Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT O APPEALS !"# PEOPLE O THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CAMPOS, $R., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for revie of the decision of the Court of !ppeals
1
affir"in# in
toto the $ud#"ent of the Re#ional %rial Court, &ranch 'IV, Oro(uieta Cit), findin# hi" #uilt) of the cri"e of
atte"pted "urder.
*ro" the records, e #athered the folloin# facts.
In the "ornin# of *ebruar) +, ,-.-, Sulpicio Intod, /or#e Pan#asian, Santos %ubio and !velino Dali#di#
ent to Salvador Manda)a0s house in 1atu#asan, 2ope3 /aena, Misa"is Occidental and as4ed hi" to #o
ith the" to the house of &ernardina Palan#pan#an. %hereafter, Manda)a and Intod, Pan#asian, %ubio and
Dali#di# had a "eetin# ith !niceto Du"ala#an. 5e told Manda)a that he anted Palan#pan#an to be 4illed
because of a land dispute beteen the" and that Manda)a should acco"pan) the four 6+7 "en, otherise,
he ould also be 4illed.
!t about ,8988 o0cloc4 in the evenin# of the sa"e da), Petitioner, Manda)a, Pan#asian, %ubio and Dali#di#,
all ar"ed ith firear"s, arrived at Palan#pan#an0s house in 1atu#asan, 2ope3 /aena, Misa"is Occidental.
!t the instance of his co"panions, Manda)a pointed the location of Palan#pan#an0s bedroo". %hereafter,
Petitioner, Pan#asian, %ubio and Dali#di# fired at said roo". It turned out, hoever, that Palan#pan#an as
in another Cit) and her ho"e as then occupied b) her son:in:la and his fa"il). No one as in the roo"
hen the accused fired the shots. No one as hit b) the #un fire.
Petitioner and his co"panions ere positivel) identified b) itnesses. One itness testified that before the
five "en left the pre"ises, the) shouted9 ;<e ill 4ill )ou 6the itness7 and especiall) &ernardina
Palan#pan#an and e ill co"e bac4 if 6sic7 )ou ere not in$ured;.
2
!fter trial, the Re#ional %rial Court convicted Intod of atte"pted "urder. %he court 6R%C7, as affir"ed b) the
Court of !ppeals, holdin# that Petitioner as #uilt) of atte"pted "urder. Petitioner see4s fro" this Court a
"odification of the $ud#"ent b) holdin# hi" liable onl) for an i"possible cri"e, citing !rticle +6=7 of the
Revised Penal Code hich provides9
!rt. +6=7. CRIMIN!2 RESPONSI&I2I%>. ? Cri"inal Responsibilit) shall be incurred9
@@@ @@@ @@@
=. &) an) person perfor"in# an act hich ould be an offense a#ainst persons or
propert), were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of
the e"plo)"ent of inade(uate or ineffectual "eans.
Petitioner contends that, Palan#pan#an0s absence fro" her roo" on the ni#ht he and his
co"panions riddled it ith bullets "ade the cri"e inherentl) i"possible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines ar#ues that the cri"e as not i"possible. Instead,
the facts ere sufficient to constitute an atte"pt and to convict Intod for atte"pted "urder. Respondent
alle#ed that there as intent. *urther, in its Co""ent to the Petition, respondent pointed out that9
. . . %he cri"e of "urder as not consu""ated, not because of the inherent
i"possibilit) of its acco"plish"ent 6!rt. +6=7, Revised Penal Code7, but due to a
cause or accident other than petitioner0s and his accused0s on spontaneous
desistance 6!rt. A., Ibid.7 Palan#pan#an did not sleep at her house at that ti"e.
5ad it not been for this fact, the cri"e is possible, not i"possible.
3
!rticle +, para#raph = is an innovation
%
of the Revised Penal Code. %his see4s to re"ed) the void in the Old
Penal Code here9
. . . it as necessar) that the e@ecution of the act has been co""enced, that the
person conceivin# the idea should have set about doin# the deed, e"plo)in#
appropriate "eans in order that his intent "i#ht beco"e a realit), and finall), that
the result or end conte"plated shall have been ph)sicall) possible. So lon# as
these conditions ere not present, the la and the courts did not hold hi"
cri"inall) liable.
&
%his le#al doctrine left social interests entirel) unprotected.
'
%he Revised Penal Code, inspired b) the
Positivist School, reco#ni3es in the offender his for"idabilit),
(
and no penali3es an act hich ere it not
ai"ed at so"ethin# (uite i"possible or carried out ith "eans hich prove inade(uate, ould constitute a
felon) a#ainst person or a#ainst propert). ) %he rationale of !rticle +6=7 is to punish such cri"inal
tendencies.
9
Bnder this article, the act perfor"ed b) the offender cannot produce an offense a#ainst person or propert)
because9 6,7 the co""ission of the offense is inherentl) i"possible of acco"plish"ent9 or 6=7 the "eans
e"plo)ed is either 6a7 inade(uate or 6b7 ineffectual.
10
%hat the offense cannot be produced because the co""ission of the offense is inherentl) i"possible of
acco"plish"ent is the focus of this petition. %o be i"possible under this clause, the act intended b) the
offender "ust be b) its nature one i"possible of acco"plish"ent.
11
%here "ust be either i"possibilit) of
acco"plishin# the intended act
12
in order to (ualif) the act an i"possible cri"e.
2e#al i"possibilit) occurs here the intended acts, even if co"pleted, ould not a"ount to a cri"e.
13
%hus9
2e#al i"possibilit) ould appl) to those circu"stances here 6,7 the "otive,
desire and e@pectation is to perfor" an act in violation of the laC 6=7 there is
intention to perfor" the ph)sical actC 6A7 there is a perfor"ance of the intended
ph)sical actC and 6+7 the conse(uence resultin# fro" the intended act does not
a"ount to a cri"e.
1%
%he i"possibilit) of 4illin# a person alread) dead
1&
falls in this cate#or).
On the other hand, factual i"possibilit) occurs hen e@traneous circu"stances un4non to the actor or
be)ond his control prevent the consu""ation of the intended cri"e.
1'
One e@a"ple is the "an ho puts his
hand in the coat poc4et of another ith the intention to steal the latter0s allet and finds the poc4et e"pt).
1(
%he case at bar belon#s to this cate#or). Petitioner shoots the place here he thou#ht his victi" ould be,
althou#h in realit), the victi" as not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to acco"plish his
end.
One !"erican case had facts al"ost e@actl) the sa"e as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong,
1)
the accused,
ith intent to 4ill, ai"ed and fired at the spot here he thou#ht the police officer ould be. It turned out,
hoever, that the latter as in a different place. %he accused failed to hit hi" and to achieve his intent. %he
Court convicted the accused of an atte"pt to 4ill. It held that9
%he fact that the officer as not at the spot here the attac4in# part) i"a#ined here he
as, and here the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an atte"pt to 4ill. It is ell
settled principle of cri"inal la in this countr) that here the cri"inal result of an atte"pt
is not acco"plished si"pl) because of an obstruction in the a) of the thin# to be
operated upon, and these facts are un4non to the a##ressor at the ti"e, the cri"inal
atte"pt is co""itted.
In the case of Strokes vs. State,
19
here the accused failed to acco"plish his intent to 4ill the victi"
because the latter did not pass b) the place here he as l)in#:in ait, the court held hi" liable for
atte"pted "urder. %he court e@plained that9
It as no fault of Stro4es that the cri"e as not co""itted. . . . It onl) beca"e i"possible
b) reason of the e@traneous circu"stance that 2ane did not #o that a)C and further, that
he as arrested and prevented fro" co""ittin# the "urder. %his rule of the la has
application onl) here it is inherentl) i"possible to co""it the cri"e. It has no application
to a case here it beco"es i"possible for the cri"e to be co""itted, either b) outside
interference or because of "iscalculation as to a supposed opportunit) to co""it the
cri"e hich fails to "ateriali3eC in short it has no application to the case hen the
i"possibilit) #ros out of e@traneous acts not ithin the control of the part).
In the case of Clark vs. State,
20
the court held defendant liable for atte"pted robber) even if there as
nothin# to rob. In disposin# of the case, the court (uoted Mr. /ustice &ishop, to it9
It bein# an accepted truth that defendant deserves punish"ent b) reason of his cri"inal
intent, no one can seriousl) doubt that the protection of the public re(uires the punish"ent
to be ad"inistered, e(uall) hether in the unseen depths of the poc4et, etc., hat as
supposed to e@ist as reall) present or not. %he co""unit) suffers fro" the "ere alar" of
cri"e. !#ain9 <here the thin# intended 6atte"pted7 as a cri"e and hat is done is a sort
to create alar", in other ords, e@cite apprehension that the evilC intention ill be carried
out, the incipient act hich the la of atte"pt ta4es co#ni3ance of is in reason co""itted.
In State vs. Mitchell,
21
defendant, ith intent to 4ill, fired at the indo of victi"0s roo" thin4in# that the
latter as inside. 5oever, at that "o"ent, the victi" as in another part of the house. %he court convicted
the accused of atte"pted "urder.
%he aforecited cases are the sa"e cases hich have been relied upon b) Respondent to "a4e this Court
sustain the $ud#"ent of atte"pted "urder a#ainst Petitioner. 5oever, e cannot rel) upon these decisions
to resolve the issue at hand. %here is a difference beteen the Philippine and the !"erican las re#ardin#
the concept and appreciation of i"possible cri"es.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in !rticle +6=7, e@pressl) provided for i"possible cri"es and
"ade the punishable. <hereas, in the Bnited States, the Code of Cri"es and Cri"inal Procedure is silent
re#ardin# this "atter. <hat it provided for ere atte"pts of the cri"es enu"erated in the said Code.
*urther"ore, in said $urisdiction, the i"possibilit) of co""ittin# the offense is "erel) a defense to an
atte"pt char#e. In this re#ard, co""entators and the cases #enerall) divide the i"possibilit) defense into
to cate#ories9 le#al versus factual i"possibilit).
22
In US vs. !ilson
23
the Court held that9
. . . factual i"possibilit) of the co""ission of the cri"e is not a defense. If the cri"e could
have been co""itted had the circu"stances been as the defendant believed the" to be,
it is no defense that in realit) the cri"e as i"possible of co""ission.
2e#al i"possibilit), on the other hand, is a defense hich can be invo4ed to avoid cri"inal liabilit) for an
atte"pt. In US vs. "errigan,
2%
the accused as indicated for atte"ptin# to s"u##le letters into and out of
prison. %he la #overnin# the "atter "ade the act cri"inal if done ithout 4noled#e and consent of the
arden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter ithout the latter0s 4noled#e and consent and
the act as perfor"ed. 5oever, un4non to hi", the trans"ittal as achieved ith the arden0s
4noled#e and consent. %he loer court held the accused liable for atte"pt but the appellate court
reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that ;eli"ination of i"possibilit) as a defense to a
char#e of cri"inal atte"pt, as su##ested b) the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal le#islation, is
consistent ith the overhel"in# "odern vie;. In disposin# of this contention, the Court held that the
federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, folloin# the principle of le#alit), no person could
be cri"inall) liable for an act hich as not "ade cri"inal b) la. *urther, it said9
Con#ress has not )et enacted a la that provides that intent plus act plus conduct
constitutes the offense of atte"pt irrespective of le#al i"possibilit) until such ti"e as such
le#islative chan#es in the la ta4e place, this court ill not fashion a ne non:statutor)
la of cri"inal atte"pt.
%o restate, in the Bnited States, here the offense sou#ht to be co""itted is factuall) i"possible or
acco"plish"ent, the offender cannot escape cri"inal liabilit). 5e can be convicted of an atte"pt to co""it
the substantive cri"e here the ele"ents of atte"pt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is
penali3ed, not as an i"possible cri"e, but as an atte"pt to co""it a cri"e. On the other hand, here the
offense is le#all) i"possible of acco"plish"ent, the actor cannot be held liable for an) cri"e ? neither for
an atte"pt not for an i"possible cri"e. %he onl) reason for this is that in !"erican la, there is no such
thin# as an i"possible cri"e. Instead, it onl) reco#ni3es i"possibilit) as a defense to a cri"e char#e ? that
is, atte"pt.
%his is not true in the Philippines. In our $urisdiction, i"possible cri"es are reco#ni3ed. %he i"possibilit) of
acco"plishin# the cri"inal intent is not "erel) a defense, but an act penali3ed b) itself. *urther"ore, the
phrase ;inherent i"possibilit); that is found in !rticle +6=7 of the Revised Penal Code "a4es no distinction
beteen factual or ph)sical i"possibilit) and le#al i"possibilit). Ubi le# non disting$it nec nos disting$ere
debemos.
%he factual situation in the case at bar present a ph)sical i"possibilit) hich rendered the intended cri"e
i"possible of acco"plish"ent. !nd under !rticle +, para#raph = of the Revised Penal Code, such is
sufficient to "a4e the act an i"possible cri"e.
%o uphold the contention of respondent that the offense as !tte"pted Murder because the absence of
Palan#pan#an as a supervenin# cause independent of the actor0s ill, ill render useless the provision in
!rticle +, hich "a4es a person cri"inall) liable for an act ;hich ould be an offense a#ainst persons or
propert), ere it not for the inherent i"possibilit) of its acco"plish"ent . . .; In that case all circu"stances
hich prevented the consu""ation of the offense ill be treated as an accident independent of the actor0s
ill hich is an ele"ent of atte"pted and frustrated felonies.
<5ERE*ORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereb) DR!N%ED, the decision of respondent
Court of !ppeals holdin# Petitioner #uilt) of !tte"pted Murder is hereb) MODI*IED. <e hereb) hold
Petitioner #uilt) of an i"possible cri"e as defined and penali3ed in !rticles +, para#raph =, and E- of the
Revised Penal Code, respectivel). 5avin# in "ind the social dan#er and de#ree of cri"inalit) shon b)
Petitioner, this Court sentences hi" to suffer the penalt) of si@ 6F7 "onths of arresto mayor, to#ether ith the
accessor) penalties provided b) the la, and to pa) the costs.
SO ORDERED.
%eliciano, &egalado and 'ocon, ((, conc$r
'arvasa, C(, is on leave
*acts9 Intod and co"pan) ere tas4ed to 4ill Palan#:pan#an due to land dispute. %he) fired at her roo".
5oever, she as in another cit) then thus the) hit no one.
Issue9 <ON he is liable for atte"pted "urderG
5eld9 No. Onl) i"possible cri"e. In the Philippines, !rticle +6=7 provides and punishes an i"possible cri"e
?an act hich, ere it not ai"ed at so"ethin# (uite i"possible or carried out ith "eans hich prove
inade(uate ould constitute a felon) a#ainst person or fa"il). Its purpose is to punish cri"inal tendencies.
%here "ust either be 6,7 le#al responsibilit), or 6=7 ph)sical i"possibilit) of acco"plishin# the intended act in
order to (ualif) the act as an i"possible cri"e. 2e#al i"possibilit) occurs here the intended acts even if
co"pleted, ould not a"ount to a cri"e. %hus9 2e#al i"possibilit) ould appl) to those circu"stances
here9
6,7 %he "otive, desire and e@pectation is to perfor" an act in violation of the laC
6=7 %here is no intention to perfor" the ph)sical actC
6A7 %here is a perfor"ance of the intended ph)sical actC and
6+7 %he conse(uence resultin# fro" the intended act does not a"ount to a cri"e.
*actual i"possibilit) occurs hen e@traneous circu"stances un4non to actor or be)ond control prevent
consu""ation of intended cri"e.
*actual i"possibilit) of the co""ission of the cri"e is not a defense. If the cri"e could have been
co""itted had the circu"stances been as the defendant believed the" to be, it is no defense that in realit),
the cri"e as i"possible of co""ission. 2e#al i"possibilit) on the other hand is a defense hich can be
invo4ed to avoid cri"inal liabilit) for an atte"pt. %he factual situation in the case at bar presents a ph)sical
i"possibilit) hich rendered the intended cri"e i"possible of acco"plish"ent. !nd under !rticle +,
para#raph = of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to "a4e the act an i"possible cri"e.