Tayler Moosa

Paper One


The Racial Contract and its Effects, Both Historical and Present


The Racial Contract, a theory proposed by Charles W. Mills, provides an explanation for
how white supremacy has maintained itself as the unnamed political system that has made the
modern world what it is today.
1
Mills argues that, even in philosophy courses, courses that
encourage critical analysis of various systems, the social and political domination of nonwhites
by whites is seen as the background, taken for granted, from which political systems arise.
2

However, the Racial Contract is based on the Social Contract, and thus the Social Contract must
be examined before an explication of the Racial Contract will hold any contrasting weight. So,
before I address the Racial Contract, I am going to discuss briefly the Social Contract, its
descriptive application in political theory that survived anthropological contradictions, and what
is missing from it that is addressed by the Racial Contract before I discuss the Racial Contract
and its influences, both past and present.
The Social Contract is a theory posited by modern contractarians as an agreement formed
by individuals as they left the state of nature and entered into a state of civilization. Though there
exist various accounts of the state of nature left by those entering into the Social Contract, the
broad strokes accepted by all are sufficient to fulfill the purpose of accounting for the
fundamental structure of human civilization: cooperation. This description, Mills points out, is
only a heuristic tool to understand various civilizations as possessing at their core this tacit
agreement between its members; the Social Contract is cited as a description of the various

1
Charles Wade Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1999), p. 1.
2
Mills, The Racial Contract, p. 2.
political and moral systems while it is no longer accepted as a legitimate origin story that takes
as fact a particular set of individuals who crafted an agreement in order to leave the state of
nature. For an example of how Social Contract theory is used to understand a particular piece of
legislation, a law against murder can be seen through the Social Contract theory as existing due
to those within a society all agreeing that, because each individual does not want to be murdered,
they will give up their right to kill another, barring extenuating circumstances.
The Social Contract, describing an abstract relationship between individuals as they came
together in an attempt to explain political and ethical theory, is thus either egalitarian in nature or
at least does not specifically bar an equality of the participants; the Social Contract describes the
abstract individual, not the African woman, the Chinese man, or any other particular expression
of humanity. It is this abstract man that, along with others devoid of any particular race, comes to
an agreement with others as to how the political system and the moral system will function. The
problem with this, Mills contends, is that there exists within the Social Contract a Racial
Contract through which certain groups are relegated to possessing a lesser degree of personhood.
Throughout history, Mills points out that the shaping of various political structures, moral
systems, and epistemologies has not been done in a way that mirrors the established pattern in
the Social Contract with its abstract men; instead of abstract individuals coming together,
cultural development has instead been founded on a contract, sometimes tacit and other times
overt, agreed upon between members of a particular group that details how those of other,
oppressed groups are to be considered in relation to the oppressing group.
This agreement specifically addresses the felt bias throughout history, a bias that can be
seen through various social and political systems, through the actions of certain nations toward
others, and as shaping the development of political, moral, social, and epistemological spheres in
ways that maintain a preference for a certain group of individuals at the expense of others.
Unlike the Social Contract, the Racial Contract is described by Mills as a naturalized theory;
Mills points to various historical events in which whites came together and decided how to
interact with nonwhites and to what extent the nonwhites were to be conceptually relegated to a
lesser form of existence.
When discussing the relationship between whites and nonwhites within the framework of
the Racial Contract, the term white comes into immediate question. The term white, though
intuitively held to be simply a descriptive classification based on ones skin and a set of
phenotype expressions, is in fact, Mills points out, much more fluid. Whiteness, though perhaps
a somewhat accurate comparison in complexion between the Europeans and the various groups
both historically and presently held by the Racial Contract to be, to varying degrees, inferior, is
more accurately understood as a description of those who possess political and social power over
others. The Shoah is one such example of those in power, the Nazi Party, essentially redefining
personhood to exclude a group that had been and continues to be a group often considered as
white or off-white. The underlying excluding conception of personhood that positioned one
particular group over others and led to genocide fits into a paradigmatic structure, defined by
Mills, perennially dividing whites and nonwhites despite the somewhat fluid state of membership
to either group.
Another point, along with the fluidity of group membership, is the fluidity of the degree
of influence the Racial Contract has. The severity of the Racial Contract is as impermanent as the
whiteness of any particular group, reaching at times extreme instances of genocide and at other
times somewhat subtle levels of cultural acceptance of racial difference. When the Nazi Party
murdered millions of Jewish people and when the European settlers found their way to North
America and began killing through various methods the indigenous Native Americans, there can
be seen a formal agreement between those making up the group of oppressors. What can be more
formal than a legal justification of the murder of those not considered to possess the personhood
required to be valued? However, the Racial Contract is not always as overt as mass murder; any
relegation of nonwhites by whites fits within this framework. For example, Mills uses the
example of the white realtor who greets nonwhites with a smile yet consciously makes it more
difficult for them to purchase a house in a predominately white neighborhood.
3
For whatever
reason, perhaps I could be polite and assume that the realtor in this example is not being
malicious but is instead concerned for the comfort of the nonwhite family searching for a home,
the realtor is making an attempt to relegate the nonwhite families she refuses help enter white
neighborhoods to those that are set aside for nonwhites. In short, from the masking smile of the
realtor to the systematic execution of the Jewish people, the Racial Contract is seen as the
underlying agreement from which the relegation of nonwhites to subpersonhood arises.
One particular occurrence of the application of the Racial Contract amongst many in
history is the European colonization of North America. Though intuitively accepted that the
history books written by the oppressors will offer a sympathetic view of them and will downplay
the tragic events that occurred under the scope of oppression, it is an uncontested fact that the
European settlers arrived, made an assessment that the indigenous people were not entitled to
their land, and took aggressive steps to occupy the already occupied space. The Racial Contract
was actualized in the mindset of those that opted to relegate the nonwhite natives to the
subperson status of savage, thus reducing the natives to a status below that of having complete
personhood. Mills states, In the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson characterized Native

3
Mills, The Racial Contract, p. 75.
Americans as merciless Indian Savages, and this mentality is evident from the onset of the
interaction between the original settlers and the members of the Native American tribes.
4
This,
not unlike the colonization of Africa by various European nations, points to whiteness as more
than the color of skin found in the particular groups; in both historical events, the Europeans took
as the standard their ideal conception of a civilized system and evaluated negatively the
encountered nonwhite cultures that utilized savage practices in place of sophisticated political
and moral systems. While the concern of the Europeans in the colonization of Africa was that of
moral salvation (those in Europe saw the African tribes as unchristian and thus immoral), the
primary concern in North America was the land that the Native Americans called home.
Along with the relegation of nonwhites to a position of inferiority and subpersonhood, the
colonization of North America also exemplifies the racing of space, defined by Mills as the
depiction of space as dominated by individuals (whether persons or subpersons) of a certain
race.
5
Joyce E. Chaplin illuminates the understanding had by the Europeans during the time of
the colonization of North America that the space occupied by the Native Americans was not for
the Native Americans as the Europeans were suffering less from the diseases that they
themselves brought over from Europe.
6
While it is now accepted as historical fact that the
European settlers possessed an immune system typically more able to fight off diseases that the
Europeans had been around previously and thus were spared from the devastating casualties
suffered by the Native Americans by these same diseases that were foreign to them, at the time
of colonization the Europeans saw this as a providential expression of the simple fact that the

4
Chaplain
5
Mills, The Racial Contract, p. 42.
6
Chaplain
land was meant for the Europeans who were clearly more suited to live there than the Native
Americans who were thus seen as foreigners on their own land.
This example interestingly seems as though it shows the racing of space, but not
particularly in the sense that Mills describes in The Racial Contract. He expresses the circular
indictment directed at nonwhites through the racing of space, stating, You are what you are in
part because you originate from a certain kind of space, and that space has those properties in
part because it is inhabited by creatures like yourself.
7
However, what we see in the above
example described by Chaplain differs in one important aspect: the whites, instead of associating
the land with inferiority as it was currently inhabited by the nonwhites, found the land suitable
and thus stated the superiority of the land that must then not be the Native Americans space. For
a more standard approach to space racing by European colonizers, one only need to examine the
reasoning employed to justify the colonization of Africa. It is there that Europeans were not
interested in acquiring the land for themselves; there, in the Dark Continent, is where the
superstition and devil worship needed to be purged from the land by Christian light.
8

The colonization of North America is only one example of the influence the Racial
Contract has had on the history of philosophy, specifically within Ethics. When considering how
people are to be treated, a fundamental question is that of who will be considered people. Thus,
the Racial Contract has consistently enabled whites to justify the oppression as ethically
permissible due to the belief that the nonwhites are in some way less than those who deserve
moral consideration. While we see a general lack of moral consideration in instances like the
colonization of North America and with slavery in North America, the colonization of Africa by
the various European nations shows not simply a negation of personhood held by nonwhites but

7
Mills, The Racial Contract, p. 42.
8
Mills, The Racial Contract, p. 46.
also a feeling of ethical superiority held by the whites who felt morally required to educate
through oppression the indigenous peoples of Africa that were, as mentioned above, immoral due
to their lack of Christianity.
Further back to Aristotle, the idea that slavery was acceptable for certain groups and not
others is yet another example of how the Racial Contract has influenced ethics. Julie K. Ward
discusses not only Aristotles conception of personhood that was granted to the fullest extent
only to a particular set of individuals with the others being relegated to various lesser positions
that included enslavement, but also that Aristotle was, to use Millss terminology, racing space
with specific regard to climate.
9
The Europeans climate was too cold, and thus the inhabitants
had not enough intelligence, while the Asians climate was too hot, causing a lack of spirit that
made them susceptible to tyranny. These natures, arising from the various climates that were
inferior to the Greeks own climate, made certain groups suited for enslavement; Ward notes, In
Politics, 1.1, for example, Aristotle uses a contrast, Greek-barbarian, in order to show that
barbarians have the sort of nature that makes them able to be enslaved by Greeks.
10
At various
places around the globe and at various times throughout history, the influence of the Racial
Contract is seen affecting the development and the application of ethical theory.
So Mills has presented an account for a divide between two groups of people, he has
shown through various historical events the effects the Racial Contract has had on cultural
development in various places during various times, and he now leaves us with the question of
what must be done in an effort to correct the bisection of the human race. Though there have
been great strides toward the equality of various disenfranchised groups, specifically within the

9
Julie K. Ward, "Ethnos in the Politics: Aristotle and Race," in Philosophers on Race: Critical
Essays (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002)
10
Ward, Ethnos in the Politics, p. 23.
United States of America that, less than two hundred years ago legally permitted slavery, the
more subtle conceptual distinctions, like that of the realtor, are still present in society. The first
step in addressing any problem is an acceptance that there exists a problem at all. At the
beginning of The Racial Contract, Mills describes this agreement as a tacit foundation, one that
has not yet been mentioned, and so Mills has taken this first step for us by outlining this
historically persisting agreement.
11

The next step is to address the systemic bias that further enforces conceptual differences
between whites and nonwhites. This concern does not stop at the notion of biased laws that exist
against only one group, but, and I argue that this is the more pressing concern, also the biased
application of the unbiased law. For example, journalist LZ Granderson discusses why those in
the black community do not trust the police:

But when youve been pulled over for no good reason as many times as I have; when
youve been in handcuffs for no good reason as many times as I have; when you run out
to buy some allergy medicine and upon returning home, find yourself surrounded by four
squad cars with flashing lights and all you can think about is how not to get shot, you
learn not to trust cops.
12



When a member of the police department pulls someone over solely for the color of their skin, an
experience commonly known as driving while black, it is both an obvious example of the
fulfillment of the Racial Contract and something that can be objectively evaluated; if the officer
in question pulls over a person without legitimate cause, the evaluative process of that officer is
in need of an adjustment and there is no subjective basis that can be called upon in defense of
that targeting action. What I am stating here is not a particular system through which we can

11
Mills, The Racial Contract, p. 1.
12
LZ Granderson, "Why Black People Don't Trust the Police," CNN, March 23, 2012, accessed
February 17, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/22/opinion/granderson-florida-shootings/.
eliminate all racial bias from the enforcing of the law, but rather simply an acknowledgement of
a particular expression of the Racial Contract that exists today and that can seemingly be dealt
with, given the proper system.
I previously stated that the biased enforcement of unbiased law is more of a concern than
biased law due to the tendency now to lean toward subtler adherence to the racial contract. While
there have certainly been shocking instances of legalized racial valuation, the associated shock
points to the underlying problem already. The shock of the genocide taking place in Germany
during the Shoah immediately pointed to the problem. As I have stated, the first step to dealing
with a problem is to acknowledge that it exists. When discussing the higher likelihood for police
harassment of nonwhites than whites, heard responses consist of Well, if they arent breaking
the law, the shouldnt have anything to worry about, and If so many of them didnt commit
crimes, cops wouldnt be suspicious. It is precisely because we know that speed limits and
traffic laws in general are not biased that whites feel able to take the position that there must be
some legitimate reason why the application of the law is only seemingly unfair.
Charles Mills, through his theory of the Racial Contract, has identified the historical
cause for various biases and divisions amongst the peoples of various communities throughout
time. Though whiteness is a fluid concept and the severity of the effects of the Racial Contract is
not constant, the Racial Contract has persisted unnoticed in mainstream political theory and
philosophical inquiry into the foundations of society. Mills leaves us with the task of taking steps
to lessening the effects of the Racial Contract, and I propose that an evaluation of the
enforcement of our laws is a good first step in doing this, as this, to a larger degree than the
crafting of biased legislation, maintains the felt divide between those considered whites and the
nonwhites.