1M girls 2010

Alvarez v. IAC
FACTS: The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-
B which were originally known as Lot 773. Lot 773 was registered in the name of the heirs of
Aniceto Yanes.
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private
respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while
the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was
survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party in
this case. Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of
Lot 823
The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots
but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a
result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, they did not visit the parcels of land
in question but "after liberation from Japanese regime" when her brother went there to get their
share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella
(Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773.
TCT was issued to Fortunato Santiago and sold the parcels of land to Fuetebella to which he
received a TCT. After Fuentebellas death his adminatrix sold the said parcels of land to Alvarez.
Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus,
filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago,
Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the
"return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823.
During the pendency of the case, Alvarez sold the same to Siason.
The court ruled ordering Alvarez to reconvey the property to plaintiff. The execution of said
decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. Sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot
773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo
Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the
plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution.
Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773
and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien or
encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding could not
be enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No.
5022 could neither be enforced against him not only because he was not a party-litigant therein
but also because it had long become final and executory.
The court ruled dismissing the case against Siason and ordered the Alvarez to pay the plaintiff.
The Alvarez appealed but the IAC affirmed the lower courts decision. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: W/N the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo
Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his
estate, after his death.
HELD: NO. Such contention is untenable to the general transmissibility of the rights and
obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of
the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance,
of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by
his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and
heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
received from the decedent.
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the
provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid
from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that
whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the
heirs would have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.
That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal
fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate,
and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of
the debts of the estate.

1M girls 2010

It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their
inheritance.
Gevero v. IAC
FACTS: The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City. Said lot was acquired by purchase from the late Luis Lancero as per Deed of Absolute Sale
executed in favor of plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4320.
Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per
deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated in the names of Teodorica
Babangha 1/2 share and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and
Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area containing
48,122 square meters.
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six children
aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and
Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476 .
By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by the said heirs, the said parcels
of land was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero. Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action
with the CFI to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha
insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.
plaintiff claims to have bought the land in good faith and for value, occupying the land since the
sale and taking over from Lancero's possession until May 1969, when the defendants Abadas
forcibly entered the property.
The court ruled in favor of private respondent. Gevero appealed but IAC affirmed the lower
courts decision. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: W/N Gevero acquired the subject property as heir of Tedorica upon the latters death or
only upon extra-jidicial partition.
HELD: Upon death. The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite
contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the
actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were
transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in
1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance
from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he
inherited from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.
Locsin v. CA
FACTS: The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all
surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the provinces of
Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided among his three (3) children.
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and
universal heir of all his properties. being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after
both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's
properties would go to his "Locsin relatives" and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives."
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time,
his will was probated without any opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his will,
Doa Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate.
9 years after the death of Mariano, Doa Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or
assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and
nieces.
Four years before Catalinas death, she had made a will affirming and ratifying the transfers she
had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading
of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate
because the properties devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by
the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies which the executor of her will or
estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.
6 years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had
already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action to recover the
properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the
conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws
on succession.
The court ruled in favor of Jaucian. The Locsin appealed which affirmed the trial courts decision.
Hence, petition.

1M girls 2010

ISSUE: W/n there is violation to the law on succession
HELD: none. Petition is granted. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the
moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. Property which Doa Catalina
had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her
estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the
property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and
even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain
circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos
does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced)
heirs
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in transferring the
properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to
circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her succession. Said
respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence
there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during
her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her
freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750,
Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the
donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct,
sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the
time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported
by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on
petition of any person affected. (634a)
Opulencia v. CA
FACTS: In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo [herein private
respondents] Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that [herein petitioner] Natalia
Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor a CONTRACT TO SELL Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa
Estate Laguna.
In her traverse, [petitioner] admitted the execution of the contract in favor of plaintiffs and receipt
of P300,000.00 as downpayment. However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses:
that the property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena
(petitioners father), in respect of which a petition for probate was filed; that at the time the
contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that
the contract to sell was not approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the
contract [petitioner] had offered to return the down payment received from [private respondents],
but the latter refused to accept it; that [private respondents] further failed to provide funds for the
tenant who demanded P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy rights on the land; that [petitioner]
had chosen to rescind the contract.
As held by the Supreme Court, a decedents representative (administrator) is not estopped from
questioning the validity of his own void deed purporting to convey land. In the case at bar, the
[petitioner,] realizing the illegality of the transaction[,] has interposed the nullity of the contract as
her defense, there being no approval from the probate Court, and, in good faith offers to return
the money she received from the [private respondents]. Certainly, the administratrix is not
estop[ped] from doing so and the action to declare the inexistence of contracts do not prescribe.
This is what precipitated the filing of [petitioners] demurrer to evidence.
ISSUE: Is a contract to sell a real property involved in testate proceedings valid and binding
without the approval of the probate court?
HELD: YES. It was correctly ruled by CA that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not
applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not
as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the
lawful owner and seller of the subject parcel of land. She also explained the reason for the sale
to be difficulties in her living conditions and consequent need of cash. These representations
clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered
into the Contract to Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by petitioner has no application to
the instant case.
We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the
decedents death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment
her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell,
because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the
estate of her late father.
And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes
the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be
adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the coowners of the
estate while it remains undivided. xxx And according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part
owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such
assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the partition
upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, where some of the heirs, without the
concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, speaking thru
its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof
was limited to the share which may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.

1M girls 2010

The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioners offer to sell is contingent on the complete
clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father. Consequently, although the
Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the
pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership
over the parcel of land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase
price and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no
basis for petitioners apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition
and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that the sale made by an heir
of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way
of such administration.
Emnace v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a
business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they
decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of
the partnership properties among them, consequent to Jacinto Divinagracia's withdrawal from
the partnership
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanao's untimely demise
in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of
the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also
reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total
assets of the partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite
formal demand for payment thereof
Tabanao' s heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment
of shares, division of assets and damages. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit, and lack
of capacity of the estate of Tabanao to sue. the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. the trial
court held that the heirs of Tabanao had aright to sue in their own names, in view of the
provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent
ISSUE: W/N they have capacity to sue regardless of not being appointed as administratix or
executrix of his estate.
HELD: YES. Petitioner's objection in this regard is misplaced. The surviving spouse does not
need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action.
She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao.
From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao' s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was
concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were
transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode
of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of
the inheritance of a person are transmitted.

Moreover, respondents became owners of their
respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.

A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or
administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As
successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence
any action originally pertaining to the decedent.
From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand fulfillment of petitioner's
obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were transmitted to respondents. They,
therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court's intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill
his obligations.
Rabadilla v. CA ARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS
FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed of the Bacolod
Cadastre.
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla. He survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and
Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint against the above-
mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The
Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil
Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in
disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near
descendants and sister of the testatrix.
Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar
to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the
complaint

1M girls 2010

the banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in case of
the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have
the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff among others then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Bellez
They arrived at an amicable settlement where petitioner agreed to deliver the piculs of sugar but
only partial delivery was done.
RTC dismissed the case which was reversed by CA on appeal. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: W/n there is violation to the codicil. W/N there was modal institution and W/N the
testatrix intended a mere simple substitution
HELD: YES. YES. NO.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent

and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of
law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the
widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of
law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them
from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the
heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such
was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal
and not conditional
Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to
take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how
his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus,
a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very
purpose of making a Will


BELINDA TAREDO, for herself and in representation of her brothers and sisters, and
TEOFILA CORPUZ TANEDO, representing her minor daughter VERNA TANEDO,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RICARDO M. TAREDO AND
TERESITA BARERA TAREDO, respondents.
FACTS: Lazardo Taedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of his eldest
brother, Ricardo Taedo, and the latters wife, Teresita Barera, private respondents herein,
whereby he conveyed to the latter in consideration of P1,500.00, one hectare of whatever share
I shall have over Lot No. 191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac, the said
property being his future inheritance from his parents.
Upon the death of his father Matias, Lazaro executed an Affidavit of Conformity to re-affirm,
respect. acknowledge and validate the sale I made in 1962.
Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents covering his
undivided ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191. He acknowledged therein
his receipt of P 10,000.00 as consideration therefor
Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children, petitioners herein.
Petitioners filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale executed by
Lazaro in favor of private respondents covering the property inherited by Lazaro from his father.
Petitioners claimed that their father, Lazaro, executed an Absolute Deed of Sale conveying to
his ten children his allotted portion under the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of
Matias, which deed included the land in litigation.
The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners failed to adduce a
preponderance of evidence to support (their) claim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision ruling that the Deed of Sale dated January 13, 1981 was valid and that its
registration in good faith vested title in said respondents.
ISSUE: Is a sale of future inheritance valid?

1M girls 2010

HELD: The sale made in 1962 involving future inheritance is not really at issue here. Pursuant to
Article 1347 of the Civil Code, (n)o contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law.
Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor
the creator of any obligation between the parties.
The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law, ownership
shall belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property. Thus,
although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the one in favor of
petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On
the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all.
As between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right
over the other who has not registered his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the
immovable property
PS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS, &
LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and TADEO F. SANTOS, Petitioners, vs.SPS.
JOSE LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAOG.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 40
FACTS: Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the
legitimate and surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita)
The other petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the daughters-in-law of Rita.
Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged owners of
the 107-square meter lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during her
lifetime.
On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the
subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc
(Maria), who died intestate
On the first occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mothers estate
through a document denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa 1979
Respondents Spouses Lumbao claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed
by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their signatures affixed therein. On the second
occasion, an additional seven square meters was added to the land as evidenced by a
document also denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa 1981
After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession
thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to
the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao
made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein
petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate
title in favor of respondents Spouses Lumbao.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent
Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire
property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned.
he Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one
another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among
themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property
already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao
respondents Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal demand letter

to petitioners but
despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still failed and refused to reconvey the subject
property to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages

before the RTC of Pasig City.
Complaint was denied by court but appeal of Sps.Lumbao was granted by CA. Petitioner filed
MR but was denied, hence the petition.
ISSUE: W/n deed is valid.
HELD: YES. It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents denominated as
"Bilihan ng Lupa," the entire property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided
among her and her co-heirs and so the description of the entire estate is the only description that
can be placed in the "Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981" because the
exact metes and bounds of the subject property sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao could not
be possibly determined at that time. Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of sale
between Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law and jurisprudence
have categorically held that even while an estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full
ownership of their respective aliquots or undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage them
when the estate left by Maria had been partitioned on 2 May 1986 by virtue of a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold by the mother of the petitioners to
respondents Spouses Lumbao should be deducted from the total lot, inherited by them in
representation of their deceased mother, which in this case measures 467 square meters. The

1M girls 2010

107-square meter lot already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited
by the petitioners because the same was no longer part of their inheritance as it was already
sold during the lifetime of their mother.
This Court holds that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981 are valid and enforceable and can be made the basis of the respondents Spouses
Lumbaos action for reconveyance. The failure of respondents Spouses Lumbao to have the
said documents registered does not affect its validity and enforceability. It must be remembered
that registration is not a requirement for validity of the contract as between the parties, for the
effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. The principal purpose of registration is
merely to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property
had been entered into. Where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is
unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior
unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. Hence, the "Bilihan ng Lupa"
documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981, being valid and enforceable, herein
petitioners are bound to comply with their provisions. In short, such documents are absolutely
valid between and among the parties thereto.
In the end, despite the death of the petitioners mother, they are still bound to comply with the
provisions of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Consequently,
they must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao the 107-square meter lot which
they bought from Rita, petitioners mother. And as correctly ruled by the appellate court,
petitioners must pay respondents Spouses Lumbao attorneys fees and litigation expenses for
having been compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF
APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31,, G.R. No. 162784, 22 June 2007, 525
SCRA 383
FACTS: The Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of
land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna.
By virtue of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 757. NHA as the successor agency of LTA is the petitioner in this case.
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother
of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother
and left heirs.
Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-
Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of
the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera. The
Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-
Adjudication
The court ruled null and void. During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-
Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots
submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother. Private
respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the application.
NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera. This Office finds that protestee has a
better preferential right to purchase the lots in question.
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President.The NHA Resolution was
affirmed by the Office of the President.
On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of
her estate which they submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the
NHA.The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and
titles were issued in their favor.Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera directed Segunda
Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.
PR Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of
Francisca. She filed a Complaint
RTC dismissed the case but was reversed by CA. RTC remanded the case and thereafter
reversed the decision of NHA which was affirmed by CA. Hence petition.
ISSUE: W/N Sinumpang salaysay may be treated as a will.
HELD: When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the
effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument;
in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay" Hence, in such period, all the
interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until
they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:

1M girls 2010

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law.
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has
already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. The NHA issued its
resolution

on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca
Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights
and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the
disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property,
the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that
interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them
later to her heirsin accordance with a will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita
Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell

with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's
demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an
obligation on both partiesMargarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible. Margarita
Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by
operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the
decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the
NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties of a property
already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession
and the law on sales and obligations.
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the
next "person" likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The
opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on
guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263
(questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and void

should
have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent
who may claim the property after a testate or intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA
therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.