Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
by
JOHN MCGOWAN
jpm@unc.bitnet
Department of English
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
_Postmodern Culture_ v.4 n.1 (September, 1993)
pmc@unity.ncsu.edu
Copyright (c) 1993 by John McGowan, all rights
reserved. This text may be used and shared in
accordance with the fair-use provisions of U.S.
copyright law, and it may be archived and redistributed
in electronic form, provided that the editors are
notified and no fee is charged for access. Archiving,
redistribution, or republication of this text on other
terms, in any medium, requires the consent of the
author and the notification of the publisher, Oxford
University Press.
Review of:
Owens, Craig. _Beyond Recognition: Representation, Power,
and Culture_. Ed. Scott Bryson, Barbara Kruger, Lynne
Tillman, and Jane Weinstock. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992.
[1]
significant here is not the fact of the matter, but the form
that the defense of oppositional artists takes. Owens has
not gotten past the association of purity and integrity with
poverty, with producing the art work which does not become a
commodity. He is setting himself up to reach the same dead
end that avant-garde art has been reaching for seventy-five
years: the dead end of silence as the only pure act and the
dead end of isolation from every audience because to appeal
to anyone outside the self (or, in some cases, outside a
small coterie) is to become implicated in social forms of
exchange that are repudiated.
[6]
In this context, the poststructuralist critique of
representation comes across as a new variant on this
long-standing modernist obsession with purity. To even
engage in debate with the culture, it seems, would be to
succumb to its terms.
It is not the ideological content of representation of
these Others that is at issue. Nor do contemporary
artists oppose their own representations to existing
ones; they do not subscribe to the phallacy of the
positive image. (To do so would be to oppose some
'true' representivity to a 'false' one.) Rather, these
artists challenge the activity of representation itself
which, by denying them speech, consciousness, the
ability to represent themselves, stands indicted as the
primary agent of their domination." (262)
What would it mean to "indict" the "activity of
representation itself" in the name of "the ability to
represent themselves"? By rejecting a conflict within the
social over different representations with the assertion
that every positive image is a phallacy, Owens places the
artist on the path of pure negation that has been a
modernist treadmill since at least Flaubert's desire to
write a novel about nothing.
[7]
The critic is left in even a worse position than the
artist.
"What you are saying, then, is that to represent is to
subjugate?" "Precisely. There is a remarkable
statement by Gilles Deleuze . . . that encapsulates the
political ramifications of the contemporary critique of
representation: 'you [Deleuze says to Foucault] were
the first . . . to teach us something absolutely
fundamental: the indignity of speaking for others.'"
(261-2)
Owens as critic does nothing else but speak for others. He
wrote only one essay--"Outlaws: Gay Men in Feminism"--that
is even remotely self-referential, and he is still speaking
for gay men, not of this particular gay man. Everything he
writes performs the traditional critical task of mediating