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ICMR Case Collection

ICFAI Center for Management Research

The Delhi Metro Project: Effective Project

Management in the Indian Public Sector

& Sachin Govind,

under the direction of S.S. George,

ICFAI Center for Management Research (ICMR). It was compiled from published sources, and is intended

This case was written by Namratha V. Prasad

to be used as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a

to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a  2006, The ICFAI Center for Management

2006, The ICFAI Center for Management Research. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means- - electronic or mechanical, without permission.

To order copies, call +91-40-2343-0462/63 or write to ICFAI Center for Management Research, Plot # 49, Nagarjuna Hills, Hyderabad 500 082, India or email icmr@icfai.org. Website: www.icmrindia.org

PROM/005 The Delhi Metro Project: Effective Project Management in the Indian Public Sector “Everyone who
PROM/005 The Delhi Metro Project: Effective Project Management in the Indian Public Sector “Everyone who
PROM/005 The Delhi Metro Project: Effective Project Management in the Indian Public Sector “Everyone who

PROM/005

The Delhi Metro Project: Effective Project Management in the Indian Public Sector

“Everyone who has traveled by the Delhi Metro wants one in his or her city. Today, there is a national resurgence in public interest in urban public transport.” 1

- Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, in 2006.

“The successful implementation of the Delhi Metro project would not have been possible without

timely availability of funds and the necessary political support. An equally important role has been

played by the DMRC’s corporate culture, which emphasizes that targets are most sacrosanct and

our dignity is in performing our duty well.”

2

– E. Sreedharan, Managing Director, Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., in 2005.

INTRODUCTION

With a 6.5 km section of Line 3 becoming operational in April 2006, Phase I of the Delhi Metro 3

project was nearing completion. Of the total length of 65.16 km of the first phase, 62 km had been

completed and opened for service. This phase was set to cost Rs. 98 billion. As of early 2006,

around 450,000 passengers were traveling by the Delhi Metro every day.

The Delhi Metro was meant to solve Delhi’s traffic problems, which had become almost

unmanageable. The first steps to build a metro system in the city were taken in the early 1990s. In

1995, the Government of India (GoI) and the Government of the National Capital Territory of

Delhi (GNCTD) formed the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd (DMRC) under the Companies Act

to construct the Delhi Metro. Conceived as a social sector project, a significant portion of the

project cost was funded through a soft loan provided by the Japanese government through Japan

Bank International Corporation (JBIC)

equity.

E. Sreedharan (Sreedharan) was appointed managing director (MD) of the DMRC and project manager for Phase I of the project in November 1997. Work on Line 1 of Phase I started in October 1998. DMRC formed consortiums to advise it on the project and to provide it with the latest technology. It also saw to it that the foreign companies worked with the Indian companies to ensure that the latter assimilated their expertise and technological know-how.

4 . The rest was contributed by GoI and GNCTD through

1 “PM lays foundation stone for Bangalore Metro,” www.pib.nic.in, June 24, 2006.

2 “Interview with Mr. E. Sreedharan, Managing Director, Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd,” www.indiainfoline.com, December 19, 2005.

3 A metro system is usually an urban electric mass transit railway system independent of other traffic and with high frequency. A metro system includes elevated, at-grade, and underground sections.

4 JBIC was founded in 1961 by the Japanese government as the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). It served as the implementing agency for loan aid given to entities in developing countries. OECF generally gave low-interest (around 2.1%), long-term funds (about 20 years with five year grace period). In 1999, OECF was merged with Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) to form the JBIC.

1

The Delhi Metro Project… The DMRC faced any number of technical and syst emic challenges

The Delhi Metro Project…

The DMRC faced any number of technical and systemic challenges during the construction of the metro. However, thanks to thorough planning, an effective project design, and a ‘we-mean business’ culture, it was able to overcome all these hurdles. The organizational culture was based on punctuality, honesty, and a strict adherence to deadlines. The DMRC successfully managed the various stakeholders in the project like the general public, government bodies, etc., and also ensured that the project was environmentally safe.

With Phase I of the Delhi Metro project nearing completion, the GoI decided to extend the metro network and work on Phase II of the Delhi Metro project was set to commence in September 2006. In the process of implementing the project, the DMRC had gained a lot of technological expertise, which would be used by other cities in India and abroad to build metro systems similar to the Delhi Metro.

BACKGROUND NOTE

Metro systems were generally considered as a transport option when the population of a city

crossed the 1 million mark (Refer Exhibit I to know more about metro transit systems). Delhi

crossed that milestone as early as in the 1940s. The 1950s saw a doubling of the city’s population;

with that, the vehicular traffic also soared. By the early 1990s, Delhi had more registered vehicles

than Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai put together. It had become one of the most polluted cities in

the world, with automobiles contributing to more than two thirds of the total atmospheric

pollution. There was an urgent need felt at this point to improve both the quality and availability of

mass transport services in Delhi.

The first ever traffic study of Delhi (titled the ‘Origin – Destination Survey of Traffic of Greater

Delhi’) was carried out by the Central Road Research Institute (CRRI) in 1957. As many as 35

more studies on Delhi’s transport problems were conducted subsequently by various entities (Refer

Exhibit II for some of these studies). Almost all these studies recommended the Mass Rapid Transit

System (MRTS) as a means to solve Delhi’s traffic problems.

In 1989, the GNCTD, with support from the GoI, commissioned a feasibility study for developing

an MRTS for Delhi. The study was undertaken by Rail India Technical & Economic Services Ltd.

(RITES) 5 and completed in 1991. RITES recommended a three-component transit system

comprising rail corridors (surface/elevated), metro corridors (underground), and a dedicated

busway, totaling 198.5 km. This mix of elevated and underground sections was proposed in order

to bring down the overall project cost .

RITES further recommended sequential construction of the total network because of the high costs

associated with the project. The complete network was to have 16 lines. Sections with higher

projected passenger traffic densities were to be constructed first.

In 1995, RITES submitted a Detailed Project Report (DPR) for Phase I of the Delhi Metro project.

6

THE DELHI METRO PROJECT

In order to implement the Delhi Metro project, the GoI and the GNCTD set up a 50:50 joint venture company called the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC). The company was incorporated under the Companies Act in May 1995. The DMRC was to complete Phase I of the

5 RITES, established in 1974, is the multi-disciplinary consultancy wing of the Indian Railways. RITES has served as a consultant to top organizations and Governments in 55 countries. It largely operates in the fields of transport, infrastructure, and related technologies.

6 As of 2002, the cost of building the underground section was estimated to be Rs. 2.70 billion per kilometer, while the cost of building an elevated section was Rs. 1 billion per kilometer. Underground sections required stricter environmental control and fire safety systems. The operational cost of maintaining underground sections was also higher.

2

The Delhi Metro Project… project within 10 years, i.e., by the end of 2005. After

The Delhi Metro Project…

project within 10 years, i.e., by the end of 2005. After the recommendations of various other civic organizations had been incorporated, the proposal for Phase I of the Delhi Metro project was approved by the GoI in September 1996.

Phase I was to connect Delhi’s business, education, and shopping districts. It was to cover about 340 hectares of land (of which about 58% was government land, 39% was private agricultural land, and 3% was private urban land) and involved the design and construction of three lines (with a total length of 56 km), 50 stations (of which 10 were underground), and three maintenance depots (Refer Figure I and Table I for the plan for Phase I).

Figure I: Phase I of the Delhi Metro Project

for Phase I ). Figure I: Phase I of the Delhi Metro Project Source: www.urbanrail.net. Table

Source: www.urbanrail.net.

Table I

Phase I of the Delhi Metro

Line

Length of Line

Route

Line 1 (Red line)

22km

Shahdara to Rithala

Line 2 (Yellow line)

11km

Vishwa Vidyalaya to Central Secretariat

Line 3 (Blue line)

23km

Barakhamba to Dwaraka

Source: www.delhimetrorail.com.

FUNDING THE PROJECT

Globally, most urban MRTS projects were financially unviable because the fares could not be fixed solely on a commercial basis. If the fares were fixed too high, the passenger numbers would remain low, thereby defeating the very purpose of setting up the system. Therefore, the concerned governments generally bore the capital costs of an MRTS system. In the case of the Delhi Metro project too, the GoI and the GNCTD bore the capital costs.

3

The Delhi Metro Project… The total cost of the first phase of the project wa

The Delhi Metro Project…

The total cost of the first phase of the project was initially estimated at Rs. 60 billion, at April 1996 prices. Later in 2002, with the cost of the project rising by approximately 10% per year, the estimate was revised to Rs. 89.27 billion.

Initially, for Phase I of the metro to become viable, it was estimated that it would have to transport 2.2 million passengers per day. This was later revised to 1.5 million passengers per day. The economic IRR 7 (internal rate of return) of the project worked out to be about 21.4% 8 while the financial IRR was less than 3%. In view of the high cost of the project and the low financial IRR, some ministers in the GoI even suggested that the project be dropped. However, the GoI decided to go ahead with it, keeping in mind that it was essentially a “social sector” project, expected to benefit the regional economy in more ways than one.

The financial plan for Phase I was approved by the GNCTD and the GoI in 1996. Of the project

cost, 28% was to be financed by equity, subscribed to equally by the GoI and the GNTCD. The two also agreed to give interest-free subordinate loans to cover the cost of land acquisition, which was expected to be about 5% of the total project cost. Funding for the major share or about 64% of the project cost was to be provided by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF – which

later became JBIC) through a time-sliced soft loan . JBIC disbursed the loan in tranches with each

tranche treated as a separate loan, with its own moratorium and repayment period. The repayment

period for each tranche was set at 30 years, which included a 10-year grace period (Refer Table II

9

for the loan tranches given by JBIC).

Table II

Loans from JBIC

 

Amount

Tranche

Year

(in mn yen)

Interest

1 1997

14,760

2.3%

2 2001

6,732

2.3%

3 2002

28,569

1.8%

4 2003

34,012

1.8%

5 2004

59,296

1.8%

6 2005

19,292

1.3%

Source: www.delhimetrorail.com.

Property development 10

funds to cover the remaining 3% of the project cost. The debt-equity ratio was fixed at 2:1. The

GoI and the GNCTD also decided to bear the exchange rate risks equally. The DMRC planned to

repay the OECF loan through surpluses from revenues, property development around metro stations and its corridors, and levies/taxes on the residents of Delhi. Further, the project was exempted from custom and excise duties.

at the highly lucrative sites around the metro stations was to generate

7 Internal Rate of Return or IRR is defined as the rate of return that would make the present value of future cash flows plus the final market value of an investment equal to the current value of the investment. It is used by firms to make decisions regarding long-term investments. (Source: www.investorwords.com)

8 Phase I of the Delhi Metro was expected to generate substantial benefits to the economy by way of saving time for commuters, enabling reliable and safe journeys, reducing atmospheric pollution, curtailing the number of accidents, reducing fuel consumption, reducing vehicle operating costs, increasing the average speed of road vehicles, and improving the quality of life – all of which, in turn, were expected to make Delhi a more attractive city for investment.

9 Time-sliced loans are given in parts (tranches or slices). Each part had its own interest rate, moratorium, and repayment period.

10 The DMRC planned to generate around Rs. 6 billion by developing real estate projects in and around the metro stations. This included an IT park, a mega shopping mall cum multiplex, restaurants, ATM counters, beverage counters, web stores, chemist’s shops, and coffee parlors.

4

The Delhi Metro Project… THE PROJECT TEAM With the funding for the project being finalized,

The Delhi Metro Project…

THE PROJECT TEAM

With the funding for the project being finalized, the next step was to constitute a project team. Sreedharan was appointed as project manager and managing director of the DMRC in November 1997. A technocrat, he had had a long stint in the Indian Railways (IR) and had retired in 1990. During his service with IR, he had earned a reputation for completing major projects 11 on time and within the budget.

By the end of 1998, DMRC was able to recruit only 100 people; around 70% of the senior staff at the DMRC was on deputation from IR. The long delay in recruitment prompted critics of the project to comment that it was an indication that the project itself would take more time and money than planned.

Sreedharan was given complete freedom to pick and choose the project team. He selected a motivated team of professionals whom he regarded as fundamental to the success of the project. “Each member of the team was interviewed personally by me. I went through their track record

particularly with regard to their integrity,” 12 said Sreedharan. Most of the staff was between 18 and

30 years. Unlike other public sector organizations in India, the DMRC opted for a lean structure. It

had just two departments – project organization, and operation & maintenance.

The Delhi Metro was only the second metro project in India (the Kolkata Metro 13 being the first).

Since the technology to build metro systems was highly specialized, experts in the areas of civil

engineering, electrical engineering, communications engineering, etc., were needed. However, the

DMRC faced the problem of skill shortage as the country had neither institutes which taught metro

technology nor experienced personnel. Therefore, after recruiting suitable candidates, the DMRC

sent them abroad for training. The key operating and maintenance personnel received training at

Hong Kong’s Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC). They, in turn, trained the rest of the

staff. Later the DMRC opened its own ‘Metro Training School’ at Shastri Park, New Delhi.

Sreedharan too visited subway systems around the world for ideas on building the Delhi Metro. In

an interview describing the difficulties he faced in getting suitable people, Sreedharan said, “When

we started there was a handicap as almost everyone was new to metro projects. Then we educated

all the personnel and officers and absorbed experience from general consultants to upgrade our

skills and now these very personnel have become one of the greatest assets to the nation.” 14

The corporation aimed to project an image of efficiency, courtesy, and a “we-mean-business”

attitude; the employees were also required to be polite and discharge their duties to perfection.

“What is important is that I have created an organization which has got a unique work culture and

organizational values. The team consists of hard-working, dedicated, and professionally competent

people,” 15 said Sreedharan.

The DMRC corporate culture was based on integrity. It was clear to the management at the DMRC that if the metro was to be built within the budget and on time, they would have to put in place effective contract-awarding and procurement processes in order to prevent corruption – the bane of most public sector projects in India. For this, the contract-awarding process was made transparent and simple. The procurement processes were made ‘fair and just’ by removing almost all traces of subjectivity from tender evaluation.

11 In 1963, Sreedharan was in charge of the repair of the Pamban bridge joining Rameshwaram, an island off the coast of Tamil Nadu, with the mainland. He was able to complete the project in 46 days when the project duration was set at 180 days. In 1997, he was put in charge of the Konkan Railways project, which involved building a railway system along the west coast of India, covering 760 km. The project, which was a major engineering feat with 150 bridges and 93 tunnels, was completed in record time and within the budget.

12 “First section of the Delhi Metro to open this year,” www.highbeam.com, January 03, 2002.

13 The Kolkata Metro in the eastern city of Kolkata (earlier known as Calcutta) in India was inaugurated in 1984. It is 16.45 km long and has 17 stations.

14 “Taking Metro to new heights,” www.hinduonnet.com, April 04, 2005.

15 “Taking metro to new heights,” www.hinduonnet.com, April 04, 2005.

5

PLANNING THE PROJECT The Delhi Metro Project… In India, major infrastructure projects are ofte n

PLANNING THE PROJECT

The Delhi Metro Project…

In India, major infrastructure projects are often stalled because of a lack of funds, political interference, lack of professionalism and accountability, property disputes, corruption, etc. Therefore, even before the commencement of the project, the DMRC attempted to put in place effective systems to ensure the smooth progress of the project.

Funding was not an issue in the case of the Delhi Metro project because it was settled even before the project commenced. In order to steer clear of political interference, the DMRC sought autonomy on all major matters and the GoI promised to give it this autonomy. “Financial powers were vested in the managing director. Also, the managing director was the last authority on tenders,” 16 said Anuj Dayal (Dayal), chief public relations officer, DMRC.

Next, the project manager put in place a system where every individual would be accountable for his/her role in the project. Each employee had to prepare a detailed project report (DPR) with particulars regarding the work assigned and work completed each day and this was to be submitted to the respective supervisors. In case of deviations, the employee had to give reasons for the

deviations and see that they were rectified. Every Monday, the heads of departments had to meet to

review progress, set new targets, or revise targets. Great stress was laid on adherence to schedules

and reverse clocks were to be used to indicate the number of days left before important deadlines.

This kind of approach was unusual in public sector projects in India.

Even though the project commenced three years later than originally planned, Sreedharan and his

team decided to stick to the original deadline for the completion of the first phase, i.e., December

2005. “When the government approved the project, it was envisaged that the metro would be

completed in 10 years. Work should have started in 1995, but we didn’t have an organization in

place until 1997 so we were only able to begin work in April 1998. Nevertheless, we said we

would complete the first phase within seven years to meet the original target. This will be quite an

achievement to build a metro from scratch within seven years,”

Like other major infrastructure projects in India, the Delhi Metro project too faced its share of

property disputes. To ensure that these disputes did not hinder the progress of the project, the GoI

enacted the Delhi Metro Railway (Operation & Maintenance) Act, 2002

in 2002. The Act, which spelt out the rules for the local authorities, superseded the local municipal

laws of Delhi. Also, lower courts were barred from issuing stay orders. This, to a large extent,

prevented property owners affected by the project from getting stay orders from courts to halt

work on the project. In other cases, the DMRC engaged a team of lawyers to make sure that the

courts did not grant such stay orders.

In order to control costs, the total expenditure of the Delhi Metro was split into three broad heads – manpower, energy, and materials including maintenance. Each of these accounted for approximately one-third of the project cost.

To control manpower costs, DMRC employed only 45 persons per kilometer of track – a number that was close to the international norm. Kolkata Metro, in contrast, had employed three times as many people. The organization was designed to be lean but effective. To keep down energy costs, DMRC entered into a special agreement with the Delhi Transco Ltd. 19 to source power 20 for the

17 said Sreedharan.

18 or the Delhi Metro Act

16 “On the fast track,” www.tribuneindia.com, January 02, 2005.

17 “First section of the Delhi Metro to open this year,” www.highbeam.com, January 03, 2002.

18 Prior to 2002, the Delhi Metro project came under the Metro Railways (Construction and Works) Act, 1978. The 1978 Act was enacted to facilitate the construction of the Calcutta (Kolkata) Metro. Since this Act covered only the construction stage of Metro Railways, the need for an exclusive Act for the Delhi Metro, covering operation and maintenance, was felt. Therefore, the Delhi Metro Act was enacted by the GoI in 2002.

19 Delhi Transco Ltd is the state-run transmission utility for Delhi.

6

The Delhi Metro Project… project at a very low rate. DMRC used Primavera Project Planner

The Delhi Metro Project…

project at a very low rate. DMRC used Primavera Project Planner 3.0 21 for project planning and monitoring. The resource planning module of the software alerted users if there was an excess or shortage of resources and the cost planning module provided a complete cost break-up for the project.

The software allowed the DMRC to keep track of project activities, the quantum of work completed at different levels, the time lost or gained, etc. It also provided information of all critical and upcoming activities, making it possible to keep track of and reschedule activities wherever necessary. This was vital considering that the loss incurred if one day of work was lost was about Rs. 5 million.

In order to ensure quality in construction, the DMRC appointed a special quality assurance team

independent of the field executives. Safety was a major concern. All personnel working at the

construction site were required to wear helmets and other appropriate safety gear.

The DMRC adopted a global bidding program for consultancy and contracts that required at least

one Indian partner. This was done to facilitate technology absorption by Indian firms and to ensure

that the technology was localized and re-engineered. “One of the preconditions for any

multinational company to bid for a Delhi Metro project is it should have an Indian partner,” 22 said

Dayal.

The DMRC secured the best technology available globally, for the Delhi Metro (See Exhibit III for

features of the Delhi Metro). “We are proud to say that Delhi Metro has the best and latest

technology in the world, sourced from various countries. In fact it would be appropriate to say that

we are using tomorrow’s technology today,”

23 said Sreedharan. Several multinational engineering

corporations from Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden worked

on the project (See Exhibit IV for the names of the various companies involved in the project).

A five-member consortium, called the General Consultants Group, was constituted in 1998 to

provide overall consultancy for the project. This group included the Japanese firms Pacific

Consultants International (PCI), Japan Railway Technical Services, and Tonichi Engineering

Consultants Inc, US-based Parson Brinkerhoff International Inc., and RITES. The group was lead

by PCI.

Initially, there was disagreement between the IR and Sreedharan over the gauge to be adopted for

24 , generally used in metro systems the world

the metro. Sreedharan was in favor of standard gauge

25 , the gauge used over most of the railway network in

India. Finally the GoI intervened and asked the DMRC to adopt the broad gauge for the Delhi

Metro. This confusion delayed the project by a few months.

The work on utility diversion was undertaken much before the work on a particular section commenced. The DMRC followed a systematic process wherein the concerned consortium surveyed the area for the utilities (water pipes, sewer, power cables, etc) to be diverted and submitted a written report to the DMRC. The DMRC in turn forwarded it to the concerned utility bodies, which completed the work within a prescribed period.

over, while the IR favored the broad gauge

20 The Delhi Metro project sourced its power from different sources in order to ensure continuous supply of power. They are - Badarpur Thermal power station, Northern Region Electricity Board and NTPC thermal power station. The DMRC paid the Delhi Transco Rs. 4.80 per unit.

21 Primavera Project Planner 3.0 software was developed by Primavera of the US, and supplied to the DMRC by KGL Systems which was a technical and marketing partner of Primavera in India.

22 “Riding high in Delhi,” usembassy.state.gov, July- August 2003.

23 “Interview with Mr. E. Sreedharan,” www.indiainfoline.com, December 19, 2005.

24 The tracks in standard gauge are set 1435 mm or 4 ft 8 1/2 inches apart.

25 The tracks in broad gauge are set 1680 mm or 5 ft 6 inches apart.

7

The Delhi Metro Project… The DMRC decided to adopt construction technologies that would help it

The Delhi Metro Project…

The DMRC decided to adopt construction technologies that would help it make up for lost time. These included trench-less digging and the use of pre-fabricated/precast concrete 26 blocks and ballastless tracks 27 . The use of ballast-less tracks also minimized maintenance costs, reduced vibration, and provided greater riding safety and comfort for passengers.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Construction work on the project commenced on October 1, 1998. The entire project was divided into three lines. Further, these lines were divided into sections (Refer Table III for details of Phase I of the Delhi Metro project).

Table III Details of Phase I

Particulars

Sections

Character

Length, Stations

Opened on

Line 1

Shahdara to

Elevated and

7.92

km,

25/12/2002

(Shahdara to

Tis Hazari

at-grade.

6

stations

Rithala)

Tis Hazari to

4.74

km,

04/10/2003

Inder Lok

4

stations

Inder Lok to

9.40

km,

01/04/2004

Rithala

8

stations

Total

22.06 kms, 18 stations

 

Line 2 (Vishwa Vidyalaya to Central Secretariat)

Vishwa Vidyalaya

Underground

4

km,

20/12/2004

to Kashmere Gate

4

stations

Kashmere Gate to

7

km,

03/07/2005

 

Central Secretariat

6

stations

Total

11 kms, 10 stations

 

Line 3 (Barakhamba to Dwaraka)

Barakhamba to

Elevated and

22.79 kms,

31/12/2005

Dwaraka

At Grade

22 stations

 

with a short

With extensions to Line 3.

Dwaraka- Subcity

underground

section

6.5 kms,

01/04/2006

Dwaraka

6

stations

 

Barakhamba to

where it joins

2.81

kms,

Expected to

Indraprastha

Line 2.

3

stations

be completed

 

in September

2006.

Total

32.1 kms, 31 stations

 

Total length of Phase I

65.16 kms, 59 stations

Source: www.delhimetrorail.com.

26 Precast concrete was generally prepared by casting concrete in reusable molds in a controlled environment. Later, it would be transported to the construction site and set into place. It generally was of higher quality and cheaper than traditional concrete.

27 Ballast, consisting of gravel and cinders, usually form the track bed on which railway sleepers are laid. In ballastless tracks, tracks are placed on concrete without sleepers or ballast being used. Ballastless tracks are mainly used on high speed lines and in tunnels.

8

The Delhi Metro Project… Line 1 (Shahdara to Rithala) The work on Phase I commenced

The Delhi Metro Project…

Line 1 (Shahdara to Rithala)

The work on Phase I commenced with the Shahdara-Tis Hazari section of Line 1, covering a distance of about eight kilometers. The work involved utility diversions, barricading, and actual civil construction. A major part of this section was on elevated tracks. All tracks in the elevated corridor were laid on concrete (ballastless). The tracks were supported on single piers. The elevated viaducts had a height of 10 m and were built generally in the middle of the roads.

The tracks were fenced with 10 ft high concrete slabs with barbed circular wire on top to prevent trespassing. The section where the metro crossed over the river Yamuna was constructed first because the density of traffic was projected to be the highest on this route. Building across the river Yamuna was completed by using a special technique called ‘incremental launching’ 28 . The use of this method caused minimum disturbance to traffic. This was also expected to provide a smoother journey for commuters because of a lack of joints. Line 1 also included a short section which was built at-grade. Line 1 became completely operational with the inauguration of the Inder Lok to Rithala section in April 2004.

Line 2 (Vishwa Vidyalaya to Central Secretariat)

Line 2 of Phase I covered 11 km and was completely underground. Of this, a four km stretch

(Vishwa Vidyalaya to Kashmere Gate) was constructed by Kumagai Gumi of Japan, Skanska of

Sweden, Itochu of Japan, and Hindustan Construction Company (HCC) of India using the ‘cut and

cover’ 29 method. The work for the remaining seven km (Kashmere Gate to Central Secretariat)

began in April 2001 and was handled by M/s International Metro Civil Contractors (IMCC) 30 , a

joint venture of five companies. Of this section, four km involved underground tunneling which

was done using fully automated, high performance boring machines. The remaining three km were

constructed using the ‘cut and cover’ method. This section of Line 2 was completed eight months

ahead of schedule.

The tunneling started in August 2002 and was completed by September 2004. Different types of

machines were used for tunneling, depending on the soil conditions. For a distance of four km

between Kashmere Gate and Patel Chowk, Rock Tunnel Boring Machines (TBM) and Earth

31 (EPBM), purchased from Bangkok Metro

To further speed up the process of tunneling, the DMRC used the New Austrian Tunneling

Method 33 (NATM). This method provided temporary support to the rock by means of shotcrete 34

and rock bolts till permanent concrete was used (Refer Exhibit V for more about the tunneling

process). The twin tunnels for up and down movement of trains were made using high quality

Pressure Balance Machines

32 , were used for tunneling.

reinforced concrete. The finished internal diameter of these tunnels was 5.7 meters.

28 In incremental launching, segments of the bridge were precast and then were launched in place with the help of special low-friction sliding bearings with lateral guides.

29 This is a simple method of excavation for building tunnels. In this process a trench is dug and is later roofed over, with strong supporting beams to prevent roof collapse.

30 IMCC comprised Dyckerhoff Widmann AG (DYWIDAG) (Germany), Larsen and Toubro (India), Samsung Corporation (Korea), Shimizu Corporation (Japan), and Ircon International (India).

31 The EPBM is a type of tunnel boring machine (TBM). It is generally used when boring below the water table. The cutter head is pressurized with either fluid or air to balance the water pressure. EPBM operators generally had to undergo intensive training including passing through decompression chambers like deep sea divers.

32 Bangkok Metro was constructed by the Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA) and operated by Bangkok Metro Public Company Limited (BMCL) under a 25-year concession.

33 NATM used the geological stress of the rock mass in the tunnel to stabilize the tunnel. An optimal cross section was computed using geotechnical measurements. Shotcrete was used, immediately after excavation, to create a natural load-bearing ring in the tunnel which also minimized rock deformation.

34 Shotcrete (sprayed concrete) generally used compressed air to shoot concrete onto surfaces. It was generally used in vertical structures, rock surfaces or for rock support during tunneling activities.

9

The Delhi Metro Project… The completion of tunneling was a major milestone for the Delhi

The Delhi Metro Project…

The completion of tunneling was a major milestone for the Delhi Metro project in view of the tricky ground conditions and the requirement to ensure complete safety of the buildings in the vicinity. Most of the buildings in that area had shallow foundations. The DMRC therefore undertook a ‘condition survey’ of each building and strengthened the foundations of the weak buildings. This was all the more important as the tunneling activity was carried out in areas with very old buildings, some even dating back to the 17th century Mughal Empire. “The new underground section was the most difficult and formidable stretch of Phase-I of the metro. We had to preserve the architectural heritage of old Delhi and the character of Lutyen’s Delhi,” 35 said Sreedharan. The metro underground tunnel was expected to have a life of 120 years.

The first four km section of Line 2 between ViswaVidyalaya and Kashmere Gate became operational in December 2004. The line’s final seven km section opened in July 2005. Line 2 was completed within the budget and nine months ahead of the contracted schedule.

Line 3 (Barakhamba to Dwaraka Subcity)

The work on Line 3 started in February 2003. In April 2004, the GoI and the DMRC decided to

extend Line 3. This led to the addition of about 9 km and nine metro stations to Line 3. With the

extension, the total length of Phase I increased to 65.16 km (13.01 km Metro corridor and 52.15

km Rail Corridor). The scheduled completion date of this phase was also revised from end 2005 to

March 2006. The revised cost of Phase I of the Delhi Metro was estimated to be Rs. 105.71 billion,

which excluded the cost of the Dwarka sub-city extension (Rs. 3.20 billion) which was to be

funded by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA).

Over the course of the Delhi Metro project, the Indian partners - especially RITES – in the

consortiums acquired several capabilities. This gave the DMRC and RITES the confidence to

manage the construction of Line 3 on their own even though the stretch passed through some of

the most congested areas of Delhi. Moreover, some changes were incorporated in Line 3 to cut

down on costs as well as on time to make the facility more user-friendly. For example, Line 3 used

U-shaped girders 36 in constructing most of the elevated sections. These were believed to be cost

effective, aesthetic, and sound absorbent. Also, cement was replaced with steel at many places in

order to save time.

The Barakhamba-Dwarka Metro section was inaugurated on December 31, 2005. This section was

elevated or at-grade with a short underground section in central New Delhi that intersected with

Line 2 at Connaught Place. At that place, the track was at a depth of 16 meters. It gradually rose to

a height of 10.5 meters. It was constructed at a 3% gradient, which meant that the track rose by three meters for every 100 meters traveled horizontally. This section was completed in 30 months. The elevated track reached a maximum height of 17.5 meters at Raja Garden crossing, where it crossed over an existing flyover. It also became, at 23 km, the longest metro section in the world to be put to service at one go.

In April 2006, the extension line from Dwarka to Dwarka sub-city was inaugurated. As more land was available in this section, the metro tracks were supported not on a single large pier but on two smaller circular piers placed side by side with a small foundation. This also meant that no buildings had to be demolished or people displaced as in the construction of the other lines. All the work on Line 3 was completed by April 2006, except for the Barakhamba to Indraprastha section, which was expected to be completed by September 2006.

35 “New underground section of Delhi Metro inaugurated,” www.outlookindia.com, July 02, 2005

36 A girder is a support beam used in construction. Tracks were laid on girders across elevated sections, especially bridges.

10

The Delhi Metro Project… MANAGING THE STAKEHOLDE RS IN THE PROJECT Effective project management involved

The Delhi Metro Project…

MANAGING THE STAKEHOLDERS IN THE PROJECT

Effective project management involved not only completing the project on schedule and within the budget, but also managing the project’s stakeholders. The stakeholders included the governments, the contractors, the funding agencies, and the general public.

Despite assurances that the DMRC would enjoy autonomy, it faced political pressure not only in its recruitment processes, promotions, and contract awarding but also in land acquisition. However, the DMRC resisted this pressure. “…we never changed any decision simply because somebody wants it. If it was required technically or from a professional angle, yes, we do it. Not because anybody wants it,” 37 said Sreedharan.

The DMRC also ensured that it paid the contractors, whom it called “associates,” on time. It was able to complete most of the project within the budget mostly by limiting corruption. “The

contractors are grateful not to have to give bribes to get a project,” 38 said Sreedharan. Because of the cordial relationship that the DMRC was able to establish with the contractors, they worked harder to help the DMRC in its project activities. In fact, the project was finished ahead of

schedule on certain sections because of the suggestions given by the contractors on utility

diversion and surface road traffic management.

Considering that the Delhi Metro was constructed mostly with Japanese funds, DMRC put in

special efforts to maintain good relations with JBIC officials. It made it a point to invite JBIC

officials to the inauguration events of various metro sections.

The DMRC also tried to ensure that the project did not cause much inconvenience to the general

public. It faced and overcame challenges of relocating a large number of utilities like water pipes,

sewerage lines, telephone and electric cables, to facilitate the construction work. It ensured that all

these utilities were diverted in advance, so that there was no interruption of services during the

construction of the metro in a particular area. It organized community interaction programs to

inform and seek solutions from the public. “We have a community meeting to explain what we

will do, what problems are likely to arise for them, and to seek their help. We have publicized a

telephone help line number so that anyone with a problem or question can contact us,” 39 said

Sreedharan.

The DMRC also faced the difficult task of relocating the people

40 evicted from properties acquired

for the project. It built temporary accommodations for the people who were to be relocated. With

the Delhi Metro Act coming into force, the DMRC faced very few legal problems in acquiring

properties. About 400 cases were filed against the DMRC on this issue, out of which only 100

were pending as of 2006. Of these, most were for augmenting the assessed value of the property,

and the compensation to be paid. “One of our main achievements has been our ability to acquire

land and move people without any major problems, whereas this is normally a very sensitive issue in India,” 41 said Sreedharan.

In order to lessen the difficulties for motorists and pedestrians, alternate traffic plans for the roads affected by the construction work were prepared well in advance, with the assistance of the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi. When the construction began, barricades were put up with assistance from Delhi Traffic Police. Moreover, new roads were built or the existing roads widened to accommodate traffic before work actually started.

37 “Politicians know I cannot be maneuvered,” www.rediff.com, March 10, 2006.

38 “Elattuvalapil Sreedharan, Getting New Delhi on track,” www.time.com, 2003.

39 “First section of the Delhi metro to open this year,” www.highbeam.com, January 03, 2002.

40 The people who had to be evicted were generally the ones who owned properties or houses along the intended metro tracks. The project involved the removal of 30 slums, and 4,000 structures, which included several small businesses.

41 “First section of the Delhi metro to open this year,” www.highbeam.com, January 03, 2002.

11

The Delhi Metro Project… The DMRC also tried to ensure that the construction of the

The Delhi Metro Project…

The DMRC also tried to ensure that the construction of the Delhi Metro did not damage the environment. It pursued environmental and safety objectives during the construction and operation of the Metro by seeking and receiving the appropriate ISO certifications. In 2003, the ISO 14001 Environmental Management certification was achieved on two sections during the construction

phase itself. In addition, in 2004, Delhi Metro obtained the OHSAS 18001 environment, occupational heath, and safety management system.

The DMRC ensured that the construction sites were entirely covered, with no soil or dirt being allowed to spread outside. Trucks carried away debris and dugout soil during the night. The construction site was also totally concealed from public view and all vehicles going out of the site were washed at the entrance. During the construction stage, special efforts were made to minimize construction noise and pollution. The DMRC used silent generators at work sites and also used light shields to reduce glare from work lights at night.

The DMRC took measures to dispose of waste water from the construction sites in an

certification for its

42

43

environmentally friendly manner. It initiated a program to plant new saplings along the route of the metro, to replace the trees that had been cut down during the project. It also included the provision

facilities as part of its station construction contract, as a measure to

of rain-water harvesting

conserve water.

44

PROJECT EVALUATION

The successful completion of the project effectively silenced the critics who had been skeptical

about the ability of an Indian public sector organization to complete any project, let alone one as

complex and costly as the Delhi Metro, on time and within the budget. The DMRC stuck to its

completion targets throughout the project and even finished some sections ahead of schedule. The

extension work (on a 2.8 kms stretch) on Phase I was progressing smoothly and was expected to be

completed by September 2006.

DMRC was expected to save Rs. 6 - 7 billion on the project. “The project completion cost is Rs

10,570 crore (Rs. 105.70 billion). We have not spent that much. Now the project is practically

over. My own assessment is we will definitely save about Rs. 600 crore to Rs. 700 crore (Rs. 6

billion to Rs. 7 billion) on the project cost,”

This was in contrast to the cost escalation seen in most public sector projects in India. The DMRC

was successful in keeping the cost of the project at US$ 32-53 million per kilometer. In

comparison, the Bangkok Metro had incurred costs of US$ 56-80 million per kilometer.

45

said Sreedharan.

OUTLOOK

The Delhi Metro was expected to play a major role in relieving the transport problems faced by the city’s residents. Moreover, with the GoI planning extensions to the Metro, it appeared that the benefits of an efficient transport system would be enjoyed by people living in a wider geographical area than originally planned. The GoI and the GNTCD had prepared a comprehensive plan to extend the Delhi Metro to 244 km by 2021 in three subsequent phases (Refer Exhibit VI for more information about the Delhi Metro project by 2021). The DMRC hoped

42 ISO 14001 environment management standards help organizations minimize the adverse effects of their operation processes on the environment. These standards are flexible and can be applied to any organization producing any product or service at any place in the world. The New York Metro is the only other metro to obtain this certification.

43 The OHSAS 18001 certification is a part of BSI’s (a leading business service provider) Health & Safety Electronic Book. The certification was created through the efforts of a number of the world’s leading national standards bodies, certification bodies, and specialist consultancy groups. It is compatible with both the ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 management systems standards.

44 Rain water run-off from the roofs of the metro stations was to be diverted through the drain pipes to settlement/ filtration tanks where the water was cleaned, before being allowed to flow into borewells below the stations.

45 “Delhi Metro has become the symbol of India's progress,” www.rediff.com, March 13, 2006.

12

The Delhi Metro Project… to start work on Phase II of the Delhi Metro project

The Delhi Metro Project…

to start work on Phase II of the Delhi Metro project by September 2006, and was set to receive financial assistance from the JBIC on the same pattern as Phase I. Phase II was planned to be completed before the Commonwealth Games, scheduled to be held in Delhi in 2010. This Phase, which was estimated to cost over Rs. 75 billion, would comprise 5 lines (3 of which were to be extensions of existing lines) with a total length of 53 kilometers (Refer Exhibit VII for the approved budget of DMRC for 2006-07).

The DMRC was also recruiting new people to work on not only the previously constructed lines but also on the new lines that were coming up. While the number of people recruited for administration jobs was low, most of the recruitments were for works, maintenance, signaling, and telecommunication. As of March 2006, the employee strength of DMRC was 3,000.

It also seemed that the Delhi Metro had provided a stimulus to the GoI and the state governments to improve the public transport infrastructure in other cities in India. With the DMRC assimilating the metro technology from its international partners, it now had the capability to build and manage projects in other Indian cities, for as low as US$ 18 million per kilometer in some cases. Some of the prospective beneficiaries include the Indian cities of Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Lucknow, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Thiruvananthapuram, and Kochi. Also, the West Bengal government had

requested the DMRC to prepare a detailed project report to connect the existing metro rail in

Kolkata to Howrah, an industrial hub on the other side of the river Hooghly. The DMRC was

expected to use construction technology similar to that used in the Euro Tunnel, although on a

smaller scale.

The Delhi Metro project was successful in reducing pollution levels and vehicular traffic. It helped

increase road safety by reducing the requirement for buses by around 2,600. Street-level traffic fell

by as much as 50% in the areas where the Metro operated. The reduction in vehicular traffic

helped increase the average speed of Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) buses from 10.5 km per

hour to 14 km per hour. Two million man-hours per day were expected to be saved due to

reductions in journey times. Fuel worth Rs. 5 billion per year was also expected to be saved.

However, as of May 2006, only 0.45 million people were using the Delhi metro, which was much

lower than expected

Despite the project having been completed successfully, the GoI’s decision to adopt the broad

gauge for the Metro seemed to have created problems for the DMRC. The DMRC imported the

rolling stock from Korea and remodeled it to suit the requirements of the broad gauge track. Even

after delivery, the rolling stock had to go to Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) in Bangalore

for fitment before it was ready for operations in Delhi, thus delaying the deployment of rakes. “We

cannot increase the frequency further than that due to the shortage of trains (rake),” 47 said Satish

Kumar (Kumar), director (Rolling Stock and Electricals), DMRC. Similarly, the process of

indigenization of the coaches was also not yet complete.

Another challenge that the DMRC faced was the severe dearth of parking facilities at its metro

stations. Many of its parking lots were full and in some areas, the municipal authority that owned the land around the metro stations did not allot it sufficient space for parking facilities. To deal with this problem, the DMRC initially considered building multi-level parking facilities near its stations. However, the idea was dropped owing to its prohibitively high cost. Instead, the DMRC sought to introduce more shuttle buses to and from the stations, to solve the parking problem (Refer Exhibit VIII for more information on operational aspects of DMRC).

The DMRC earned revenues of Rs. 1.50 billion in the financial year ended March 2006, in comparison to the Rs. 720 million it had earned the previous year. It planned to repay the Japanese loan from 2007. Moreover, it expected to earn additional income by providing consultancy services to organizations and cities, both in India and overseas. Sreedharan said “DMRC has also been approached by Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Syria, and Iran for setting up metro systems in their countries.” 48

46

.

46 “Metro to increase frequency today,” www.hindu.com, August 09, 2006.

47 “Crowded days ahead for Delhi Metro,” www.hindu.com, July 18, 2006.

48 “Taking Metro to new heights,” www.hinduonnet.com, April 04, 2005.

13

Exhibit I The Delhi Metro Project… The first metro system in the world was the

Exhibit I

The Delhi Metro Project…

The first metro system in the world was the London Underground which became operational in 1863. Later, metro systems were established in Paris and Berlin. In 1904, the New York City Subway was commissioned. Extending to 1,355 km, this went on to become the largest metro system in the world. In the 20 th century, metro systems became common with new ones coming up in major cities of the world.

Some Metro Systems around the World

Country

City

Name of System

Year Opened

Length (Kms)

England

London

London Underground

1863

408

France

Paris

Paris Metro

1900

221.6

USA

New York

New York City Subway

1904

1355

Spain

Madrid

Madrid Metro

1919

226.7

Japan

Tokyo

Tokyo Metro

1927

183.3

Japan

Osaka

Osaka Municipal Subway

1933

113.5

Russia

Moscow

Moscow Metro

1935

278.3

Russia

St. Petersburg

St. Petersburg Metro

1955

109.5

S. Korea

Seoul

Seoul Metro

1963

287

Mexico

Mexico City

Mexico City Metro

1969

177

Hong Kong

Hong Kong

Mass Transit Railway

1979

91

India

Kolkata

Kolkata Metro

1984

16.45

Egypt

Cairo

Cairo Metro

1987

43.5

Australia

Sydney

Metro Light Rail

1997

7.2

Thailand

Bangkok

Bangkok Metro

2004

21

Source: www.wikipedia.org.

Exhibit II

Studies on Delhi’s Traffic Problems

S.No

Study

Organization

Year

1 Transportation study

Central Road Research Institute, New Delhi Ministry of Urban affairs and Employment Ministry of Urban Development Ministry of Railway Planning Commission Indian Railways Ministry of Urban Development Central Road Research Institute, New Delhi RITES

1969

2 Town and Country Planning Organization study

1973

3 Metropolitan Transportation Team

1974

4 Metropolitan Transport Project

1975

5 Study group

1982

6 Indian Railway Study Group

1986

7 Task Force

1987

8 Planning of Mass Rapid Transport System for Delhi

1989

9 Mass Rapid Transport System for Delhi

1990

Source: www.delhimetrorail.com.

14

The Delhi Metro Project… Exhibit III Outstanding Features of the Delhi Metro The Delhi Metro

The Delhi Metro Project…

Exhibit III Outstanding Features of the Delhi Metro

The Delhi Metro was considered an advanced MRTS. It followed all the appropriate Indian and International construction codes. Each metro train could seat 240 passengers with space for another 1,240 passengers to stand. Of the required 280 coaches, 60 were manufactured offshore in Korea and the other 220 coaches were to be manufactured by progressive indigenization by BEML. The coaches were 3.2 m wide and made of lightweight stainless steel. The coach interiors were air-conditioned and fire resistant. Every coach was fitted with anti-collision devices conforming to international standards. Centralized Automatic Train Control (CATC) comprising Automatic Train Operation (ATO), Automatic Train Protection (ATP), and Automatic Train Signalling (ATS) systems was installed on the Delhi Metro. The ATO was mostly used on the underground section. The ATP system applied automatic brakes on trains and brought them to a dead halt when train drivers

went too fast or got too close to another train. This system made the Delhi Metro very safe even

when more than 256 trains traveled on any line.

Ticketing in the Delhi Metro was fully automatic. Contact-less stored value smart cards served

the purpose of tickets for metro passengers. The entire fare collection system was monitored

through a central computer in the operational control center of the DMRC.

Communications equipment on the Delhi Metro consisted of a transmission system with

fiberglass cables, a train radio system enabling communication between the metro trains and the

operations control center, an internal telephone system, a public-address system for the

individual stations, and the power supplies for the various communications equipment.

A fully automatic computerized system i.e. SCADA system (Supervisory Control and Data

Acquisition System) was used for controlling the power supply. The system could detect faults

and rectify them within seconds. The power for running trains as well as for all the stations of

the 11 km underground section came through a feed from the New Delhi GIS sub-station.

The station air-conditioning and ventilation system in tunnels were designed to meet the

rigorous climatic conditions of Delhi (temperature is maintained around 29 o C). Its reversible

ventilation fans were designed to keep passengers cool while the automatic fire doors ensured

their safety. Also, all coaches were provided with emergency batteries that provided lighting

and ventilation in case of power failure. There were escalators and accessible elevators at all

stations, with tactile tiles to guide the visually impaired from outside the stations to the trains.

All entrances of the metro stations were controlled through automatic flap gates through which

45 to 60 passengers could enter per minute. The security systems on Delhi Metro were comparable to the best transport systems in the world. All stations were fitted with CCTV cameras and surveillance systems. The trains system also had “in-built safeguards” against any terrorist attack. Even though X-ray machines were installed at some stations, manual frisking of passengers was also done as it was considered more “effective”. All metro stations also had their own police force called the Metro Police. Since Delhi is an earthquake prone area, the elevated and underground sections of the Metro were constructed to withstand extreme seismic stress. All stations were fitted with seismic sensors to warn of impending earthquakes.

Compiled from various sources.

15

The Delhi Metro Project… Exhibit IV Companies Involved in the Project General Consultants Group Pacific

The Delhi Metro Project…

Exhibit IV Companies Involved in the Project

General Consultants Group Pacific Consultants International (PCI), Japan Railway Technical Services, and Tonichi Engineering Consultants Inc. (all three belong to Japan), Parson Brinkerhoff International Inc. (USA) and RITES (India).

Rolling stock

Mitsubishi Corp. (Japan) and KOROS (renamed ROTEM) (Korea) and Bharat Earth Movers Ltd.

Alternating current (AC) propulsion system, installation and control system for rolling stock

Centralized Automatic Train Control Alstom Transport Ltd. (India), Alstom SA

(France), Alcatel SA (Portugal), and Sumitomo

Mitsubishi Electric Corp. (Japan).

Corp. (Japan).

Fare collection system Thales-e-transactions CGA, S.A.(France)

Communications equipment Siemens Ltd. (Germany)

SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data

Acquisition) System

Maintenance activities

Alcatel (France).

Cobra S.A and Eliop S.A, (both of Spain) and

IRCON International Ltd. (India).

Kumagai

Itochu

Company (India).

Dyckerhoff Widmann AG (Germany), L&T

Construction

(Sweden),

4 km stretch

(Vishwa Vidyalaya to Kashmere Gate)

Gumi

(Japan),

and

Skanska

(Japan),

Hindustan

7 kms

(Kashmere Gate to Central Secretariat)

(India), Samsung Corp. (Korea), Shimizu Corp.

(Japan), and IRCON International Ltd.

Compiled from various sources.

16

The Delhi Metro Project… Exhibit V Tunneling Process of a Part of Line 2 of

The Delhi Metro Project…

Exhibit V Tunneling Process of a Part of Line 2 of Delhi Metro

Delhi Metro Project… Exhibit V Tunneling Process of a Part of Line 2 of Delhi Metro

Source: www.delhimetrorail.com.

17

Exhibit VI The Delhi Metro Project by 2021 The Delhi Metro Project… S.No. From –

Exhibit VI The Delhi Metro Project by 2021

The Delhi Metro Project…

S.No.

From – To

Length

Phase I (2005)

62.16

1 Shahdara-ISBT-Trinagar-Bariwala 28.00

2 Vishwa Vidyalaya-Central Secretariat

11.00

3 Barakhamba road-Patel Nagar-Dwaraka

23.16

Phase II (2011)

53.02

4 Vishwa Vidyalaya-Jahangiri puri

6.36

5 Central Secretariat-Qutub Minar

10.87

6 Shahdara-Dilshad Garden

3.09

7 Indraprastha-Yamuna Bank-New Ashok Nagar

8.07

8 Yamuna Bank-Anand Vihar ISBT

6.16

9 Kirti Nagar-Mundka

18.47

Phase III (2016)

58.20

10 Jahagiri puri- Raja Garden- Dhaula Khan-AIIMS- Nehru

34.60

 

Place- Okhla Industrial Area Phase I

11 Barwala-Bhawana

5.20

12 Rangpuri-IGI Airport-Shahbad Mohaamadpur-Dwarka City

8.20

13 Shahbad Mohaamadpur-Dwarka City-Kakraula Village

10.20

Phase IV (2021)

72.80

14

Jahangiri puri-Peeragarhi-Pankha Road-Sagarpur

24.20

15

Narela-Bhawana-Gheora-Najafgarh

33.00

16

Mehrauli-Gurgaon

11.60

17

Dilshad Garden-Nand Nagiri

4.00

Total

244.86

Source: www.delhimetrorail.com.

18

Exhibit VII Approved Budget 2006-2007 The Delhi Metro Project… Particulars (Figures in billions of Rupees)

Exhibit VII Approved Budget 2006-2007

The Delhi Metro Project…

Particulars (Figures in billions of Rupees)

Phase I

Phase II

Total

Business Area-Project JBIC funded payments Non-JBIC payments Total Project Expenses PD Works Deposit Works

5.45

3.11

8.56

3.58

9.26

12.84

9.03

12.37

21.41

0.82

0

0.82

0.79

0.72

1.51

Business Area- O&M Receipt from Operations

2.29

0

2.29

O&M Expenses

1.86

0

1.86

Business Area-Consultancy

Receipts

0.80

0

0

Expenditure

0.40

0

0

JBIC Payments

Interest Payment of JBIC loan

1.77

0

1.77

Repayment of JBIC Loan

0.14

0

0.14

Source: www.delhimetrorail.com.

19

The Delhi Metro Project… Exhibit VIII Operational Aspects of the Delhi Metro Project Phase I

The Delhi Metro Project…

Exhibit VIII Operational Aspects of the Delhi Metro Project Phase I

A study of the operational aspects of different metro networks of the world gave the DMRC

inputs to run the Delhi metro. Within the short period that it had been functioning, the Delhi Metro set new operational efficiency standards. It became one of the few railway systems in the world to record a punctuality level of over 99 per cent in train operations. The trains operated at intervals of three to five minutes between 6 am and 10 pm.

In 2003, the DMRC signed an agreement with the Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC), Delhi’s

bus operator, for the introduction of about 200 shuttle buses to move people to and from railway stations.

In the early days of the Delhi Metro, there was a near stampede to get onto the trains. People

jostled with each other, refused to stand in queue, did not return the tokens, tore up the seats,

spat inside the coaches and even pulled the emergency chains without reason. The DMRC educated passengers on appropriate behavior in trains as well as imposed penalties to rectify

their behavior. It also conducted programs to teach passengers how to enter and exit the coaches

properly.

The DMRC laid a lot of emphasis on commercial property development in the metro station

complexes to earn higher non-operating revenues. As of 2006, almost 20% of the annual

revenues of the DMRC came from these sources. Moreover, the DMRC had a system to

rationalize its fare structure so that the Delhi Metro earned more per passenger without affecting

passenger numbers. The maximum expenditure, about 23%, was incurred on salary, wages, and

other employee costs.

 

2004-05

2003-04

Particulars

(Rs. in million)

(Rs. in million)

Revenue (income from operations, consultancy and

720

rentals from properties)

Expenditure (before depreciation and interest on loans) 520 –

Loss after adding depreciation, interest and other costs 760 320

Compiled from various sources.

20

Additional Readings & References: The Delhi Metro Project… 1. Chandan Mitra, Delhi is finally a

Additional Readings & References:

The Delhi Metro Project…

1. Chandan Mitra, Delhi is finally a Metro, www.dailypioneer.com, July 10, 2006.

2. Manojit Saha, Metro Rail will www.projectsmonitor.com, July 06, 2006.

3. Rajat

be

Guha,

Govt

to

give

metros

a

a

cheap

free

mode

of

run,

under

www.economictimes.indiatimes.com, June 23, 2006.

transportation,

common

code,

4. Gaurav Vivek Bhatnagar, Crowded days ahead for Delhi Metro, www.thehindu.com, June 18, 2006.

5. Sudipta Sengupta, Delhi metro reports losses for 2nd year in a row, www.merinews.com, May 26, 2006.

6. Vandana Gombar, Is the Delhi Metro a costly mistake? www.rediff.com, April 03, 2006.

7. Mission 2020: Delhi Metro must cover 400 km, www.thehindubusinessline.com, March 23,

2006.

8. Archana Masih, Politicians know I cannot be maneuvered, www.rediff.com, March 10,

2006.

9. Delhi Metro chief Sreedharan in US top 25 newsmakers list, www.ibef.org, January 12,

2006.

10. Mukta Magazine, How KLG Systel is keeping track of Delhi Metro

www.klgsystel.com, 2006.

Corporation,

11. Shekhar Gupta, For the Record: Talking with E. Sreedharan, www.indianexpress.com,

November 18, 2003.

12. DMRC all set to complete first section of Phase III, www.thehindu.com October 06, 2005.

13. Urban transit: The challenges, www.deccanherald.com, June 21, 2005.

14. Amelia Gentleman, Delhi delighted with its new metro, www.iht.com, March 12, 2005.

15. Ramesh Ramachandran, On the fast track, www.tribuneindia.com, January 02, 2005.

16. Delhi Metro rail

17. R. C. Acharya, All set for Delhi Metro flag-off, www. thehindubusinessline.com, December

2,500

less buses on roads! www.indiainfoline.com, January 03, 2003.

23, 2002.

18. Delhi Metro a symbol of Indo-Japanese friendship, www.cities.expressindia.com,

December 25, 2002.

19. Ajita Shashidhar, Delhi Metro to raise funds through realty development, www.blonnet.com, November 04, 2002.

20. www.delhimetrorail.com.

21. www.urbantransit.net.

22. www.irfca.org.

23. www.blonnet.com.

24. www.wikipedia.com.

25. www.pbworld.com.

26. www.delhimetrorail.com.

21