MUNOZ, JR. v.

ERLINA RAMIREZ and ELISEO CARLOS

25 August 2010
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses mortgaged a residential lot (which the wife inherited) to the GSIS to secure a housing loan
(200k). Thereafter, they used the money loaned to construct a residential house on said lot.
It is alleged that MUNOZ granted the spouses a 600k loan, which the latter used to pay the debt to GSIS. The
balance of the loan (400k) will be delivered by MUNOS upon surrender of the title over the property and an
affidavit of waiver of rights (over the property) to be executed by the husband. While the spouses were able to
turn over the title, no affidavit was signed by the husband. Consequently, MUNOZ refused to give the 400k balance
of the loan and since the spouses could no longer return the 200k (which was already paid to GSIS), MUNOZ kept
the title over the property and subsequently, caused the issuance of a new one in his own name.
The spouses then filed a case for the annulment of the purported sale of the property in favor of MUNOZ. The RTC
ruled that the property was the wifes exclusive paraphernal property (since she inherited it from her father) and
as such, the sale is valid even without the husbands consent.
The CA reversed and ruled that while the property was originally exclusive paraphernal property of the wife, it
became conjugal property when it was used as a collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal
funds. Hence, the sale is void.
ISSUE (1): Is the property paraphernal or conjugal?
RULING: PARAPHERNAL. As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved. In this case, clear evidence that the wife inherited the lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership. Consequently, the residential lot is the wifes
exclusive paraphernal property (pursuant to Article 92 and 109 of FC).
It was error for the CA to apply Article 158 of the CC and the ruling on Calimlim-Canullas. True, respondents were
married during the effectivity of the CC and thus its provisions should govern their property relations. With the
enactment of the FC however, the provisions of the latter on conjugal partnership of gains superseded those of the
CC. Thus, it is the FC that governs the present case and not the CC. And under Article 120 of the FC (which
supersedes Article 158 of the CC), when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in the value are
more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property shall belong to the
conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement; otherwise, the property shall be retained in ownership by the
owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement for the cost of improvement.
In this case, the husband only paid a small portion of the GSIS loan (60k). Thus, it is fairly reasonable to assume
that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the contribution paid by the husband. Thus, the
property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of the wife at the time she contracted with MUNOZ; the
written consent of the husband was not necessary.



Fuentes v. Conrado Roca, G.R. 178902, April 2010
Post under case digests, Civil Law at Friday, December 16, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
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FACTS: On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years later
in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who
would prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and
Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the removal of
Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would
be attained. Atty. Plagata thus went about to complete such tasks and claimed that he went to Manila to get the
signature of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed January 11, 1989.
As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and control over the lot. Eight
years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property on
the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios signature was a
mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the
ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that the testimony of Atty. Plagata
who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that the action has already prescribed.
On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating that the action has not prescribed since the
applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the
other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in 1989
and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within the prescriptive period.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their
conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed;
and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale.
RULING: 1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the document
giving consent and another document executed at the same time period. The SC noted that the CA was correct in
ruling that the heavy handwriting in the document which stated consent was completely different from the sample
signature. There was no evidence provided to explain why there was such difference in the handwriting.
2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in 1989, after the
effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships already established at the
enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is
completely void under Art 124 of the family code. With that, it is a given fact that assailing a void contract never
prescribes. On the argument that the action has already prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that
prescriptive period applied to the Fuentes spouses since it was them who should have assailed such contract due
to the fraud but they failed to do so. On the other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no consent given by
the other spouse does not prescribe since it is a void contract.
3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case to assail the
validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the action anymore. The SC ruled
that such position is wrong since as stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land
remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the
ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under
Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.

DELA PENA V. AVILA
G.R. No. 187490, [February 08, 2012]
FACTS:
Antonia Dela Pena (Antonia) obtained from A.C.Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of P250,000.00 with
interest pegged at 5% per month. Antonia executed a promissory note and a notarized Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over a 277 square meter parcel of residential land, together with the improvements thereon, situated in
Marikina City and previously registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Pea (Antonia), married to
Antegono A. Dela Pea (Antegono) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-32315 of the Registry of Deeds
of Rizal.[to secure the payment of the loan obligation.
Antonia executed another notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of Gemma Remilyn C. Avila
(Gemma), for the stated consideration of P600,000.00. As such Gemma caused the transfer of the aforesaid
property to her name. Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over same property in favor of FEBTC-BPI,
to secure a loan facility with a credit limit of P1,200,000.00.
Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, that she was the true and lawful
owner of the property and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her title was simulated.
The Register of Deeds inscribed the adverse claim.
FEBTC-BPI caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted over the property due to
Gemmas failure to pay the loan. As the highest bidder at the public auction conducted in the premises, FEBTC-BPI
later consolidated its ownership over the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name under TCT No. 415392
of the Marikina registry.
Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin Dela Pea (Alvin), filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed
of sale as the subject realty was conjugal property, and that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage Antonia executed in
favor of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono who was already dead by that time. Gemma specifically denied
the material allegations, maintaining that the realty was the exclusive property of Antonia who misrepresented
that her husband was still alive.
RTC held that the subject property was conjugal in nature and that the Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia executed in
favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code.
CA reversed the RTC decision, stating that the property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peas to
prove that the same was acquired during Antonias marriage to Antegono. Furthermore, that the Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Avila and the subsequent sale on auction of the subject property to FEBTC-BPI are upheld as valid
and binding. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the house and lot covered by TCT No. N-32315 conjugal
property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Pea.
HELD:
No, petition is denied. CA decision affirmed in toto.
RATIO:
Pursuant to Article 160 of the NCC, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove
that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an
essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case of
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, the Court said that the party who invokes the presumption under Art. 160 of the
NCC, must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition
during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the
presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no
showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of
conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality, the Dela Peas did not even come close to proving that the
subject property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and Antegono. Beyond Antonias bare and
uncorroborated assertion that the property was purchased when she was already married, the record is bereft of
any evidence from which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained.
In the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, the phrase married to is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife
and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner. Because it is likewise possible that
the property was acquired by the wife while she was still single and registered only after her marriage, neither
would registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was acquired during the marriage and,
for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. Since there is no showing as to when the property in question
was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal,
i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse.
As such, the nature of the property is paraphernal and the CA correctly ruled that the RTC reversibly erred in
nullifying Antonias sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the liquidation required under Article 130 of the
Family Code. Furthermore, Antonia treated the realty as her own exclusive property may, in fact, be readily
gleaned from her utilization thereof as security for the payment of the P250,000.00 loan she borrowed from
Aguila.



BEUMER V. AMORES
G.R. 195670 December 3, 2012
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J
FACTS:
Petitioner. a Dutch national, assails the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC Negros Oriental.
Petitioner and Filipina respondents marriage was nullified by basis of the formers psychological incapacity.
Petitioner thus filed for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership praying for distribution of the properties acquired
during their marriage which include 4 lots of land acquired through purchase and 2 lots by inheritance. RTC ruled
that all parcels of land be given to the respondent, tools and equipment in favour of the petitioner and the two
houses on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA?
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines. However, there are no restrictions
to the ownership of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are
considered co-owned by the parties.
Aguete vs. PNB
FACTS:
Spouses Ros filed a complaint for the annulment of the REM and all proceedings taken thereunder against PNB,
Laoag Branch. The averments in the complaint disclosed that Jos obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag
Branch and as security for the loan, he executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land. Upon maturity,
the loan remained outstanding.
As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial
sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB,Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of 1 year
without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB, Laoag
Branch.Claiming that she, Estrella, the wife, has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor she
consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property - a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings
pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of theproperty - interposing the defense that her signatures
affixed on the documents were forged andthat the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
In its answer, PNB prays for thedismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it
wasSpouses own actsof omission/connivance that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground
of estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.The trial court, in its decision ruled in favor of Spouses Ros
without prejudice to the rightof action of PNB to recover the amount of the loan and its interests. The trial court
declaredthat Estrella had no knowledge of the loan and mortgage, thus, under the Civil Code, theeffective law at
the time of the transaction, Ros could not encumber any real property of theconjugal partnership without Aguete's
consent. Aguete may, during their marriage and within tenyears from the transaction questioned, ask the courts
for the annulment of the contract her husband entered into without her consent, especially in the present case
where her consent isrequired.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the trial courtconcluded forgery without
adequate proof; thus it was improper for the trial court to rely solelyon Aguete's testimony that her signatures on
the loan documents were forged. The appellatecourt declared that Aguete affixed her signatures on the
documents knowingly and with her fullconsent. Assumingarguendo that Aguete did not give her consent to Ros'
loan, the appellatecourt ruled that the conjugal partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds redounded
tothe benefit of the family. The records of the case reveal that the loan was used for theexpansion of the family's
business. Therefore, the debt obtained is chargeable against theconjugal partnership.
ISSUE:
a.
Whether or not the evidence of Spouses Ros sufficiently proved that Estrella, thewife, did not consented, neither
signed the loan and the REM?
b.
Whether or not Jose can file the complaint?
c.
Whether or not the debt obtained by Jose, despite the allegation that the wife,Estrella, did not consent to the
same, is chargeable against the conjugalpartnership?RULING:
a.
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without theconsent, express or implied, of
the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract isvoidable.
Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros' encumbrance of the subject property. However, the
same article does not guarantee that the courts will
declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a findingthat the wife did not give
her consent. In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her
consent to Ros' encumbrance of thesubject property.The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged
before a notary public,hence they are public documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged and certified
asprovided by law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
beingprima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.
The execution of a document that has been ratified before a notarypublic cannot be disproved by the mere denial
of the alleged signer. Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a handwriting expert, who
could authoritatively declare that Aguete's signatures were really forged. A notarized document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and it has in its favor the presumption of
regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as
to the falsity of the certificate. Absent such, the presumption must be upheld. The burden of proof to overcome
the presumption of due execution of a notarial document lies on the one contesting the same. Furthermore, an
allegation of forgery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden of
proving the same.
b.
Ros himself cannot bring action against PNB, for no one can come before the courts with unclean hands. In their
memorandum before the trial court, petitioners themselves admitted that Ros forged Aguete's signatures. Ros in
legal effect admitted in the complaint that the signatures of his wife in the questioned documents are forged,
incriminating himself to criminal prosecution. If he were alive today, he would be prosecuted for forgery. This
strengthens the testimony of his wife that her signatures on the questioned documents are not hers.
c.
The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively "for additional working [capital] of buy &
sell of garlic & virginia tobacco."
In her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware whether it
prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans contracted by Ros, but did not know wherehe "wasted the money."
Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to
the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. If the husband himself is the
principal obligor in the contract,
i.e.,
he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that
contract falls within the term "x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual
benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From
the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to
be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession
fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, wherethe husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business,
the law presumes ,and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership .For
this reason, Ros' loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED







Pana v Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr. December 10, 2012 FACTS:
The prosecution accused Efren Pana, his wife Melencia, and others of murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Surigao City, and eventually a decision was rendered acquitting Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence
but finding Melencia and another person guilty as charged and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court
affirmed RTCs decision but modified the pen
alty to Reclusion Perpetua. As for the monetary awards, the court affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral
damages but deleted the award for actual damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place the court made an
award of php15, 000 each by way of temperate damages. In addition, the court awarded Php50, 000.00 exemplary
damages per victim to be paid solidarily by them. The decision became executory of October 1, 2001. Upon motion
for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ resulting in the levy of real
properties registered in the names of Efren and Melencia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on
execution were issued. On April 3, 2002, Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution
claiming that the properties levied were conjugal assets and not paraphernal of Melecia.
On September 16, 2002, the RTC denied the motion. The spouses moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied
the same. In this case, it is submitted that Efren and Melencia were married when the Civil Code was still in effect.
They did not execute a pre-nuptial agreement, hence CPG governed their property relations. However, both RTC
and CA held that property regime changed into ACP when family code took effect it reason out that Art. 256 of the
Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Both the RTC and the Court of the Appeals are in
error on this point. While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouses in their conjugal assets are inchoate or
unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of hains and, therefore none of them can be said to
have acquired vested rights in specific assets , it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to
reac back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relations all conjugal partnership of
gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melencia can be levied and executed upon for the
satisfaction of Melencias civil liability in the aforesaid murder case.
SUPREME COURT: YES, provided that the conditions under Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
First of all, the Supreme Court explained that it is clear from the facts that Efren and Melencia were married when
the Civil code was still the operative law on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is
that they were married under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. Furthermore, Article 119 of the Civil
Code provides that the future spouses main in marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains or upon a complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The family
code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage, and
clearly, under this situation, the spouses cannot modify their regime. Post marriage modification of settlements
can take place only where (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a
decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their
former property regime; (c)judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons
the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family; (d) there was judicial separation
of property under article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in this case.

In Spouses Aggabao vs. Parulan, et al. G.R. No. 165803, 1 September 2010, the buyers sought to purchase 2 lots
which was owned by estranged spouses. The wife presented a purported SPA from her husband.
The buyers allege that they acted in good faith in relying on the SPA. They inquired with the Register of Deeds on
the status of the properties and found that it had been encumbered on at least 2 occasions by the wife utilizing
SPAs executed by her husband.
The buyers proceeded to buy the properties. They were able to secure 1 TCT and transferred the title in their
name. Subsequently, they learned that the other TCT was with a brother of the husband. This brother sought to
negotiate a sale of the property separately. The property was offered for P800,000 but the buyers made a
counter-offer of P250,000 which was declined. The buyers would later on insist that the sale had already been
consummated with the wife.
The husband then brought suit against the buyers to annul the sale of both properties while the buyers sought
specific performance.
The court ruled against the buyers.
The court relied on the provisions of the Family Code when it invalidated the sale entered into by the wife with a
forged SPA. The buyers were obliged to exercise the necessary prudence to inquire into the wifes authority to
sell and that the sale of conjugal property without the consent of the husband was not merely voidable but void;
hence, it could not be ratified.
The court further stated that a purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another, without notice
that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays the full and fair price for it at the time
of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys
the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey
title to the property. He cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on his guard and still
claim he acted in good faith. The status of a buyer in good faith is never presumed but must be proven by the
person invoking it. And that diligence extends not only to verifying the status of the title but also to the authority
of the transacting spouse.
The buyers insistence that they performed due diligence in verifying the status of the TCTs is unavailing. Article
124 of the Family Code requires the consent of both spouses before the conjugal property may be disposed of by
sale, mortgage, or other modes of disposition. In Bautista v. Silva, the Court erected a standard to determine the
good faith of the buyers dealing with a seller who had title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell
was restricted, in that the consent of the other spouse was required before the conveyance, declaring that in order
to prove good faith in such a situation, the buyers must show that they inquired not only into the title of the seller
but also into the sellers capacity to sell. Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must observe two kinds of requisite
diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in verifying the validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the diligence
in inquiring into the authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the other spouse.
The buyers, knowing the requirements of the law, should have inquired into the SPA purportedly executed by the
husband. They would have discovered that the spouses had been estranged from each other and were under de
facto separation, and that they probably held conflicting interests that would negate the existence of an agency
between them. To lift this doubt, they must, of necessity, further inquire into the SPA of Ma. Elena. The omission
to inquire indicated their not being buyers in good faith xxx.
The unquestioning reliance on the SPA without first taking precautions to verify its authenticity was not a
prudent buyers move. The court found that the notary of the document was not even authorized to act as such
for the period in question.
Moreover, making payment despite the absence of one TCT shows a lack of precaution. The court noted their
passivity in not insisting on a copy of the title which reflected their lack of due care.
Their good faith is also called into question by their failing to take immediate action against the seller when they
found one of the titles to be in the possession of another. Instead, they even met with this third party in order to
negotiate. In this case, it was further established that the signature of the husband had been forged, since he was
out of the country at the time and the notary was not authorized.
Apart from checking the title with the Register of Deeds, a buyer should now also check the authenticity of an SPA
- or better yet get both spouses to sign the deed of sale - including the credentials of the notary public in order to
prove good faith and the exercise of due diligence, specially when dealing with spouses. It is only what the
spouses have sold together that the courts will not put asunder.

Flores vs Lindo
In October 1995, Edna Lindo obtained a loan amounting to P400k from Arturo Flores. To secure the loan, Edna
executed a deed of real estate mortgage on a property which is however part of the conjugal property (it was both
in her name and her husbands name Enrico Lindo). Only Edna signed the deed. But in November 1995, Enrico
executed a special power of attorney authorizing Edna to mortgage the property.
Edna was not able to pay the loan despite repeated demands from Flores. Flores then filed an action to foreclose
the mortgage.
The trial court (RTC Manila, Branch 33) ruled that the action for foreclosure cannot prosper because it appears that
there was no valid mortgage between Edna and Flores. Edna mortgaged the property without the consent of her
husband and the special power of attorney executed by Enrico a month after the execution of the deed did not
cure the defect. The trial court however ruled that Flores can instead file a personal action (collection suit) against
Edna.
Eventually, Flores filed a suit for collection of sum of money against Edna and Enrico (raffled to RTC Manila, Branch
42). The Lindo spouses filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion.
The spouses then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The CA ruled in favor of the spouses. It ruled that when Flores filed an action for the foreclosure of the mortgage,
he had abandoned the remedy of filing a personal action to collect the indebtedness. These remedies are mutually
exclusive.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that as a rule, a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that
is, to recover the debt; and that he has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money
or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. These remedies are indeed mutually exclusive.
However, in this case, the Supreme Court made a pro hac vice decision (applicable only to this case and as an
exception to the rule) which allows Flores to recover via a personal action despite his prior filing of a real action to
recover the indebtedness. This procedural rule cannot be outweighed by the rule on unjust enrichment. Here,
Edna admitted her liability of indebtedness.
Quiao vs Quiao
FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered
a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and
all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the
children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children because Brigido is the offending spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period. After more than nine months from
the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to
define the term Net Profits Earned.
RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each *of the+ spouse and the debts. It further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse
does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of
the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of
Article 102. He argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all
the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired
during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the
couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided
between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established,
irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no
separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. And since the legal
separation decision states that the share of Brigido in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido
will still be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the
Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from
their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains
or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of
the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those
debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties,
there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the
spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share
from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article
63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may
be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.

Protacio Go vs Servacio
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code, any disposition of the conjugal property after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in the conjugal
partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share without an actual partition
of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal
or abstract quota in Martas share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had
the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.
Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer
(Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share. Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the
applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the
thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their
shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners
who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the
benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her.