the
French representative.
It remains
to be asked if our
partners vision of what
is an exercise and the
modelization
of the threat will permit
the development of a
common product.
And last, since our forces
engagement has to be
regarded as being part
of a joint effort, the same
should be done for the
exercises synthetic OPFOR.
Indeed these studies have
up to now been mostly
conducted by an Army
workforce and this for a
practical reason, because
it was for the Army that
the requirement was
urgent. Supplementary
studies have to be
envisaged not only to
depict how OPFOR air and
maritime forces could
threaten a land force but
also to describe a more
global threat against
friendly air and maritime
components. These studies
are to begin shortly and
they should lead to the
development of a joint
OPFOR corresponding
to the NATO expected
product. Collaboration
on that topic with other
nations under DRMs
guidance should be looked
for.
1 Forces Employment Doctrine
Center /Forces Employment
and Command Structures
Division.
2 Land Forces Command.
3 Military Intelligence
Directorate which, inter alia,
represents France within all
NATOs organizations that
elaborate intelligence related
doctrine.
4 Land Forces.
5 Forces Employment and
Command Structures Division
/Simulation and Operational
Research Division.
6 Land Logistic Forces.
7 Commandement de la
formation de larme de terre.
8 Brigade CP Battle Command
Training Center.
Our forces should soon be provided with an advanced tool enabling them not only
to conduct training, including within a joint environment, but also to think about
their maneuver and doctrine. It could also be used as a support to studying
the capabilities that we ought to require in the short term. Just like any other tool, it
will only produce what we ask it to produce and its capabilities are still to be further
developed.
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GLAISE
GLAISE Army comprises two major elements: the regular armed forces (400,000 pers.) and a Law Defenders
corps (80,000 pers.). Apparently similar to Vermillion, GLAISE is an Army corresponding to the one of a regional
power and that includes powerful and modern forces well organized and equipped like the Former Warsaw Pact
was. However, GLAISE forces are very different as far as structures are concerned; its Armys basic tactical element
is the battalion. In addition, the brigades are much less numerous than the Warsaw Pact ones and they have a
ternary type of structure.
GLAISE Army has three major characteristics. First, it favors defensive doctrines. Contrary to our former generic
enemy, GLAISE fights on its territory, perfectly knowing how to command and conduct mobile or static defense,
fighting on in depth prepared positions adapted to the terrain. They do not hesitate to leave vacuum areas within
their field configuration. GLAISEs logistics organization relies on pre-positioned stockpiles and civilian
infrastructure facilities; its weak transportation capability does not enable it to conduct significant operations
outside its borders. GLAISE frequently makes use of deception and decoy positions. GLAISE has at its disposal an
amazingly important amount of firepower (field and air defense artillery)
The major originality of GLAISE Army is then the presence at its sides of perfectly trained and fanaticized
ideological forces. Constituting the Praetorian guard of the regime, they are in charge of ensuring the countrys
internal security, and in particular the defense of the capital city governmental sites as well as the one of the major
strategic sites that are spread throughout GLAISE territory (oil fields, depots, harbor infrastructure...).
The ideological forces make use of guerilla techniques and envisage, as of the preparatory phase of a conflict, to
conduct large resistance operations.
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Army
BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL LAURENT LENA, CDEF/DEO
1
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And last, differently from VERMILLON and
ECARLATE which disliked to get engaged in
urbanized areas that were supposed to
consume too many people, equipment and
delays, GLAISE operates readily in urban
areas. GLAISE forces conduct attrition type of
combat taking advantage of towns of secondary
importance and steady defense of larger towns
and cities. The sanctuarization of the capital city
makes it to be the privileged ground for
asymmetrical combat that favors a leveling of
the powers by minimizing GLAISE forces
inferiority; GLAISE developed a very elaborate
defense strategy, focusing on the steady
defense of the capital city major governmental
and significant sites (presidential palaces,
Parliament, ministries, television broadcasting,
crossroads, major hotels, airport, etc).
GLAISE Army documentation has been officially approved at the beginning of 2006 and it is already in use within the
French Army. It has been tested during the 7
th
(Armd) and 1
st
(Mech) Bdes Aurige exercises. This new OPFOR will require
some effort to get accustomed to it because of the innovations in its organization and doctrine that might sometimes be
disturbing, in particular for what regards combat in urbanized areas, but which also fit perfectly the new context of
engagement.
1 Forces Employment Doctrine Center / Forces
Employment and Command Structures Division.
P.24-25 Doctrine 26/07/06 10:39 Page 25
Changes in intelligence
requirements
With the demise of
the USSR, the likelihood
of a major confrontation
vanished but it is not
completely over. Yet, in
the short-term, we do not
see which country or which
coalition could attack
the EU or NATO in a
conventional war, but
nobody can discard it in
the long-term. How will
Russia evolve? What about
Chinas build-up? What
could the Iranian hard-line
policy lead to? Still,
what about current
skyrocketing oil prices?
And then, do we not also
say that water will be one
of 21st centurys stakes?
These are many issues that
could feed political-military
forecasting endlessly;
for the Military
Intelligence Directorate
(DRM), it means that
anticipating and planning
are most necessary:
endeavoring to find where
and when crises could
occur throughout the
world, which violence
actors could take part in
them, directly or indirectly,
what opposing forces -
their capabilities and their
weaknesses - could be.
Once this work is
completed, we have to
follow up conflict-to-be
situations over protracted
periods; should they result
into conflicts, we have to
support the forces that
could be set up for this
specific crisis.
These are the two main
missions for the Military
Intelligence Directorate
(DRM):
Taking part in a preventive
posture, i.e. a standing
strategic watch.
The Military Intelligence
Director, reporting to
the Minister of Defense
and to the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces should
be in a position to warn
political and military
authorities about pending
crises likely to develop,
and focus their attention
on the likelihood of an
armed conflict and
the participation of our
forces into it.
Provide our committed
forces with intelligence
support.
Thus, the DRM should
follow up the power
structures and the military
tools that are not allied
ones, in particular in
the areas throughout the
world where current or
The New Threats:
the Challenge for Military-Oriented
Intelligence
W
ith the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989, the cold war ghost and the risk of a major East-West
confrontation disappeared. Alongside with it, new hazy - often called asymmetrical - threats
came up together with the requirement to broaden the field of military intelligence to its economic,
cultural and human environment. From now on, we have to deal with military-oriented
intelligence (RIM). The French military intelligence system had to rapidly adapt itself to this new
situation. It is already halfway there but it still has a long way to go with difficulties ahead.
After some brief remarks about the changes that have occurred in the environment within which
military intelligence should take place from now on, we are going to focus - in a second part - on
what has been done to rapidly meet this new situation; in a last part, the various ways for short-
term and mid-term evolutions will be shown.
This article will necessarily be concise and general, as much to avoid technical considerations as
for obvious confidential reasons.
BY BRIGADIER GENERAL CHREAU DCS/OPERATIONS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (DRM)
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future conflicts occur, on
its own or within the
framework of shared
intelligence with the Allies.
As conflicts are no longer
to be solved according to an
all or nothing principle,
as it used to be during
the period of large
confrontation risk,
intelligence requirements
have thus considerably
increased beyond the sole
well known military
intelligence, to extend
towards all the political,
economic, cultural, religious
factors, etc... enabling to
grasp the evolutions of
societies and crises - what
we call environment
intelligence. This evolution
is a real challenge for
the military institution,
whose expertise is not
universal and whose human
resources are not
extensible.
Furthermore, the violent
events that everyone has
been able to see since
September 11, 2001, clearly
show that conventional
confrontations, either small
or large, are being currently
overshadowed by
the terrorist threat; it is
an omnidirectional and
considerably irrational
threat (which, obviously,
does not make things easier
for collection organisms)
that succeeds in
counterbalancing the
Western technological
superiority with
rudimentary military assets
- the overwhelming US
superiority and therefore
our own superiority.
But there is not only
the Lerna Hydra
of Al Qaeda and of Islamist
radicals. On the other hand,
we see that our committed
forces are likely to meet
the hazards of
insurrectional movements,
guerilla warfare, and
organized crime, even
crowds that could become
extremely violent under
the effect of manipulations
from activists or of other
stimulants such as drugs
or alcohol.
In terms of collection,
all this results into
the requirement to
penetrate and understand
the environment within
which our forces could
be committed, if need be,
including in remote areas
and in unfamiliar cultural
environments - if not hostile
to the Western world.
To meet this moving and
irrational context, the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces
must have reactive and
relevant information
gathering capabilities
available that stick to the
current threat. It means
having modern and
appropriate technical
sensors but also and
especially motivated,
educated and trained men
and women.
Evolving national
capabilities
Since the setting-up of
the DRM in 1992, there
has been a permanent
effort to adapt ourselves
to the threat.
Just to mention some
examples, in France,
satellite observation
appeared very early as a
sovereignty tool, taking
part in the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces autonomy
of assessment, still claimed
by France.
Without having - by far -
the capabilities of the USA
or of Russia, France has
reached a good
technological level in this
area. The performance of
Helios I, then, of Helios
II more recently enable us
to scrutinize areas and
dubious facilities from
the sky and to take
snapshots of very high
quality; thus, it enables
our experts to draw useful
information out of them.
Thanks to this capability,
our authorities were able
to have their own points
of view during important
crises, for instance during
the military campaign in
Kosovo or more recently,
before and after the US
commitment in Iraq.
In the area of
communications intercept,
the situation is mixed.
Indeed, our capabilities to
engage conventional
military networks are not
insignificant, but since that
time there has been a deep
increase in the number of -
military but especially
civilian - communications;
in front of this increase
military capabilities are in
difficulties today. Anyway,
France did not fully agree
with the human and
technological effort that is
supported by other
countries with the famous
Echelon network.
Besides, these
communications are no
longer unscrambled as they
used to be, but protocols
have become more
sophisticated, robust
encryption has spread, thus
resulting in access into
these communications
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being more and more
difficult and expensive.
Something is most
worrying: the most common
communication assets, i.e.
GSM or Thuraya cell
phones for example happen
to be difficult to intercept,
whereas anyone can get
one today - from an honest
citizen to an unknown
guerrilla from an otherwise
developing country.
Nevertheless, the DRM is
working on it, in close
co-ordination with other
national intelligence
services.
Moreover, and without
giving away a secret, our
Signal Intelligence
(SIGINT) gathering system,
which used to be oriented
eastward and had standout
successes, is currently the
subject of important
measures aiming at
reorienting it towards other
areas of emerging concern
and at adapting its assets
to the new above-
mentioned communication
pieces of equipment. It is an
opportunity to significantly
reinforce joint co-operation.
We cannot limit ourselves to
technical capabilities when
reviewing collection
improvements. Obviously, we
have to deal with man and
more specifically with
Human Intelligence
(HUMINT).
Today, this collection
capability is still critical and
our US Allies in Iraq are
regularly experiencing it
bitterly. In fact, the actual
issue does not consist in
extending mans capabilities
through technical items,
but in the capability of
the human sensor to
penetrate a hostile or foreign
social environment, to gain
its confidence, to analyze it,
to understand it and to
anticipate its behavior.
At strategic and operational
levels, which are the DRMs
province, all this requires to
appeal to human qualities
that are rare and rarely
gathered within the same
man: thorough theater
awareness, ability to
communicate, professional
experience, capability to
know how exfiltrate oneself
if necessary, moral
strictness, etc... not to
mention being able
to speak 25 languages!
Besides, if DRMs
requirements are very large
in this field, it has no
significant HUMINT
resources of its own as
it is in Services hands,
in particular Armys hands;
conversely, it has IMINT
(Imagery Intelligence)
with satellites and SIGINT
(Signal Intelligence) with
a fixed land system
completed by Navy and Air
Force capabilities. Though
the DRM is at the top end
of the intelligence chain in
operations, it cannot always
have the HUMINT resources
it needs. The recent decree
aiming at providing the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces
with authority over the other
Services Chiefs of Staff
could perhaps make things
easier, even if, on the other
hand, each Chief of Staff
should be able to have
HUMINT assets, enabling
him to set up the tactical
level.
A few trends about
tomorrows intelligence
More than ever, in an
unforeseeable and
uncertain world, an
increased intelligence
effort should be launched
to be able to deal with
crises at the lowest level of
violence, and this, through
a coordinated action from
the international
community.
We should also have
an all-out and in-depth
look, according to all
the meanings of the word.
But we should also be able
to have a detailed look as
todays terrorists - a fortiori
tomorrows terrorists that
are being developed - will
not often be spotted from
a geostationary orbit.
Thus, we have to develop
our technical and human
collection capabilities in
coordination with other
French intelligence
services but also with
those of our foreign
partners.
At international level, it also
means a requirement to
carry on pooling among
European nations, at least
analyses, at best
information gathering
capabilities. Indeed,
the intelligence world is
an exclusive one by nature
and France is not the only
country that wants to keep
some autonomous
estimate capability; but
this willpower should be
considered in comparison
with the assets that we
really intend to devote to
it, so that this willpower is
not limited to an illusion.
Furthermore, the building
of the Europe of Defense
has no meaning without
pooling the threat
assessment. For example,
the build-up of the EU HQ
(European Union
Headquarters) requires
being able to rely
on a European situation
estimate capability.
It could also result into
the acquisition of common
and/or shared collection
capabilities at
the European level
(common armament and
training programs, more
important exchanges of
information...).
In parallel to this,
cooperation within NATO
is reinforcing. It is both
necessary to be able to
meet new threats - in
particular asymmetrical
threats rapidly mentioned
earlier, but it is also in
coherence with the concept
of High Readiness Forces
(HRF) coupled with the
concept of NATO Response
Force (NRF) that deals with
the three components.
The French Army is deeply
committed to it to have
the FR-RDC (French Rapid
Deployable Corps) certified.
The Navy and the Air Force
have already passed
this exam.
It implies to have an
intelligence gathering
capability at all these levels
and another capability to
coordinate intelligence at
operational level. Work lies
ahead and it looks
sophisticated...
Under our Ministers impulse,
but also under increasing
budget and human
constraints, joint
cooperation has greatly
expanded in the last few
months; recently, it got a
very specific dimension in
operation theaters with
the setting-up of intelligence
committees in each current
theater and their mirror-
structures at strategic level.
From now on, French national
intelligence services
exchange information in an
open and fruitful way within
these organizations.
Interesting progress has
already been recorded.
It is supposed to develop
even more in the coming
weeks in fields such as
counter-terrorism warfare
about which our Minister
of Defense clearly said that
the armed forces should
commit themselves into it
to a larger extent.
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In addition to these actions,
which are mainly the
province of defense policy,
capability developments
are necessary.
The first one is about the
effort to be done for Signal
Intelligence (SIGINT) in
order to follow the
tremendous current
telecommunication and EDP
(Electronic Data Processing)
movement. SIGINT is and
will remain a remote
intelligence tool that
ignores borders and does
not jeopardize men - and it
is a tremendous virtue.
We must absolutely get out
of the major-system logic - a
heavy heritage from the
cold war - and determinedly
commit ourselves into
modular and light systems,
likely to be set up on any
kind of carriers/launchers.
The DRM determinedly
moved into this way.
In the Imagery Intelligence
(IMINT) field, work is
tremendous as we have
to get out of a full-Helios
logic and to have an array
of assets enabling to keep
operating on the battlefield.
Drones are possibly an
insufficiently explored way
but the political will issue
of committing them will
undoubtedly come up in
due time. During these last
few years, these assets
were not committed on
the pretext of unacceptable
political/media risks,
whereas the need was
established in some
theaters. But once again, we
have to be within a logic of
modular and light systems,
likely to be set
up on any kind of
carriers/launchers.
The DRM determinedly
moved into this way.
Today, other collection areas
should be carefully
considered: in particular,
it is about computer
intelligence, for which
the DRM is currently
developing some expertise,
in coordination with other
French intelligence services;
but it is also about open
source intelligence for which,
once again, the DRMis
organizing itself.
But military collection
capabilities are not limited
to weapons systems only.
They are also and
especially men, even
men systems. All this is
obvious as regards human
collection. This is the major
short-term collection
improvement work.
By the way, it will be
the purpose of a thought
workshop in late 2006 in
which all potential actors
will take part.
There is already an
appetence for intelligence,
then an intelligence culture
to be developed among the
whole of military manpower
because it is currently a gap
that weighs down on our
capability to understand
our environment. There is
also a reservoir of experts
to be significantly developed,
both in strength and in actual
expertise to be up to
the stakes that are in store.
The Army is on the front line
in this field, both as a
beneficiary and as capability
reservoir. Anyway, the armed
forces should be watchful
and not watch
the trains go past, i.e. run
the risk of seeing other
armed forces being
exclusively entrusted with
know-how that they could
have developed internally,
at least to some extent.
In conclusion, in front of a multifaceted, often unpredictable, sometimes atypical threat, the DRM has actually endeavored to
adapt itself, as much regarding equipment as methods of work, development and maintenance of new know-howduring these
last few months and often in close co-operation with other national intelligence services.
Today, this effort should get a new impetus in order to take into account the changes in military-oriented intelligence, among
which counter-terrorism warfare is one of the most important components.
This action can only be carried out within the framework of an increased co-operation with all the French security and
intelligence services by strictly complying with everyones mission and know-how.
It should also take place within a logical framework of increased co-operation with our foreign partners.
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onsequently and
before even studying
how to adapt our
capabilities, we should
consider all the importance
of the multi-sensor
specialized collection
maneuver, by relying on its
three principles:
- synergy (obtained by
the complementarities
of assets),
- modularity (fulfillment
of adaptation to needs),
- flexibility (attachment to
any type of operational
command).
In fact, although closely
imbricated in the general
maneuver of the combined
arms commander as far as
planning and coordination
are concerned, the
maneuver of collection
assets is separated from it
in its conduct and follows a
specific logic, which is that
of its combined effects.
This is reinforced by the fact
that collection units can
participate in military
intelligence collection
operations or in military
interest ones which fall
under objectives that can
be of:
- a strategic level, for the
non-exclusive benefit of
the Armed Forces Joint
Staff/ Directorate, Military
Intelligence;
- or operational level, for
the benefit of a theater
commander;
- and tactical level, for
the benefit of a land
component commander.
Role and mission
of multi-sensor
The intelligence brigade,
which is a large multi-sensor
collection unit, falls in
priority both under
the framework of
the strategic watch and
under that of the force
engagement at all
employment levels,
by developing its ability
of carrying out particularly
sensitive missions such as:
- preparing and supporting
the engagement of
the force;
- acquiring tactical
intelligence for action
purposes;
- directly supporting in depth
or on the rear ;
- supporting the action of
special forces.
To this end, from its
headquarters and its
subordinate units, it
provides a level 1
implementation center at
the FR-Rapid Reaction Corps
and a multi-sensor
intelligence battalion CP
at level 2. This type of
structure demonstrated its
efficiency in Kosovo during
nearly five years with
the intelligence company
team subordinated to the
MNB-NE G2, and is again
efficient in the Ivory Coast
with the intelligence
company team whose
commander is under direct
command of the LICORNE
force commander.
On the other hand, whilst
warranting its capability to
generate these structures,
the brigade develops and
implements the concept
of intelligence direct
support detachment
(IDSD
1
), for the benefit of
levels 3 and 4. The first IDSD
was created for the benefit
of the 7
th
Armored Brigade
during exercise FATEXTEL
2005. Similar light
structures are created in
case of need within
the collection company
team of operation LICORNE.
The brigade will validate
Collecting Intelligence
Adapting our Capabilities
As far as intelligence collection is concerned, we are still experiencing a true revolution, because of:
- the dramatic change in the nature of intelligence requirements for operations that are very far from conventional
conflicts, and especially the fight against terrorism;
- the explosion of technologies in the fields of telecommunications and information, which includes imagery;
- the common employment of these technologies by our potential opponents;
- a concomitant evolution of technical and human collection skills.
The adaptation of collection capabilities represents one of the main ambitions for the coming years, through
the following stakes:
- fight against asymmetrical threats and their three principles (terror, unpredictability, fluidity);
- implementation of the info-valorization concept.
GADIER GENERAL PATRICK BLERVAQUE, INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE COMMANDER
P.30-34 Doctrine 26/07/06 10:37 Page 30
the concept during exercise
FATEXTEL 2006, with
the coming into play of an
IDSD for the benefit of
the 3
rd
Mechanized Brigade.
It should be noted that
the name of these
structures is not yet final.
Today, specialized
collection has to face a
twofold challenge: on
the one hand, it must keep
and valorize its capabilities
linked to the permanent
nature of intelligence
collection, and on
the other, develop an
organization flexibility
for engagement due to
the need of being able
to rapidly deploy, in
accordance with
contingency constraints,
contingency collection
assets, within the framework
of crises management and
of the conduct of operations
on overseas theaters.
This is why the terms
of the intelligence brigade
mission were very recently
re-actualized:
The mission of
the intelligence brigade,
committed partly or as a
whole, consists in setting
up the assets necessary to
the conduct of collection
operations by supplying:
- on the one hand
and systematically, the
simultaneous engagement
of detachments of
the various components,
- on the other hand,
the operational command
and control structures to
conduct the multi-sensor
maneuver.
The engagement
of the multi-sensor
This engagement can be
simply illustrated by two
rapidly evoked examples
that have been lived
recently.
A national example
In its area of operation, a
Task group is facing a non-
conventional rustic and well-
organized enemy using
simple but efficient
weapons (AKs, PKMs, RPGs
and use of antitank and
remotely controlled mines),
modern communication
assets (one satellite
telephone and one radio
liaison per group).
It generally moves using
mopeds or on foot by teams
of 10, preceded by scouts
and having permanent
informers in some villages.
The Task Group collection
detachment is divided
into 3 modules, in order
to collect the following
intelligence:
- conversational intelligence
based on a network of
informers and interviews
of all nature;
- visual intelligence
elaborated from
observations, especially
during patrols;
- electromagnetic
intelligence that brings
further protection to our
forces confronted to an
enemy taking perfect
advantage of relief. It is
sometimes the sole
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collection asset when
weather conditions are
pinning down patrols in
their bases (static
listening for example).
This collection capability
was able to provide
intelligence to the Task
Group by demonstrating
employment flexibility
and a reactivity adapted
to the large unit maneuver.
A second example
in an Allied army
Stabilization operations
(SFOR, KFOR, ISAF) have
shown that a complex
situation could only be
assessed with the
complementarities of
technical and human
collection capabilities.
However, it was noticed
that recce and intelligence
collection assets are very
scattered, under the orders
of units at very different
levels ranging from
the battalion to the platoon.
Therefore, within
the framework of the ISTAR
(Intelligence, Surveillance,
Target Acquisition and
Reconnaissance) concept,
the following assets were
regrouped within the same
unit:
- wheeled armored vehicles
and RASIT type radar, up
till then subordinated to a
recce battalion;
- drones and artillery RATAC
type radars, up till then
subordinated to an
artillery battalion;
- human collection assets
and long range
pathfinders patrols, up till
then subordinated to a
specialized company.
This regrouping will quite
probably prove profitable
as it is studied within
several other European
armies.
In this respect, one should
insist on the utmost role of
multi-sensor collection
detachment commanders
in operations, to whom is
issued a specific directive
before their projection,
and in which G2 heads
are often confident in their
capability in drafting
the specific intelligence
plan and in conducting
the intelligence maneuver.
Adapting the specialized
collection components
Beyond these efforts in
the field of the definition
and implementation of a
multi-sensor tactic, each
collection component is
engaged in an adaptation
cycle facing the threat,
the framework of
engagement and
the evolutions of basic
technologies.
Electromagnetic
collection
Today the primary mission
of this component is
the tactical electronic
direct support of
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the combined arms
engaged on operations.
The 44
th
Signal Regiment
fully participates in this
mission, especially
in the field of new
interception types, by taking
over, along the lines of a
process similar to that of
the Development and
Experimentation Concept,
the equipments developed
and tested by the Army
Staff, even by the battalions
themselves.
The adaptation of
electromagnetic collection
capabilities moves forward
in three directions:
- The conduct of
electromagnetic collection
in direct support and the
development of tactical
courses of action fulfilling
those of supported units.
It is the case of
generalizing the
implementation of the
electronic direct support
detachment, a module
likely to encompass a
large range of assets
adapted to a rapid
engagement at tactical
level, able to accompany
3
rd
and 4
th
level units in
their maneuver, under
certain conditions.
- The acquisition of
specific know-hows in
terms of interception and
localization in desert and
mountain areas, facing a
clever and organized
enemy, as described in
the first example.
- The mastering of
constraints pertaining to
life on campaign in a very
hostile geographic,
climatic and tactical
environment.
An adaptation of
equipments is also
necessary.
The favored course of
action of numerous
terrorist groups is
harassment using remotely
controlled explosive
devices. Consequently, we
must very closely monitor
the evolution of present
experimentations
pertaining to Improvised
Electronic Devices (IED), in
order to deploy as fast as
possible assets able to
counter this main threat to
the two ongoing operations
in Afghanistan. Our Allies
seem to meet some
successes in this field.
Generally speaking,
jamming assets are to be
fitted on each vehicle of
a convoy or of a patrol that
is moving within the area
of operation, under the
following conditions:
- programming
the jammers is under
the responsibility of
the electronic direct
support detachments;
- operating the jammers is
under the responsibility of
the unit employing them.
The considerable effort in
adapting our capabilities
consists on the one hand,
in rapidly taking over
the new interception
equipments needed to deal
with the potential
opponents commonly used
communication assets.
Taking these equipments
over is ongoing both on
theaters of operations and
within the framework of
the build-up of the new
operational structures
adopted by the 54
th
Signal
Regiment in particular.
But the two Regiments
are complementary and
the brigade commits their
assets in accordance with
available assets and
operational requirements.
On the other hand, the
adaptation to New
Communications and
Information Technologies
(NCIT) imposes the rapid
development of internal
appropriate interception
assets (especially software
applications), and by giving
priority to off the shelves
procurement in order to
compensate for the present
inadequacy of the
armament program policy
in this respect.
Imagery collection
One must notice that this
component is badly
appreciated by the armed
forces, at tactical and
operational levels.
The operational service
fielding of the few drones
systems presently being
procured, both for the Air
Force and the Army, is
lagging behind due to
technical reasons and
the operational systems
are not deployed, mainly
due to the significant
volume (equipments and
personnel) represented
by the modules to be
projected.
However, the employment
of these assets obviously
falls within the framework of
multi-sensor collection for
the benefit of the forces,
and the procurement of a
drone system at each level
of employment represents
a major challenge for
the armed forces in
the five coming years,
provided that the policy
especially pertaining to
the employment of
the Army drones in
particular is clearly defined.
However, examples exist
in other nations, in
the current operations, of
the successful engagement
of drones, including in
the search of terrorist
groups. Last, only
experience enables to
progress and it should
contribute to reduce the
present difficulties.
The projection of the CL
289 in Bosnia, at that time,
significantly contributed
to the taking over of
the system and rendered
it easier to project.
The only positive point
is the procurement ant
the deployment of the first
light interpretation
stations, which enable to
render the formidable
skills of image interpreters
analysts available for
the benefit of joint
operational forces within
very short delays and with
the greatest success,
despite the frequent lack
of an image axis
2
.
Human collection
The intelligence coming
from human
conversational sources
(conversational HUMINT)
was significantly developed
to fulfill the new
intelligence requirements
ensuing the commitment
of forces in peacekeeping
operations under its
various forms
3
.
In this respect and for
the operation commander,
intelligence collection
especially aims at
mastering the general
theater environment and
the particular situations in
the wide range of domains
that characterizes it:
political, economical,
institutional, legal,
sociological, media,
humanitarian,... Today and
in two words, it is the case
of mastering the systemic
analysis process.
HUMINT can be defined as:
Within the framework of a
declared crisis or conflict,
from its build-up to its
resolution, it is the case of
contributing to fulfilling
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the intelligence needs of
military interest for
command and control
using and processing over
time selected human
sources, connected to a
given theater and likely to
detain information that
would prove useful to the
assessment of situations
4
.
The three competence
levels of the French Land
Forces as far as HUMINT is
concerned have now been
defined.
Besides, the human
resource management,
which was up till now only
mastered within
specialized services,
is now becoming subject to
the concern of the services
that are now formalizing
their action in this respect.
The adaptation of
linguistic capabilities
to peace support
operations is a main issue,
the difficulty of finding
and training linguists in
the rare languages that are
more and more met on
the present theaters can
become a bottleneck in
our capabilities both in
electromagnetic and
human intelligence
collection. A single
example: the urgency of
training 4 or 5 linguists
to the basics of the Pushtu
language (ability to
recognize 500 usual
words), by putting up a
sort of crush educational
program. The Air Force
has succeeded, within
three months and under
the same conditions, in
training three linguists
in Farsi.
The present operational
constraints impose to
review the recruiting and
basic abilities of potential
linguists, maybe by
studying a root language
and then, in accordance
with the needs, a second
language. On the other
hand, English is essential,
including in rare
languages areas as it is
in many cases the lingua
franca for communications
that go beyond the local
ethnic groups circle.
1 DAR - Dtachement dappui
renseignement.
2 Partly or fully integrated
system of imagery
transmission and processing.
3 Reference: Joint Doctrine for
the Employment of Forces on
Operations (PIA 00-200).
4 Reference: employment
manual of the information
collection group (TTA 970).
This panorama of the intelligence brigade capabilities evolutions is obviously synthetic and sometimes allusive,
but it shows the dark and bright aspects. A strong motivation of men is needed in sticking to operational needs
of combined arms employers as well as to the drastic constraints imposed for the projection of operational
modules. The will for flexibility is there and the productivity effort is constant.
However, everything is not possible and mastering information, anticipating the opponents action and
winning over hearts and minds and other often praised principles that can only be supported, can be put
into practice only if the adversary and the environment are well known. Preferably it is even better if we know
them better than he knows us ! Therefore, we must know how to commit our intelligence capabilities in due
time and in appropriate volumes.
The effort on technical capabilities is obviously to be pursued and reinforced in order not to become
outmatched by the state of art and render the systems reliable that, for some of them, still remain shaky.
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Emerging threats can be
categorized according to
their main features
The so-called symmetrical or
dissymmetrical threats are
based on three principles:
- Realization of courses of
actions qualified as rather
conventional, which
complies with war
principles and their rules.
Even in case of a
confrontation weak versus
strong, the engagement
is military. It is the most
frequently frontal at
the time of contact and
military tactics drives
action.
- Employment of weapons
systems similar to ours,
which generates relatively
balanced duel situation.
A tank, a fighter aircraft or
an infantryman, even less
efficient are entering
identified categories and
systems that can compete
with ours.
- organizations and tactical
processes are relatively
known to us. Few
organized armed forces
are indeed ignored by
intelligence agencies in
general. This provides
each of us with an a
priori knowledge of
the adversary to be
designated.
In front of these
symmetrical or
dissymmetrical threats, our
armed forces are benefiting
from operational
advantages. Forces ratio
remains usual and can be
measured. The response to
the danger these threats
represent is most of the
Future Intelligence:
Stakes and Digitization
D
eveloping the intelligence capacities of the Government and more specifically of the armed forces
is a vow regularly voiced by our political and military officials. We should however go further than
the mere wish expressing an actual need. It seems indeed useful to focus on the real stakes of
development of our intelligence capabilities. Then we may determine how the armed forces digitization
will maybe enable finding answers to the so-set challenges.
The revolution which occurred in military affairs at the end of the 20
th
century fostered the emergence
of a number of innovating concepts. These were even capable to generate breaks in the strategic and
tactical landscape, in particular regarding western powers.
On the one hand, the nature and conditions of military commitments are and will possibly be forcing
the armed forces to gain multiple expertise, non only focused on war action, in front of very evolving
threats.
On the other hand, digitization represents, whatever is said, a real technological breaking off. It drove
the typical operational functions towards a new era. Permanent hunt to increase factors such as action
briskness and remote damage to the adversary passes a new threshold. Its concepts of (quasi) real
time situation awareness and effects delivery out of direct sight are the main outcomes.
In this framework, intelligence, function meaning, as all operational functions is in full transformation.
As far as it is concerned, the associated innovating concept is called ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance,
Target acquisition and Reconnaissance)
1
. Its concretization is a real challenge.
Conditions of current as well as likely future commitments and in particular the analysis of emerging
threats, are building the framework. It is then possible to outline the main stakes for future intelligence
and identify how digitization will carry tactical and technical breakings off tending towards the necessary
concretization of ISTAR concept.
BY COLONEL BERTRAND CHANDOUINEAU, ARMY STAFF - LAND FORCES SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT BRANCH
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time known and applicable
and, most of all the exact
nature of threats can be
defined. This enables
anticipation and sequencing
traditional courses of action
of the intelligence function.
On the opposite, threats
of asymmetrical nature are
setting out real challenges
to be taken as they are
based on three principles
more complex than
the previous ones:
- Terror as a means to meet
the overall objective.
Terror is achieved through
courses of action mostly
unconventional, not
complying with war rules.
Its psychological impact
is huge. Subsequently
privileged targets are
those less naturally
protected (civilian
populations) or the more
vulnerable within military
forces (communications
network, logistic systems,
more generally support
agencies, human
environment of the force).
In respect of tactics, these
threats are supported
by thunder-like action.
Similarly, in respect of
morale, they are
supported by the
combatants fanaticism.
- Unpredictability of their
launching. This provides
these threats with the
capability to make the
war fog denser. They
are characterized by
several features. Their
presence is continuous as
well as the implication of
civilian population amidst
which the forces are more
and more evolving.
The influence of networks
of all kinds may be
contributing to their
build up. The threats are
employing original
courses of action
endlessly renewed.
Subsequently these
threats are presenting a
real ubiquity feature and
can stay invisible until
they blow up.
- Finally, the fluidity of
these threats vectors is
a principle that links their
stealthily to their
elusiveness. The tactical
result achieved by a small
team can indeed be as
efficient as these achieved
by a typical military unit
without having its
footprint.
The confrontation in an
open environment is
replaced by a
confrontation in an urban
terrain, complex and
concealed where
population becomes
a shelter. Moreover,
the individual is unworthy
and very diverse
technologies including
some contemporary
(digitization) and some
ancient (knife enabling
the hostage execution)
are used with a frightening
easiness. Through their
fluidity, these threats
really impregnate
the military action of
classical armed forces.
This kind of threat enables
an adversary whether
declared or not to possess
an effective part of
operational superiority
over armed forces and
efficiently oppose the
efforts of classical military
intelligence. To face it, our
intelligence agencies should
be provided with new
capabilities.
Gaining new capabilities
New capabilities should be
gained in order to oppose
the most efficiently as
possible all kinds of future
threats.
The first of these capabilities
is the extension of the vision
area of the armed forces.
This will be enabled via a
deep cultural change in
everyones mind, especially
with combined-arms and
joint commanders and,
most of all, with every
individual operationally
involved. It will inoculate an
intelligence sense from
the highest command levels
down to tactical levels.
Furthermore, sensors
multiplication and support
from technologies adapted
to contemporary conditions
of engagement (urban
terrain, technical assistance
to human sensors, all
weather capability...) will be
required.
The next capability to be
acquired related to the
monitoring of threats
vectors. This will enable
to keep sight of threats
building up once they have
been detected in order to
decrease their stealthily.
In addition to the
multiplication of sensors
and the call for adequate
technologies, this capability
will be based on information
processing and a better
cooperation between
agencies but also
internally between forces,
services and branches.
Finally, the capability of
adversaries knowledge
already present should
be enhanced through
reinforcement of intelligence
processing capability and a
better organization for its
capitalization.
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Combination of these three
capabilities will enable the
acquisition of the overall
capability representing the
understanding of threats
and environment. The
armed forces will require it
in the short future for the
anticipation they shall be
more and more showing.
This last capability should
indeed be the base of the
whole thinking in respect of
future intelligence, of which
digitization is one of
determining components.
Digitization enables
the response to each
of the required evolutions
stated before
This digitization can enable
the transition from classical
intelligence to ISTAR
concept (intelligence,
surveillance, target
acquisition, reconnaissance).
A short definition of this
concept could be the
following:
Enabled by digitization,
the ISTAR concept aims at
offering the permanent
awareness the most acute,
complete, fair, relevant and
updated of the situation in
respect of adversaries,
threats and the environment
by merger of the whole
information usefully shared
according to the time and
the need to know.
Digitization will indeed
enable the development of
previously said capabilities
especially through the
development of several
principles.
(Re-) providing intelligence
collection with a real
tactical dimension will be
required first. Considering
each soldier as a potential
sensor, the information that
he collects should be
usefully disseminated, thus
enabling him to participate
in the elaboration of
the overall intelligence.
Digitization allows as well to
contemplate a multiplication
of the number of sensors.
This would not oblige to
multiply the number of bases
dedicated to this function
but would integrate
additional technologies
on the same vectors.
A proportion of these vectors
would be robotized in order
to avoid human losses and
achieve a real permanency.
Drones represent already
the concretization of such
robotized multi-sensors
vectors. Sensors should
more and more be connected
together in order to increase
their synergy but also be
connected to effects
generators to enhance their
action rapidity and their
efficiency. Besides, specific
need-tailored technologies
should be developed
including in particular
technologies related to
imaging, radars and
communications assets in
order to detect new signals.
Moreover, the indispensable
acceleration of intelligence
processing will be enabled
by fusion in particular.
This could be defined as
the double automated
capability in respect of data
correlation assistance and
situation aggregation
assistance. Fusion will allow
intelligence to be almost
immediately validated
and then will enable
the monitoring of threat
vectors. Consequently it
lies in the heart of future
intelligence capabilities.
In addition, the increased
cooperation between
agencies in order to
widen area of military
intelligence interest will
quickly correspond to a
vital need. Digitization will
precisely facilitate this
cooperation through a
better organization of
intelligence capitalization
and the link between
structured databases
in view of a shared, quick
and rational processing.
Beginnings of specific
numeric tools can already
be found in particular
regarding economic
intelligence. The Army
wishes to be provided with
such tools through
the SORA project (airland
intelligence optimization
system). Development
of such tools will enable
to increase both
processing/production
capability and analysis
power.
1 SA2R in the French Army.
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This evolution heading to the concretization of the ISTAR concept and the development of described capabilities
will of course have direct consequences. This relates in particular to the intelligence function in respect of human
resources (new trades and analysts volumes), professional education and training (intelligence actors, multi-
sensors, intelligence simulation), equipment (new sensors, information and communication systems) as well as
organization (multi-sensors ISTAR units).
These consequences seem heavy to take on at the time when armed forces budgets and personnel are measured.
But, save admitting to be increasingly blind and deaf in front of threats that are and will be present around military
commitments, it seems that the price to pay must be accepted. Consequently a real effort on digitization of
intelligence function should be emphasized.
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Collective training: the link
between basic education
and operational training
Collective training will always
be the main means to gain,
improve and maintain
collective knowledge and
know-how that are required
to perform a function or to
exert a military job.
Collective training had
sometimes been neglected
due to external constraints
but now, it has become a
priority. Collective training is
not only a battalion tool,
staffs functional cells have
also to go through it. It was
thus necessary to take
advantage of the fact that it
had become a CFAT
responsibility to review its
organization and objectives,
especially for what
participates to optimizing
the Intel function.
Within the forces
It relates in priority to
the training to using main
and secondary equipment.
The objective is thus to gain
and maintain collective
know how within the main
military occupation (major
equipment) and within an
operational function in order
to initiate combined arms
training
2
, since this
acquisition is a prerequisite
to the conduct of combined
arms training.
Three major directions can
be identified
- All units should standardize
and make denser their plan
of activities.
- Intel related units: initiate
the combined arms and
multi sensors nature of
the level 3 and 4
intelligence support units.
- Other units: promote and
maintain Intel awareness
for all non Intel specialists.
The Battalion S2 has a
prevalent role in that
domain.
Collective Training
for Intelligence
A New Organization Framework
C
ollective training constitutes a fundamental building block of the operational preparation.
It is conducted upstream of the unit training. This is an activity which is adapted to one single
operational function. In the summer of 2005, CFAT
1
was entrusted with the responsibility for the conduct
of collective training within the Army.
The creation of a French Rapid Reaction Corps - and in particular its G2 - within the Land Forces,
and the refocusing of CFATs missions on the conduct of the operational preparation have been
an opportunity to better organize staff functional cells collective training and to better define
the objectives, not only to put them in coherence with those of the staffs training but also with
the forces requirements. It had then to be kept in mind that these forces are most often engaged
in overseas operations and then organized with contingency structures and missions that might be
slightly different from those used during training exercises.
These guidance are not specific to intelligence specialist only but to all branches personnel who may
participate, at their level, in collecting intelligence or are in charge of employing the assets that have
been detached to support their unit.
BY BRIGADIER GENERAL JEAN-PIERRE BOURIN, CHIEF INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DIVISION LAND FORCES COMMAND (CFAT)
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Within staffs
It is currently patent that our
HQs have very few training
activities during the
operational preparation cycle
that would enable them to
work in a combined arms
environment and even less
prepare them for a joint
environment where superior
and subordinate levels would
be represented. Collective
training represents a
necessary and most
favorable opportunity to get
ready for the exercises (CPX,
CAX, etc.) where HQs can be
trained and evaluated.
A specific action plan
CFAT has developed a
specific action plan
3
that
complements training
actions which can be
endeavored at each battalion
and HQ level to practice
horizontally their own staff
and CMO
4
SOPs. This action
plan describes a concept of
collective training conducted
to the benefit of
the functional cells and
it establishes the need
for an additional vertical
action that would improve
the dynamism of this
collective training and
ensure that all entities are
trained in a consistent way;
this would also render the
operational preparation
cycle more responsive to
changes in forces structure
and employment within
the various frameworks
of engagement.
The action plan which has
been included in the 2006
DCPO
5
aims at optimizing
the Intel function within
the framework of the Army
2008 project. The priority
is thus given to:
- Brigade Intel functional
cells collective training;
- Battalion level Intel
specialists (S2 and NCO)
collective training, which is
currently not very well
taken into account;
- The consistency of
the entire Intel chain, in
particular for what regards
procedures and behavior.
The goal is to fulfill the Land
Forces requirement for better
educated and trained Intel
staff cells able to work within
staff structures that might be
different from those used
during training exercises, be it
for OPEX (abroad operations)
MISSINT (domestic actions),
operational attachments and
detachments, reinforcement
of national or multinational
cells.
Objectives
of the horizontal action
Collective training
responsibility is
decentralized within
the staff itself for what
regards the functional cells
internal procedures as well
as the interaction of the cells
within the staff. Overall
responsibility lies on the HQ
commander.
Generally speaking,
collective training aims at
developing and maintaining
HQs (level 1 through 4)
abilities to conduct force
coercion or mastering of
the violence operations.
Priority is given to the
development and practice
of the HQs internal
organization, functioning
and technical procedures
(orders elaboration
and dissemination, etc.)
This collective training
concept replaces the self
training one, it is conducted
using minimum
reinforcements and doesnt
always require the
deployment of additional
supporting environment
(HICON, LOCON, Lessons
Learned & AAR specialists,
etc.). These types of
activities correspond to
the NATOs BST (Battle Staff
Training).
Such a collective training
must be conducted at least
once a year when new
personals have been
assigned.
Specific objectives for
the Intel chain
Intel collective training aims
at improving:
- The operational coherence
of all Intel functional cells
(level 1 through 4);
- Their ability to be
reorganized in order to
better fit the employment
requirements;
- Their ability to integrate
operational attachments;
- Their ability to operate in
conjunction with CMOs;
At EMF
6
level, this type
of action allows a better
integration of personnel
from the two Intel cells
within one NATO type
divisions Intel cells.
The land forces most usual
employment domain still
remains coercion; however
it is preceded, followed or
it intermingles with phases
of mastering of the violence
or stabilization.
The training effort, which will
use existing documentation
and CEERAT
7
support, will
put an emphasis on:
- level 4 cells (battalion level
Intel specialists);
- the integration of these
cells within the staffs (in
OPEX, and MISSINT);
- the role these cells should
have within their battalions:
operational preparation,
Intel courses (focusing on
intelligence collection) to
the benefit of the battalions
non Intel specialists
personals;
- Mastering CIS;
- Management of
information;
- Getting familiar with the
new synthetic OPFOR
documentation (TTA 808);
- Integration of terrain
analysis (geographic
intelligence), and the taking
into account of the
meteorological dimension
within any intelligence
action planning (SOSA
IPB);
- Acquiring knowledge of the
Land forces Intelligence
procedures recently
updated by CEERAT;
- Mastering NATO
standardized procedures
related to requests for
information (RFI) and
responses to these RFI, how
to concatenate information,
and getting familiar with
English terminology usually
employed within the
framework of multinational
operations;
- Improving the LL (Lessons
Learned) procedure (short
loop) through a better
normalization in their end-
of-mission reports of LLs
not only at actors level but
also at senior evaluators
one.
Objectives
of the vertical action
The controlled Intel collective
training (RENSEX) is
monitored by the Land Forces
command. This training is
organized according to
the principle of subsidiarity:
each level monitoring its
subordinate level training.
It aims at organizing once a
year a training period for
all Intel cells of all levels
(1 through 4).
These actions aim
particularly at:
- Being able to practice
the Intel function within
cells different form
the usual ones: that have
been specifically organized,
in accordance with
contingency circumstances,
or that have to integrate
attachments from external
sources (HQs, allied
personnel). All this aiming at
getting ready for OPEX or
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for any other action different
from those related to usual
training situations, at
tactical or Joint CP (Land
heavy) level and within a
multinational framework.
- Normalizing staffs SOPs.
- Improving the lessons
learned dissemination and
the rapid taking into account
of the decisions made by
the Army staff as a
consequence of these
lessons learned (short loop).
- Being able to operate in a
collective way, CIS means
different from those used by
the Land Forces Command,
provided joint assets are
available
8
.
- A better management of
Intel human resources
(collection and exploitation)
within a single staff or to
the benefit of superior
levels, in consistency with
the employment concept
evolution (stabilization
concept), an evolution that
can also be linked to a
reorganization of the force
architecture.
- Learning how to take into
account an asymmetric
threat (TTA 808) in exercises
as well as in operations.
The controlled Intel
collective training constitutes
a particularly reactive means
to better adapt our
capabilities to the new types
of threats and to
the evolutionary articulation
of the organization in OPEX.
It is also a privileged moment
to let officers and NCOs study
the existing or potential
evolutions, and to think about
how to formalize operational
requirements, be it for getting
ready for the future or for
exploiting lessons learned.
And last it constitutes a good
way to take advantage of
the experience that has been
gained on theaters and to
distribute it to all.
This organization should
contribute to better
understand that
- intelligence is not
the product of specialized
collection means only, but
also the one of the research
conducted by all combined
arms units;
- information collection is
everybodys responsibility
but intelligence production
is G2s mission and is
directly depending on
the staffs analysis and
understanding capability
Taking advantage
of the National Army
Training Center (CPF)
capabilities
This center as well as its
associated subsidiaries
should become, in the short
term, the major actors for
what regards operational
preparation and units
evaluation. As a consequence
its capabilities should be
used to participate in the
improvement of the
functional collective training.
It is first a powerful means
for acculturating non Intel
specialist officers and NCOs
to Intelligence. To that
purpose, Intel support must
always be portrayed in all
level 3 and 4 exercises.
Thanks to its equipments
and hosting facilities,
the Army Training Center
constitutes also a tool that
must be used to the
maximum of its capabilities
in order to teach functional
specialties without looking
for developing similar
capabilities elsewhere
and at a high cost.
In the coming year,
the combined arms brigades
(BIA) will be provided with an
Intel chain training system
(level 3 and 4). In 2007, this
system should be also used
by the Force HQ (EMF)
in charge of conducting
the controlled collective
training to the benefit
of BIAs.
Improving simulation
means capabilities
The SCIPIO simulation
system current capabilities
should be improved, in
particular its Intel
functionalities that are
assessed to be poor. These
improvements would be
beneficial for combined arms
brigades or Bn. TF exercises
or for the functional collective
training organized to the
benefit of staff cells Intel
brigades units.
Intel Brigade officers and
NCOs must have at their
disposal a simulation
tool representing
the Multisensor Intel Bn.
(BRM in French
9
) that
would enable them to learn
how to employ that unit,
which can be called a
combined arms one since it
is the various branches
which provide
the elementary capabilities
of the units, be they
specialized or not.
The goal is to acquire this
simulation means by 2008.
1 CFAT: Land Forces Command.
2 This combined arms training can
start at a level lower than
company combined arms
detachment (in urbanized area) or
the Intel Detachment in support
of a battalion size task force.
3 Action plan related to improving
the Intel functional cells
preparation to operations n 518
605/CFAT/DIV RENS/B RENS OPS
du 28 novembre 2005.
4 CMO : Centre de mise en oeuvre:
Specialized support operating
center; a small staff entity used
as an interface between a level 1
functional cell and attached
supporting elements
5 Directive pour la conduite de la
prparation oprationnelle:
guidance for the conduct of
operational preparation.
6 Etat-major de force: Division
equivalent Force Staff.
7 Army intelligence training and
studies center.
8 These objectives will be better
achieved if personnel has
received specific training on joint
and multinational CIS within the
framework of NATO and EIREL
(Joint Intel and Language school)
courses.
9 Multi-sensors Intel battalion, a
level 2 support unit, that can be
distributed into sub-task forces at
level 3 and even 4 as DARs (Intel
Detachment detached in support
to battalion level units).
Getting ready for tomorrow
It is from that early stage of operational preparation that we
must take into account the multinational factor which is an
almost permanent characteristic of our engagements; we
must also acknowledge the requirement for having at our
disposal smaller size units, trained to operating with similar
foreign units.
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The future engage-
ments characteristics
These engagements will be
characterized by:
- The major importance of
urbanized areas.
The freedom of action of a
force engaged in a town or
in a suburban area
decreases significantly: a
lack of intelligence about
conventional or asymmetric
opponent could very rapidly
lead to a considerable level
of losses that our
democracies would not
accept easily.
- The prime importance of
the population, which, at
the worst has to be
deterred, and at the best to
be tamed but should never
be confronted. Environment
intelligence takes in that
case its full significance:
the force must get an in-
depth knowledge of what
the various components of
the population are in order
to be able to anticipate
potential outbursts of
temper, what are the major
trends, what does
the population like or
dislike. Population has to be
felt. It is also necessary to
get means able to influence
its morale as well as its
leaders will.
- The Three block war
types of operations and
the corresponding rapid
changes of posture require
that intelligence officers
should be able to adapt very
rapidly to the situation.
- The permanent
disinformation: the huge
number of human sensors
and the rarity of the sources
can lead to self-
indoctrination. Besides,
asymmetric threats use
disinformation as a course
of action, which is not
the case for French forces
that can only conduct
influence military
operations. Intelligence
officers must be very
vigilant and contribute to
detect as early as possible
any of these disinformation
attempts.
- The prime importance of
conversation-based
intelligence. US AAR are
very assertive on that topic:
most pieces of intelligence
are collected through
HUMINT components and
the increased urbanization
of the areas of operations
should only reinforce that
characteristic.
Which requirements
are then imposed
on the Intelligence
functional area
Intelligence specialists
professionalization
It is obvious that, for Intel
personnel, the new
framework of engagement is
much more complicated than
the previous ones: on
the one hand, the Intel officer
domain of action grew up
considerably due to the
almost unlimited expansion
of what might present an
interest from a military
intelligence point of view
(economical, political,
religious, social,
humanitarian, cultural,
medias domains, ...), and on
the other hand, the number of
actors involved on a theater
of operations that also grew
up significantly.
Seeing the complexity of the
work that intelligence
officers have to performas
well as the every day higher
expectations of the combined
arms commanders regarding
intelligence, it seems
imperative that these
intelligence officers should
benefit from a curriculum of
specific trainings and from a
well planned in advance
professional career so that
they can become true
experts. The training
organization that has been
set up at CEERAT, should
ensure, from 2007 on, the
intelligence training
continuity for all ranks from
the lieutenant to the
colonel.
Acculturing the Army
to Intelligence function
is a vital requirement
On the one hand the Intel
functional area has to be
served by specialists well
trained to Intelligence
collection and processing
and on the other hand it has
also to rely on the
commitment of all, even non
specialists.
It could even be said that
the growing urbanization of
the operations gives even
more importance to the
information that can be
Training for intelligence
Evolutions to be Expected
for Army Officers
T
he war in Iraq as well as the weekly terrorist attacks that are highly publicized by the media remind us vividly that
the world is changing and that French forces might have to be ready for the worst next time theyll be engaged.
Threats evolve very rapidly, and this implies that the Intelligence function should evolve accordingly to be able to
fulfill its mission to the benefit of operations commanders.
This article will first describe what future engagements could look like and then what the Intel function will require to
respond to the changes, and in a last part, it will show which new types of training have been developed by CEERAT.
BY COLONEL ARNAUD DE LAMMERVILLE, CEERAT
1
DIRECTOR FOR TRAINING
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P.41-43 Doctrine 26/07/06 10:35 Page 41
collected and forwarded by
all types of units members,
combat, combat support or
combat service support. The
current motto the Army:
400 different professional
occupations! could be well
replaced by the Army:
134,000 sensors!.
It is well known that, due to
cultural characteristics, we
have very little attraction for
the Intelligence business; this
is also true within Defense
organizations and in
particular the Army. This is a
fact that obviously does not
contribute to the success of
operations. However, this
should not be regarded as
something that cannot be
changed; thats why the Army
Chief of Staff decided that
acculturing the Army to
Intelligence would be one
of his top priorities.
It is in that perspective that
CEERAT was given a mandate
by CoFAT
2
for defining, in
close coordination with all
other Army training
organizations, what should
be the Intelligence training
objectives for all Army
officers and NCOs, from basic
training up to CSEM
3
. These
objectives should serve as
a basis for developing actual
training schedules, before
the summer of 2006.
In order to make this
endeavor a credible one,
CEERAT will organize, from
2007 on, a three days yearly
session intended to refresh
the Intelligence knowledge
of the combined arms training
organizations specialized
instructors.
An indispensable
awareness of
the environment
In current conflicts, the
civilian population is always a
major actor of the crisis due
to the fact that confrontations
have moved towards urban
areas and also because
the media have the capability
to alter the understanding
one might have of any events.
Within this context, only a
thorough knowledge of
the environment, especially
the human one, will enable
the Intelligence officer to
fully play his role.
This officer has thus to put
events in perspective so as
to provide the combined
arms commander with a
good interpretation and the
necessary delays that will
enable him to adapt the
operation while preserving
his capability to remain
ahead of the protagonists
potential activities.
A permanent awareness
of security related issues
Security is vital for the entire
force, but even more for
the Intelligence function:
- There is a permanent risk
that any event might be
exploited by the media.
Information protection
and confidentiality,
especially the protection
of the sources, must be
faultless when it circulates
through the Intelligence
chain. The slightest
negligence may have
direct consequences on
the political control of
the conflict, on the conduct
of the operation and on
the security of persons
belonging or not to
the force.
- Operations are
multinational. Intelligence
and information constitute a
source of power and a factor
of sovereignty. This is why
the Intelligence operational
function is difficult to
integrate within a
multinational environment.
This function is still
conducted more like a
bartering than a sharing
process, it must thus ensure
the protection of its data
and the one of data
supporting tools.
The CEERAT
training response
CEERAT developed an
Intelligence officer curriculum.
The corresponding training
actions follow a logical,
consistent, and progressive
approach. Three levels have
been considered:
- Initiation, for lieutenant
attending the officers basic
course at the Infantry,
Artillery, Armored and Signal
branches schools.
- Integration
4
, for the
captains who have been
designated to command a
company of an Intelligence
battalion, of the Intelligence
Collection Group or of the
28
th
Geographical Group.
- Consolidation, for officers
who, after having
commanded a company, are
designated to be assigned
to brigade S2, division or
corps G2 during the second
part of their career.
Various types of training
available
The various types of training
conducted by CEERAT can be
regrouped into two different
categories:
- Curriculum training,
- Adaptation training, which
includes staff Intelligence
specialists training, and
constitutes CEERAT priority.
Curriculum training
Basic training
It includes a two months
(March - April) common
course at CEERAT, followed
by a training on sensors
techniques specific to each
of the Intel domain
specialties. The common
course emphasizes
behavioral issues: lieutenants
must become aware of their
deficiencies in terms of
behavior and compare them
to the Intelligence officers
standard profile; they must
also take the time to
understand how theyll be
able to progress. They are
then initiated to the
intelligence function. When
they leave CEERAT, they
should have become very
much sensitive to everything
that regards security issues.
Integration training
The main focus of this
formation is the acquisition of
sensors knowledge and how
to implement them; this is
conducted in parallel with
a familiarization with
the combined arms
operations and with
the efficient preparation
of the future company
commanders to their
forthcoming duty.
At the end of this common
phase conducted at CEERAT,
the captains will also receive
a specific decentralized
training adapted to each type
of company they are
designated to command, and
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so they will be prepared to
command an Intelligence
detachment in operation
Staff Intelligence
adaptation courses
Battalion S2 (Intelligence
officier) course
Since the role of a Battalion
S2 and the one of a Brigade
S2 are very similar as well as
their responsibilities towards
their respective commanders,
this 4 weeks long course has
been included in within the
Staff Intelligence Course
category.
The following courses belong
to the above described
confirmation category.
OREM 1
5
Two courses (a short one
of 4 weeks and a long one of
9 weeks) ensures the training
of S2/G2 staff officers at all
levels (Brigade, Division and
Corps). The 4 weeks course
is open to officers who have
already attended the initiation
and integration courses.
OREM 2
Two courses (a short one of
7 weeks and a long one
of 13 weeks) ensures
the training of Brigade S2s
and Force HQ
6
G2s.
The 7 weeks course is open
to officers who have already
attended OREM1.
OREM 3
Two courses (a short one
of 4 weeks and a long one of
9 weeks) ensures the training
of Force HQ G2s and Corps
ACoS G2. The 4 weeks course
is open to officers who have
already attended OREM2.
Courses intended to train
reserve officers to staff
Intelligence duties are also
conducted over periods of 2
years. These courses combine
correspondence courses with
training at CEERAT during one
or two weeks depending on
the level (1 or 2). There is no
level 3 course for the
reservists, which is consistent
with their employment policy.
These course (for active duty
and reserve) enable the
student to be awarded with
an Army Intelligence
qualification (elementary,
level 1, 2, or 3) after they
have acquired actual
experience in a corresponding
assignment: 1 year at home
station or 4 months in
operation.
The courses major
characteristics
Methodology
Since the land forces method
of reasoning (MRFT) gives
a large importance to
the processing phase,
the acquisition of a method is
at the heart of the staff
intelligence training courses.
The methods has two goals:
on the one hand to contribute
to the development of the
combined arms operation and
on the other hand to plan and
direct the intelligence
necessary for its execution,
in particular by planning
the sensors maneuver and
more generally speaking by
controlling the collection. Any
theoretical course is
immediately followed by an
application exercise carried
out within the framework of
an exercise whose scenario
has been developed by
CEERAT to meet its own
teaching objectives.
The CIS SICF
intelligence
functionalities
SICF is the operational staffs
working tool. Thus all OREM
courses include a module
describing SICF Intelligence
functionalities; the volume
of that module depends on
the students future level
of responsibilities. The staff
officer must be able to
perform several intelligence
tasks with that tool and on
the other hand, the chief must
know what can be expected
out of that tool in order to
better organize and monitor
the work of his functional
area.
Increasing awareness
of the new threats
CEERAT has very rapidly felt
that it was indispensable to
work in close coordination
with DPSD
7
. That directorate
provides the centre with its
experience by giving courses
focusing on counter
interference
8
. DPSD
participates also in the
development of application
exercises to make sure that
realistic incidents linked to
counter interference threat
are integrated into them.
Security
CEERAT gives a high degree
of priority to making
the students aware of
information and automated
data processing security.
For that matter also, a close
cooperation with DPSD is
beneficial.
Opening the door to
joint and interagency
dimensions
In the current operations, the
domain of interest of military
intelligence is so vast and the
actors so many that G2
Intelligence officers must
have a sound knowledge of
the theater Intelligence
function. It is thus necessary
to familiarize them with the
product that they could
receive from other services,
gendarmerie and agencies
depending on the Defense
Ministry (DRM
9
, DGSE
10
,
DPSD). That awareness
training provided at CEERAT
must for some of the students
be prolonged by Joint
Intelligence training courses,
should these officers had to
acquire specific competences
before being assigned to
strategic or operational
functions, be it in a
multinational or a national
environment. That training is
provided by EIREL
11
that will
become an Intelligence Joint
Training Centre in the
Summer of 2007.
1 Army Intelligence Training and
Studies Center. It has been
established in Saumur.
2 Army Training Command.
3 Army Command and General Staff
College.
4 Integration is the word that has
been selected because it will be
during that phase that the young
officers (Captains) will receive their
Intelligence label which will
guarantee them to be assigned
to an Intel posting (main military
specialty) and to have their
Intel career managed
by the Intelligence C2 directorate.
It represents their integration into
the Intelligence subdivision.
5 OREM 1, 2, and 3: Officer de
renseignement dtat-major, Staff
Intelligence Officer level 1,2, and 3
6 French term: EMF - Etat-major de
force: Force HQ.
7 Defense protection and security
directorate.
8 Counter Interference fights against
terrorism, espionage, subversion,
sabotage and organized crime.
9 Military Intelligence Directorate.
10 External Security General Directorate.
11 Intelligence and Foreign Languages
Joint School.
doctrine
doctrine
Thanks to CEERAT, the Army has now at its disposal a
coherent Intelligence training system that puts the
emphasis on staff Intelligence duties. It will not be
possible to assess the results of that training before some
time, once most of the personal assigned to G2s will have
effectively received the adequate type of training.
The entire Intelligence function should improve
significantly provided Intelligence acculturation of leaders
and soldiers progress accordingly.
P.41-43 Doctrine 26/07/06 10:35 Page 43
Main Abbreviations
and Acronyms
in the Intelligence Area used in the articles
Remarks
INTELLIGENCE cycle
NATO: 4 sequences: US: 5 steps:
1) Planning and Direction
2) Collection
3) Processing
4) (US) Producti on(i n addi ti on to processi ng
includes all sources data fusion and adaptation of
the intelligence product to each user requirements (JP1-02)
4) [NATO] Dissemination
5) [US] Dissemination
Principaux sigles
et acronymes
du domaine du renseignement utiliss
dans les articles de la revue
Remarques
Cycle du RENSEIGNEMENT
FR : 4 phases :
1) Orientation
2) Recherche
3) Exploitation
4)Diffusion
PRCB
PREO
PRR
PPr
PEMI
Planification RENS
Prparation RENS du champ de bataille
Prparation renseignement de
l'environnement oprationnel.
Plan de renseignement et de recherche
Plan particulier de recherche
Plan d'emploi des moyens d'investigation
J2
B.RENS
ou B2
(ou G2)
Chef
B.RENS
S2
ORCT
Bureau renseignement du niveau
interarmes.
Bureau renseignement - Selon le niveau
de l'unit tactique : division, corps et
au-dessus (arme de terre)
Chef du B. RENS (corps d'arme)
B.RENS brigade /rgiment ou GTIA
Chef du B. RENS de brigade
Officier renseignement de corps
de troupe
IPB
CP
Planning for intelligence
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
Intelligence Plan.
(Intelligence) Collection Plan
(Intelligence) Collection Assets
Employment Plan
J2
G2
ACoS G2
(Bde/Bn)
S2
Bde S2
Bn S2
Joint Intelligence Division (Force HQ and
above)
Intelligence Branch or Section. -General
Staff - Army (division, corps and above)
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
(Corps)
(Brigade/Battalion Staff ) Intelligence cell
Brigade IO
Battalion IO
P.44-47 Doctrine 26/07/06 10:34 Page 44
Bn/Co XO
AOR
AI
ASAC
ASAS
CCIRM
(Center)
CDE
COIN
COP
"CIP"
Battalion/ Company Executive Officer
Staff Intelligence Officer
Area of Responsibility
Area of Intelligence Responsibility
Area of Interest
All Sources Analysis Cell
[US] All sources analysis system
(Corps and above)
Multi-Censors Intelligence (MI) Bn
Collection and Coordination of Intelligence
Requirements Management (Center)
(French) Army Intelligence Training and
Studies Center
Ground Intelligence Processing / Production
Center (Land Forces Command)
Infra-red (IR) counter counter-measures (CCM).
Concept Development and Experimentation
Military Information and Documentation
Center for Overseas Operations
(now replaced by EMSOME)
Intelligence Collection Assets Operating Center
[UK] Counter-insurgency operations
Common Operational Picture
"Common Intelligence Picture
Intelligence Support Detachment
Electronic Warfare (EW) Support Detachment
(French) General Directorate for Foreign
Security
C2/OA
OREM
ZR
ZRR
ZI
BRM
CEERAT
CERT
CCMIR
CDE
CMIDOM
CMO -RENS
DAR
DETAE
DGSE
Cdt. en second (RGT) /Officier adjoint
(Compagnie)
Officier renseignement d'tat-major
Zone de responsabilit
Zone de responsabilit renseignement
Zone d'intrt
Cellule d'analyse des informations
"toutes sources"
Systme (informatique) d'analyse
des informations "toutes sources"
(US. Niveau corps et au-dessus)
Bataillon de renseignement multicapteurs
(Centre de) Gestion et coordination des besoins
en renseignement et de la recherche
Centre denseignement et dtudes
du renseignement de larme de terre
Centre dexploitation du renseignement
terrestre (CFAT)
Contre contre - mesures infrarouge
Concept de dveloppement et
dexprimentations (US et OTAN)
Centre militaire d'information et
de documentation sur l'outre-mer.
(remplac par lEMSOME)
Centre de mise en uvre du renseignement
Oprations contre-insurrectionnelles.
Prsentation commune de la situation
oprationnelle
Prsentation commune de la situation "RENS"
Dtachement dappui renseignement
Dtachement dappui lectronique
Direction gnrale de la scurit extrieure
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ENSITREP
FRENIC
IED
SOF TF
GWOT
HRF
INTREP
INSUM
IRs
PIRs
JOIIS
Liaison and Information Collection Detachment
(French) Defense Security and Protection
Directorate
Reconnaissance and Close Support UAV
(French) Military Intelligence Directorate
Enemy situation report
French Intelligence Cell(Multinational HQ)
Scout and ReconnaissanceTroop / Co
Improvised Explosive Device
(French) Military Center for specific Training on
Overseas Territories and Operations
(Intelligence) Data Handling (Systems)
Imagery Intelligence Processing Team
Special Operations Forces Task Force
Information Collection Element
[US] Global War on Terrorism
NATO High Readiness Forces
Operational Preparation
Intelligence report
Intelligence summary
Information / Intelligence Requirements
Priority Intelligence Requirements
Joint Operations Intelligence and Information
system
DLI
DPSD
DRAC
DRM
ENSITREP
EEI
EEI
EMSOME
GED
GEI
GFS
GRI
MCO
INTREP
INTSUM
Dtachement de liaison et dinvestigation
Direction de la protection et de la scurit
de Dfense
Drone de reconnaissance et dappui au contact
Direction du renseignement militaire
Compte rendu (format) de situation
ennemie
Cellule RENS franaise (dans un EM
multinational)
Escadron dclairage et dinvestigation
Engin explosif improvis
Ecole militaire de spcialisation sur l'outre-
mer et les oprations extrieures
Gestion lectronique de donnes
Groupe dexploitation des images
Groupement des forces spciales
Groupe de recherche de linformation
Guerre totale contre le terrorisme
Forces OTAN de haut degr de prparation
Mise en condition oprationnelle
Compte rendu renseignement (format)
Synthse renseignement
Besoins en informations / renseignements
Besoins en renseignement prioritaires
Systme informatique de renseignement pour
les oprations interarmes
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OPCON
QRT
RIM
ROEM
ROHUM
ROHUM - C
ROHUM - R
ROIM
SA2R
SGR
SORA
TESSCO
URH
Equipe de liaison et d'observation
Equipe de liaison et de surveillance
Listes des principaux vnements et
incidents (animation d'exercice)
Force de raction de l'OTAN
Contrle oprationnel
Ennemi conventionnel - Plastron
Qualification renseignement terre
Renseignement dintrt militaire
Renseignement dorigine lectromagntique
Renseignement dorigine humaine
Renseignement dorigine humaine -
Conversationnel
Renseignement dorigine humaine -
Reconnaissance
Renseignement dorigine imagerie
Surveillance, acquisition, renseignement et
reconnaissance
Sous-groupement renseignement
Systme doptimisation du renseignement
aroterrestre
Terrorisme, espionnage, subversion,
sabotage et crime organis
Drone
Unit de recherche humaine
Ecole d'application et centre d'instruction
du renseignement de l'arme de terre
amricaine
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LOT
LMT
MEL-MIL
NRF
OIL
OPCON
OPFOR
SIGINT
HUMINT
IMINT
ISTAR
UAV
USAIC
Liaison and Observation Team
Liaison and Monitoring Team
Main Events-Main Incidents List
NATO Response Force
[US] Observations, insights and lessons
Operational Control
Opposing Force
Army Intelligence Training Achievement
Military-Oriented Intelligence
Signal Intelligence
Human Resources Intelligence
Imagery Intelligence
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition
and Reconnaissance
MI Company Team
Air-land Intelligence Optimization System
Terrorism, espionage, subversion and
organized crime
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
HUMINT Company
US Army Intelligence Center
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Bibliography
1
Current Doctrinal Documents
(See BEAT - Only on Army Internal
Network)
- Joint Concept about military related intelligence, 2003 issue
- PIA-02.200, Joint Doctrine (Volume 1), 2003 issue
- PIA-02.300, Joint Implementation Guidance for military related intelligence (Volume 2), 2003 issue
- Concept of Intelligence in support of Air Land Operations, 2003 issue
- Concept of employment of UAVs in the Army, 1999 issue
- TTA 181/1, Manual about Intelligence in operations to be used by the Land forces, 1996 version,
pending rewriting
- Doctrine Handbook about the Land forces operational intelligence, 2000 issue, pending rewriting
- Land Forces Intelligence Method - Volumes 1 and 2 (MRFT), 2005 issue
- Employment Doctrine for the Army electronic warfare units, 1999 issue, pending rewriting
- Manual about the employment and implementation of the CL 289 system, 2006 issue
- Manual about the employment and implementation of the SDTI system, 2006 issue
- TTA 970: Manual about the employment of the Information Collection Group, 2002 issue
- Manual about the employment of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Cavalry Squadron
(RBRR
2
) Detachments, 2004 issue
- TTA 808: Generic enemy - Volume 1 : SCENARIOS, 2005 issue
- TTA 808: Generic enemy - Volume II/1 : GLAISE Army, 2006 issue
1 Classified documents not available for the general public are not included.
2 RBRR: Rgiment blind de renseignement et de reconnaissance.
doctrine
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P.49-51 Doctrine 26/07/06 10:32 Page 49
Doctrinal documents pending drafting
(Reference: Operational studies data base
on the CDEF site)
- Intelligence Doctrine for the Land Forces in operation
- Employment Doctrine for the electronic warfare and electromagnetic intelligence units
- Role of the Battalion S2.
- Manual about the employment of the Area Intelligence and Support Company
3
- Manual about the employment of the Multi-sensor Military Intelligence Battalion.
- Handbook dealing with the role and organization of the Counterintelligence ( G2X) cell
- TTA 808: Generic enemy - Tome II/2: TOURBE Army, Tome II/3: HUMUS Army, Tome III: non
conventional forces
To Know More:
Some Works or Magazines Dealing with
Intelligence
- Jacques BAUD: "Encyclopdie du renseignement et des services secrets" (Intelligence and
secret services encyclopaedia), Lavauzelle, 1997
- Jacques BAUD: "Le renseignement et la lutte contre le terrorisme" (Intelligence and the fight
against terrorism), Lavauzelle, 2005
- Jacques BAUD: "La guerre asymrique ou la dfaite du vainqueur, (Asymmetric warfare or
the winners defeat), Editions du Rocher, 2003
- Eric DENECE: "Des rseaux et des hommes. Contribution lhistoire du renseignement"
(About networks and men. A contribution to the history of intelligence), CEHD, LHarmattan,
Paris, 2000
- Grard DESMARETZ: "Le renseignement humain" (Human Intelligence), Chiron, 2005
- Allen DULLES: "La technique du renseignement" (Intelligence technics), translated by
Roland GARRANE, collection "Lhistoire que nous vivons" (The story we are living), Robert
Laffont, 1964
- Loup FRANCART (Brigadier General, Ret): "La guerre du sens Pourquoi et comment agir dans
les champs psychologiques" (The war of the meaning Why and how to act in the psychological
fields), Economica
3 CRAZ: compagnie de renseignement et dappui de zone.
P.49-51 Doctrine 26/07/06 10:32 Page 50
- Frdric GUELTON (Colonel): "Pourquoi le renseignement ?", (Intelligence, why?),
Larousse, 2004
- Jean GUISNEL: "La citadelle endormie. Faillite de lespionnage amricain"
(The sleeping citadel. The failure of American spying), Fayard, 2002
- Brigitte HENRI: "Le renseignement : un enjeu de pouvoir" (Intelligence: a power stake),
Economica
- Pierre LACOSTE (Admiral): "Le renseignement la franaise", (Intelligence la franaise),
Economica, 1998
- MM. MARBULOT et LUCAS: "La guerre cognitive" (The knowledge war), Lavauzelle, 2002
- Alexandre de MARENCHES: "Dans le secret des princes" (In the princes' secrets), Stock, 1986
- Herfried MUNKLER: Les guerres nouvelles, (New wars), Alvik, 2003
- J.-P. SIFFRE: "La guerre lectronique" (Electronic warfare), Lavauzelle, 2003
- Georges SOUTOU: "Lexploitation du renseignement" (Intelligence processing), Economica
- Georges SOUTOU: "Quel renseignement pour le XXI
e
sicle ?" (Which intelligence for
the XXI
st
century?), co-operative work, Lavauzelle, 2001
- Revue historique des armes (Armed forces historical review), n 3, 1994, Marcel PIVAK:
"1
st
French Army G2",
- Revue historique des armes (Armed forces historical review), n 4, 2000, "Intelligence from
1860 to our days: situation of the military sources",
- Collection "Renseignement et guerre secrte" (Intelligence and secret war), Lavauzelle, directed
by Fabienne Mercier-Bernardet, among which "1939-1945: the war of minds"
- Cahiers du centre dtudes dhistoire de la Dfense (CEHD/SGA) (Reviews from the Defense
center for historical studies) among which the notebook N1 from the workgroup about
intelligence history co-chaired by Admiral LACOSTE and Professor VAISSE
doctrine
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P.49-51 Doctrine 26/07/06 10:32 Page 51
The article of Major General Fast, Commanding General, US Army Intelligence Center, shows the
efforts undertaken by the US Army to rapidly adapt itself in view of its new theaters of
operations, especially thanks to a continuous lessons learned process.
Intelligence Lessons Learned:
of Operation Iraqi Freedom/
BY MAJOR GENERAL FAST COMMANDING GENERAL, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
F
or well over four years, the United States Army has been involved in an
extended conflict, battling cunning and adaptive enemies. In Iraq and
Afghanistan, and elsewhere across the globe, Army Military Intelligence (MI)
forces are engaged in ongoing combat operations as part of a combined and
joint team. As the mission has evolved and the enemy has adapted to our tactics,
so too have we transformed to address the changing environmental dynamics.
At the US Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), we have established formal and
informal mechanisms to systematically attain the lessons learned from the
battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. At USAIC, we are implementing effective
methods to ensure that these lessons inform changes in Army Intelligence force
structure, training, and leader development so concepts and equipment
developed at the center truly reflect the needs of the forces in action.
Most significantly, these lessons learned in the current environment have
dramatically shaped how we think about the conduct of intelligence operations
and have shaped our development and implementation of doctrine. In this way,
we are able to better know ourselves while conducting operations to more
effectively know the enemy.
P.52-58 Foreign 26/07/06 10:31 Page 52
Doctrine -
The Intellectual Foundation
Throughout the Department of
Defense, we use doctrine to
establish the basic concepts that
we will execute in wartime. Doctrine
is how we think about full spectrum
operations. It is the mechanism that
we use to inform the entire force
about emerging concepts and it is
the tool we use to establish a
common professional vocabulary.
The US Army definition of doctrine
truly illustrates the importance we
place on sharing a common vision
of warfare and is indicative of the
intellectual underpinnings of our
operations:
Doctrine is the concise expression
of how Army forces contribute to
unified action in campaigns,
major operations, battles, and
engagements. While it
complements joint doctrine, Army
doctrine also describes the Armys
approach and contributions to full
spectrum operations on land. Army
doctrine is authoritative but not
prescriptive... Doctrine touches all
aspects of the Army. It facilitates
communication among soldiers no
matter where they serve,
contributes to a shared
professional culture, and serves as
the basis for curricula in the Army
Education System. Army doctrine
provides a common language and
a common understanding of how
Army forces conduct operations.
It is rooted in time-tested
principles but is forward-looking
and adaptable to changing
technologies, threats, and
missions. Army doctrine is detailed
enough to guide operations, yet
flexible enoughto allow
commanders to exercise initiative
when dealing with specific tactical
and operational situations.
To be useful, doctrine must be well
known and commonly understood.
(FM 3-0, June 2001).
Coupled with innovations drawn from
the current operational environment,
doctrine is the foundation which
shapes the way the US Army
intelligence system operates.
By rapidly and efficiently
incorporating the lessons drawn
from the battlefields of Iraq and
Afghanistan and elsewhere, we can
adapt more quickly than our enemies
and provide the soldiers on the
ground the knowledge and tools they
need to achieve operational success.
The lessons learned process is a
deliberate and systematic process
for collecting and analyzing data
from the field and for disseminating,
integrating, and archiving
observations, insights, and lessons
(OIL) collected from Army operations
and training events. This information,
once analyzed and validated, is
integrated into Army organizations,
research (industry and academia),
development, acquisition, and
planning activities in order to sustain,
enhance, or increase the Armys
preparedness to conduct current and
future operations. The process is
designed to support organizations at
all levels of command and staff and
can be adapted for use in all
operations, to include combat,
training, maintenance, installation
support, experiments, and equipment
fielding. Observations, insights, and
lessons do not constitute lessons
learned; these lessons must be acted
upon by individuals or units and must
change Army behavior. This critical
process is formally and informally
conducted through the application
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P.52-58 Foreign 26/07/06 10:31 Page 53
of the Lessons Learned (LL) process.
An identified deficiency or capability
gap that is not resolved will likely
be repeated or observed again in
the future.
Throughout the US Army, we
emphasize the lessons learned
process. The Center for Army
Lessons Learned (CALL), located
at Fort Leavenworths Headquarters
for the Army Combined Arms Center,
is responsible for executing the
LL program across the service and
is the central repository for the
collected data. CALL provides the
guidance and framework under
which all proponent LL teams
operate and provides the forum for
sharing LL throughout the Army.
In establishing standards for this
important process, CALL defines
a lesson learned as: Validated
knowledge and experience derived
from observations... that leads to
a change in behavior at either the
tactical, operational, or strategic
level or in one or more of the Armys
organizational domains. Within
this framework, USAIC executes an
intelligence focused process that is
designed to provide and enhance
effective intelligence support to full
spectrum operations.
United States Army Intelligence
Center - Lessons Learned Program
As MI soldiers returned from Iraq
and Afghanistan, they began to
relate their battlefield experiences
to the USAIC faculty and staff.
To more effectively exploit this
knowledge; during the summer
of 2003 an organized process for
developing MI specific lessons
learned was created. This process
was designed to effect and enhance
change in the MI Corps current and
future warfighting and operational
capabilities. Ongoing support to the
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and
Army transformation efforts provides
additional emphasis on actively
seeking out immediate changes
required to improve intelligence
operations.
This program, supported by a full-time
staff of seven soldiers and civilian
analysts, is designed as a two-part
approach to LL integration: a rapid
fire channel to quickly disseminate
time-sensitive findings into the
operational and training base, coupled
with a formal biannual review and
validation of intelligence lessons
learned collected from all participants
throughout the intelligence community.
The process executed at Fort Huachuca
was adopted as the current US Army
model and includes procedures for
quickly integrating critical findings into
current training operations as well as a
more systematic procedure for longer
term analysis and implementation of
long-term issues (See Figure p. 55).
In addition, the LL team receives
collection emphasis guidance in
the form of information requirements
(IRs) for future collection efforts.
The identification of issues and
development of solution strategies
is done in real-time, through ongoing
efforts between Fort Huachuca and
outside agencies. This formalized
process includes a series of briefings
to the USAIC Commander and provides
a forum for developing guidance on
implementation strategies and
recommended solutions. To ensure that
our collection and analysis will have
direct impact on operational matters,
we organize the effort based on clearly
defined categories. These categories
align with our operations and training
process and ensure that we can
efficiently integrate our findings with
ongoing operations.
Collection Emphasis for Intelligence
Lessons Learned
In order to efficiently organize our
data collection, we use the US Army
data categories of Doctrine,
Organizations, Training, Materials,
Leader Development, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTML-PF).
These categories are widely used
by all agencies in the Army and allow
a common framework for all
LL and operational support efforts.
The LL collection team uses specific
questions, based on the type
of organization they are visiting,
to focus their efforts.
For examples:
Doctrine - Is current doctrine
sufficient and effective?
What doctrine is used?
Does the unit use doctrine or
local TTP/SOPs?
What updates need to be published?
Organization - What current
organizational structure are you
organized under?
Is your unit organized appropriately?
What are critical shortages or gaps
in organizational design?
What part of the organizational
design works well?
Training - Does the training received
at USAICS provide baseline skills at
appropriate level (Initial Entry
Training, NCO Education System,
Officer Basic Course, MI Career
Course, Warrant Officer Basic
Course)?
What specific training activities have
proven most effective?
Material - Is the current equipment
fielded to the unit sufficient to
execute the task?
What equipment works well and
what equipment presented
operational difficulties?
Leader Development - What specific
elements of leader development
are meeting requirements for current
operations?
Personnel - Does the unit manning
(knowledge, skills, abilities and
competencies) support the mission,
timing, and tempo of assignment?
COE (Contemporary Operating
Environment - OIF/OEF)
How is the OIF/OEF operational
environment effecting mission
execution?
Are tactical/operational intelligence
collection operations meeting the
requirements of the commanders?
What TTP/SOPs are units developing
to meet mission requirements
of based on OIF/OEF COE?
What new day-to-day operations
or best practices require new
or updated doctrine.
P.52-58 Foreign 26/07/06 10:31 Page 54
Army Intelligence Centers Lessons Learned Program -
From Collection to Action
As outlined in Figure, we have developed a process that systematically collects and reviews the information, validates
the utility of the data, tasks the appropriate agency with action, and then monitors execution by those agencies
responsible for implementation.
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The process begins with the collection of observations from soldiers. Several methods of observation collection are
used, to include the following:
- Unit AARs.
- CALL Initial Insight Reports (IIRs).
- CALL imbedded collectors.
- Unit visits.
- Interviews.
- USAICS course surveys.
- Intelligence Center Online (ICON) surveys.
P.52-58 Foreign 26/07/06 10:31 Page 55
The use of unit AARs and the various
CALL products help focus the unit
visit collection effort. Based upon
the type of unit (STRYKER Brigade,
Brigade Combat Team, Echelon
Above Corps Unit) and the issues
contained within those publications,
a unit specific collection plan is
developed. The collection plan is
the basis for conducting soldier
interviews to gather supporting
data; this allows the team to better
define the problem and to more
effectively determine the needs of
the individual solutions. The overall
goal is not only to seek out problem
areas but also to discover new
solutions created by units and/or
individual soldiers.
The collection effort is followed
by an extensive analytical effort
that refines the issue and
determines whether the finding is
unit specific or applies Army-wide.
The purpose of this analysis is to
systematically identify best
practices that can be shared with
the Army and its warfighters and to
verify that LL have been incorporated
into the various components of
the DOTML-PF domain.
OIL products are reviewed to
determine relationships and form
recommendations to optimize issue
identification and resolution.
This analysis provides a unique view
by encapsulating emerging and
recurring trends as well as
identifying issues of interest to units,
agencies, organizations, and the
Army. By analyzing this data,
the Army determines how to sustain,
enhance, or increase its
preparedness for future operations.
Unit-specific issues are noted and
cataloged for use in any doctrine
or training as well as future visits
to other like organizations (for
example, STRYKER brigade related
issues). Further analysis is
completed on Army-wide issues
to determine trends that require
potential action.
Observations may support existing
issues, either confirming that
the issue still exists and/or the
developed solution has not fixed
the problem. On occasion,
the solution creates additional
problems that are analyzed for
action. When a new issue has been
identified, it moves forward through
the USAIC led process of issue
validation and solution development.
This part of the process involves
4 to 6 months of analysis and
planning. At the end of the 6-month
process a well developed plan to fix
the issue is briefed to the USAIC
leadership and either approved or
sent back for further collection,
analysis, and planning. If the issue
solution and strategy are approved,
the appropriate actions are tasked
to the various elements of the USAIC
organizations, and the critical
lessons are shared with the Army
and Joint intelligence community.
Lessons Learned in the Global
War on Terrorism
Many of the results from the LL effort
have led to the accelerated
transformation of the Armys
doctrine, organization, and training.
Observations and lessons from
operations in support of the GWOT
have been identified and analyzed
with solutions designed to
strengthen tactical forces and
provide the best available resources
and training for soldiers.
One key aspect of the impact of
the LL process on influencing
change has been the recognition
of the importance of individual
soldiers on the battlefield.
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
have forced a shift from a sensor-
focused approach to a system that
focuses on providing optimized
intelligence support to the one who
needs the information the most -
the soldier and small unit leader.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Army
is engaged in a war unlike any other
in the history of the United States.
It is a war made up of daily battles
in which information is the critical
enabler for decision makers
and the individual soldier alike.
The threats in OIF/OEF are more
complex than any other enemies
faced in history. The current enemy
moves freely within the civilian
population, operates in complex
urban terrain, strikes lethally using
asymmetric methods, and operates
outside the accepted laws of
warfare.
The type of threat that we are facing
in Iraq and Afghanistan requires
us to continuously modify our
intelligence capabilities.
Improvements must be made rapidly,
and we must act quicker than our
opponents. The current operating
environment emphasizes
the individual soldiers role in
the intelligence process. It is a
cultural mindset change so that
todays soldier sees everyone they
come in contact with as having
intelligence value. Soldiers talk to
the local population and observe
more relevant information than many
of the technical intelligence sensors
can collect and process. In order to
defeat these more complex threats,
the Army has begun to transform its
intelligence collection, analysis,
reporting and dissemination
capabilities to produce more relevant
and actionable intelligence.
The LLP has illuminated the need
for intelligence which provides
commanders and soldiers a high
level of shared situational
understanding, delivered with
unprecedented speed and accuracy.
Both maneuver and intelligence
doctrine has been updated to reflect
the emerging concepts and learned
lessons from GWOT operations and
changes in Joint Doctrine. Maneuver
doctrine on urban operations,
stability and reconstruction
operations, as well as manuals
on the new unit structures such as
STRYKER and Brigade Combat Teams,
have been completed. Intelligence
doctrine has evolved incorporating
the latest changes in force structure,
incorporating techniques for analysis
of the threat, and adding the best
proven practices and TTPs into
numerous revised publications.
FM 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation
of the Battlefield (IPB) has been
updated to reflect changes in
P.52-58 Foreign 26/07/06 10:31 Page 56
the proven IPB process as it pertains
to todays operations. FM 2-91.6,
Small Unit Support to Intelligence
outlines the roles and
responsibilities of
the individual soldier in intelligence
collection. This FM is tied into
the Every Soldier a Sensor,
concept which capitalizes on
the most capable collector within
the Army, the individual soldier.
Soldiers are being trained to
actively observe details related
to Commanders Critical Information
Requirements within their area
of operations and report their
experience, perception and judgment
concisely and accurately. Leaders
now understand how to optimize
the collection, processing, and
dissemination of information in
their organization to enable the
creation of timely intelligence.
In addition to doctrinal updates,
the Army is undertaking an
organizational change unlike any
in its recent past. Todays operations
require Army forces to respond
rapidly with forces that move
quickly and commence operations
immediately upon arrival in distant
theaters of operations. Every
regional combatant commander
(COCOM) has employed Army forces
in the past five years, and in every
case the Army has had to modify its
corps, division, and specialty troop
organizations to meet the COCOMs
requirements. To satisfy operational
demands, the Army has had to
reorganize its units to configure
them for the tasks at hand.
This difficulty in using existing
formations, coupled with the need
to employ land forces immediately
with little time to reorganize after
deployment, made the need for
more deployable Army forces
unmistakable.
MI units and sections are
a significant part of this
organizational restructure.
Maneuver commanders have stated
a requirement for increased
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intelligence capabilities within their
organic organizations. Increases
in personnel and equipment at
the Brigade Combat Teams with
in the various Brigade and Battalion
S2 sections are occurring.
The creation of the HUMINT
Operations 2X position to provide
technical assistance to the increased
HUMINT and Counterintelligence
assets is ongoing. Military
Intelligence Companies are slated
for increases in personnel and
capabilities in order to provide
the intelligence collection and
production required by commanders
to plan operations and by soldiers
to execute those missions.
The changes in doctrine and
organizations have required that
training of intelligence soldiers at
all levels be revised. The Army has
improved the outdated intelligence
process and systems based upon
the Cold War environment when
intelligence relied on mostly
technical collection capabilities.
Today, intelligence is integrated with
operations, and commanders are
fighting for knowledge. Intelligence
soldiers receive training not only on
the latest systems and technology
but also on those hard skills that
have stood the test of time. Tactics,
cultural effects on operations,
dealing with ambiguous situations,
critical thinking, and the law of
warfare are just a few examples of
the recent changes in the curriculum.
All of these solutions detailed
above will not be successful without
competent leadership at all
echelons. Leaders at all levels, from
assistant squad leader through
commander, are being challenged.
Todays leader must understand
the vast potential of the intelligence
warfighting function. A mindset
change is required to fight for
knowledge by integrating
intelligence with operations.
Leaders must also achieve a high
level of comfort and familiarity with
their intelligence assets and
the systems and organizations that
provide that intelligence. They must
also develop and exhibit the mental
agility that allows them to quickly
react to an ever-changing situation.
The ability to comfortably operate
in todays complex and ambiguous
situations is a must for a successful
leader.
Integrating lessons learned from the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan is critical to the US Armys
success in the GWOT. The focus and energy that we are placing on this critical task reflect how USAICS is
proactively engaging in preparing units and soldiers for operational deployments and is becoming more
responsive to emerging threats and contingencies. It is a total Army effort, with the active involvement of
MI soldiers from Private through General and Active and Reserve Components, that has allowed for the
successes of the LLP. We will be triumphant in this campaign by knowing ourselves through a
comprehensive LL and integration effort and by training and equipping intelligence soldiers who know the
enemy and can provide commanders the intelligence they need to be successful in any contingency.
Always Out Front!
P.52-58 Foreign 26/07/06 10:31 Page 58
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Framework of engagement of the Multinational Brigade Plus Ultra
The Multinational brigade Plus Ultra (MNB PU) was constituted with Spain as framework-nation. It also included
contingents from four Spanish speaking sister-nations: Honduras, Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. Its
CP was located in Diwaniyah (see map).
Intelligence in Iraq
within the Spanish Brigade Plus Ultra
BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL IIGO F. NAVARRO DE LOS PAOS, FROM THE COMMAND & STAFF COLLEGE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DEPARTMENT
A
t the request of the American government, Spain deployed one brigade in Iraq to
take over US Marines in an agreed area. This operational experience only lasted a
small year but proved to be rich in lessons learned included regarding intelligence.
After reminding the framework of the mission, this article will explain how the
intelligence function took part in the success of the brigade Plus Ultra with, notably,
the particular role played by HUMINT.
P.59-62 Foreign 26/07/06 10:30 Page 59
The MNB PU itself was part of the
Multinational Division Centre South
(MND CS), for which Poland was
the framework-nation with a CP
in Babylon. Beside the MNB PU,
the MND CS included a Polish brigade
and an Ukrainian brigade. This MND
CS was itself under the authority
of the CJTF-7, commanded
by the United-States from Baghdad.
It must be noted that LTG Sanchez,
the CJTF-7 commanding general,
spoke Spanish correctly which was
facilitating communication between
the three Spanish generals present
in Baghdad, Babylon and Diwaniyah.
The MNB PU deployed in Iraq during
summer 2003 in the AOR that had
been assigned to it, encompassing
two provinces with a Shiite majority,
with around one million inhabitants
each, the capitals of which being
Diwaniyah and Najaf.
The MNB PU had two bases in
Diwaniyah: BASE ESPANA in which
was the brigade main CP as well as
most of the Spanish and Nicaraguan
contingents and BASE SANTO
DOMINGO where was the Dominican
battalion.
In Najaf, a Shiite sacred town
including Alis mosque, the MNB PU
had two bases and one party:
- BASE EL SALVADOR
accommodated the Salvadoran
battalion,
- BASE TEGUCIGALPA
accommodated the Honduran
battalion,
- AL ANDALUS party, the location of
MNB PU alternate CP, of the CIMIC
and GST teams (Government
Support Team) as well as personnel
from the Najaf CPA (Coalition
Provisional Authority).
In Diwaiyah and Najaf, the MNB PU
took over Battalions 3/5 and 1/7 -
1
st
MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force)
that had taken part in the offensive
that reached its pinnacle 4 months
before with the capture of Baghdad
on April 9
th
2003.
On December 15
th
2003, MNB PU 1
has been relieved by MNB PU 2 which
kept using the same five bases to
perform the same missions as during
the previous mandate and this until
spring 2004, a date when, in
accordance with the orders of its
government, the Spanish Army began
withdrawing its troops posted in Iraq
back to the national territory.
Even if this was not the first such
Spanish Army deployment abroad,
since it had already before engaged
one national brigade in Bosnia
Herzegovina (SPABRI), this
deployment in Iraq to take part in
the IRAQUI FREEDOM operation
(I/F) was representing a challenge
with a totally different size: indeed
on the one hand it was the first
multinational brigade led by Spain,
on the other hand it had to be
constituted and set up at very short
notice, finally and above all the
engagement zone was on a distant,
unknown and potentially hostile
theater of operations.
The different phases of
the engagement: planning, force
generation and projection, relief of
the Marines and fulfilment of
the stabilization mission, relief
between MNB PU1 and MNB PU2
and finally the withdrawal of
the latter, gave birth to numerous
problems in the domains of
personnel, intelligence and security,
operations, logistics, CIS and INFO
OPS (CIMIC, PSYOPS and PIO). These
problems were solved and the
difficulties they had generated
overcome partly thanks to
the extraordinary effort done by all
the members of the MNB PU.
We will now develop only the matters
regarding intelligence collection and
processing. They have represented a
difficult but enriching challenge.
Intelligence within the brigade
In Spain, even prior to
the deployment, the G2 and the MNB
PU intelligence unit (UINT) had had
already to make a great effort to
update the documentary
intelligence concerning the AOR.
This initial gap was slowly filled
thanks to the information collected
during the two AOR reconnaissances
performed in June 2003 by two
liaison officers (LNOs) from the
Spanish Defense staff and the joint
staff (EMACON) sent to Diwaniyah
and Babylon at the end of June 2003.
In Iraq, the period of the relief
of the 3/5 and 1/7 USMC battalions
permitted to receive some
documentation, to exchange LNOs,
to organize information meetings
and to reconnoitre the area. At a
high level civilian and religious
authorities were introduced while
the contact units performed patrols
in the towns together with the
Americans, by car as well as on foot.
These patrols proved very useful for
our soldiers who received from
the Marines - many of whom spoke
Spanish - detailed information
about the people and the locations.
The intelligence function was
animated from the main CP at
Diwaniyah thanks to a total
integration, physical as well as
organic, of the UINT CP in the G2,
notably through the ASC and CCIRM
cells. This G2/UINT also included
a classic structure with planning,
CI (counterintelligence) and
security, operations cells.
One party was represented
in the Najaf alternate CP.
The G2/UINT decided to give priority
to the creation, then the release
and the updating of a powerful data
base built to be transmitted from
one mandate to the other. To be
able to make it live it was decided
to increase the awareness of all
personnel to intelligence collection
which means that all the tactical or
logistical missions were to have also
an information component. This
materialized, for example, by the
fact that each movement of MNB PU
elements was followed by an end
of mission report including a chapter
about the collected information.
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The means devoted to imagery were
varied. Must be noted the general use
of digital devices, the photographic
reconnaissances of our helicopters,
the missions performed by the Dutch
and RomanianUAVs in support of
the MNB PU in miscellaneous
occasions. Regarding the processing of
the taken pictures, the software and
FALCON VIEW data base provided by
the Marines at our request must be
particularly noted.
It includes a system similar to our
Digitised Map, providing a
cartography at different scales and
high resolution satellite pictures of
the whole AOR. It is a true luxury
that we frequently used and that
permitted us, among other things,
to facilitate the task of our HUMINT
teams.
However, the G2/UINT had difficulties
to work on the one side with a US
Army SIC (CENTRIX) and on the other
side with 4 Spanish SICs: SICONDEF,
SIMACET, SIS and LAN, which led to
practical difficulties to be able to
exchange information between
the different systems.
- CENTRIX gave the possibility to
have access in English to the daily
INTSUM from the higher levels
(MND CS and CJTF- 7) and from
the neighbours. It also provided
OSINT in English.
- SICONDEF gave access to the daily
INTSUM in Spanish from
the EMACON and from our NIC
in Baghdad.
- SIMACET provided the daily
INTSUM in Spanish from the four
MNB PU battalions and from our
alternate CP in Najaf as well as
the weekly INTSUM from our
reconnaissance company, from
our engineer unit, from the logistic
support unit and from our NSE.
- Our SIS once again rendered
service as main system for logging
in and consulting our data base.
- The brigade LAN also provided
OSINT.
Everyday the G2/UINT would send an
INTSUM in English to the MND CS
and another one in Spanish to the
MNB PU units and to the national
territory.
HUMINT role in collection
HUMINT played a decisive role in
intelligence collection in Iraq.
It was coming from different types
of sources and was collected
by different types of sensors.
Regarding the sensors, we can
already mention that there were
Spanish military in Baghdad (within
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the CJTF-7 CP and in the CPA one -
Coalition Provisional Authority) as
well as in Babylon (HQ MND CS) with
whom the G2/UINT exchanged points
of views.
Right from the start it appeared
obvious that information coming
from the CIMIC and GST teams as
well as, in a smaller scale, from
the PSYOPS and from the press
service was to be exploited.
It was also clear that the internal
communication with the main CP was
to be facilitated mainly between G2,
G3 and G9/Civil affairs.
The Civil guard major responsible
for the military police, killed while
on duty, was permanently bringing
useful information about the people
and the infrastructures beside its
own liaison mission with the local
police.
Our national CI and security teams
(ENCIS) constituted by our
colleagues from the national
Intelligence Center (CNI) killed while
on duty were not only the most
powerful research tool of the brigade
but also an important support
in the intelligence processing
and production phase.
Finally, the information provided
by our special operations command
teams (MOE) proved to be of
extraordinary value.
As regards the other sources,
spontaneous informers (Walk-in
informers) would show everyday at
our bases to propose their services
but, once interviewed, their
information proved in most cases
to be unacceptable. However, thanks
to this possibility given to the local
population, we succeeded to
recruit contributors and therefore
to build an informer network that
would take our RFIs into account.
That way, they would feed our
intelligence loop with very important
data.
The spontaneous interviews, those
with our contributors, the security
interviews of hired civilian
personnel, the questioning of
detainees would oblige us to hire
numerous local interpreters whose
efficiency and credibility were not
warranted.
Finally, it must be stressed that Iraq,
far more than the Balkans,
emphasized the need for specific
funds to be able to pay collaborators
and informers.
The engagement of the Brigade Plus Ultra proved to be rich in lessons learned for the Spanish Army in domains
such as intelligence, mainly regarding the role of intelligence in asymmetric conflicts. It notably emphasized
that, in this type of conflict:
- intelligence is playing a decisive role and proves to be the key to the success of the operations,
- HUMINT is the most fruitful collecting mode but it proves to be difficult and dangerous when the environment is
frankly hostile,
- it would be interesting to possess a data base associated to a geographical information system similar to FALCON
VIEW that would be a precious help in a urbanized environment notably for the preparation of HUMINT
investigation missions.
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The ISTAR Capability
of the Canadian Forces
BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL LEFEBVRE, FROM DBRT 8/PD LF ISTAR/CANADIAN FORCES
I
n 2002, the Canadian Army has set up OMNIBUS initiative in order to address its
ISTAR capability. The initiatives mandate consists in delivering an interoperable
and integrated ISTAR capability, which will enable the commander to improve his
view of the tactical environment; it will also enable him to manage his ISTAR resources
more efficiently. It will also support the planning and the implementation of tactical
operations, thus enabling the commander to carry out his mission successfully.
Moreover, this initiative should also meet the joint objectives of the Canadian forces,
i.e. to integrate ISTAR strategically and operationally.
The ISTAR project for the Canadian forces is broken down into several subprojects
dealing with the following: integrating the various fielded sensors, procuring an UAV
fleet, increasing the digital capability of tactical communication systems, increasing
EW (Electronic Warfare) capability, procuring (radar and acoustic) detection sensors
and eventually transforming the command and control capability as needed to
optimize the ISTAR capability.
One of the constraints for the ISTAR
project consists in integrating and
supporting this new capability within
the Armys C2I (Command, Control and
Information) system. It raises some
technological challenges; however,
lessons learnt during the first three
years show that the most important
challenge facing the team consists in
breaking the conventional model and
the mentalities revolving around the
cold war; all this closely links together
doctrinal, individual and crew training
aspects as well as the current
organisation of trades and land force
units. First and foremost, the
optimization of the ISTAR capability
gets through the transformation of the
Canadian Armys current organization.
It has become necessary in order to
better adapt ourselves to
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the technological capabilities
of the various sensors and to meet
the processing and analysis of
the amount of data that are now
available to the commander.
In order to take up these challenges,
the initiative is fitted with a
multidisciplinary team covering
the various (technical and
operational) fields, necessary for
the determination of requirements,
for developing solutions and for
implementing this program within the
Army. This program will be spread over
a period of 10 years, thus enabling to
calibrate the various stages: project
definition, tests and trials, and
implementation for each subproject.
Within this period of time, this project
will take advantage of several
opportunities and joint ISTAR exercises
that should enable to gradually grasp
solutions and especially to test the
different systems and concepts
considered in the project. Among
others, lessons learnt from the first 2
joint exercises in 2004 and 2005 have
enabled to highlight the requirement
to establish a well defined approach
in order to tackle the following areas
in a more detailed manner:
Management of ISTAR sensor
resources. Fielding a new sensor
capability often requires much
attention from the commander and his
staff. We often incline to focus on the
use of this new sensor, rather than
expressing information requirements.
This is not necessarily the optimal
approach to carry out a global use of
the ISTAR capabilities within a tactical
unit. We must emphasize staffs
training on this issue in order to
minimize this impact.
Information processing and
monitoring. Technology can deliver a
nearly unlimited quantity of digital
information. Once tests and trials are
completed, it is extremely important
to establish a steady information
management policy. This policy should
also be flexible in order to take the
requirements of the commander and
his staff into account, as well as
sensors capabilities. During the latest
exercise, the tremendous amount of
gathered information enabled us to
clearly identify the problems linked to
information backup and storing over a
short-time period. We now have to find
a balance between legal and
governmental requirements regarding
information and operational
requirements and the storing and filing
capabilities of our tactical command
and information systems.
Organization management (trades
and units). The setting-up of
numerous sensors raises several
questions pertaining to the types and
organizations of the units that will
process these resources. Several
people would like to have
decentralized sensors in order to have
them as close to the C2 cycle as
possible; other people recommend a
centralized sensor approach in order
to maximize synergy among them.
Canadian Forces (CF) carried out tests
and trials with these concepts during
both joint exercises eventually to
conclude that we do not have enough
resources to consider a
decentralization of ISTAR resources.
The other observation - which has
rapidly become a serious factor for
centralizing sensors - is the lack of
expertise (such as acoustic, thermic,
electro-magnetic (EW) ones, etc...
regarding ISTAR imagery analysis
within Army trades to optimize
the exploitation of the ISTAR
capabilities. This project endeavors to
deal with the various levels of
expertise that should be maintained
within trades structures in order to
tackle this problem.
Merging / correlating data. The last
factor that tests and trials enabled
to highlight is the need to merge and
correlate data. The efficiency and
the speed of a commander and his
staff to make decisions also get
through the capability to meet their
information requests at all levels. We
could easily imagine what the battle
screen display would look like if we do
not succeed to achieve a specific
summary point at each level. Similarly,
data gathered by different sensors get
a meaning only when it is possible to
set them within the operation context.
In conclusion, exploiting the ISTAR capabilities requires a global approach within an organization such as
the Canadian forces in order to maximize and optimize its implementation and its use. The challenge could a
priori seem to be technological but the comments and observations about the Canadian ISTAR project tend to
prove the contrary. This technological challenge could rapidly be tackled with the current technological
improvements. The required cultural changes within a specific organization require much more care.
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The Dutch Approach of ISTAR
concept during NRF-4
BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL TIMMERMANS, DUTCH LIAISON OFFICER TO CDEF
T
he tempo of both the decision making and the execution of current operations is
high and will only increase as a result of technological developments. This increases
the importance of timely and relevant intelligence and information, in which the
emphasis will lie on digitisation and management of all available information. This form
of information warfare (Network Centric Warfare) will take place at all command levels.
The struggle for superiority in the collection and the use of information will become of
greater importance in the planning and execution of operations. In this respect efforts
must be directed at achieving a balance between the capability for information
collection and the possibilities for using the information in question. The ability to
have the right information quickly available is of vital importance to the success
of the fast paced operations.
T
he only way to have information rapidly available at each level is to make maximum
use of technological support (communications, hardware and software for
situational awareness, night vision, etc.) and to ensure that the operational decision-
making process including the connected sub-processes are kept clear and
unambiguous. Conversely, the fact that deployment will usually take place in an
international coalition will, in turn, slow down the tempo. Consequently, the setting
of the intelligence requirement and the direction of the collecting agencies must
take place as closely together as possible.
A
ccording to the Netherlands Armed Forces policy, The NATO ISTAR LAND concept
creates the conditions to this end and the Netherlands Minister of Defence decided
in 2001 that all collecting agencies of the Royal Netherlands Army would be placed
under a single leadership within an Intelligence-Surveillance-Target Acquisition
and Reconnaissance- unit (ISTAR). This battalion was to be operational by mid-2006.
T
he first serious deployment of 103 (NL) ISTAR Battalion took place within
the Land Component of the NATO Response Force 4 (NRF-4).
I
n this article we will present two major lessons learned of this new unit during a
six months participation within NATOs rapid reaction capabilities. The first lessons
learned topic will demonstrate the importance of Intelligence Fusion. The second
topic elaborates on the Network Enabled capabilities. Before doing so, we will first
have a short look at the characteristics of the ISTAR system, the tasks and organisation
of 103 (NL) ISTAR Battalion and the role of the battalion within NRF-4.
P.65-69 Foreign 26/07/06 10:29 Page 65
The ISTAR concept
ISTAR is a system of systems.
It consists of separate systems,
units, headquarters and formations
that become more effective and
efficient by means of interfaces
and central coordination of their
information and activities, without
adversely affecting the responsibility
of the various levels.From the
manoeuvre battalion upwards, each
level has its own basic ISTAR
capabilities (unit/assets) that
complement each other and partially
overlaps in the area of responsibility.
All systems, units, headquarters and
formations at the various levels are
linked. This gives intelligence staffs
and other authorised users access to
the collected information and
recorded intelligence.
Intelligence in the ISTAR system
of systems gives direction to
surveillance, target acquisition
and reconnaissance in the area
of (intelligence) responsibility.
Furthermore, the system converts
data, information and/or intelligence
from many different sources and
collecting agencies into intelligence.
This intelligence is aimed at
the assessment of capabilities
and the expected intentions of
the adversary or groups as well as
the weather and terrain situation
in the (future) area of operations.
The ISTAR system integrates
activities between intelligence staffs
and collection agencies at the same
level and co-ordinates between
the various levels. It achieves central
monitoring and constant systematic
implementation of collecting
activities, target acquisition,
information processing and
intelligence reports with all available
assets within the entire operational
framework.
Furthermore it ensures robust and
uninterrupted coverage of the area
of (intelligence) responsibility
and is able to respond quickly to
the needs of the commander and
his units. It provides timely, relevant,
objective information
and intelligence for the command
and control and/or target combating.
To make the system accessible,
the G2 of a formation has access to
(parts of ) the ISTAR Battalion.
The slide below details
the main ISTAR activities
and the corresponding G2 task
organization.
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103 (NL) ISTAR Battalion
The main task of the battalion
is to collect and process data and
information to produce usable
intelligence for the commander.
He indicates the total intelligence
requirement and provides directives
and orders for its acquisition.
He also provides directives for
he use and dissemination of the
intelligence. It is therefore essential
that parts of the ISTAR battalion
headquarters are in direct contact or
even co-located with the G2
of the supported headquarters.
Other tasks of the battalion are:
- support of the units to be
deployed, by providing information
on the deployment area,
- provision of intelligence support
to headquarters and units for
the duration of a deployment.
The sub-units and/or the system
platoons are tasked with the
acquisition of intelligence/collection
of information. The reports do not
follow the hierarchical route,
but the shortest possible route.
The battalion can be deployed
within the strategic/operational
environment:
- as a battalion-sized ISTAR unit for
any multinational HQ at the level of
Land Component or Combined Joint
Task Force (CCP/CJTF),
- parts of the battalion can be
deployed for a multinational
headquarters or brigade-sized units
or an independently operating
battalion.
The units earmarked to participate
within a High Readiness Forces
(HRF) asset must be operationally
ready within 5-20 days at a
maximum and must be capable
to operate in non-article 5 Crisis
Response Operations (CRO) as well
as in foreseeable Article 5
operations. In other words,
operations at the high end of
the spectrum of force!
The ISTAR battalion must be capable
of cooperating with the intelligence
processing capability and collecting
agencies of other nationalities.
Additionally the ISTAR battalion
must be able to provide and process
information/intelligence from/to
the Air Component Commander,
Maritime Component Commander
and the Special Forces Component
Commander.
Generic organizational charts is as follows:
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NATO Response Force 4
The NRF is NATOs quick reaction
force. It consists of a Land-, Air,
Maritime- and Special Forces
component, that are built every six
months by different NATO members.
The force is capable of deploying
within five to thirty days and can
perform missions worldwide across
the whole spectrum of operations.
From January 15
th
until July 1
st
2005,
the Netherlands contributed the
largest part of the Land Component
of NRF-4. Together with a large
number of allies and under command
of the 1
st
German-Netherlands Corps
(1GNC), a considerable contingency
(approximately 5000 pax) of
Netherlands armed forces was
on stand-by for deployment.
The NRF-participation can be divided
into two periods.
The first period (Jan-Dec 2004)
consisted of training and
certification, followed by the
stand-by period (Jan-June 2005).
The operational capabilities were
trained during five major exercises,
including NOBLE JAVELIN
(April 2005) on the Canary islands
and IRON SWORD (June 2005)
in Norway.
All NRF-4 elements were trained
in a three-block warfare scenario.
In future Crisis Response operations,
NATO units will deal with a
combination of humanitarian aid,
reconstruction operations and
combat operations, including
counter insurgency.
This combination, mostly conducted
in difficult and dangerous terrain,
is an enormous challenge for every
commander on all levels. To support
these commanders with validated
and relevant intelligence is of great
interest.
Looking at on-going military
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan,
we can conclude that three-block
warfare is more than a futuristic
development. It is already reality.
The first ISTAR
lessons learned
During the NRF-4 period, 103 (NL)
ISTAR Battalion was reinforced
with Romanian, Norwegian and
Portuguese assets. From an
intelligence point of view, the
battalion consisted of human
intelligence (humint) assets,
electronical warfare and signal
intelligence assets (EW/Sigint),
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV),
weapons location radar and long-
range reconnaissance sensors.
For Command and Control (C2) and
for All Source Intelligence Process
(ASIC), a multinational staff element
was created. 103 (NL) ISTAR
Battalion was directly attached to
the Land Component Commander
(1 GE/NL Corps).
In the three-block warfare
scenarios used in the NRF-4
exercises, the area of special interest
for intelligence personnel had mainly
shifted from capabilities oriented
analyses, to more and more
intentions oriented analyses.
For many intelligence specialists
this has meant a change of mindset.
Force Protection issues like
intelligence gathering on anti-force
activities, remain key. Nevertheless,
the analysis of the intentions of key
players in the area of operations has
gained importance. Relations
between the formal and the informal
leadership must be fathomed.
We need to know what the possible
consequences are if we deny the
informal leadership or what could
happen if we do business with them.
Very real in todays Crisis Response
operations are the Prioritised
Intelligence Requests (PIRs)
regarding intentions and
capabilities of irregular- or even
terrorist organisations. Conducting
intelligence operations on this issue
is, at least, very challenging.
Depending on the operation there is
a last group of possible intelligence
requirements. Organised crime is an
important factor in almost every
Crisis Response Operation.
One of the most important lessons
learned during all the NRF-4
exercises is that we have to improve
the operating procedures on
the information overflow and
intelligence fusion. The amount
of information that is gathered in a
three-block warfare scenario is
difficult to manage with the danger
of becoming meaningless
information. Instead of creating a
history book, annalists should use
the information for predictions. It is
the job of an analyst to find patterns
in the divers quantity of information,
using different kinds of techniques.
We can, for example, regroup
incidents according to similarity
(mortar attacks), or according to
intensity. We can make the incidents
visible over time, but we should do
more than plot the incidents. All
kinds of information, such as human
Intelligence, signal intelligence,
reconnaissance, etc, must be fused
in order to build up a common
intelligence picture.
Challenges ASIC
In the intelligence fusion concept
of the 103 (NL) ISTAR Battalion,
all information is put together
and made visible within time-space
factors. The next step is the most
important, namely to compare
all the rough information and
demonstrate connections. By using
different kinds of analyst techniques
and software programs, the battalion
is able to create a predictive ability
instead of writing a history book.
With the so-called Recognised
Environmental Picture Concept
we will have a better possibility
in discovering the Modus Operandi
of irregular forces in a specific Joint
Operation Area. The question that
remains is what level is best
equipped for the intelligence
fusion process, or should every
level execute its proper intelligence
fusion?
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In the 21
st
century, the concept of transferring information is becoming network-based, supported by the latest
ICT-technology. This enables command & control systems in which sensors, analysts, decision-makers and
shooters are all connected together, resulting in an enhanced Situational Awareness and capability to act
immediately upon targets of opportunities. The C4I-concept of 103 (NL) ISTAR Battalion is based upon this
network structure on the way to Network Centric Warfare.
In order to contribute to and benefit from the Information Age, special attention should be given to
interoperability. Almost all recent operations are conducted in a joint and/or combined environment. To achieve
the maximum results, both the technical solutions and the accompanying doctrines need to be synchronised. This
needs effort from all participants.
Especially, during the NRF exercise IRON SWORD, we have learned that in a Network Centric environment there
is a need for additional Standing Operating Procedures. On the other hand, without a network system there is a
risk that essential information will not be in time at the right place.
Some important questions are still to be answered:
- What kind of information do we want to make available on the network?
- Do we need to disseminate information at once to a certain level?
- If so, at what level should it be disseminated?
- How should it be made visible in the system?
A well thought-out ISTAR and intelligence fusion system, enabled in a Network Centric environment, will be a
force multiplier for operational and tactical commanders in future operations.
O
T
A
N
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Additional opinions on the topic dealt with in this 09 issue Additional opinions on the topic dealt with in this 09 issue
Land forces:
an intelligence actor facing future threats
Should it happen that the major future issue for
land forces would consist in taking part in warfare
against asymmetrical threats and sometimes, more
specifically, against terrorist threats, all this means
that the Army will have to focus on its capability to
detect them, to analyze them and to understand
them, therefore adapting its attitudes.
A prerequisite to all this is major cultural changes.
This cultural evolution is not the province of
experts only, but it should be shared by all of us,
from top to bottom, and this, whatever
the expertise area is. Thus, it deals with a new
state of mind supported by culture and training.
Being aware of who the other one is, what he
wants, what he does or intends to do, the way
he does it, with whom and with what. It is about
putting oneself in the other one place to
endeavor to understand his motivations, his
intents and his reactions in order to be able
to anticipate his actions.
The major difficulty comes from the fact that we
no longer have to be aware of the Warsaw Pact
doctrine, of the number of tanks and their
locations to be able to deduce intentions; but
today, probable enemies, without any tank or
uniform, are fearsome technicians in wars that
combine the use of terror and information
techniques. The use of all the possibilities of
modern communication assets around the
Internet and cell phones is perfectly mastered
by these soldiers from an army without
any face but terror.
Warning from the publishing department
Considering the numerous interesting articles that are sent to us and that are often not published in the Doctrine overall
studies review - because they do not deal with the topic presented in the quarterly issue - or in the Heracles information
and exchange newsletter of the doctrinal community - because they are too long - the CDEF has decided - from now on
- to split the Doctrines freedom of speech part into two parts: the first one - the customary one - with the articles
directly tackling the quarterly topic, and a second one - a new one - gathering foreign and French articles of course
dealing with the employment of forces.
The shortest articles will keep being published in Heracles in priority, issued every two months.
Terrorism and ground intelligence
W
hatever the trends of hazards and threats that will emerge in the 10 coming years, we will still have -
and maybe more than ever at the core of military intelligence - the vital need to feel and understand
the environment or environments within which operations carried out by land forces will take place -
that could have to thwart enemies using terrorist methods.
Technical intelligence plays a part in it; though it necessarily complements Human Intelligence (HUMINT),
it cannot replace it completely. Even this kind of intelligence is nothing without the quality of analyses
and the expertise of operators, sophisticated as it is and performing as equipment could be.
Whatever the nature of crises is today, operational intelligence relies more than ever on the awareness of
the environment and of the actors of a crisis as well as on relevant behavior for - specialized or non-specialized -
soldiers committed in the field.
BY MAJOR GENERAL (RETIRED) FLEURY
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Thus, it is the province of the militaries - and
probably before other people - to try to
understand the logics, the ways of thought and
action of these new enemies, whose messages are
sent un-ciphered in order to be prepared to
participate in their neutralization, if need be.
As an answer from the weakest to the strongest,
terrorist operations tend to spread, to become
diversified even to become commonplace. It could
either be used in isolated symbolic actions - such as
Madrid and London - or in a steadier and recurring
way within the framework of attrition warfare or
guerrilla warfare - as it is
the case in Iraq today.
Action framework
In the future, we can imagine that the French Army
or some of its components are likely to take part in
actions or operations in front of
an enemy using terrorist methods.
Indeed, if it is clear today that the police are tasked
to control counter-terrorism (and we do not say
warfare) as it falls within the competence of legal
activities, we could think that the situation could
evolve tragically and to such an extent that its
importance would have to be reconsidered.
As of today, it has become obvious that all
the organizations tasked to participate in French
intelligence support the entities responsible
for this field owing to the international character
of this phenomenon, but still, it is a matter of
specialists.
Maybe tomorrow, we will be compelled to
broaden the participation in what would become
actual war, towards which it will be difficult to
overcome accumulated delays. So, it seems
highly necessary that military-oriented
intelligence takes such threats into account
alongside other intelligence bodies.
How does this enemy operate?
Serious, methodical, trained and battle-ready,
he is most of all inconspicuous and underground.
Let us think of 09/11 kamikazes: we are facing
outstanding clandestine experts, able to set up
operations over several months or years, with a
high intellectual and technical level and also
perfectly self-controlled. As regards the groups
claiming Al Qaeda allegiance in Iraq, we also
notice how difficult it is for the Americans and
for the Iraqis to thwart their action.
The enemy in front of us has a major advantage:
being able to melt within an environment that
he knows or that he learned to control and within
which he can move without attracting attention.
In other cases, he could take advantage of an
environment that has become out-of-reach
thanks to the protection of networks or
organizations or to the setting-up of a sealed
area. All this shows how difficult it will be to
detect, spot and identify such an enemy; it also
means that intelligence operations aiming at
reaching him will have to be carefully planned,
coordinated and controlled, whoever carries
them out: experts or non experts.
This is also an opportunity to remind you of
the fact that intelligence operations are
commonplace operations even more sensitive
than others that cannot be left to the initiative
of some enlightened experts; as any other
operations, they should be planned, conducted
and controlled by the operational commander.
Of course, it implies that this commander has a
minimum culture and awareness about this
issue, about the methods, procedures and
constraints specific to intelligence operations;
and it especially implies that he will endeavor to
understand the nature of the environment that
protects the enemy or conceals him, who the
enemy is as well as his physical, intellectual,
moral and spiritual features that make him
different from us, and also his motivations, his
determination and his probable targets.
freedom of speech
freedom of speech
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Consequences for intelligence maneuver
Within such a context - the context of asymmetrical
warfare, whatever its characteristics - intelligence
maneuver will be at the heart of force maneuvers;
more than ever, it will determine their efficiency and
safety.
In other terms and to use easy examples,
the former fire support coordinator (the famous
FSCOORD) is going to be replaced by the Deputy
Commander, Intelligence, permanently alongside
the operational commander; he will be focused on
environment awareness, on the capability to detect,
analyze and interpret indicators and their
evolutions as well as on the capability to anticipate
in order to resume initiative.
It means dramatic changes in the cultural approach:
intelligence offensive operations encompassing
hazards, among which having to operate up to
the lions mouth.
This hazard concept is not specific to intelligence
operations; it is linked to combat or operations
challenges. Thus, if an operation is limited to mere
gesticulation, the only challenge that is left deals
with the security of forces; but lessons learned
show us, once again, that we are likely to pay a
high price if we are careless.
And this is all the more basic for operations carried
out within asymmetrical warfare environments: all
actors take part in intelligence operations, one way
or another, from the simplest and commonplace
ones to the most sophisticated. On the one hand,
a difficulty comes from the fact that you do not get
accustomed to the environment overnight and on
the other hand, it should apply to everybody if we
want this acculturation to be somewhat efficient.
Indeed, if the enemys strong point lies in his
capability to melt within an environment that we
no longer control, the first question is about to
know how to resume action, to become aware of
this environment again and then to control it again,
whatever it is: geographical and physical
environment, communications, information and
influence.
From that point onwards, our own action will have
to be well considered, organized and planned in
order to undertake coherent and controlled
intelligence operations according to well identified
successive objectives and thus to comply with clear
orientations and collection orders. Obviously, - but
is it necessary to remind you of it? - this approach
starts from items we are looking for and not from
collection assets. It means that we have to grant
the analysts with priority and grandness; more than
anyone else, he should know what is already
known and brief us on what we need to know by
suggesting priorities among which the operational
commander will choose.
It gets through the rehabilitation of actual G2s/S2s
specific to the forces, totally integrated into
standing command and control structures,
accustomed to work with other Gs and having
knowledge and data bases fully adapted to the
theater.
It also gets through a better coordination among
all the specialized entities of French intelligence,
the acknowledgement of clear responsibilities,
the setting up of procedures strictly enforced
by everyone.
Eventually, why, from now on, dont we think of
setting up a real reservoir of analysts specialized
in the knowledge of this matter, trained to have
contacts with all the experts from the ad hoc
services and likely to be appointed to other services
in other Departments.
A required cultural evolution
The white knight crusade in counter-terrorism
warfare implementing the assets and the
methods of the previous war proved its worth.
Thinking of a war against an enemy as he is
means that we get into a position enabling us
to identify him, to become aware of his
motivations and intents, his methods, his
support and his assets.
If this enemy has dared to slip into our mould,
has been patient enough to study the way we
operate and to adapt himself to it, has been
clever enough to become aware of our
weaknesses and our vulnerabilities, all this
means that he is prompted by a real
determination.
To thwart him, the slogan could be: to slip
oneself into the enemys shoes and to
anticipate his behavior (a method taught by
Sharon to his paratroopers). Resoluteness to
thwart him should be at the same level at least
and it should be asserted.
But it will not be enough. Indeed, it should lead
to behavior changes and it can only be the result
of changes in the education and the training of
our officers, NCOs and soldiers.
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To this purpose, several ways are possible:
Releasing Army intelligence experts from their
dropout and orphan status. Dropouts, as they
perpetually suffer from mistrust by commanders,
whose first mistake consists in not knowing them
enough and having no esteem for them. Orphans,
as they are too often left to themselves and they
are constantly shunted around from one interest
and pressure group to another, sometimes
nicknamed branches, being aware that they
have neither parent organization nor guide
and protector within a context where there is no
forgiveness. So, they need a leader and a parent
organization.
Restoring the concepts of intelligence
responsibility at all command and control levels,
starting with our sergeants and ending with our
tactical leaders and commanders. This
responsibility means that we must radically get
into modern intelligence culture relying on
the acquisition of behaviors, rules, methods
and awareness, but especially to have some
intellectual gallantry, among which the capability
to say no sometimes.
Recent events showed us how much this concept
of responsibility cannot be avoided; it should
rely on strict control measures with written
procedures, if necessary, whose level of
exploitation is determined by the need to become
informed, which is a commanders choice.
Giving a very specific priority to education and
training in schools and in the syllabus for NCOs
and officers.
Intelligence education mainly means
the acquisition of new reactions by getting
accustomed to new behaviors that will be critical
within the context of future commitments.
It deals with all commitment actors, in a capacity
or another, where the weak link is likely
to jeopardize any operation.
Training: if intelligence is an art at the highest
level, it is above all work and discipline meeting
rules, procedures and constraints that can only
be learned with patience and modesty, actually
two hardly used terms.
Setting intelligence early at the heart of any
operational planning, taking the tactical level into
account, with its initial requirements about
intelligence processing assets, then assets able to
gather intelligence, without forgetting that, in this
collection role field, an extensive use of all
committed units - well trained and oriented - has
the advantage of sparing forces, of increasing
information collection and gathering
effectiveness, of reinforcing units security
awareness.
Extensively reinforcing our forces intelligence
cells architectures at all levels, battalion
intelligence officers, S2s, G2s, by deliberately
focusing on analysis, processing and production
capabilities, by unifying data base structures and
by making sure of an actual and checked
compatibility for processing tools among
the various levels.
For our future commanders, shifting from the
current intelligence awareness to an actual
comprehensive, exacting and confirmed training,
without which they will not be able to aspire to
an operational command. This training can be
considered as placed on a sliding scale during
the whole career, from training schools to joint
training.
Operating in such a way that analysts
specialized in the terrorist field can increase
their own experience through assignments and
contacts in other ministries/departments and
in other intelligence agencies.
The intelligence contribution provided by land forces against the terrorist threat is only one probable and possible aspect of
the evolution of operational intelligence pertaining to land forces. However, it highlights the need for deep cultural changes that
would enable our forces to meet these threats - in fact, not so new, but that appear under a new aspect and within new
environments.
Indeed, more than ever, we have to be in a situation to understand in order to be able to anticipate and react, which means,
instead of running in all directions without knowing what we are looking for, really build up sound intelligence capabilities that
get through a great effort on analysis, intelligence culture, the knowledge of rules and the proper use of ones assets.
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ROHUM
1
, what is it?
As a preamble it is necessary to clearly define what is
understood by human origin intelligence. For that,
we must start from the terminology made official
by the Concept of employment of intelligence in
support of Air Land operations (Army Staff
December 2003), already proposed by the 2001
Employment grid for human sources collection
(Land Forces Command document).
The French word ROHUM includes at the same
time intelligence obtained by an interactive
(or conversational) mode or ROHUM - C, when
a human sensor questions a human source and
intelligence obtained by observation without
contact with the adversary (ROHUM - R). We can
regret the frequent mix-up between intelligence
and collection modes typologies though there is
no equivalence but, up to now, nothing better has
been found.
However, the multinationalization of the operations
and the use of words and concepts from NATO or
from English-Saxon origin disturbed the readability
of the facts through an extensive use of the word
HUMINT. But this word only covers
the interactive intelligence part. The excessive
use of the word HUMINT thus covers two very
different modes of action.
The collection of information
2
by interactive mode
is in everybodys sphere and, in fact, performed
by anyone; it is after all the first vector of
communication. To present it as a joke, (with
reference to Molires famous play) we might say
that Mr. JOURDAIN was in his time making prose
without his knowing but also, surely, intelligence
without his knowing (sorry, information collection).
Those who thoroughly read the play will remember
that because Mr. JOURDAIN has been making
(approximately) prose for 45 years without his
knowing, he believes that he is able to make (well)
poetry at will (Ref his love sonnet to the
marchioness).
However this pretence which, in his case, makes
people laugh, is extremely frequent in our Army
as regards human intelligence, in the common
meaning, which is still more unfortunate.
Indeed not everyone is able to:
- Discuss;
- Collect information from an individual with his
consent and a fortiori from a non willing one;
- Sort out a flow of oral, imperfect, incomplete or
wrong informations.
Leading an adversary to himself unveil his
information is not easy. To be convinced of that, you
just need to think about the testimonies that you get
on the scene of a crime or of an accident. Very often
these informations are fragile, fragmentary,
inaccurate or even imagined and sometimes
deliberately wrong. The source-sensor relation
is also very similar to the informer-police officer
relation. In a certain way the search for interactive
Human Intelligence (HUMINT),
Expectations and Problems
T
he relatively permissive context of overseas operations caused the number of people intervening in
the domain of human origin intelligence to explode. The reports and lessons learned (LL) pertaining
to this part of the intelligence activity recurrently mention difficulties to make choices as regards
the actors, to orient the collection effort and also gaps in terms of competence.
Besides, the multiplicity of the actors and the extreme variety of the obtained information, the sensitivity
of the use of human sensors make it difficult for the combined arms leader to understand the challenges
and issues of human intelligence collection.
Without completely explaining the matter, this article aims at clarifying some basic notions, at bringing
light upon current problems as well as at providing some warnings meant to moderate the craze for that
part of intelligence.
BY COLONEL EMMANUEL POUCET INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE
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human intelligence is close to the police
techniques. It must be oriented, crosschecked,
checked, doubted. The sensor himself must know
how to take some distance from his source, when
it is not the sensors employer who must take some
distance with the sensor! This is clearly seen in
the good police movies.
Finally, even if the collection methodology is good,
we only have at our disposal a good stock of
informations, we still dont have intelligence
because it is now that processing is performed but
this topic will not be studied here.
A trial to sort out the types of sensors
In a first step, it is necessary to make a list (if
possible rational and handy) of the sensors,
those identified as such and those who are de facto
sensors. This helps notably in drafting missions,
in defining roles, rules of engagement and
implementation procedures. For that, there is no
need to be original; in the light of its still worth
goal, one can take example from the already
mentioned Employment grid for human sources
collection: by placing face to face on the one side
the available human resource and on the other side
the operational need, to adapt the capabilities to
be detained by the employment module depending
on the difficulty/sensitivity of the mission to
be completed.
To go from the most to the least specialized:
1. One single Army unit has for first and only job
intelligence in the interactive mode (ICG
3
,
working in accordance with the employment
manual TTA 970). The personnel in this unit is
submitted to psychological and intellectual tests
aiming at checking their ability to perform that
mission. They receive an adapted training using
the communication and interview techniques,
they are made particularly aware of the
particularities of the human sources and of
security. The personnel of that unit must be used
against high added value targets. Finally, they
are the only ones that might be called to question
prisoners
4
. This type of mode of action demands a
strong professional ethics and a high capability to
keep distant from the mission real life experience.
2. Secondly, there are intelligence units specialized
in human intelligence through stealthy
observation. They are infiltrated in the depth of
the adverse disposition and implement elaborate
techniques and procedures that protect their
discretion. In the framework of the stabilization
phases, these units easily practice the job of
human intelligence by interactive mode. Thanks
to their education, they are aware of the notions
of orientation, decision making, cross checking,
verification, the need for discretion, respect of
the procedures and they possess a true base of
intelligence know-how. These units are very well
prepared for their mission.
However, it must be stressed that interviewing is
a very specific job and rather different from their
basic job since it implies contact with the
adversary. They must then be upgraded for
example through adaptation training before
being committed at their best.
3. The third category of sensors is constituted
by the personnel manning the intelligence
cells at all levels who, through their
jobs and contacts, are in a position to
collect information. This personnel has
sometimes intelligence qualifications.
As regards the contacts they may have,
they need to have a training about this
mode of collecting information. They
must also know how to keep the
distance we already mentioned
because this confusion of role between
processing leaders and individual
sensor is fundamentally unsafe, even if
it is sometimes necessary because of
their function within the staff.
In all the good services, it is taught,
as early as the basic training, that it is
necessary to separate research from
processing not to let oneself be
brainwashed (by the ENY, the false
friends and above all by oneself )
Finally, I do not know if other actors
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must be mentioned (to be confirmed after taking
into account their concept / doctrine presently
pending definition by the FEDC) such as the non
specialized units used in the framework of the
liaison and observation teams for example the
LOTs and LMTs in the Balkans. These units are
effectively clearly mentioned as being no
intelligence units though they practice intelligence
without practicing it, they have clear surveillance
missions, they are oriented by G2, etc.
It can be said, as a caricature, that they are to
intelligence what PROTERRE
4
engagement is to
infantry warfare. They provide an open and mainly
passive surveillance capability, in a permissive
environment in which threats are light and
information collecting is considered easy; they
would, probably, hand over the relay to more
specialized teams if clues about suspect things
were to be detected.
Some caution is needed. Their immersion in
the adverse environment makes them sensors
but also ideal targets for brainwashing. These
personnel must be warned of the risks of
manipulation and compromising their own mission
and possess some marks as regards the interview
techniques. They must be convinced that this mode
of contact with the adversary requires a high
strictness. A minimum training or better said
adaptation to the mission is indispensable.
The goal is essentially not to compromise their
contact mission by clumsily substituting themselves
to specialized units.
Finally, as written before, any personnel of the
force may be led, in the course of its main mission,
to collect information in the contact of local
populations, notably during assistance and security
missions, particularly because of the French Army
tradition of interweaving Land operation Forces and
population, when the security situation permits it.
Animating them, for it remains necessary, falls
under the responsibility of the Battalions S2s.
It is worth mentioning, now, some difficulties to
be mastered when employing these sensors;
they present a different acuteness depending on
the categories.
Sand grains
Following-on the sources and making
deconfliction between sensors on the one hand
and the use of interpreters on the other hand are
the two main matters posing problems. They are
not much felt during the coercion phase of the
operation but are clearly felt as soon as the force
disposition stabilizes notably with the
superposition of the areas of responsibility for
intelligence of the different levels. The question of
the risks that the human sensors might face cannot,
either, be neglected.
Coordinating the employment of the sensors is
not an easy task. The superposition of the
dispositions and their relative narrowness, or even
the difficulties to access to the data bases result in
the possibility that a single human source may be
dealt with by several intervening actors belonging
to different hierarchic levels. This usual
phenomenon has a lot of inconveniences. The first
is the risk of brainwashing and the unveiling of
the needs for intelligence, the useless scattering
of efforts, wrong cross-checking: the Bn TF reports
something, the brigade questions the same source
(without knowing it), the brigade S2 sees then the
same piece of information arriving from the same
source and therefore considers that the information
is confirmed, etc. SFOR and KFOR have been and
still are - potentially? - famous places for circular
intelligence or even for the plain Arabic
telephone.
Coordination demands discipline and a strict
organization as well as a consolidated report
system. Finally, following-on the sources must be
organized to make for the instability of our sensors
and, to check as much as possible the reliability of
these sources. Indeed our interventions always
occur in traumatized countries that is why the
political, material, etc. interest gives birth to
numerous vocations as sources in which there is
a lot to sort out.
Besides, all the sensors deployed in a brigade zone,
for example, are far from being under the brigade
commanders orders: there are those from the
higher levels who may not have a strong pressure
from their leaders to respect a possible TACON, the
special forces, the Gendarmerie, the element from
the DPSD (French Defense Security and Protection
Directorate), miscellaneous other departments;
this does not take into account the actors from the
other nations falling under the same categories nor
the galaxy of organizations falling under the UNO
or the EU, etc. A possible coordination with
non subordinated bodies can then only be made
a minima, as a gentleman agreement, in as much
as we judge timely to unveil our actions to them.
We must take the opportunity to tell something that
will displease my comrades who do not belong to
the intelligence specialty but it is worth dissipating
fruitless illusions. The men from intelligence are,
structurally, disturbers. They disturb by their
investigation methods: this has been true since
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St Raphael in the Bible - the recent patron saint
given to Intelligence - it is true in the processed
products since the Cassandra of the Trojan war -
who might have become a laic patron of
Intelligence, virgin and martyr! - as for the
Intelligence men who hide things from the tactical
level, Coventry inhabitants know a lot about
that since they have been sacrificed by Churchill to
avoid risking to make know that he was deciphering
the Enigma device...
Therefore, as long as you will have leaders, military
or political, you will - potentially - have
uncontrolled guys roving through my zone without
reporting to me.
Then, the language barrier remains a major
obstacle. In the past, the intelligence officer was
often somebody mastering a foreign language.
Today, there are few individuals with the cultural
basis necessary to understand
the adversary, above all when
our adversaries are recruited in
areas very distant from our
cultural world.
The intermediary of an
interpreter is often the only
mean to communicate. It has its
limits. The interpreter may
himself work for the adverse
party or be submitted to
pressures. He does not always
totally master our language.
For one source, it is not neutral
to see a fellow citizen
translating his words, there is
thus a witness to the exchange
and this witness is not inert. The translator can hide
or betray the thought of the source, be mistaken,
to make it short, he is imperfect.
This problem of recruiting and rendering the
interpreters faithful is today a major bottleneck
in the efficiency of the intelligence function and an
important brake in the development of interactive
intelligence.
1 HUMINT in French.
2 Fans of accurate language may refer to the Air Land intelligence
doctrine to see the difference existing between information and
intelligence, a non superfluous difference in matters of intelli-
gence and above all in ROHUM-C.
3 Information collection group.
4 Up to now POWs, even though this concept may be soon taken in
a wider meaning.
Nevertheless we have no reason to be pessimistic and for myself, I believe in the role of interactive intelligence in
stabilization operations. We have capabilities that we need to know how to use, we even have an important capability gap.
But this is no reason to work as amateurs. First we need judgement in the chain of command to fully assess which type of
capabilities is necessary depending on the framework of engagement and the nature of the information we are looking for.
We need seriousness and method Human intelligence of the interactive type is fragile in essence. Even practiced by
interview specialists, it must imperatively be controlled, cross-checked and doubted. If it can be excellent and very rapidly
provide high value information, it can also be a source of brainwashing.
It must never be practiced by unprepared personnel.
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Features of the asymmetrical threat
Without starting a holistic presentation of a subject
already considered by academic authors, this threat
presents for a G2 the following main features:
First of all, it is not about a combat restricted to
the tactical level with players well identified in a
reduced number and with relatively well known
courses of actions. It is about a much more global
confrontation overlapping strictly military
confrontation fields to encompass ideology,
politics-ethnics, cultural and religious aspects.
This is observed in national liberation wars and
other conflicts inter or mostly intra-governments
degenerating in collective violent action.
A good grasp of this environment is
indispensable. On the one hand, we have to
understand the milieu in which the Land
Operational Force is involved and with which it
shall interact whether it wants it or not. On the
other hand, this milieu is inevitably- in a varying
manner according to the circumstances - the
sanctuary, the breeding ground and the rear
base for the actors of these threats
Then, and this is specific to asymmetry, the
adversary of our forces in operations is refusing
the fight in line for which he would be out
ranked regarding technology. He will then try to
act on our vulnerabilities mitigating his shorter
number by the use of surprise: concentration of
efforts remains indeed a war principle even if
asymmetrical. He can act in a strong manner...
when being weak, only where we are weak
ourselves. Surprise is subsequently of capital
importance, an example of related courses of
action being terrorist attack. The assaulter will
always try to take the lead when selecting place
and time whereas, on the opposite, defense
(the author considers that in violence control
forces are placed de facto in a defense position)
due to legal constraints and rules of
engagement cannot engage identical assets.
Finally, and this makes the connection to the
concern considered first, the adversary is not
only relying on the purely military aspect of his
action. He relies a lot on efficiency multipliers
even if he does not use this wording. In this
instance, this involves assistance from the
populations or merely population reaction and
international opinion. It will generally be
expressed through an indirect strategy where
nuisance capability is supported partly on
power levers such as patriotic organizations,
as well as veterans, community, ethnical, youth
ones, women movements etc. They are
themselves at the center of a loose
conglomeration tending frequently to take a
mafia flavor to respond to financing needs.
Asymmetrical
Threat and Ground Intelligence
G
2s and S2s from the Land Forces Command have some know-how regarding intelligence development during
coercion operations. It is based, on the one hand on professional education gained with the associated
methods learned and, on the other hand on training exercises conducted CEPC
1
(AURIGE, GUIBERT). The
foundations required for processing asymmetrical threats during other types of action (stabilization, assistance)
went indeed through a significant reflection. However they are less established and require additional
developments in terms of tools and methods.
After a reflection about the features of the asymmetrical threat, this article will suggest approaches to
investigate being supported by experience already gained by Force HQ 4 during several overseas commitments.
This will then enable to deduce actions to conduct for the benefit of the intelligence function in order to develop
its situation awareness.
BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL DIDIER SIMON EMF 4
2
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The main processes usually operated by these
actors are:
- Surveillance actions consisting in testing locally
the capacity, response time and involvement of
the force committed in the mission as well as the
points of implementation for its security
measures.
- Deception actions consisting in keeping
authorities and forces HQs under pressure in order
to better monopolize or focus and / or divert their
attention to favor the achievement of an objective.
- Actions aiming at discrediting, un-legitimizing the
force in attempting to drive it to a mistake through
a reaction out of proportion or, on the opposite
through a guilty lack of reaction:
- Finally, actions with a detected objective to
develop an overall terror atmosphere. These may
put in place conditions of an overall
communicative paralysis planned for inhibiting
decision-makers (events occurring in Abidjan in
November 2004 against French expatriates)...
Deception actions may be accompanied by
manipulation maneuvers, and through Balkans
theaters experience, multiple sensors and sources
scarcity sometimes led sometimes our forces to be
self-manipulated.
Intelligence tools
Without spending too much time on the evolutions
either in progress or to be conducted under
the heading of collection capabilities, the objective
is now to identify what are the available assets
and methods to take this threat into account.
The first job to be performed by a G2 or S2 in this
respect is the intelligence preparation of the
battlespace. It should be implemented through its
smallest details especially in the survey of the
physical, human (governments, unions, security
forces) environment without neglecting human
geography: ethnical breakdown, geographical
distribution and issues (recurrent or related to an
event), leaders biographies etc.
This analytic approach should not be considered as
a finished product but should be followed by:
An analysis regarding cultural/ethnic-
religious/political/economic aspects, building
the documentary background of a database
3
, an
essential reference tool available from the theater.
To be considered as a reference, it must be a
tool common at all levels (from the Military
Intelligence Directorate to combined arms
Battalion Task Forces - Bn TF) and continuously
updated, easy to use for example working with
key words or events.
If any G2 in operations has currently access to
a documentary heritage, its transfer from a
mandate to the following one is always
generating problems, precisely because of
the lack of support. The objective stated above
remains today a wish, this concept being not
realized nor even its fundamentals analyzed at
national level in respect of both contents and IT
software likely to constitute its pillars.
Experiments were nevertheless carried out
within SFOR and KFOR (NATO employed JOIIS
base). IDELIANCE application deployed in the
Ivory Coast and presented in another part is
similar.
This base is, in particular, used to determine
social structures that prevail in respect of
authority, obedience (governmental, political,
clannish, tribal and religious) in the places
where the force is deployed and this, to issue a
political-cultural story board.
Milieu systems analysis. These analyses are
required to understand human organizations,
a fortiori underground organizations. Related
methods are, to a large extend, experimental
even if some of them are starting to experience
a somehow operational application within
agencies and the judicial system. ANACRYM
is a software enabling relationship analysis.
It is implemented by the gendarmerie to survey
criminal networks in the mainland and
illustrates this principle.
As an example, the sketch below gives a
representation of human groups structured
in cells (according to the meaning given by
the revolutionary war theorists). Theses are
independent with a single focusing point which
is the common goal (ethnic, political, religious
phobia) without linearity or contiguousness
in the example of the war with no front-line:
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Such an organization does not prevent from an
analysis of the links in actions, communications,
symbols etc.:
This analysis may reveal a loose conglomeration
not identified before, the collection of weak
indicators being very important in these threats
analysis.
Occurrences analysis. Adversaries usually go
through a build-up phase that should be detected
as soon as possible; then a sequence of actions to
be precisely analyzed
4
and this not to be anymore
in a position to react but to predict. Besides, as
many as possible indicators should be selected
(posters, graffiti, demonstrations, burning
speeches, partisan and inflammatory press
releases). They should be associated with a
sequencing sketch of foreseeable events (elections,
religious feats etc) that may help in defining actions
occurrences or at least a general trend.
The problem is getting harder with sleeping
theaters such as KOSOVO. Spectacular and
analyzable actions are extremely rare (terrorist
attack on the bridge north of MITROVICA in April
2003 and anti-Serb unrests in March 2004
confirming the well known spring offensive by ex-
UCK and its circumstances). The exercise is
particularly complex when actions phases relate to
irrational and unforeseeable behavior (bombing of
French troops by FANCI
5
aircraft).
Moreover, G2s capability should include
performing events analysis and, what is mainly
expected from him, anticipating attacks or tension
situations. This is depending on his understanding
in depth of the milieu and on his control of its
codes of communications whether they are open
or underground. An expertise in communication
analysis / linguistics with specialists in media
relationships is required. They should be in a
position to decipher subliminal messages as well as
psychological operations led by the adversary that
manipulate media. Such
an expertise is not very
common in the armed
forces, with the
exception of some
reservist staff with the
related civilian
experience.
Finally an expertise
regarding legal and
scientific analysis
cannot be skipped over
(as far as crime
resolving is considered).
This requires support
from gendarmerie to
develop investigation
procedures permitting to analyze, understand and
exploit processes and techniques while assessing
adverse potential vulnerabilities. IED
6
problem as
experienced by land forces in Afghanistan is
therefore a clear example.
In front of the threat presented in the first part of
this article, the points that were just raised
demonstrate a similarity between Mister JOURDAIN
in Molires play who made prose without knowing
it - and subsequently imperfectly- and G2 officer.
G2 officer analyzes the asymmetrical threat still
with a craftsman approach. He has nevertheless
some ideas about methods and tools that would
enable him to professionalize his consideration of
this threat in order to anticipate his action and
deliver the combined arms commander the freedom
of action he needs.
Approaches should now be proposed to develop
processing capabilities of a Land Force G2.
Efforts to be made for intelligence benefit
This article does not intend to develop questions
related to collection. A natural trend however
appears through the matters of interest being
presented (meeting what we call PIRs - Priority
Intelligence Requirements - needed by the
combined arms commander). As confirmed by a
number of lessons learned, intelligence on human
milieu, especially violence authors, actual or
potential, showing off and a fortiori underground
can only be provided by human sensors. This
requires from the Army an important investment
in the HUMINT domain.
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A large scale counter-interference expertise
should be developed and coordinated. This should
be done in spite of difficulties to penetrate a human
milieu generally closed and hostile and also despite
the constraints of legal framework which does not
allow yet an offensive posture of HUMINT assets to
conduct intrusive collection actions.
This collection capacity being reinforced,
processing tools are then needed to enable G2
to accomplish his mission in a professional way.
The first requirement consists in an intelligence
orientated knowledge base. It may be accessible
at least partially to other users according to the
principle of availability of validated intelligence.
This knowledge base should correspond to a stable
model available in operations as well as in the
mainland. It should be interoperable with the base
of validated intelligence from DRM or as a minimum
the data handling systems that FRENIC benefits in
theaters. The availability of such a tool will
represent a considerable progress in G2s efficiency
in stabilization operations. It would be also a
powerful tool for this G2s operational preparation
before deployment. Its rigorous feeding should then
be monitored, this being mainly a matter of
intellectual discipline as mighty devices are far from
being easily accessible.
The second requirement lies with software
assisting in threat analysis or at least methods of
reasoning. The ANACRYM example was considered.
Tools exist and are operated in some agencies,
other ones are still to be developed but work by
hand which remains the common scope should
be replaced.
These two capabilities will be really enhanced when
they are network accessible. This leads to a need
of high capacity connections for joint or tactical
intelligence activities with a reach-back remote
support capacity (maybe out of theater) from top
experts by domain and intelligence analysts to reach
other perspectives (intelligence of neighboring
countries, analysts in political economics).
These capacities being available, adversarys cells
can then be identified and isolated by separating
them from the considered group of population. We
may then try to divert their attention to place them
at minimum is a defensive position and finally
establish their vulnerabilities (tensions, rivalries
etc), as intelligence job to permit operational
engagement.
This kind of actions can be contemplated only on
the long termwhich requires an institutional
memory to be built up and the intelligence
function to be stabilized. It is then a requirement for
the actors to be involved in the long run. As far as
the intelligence function is concerned, all overseas
assignments should last 6 months or one year in
order to draw as much as possible from the
acquired experience and understanding.
Finally in an upstream position from these know-
how, lie their definition and the conduct of related
training actions. Without falling in the hyper-
specialization stated in some documents, there is a
risk for S2s and G2s to make the war fog more
hazy. A reinforced training at CEERAT10 is to be
whished for a good taking into consideration of
these threats.
1 Brigade and above CP Battle Command Training Center
(subordinated to CPF).
2 EMF 4 - Etat-major de force N4 - Force HQ 4.
3 Ideally a knowledge base but we should start from what
is allowed by the state-of-the-art and our initial awareness.
4 A spreadsheet can already store a number of processed
information as well as space-time or actions related.
5 FANCI: The Ivory Coast National Armed Forces.
6 IED: Improvised Explosives Devices.
7 CEERAT (FR) - Army Intelligence Research &Training
Center.
The Army has been exposed already for several years to asymmetrical threats on theaters where it is deployed even if it was
lucky enough not to experience confrontations as violent as these experienced by our allies in Iraq. A significant effort was
performed by G2s to take these threats into account, to develop their analysis as much for our forces safeguarding than to
permit their neutralization.
The moment has now come mainly at the light of the violence bursting out on some theaters and likely to spread out, to
professionalize our processing methods. Somehow, we should respond in an asymmetrical way to an asymmetry. This should
be done not by adopting the adversarys methods or techniques but by making ours its culture, its mental methods in order to
think like it but also quicker than it. Our analysis methods should also make progress.
This challenge is achievable by the Army and the Force HQs can bring their expertise to people in charge of such challenge.
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Digitization and traffic jam
The first Iraq After Action Reviews (AAR) illustrated
the fact that our US allies, who had deployed
digitized brigades equipped with a reputedly
efficient intelligence dedicated CIS (ASAS), were
left almost asphyxiated by an overflow of
electronic information during the early phases of
the offensive. Their capability to provide on time
intelligence useful for the engagement was thus
reduced.
French Army has not reached
that point yet: the battlefield
digitization is slowly being
implemented even within
specialized intelligence collection
units. In addition our collecting
capabilities are considerably less
important than the American
ones
3
; and last the operational
tempo is very different in Iraq from
what it can be on a stabilized
theater of operations such as
Former Yugoslavia.
However many SFOR, KFOR,...
staff officers complain for having
to analyze every day 30 to 60
pages in English coming out of
CRONOS or any other CIS; they
used to add that very often, most
of those pieces of information do not bring any
thing to the operation but they still have to be
analyzed since, among them, there might be one to
be actually processed. This is getting worst when
the level of operational activities reaches a peak
due to the multiplicity of the activated sensors and
to the number of incoming urgent reports.
This is a very understandable phenomenon due to
how easy it is to generate electronic information
that can then be disseminated instantly through
The All sources Analysis Cell:
An improved Way to Process Information
W
hen participating in an overseas operation or when reading end-of-mission Intelligence reports,
one has often the feeling that G2s are drowned into too much information, especially electronic
one. This overinformation is not a military specialty, but it is within the military world that it may be at
the origin of terrible consequences due to the rapidity of the decision-making cycle and to the fact
that lives are at risk during any operation.
This article will first analyze the problem from both technical and behavioral points of view and then it
will present a solution based upon the all sources analysis cell reflecting what several of our allies
currently do
1
, a concept that could require to be adapted to our forces specificities in order to get ready
for any heavy engagement that would challenge our intelligence organization.
BY CAPTAIN (TA) STPHANE DOSSE (CDEF)
2
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SICF
4
, CRONOS or any other system. This is even
truer when dealing with open sources information
that takes every day a larger place among the
sources exploited by Intelligence organizations.
Informational tornado warning
Can the flow be mastered thanks to
the technological miracles / mirages? Surely not,
at least not if specific measures are not undertaken.
Should digitization continue as envisaged,
the multiplication of CIS powerful and most of all
interoperable - thanks to SICAT
5
and its post 2010
successors - should bring in flows of data
provided by specialized sensors. Lets have a
look for instance at SIGINT: modern interception
capabilities, in particular satellites allow to
collect, within a single intercepted package,
a whole bunch of data that do not relate to
the military, that must however be sorted and, if
possible, brought back up to the G2 in due time.
IMINT, be it from satellite, UAV or ground sensors
videos, will have to be digitized, not to talk about
excerpts from civilian TV programs. All this will have
to be rapidly forwarded to the G2, and possibly be
projected on the chiefs screen in due time to
support his decision making process... especially
if he does not want to be late compared to his
political authority who, during a crisis, has always
CNN available in the office.
HUMINT sensors, though MAESTRO (and
successors), will have the possibility to provide
the G2 database with specific information on what
they see or hear, conversations that they will have
collected etc., then it will be the turn of all the units,
in particular for what regards monitoring information
and combat intelligence that will be reported up the
chain using SIR
6
. It is not something that will happen
immediately since the rate of Battlespace digitization
implementation is rather slow, but it will happen.
Even at brigade level, S2 will not be able to live any
more with an only approximate knowledge of the
enemy as it did formerly and it might potentially be
drowned under a multitude of data coming from each
basic soldier who will able to give accurate battlefield
information, such as the coordinates and attitude
of a single enemy tank.
Of course, this is not a new issue and it has already
been taken into account, in particular when the
responsibilities related to data processing have
been defined, resulting in the possibility to filter
flows of information by level: Bn S2 basic
specialized sensor, unit HQ, Intel assets
implementation center, G2.
Studies are being conducted to develop software
capable of supporting data fusion and intelligence
analysis processes. Several products, with diverse
degrees of performance, can be found off the
shelf and, both the Army and DRM
7
are developing
their own requirements. They both carried out
actual experiments: for the Army, the IDELIANCE
project (described in another article), and for the
DRM, a comparable application evaluated on the
same theater. There is no assessment yet about
what can be expected out of these experiments.
Moreover, the budgetary evolution of the SORA
8
program, which regroups all corresponding studies,
might be a bad omen: there might be some times
before technical support is developed and fielded.
There is a real threat, in the short term, for G2
analysis capabilities to be drowned under a
flooding of military intelligence. This problem is
not specific to the military: our society wants to be
a communication society, and thus every one of us
is drowned under publications of all kinds, among
which he must look for the one detail which he
actually needs. Rather than looking for the needle
in the haystack, it could, on the contrary, be a
matter of producing a synthesis, one could even
talk about a distillation, i.e. to look for a synthetic
information that can only be produced by analyzing
a mass of data, layer by layer, through a series of
sieves of understanding.
Moreover, the problem that G2 is and will be
confronted to, is not only a problem related to
quantity, but also to the complexity of the
information to be analyzed, in particular during
the stabilization phase of an operation: it is
necessary to understand the variety of this
information, which requires an increased
knowledge of the environment where it comes from.
This problem may result into a wrong assessment
of the situation or an additional workload for
the intelligence divisions of the deployed HQs
which cannot process correctly and in due time
the received informations.
A first organizational solution
The idea that comes first to solve that problem is
to increase the deployed G2/S2, this solution is
already partially implemented: the current or
recent operations G2s comprise much more
manpower than what is listed in the regular PEs.
This is a possibility, but it reaches its limits because
of, on the one hand, a lack of resource, and on
the other hand because of the difficulty to organize
the structure in operation. Moreover, it is not sure
that all commanders would appreciate or
understand the need for an oversized G2 in
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comparison with the other staff cells: what seems
to be normal for the Americans may not be the
same for us.
That also raises a fundamental problem: a staff is
supposed to conceive, which means that by nature
it must remain small. If the operation center (OC)
becomes too big, one should wonder about its
concept; it could mean that some of the capabilities
that were incorporated into the OC, although they
do not constitute traditional combat units, should
rather be regarded as being combat support
capabilities to the OC, even if their mission does
not imply the use of guns or AT mines. In the civilian
sector, one could even mention them as services
or services enterprises.
This is not an entirely new concept for the French
Army. As an example, it is obvious that each
Tactical Operational Center (TOC) needs support
and protection: however nobody would say that
the security details guarding the entrance to
the position belongs to the TOC but rather to
the HQ Support battalion. InfoOps and CIMIC
groups, when deployed can be regarded similarly
with the exception of the concept development
cells which although they belong to those groups,
will be integrated within the TOC.
It should be the same for G2: it can be said that
even if it requires significant data processing and
intelligence production capabilities, this might
not be a requirement to be met within G2 itself
but rather alongside G2; G2 keeping for itself
the most elaborate processing related tasks
(not to talk about direction and collection, which
are not dealt with in this article).
Concretely, one can thus imagine to set up, at G2
level, an all sources analysis cell in charge
of carrying out a first level of information
processing for all pieces of information sent to
G2, and in order to feed the G2 intelligence
database. This cell would thus enable G2
production cell staff officers to focus on drafting
responses to intelligence requirements/RFIs.
This idea is not original, it has already been
implemented by several of our allies through
the ASAC (All Sources Analysis Cell) concept, that
can be observed on the theaters where we are
deployed jointly with them. The ASAC precise role
depends on the different nations but, in any case,
it represents a significant capability: from platoon
to company size for any autonomous
division/brigade, depending on nations and
theaters. The manpower comes from either a pool
of analysts located at regional HQ level (experts
coming from the top) or from units regrouping
analysts who, when not deployed, are assigned to
Military Intelligence Battalions (experts coming
from the collection function, i.e. from the bottom).
In addition, the creation of that cell is consistent
with the ISTAR concept that France has approved at
Army and joint levels, and whose implementation
might be interesting to study: it constitutes a center
of expertise where are collected information coming
from all sources, from specialized sensors or
surveillance information, in order to provide a
capability to quickly develop a synthesis of that
information and its operational processing. This
concept is based on a principle of economy by
forwarding to each processing level only what is
necessary, in order to avoid overinformation.
Lastly, it favors the valorization of acquired
expertise and know-how by avoiding redundancy
of effort, i.e. avoiding that everyone would have
to do everything.
This cell should however not be confused with an
Intel assets implementation center or with a
Multi-sensor intelligence battalion HQ which might
be assigned to the brigade or to the division.
In fact this is not a collection capability but rather
a capability of analyzing the data collected by
the collection function, which is very different.
There is thus no duplication of any existing
structure.
Lastly, by making clear the differences of the tasks
through a separation of the organizations, this
structure contributes to clarify the different
specialties; then this makes it possible to define
different types of trainings, or specialized software
applications. This concept implementation,
consisting in differentiating the tasks because of
their growing complexity, has already started, with
the evaluation of IDELIANCE software by the CERT
9
(Ground Intelligence Processing Center). The
proposed structure offers many possibilities for that
concept to be developed.
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Like any idea, it would certainly have to be studied
before making it a fully operational concept, and
then deduce of it practical organizations and
procedures. The first problem to solve is, for
instance, the one of the force pool into which
should be picked up the forces to compose that
structure - which has been described above as
being deployable - without having it permanent
stood up in peace time. Are we talking about
undeployed G2s, the Intelligence Brigades
elements, or other units or organizations?
This article will not deal with this aspect of the
problem, which could be one of most sensitive. In
the current state of PE/CE studies, in particular the
Intel one, it is possible to say that if the overall
manpower quantity doesnt change, most of the
researched qualified resource could be found in the
Intelligence Brigade, without making any decision
at this stage on the permanent structures of
operational preparation which it would be
necessary to define or organize. A significant part of
the Intelligence Brigade personnel is, in any event,
already employed, within their battalions and within
the framework of their professional specialties, to
accomplish tasks related to information analysis
and processing. In the case of the GEI
10
, for
example, that concept resulted in the definition of a
deployable structure, listed in the INS 10 00011.
Should manpower volume was allowed to increase,
everything would then become possible...
1 The All Sources Analysis Cell is also a NATO concept.
2 Forces Employment Doctrine Center /Forces Employment
and Command Structures Division.
3 As an example, it is to be noted that the considerable
amount of aerial videos had an important role in US
Intelligence systems saturation.
4 French Current CIS.
5 Army Future CIS.
6 Battalion Level Information System.
7 Military Intelligence Directorate.
8 Airland Intelligence Optimization System.
9 CERT - Centre dexploitation du renseignement terrestre.
10 IMINT processing group being part of the 61 Arty Bn.
11 French general CE.
12 i.e. not taking into account detachment of personnel
outside the Forces.
Vis--vis the inevitable growth, permitted by the Battle space digitization, of the flow of information arriving at major
units HQs, measures are to be taken to avoid G2 saturation. The general concept chosen by the Army is to conduct at
each level a selection of what deserves to be transmitted to the higher level.
It must be supplemented by an effort of rationalization of the jobs and organizations, but it doesnt seem to be possible
avoiding an overall increase of the number of personnel dedicated to intelligence processing. One of the possible
measures that could be taken for this purpose would be to better separate the analysis function from the intelligence
production one, by creating, at major units G2 level, an all sources analysis cell. This structure would contribute to
professionalizing the analysis tasks and would accompany the fielding of advanced software tools.
This evolution is only possible if the Land Intelligence manpower structure
12
is reorganized. It currently looks like a
pyramid with a strong basis in charge of the collection (the Intelligence Brigade), and a small summit in charge of the
analysis (G2s).
This is the opposite of the modern intelligence services where the manpower pyramid is inverted: most people work
in capital cities (processing/production). That situation is not new and proved to be efficient during large operations:
the Wermacht enciphering tool, ENIGMA, was deciphered by the Allies thanks to the capture of several of these tools -
a collection activity that kept occasionally busy a few men - but most of all thanks to the 3,000 specialists who worked
24 hours a day during 4 years at deciphering it; in addition technology was used to support that effort since the first
computer in history has been designed to that purpose.
Without wanting to copy them because the operational need is different, a rebalancing between the two intelligence
sub-functions is undoubtedly a condition necessary to be able to apply the proposed evolution.
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Doctrine and Command in the British Army:
an Historical Overview
O
nly since 1989 has the British Army adopted a formal and unifying doctrine. Traditionally it made a
cult of pragmatism and flexibility in the way it did its business. Doctrine, broadly defined, had long
existed but tended to be semi-formal at best; often centred on an individual commander or based on a
specific set of not easily transferable circumstances and sometimes more honoured in the breach than
the observance. The reinvention of the British Army as a doctrinally based organization is as profound
a revolution as any in its 350-year history.
NATO defines doctrine as fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support
of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application. British Defence Doctrine states
that its principal purpose is to provide... a framework of guidance for the conduct of operations. There
are two obvious implications here. First, doctrine is not intended as a substitute for thought. Second, a
flawed doctrine can be worse than having no doctrine at all.
This essay will employ J. F. C. Fullers 1923 definition of doctrine as the central idea of an army. This is
simple and brief yet broad enough to encompass the wide varieties of doctrine that have influenced the
Army over the last century. Fuller added that [it] must be based on the principles of war, and... elastic
enough to admit of mutation in accordance with change in circumstance. ...doctrine is nothing else than
common sense - that is, action adapted to circumstances. However, to become a true central idea
doctrine must establish a framework of understanding that informs the decision-making process. At the
higher levels it should permeate the thinking of commanders and, through training, subordinates should
be able to anticipate their thoughts.
Before we look at how the British Army finally developed such a doctrine, both for counter-insurgency
(COIN) and warfighting, and how this has impacted upon command, two fundamental background points
need to be understood. The first concerns the dissemination of ideas. Doctrine can be disseminated in
many ways, both formal and informal. For most of its existence, the British Army has relied primarily on
informal ones, in particular passing on experience at regimental level. This was a consequence of the
Armys historic structure, as a loose federation of individual regiments and corps, a factor in inhibiting
the imposition of ideas from on high.
Secondly, lack of doctrine was also a manifestation of the political context within which the Army has
operated - generally one of benign - or sometimes not so benign - neglect. For example, the government
only made a formal decision to send an expeditionary force to the Continent in early 1939, which left little
time to prepare the Army for its new role. Indeed, in the absence of political-strategic direction, the
Army had simply got on with what it is good at: fighting small wars, which gave full rein to flexibility and
pragmatism.
BY LTC JW ROLLINS, UK LIAISON OFFICER TO CDEF
AUTHOR OF THIS SHORTENED VERSION OF DR GARY SHEFFIELDS ARTICLE REWRITTEN FOR DOCTRINE
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Colonial Warfare to Counter-Insurgency
to Peace Support Operations
British COIN practice demonstrates much of
the above. During the last two centuries
the British Army acquired a vast amount of
experience in small wars. There was no
attempt to produce a formal doctrine in
the modern sense for such wars, something
contrary to the ethos of the Army at that time.
However, a body of unofficial but influential
writings was produced which, along with
teaching at military colleges and the passing
on of experience, did create something of a
central idea. This comprised a number of
basic principles that were generally recognized
as effective and which were usually adhered
to: the use of minimum force; the use of local
resources; intelligence gathering; and
the recognition that unrest was usually rooted
in a political grievance, with all that implied.
Underpinning this was a pragmatic approach
to problem solving, to which flexibility was
the key. This certainly did not offer a rigid
template, and principles were often breached,
most famously at Amritsar in India (1919)
when 380 demonstrators were killed.
The experience of colonial campaigning was
codified by Callwells Small Wars: Their
Principles and Practice in 1896 and similar
works. Tactical instructions were produced,
for it became standard practice for the Army
to be called in by the civil authorities only if
the police could not handle the situation.
Commanders usually remained subordinate
to civil authorities and the use of minimum
force emerged as an ideal. Such texts were
widely used at the Staff College. However, how
many actually internalized them is debatable.
Probably more important was dissemination
of knowledge at regimental level and
commanders personal experience.
After 1945 the Army continued to pass on best
practice informally, backed by official tactical
manuals and some unofficial but influential
writings. The colonial experience proved a firm
basis on which to base COIN in the post-1945
era, with tried and tested methods being added
to an enhanced political understanding; and out
of formative experiences in Palestine, Malaya
and other campaigns, emerged a distinctive
pattern of counter-insurgency that when
adapted to fit specific conditions, proved
successful in maintaining at least a measure
of political stability, even under the pressure
of strident nationalism or communist
revolutionary warfare.
The adaptation of this semi-formal doctrine
was not always successful. The expedient of
uniting civil and military authority in one
individual in Malaya in 1952 was less successful
in Cyprus. Moreover, principles were not always
consistently applied. Nevertheless, certain
threads running through British COIN
campaigns can be identified, including
the primacy of civil control, coordination of civil
and military activity, emphasis on intelligence,
separation of the insurgent from the mass of
the people, the battle to win hearts and minds,
appropriate and proportionate military
response and political reform. But many saw
this very British, pragmatic and ad hoc
approach of adapting general principles to
specific situations as plain common sense,
thereby perhaps negating the need to preserve
and transmit experience systematically.
Even in the 1970s British writings on COIN did
not enjoy official status, but were
nonetheless influential. They included the
works of Sir Robert Thompson whose five
principles stressed political responses,
reflecting his experience in Malaya. General Sir
Frank Kitson, who had wide COIN experience,
was particularly prolific. He placed especial
emphasis on intelligence. They, and others,
influenced the first formal British COIN doctrine,
which appeared in the 1990s.
In 1994, a controversial doctrinal work, Wider
Peacekeeping (WPK), was published against
the background of the British deployment to
Bosnia. WPK stressed impartiality and consent
as absolutes. Commanders felt that the Armys
extant experience was more than adequate
preparation for dealing with this latest
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Other contributions to doctrinal thought Other contributions to doctrinal thought
complex emergency. Critics of WPK saw it as
overly timid and risk averse. This reflected
wider unhappiness with what some perceived
as the Armys excessively passive role in
Bosnia. Some saw WPK as a political
document that justified the Armys actions in
Bosnia. It was replaced by Joint Warfare
Publication 3-50 in 1997, a doctrine for peace
enforcement that envisaged the Army being
used in a much more robust fashion than in
the early stages of the intervention in Bosnia.
The WPK saga indicated that the British Armys
tradition of empiricism and flexibility continued
to be important into the post-1989 doctrinal
era. It also showed how a specific piece of
doctrine could be controversial - something
largely avoided during the pre-doctrine era.
Most important, it showed that the semi-formal
British COIN doctrine proved a firm basis for
the construction of doctrine for Peace Support
Operations that continues to be borne out by
subsequent experience. In recent operations
British troops have employed the traditional
approach of flexibility and pragmatism, but now
it is buttressed by doctrine which provides a
framework for thought and decision-making.
The First World War
The British Army of the First World War has
been portrayed as inflexible, conservative,
addicted to the offensive, exalting morale over
technology, and relying on sheer mass. It has
also been criticized for its lack of a coherent
doctrine, and compared unfavourably with
the innovative, doctrinally-based Germans.
The truth is rather different. Overcoming huge
problems, between 1914 and 1918 the British
Army transformed itself from a colonial
gendarmerie into a continental-sized army.
In 1918 this Army won the greatest series of
military victories in British history. To do so,
it had to expand the small Regular Army into a
vast citizen force. To provide commanders and
staffs for such a force meant rapid promotion
and training to handle greatly expanded
responsibilities, and to do so while in contact
with the enemy. The wonder is not that costly
mistakes occurred, but rather that the Army
became so proficient.
The Army fought the First World War without a
formal doctrine in the modern sense. It did,
however, have Field Service Regulations (FSR).
Rather than being prescriptive, FSR set out
broad principles for action. Under the direction
of General Sir Douglas Haig, FSR 1909 included
the lessons he had learned as a Staff College
student that battles fell into four stages:
the advance to contact; the establishment of
the firing line, in which fire superiority would
be achieved; the assault; and the pursuit. Haig
regarded these principles as timeless, being
adjustable to the scale of the engagement.
Commanders saw trench warfare as an
aberration from the norm. Seen in the longer
perspective, they were right; mobile or semi-
mobile warfare had again become the norm
by the spring of 1918. Because the principles
were so broad, they permitted the exercise
of the pragmatism, flexibility, empiricism and
innovation that the pre-war Regular Army
cherished.
Some have shied away from describing FSR as
a doctrine. Certainly, the principles it contained
were broader than the semi-formal doctrine for
COIN, although FSR was more formal and
official. It can nonetheless be described as
the central idea of an army. There was much
emphasis on moral factors such as courage and
offensive spirit, and on training to this effect,
echoing thought in other European armies.
If morale was the first plank of this doctrine,
underpinning warfighting on the Western Front,
manoeuvre and firepower were the other two,
reflected in the development of the tank,
aircraft, infantry tactics and artillery techniques.
By painful trial and error, between 1915 and
1918 the British Army evolved a coherent
method of warfighting. This involved
the adoption of technology, the codification of
tactics, and the establishment of an Army-wide
training organization. By late 1917 a distinct
style of warfighting had emerged, based
around the all-arms weapons system, artillery
heavy bite and hold operations, and the use
of technology as a substitute for numbers.
Weaknesses were still displayed (for example
rigidity in command systems) and mistakes
made. However, these methods were pivotal
to the Hundred Days of victories, August-
November 1918.
Between the Two World Wars
The huge, effective Army of 1918 was rapidly
demobilized, leaving a small regular one that
was committed to a myriad of small wars and
police actions. This denied breathing space for
proper analysis of recent experience. Moreover,
rather like today, there was no obvious
conventional enemy on the horizon, so it is
not surprising if the focus was primarily on
immediate COIN campaigns. Furthermore, not
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only did politicians show little inclination
to think about the role of the Army in a future
major war but financial constraints also
hampered the introduction of new equipment,
and even training - impacting on
the preparedness of the Army in 1940.
Nonetheless, in the interwar years senior
soldiers did address the lessons of the First
World War, reformed the Army and, to a far
greater extent than before 1914, recognised
the importance of doctrine. The 1920 edition
of FSR Vol. II (Operations) stated this bluntly
in the first paragraph: The Army will be trained
in peace and led in war in accordance with
the doctrine contained in this volume.
Principles should be so impressed on every
commander that, whenever he has to come to
a decision in the field, he will instinctively give
them their full weight.
The lessons of the Great War and
the importance given to high morale, surprise,
and superior firepower, as stressed in the FSR
of 1935, were further manifested in
mechanisation and investment in tanks. Indeed,
the Field Force sent to France in 1939 was
the most highly mechanized army in the world.
However, all these good intentions did not
deliver a doctrinally based army n the modern
sense. There were three reasons for this. First,
FSR still remained closer to the pre-1914 semi-
formal style of doctrine than the modern, more
prescriptive variety. Second, other factors -
the regimental system; a lack of inter-arm
cooperation; the dispersion of the Army across
the globe; anti-intellectualism; adherence to
the empirical tradition - prevented FSR being
thoroughly internalized, and truly becoming
the central idea of the British Army. Third -
though there were some notable exceptions-
rigidity of command and extant culture militated
against developing independent thought,
and there was a tendency to see operations
in the terms of 1918-like set-piece advances.
In short, there was still a lack of preparedness
for the type of fast moving battle encountered
in 1940.
A further strand of thinking was reinforced
by the writings of Fuller and Liddell Hart.
They - and others - assumed that in future
the great artillery bombardments of 1916-17,
that had sacrificed surprise and restricted
movement, would be unnecessary.
In the 1930s artillery command systems were
decentralised, resulting, especially in the desert
campaigns of 1941 and early 1942, in an
inability to concentrate artillery fire at
the decisive point. Under Haig, artillery had
been the Armys most advanced arm, a battle-
winner. Under Montgomery, it was to become
so again. In the meantime, there was a
dangerous gap. Moreover, the battlefield role
of airpower was neglected in the interwar
years in favour of strategic bombing.
The Army was to pay the price.
The Second World War
OConnors defeat of the Italian Tenth Army
in 1940-1, demonstrated the basic soundness
of the Armys pre-war doctrine. His surprise,
all-arms attack, followed by a dash across the
desert to outflank the Italians and cut their
retreat, was based on common sense rather
than the theories of the armour radicals.
However, captured in early 1941, things were
rather different after him.
Willingness to experiment radically with armour
rather than building on the sound foundations
of FSR 1935 was a self-inflicted wound. In 1941,
it appeared that Blitzkrieg had transformed
warfare; and that the future lay with the tank.
The terrain in the Western Desert encouraged
a false analogy with war at sea. Here the classic
principles of war no longer seemed relevant.
The tank had seemingly created new ones. New
tactics were improvised accordingly, fatally
neglecting the coordination of all arms.
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Armoured units were prone to fight independent
battles and the propensity of some units for
the frontal charge was exploited by the
Germans who lured tanks onto their anti-tank
guns. Frequent changes of commander and
units within Eighth Army did not make the
establishing of a sensible coherent doctrine
any easier.
British dispersal of artillery was a symptom of a
wider malaise. High commanders of the Second
World War had been junior officers in the First
and anything hinting of attrition was anathema
to them. Liddell Harts indirect approach
offered a seductive alternative. It replaced
the principle of concentration of force in favour
of dispersion, with the inherent danger of
overextension. Moreover, some efforts to create
all arms groups at brigade level were
neutralised by an institutionalized dispersion
of effort. After surprising Rommel during
Operation CRUSADER in November 1941,
the decision to dispatch the three brigades of
7
th
Armoured Division to divergent objectives
contrasts strongly with Soviet and German
practice of concentrating armour.
The arrival of Montgomery to command Eighth
Army in August 1942 brought about a return,
doctrinally speaking, to 1918, as codified and
modified in FSR 1935. The division again
became the basic tactical unit. Artillery was
centralized, and massive bombardments proved
highly effective. All-arms cooperation took pride
of place and formations were made less tank-
heavy. Montgomerys hallmark became
the tightly controlled, centralized, attritional
battle, neatly encapsulated in the phrase
the tidy battlefield. His style was based on
heavy firepower and methodical advances and
he ensured logistic preparations were complete
before an attack. He was concerned to keep
casualties as low as possible, thus conserving
the morale of his armies.
Montgomery was a highly skilled commander
with a thorough understanding of what would
now be called operational art. Yet his cautious
approach is controversial. His crossings of
the Straits of Messina in September 1943
and the Rhine in March 1945 have been
particularly criticised, but his wariness is
explicable in terms of his realistic appraisal
of what his army could achieve. It is instructive
that his more imaginative Operation MARKET
GARDEN in September 1944 went badly wrong.
He returned to type in subsequent operations,
and to his winning ways. The Monty method
suited the British Army. It was a conscript force
that was badly overstretched and unable to
sustain heavy casualties. Montgomery delivered
victory at an acceptable cost in casualties.
Montgomery promulgated a sound warfighting
doctrine. However, effective application
depended on his presence. The record of his
protgs was poor and his successors in Italy
seemed to lose sight of the importance of
massive force. Attacks were often too weak
to achieve success. In the first three battles
of Casino the Allies fought a series of poorly
co-ordinated actions at corps level. Only in
the fourth battle did Allied forces fight as a
cohesive whole.
Tactical doctrine also proved surprisingly
difficult to get right. Unlike in the First World
War, there was no single major theatre in which
the Army was engaged from beginning to end.
Hard-won lessons from one theatre did not
necessarily transfer well to another. In part this
was because some tactics were theatre-specific,
but there was also institutional jealousy.
In Normandy, troops had to relearn some
of the lessons painfully acquired in
the Mediterranean. There were similar problems
with joint doctrine. Following the 1940
campaign, there was a fierce battle between
the Army and RAF over the control of aircraft.
By the end of the desert campaigns air-land
co-operation was very good indeed. But it
proved difficult to transfer to Normandy -
a process exacerbated by personality clashes
between Montgomery and some senior airmen.
In Burma Bill Slims approach was markedly
different from Montgomerys. In the Meiktilla
campaign of 1945, he matched strength against
weakness, achieving momentum and tempo.
He never lost sight of his core aim of defeating
the enemy rather than taking ground for its
own sake and remained bent upon persuading
his enemy that the battle was lost rather
than proving it to him through the physical
destruction of his army. He often used
deception and surprise to do this. Yet, where
the physical destruction of the enemy was
necessary, he did not shy away from attritional
fighting. Slim recognized the importance of
mission command, though he would not have
recognized the term. He quoted advice given
to him as a young officer by a grizzled sergeant
major: Theres only one principle of war
and thats this. Hit the other fellow, as quick
as you can, and as hard as you can, where
it hurts him most, when he aint lookin!
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Slims methods were essentially manoeuvrist,
but he took great risks with logistics. Indeed,
his methods may not have translated well to
Normandy. Moreover, his practice of mission
command did not always match the ideal he
preached; sometimes his control of Fourteenth
Armys corps and divisional commanders bore
a resemblance to Montgomerys methods in
Europe. The two men shared other traits. Both
created a coherent warfighting doctrine and
imposed it on their commands. Both nurtured
a group of protgs. Above all, both were
successful.
The Army and Doctrine since 1945
By 1945, there were, therefore, two warfighting
cultures in the British Army; the Monty-
inspired one emphasizing attrition and the tidy
battlefield and Slims more manoeuvrist
approach. Largely through the career success
of Montys protgs, his method prevailed until
the 1980s.
After 1945 the bulk of the Army found itself
defending the North German Plain from Soviet
attack. Hemmed in by geographical constraints
and by the politically imposed strategy of
forward defence, the British Army of the Rhine
(BAOR) adopted an approach based on
positional defence and firepower to wear down
attacking enemy forces. One problem was the
view that, ultimately, conventional forces were a
nuclear trip-wire. As the 1952 pamphlet The
Armoured Division in Battle showed, the Army
had not entirely abandoned manoeuvre, but
the parallel pamphlet on infantry reflected
the tidy battlefield. Overall the Army viewed
the defence of Germany in terms of a series
of small tactical-level engagements and failed
to develop a coherent corps plan or operational
concept. Montgomerys legacy had become
debased.
Thinking changed in the 1970s. The
introduction of NATOs Flexible Response
strategy in 1967, enhancing the importance of
conventional defence, triggered a reassessment
of BAORs methods. Positional defence and
firepower remained, but greater flexibility was
built in. Plans for a phased withdrawal
envisaged drawing Soviet forces into killing
zones. If the unthinkable had occurred, several
painful facts would probably have rendered this
approach ineffective. First, Soviet forces were
too strong. Second, 1 (BR) Corps aimed to fight
not as a corps, but in a series of holding
actions, thus surrendering the initiative to
the enemy. Third, there was little cooperation
with other NATO corps, and certainly no idea
of fighting as a coherent Army Group.
This unsatisfactory state of affairs was to lead
to a doctrinal revolution in the British Army.
This was affected by external influences,
including the US Armys post-Vietnam doctrinal
debate that was informed by intensive study
of Soviet forces. One result was the acceptance
of the concept of an operational level of war.
Another was the recognition that the US
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experience of air mobility in Vietnam had
important lessons for the Central Front.
The concepts of Follow on Forces Attack (FOFA)
and Air land Battle were introduced by the
British through NATO.
The doctrinal ferment in the US was paralleled
by a lower key debate in the British Army. Key
manoeuvrist texts such as William Linds
Maneuver Warfare and Richard Simpkins Race
to the Swift were widely read, and at Sandhurst
officers were introduced to historical examples,
especially those drawn from the German and
Soviet campaigns of the Second World War,
and the Arab-Israeli Wars. Finally, the political
climate of the early 1980s made a strategy
based on the battlefield use of nuclear weapons
increasingly unacceptable.
All this coincided with the advent of a handful
of British senior officers who were determined
to place BAOR onto a sounder footing. Field
Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall rates as one of the
most significant reformers in the history of the
British Army. As commander of 1(BR) Corps in
1981, he began the process by which the British
Army embraced the Manoeuvrist Approach and
Mission Command. Moreover, he introduced
the idea of the corps-level counterstroke. This
involved fighting the corps as a corps, offering
a better chance of defeating the enemy rather
than delaying him. At NORTHAG from 1983-85,
Bagnall carried on his work of reform, and as
CGS from 1985 to 1988, he commissioned
Design for Military Operations (1989), often,
if misleadingly, described as the British Armys
first ever formal doctrine.
Bagnalls successor at 1 (BR) Corps and
NORTHAG, General Sir Martin Farndale,
extended the corps counterstroke concept, and
by the late 1980s the Manoeuvrist Approach,
Mission Command and the operational level
of warfare were firmly embedded. Ironically,
the British Army reached a peak of intellectual
and doctrinal readiness at the very moment
when the Soviet threat disappeared. Belatedly,
the legacy of Slim supplanted that of
Montgomery.
The publication of Design for Military
Operations was only half the story.
From the 1990s onwards doctrine was
internalized by Army officers. One reason was
that it was promptly validated dramatically in
the First Gulf War. Another was Bagnalls
influence in forcing through a complete change
of attitude and practice, not least at the Staff
College. Other factors included: the move to an
overwhelmingly graduate officer corps;
the shake up occasioned by the end of the Cold
War; the establishment in 1988 by Bagnall
of a Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC)
for top colonels and brigadiers, focused at
the operational level. While some say there is
now too much doctrine; it is rare to hear anyone
argue that there should not be any at all.
The period since 1989 has seen further
dramatic changes. The ending of the bipolar
world of the Cold War has seen a return to
expeditionary warfare, with the Army being
almost constantly on operations. Digitization
is likely to have a profound impact on future
warfare. Moreover, the doctrinal revolution has
been accompanied by a revolution in jointery.
The creation of a Permanent Joint Headquarters,
the emergence of properly structured Joint Task
Forces, the Joint Services Command and Staff
College, the development of the HCSC into a
joint course, and the setting up of organizations
such as the Joint Helicopter Command are
testimony to the radical changes afoot. So is
the development of joint doctrine. The RAF
and RN followed the Army in producing single
service doctrine in 1991 and 1995 respectively,
while in 1997 the first edition of British Defence
Doctrine appeared. The Joint Doctrine and
Concepts Centre opened in 1998. For all that,
change in British Army doctrine since 1989 has
been evolutionary rather than revolutionary.
Perhaps this reflects a belief that, like the FSR
of earlier days, the original doctrine was
fundamentally sound, and has proved capable
of being adapted to a range of circumstances.
The British Style of Command
The historically non-doctrinal, pragmatic
nature of the British Army has been reflected
in the British style of command. The Duke of
Wellington once said of French commanders
during the Peninsular War (1808-1814): They
planned their campaigns just as you might
make a splendid piece of harness. It looks very
well; and answers very well; until it gets
broken; and then you are done for. Now I made
my campaigns of ropes. If anything went wrong,
I tied a knot; and went on. British generals
down the ages have had to display similar
pragmatism and improvisation in their
campaigns. This style of command has been
influenced by a number of factors.
The first is a lack of resources. Generally, and
certainly at the beginning of most conflicts,
the Army has had to operate without the full
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wherewithal. This was true in the two world
wars. Post-1945 campaigns, such as Korea,
Suez and the two Gulf Wars saw the cobbling
together of forces amid much improvisation.
On only one occasion, in 1918, has the British
Army had the luxury of unlimited resources.
Even in 1944-45 there were severe limitations
on manpower. The second factor is the small
wars tradition, such conflicts being the focus
of the Army for most of its existence. These
campaigns tended to be fought on a shoestring.
With the exception of the Second World War,
the formative influences of British commanders
have tended to be in small wars. Positive effects
include the flexibility and rope-tying skills
acquired - excellent training for high command.
On the down side, such conflicts often involve
troops scattered over a wide area, inhibiting
formation training and the preparation of
expeditionary forces for other tasks.
To step up from command in even a big small
war such as the Second Boer War (1899-1902)
to a major conflict against a first class enemy is
to ask much of a general. Sir John French failed
in Europe in 1915. Allenby, a relative failure on
the Western Front, thrived in Palestine in 1917-
18 - but this was more of a big small war in
the midst of a major conflict. Of course, over
the last two centuries the British Army has done
well in small wars. They are its bread-and-butter
and the only experience of active service
command for many officers. With the debatable
exception of the BAOR era, the Army has
primarily been a small wars gendarmerie
capable of generating an expeditionary force
in times of emergency. That pattern seems
set to continue.
Coalition warfare has been a constant
influence on the British style of command.
Of all the major wars fought by Britain since
1688, only one - the American War of
Independence-was fought without major allies:
and that ended in Britains only major defeat.
Coalition wars are conducted, often painfully
slowly, by committee, and the opportunity for
unilateral action is constrained. An ability to
negotiate and an aptitude for diplomacy have
been critical skills.
As a rule, the more troops a commander
possesses, the greater his influence.
Haig during the First World War was always
the junior partner to the French. In Italy during
1943-45 British and US forces were roughly
equal, but in North-West Europe during 1944-45
Anglo-Canadian forces declined steadily as an
overall percentage of the total Allied forces.
This contributed to the decline in Montgomerys
influence in the coalition, already undermined
by his abrasive personality. Since 1945,
the challenges of coalition warfare have
reappeared with British generals either
commanding a relatively small contingent
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within a US-dominated coalition force (Korea
and the Gulf ), or in a position of near-equality
(Suez and former Yugoslavia).
Many of the problems of coalition warfare
are repeated in small wars, with the need to
cooperate with a wide range of individuals or
bodies, such as police forces or NGOs. One
enduring theme in all Britains wars is that large
numbers of foreign and imperial troops have
been under British command. Many small wars
were only possible because the British were
able to make use of locally raised troops, such
as the pre-1947 Indian Army or the Ulster
Defence Regiment. Likewise, in both world
wars British armies were actually
Commonwealth coalition forces with sizeable
overseas contingents under British command.
This complicated command as they could not be
treated as if from the Mother Country - as such
contingent commanders often made clear.
The absence of joint doctrine has long caused
problems. During periods of close cooperation,
for example during the Napoleonic Wars, each
service came to understand the other and an
effective partnership was forged. But this was
dependent on personalities. Of course, effective
doctrine can help overcome personality
difficulties but valuable experience can be lost
if individuals, or circumstances, change.
We have already seen how lessons of air-land
cooperation during the First World War had to
be relearned, painfully, during the Second.
These problems have now been at least
partially remedied by the jointery revolution
of the 1990s. Similarly, the lack of a doctrine for
command has been addressed with
the introduction of Mission Command, and
the HCSC provides some of the training for high
command hitherto singularly absent.
1 Advertisement by LTC JW ROLLINS, UK Liaison Officer
to CDEF, author of this shortened version of the article
rewritten for Doctrine: This is a much shortened
version of the essay produced by Professor Gary
Sheffield for the British Army publication Land
Operations. I have used much of the original text but,
for the sake of brevity, have rewritten some parts and
deleted others. Although Professor Sheffield has
authorised publication of this version, I strongly
advise reading the original to capture its full detail
and subtlety.
For most of its history, the British Army has eschewed prescriptive doctrine, priding
itself on its empirical attitude to problem solving. The British style of command has
been characterized by a similarly pragmatic approach. However, it is a fallacy to
believe that the Army lacked any sort of doctrine. Doctrine did exist, but it was either
semi-formal, associated with a specific commander in a specific theatre, or took the
form of broad principles. With the adoption of formal doctrine in 1989, the Army
entered a new era. Complacency would be extremely unwise; but in the early years of
the 21
st
century, the British Army is probably better prepared intellectually to face the
challenges of complex operations than at any time in its history.
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French Practice in Getting
Prepared to Overseas
Operations
F
rench forces said good-bye to their draftees and dressed themselves with the fatigues of
professional soldiers by 1996. Challenge faced and met, Id dare say, since professionalization
happens to be quite a mature process by the time being. During this remarkable decade of reforms,
French forces had to get familiar with overseas military commitments atypical to their usual combat
operations. Hence, this newer pattern early called commanders upon consideration for education
matters. Obviously, instruction and training concepts and methods needed to be revised. On this
subject, the past 1970-1996 era credibly demonstrates that this reform is not yet complete in
some aspects.
What does this era show actually? The first-born of French professional units start facing
the challenge posed by military interventions overseas, especially in Africa. Their key-personnel
tackle with the full spectrum of non-conventional warfare, including counter-guerrilla, coercion
and violence-containment operations. They go diving into a myriad of cultures that are alien to
their standard believes and manners. They venture on the unpaved way of instructing African
forces. So, at that time, we can already see France sending a handful of her sons in Africa to
restore peace and security, protect populations and alleviate the pains inflicted to them by ethnic
wars. The lieutenants and captains of that age happen to be todays GOCs
1
committing regular
forces abroad. Which operational and cultural challenges have our former professional battalions
met? How have they been instructed and trained? Or, in other terms, how to learn overseas and
operate in that environment?
As a grown-up party of regular soldiers, Army can now draw valuable answers from the questions
aforementioned whilst exploring the wide field of training key-personnel to all sorts of military
expeditions. Such answers can also be referred to as a French-style area of expertise that quite
a number of Western forces, including US forces, are still hunting for.
The developments below mainly depict how the Army has been training professional units to the
interventions applying in Africa between 1970 and 1987. These lines are to contribute in think-tanks
developing on the subject of enhanced training for overseas operations, where appropriate to
tactical units and courses on the one hand, and integration into senior staff-officers programs on
the other hand.
BY COLONEL (RETIRED) HENRI BOR
2
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Learn overseas
Between 1970 and 1997, Africa happened to be
the main area of operations for our first-born
professional units. They have noticeably
3
been
committed to a series of missions in Chad; also
to operations such as Lamentin in Mauritania;
Barracuda and Almandin in the Central African
Republic, Godoria in Djibouti; Baumier
in the former Zaire; Onix in Somalia; Norot,
Amalys and Turquoise in Rwanda; Azale
in the Comorian Islands; etc. As far as key-
personnels training is concerned, two main
lessons came surfacing from these missions.
The first one is of a tactical nature. Conventional
operations, amongst which Licorne -in the Ivory
Coast- could set a fashion, are generating newer
requirements such as CMO
4
, PSYOPS and HUMINT.
These functions are not the field of strategic and
operational experts only. They also address
combat echelons in terms of tactical skills, from
the commanders level to every squad leader.
The second one is of a cultural nature. Awareness
of the local cultures, including in their fainter
aspects, is a prerequisite to achieving any missions
in Africa or in whichever distant theater.
Squad and platoon leaders as well as battalion
commanders engaged in such operations are to
face what the US Marine Corps calls the four
blocks of hybrid wars
5
. Actually, they will
seamlessly gear combat operations with CMO,
PSYOPS, INFO-OPS and HUMINT activities. They
will also deal with civilian populations and military
forces whose traditions and habits may produce a
true cultural choc to them.
Self-confidence; enterprise and novelty
How could such lessons be not lectured to our
commissioned and non-commissioned officers?
Actually, key personnel are basing their education
program for overseas and other non-conventional
operations on this cultural and tactical
background. Once they know that a mission
abroad is planned for their units, all sergeants and
lieutenants involved start preparing that mission
day after day. Indeed, grasp of the human
environment together with counter-guerrilla and
violence-containment warfare would form the hub
of training efforts. CMIDOM
6
therefore integrates
key-personnel from units previously committed
overseas, with a view to teaching tactics and local
cultures to students preparing themselves for
similar missions. This is how all military virtues
preached by Faidherbe, Gallieni and Lyautey keep
being passed to junior generations. Namely, open-
mind, sense of initiative and inclination to novelty.
Greenhorn key-personnel start exploring various
African cultures, also salient ethnic and religious
groups that are known to bear on the political and
social life of those countries stretching along the
Western coast and in the Horn of Africa. Then, they
learn how to apply this knowledge to the conduct
of operations, with special attention paid to
dealing with the populations and winning the
battle for hearts in rebellion-affected regions.
Training-support to African forces also takes an
important place in education programs dedicated
to non-conventional operations. Finally, students
get familiarized with the natives ways of thinking,
living and working, especially where a serious
cultural adjustment to them is essential.
Lawrence of Arabia
and his knife-and-soup motto
Sir Lawrences motto can actually respond to a
number of interrogations from inexperienced
officers and NCOs in the battalions. Namely, how
can we translate the subtle changes of the
populations behavior into an intelligence report?
How can we anticipate on and keep control over a
guerrilla? How can we monitor a sector in Tropical,
Saharan or Urban areas? Which tactical and
technical skills should we refer to in mob-control
conditions?
In a given battalion, the commander imposes that
key-personnel be reading two books, Modern war
from Roger Trinquier and The seven pillars of
wisdomfrom TE Lawrence. To express what he is
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expecting from his personnel, this colonel uses
to impersonate Lawrence in the following terms:
Gentlemen, you wont eat soup with a knife.
A flash of wit that summarizes the whole
philosophy of training for overseas operations.
In the early stage of their career, junior executives
should be informed of the importance of cultural
and intellectual flexibility in expeditions that may
require special courses of action and leadership.
Actually, such operations demand that the same
squad or platoon leader be
capable of executing
his/her combat missions
together with the full
spectrum of CMO, PSYOPS
and HUMINT activities
supporting them.
Acting overseas, a matter
of versatility and cultural tuning
As a matter of fact, key personnel of all combat
units set on training for overseas missions have
been nursed out of two major principles of action.
Be task-versatile on the one hand, and display
cultural agility on the other hand.
Multi-task capability versus specialization
One key-requirement instructed to platoon leaders
was multi-task capability. Always get involved
locally in a forceful action altogether with
information and psychological operations that
can secure the population to your side and
subsequently cut insurgents from their current
support. That precept naturally implied that key-
personnel be qualified for a variety of tasks.
Actually, specialized functions such as CMO,
PSYPOS, INFO-OPS and HUMINT were nothing
but tactical deeds and the sphere of duty
assigned to every squad or platoon leader
servicing in a combat unit.
Consequently, versatility is now given
precedence over specialization and key-
personnel keep accumulating qualifications.
Companies are wandering about in remote
villages to display the information and
psychology that help forge a favorable human
pattern across the area of operation. Soldiers
play the role of administrative agents; they dig
wells; they also build roads, bridges and schools.
In return to this positive image gained in
the eyes of the local populations, they receive
from them the very pieces of information
essential for the success of their mission.
A pillar of overseas-oriented training, versatility
becomes paragon to fashioning key-personnel
for all expeditionary missions. In this context,
sergeants and lieutenants familiarity with the full
range of special operations is actually as important
as their ability in operating organic weapons or
running some traditional attack or tactics. This is
why CMO, PSYOPS, INFO-OPS and HUMINT quickly
materialized in every combat companys OPORD,
at paragraph execution. As well, a particular style
of leadership starts
developing in line with
that education and
training methodology.
A feature specific to
the French military
culture, the wide sphere of duty disclosed to lower
tactical levels of command is boosting self-
determination and task-versatility across
the Army. Indeed, this can work only where
the spirit and word of the mission are clearly
expressed and understood.
Some individuals are presently recommending a
similar approach for the US Marine Corps; also for
US Special Forces. General Lambert, a former SOTF
Cdr, is especially calling for more versatility in land
forces
7
. Kind of silent cry in a predetermined world,
I would say, since on this side of the Atlantic,
established military standards are mainly oriented
to specialization. This trend is much the result
of substantial human and financial resources
supporting an advanced technology. Same credo
keeps inspiring the US Defense Policy. In fact, DOD
Secretary Rumsfeld continues generating a number
of corps specialized in Intelligence, Civil Affairs,
PSYOPS and INFO-OPS. Most of these branches
are already supporting study roads and schools
of their own and can offer a career-profile up to
the rank of general officer. This said and with respect
to the most recent example of Iraqi post-strike era,
many flaws scored by US Forces in dealing with non-
conventional operations are clearly demonstrating
the limits of that system.
Conversely, the French military culture and practice
aforementioned would advocate for multi-task
capable key-personnel, from top down to the level
of squad-leader, who could cater for CMO, PSYOPS,
INFO-OPS and HUMINT in addition to combat
activities. This aspect is worth being approached in
schools for commissioned and non-commissioned
officers as well as in colleges for senior staff-officers.
Culture is an iceberg
By 1970 to 1997, there had been a big deal making
trainees aware of indigenous cultures before they
got committed to overseas operations. In fact,
( )
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grasp of the local culture helps realize the
challenges posed by those missions of assistance
and training directed to foreign forces. Key-
personnel involved in such missions need to
understand the iceberg-shape of culture, since
genuine traditions and customs hardly come to
light at a first glance. That lesson learned still
happens to be of a priceless value to junior
platoon and squad leaders. To the exception of
those tribal warriors present in some regions,
African forces actually train themselves, combat
and utilize courses of action and staff procedures
similar to the western standards. Alike rules of
operation, identical regulation and same pride at
servicing for the nation are but forming the visible
portion of the iceberg named culture. Below
the waterline, there still exist soldiers and key-
personnel who keep wavering between tradition
and modernity. Loyalty to some clan, ethnic group
or religious party may hence rapidly dispute
obedience to the established state authorities.
Non-natives can hardly perceive the roots of
ancestral traditions although these are definitively
fashioning mentality and manners.
This is why our instructors were so much insisting
that students understand their future cultural
environment and realize that some fragile alliances
might randomly fluctuate, decline or break down
without notice. Key-personnel returning from a
mission-tour came depicting one or the other facet
of the iceberg. They clearly put the light upon
those cultural gaps existing between the
European8 and the African military. One telling how
some Tibesti warlord shot a bullet at an insolent
lieutenant from another clan, right in his head.
Another expressing his surprise when he saw his
Mauritanian counterpart, a company commander
from the river region, paying respects to his
lieutenant who was but the son of a powerful
Moorish family from the North. Such real-life
reports to key-personnel planted the scene so that
the audience could realize how cultural agility is
crucial to achieving any missions overseas.
So, military success overseas is much a matter of
insight into those regional cultures, traditions,
believes and myths which are knitting the social
and mental pattern in the AOO. To that extent, it is
essential that some meaningful silences be also
perceived. For example, between 1970 and 1997,
our first regular troops had to make for many
unvoiced angers and desires whilst carrying
counter-guerilla missions or training local forces.
Eventually, tactical skills and open-mindedness to
foreign cultures should form the core duo of any
instruction process oriented to the projection of
forces.
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freedom of speech
freedom of speech
1 General Officers Commanding.
2 Colonel (Retired) Henri Bor lives in the United States.
He is working as consultant for US agencies running
African forces dedicated assistance and training programs.
3 Reference: From Bizerte to Sarajevo, released by the
Overseas Forces Committee (Lavauzelle 1995) and
Expeditionary operation files, published in the Ancre dor
review by September 2005.
4 Civil-Military Operations. NATO equivalent: Civil-Military
Cooperation.
5 In Future Warfare: the Rise of Hybrid Wars, General
James N. Mattis & Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman,
editorial published in the Proceedings review by November
2005.
6 CMIDOM stands for Military information and
documentation center for overseas operations. Once
transferred from Versailles to Rueil-Malmaison, this center
was renamed Military specialization school for overseas
and foreign areas of operations (EMSOME in French).
7 Best balance between special and conventional forces,
Inside the Army, 28 November 2005.
8 Note of the translator: Col Henri Bor actually used a more
generic term occidental.
Quick projection beyond the own territory keeps being the field of qualified, professional units. Swift
execution secures the success of conventional operations developing in coercion and violence-
containment activities. It is expected from military leaders, especially green juniors that they can
respond with promptitude and pertinence to the letter and the spirit of the mission assigned to
them. Thus, they will be responsible for meeting the level of excellence ordered to them in the full
spectrum of combat, HUMINT, CMO, INFO-OPS and PSYOPS activities. A very demanding goal,
excellence in all domains and at all levels entails that the whole training process be versatility-
oriented and apply in the same way from squad-leaders up to the Bn TF Commander. Positive effects
of the system materialize immediately in the field. Lower combat echelons can carry on complex
activities that progressively bring reluctant or even hostile populations to a more cooperative
attitude. Ultimately, these troops will get from them the crucial information required for
preventing/resolving chaos situations.
The subject of tactical and technical skills specific to non-conventional operations is really worth
forming the background of programs issued for officers and NCOs scholarship as well as for senior
staff-officers colleges. Such programs should also be lectured to key-personnel within combat units
in order to help them get into the picture of potential theaters of operation. To that extent, EMSOME
(see footnote 6 at page 1) stands for the best Armys winning card.
Where instructing foreign cultures and the species of tactics for non-conventional operations have
been modeling professional units during the 1970-1997 era, their key-personnel have developed
leadership-virtues essential to professional military. I mean self-confidence, personal rationale and
inclination to novelty. The juniors of that time have been further on assigned higher responsibilities
but, whichever the duty was, they could still feel the good of their prime initiation to overseas and
other non-conventional operations. Recent events occurring in Darfour, Congo and the Ivory Coast
indicate testify that Africa might become the field of French land forces again by the next decade,
either for nationally or multinationally led operations. In either case Army junior key-personnel will
have to tackle with the very challenges met by their predecessors.
P.95-99 Freedom 26/07/06 10:23 Page 99
Intelligence in Indochina
Discretion and Professionalism were rewarded
When put into Practice
F
rontless war facing a determined enemy, elusive but present everywhere, the Indochina war can be
usefully studied today in its political as well as diplomatic or military aspects. More than any previous
conflict, probably, interactions between these various areas are interweaving in a complex network due
to the revolutionary feature given to the confrontation by the Vietminh (VM). Since early 1947, Lieutenant
General Leclerc defined such an environment as before all a political issue. There is no point strictly
related to operations or more clearly every question related to operations is always mainly shaped by
the whole environment in which it develops.
BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL RMY PORTE RESEARCH BRANCH DEFENSE HISTORICAL AGENCY - ARMY (SHD - T)
1
Preamble
Let us remind quickly, to get convinced,
two Marxist-Leninist principles of
the revolutionary war: the healthiest
strategy consists in postponing
operations until the adversarys moral
disintegration enables us the more
easily to deliver him a lethal strike.
It is a matter of saving time,
demoralizing the adversary and
aggregating forces then to turn to
offense.
Based on his own experience,
Mao Ze Dong rephrases these principles
as: the enemy progresses, we
withdraw; the enemy stops,
we harass him; the enemy gets
exhausted, we strike him; the enemy
withdraw, we chase him. When
the Vietminh command deludes itself
about its real operational capabilities,
forgets these rules and lets itself be
driven to more traditional modes of
military engagement, it suffers his most
serious defeats.
( )
the enemy progresses, we withdraw; the enemy stops, we harass him;
the enemy gets exhausted, we strike him; the enemy withdraw, we chase him.
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The most possible detailed knowledge
of the adversarys political and
military apparatus is subsequently
indispensable. The issue of
operational intelligence is intimately
connected to the problem of collecting
information related to his organization,
his command structures, his
employment doctrine and his
objectives, his logistic flows and his
support bases. It also relates to his
structures for controlling populace,
for infiltrating friendly organizations
or his networks in the neighboring
countries.
However, we should go further than
the immediate importance of
intelligence from contact, interesting
punctually such unit or such
geographical area. Any information is
likely to be integrated in a wider
network. It assists then in validating
or in invalidating the analysis always
provisional allowed by data from
other sources. It is then of primary
importance first, to define the most
adequate command level for synthesis
and processing, second, to make
sure of the rapidity and security of
reporting forwarding and third to
provide the responsible echelon with
human and materiel resources in
order to screen and analyze growing
flows of information.
Overall organization
of French intelligence
France attempts to respond to these
multiple characteristics and
constraints through the formation
of specialized organizations at
the various levels of command.
- Reporting to the High
Commissioner, General Directorate
for Documentation (DGD) is
interested in a number of matters:
information from diplomatic sources
through National Defense Permanent
Secretary; overall and political
intelligence through the Security
Branch (of the Police Force);
intelligence on insurgent area
and on action on the enemys rear;
counter-intelligence and
communications intelligence through
SDECE
2
; monitoring of organization
and locations of Vietminh formations
through either fixed, mobile or aerial
radio-goniometry by GCR
3
.
- At the level of the Commander-in-
Chief, the three services are
contributing to intelligence
collection. G2 (Second Bureau)
from Army and Vietnamese Forces
Headquarters are activating
the operational intelligence services
directly focused on VM military
structure and its sanctuaries. Air Force
G2 benefits from the information
collected by one then two specialized
flights; it ensures intelligence
support to ground troops and tries
to conduct despite limited resources
a systematic land topographical
surveillance. Navy G2 operates its
operational intelligence branch SRO
4
.
- Locally or at tactical level, more or less
efficiently supported by the
Vietnamese intelligence service
beginning in 1951, structures and
responsibilities are crossed around the
territories G2s: mobile administrative
operational groups, sectors posts and
troops, passing formations even native
branches in some areas or
relationships with maquis from GCMA
5.
How ambitious and intellectually
satisfactory it could be in its principle,
this approach suffers from a double
unacceptable shortage: on the one hand
lack of specialist trained staff, on the
other hand coordination gap and
problem of mission definition.
On the ground, a number of sensors,
French and Vietnamese agents, civilian
or military, collects countless pieces of
information and enables to set up a
relatively precise picture of Vietminhs
capacities, capabilities and objectives.
However French military operations
achieve real success on the battlefield
only when scattered data reach timely
the adequate command level. Examples
are the poor analysis of intelligence
gained about VM assembly areas in the
vicinity of RC4
6
just before the famous
drama and mistakes in the assessment
of the enemys artillery capabilities four
years later. Between these, Commanding
Officers and officers from battalions and
motorized Bn Task Forces remain with
an overall feeling of numerous
dysfunctions and serious lacks.
The example of Operation
Mouette
7
Lieutenant General Navarre launches
beginning in summer 1953 a series of
operations aiming at the disorganization
of the Vietminh main body, their depots
and logistic routes to prevent them from
taking the lead on the offense in a
further stage. CEFEO
8
activities are then
observed by countless spies which
explains why a number of military
initiatives were unsuccessful.
Hirondelle and Camargue operations
in July, Brochet in September,
Atlante in January 1954 do not achieve
the expected outcomes. Mouette,
during the second half of October 1953,
offers better results and learns
interesting lessons.
The two division group, that Major
General Gilles launched against Division
320 at the Tonkin-Annam border zone
receives a twofold objective: to strike
seriously the VM combat force and
directly reach its depots and lines of
communications. In the vicinity of Yen
Lao and the region of Royal Graves in
particular, the operation marked by half
a dozen of major engagements is
developing for 23 days up to its end on
7 November. The outcome is significant
as division 320 recognizes (from radio
interception) the loss of more than
3,500 men, armament and numerous
stocks as well as two major depots.
Among the lessons learned with an
operational feature directly connected to
this operation, some of them are directly
related to the intelligence domain:
- The previous knowledge the most
precise as possible of the enemys
disposition and his intents is the only
one to enable to plan the initial
organization, likely to evolve from
the start of engagement according to
the enemys first reactions. The concept
of operations is therefore dedicated to
a strictly limited number of officers
meeting in a villa belonging to TAPI
9
headquarters and separated from
the other offices. It is then possible to
make sure of the containment of secret
during the planning phase.
- A specific effort is made in the signals
domain to provide the French troops
with an unarguable technical
superiority. Against the VM, the activity
lessons learned
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P.100-102 Lessons 26/07/06 10:22 Page 101
of the various sensors is centralized
and coordinated, the needs refined as
the triggering date for the offense gets
closer. For the profit of CEFEO units, an
order of battle for communications is
distributed at the last minute, the use
of multiplex and ciphered radio assets
ensuring briskness and discretion. Non
compliances with the rules of use are
seriously sanctioned, but the VM
hearing of GM4 (Motorized Bn TF#4)
communications precipitates BT3 in a
deadly ambush.
- Widening of diversion operations
aiming at deceiving the adversary. The
Navy actively participates in Operation
Pelican drawing the attention
towards Thanh Hoa coasts while land
forces assigned to Mouette are
placed through classical cleansing
operations and are still likely to
intervene on D Day in various
directions.
- Results from the Artillery and the Air
Force during the operation itself show
the efficiency of concentrations
required from intelligence. Swapping
assets as the needs are evolving
according to information directly
forwarded results in temporary
detachments and a wide flexibility of
employment. Likely to intervene
permanently under very short notice,
French arty guns and aircraft are
placing VM combatants under a
continuously unsafe environment.
- Evidence is revealed about the
importance of previous training.
Training periods, arranged by FTVN10
G2 are beginning to be fruitful.
Intelligence officers from GMs
11
and on-
the-ground battalions show for the
majority of them a constant concern for
progressing as quickly as possible to
the operation HQ any information,
document, prisoners likely to be of
immediate interest. Quickly processed,
this intelligence enable either to have
arty/air force dealing with VM
assembly areas or to make orders to
subordinate units evolve with FRAGOs.
1 SHD - T: Service historique de la Dfense -
Division Terre
2 SDECE: Service de documentation xtrieure
et de contre-espionnage: Agency for
Intelligence and Counter-espionage.
3 GCR: groupe de contrle radiolectrique:
radio communications control team.
4 SRO: service de renseignement oprationnel:
operational intelligence service.
5 GCMA: groupement des commandos mixtes
aroports: airborne mixed commando
group.
6 RC4:Route coloniale 4 / Colonial Road N 4.
7 Seagull.
8 CEFEO: Corps expditionnaire franais
dExtrme- Orient: French Far East
Expeditionary Corps.
9 TAPI: Troupes aroportes dIndochine:
Indochina Airborne Troops.
10 FTVN: Land Forces in Vietnam.
11 GM groupe mobile: motorized task force.
In front of a contrasted profit & loss statement, let us the last French Expeditionary Force C-in-C voice his views. In is final
report on Indochina War Lessons Learned, Lieutenant-General Ely states in 1955, that on the one hand CEFEO G2 knew
the disposition of Vietminh units with an accuracy frequently higher than 80% but rarely lower but on the other hand
the battalion CO or the post commander knew one day or the other the most brutal surprise. Listing the main gaps in
intelligence agencies, he synthesizes them in three main lessons: discrepancy between the deep intelligence, that was
always provided to the Higher Command and the close immediate intelligence, that was never gained by the lower
commanders; lack of a stable specialized staff immersed amidst the population in sufficient strength; sufficient interest
brought by the various local or territorial authorities for collection activities.
Key conditions for reliable results to be gained after operations are launched are: a rational and flexible organization,
sustained coordination and cooled down work, sufficient resources granted and adequate training before crisis
reaches a head. These rules have not changed.
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A vague and protean threat
Indeed, despite the relative
permissiveness of the situation in
the Kabul region, that threat,
especially the terrorist one, remains
permanent. It demands a persistent
watchfulness and it poses daily the
problem of the security of the small
elements (particularly CIMIC). The
attacks perpetrated
against the ISAF
and notably
the improvised
explosive device
attack (IED) against
a light armored
vehicle from the
French element in
October 2005
bitterly reminded it.
In the long term,
serious disorders
cannot be
excluded, or even
the renewal of the
civil war in the case
of radicalization of
the ethnic rivalries
or of uprising of
the still militarily
powerful war
lords.
Contact Intelligence
in the Kingdom of Insolence
1
F
or the last four years, the French Army has been engaged in the stabilization of Afghanistan within the
ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), placed under NATO command since August 2003. This
operation, code named PAMIR, demonstrates, if need be, to which extent, in this type of complex crisis
the access to reliable information is indispensable to the Task Force commander to assess the theatre
situation as objectively as possible. Indeed, the Afghan society is particularly opaque to any Western
observer: beyond the barrier of language and culture, the interests at stake at the local level as well as
their connections seem very complex and they always remain difficult to grasp. In a contribution to this
publication (issue N 5 - December 2004) a French Contingent Senior Officer (4th mandate) already
stressed in his writings that the main difficulty of his function was the perception of the threat.
BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL RANDAL ZBIENEN, FORCES EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE CENTER (CDEF) RESEARCH & LESSONS LEARNED DIVISION
lessons learned
lessons learned
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Each soldier is a sensor
In such a complex context, it is proved
that 80 % of the relevant intelligence
are collected by human means, which
once again confirms that human origin
intelligence (HUMINT) is decisive in a
stabilization operation, and deserves
priority over more technical means.
Nevertheless, the only specialized
sensors (few in number due to the
small size of the party) are obviously
not enough to warrantee the autonomy
of judgement of the French command.
That is why it rapidly became obvious
that the action of these sensors
needed to be completed by all
the means of the French element.
Therefore the staff officers (among
which, of course, the French element
senior officer intelligence advisor
and the French battalion intelligence
cell), the specialized elements
(engineers, operational
communication and CIMIC) as well
of course as thecombined arms units
take part daily to the collection
of intelligence. From now on, all
the leaders, down to the lowest
echelon (section or patrol leader)
are aware of this aspect of their
mission.
The French approach
to contact intelligence
Intelligence collected by the units in
the field is thus constituting an
important part of the information of
the French element. It is collected
by direct observation, notably
thanks to the night surveillance
dispositions using night observation
devices that provide the French
forces with an undisputable
superiority over their potential
adversaries. But it is through their
regular contacts with the Afghan
population that the combined arms
units collect most
of their information.
This type of intelligence collection
by contact with the indigenous
populations relies on action modes
and a French style military behavior
which is recognized by the allied
contingents as being specific.
Indeed, the French units stand out
from most of the other contingents
by:
- A sustained presence, by day and
night, with the deliberate research
of the contact with the population.
This concept of proximity led
the French battalion (FRBAT) to
frequently bivouac in its sector, in
the vicinity or in villages. To better
put the terrain under tight
surveillance, the large size of
the zone of action commands
decentralization down to the lowest
echelon. Particularly in the
SHAMALI plain, any patrol leader
(sergeant or corporal) is daily
responsible for 15 to 20 villages
with which he maintains regular
relations. As emphasized by a
French contingent Senior Officer
(9
th
mandate): a true proconsul in
his zone, this low ranking NCO also
performs an outstanding role as
ambassador of France....
Therefore, intelligence collected
by the units mainly consists in
the open collection of information
given by the population and
the Afghan security forces.
The synthesis of the intelligence
collected by the platoons is made
by the deputy company
commander (X-O) before it is
processed by the intelligence cell
(S2) in the FRBAT tactical staff.
- An examplary way of being
(besides called the French touch)
aiming at winning the hearts and
minds.
During their contacts, the French
soldiers do their best to respect
the local traditions and customs.
They maintain warm, courteous
and respectful relations with the
local authorities (maleks
2
,
governors, police chiefs, priests
of all denominations, etc.).
Similarly they do not adopt
aggressive attitudes: for example,
they only wear their helmets in
case of confirmed threat. These
know-how and way of being
inherited from the experience in
Africa (behave according to the
custom) seem to be particularly
appreciated by the very
traditionalist Afghan environment.
- And finally, the search for a
synergy between the different
operational functions.
The environment functions (CIMIC -
CIMIC and operational
communication - Operational
communication), even if it is not
their primary mission, contribute
also to the collection of information
about the environment. For example
the CIMIC teams (Tactical support
teams: TST) proved, according to
the opinion of successive French
Contingent Senior Officers, to be
good collectors of intelligence about
the atmosphere, notably through
international organizations and non
governmental organizations (NGOs)
that they contact regularly. That is
why the French command is trying
to develop the actions of
the various components, particularly
by making sure that the action of
the TST is performed in the field in
complement with that of the fighting
units in order to weave true
confidence relations with the
population in
his sector.
This French approach, relying
on duration, on a way of being
respectful of the local culture and on
a very active CIMIC policy, has begun
to produce its full effect when
the population provided quality
intelligence, permitting to seize
arms caches, a French exception in
the whole Kabul area.
The limits of the French
approach
Nevertheless it is important not to
overestimate the efficiency of such
an approach.
Taking into account the size of
the zone of action
3
forbidding any
presence in depth, intelligence
collected in contact remains rather
superficial. For example, some
villages are visited only once every
fortnight.
Similarly, the imperviousness of
the Afghan society and the
language barrier, in a country where
the French language is almost
unknown and the English language
used rather rarely, do not facilitate
P.103-106 Lessons 26/07/06 10:20 Page 104
the collection of information and
make the open intelligence
uncertain. It depends on the
competence and the reliability of
the interpreters who are absolutely
indispensable but may constitute
a vulnerability because of the risks
of interference it induces.
Moreover, the French Contingent
Commanders stress the lack of
training of the young leaders to
optimize this specific mission. Even
if the interview report forms have
been released, the leaders in
the combined arms units should be
better trained to the particular
techniques required by the type
of open intelligence (notably to
conversation techniques). Generally
speaking, the Afghan experience
emphasizes a lack of culture and
training to intelligence at battalion
level to grasp the complex situations
of the contemporary stabilization
operations.
Finally, the specificity of the Afghan
theatre, with the overlapping of
terrorism and criminality, might
involve the forces in domains where
they are not competent. That is why
the risk for the French contingent
to be manipulated during its
contacts must not be undervalued.
The French touch, as reminded
by some of the French Contingent
Senior Officers, must not lead to
blindness or to naivety. If for long
this specificity explained the almost
absence of characterized attacks
against the French element, the IED
attack in October 2005 reminded
that the situation remains highly
versatile and that the French forces
might always show judgement and
watchfulness during their contacts.
The Afghan lesson
So the French experience on
the Afghan theatre permits, through
its successes and its limits, to draw
some lessons learned about
the intelligence function in a
stabilization operation. These
lessons learned concern training,
the preparation of the mission itself,
the conduct of the contact
intelligence on the theatre but also
the attitude - i.e. the way of being -
that will optimize it.
First, it is confirmed that if
the HUMINT obtained in contact
by units remains decisive in this type
of complex operation, this capability
demands a specific training at
battalion level and this down to the
lowest level. Similarly it appears that
this upstream training will be
extensive and adapted to the theatre
during the operational readiness
preparation (ORP) prior to the
projection. For that, the intelligence
cell (S2) of the combined arms task
force should receive a particular
attention regarding its manning
and equipment (software adapted
to information processing) as well
as its training. Besides, during their
preparation, the Task Force HQs to
be projected must be able to gain
access to the real information from
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the already deployed units in
addition to the document support
provided by the specialized bodies.
Then, during the conduct on
the theatre of operation itself, it is
necessary to put in perspective
the efficiency of contact intelligence
in a context in which the manpower
strength is always limited. Only a
large strength would permit to
penetrate in depth into the human
environment and to really control an
area. That is why this capability will
always have to be completed by
specialized sensors. All the more,
the language barrier demands,
in the frequent lack of language
specialists, that the local
interpreters be selected with care.
Finally, collecting and processing
the information obtained
by the units must be strictly
formalized (interview report,
analysis software, etc.).
Developing and maintaining
permanent, respectful and unselfish
relations with the population
obviously facilitate the collection of
contact intelligence. Nevertheless,
this French specificity must not be
considered as a definitive know-how:
it cannot be improvised and it
deserves to be thoroughly studied
and released down to the level of the
individual combatant. It necessitates
in particular the creation of a
reference documentation, short and
updated, permitting a thorough
knowledge of the environment and
a good understanding of the local
customs and habits. Thus it is
necessary to study the means to
be set up to transfer the acquired
experience at the contact with
the population so that it is not
corrupted from one mandate to
the other (a handbook drafted and
updated on the spot, centralizing
the information at the EMSOME
4
, to
feed the CERT
5
that would complete
with classified intelligence).
However, in a stabilization operation,
where the threat always remains
vague and omnipresent, reversibility
must remain a basic capability for
the engaged Land forces. If it does
not exclude maintaining regular
relations with the local population,
this reversibility implies a permanent
watchfulness to avoid any
compromise and a capability to very
rapidly change position and attitude.
1 According to the title of a book by Michael
Barry Flammarion editions 2002.
1 After the title of the book by Michael Barry -
French re-edition Flammarion 2002.
2 Malek: traditional chieftain of the village.
3 The area of the French sector is some
900 km
2
, there live 1.5 million inhabitants,
including one fifth of Kabul and
200 villages.
4 EMSOME: Ecole militaire de spcialisation
de loutre-mer et de ltranger.
5 CERT: Ground Intelligence Processing Center
(a section in the Land Forces Command HQ).
As a conclusion, the lessons learned in the domain of contact
intelligence confirm the fact that the French engagement in
Afghanistan, despite its modesty, contributes to feed the
doctrinal thinking about this type of operations. A true mini
laboratory about stabilization operations, operation PAMIR
also emphasizes, if need be, the indispensable adaptation
capability of the French Land forces in more and more
complex environments.
P.103-106 Lessons 26/07/06 10:20 Page 106
General framework
of the mission and its
preparation
The mission lasted from mid January to
mid June 2005. The French Battalion,
garrisoned on Kabul International
Airport, includes three companies: one
motorised infantry company, one scout
and investigation company and one
command and logistic company. It is
integrated into the KMNB
2
, itself
subordinated to ISAF
3
.
The French Battle Group mission (FRBG)
consisting in taking part in the building
of a secure climate is in fact an area
control mission. Thus it includes a
strong intelligence component.
The French Battalion area of
responsibility (AOR) is very broad
(Ref map in Annex). It spreads from
the Kabul northern districts included to
the Southern limits of the suburbs of
Bagram. Two mountainous ranges, Kuh
E Baktari in the West and Kuh E Safi in
the East flank the Shamadi plain which is
crossed by two main axis leading to the
North of the country and by a lot of
A Battalion Intelligence Officer
in Afghanistan
B
eing the 2
nd
REI (Foreign Legion Infantry Battalion) intelligence officer since the end of my assignment as a
company commander in summer 2004, I have been assigned to Afghanistan in this function in early 2005 in
the framework of the 10th mandate of operation PAMIR. Though it was my first mission as a Battalion
intelligence officer (Bn S2), I could nevertheless pride myself on some experience in this domain thanks to my
participation to several exercises
1
.
Indeed a thorough preparation for the mission is necessary to the Bn S2. This preparation will enable him to
properly understand his battalion operational environment and the intents of his tactical commander and,
right from the start of the mission, to totally devote himself to the performance of his functions.
More generally, it is worth reminding that intelligence is not a goal in itself and that the intelligence chain must
be fully integrated into the operational chain. If the French Battalion intelligence cell operated well it is because
the whole command chain was operating well.
After a general presentation of the framework of the mission and of its preparation, the organization and the
working methods of the Battalion intelligence cell will be described. Finally a certain number of lessons learned
drawn from this mandate will be detailed.
BY CAPTAIN NEGRONI FRBAT S2, 10
TH
MANDATE, OPERATION PAMIR
lessons learned
lessons learned
2
R
E
I
P.107-110 Lessons 26/07/06 10:19 Page 107
lateral routes. There are some 600,000
inhabitants, scattered in 10 districts,
7 rural ones (that we can compare to
the French cantons) and 3 urban ones
(corresponding to the districts of our
large towns). Half the population in the
AOR is living in the three urban districts.
The cultural and religious characteristics
of these populations and notably
the very strong influence of Islam must
be imperatively taken into account.
The preparation of this projection began
as early as November 2004 by a
thorough study of a very complete SOP
file
4
including a specific chapter for each
function (operations officer, Ops center
officer, intelligence officer, etc). Thus,
each of the officers in the CP had about
two months to get intellectually
prepared. This preparation was then
presented as briefings, first to the Chief
S3/training and operations and then to
the Battalion commander and all the
Battalion officers and NCOs during
the period of operational preparation.
The particular mission of the FRBG
intelligence officer reads as follows:
To collect any useful information
pertaining to the operations or the
environment in our AOR in order to
ensure the security of the force.
The intelligence officers mission itself
was fixing him a clear goal that totally
integrated intelligence into the
operational chain.
Therefore, the intelligence officer had to
assess at his best the threat by drafting
the Battalion level intelligence synthesis,
by orienting and coordinating
the information research through
the drafting of various plans (ICP
5
, CRM
6
and collection assets management plan,
specific collection orders and
requirements) and by maintaining
frequent contacts with the local
authorities.
The Battalion intelligence
cell: organization
and working methods
The FRBG intelligence cell (S2) was
constituted by two officers, one NCO
and one private. On the following
organization chart, the functions not
planned by the TOE appear in red.
S2 officer CPT
(After Co Cmd
assignment)
Assistant S2
Second-lieutenant
Driver
Corporal
Intelligence NCO
Sergeant First Class E7
This cell reinforcement will permit to
obtain a better synthesis capability and
therefore to avoid having too analytic an
intelligence.
In addition, the intelligence officer had
a HUMINT unit, the liaison and
investigation detachment from
the 27
th
Mountain Infantry Battalion.
This element proved particularly efficient
and indispensable notably for treating
the sources and for target acquisition
intelligence. Considering the current
engagements, we need to study the
Scout Platoon employment for this
type of mission, on the condition that its
members be trained to human research.
This would reinforce the homogeneity
of the projected units and thus their
efficiency.
The HUMINT Unit zone of action was
covering the whole French AOR. Its
mission was to collect intelligence
pertaining to the domains of the OMF
7
activities whether political, military,
police or administrative and to be ready
to fulfil any particular mission for
the Battalion benefit.
Besides, the company executive officers
(Co XO) were the company intelligence
officers. Their mission was to collect raw
information in the following domains:
Terrain : Axis status and trafficability.
mined areas, infrastructures.
OMF activities.
ANA
8
, AMF
9
and local police activities.
Political and administrative activities.
Environmental information.
The zone of action of the infantry
company is covering the three urban
districts while the scout and
investigation company deals with the
seven rural districts.
The Battalion could also benefit from
specialized means from the brigade
upon request and at relatively short
notice (24 to 48 hours). They were:
A German LEGAR type radar platoon.
A German FENEC type observation
vehicle platoon.
A Canadian COYOTTE type observation
vehicle platoon.
A German LUNA type UAV platoon.
P.107-110 Lessons 26/07/06 10:19 Page 108
Several times and notably for pinpoint
operations, all or part of these
reinforcements have been
implemented and proved to be very
useful. Their employment requires
beforehand a meeting with the element
commanders to get a thorough
knowledge of their respective
capabilities.
Finally, specific national assets worked
several times for our benefit. However,
they had not all the expected
capabilities.
The various intelligence chains
on the theater
Because of the international context,
there are numerous intelligence chains
on the Afghan theater. The FRBG
intelligence officer had to work
principally with two intelligence
chains:
The French chain, for which
the contact point is the FRENIC (to
which he is not directly
subordinated)
The ISAF chain and notably the
brigade intelligence office (G2) to
which he is directly subordinated.
Occasionally, the intelligence officer
had to work with other chains.
The two following examples illustrate
this type of situation.
During an operation the goal of which
was to counter an attempt to infiltrate
by night a terrorist element into our
AOR, we worked with a Norwegian
HUMINT unit since the information
was coming from that unit but the
enemy action was performed in our
zone.
A NIC
10
from another nation requested
us to validate information about an
influent man in our zone whom we
had contacts with and whose arrest
was foreseen by our allies.
The scheme attached in Annex shows
the two main intelligence chains which
the S2/FRBG usually worked with. It
can be noted that the CIMIC teams are
mentioned though not belonging to
the chain.
lessons learned
lessons learned
The Intelligence Chain of Command
FR BG S2
Sct Co
XO
4
th
Co
XO
Engt Det
Leader
LID
Leader
REP FRANCE
CONS RENS
FRENIC
LEGEND
INTSUM/INTREP
RFIS
COLLECTION SPECIFIC ORDERS
ICP/CRM
MUTUAL INFORMATION
KMNB G2
ISAF J2
CIMIC
P.107-110 Lessons 26/07/06 10:19 Page 109
Organization and working
methods within the cell
On arriving on the theater, we found
on the spot a very well made data base
(villages files, districts files, biographies
files, poll files, organization charts of
the administrations, the army, the
police), an important contact network
and the indispensable working
documents notably the ICP (Intelligence
Collection Plan) released by the brigade.
Everyday the intelligence officer
analyses the companies INTSUMs and
drafts the Battalion INTSUM. In case of
an important event, he will have to draft
an INTREP. He has an interview with one
of his contacts that he must meet,
whenever possible, not less than once
a week. Finally, he takes part to the
Battalion commander situation briefing.
Every week, in the presence of
the Battalion commander he organizes
a meeting with the intelligence actors.
During that meeting the Co XOs and the
LIP leaders report an accurate situation
point that will permit to draft the Weekly
Assessment (forwarded to the brigade)
and to update the CRM.
The Battalion intelligence officer also
drafts the enemy paragraph of the
FRAGOs: as an indication, 80 FRAGOs
have been released during our mandate.
As for the assistant S2, he is in charge
of the management and the updating of
the data base which is a very important
work. Besides, he witnesses in
the background the intelligence officer
interviews and reports them.
Finally the intelligence NCO assists
the assistant S2 in the management and
updating of the data base. He is also
responsible for the liaisons with
the brigade (one daily meeting which is
rather time consuming) and for
the messages.
Lessons learned
This extremely interesting mission
permits to witness already known
malfunctions and to draw some lessons
learned.
The intelligence chain often seems
disconnected from the operational
chain and so is just ticking over. More to
that, intelligence is not working only
from below towards the top.
So the higher echelon (G2) gave few
guidances to the S2 and provided
practically no situation analysis. For
example, every evening all the INTSUMs
(even ours) from the theater were sent to
us. The brigade INTSUMs and
sometimes even the ISAF ones were
reusing word for word the Battalion
INTSUM.
Intelligence sent to the brigade were
never confirmed nor invalidated, there
was no feed back.
We can also regret the habit by some
nations to buy intelligence or to work
in our AOR by questioning our contacts
without telling us. This type of behaviour
is not only a damage for the proper
operation of the intelligence chain but
it may prove counter productive.
Some simple principles enable
the Battalion intelligence cell to fully
contribute to the success of the mission.
Preparing the mission is vital; to be
operational right from the start you
must arrive on the theater with a
perfect knowledge of the mission.
The CD ROM dealing with the SOPs
sent by our predecessors two months
before our departure greatly facilitated
our task.
A true intelligence manuvre must be
elaborated by controlling the collection
through accurate orders: regularly
updated ICP, CRM , IRs and RFIs, by
demanding the combat units to go for
contact intelligence and by forbidding
them to rush at fake specialized
intelligence for which they are not
prepared.
In the same state of mind the creation
of synthesis files must be imposed
through specific orders or requests
and numerous interviews (at company
level) with the local authorities must
be processed by imposing the
company commanders to prepare
them and to draft interview reports.
Besides, the specialist competences
(LID
11
and brigade reinforcements)
must be fully used. We must stress
that the relations between the French
HUMINT units on the theater were very
good and therefore permitted fruitful
exchanges of information.
As for the Battalion intelligence officer,
he must be a man of contact, open and
available, able to rapidly establish good
relations with the authorities and
influent people in his AOR. He must also
be a man of the field who will perfectly
know the Battalion area of action and
will not let himself be overloaded by
office work.
1 4 digitized battalion exercises, 2 digitized
exercises at brigade level and the Destined
Glory 2004 exercise.
2 Kabul Multi -National Brigade.
3 International Security Afghanistan Forces.
4 3
rd
Hussards Battalion.
5 Intelligence collection plan.
6 CRM: collection requirements management .
7 Opposing Military Forces.
8 Afghan National Army.
9 Afghan Military Forces.
10 National Intelligence Cell.
11 LID: Liaison and Investigation Detachment.
Finally, this is only a matter of common sense and pragmatism, the intelligence chain must be totally integrated to
the operational chain and the intelligence officer must not forget his priority: to focus his thinking on the intelligence
synthesis in order to assess the enemy threat, to determine his likely courses of action in order to ensure the security
of the force.
P.107-110 Lessons 26/07/06 10:19 Page 110
The expression
of intelligence
requirement
and its processing
Conditions survey
The Republic of Ivory Coast builds up a
specific theater showing a variety of
weaknesses regarding intelligence
collection and processing. The main
ones are:
- the shortage of specialized sensors
in respect of the theater size (see
map),
- the crucial lack of coordination
between the various intelligence
actors; this was mitigated since with
the assignment during mandate 10 of
an intelligence coordinator directly
attached to the force commander,
- the need for in-source treatment
specialists,
- an insufficient control of reporting,
- the absence of a structured database,
- the increasing weigh of picture
support ( videos, photographs).
LICORNEor the Challenge to Reality
Competences still to be Developped in Respect of
Intelligence Processing for Stabilization Operations
F
rom June 15
th
to October 11
th
2005, 3
rd
Mechanized Brigade was reinforced by three basic tactical
units belonging respectively to 2
nd
Foreign Legion Airborne Battalion, 1
st
Cavalry Hussards
Airborne Battalion, 1
st
Marine Infantry Airborne Battalion and a Very short range ADA element from
402
nd
Artillery Battalion. It staffed
1
the Theater Joint HQ and the combined arms Bn. TFs in Mandate 9
Licorne Force. The related period showed no discrepancy from the previous mandate.
In background was the polling deadline for presidential elections scheduled on October 30
th
2005.
At the end, these do not occur.
To comply with the new resolution 1609 which explicitly describes the support from Licorne Force
to UNOIC
2
, the decision was made to tighten the disposition on each side and in the confidence
area, a part of ICR
3
where the credibility of our action was mainly at stake. Since then, information
collection was focused on this part of the Ivory Coast. It also involved Abidjan itself and its suburbs
without totally forgetting the remaining part of the country.
It would be trivial to state that intelligence collection and its analysis are a key condition to
the mission success. However, one should be in a position both to interpret the joint commanders
intelligence requirement, into terms of maneuver but also to be sufficiently responsive to satisfy
his needs.
BY BRIGADIER GENERAL FRANK LE BOT 3
RD
MECHANIZED BRIGADE COMMANDER AND DEPUTY COMMANDER/OPERATIONS FOR OPERATION LICORNE
lessons learned
lessons learned
P.111-114 Lessons 26/07/06 10:18 Page 111
The existing structures
Excepted for acute crisis situations,
the brigadier general deputy for
operations is in charge of the tactical
conduct of the operations. He is
supported by the backbone - COS,
DCOS for operations, Chief J2 - and
coordinates with the other Theater
Joint HQ cells that contribute to the
elaboration of the concept of
operations. He validates the
intelligence specific plan, regularly
updated during the mandate and
decides on intelligence requirements
preceding any action by the force
units. Only a transverse action within
the theater Joint HQ and a constant
dialogue with the battalions S2s
grant the definition of a coherent
collection order. This permanent and
iterative process can be enhanced by
analysis and synthesis carried out on
the mainland.
The Theater Joint HQ benefits from a
J2 including a SGR
4
cell which gives
orders to ELINT and HUMINT long
range teams. These various sensors
were aggregated within a collection
support team in support of the main
action performed by Bn TFs. This
team was under TACON of the TFs
for a limited period of time (5 to 10
days); it achieved good results.
The employment of such a team was
frequently complemented by the
commitment of an Army Aviation
element composed of Gazelle
Viviane
5
. It was sometimes
employed within a joint operation. In
this widened framework, operational
assets mostly air but also belonging
to the Special Forces TF completed
the tactical assets.
Main issues
A specific attention was focused on
the employment of tactical collection
assets and their missions. These are
to intervene for complementing and
not overlapping sensors out of J2s
control. The presence of an
intelligence coordinator should
P.111-114 Lessons 26/07/06 10:18 Page 112
facilitate a better synergy between
the various actors, thus providing
the intelligence chain with more
efficiency and security.
Source processing through
conversational mode is sometimes
performed by not trained and not
controlled staff personnel. If
information collection specialists are
not available, this collection should
be dedicated to staff personnel who
are at least made aware of interview
techniques as well as fundamental
safety rules. This awareness can be
achieved during the mandate when
meetings involving Bn. TFs S2,
liaison officers and liaison teams
with UNOIC and FDSCI
6
are
arranged. This specialty short of
staff can be however activated
through a temporary reinforcement
by resources from the mainland or
if not available by the attachment
of one or two information collection
specialists within J2 in order to deal
efficiently with the main issues.
As soon as an intelligence chain is
in place and capable to satisfy the
commanders requirements for his
concept of operations its efficiency
is mainly based on its capability to
carry out quality analysis within an
acceptable time schedule.
Responsiveness
of the intelligence
maneuver, a key
factor for assistance
in decision making
Specialists of the Ivory Coast
are agreeing to state that all serious
events that occurred in this country
were foreseen. However they
immediately add that such events
surprised everybody when
they sparked off. The extreme
volatility of the ambient situation
in this country subsequently forces
an anticipation capability. So weak
it could be, this capability would
however release time enabling
then the force to keep the lead.
To respond to this persistent
challenge, Licorne Force is not
always in a position to react to
the event.
Situational awareness
The Ivory Coast theater is
characterized by the interweaving
of the political-military level in
the tactical action. This gives the
lowest echelons a huge responsibility,
as any of their action can trigger
major political effects, which could
be either right or wrong.
Subsequently it is an absolute
requirement that every commander,
at any level, has an intimate and
constantly updated understanding
of the political-military situation.
This would avoid in any incident
management, its exploitation by the
crisis political actors. Such an
understanding enables units to show
a good grasp of the situation and to
avoid confrontation when it
obviously is a matter for
provocation.
Subsequently, when units are
building up before their
engagement, an effort should be
made to gain the needed knowledge
and to measure the theater specific
environment. This learning stage is
all the more applicable to intelligence
specialists who possess a bulky
documentation from which the
updated data should be extracted.
Difficulties encountered
The first one lies with the processing
of extensive and unequally worthy
data converging on analysts. It
relates to their capability to extract
the useful information to be
arranged in order to identify the
adversarys courses of action. How
can we organize in order to sort
continuous rumors, a significant
number of them being from sources
assessed as reliable? How can we
elaborate, from a body of clues
gathered by 3,800 human potential
sensors, something more than an
intuition?
To respond to all these problems,
channeling the acquisition of all
source intelligence is demanded.
This would require the support of
collection and employment plans to
be extremely precise and, no doubt,
evolving. To achieve this goal,
specialists structures within the Bn
TFs should be staffed by trained
personnel capable in particular to
forward, through rigorous reporting,
intelligence which can be used by
the upper level.
As stated before, J2 has not in hand
a structured and updated database.
Subsequently at each relief, a
collective loss of memory is
observed, which leads frequently to
re-invent what is already available
somewhere.
The reach back concept related to
a mainland centralized database,
operated by staff from the Joint
Operations Planning and Command
& Control Center
7
or from the
Ground Intelligence Processing
Center
8
within the Land Forces
Command could meet this theater
requirement. This could be
applicable as well to other areas
where French Armed Forces are
engaged. Moreover, access to a
number of data available at central
level would avoid wasting efforts to
collect on the theater an already
existing data.
Capabilities to be developed
Napolon stated that a good sketch
was much better than a long speech.
Today a photograph or a film even
of a poor quality are a hundred times
worthier than a long report how
precise it can be.
Photo and video support is an
unquestionable operation
requirement. Besides medias
campaigns willingly focused against
the force, it appears that the
smallest incident even remote from
Abidjan is exploited by the various
players. The loyalist faction
demonstrated a undisputable
control in this respect.
The operations leaders on
the ground, at each related level,
should have the reflex of the visual
evidence implementing a photo or
even video coverage of incidents.
The number of digital cameras within
units enables gathering field work
photos. However the limited
technical characteristics of cameras
being used cannot produce high
lessons learned
lessons learned
P.111-114 Lessons 26/07/06 10:18 Page 113
Intelligence collection and analysis are key enablers to the mission success. On this key point, the units attention
should be drawn on the fact that its acquisition is and will be very difficult. It should be weighed according to the
balance between risk taking and intelligence interest. This collection should be the permanent concern of everyone
but should not lead to individual or collective jeopardizing without proportion with the expected benefit. This applies
especially for staff for whom it is neither the core trade nor the mission. Deployment of specialist units is
subsequently required. This enables covering the area of tactical interest while making sure of synergy between all
sensors and intelligence actors. Due to their capabilities and limited strength, they cannot observe the whole
territory.
quality pictures. This is due in
particular to the performance of
the zoom which protects
the photographer from any kind of
object thrown and also from being
spotted. Their interest in terms of
processing is subsequently
restricted. Only the implementation
on the theater of combat camera
teams adequately equipped would
respond to this problem.
The deployment of such teams
within the Bn TFs is then still
relevant.
The imagery processing team was
very much demanded during the
mandate for building up dossiers as
well as for intelligence collection
from an aircraft. Army Aviation
assets dedicated to air imagery
collection (in particular
GLOBALScan) revealed very
satisfactory. Several times, the force
commander had in hands documents
taken in the course of action with
high added value. These weighed a
lot during top level meetings, some
of these reached UNO. UAV is
the big imagery system absent on
the theater. Without asking for a
standing deployment of this system,
drones could be temporarily
deployed during periods of time
considered as sensitive such as for
instance elections terms.
1 PCIAT: Poste de commandement interarmes
Terre/ Joint HQ (Land).
2 UNOIC: United Nations Operations in the
Ivory Coast.
3 Republic of Ivory Coast.
4 SGR: Sous-groupement recherche: Collection
sub-unit.
5 Gazelle Viviane: light helicopter IR equipped.
6 FDSCI: Forces de scurit de Cte dIvoire:
Ivory Coast Security Forces.
7 CPCO: Centre de planification et de conduite
des oprations.
8 CERT: Centre dexploitation du
renseignement terrestre.
S
I
R
P
A

T
E
R
R
E
P.111-114 Lessons 26/07/06 10:18 Page 114
The need for an EDM tool
adapted to intelligence
The first acknowledgement was that of
the inadequacy of the French Forces C2
Information System (SICF) for fulfilling
the intelligence function requirements
with the exception of the representation of
a tactical combat picture between classic
units (the statutory ENSITREP). In this
respect, the SICF V1 is completely
inadequate, V3 is less inadequate, but this
fact will not disappear in the near future.
The priority is likely to have been given in
the SICF, to the development of transverse
capabilities of the Information System of
an operational center, with the aim of
enabling and speeding up the specific
formalism of high intensity combat, the
development of specific functional
applications being of a second priority. In
addition, the intelligence function had a
project of a framework program
encompassing functional software:
the SORA
3
, which was to fulfill all
corresponding requirements in the future.
For the Land Forces Command, this
situation was a concern as:
- SORA would undoubtedly bring high
quality applications, but certainly in the
long term;
- Without at least a little structured EDM
for intelligence, complemented with a few
applications to assist in information
collection (what is called data mining
by experts), G2s on operation were bound
to be paralyzed in front of the ever
increasing electronic information flow,
as already unfortunately illustrated within
the SFOR and KFOR staffs at various
levels. In addition, the problems arising
at mandate relieves were a real headache
as the data base left by a given mandate
proved to be largely unusable for the next
mandate, for lack of a rational, recognized
and durable arrangement.
The state of the art still enabled something,
and, upon the Army Staff request,
the Technical Services of the Army had
undertaken evaluations of products
available on the market in accordance with
the SORA framework, in order to better
grasp the operational need in certain fields
of the intelligence work poorly covered
by the technical and operational studies of
the French Procurement Agency. Therefore,
the IDELIANCE application, coupled with
the SIG
4
GEOCONCEPT, was procured
The First Computerized Application
for Intelligence:
the Ideliance Project
W
hen tumbling down, the Berlin wall has not only caused the fall of the Soviet system: it has also
announced, for the Western militaries, the reign of complexity. In fact, switching from a well-known
adversary, under all his aspects, and whose knowledge only equaled the one he had of us, staffs and their
intelligence services have seen, with the 90s, the torments of arriving in terra incognita. How can we then
understand the situation, what it hides, understand its profound sense and usefully and timely advise the
commander?
In addition, we have switched from the short and intense engagement hypothesis, centered on combat between
military units, to operations that have later been baptized as stabilization, even as normalization, which, on
the one hand, were longing in duration, and on the other, granted a determining place to the taking into account
of the civilian environment. The work to be carried out by the G2s had therefore to be thought again.
Aware of the lack in methods as well as in appropriate computerized tools
1
, the Land Forces Command has carried
out since 2001 the experimentation of an electronic document management (EDM) tool, baptized IDELIANCE,
encompassing assisting functions for situations analysts.
Therefore, this article will present the objectives and the capabilities of the present product, illustrated with an
assessment drawn from lessons learned and the evaluation carried out simultaneously in the Ivory Coast and on
the national territory. It will then evoke the envisaged future.
BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL GILLES PERCHET, COMMANDING THE GROUND INTELLIGENCE PROCESSING CENTER (CERT)
2
FRENCH LAND FORCES COMMAND
lessons learned
lessons learned
P.115-119 Lessons 26/07/06 10:17 Page 115
by the Technical Services of the Army and
handed out to the Intelligence Brigade for
evaluation. IDELIANCE having been tested
as being more adapted for a G2, was
proposed to the Land Forces Command
at the end of 2000 in order to:
- experiment it;
- orient the Army Staff about the products
necessary for an operational G2 within
the framework of its PROCESSING
function.
Grasping the interest of the matter,
the Land Forces Command in turn proposed
itself to experiment it within the Ground
Intelligence Processing Center that was
under creation, thus materializing a Concept
Development and Experimentation (CDE)
approach ahead of time.
The IDELIANCE information
application
First of all, it must be noticed that the name
of application is a language convention, to
the extent that the product has rapidly
evolved towards a software platform
regrouping several applications around
the engine effectively constituted by the
IDELIANCE application.
IDELIANCE is aimed, in priority, for the use
of a level 1 to 3 G2, and preferably for
employment in stabilization/normalization
operations, and offers assistance for
intelligence document management and an
aid in the analysis, writing and presentation
of intelligence. It is therefore essentially
dedicated to digitized documents whose
contents can be worked upon:
- WORD/HTML texts, possibly including
images;
- EXCEL files, etc.
First of all, it encompasses an input phase
of the original document:
- integration within a filing system;
- indexation;
- creation of specialized links between
documents. Links with maps are also
possible.
Contrarily to a pre-established fixed filing
system, as in other databases,
the IDELIANCE filing systemcan evolve
in accordance with situations, priorities or
threats. A semantic administrator, member
of the team of analysts, carries out
the modifications. After input of the
individual texts, a database update enables
complete indexation of the database.
This possibility becomes very interesting
as soon as the text database exceeds a few
dozens of references. It becomes a must in
present operations (several dozens of
thousands of texts within the SFOR and
KFOR HQs to date). It avoids headaches at
input time: it is no longer necessary to find,
for each information, the appropriate box
within a filing plan such as the Military
Intelligence Filing System in order to input
it, all the more so as the present overlap
of subjects entails that the same
information, a person for example, falls
under several fields (economical, political,
criminal...).
The main use of the database then
consists in making queries on a given
theme/expression. IDELIANCE then
provides answers under the format of a
selection of texts organized in accordance
with their adequacy, underlining, inside
the texts, the justification for the selection.
This is carried out by a fast and performing
full text research engine, which enables an
automated research from the contents of
the knowledge bases. Possibilities of simple
or crossed queries exist. The answer to the
query, carried out in natural language,
is displayed under graphic form. Two
examples illustrate the possibilities offered
by this display mode.
Case 1: To fulfill a request from his
commander, an analyst must answer
the following question : what link(s)
exists between the regular army and the
insurgents of a given country?. He may
draft the query as it is. The application will
in turn identify several routes:
then these types of sketches are left to be
interpreted. They present the great
advantage of going further than what
stands to reason and especially of
detecting links that one might not have
found alone within the mass of documents,
especially the weak signals ones. In
addition, the response time is below one
minute, which is not inconsiderable!
However, judgment has to be brought in
this interpretation. A rough approach could
lead to believe that the regular army has
illegitimate ties. But the meaning of the link
can be anything else (the army fights,
tracks down, watches, neutralizes,
destroys...). Thus, facing the geometrical
mind of the machine that delivers a
recognized technical fact must reply the
smartness of the mind of the analyst,
who must weigh, interpret and refine this
P.115-119 Lessons 26/07/06 10:17 Page 116
fact. Therefore, one must be conscious that
the machine only reasons about what it
knows, therefore about what is given to it.
The input phase is therefore essential;
information must be entered with rigor and
in accordance with a precise syntax, so that
the links created at input time reliably
represent the meaning of the collected
data.
Case 2: an analyst wants to identify Mafia-
type networks in Afghanistan. For this
purpose he carries out a prior out the
spadework on the issue by making an
update of the situation of known networks
in order to, starting with the prosperous
and highly respected known networks,
rebuild their relationships networks that
should largely correspond to the Mafia-like
networks he is looking for. To this end he
will input the query who meets whom in
Afghanistan?.
IDELIANCE then displays the following
graph:
The analyst immediately deduces three
elements from this graph:
A: two persons show a meeting frequency
peak outside normal standards, which
might indicate a very strong
relationship, not to say a complicity;
B: this person practically knows
everybody, which renders him an
unavoidable interlocutor, if not
listened to and influent;
C: this person although known by
the force, seems to have no
acquaintance, which might indicate
that he hides his contacts or that he
doesnt represent an interesting target
due to his little involvement in
the environment.
The ordeal of facts after
the trial in the Ivory Coast:
a black and white picture
The experimentation concretely started
at the end of 2002, with the assistance
of two Force HQs. As soon as 2003,
the Ground Intelligence Processing
Center and the Force HQ 3 highlight
the advantages of the product:
the simplicity of queries and the power
of the research engine. The graph format
also proves to be interesting in a great
deal of cases.
Thanks to a documentation scanning
significantly much faster than what could
be performed by the analyst, it enables,
for example, to highlight, generally
under a curve or graph format, a trend
(for example the generalization of IED
5
along the insurgents withdrawal routes),
a starting peak (violence on a given
theater) or, on the contrary a decline,
a stabilization. Similarly, the appearance
of new phenomenon or the temporary or
complete disappearance of old and usual
elements, which would have not been
noticed or would have taken a certain
time to show, are taken into account
more rapidly and more accurately.
These points were acknowledged within
an operational framework in summer
2004 with the installation of an
IDELIANCE screen within the LICORNE J2.
An analyst was then dedicated to the
input, and a specific connection was
established between the J2 and
the Ground Intelligence Processing
Center based in Lille. It enabled
the exchange of files dedicated to
the software, including in a native way
specialized links and allowing an
automated update twice a day from a
mirror database on the national territory.
At the same time, training was improved
and an IDELIANCE module is included
in the operational preparation that
the personnel appointed for joining
Licorne carries out within the Ground
Intelligence Processing Center.
At the beginning of 2005, three reports
(STAT/J2 Licorne/ CFAT) were forwarded
to the Army Staff: the J2 Licorne
describes its general satisfaction, whilst
strongly pointing at the very high
handicap represented by the input
phase, especially the slowness
and the very formalized nature of
entering the smallest piece of
information. For example, once the
INTSUM has been drafted, 60 to 90
minutes are needed to input it into the
IDELIANCE database. These limitations,
added to a constant decrease in
personnel strength, have led the
analysts to perform inputs that they
should not normally be responsible for
in order to only deal with the treatment
of requests or of ongoing priorities.
Therefore, 2005 ended on a half-tone
acknowledgement, drawbacks
prevailing over expected advantages.
lessons learned
lessons learned
P.115-119 Lessons 26/07/06 10:17 Page 117
By the way, this input issue is not specific
to IDELIANCE. The ANACRIME
6
system
used by the Gendarmerie or NATO, also
requires heavy training: 4 weeks of
courses, 6 months of work in duplicate.
However, it can be deducted from this
that input must be given to specialized
personnel, commonly named librarian
within civilian enterprises, who could be
called first level analyst, or input analyst.
The existence of such a tool as basic G2
tool also leads us to put into question the
organization of the G2: similarly to the
SICF, which has had influences over
working procedures within CPs,
IDELIANCE could modify the way in which
G2s work. In a first step, a project of
directions for use of a G2 equipped with
an intelligence data handling generic
system has been drafted.
Lastly, the question of systems
interoperability must be solved, which is
far from being the case, and has not
enabled a full operational evaluation of
the product : at minimum, it is the case of
warranting internal interoperability (SIC
V3, SORA, GRANITE) and external
interoperability (joint connections).
More fundamentally speaking, IDELIANCE
was evaluated by the Army, but within a
framework that is not far from what could
be a joint employment within a FRENIC
(French Intelligence Cell) for example
7
.
One can ask oneself, beyond punctual
differences of assessment, whether it
would not be possible to define an
identical requirement, which could lead
to a common system for all levels, a sort
of main application on which could
be hooked the specific service or joint
modules.
Orientations for the future
By the light of these lessons learned,
the land Forces Command forwarded to
the Army Staff at the end of 2005 its
conception about the G2 equipment for
the Land Forces Command and for
theaters as far as intelligence data
handling systems are concerned,
indicating the need as well as
the implementation steps for these
systems. In fact, one of the difficulties of
this assessment and one of the sources
of these trials and errors encountered in
the platform building comes from the fact
that this evaluation had been carried out
for several years without an appropriate
description of the operational
requirement in a text. Therefore, we had
to start with formalizing this
requirement.
Early 2006, the decision was then taken
to ensure the perpetuation of
IDELIANCE, to put in place the funds
necessary for the evolution wanted by
the operational personnel, and to put in
place this new version in the Ivory Coast
Republic and at the Ground Intelligence
Processing Center during the summer of
2006.
The selected general concept is
the definition of a common tool for Land
Force Command/ Ground Intelligence
Processing Center on the national
territory, level 1 to 3 S2s/G2s, and G2s
on operation. This tool should offer to
personnel a permanent capability for
management and analysis of an
operational intelligence data base.
In this way, G2s on the national territory
and organizations responsible for the
preparation for operational conditions
will then have a tool enabling a serious
and in-depth preparation of the
operation as far as intelligence is
concerned. A very important element
of the expected capability from
the IDELIANCE-NG
8
is to offer a
mirror-database of the theater database
on the national territory, enabling to
monitor the situation and to place
personnel in the atmosphere (document
intelligence) during the preparation for
operational conditions. This point was
only evoked slightly in the preceding
lessons learnt, as the state of the art has
not given us the possibility to assess this
point. On the other hand, this capability
will have to be subject to a fine-tuning
and in-depth evaluation. This capability
can also be an opportunity to think
about the concept of remote intelligence
support, and about the tools and
methods that are necessary for this
purpose.
The question of need to know and
right to know of personnel during their
preparation to operational conditions
in relation with operational intelligence
will have to be solved, obviously within
a joint framework, with probably further
tunings to be planned.
It is now necessary to convert the try
by drafting the detailed requirements
description document of the system.
The Land Forces Command project has
been handed out to units for advice
since March 2006 for remarks and
recommendations but also to the Army
Intelligence Training and Studies Center,
the Army Technical Services and
the Forces Employment Doctrine Center.
The main outlines can be summed up as
follows:
- simplify the initial input of documents;
- propose to the analyst a set of analysis
tracks he could not develop by himself;
- speed up and simplify the elementary
phases of the analysis in order to save
time for pure reflection, heart of the
craft of the analyst.
Besides this, everyone must be
conscious that progress has its cost.
In order to illustrate this, we could say
that an excavator is a much more
powerful tool than a shovel, but its
employment is also much more complex.
This will be the same with the
implementation of aided intelligence
data handling elaborate tools. Therefore,
a reflection must be carried out on the
new jobs that have to be created,
especially the intelligence librarian
one.
Among envisaged evolutions, one
can concretely quote the reinforced or
improved functionalities, such as for
example to insert pictures, files and
videos into the graphs.
But also the possibility, when looking
for links, to indicate either the shortest
route or the mostly used one in order
to highlight flows and anomalies.
It is also envisaged to visualize over a
map the incidents or events, in order to
draw information from their localization
(are protagonists acting in accordance
with a precise territory logic, are they
radiating around an operational base,
etc.?).
A new version should therefore be
fielded within a Force HQ G2 in May
2006, in order to enable the personnel
designated for joining the next Licorne J2
to get accustomed to this new tool. This
P.115-119 Lessons 26/07/06 10:17 Page 118
Doctrine
The New Conditions of Military Efficiency p. 4
Ground Intelligence Future and Stakes p. 9
New Techniques, New Threats p. 13
The Threat Continuity - From National Territory to Theaters of Operations p. 16
The Land Forces Synthetic OPFOR p. 20
GLAISE Army p. 24
The New Threats: the Challenge for Military-Oriented Intelligence p. 26
Collecting Intelligence - Adapting our Capabilities p. 30
Future Intelligence: Stakes and Digitization p. 35
Collective Training for Intelligence - A New Organisation Framework p. 38
Training for intelligence - Evolutions to be Expected for Army Officers p. 41
Main Abbreviations and Acronyms in the intelligence Area p. 44
Bibliography p. 49
Foreign studies
Intelligence Lessons-learned - Leveraging the Practical Experience
of Operation Iraqi Freedeom/Operation Enduring Freedom p. 45
Intelligence in Iraq within the Spanish Brigade Plus Ultra p. 59
The ISTAR Capability of the Canadian Forces p. 63
The Dutch Approach of ISTAR concept during NRF-4 p. 65
Freedom of speech
Terrorism and Ground Intelligence p. 70
Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Expectations and Problems p. 74
Asymmetrical Threat and Ground Intelligence p. 78
The All sources Analysis Cell: An improved Way to Process Information p. 82
Doctrine and Command in the British Army an Historical Overview p. 86
French Practice in Getting Prepared to Overseas Operations p. 95
Lessons learned
Intelligence in Indochina p.100
Contact Intelligence in the Kingdom of Insolence p.103
A Battalion Intelligence Officer in Afghanistan p.107
LICORNE or the Challenge to Reality p. 111
The First Computerized Application for Intelligence: the Ideliance Project p. 115
Directeur de la publication :
Gnral (2s) Jean-Marie Veyrat
Rdacteur en chef :
Capitaine Stphane Carms
Tl. : 01 44 42 35 91
Traductions :
Colonel (CR) Robert Travaillot
LCL (CR) Jean-Claude Laloire
LCL (CR) Daniel Sillon
LCL (CR) Jacques de Vasselot
LCL (CR) Alain Prignon
LCL (CR) Donatien Lebastard
Relecture des traductions :
Colonel (ER) Philippe Jolly
Maquette : Christine Villey
Tl. : 01 44 42 59 86
Schmas - PAO :
Nathalie Dujardin
Anne Laporte
Cration : amarena
Crdits photos :
SIRPA Terre
(1
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et 4
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de couverture)
Diffusion : bureau courrier du CDEF
Impression : Point dimpression
de lArme de Terre de Saint-Maixent-
lEcole 06-0330
Tirage : 2 000 exemplaires
Dpt lgal : parution
ISSN : 1293-2671 - Tous droits
de reproduction rservs.
Revue trimestrielle
Conformment la loi informatique
et liberts n 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978,
le fichier des abonns
DOCTRINE a fait lobjet dune
dclaration auprs de la CNIL,
enregistre sous le n 732939.
Le droit daccs et de rectification
seffectue auprs du CDEF.
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Web : www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr
Mel : doctrine@cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr
Summary # 09
Summary # 09
The progress accomplished since 2000 is impressive, even if it was too slow compared to
the theaters J2 personnel expectations. This dissatisfaction must be relativized: if it is
(rather) easy to define tomorrows MBT from todays MBT, the definition of a completely
new tool is another ambition. In addition, when it is a tool performing an intellectual task,
the challenge is somewhat more difficult, especially when from the start, as in the MBT
case, there exists no expertise center such as the one existing within the Armor School to
animate the definition and trials. The Land Forces Command is and will therefore be
taking full responsibility for this definition and evaluation effort of an intelligence data
handling system.
The Land Forces Command is rather confident of succeeding to achieve in the short term
an efficient document intelligence processing tool that will have its place within the
whole SORA program. It is also conscious that the expected performance requires a
higher qualification level, which will undoubtedly require specialized training that should
obviously be carried out within the Army Intelligence Training and Studies Center.
The main point now is that the intelligence community as a whole acknowledges the
need, whatever the final selected technical solution will be, and resolutely commits itself
in the fine-tuning of the product.
new computer would then go along with
the relief, thus warranting a well-
mastered tool for analysts. At the same
time, a similar tool would be deployed
within the Ground Intelligence
Processing Center, to be used as mirror-
database and evaluation tool in the
national territory.
The fielding time of the product under
definition thanks to the detailed
requirements description document will
be defined later, depending on the
selected level of requirements and on
allocated funding.
1 France had neither fielded nor under
development any equivalent to the NATO JOIIS
(Joint Operations Intelligence & Information
System).
2 CERT: Centre dexploitation du renseignement
terrestre.
3 Systme doptimisation du renseignement de
lavant. (Forward Intelligence Optimization
System).
4 Systme dinformation gographique.
(Geographic Information System).
5 Improvised Explosive Device.
6 Organized Crime Analysis Software.
7 The LICORNE Joint Taskforce CP is already of a
joint nature, even if land actions prevail.
8 Generic expression, the official name has not
yet been approved.
JUNE 2006 DOCTRINE N 09 119
lessons learned
lessons learned
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Forces Employment
Doctrine Center
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Contact Intelligence in the Kingdom of Insolence
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Lessons learned
2006
#09
DOCTRINE
Ground Intelligence
Future and Stakes
FOREIGN STUDIES
Intelligence Lessons Learned
of Operation Iraqi Freedom
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Terrorism and
Ground Intelligence
INTELLIGENCE
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INTELLIGENCE
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