Stephen Scheidell

1. What has Athens to do with J erusalem?

The key difference between Augustine and Aquinas on the relationship of Greco-
Roman philosophies to Christianity rests in how distinct, i.e. autonomous, they saw the
two disciplines of philosophy and theology.
Augustine made no clear distinction; one cannot read his philosophical ideas without
frequenting his theological writings. For him, reason had a two-fold part to play in
relation to faith removing intellectual barriers so that one might come to faith, and once
one has come to faith, reason is employed again to penetrate the "data" of faith so that
one can come to understand ("faith seeking understanding.") The ultimate end for
Augustine is that one might use reason as a stepping-stone to faith, and that one might
finally arrive at mystic union with God. (This ultimate end finds itself again as Aquinas'
beatific vision.) To take the intellectual ascent toward understanding God, would be
incomplete until one takes also the spiritual ascent via faith by grace.
Since Augustine made no clear distinction between philosophy and theology, his
approach allowed him to investigate man in the concrete. While typically philosophers
treat of natural humankind and theologians deal with questions of humankind's
supernatural soul, Augustine's approach led him to study humankind as is fallen and
redeemed by divine grace.
Aquinas, on the other hand, argued that the two "sciences" be kept separate.
Philosophy begins with what the mind can grasp in its natural state, whereas theology
begins with divine revelation. In other words, philosophy takes authority from human
reason; theology takes authority from revelation. For Aquinas, since the two begin with
separate points of authority, they cannot be melded into one science. Human reason must
always be subject to revelation. This distinction provides a form of safeguard for both
disciplines finite human reason may only go so far, and divine revelation is kept from
the meddling of human reason.
This is not to say, however, that the two disciplines have no relationship to each
other. While Augustine focused on using reason to understand what one accepted by
faith, Aquinas might be likened to St. Thomas the apostle in that by pushing through
doubt intellectually, he becomes all the more willing and ready to accept Christ. St.
Thomas, after settling his doubt, cried "My Lord!" first among the apostles. Furthermore,
he came closer to (what Aquinas titled beatific vision) in physical life than anyone he
alone touched the scars in the hands and side of the glorified body of Christ. Simply put,
St. Thomas the apostle and Aquinas used reason as a tool to arrive at faith. In Aquinas
terms, philosophy serves as a handmaid to theology.
While I'm more inclined toward Aquinas' approach of distinguishing disciplines from
competing authorities, Augustine's ability to study humankind in the concrete offers an
excellent critique for Aquinas, who by separating the fields must consider natural human
via philosophy and supernatural soul via theology. Rather than arguing that one view is
more compelling than the other, I would prefer to argue for a melding of the two, that we
might understand humankind in the concrete without having human reason overstep its
territory, while also clearly leaving the relationship as part of the single process of
coming into union with God. I see the relationship between the two as a two-part line
(shades of Plato?) like the following:

|A|---------------------------------------|B|------------------------------------|C|

Human reasoning may take us from |A| to |B| at which point, divine revelation
(originating at |C|) guides us to God from |B|.

~

2. What is the problem of universals?

Aristotle's definition: "What is predicated of several things."

The problem of universals arises from competing metaphysical views, Realism (that
universals exist in particulars and are apt to be understood) and Idealism (that universals
exist only in the mind and are unfounded and useless for understanding reality). Both
views in their early stages led to difficulties. If universals exist in particulars we have
difficulty explaining the wide diversity of thing even under the same genus. If they do not
exist, by what means can we understand particulars in relation to other particulars?
Boethius answered the dilemma by way of the mind's abstraction, whereas Abelard
gave a linguistical response, saying that words are universal, not things.
Both Boethius and Abelard offered strong critiques of Realism. One argument
Boethius used explained that a universal genus cannot reside as a whole in each particular
simultaneously. In (B11-13) he argues that for the genus to remain wholly in each
particular, it must be multiplied by as many times as it is found in particulars. However,
if the genus is many, then another genus must be placed over that one, then another over
that, and so on.
Abelard argues that Realism abolishes all essential diversity amongst particulars
(A29). To use the genus of animal for example: If the essence animal is found in each
particular, then differences like irrational and rational would only be advening forms of
the same essence. This results in the odd conclusion that an irrational animal Browny is
essentially identical with rational animal Socrates. What diversity remains if even
Browny has the same identical essence as Socrates?
Boethius rests his mind by striking a middle-ground between Idealism and Realism
by his theory of abstraction. He argues that universals subsist in things, but are grasped
by the mind. (A31): "Species is nothing else than the thought gathered from the
substantial likeness of individuals. [Universals] subsist therefore in the realm of
sensibles, but are understood apart from bodies." The mind conjures a "likeness" gathered
from particulars, and this "likeness" is the universal.
Abelard took the most nuanced approach by throwing aside altogether that things are
predicated of others. He argued (A65) that words alone can be predicated of things. After
establishing this, he narrowed the universal further (A80-84) by saying that a word on its
own conjures a confused image in the mind. "Man" does not signify anything
specifically, but "man is walking" situates in the mind a precise concept that can be
predicated of several men who walk. Such a universal signifies truly by naming the
particulars (A145).