The cognitive-consciousness loop

Abstract
The brain is a modular organ where all its parts work in coordination. The scientific
evidence strongly suggests that the coordinator of the cortical activity is the thalamus.
Therefore, that part of the limbic system is not only a rely station but it also participates
in the creation of the contains of consciousness. Still the reptiles from which our brain
evolved didnt have a cortex but they were able to perceive, memorize and learn from the
environment whatever they needed to survive and procreate. As the obliteration of great
areas of the cortex in patients or the sufferers of an extreme form of brain damage,
hydranencephalia that almost completely eliminate the cortex show, consciousness itself
could be found anywhere else than in the cortex.
The need of that integration of the information that composes conscious thoughts has
been formulated in the past by theories proposing an inner observer, an homunculus
observing the brains works and more recently by the integration information theory.
any neurological studies show also that thalamus takes an active part in what we pay
attention to and, as the many neuronal connections from cortex to thalamus suggest, is the
place where the information is integrated. !t is then the only place where the experience
as a whole can take place.
The information provided by the thalamus supposes a primary anchor to reality, or at
least to what we would need to know to survive in the world of our early ancestors and,
while coordinating the activity of the different cortical modules, receives in coordination
reports from those modules, reports that bear simplified but concentrated information,
that, once integrated become the content of consciousness. The thalamus wouldnt be
then an intelligent observer as the homunculus based hypothesis expected, but an
intellectually impoverished observer whose intellect is enough to coordinate the work of
the cortical modules to which sends the sensorial information to be analyzed, enough to
observe the results of the computations that the cortical modules send back, resolve time
or logical mismatches in the simplest possible way and to respond to impulses of the
motor cortical areas bi initiating movements. The thalamus as an observer hears the
cortical reports in form of sounds that we hear as we hear ourselves speak and images
that we see as we can see the creations of our imagination. The integrated information
coming from the cortex is what becomes the contents of consciousness.
An information loop that creates the idea of self and the consciousness itself.
The concept of consciousness is very tightly united to the existence of a self. There must
be somebody having an experience for that experience to be conscious.
"ost mysteriously, your brain also turn its view back on itself to generate your sense of
self#awareness$ %&.S 'amachandran, The tell-tale brain, ()*(+
,ouglas -ofstadter describes the need of the information that we receive to describe a
loop where we not only receive information that we interpret, but we also generate
information when we interact with our environment and, as we observe and interpret the
conse.uences of our actions, the information that we receive is forcefully self#centered.
"!n the end, we are self#perceiving, self#inventing, locked#in mirages that are little
miracles of self#reference$ %,. -ofstadter, I Am a Strange Loop, ())/+
!n a similar way the possibility of reflecting on the information that we possess, either to
think about the past, preview the future or to analize what our senses are perceiving at
this moment re.uires the information to describe a loop in which the brain first registers
what is observed outside %sensations+, stores it as a memory to be observed inside the
brain and, in a final movement that closes the loop, becomes part of the brain %the
observer+ as a learnt information, thanks to synaptic plasticity. The end of that loop,
re.uires the information to be related to other information learnt in the past or perceived
simultaneously in order to avoid contradiction that would become noise if accumulated
and integration to ac.uire meaning respect other brain contents.
Integrated information theory of consciousness.
The dependence of consciousness of an integration system that allows the perceived
information to form a single experience, perceived by the self that receives and processes
it, is what in principle made philosophers like ,ennet who proposed the existence of a
cartesian theater where the integrated information is presented to an inner observer, an
undefined homunculus, and important linguists like 0oam 1homski who defends the
theory of the homunculus as a brain organ receiving those perceptions. The homunculus
theory was untenable because once the homunculus received the sensory information it
would have needed another inner observer to understand it who as well would have had
to present it to an inner homunculus, etc.
2. Tononi %Archives !talines de 3iologie *4)5(6)#(78, ()*(+ states that consciousness
could not exist without the information being integrated, an experience, for the !ntegrated
!nformation Theory is a unit of information that cannot be decomposed in independent
parts. 2. Tonini proposes three though experiments to illustrate that inevitability.
"The 9hotodiode though experiment.
1onsider a human and a simple photodiode facing a blank screen that is alternately on
and off. The photodiode can tell :light from :dark ;ust as well as a human. -owever, a
human also has an experience of light or dark, whereas the photodiode presumably does
not$
The key of the difference is in the fact that the diode only reacts to a single fact, presence
of light, while a human sees in the state of light on that there is an intensity, a certain
tonality, the sound of the switch when the light is turned on, and a large number of
alternatives.
3ut, of course we can imagine more complex electronic e.uipment that would perceive a
large amount of alternatives, for instance a digital camera.
"The camera thought experiment
Assume the sensor chip of the camera is a collection of a million binary photodiodes.
Taken together, then, the cameras photodiodes can distinguish among (*,))),)))
alternative states, an immense number, corresponding to * million bits of informa#
tion. !ndeed, the camera would respond differently to every possible image$
!s the camera then conscious<
Since, each diode works on its own, and there is no part of the camera where the
information is integrated there is no part of the camera that knows what the photodiodes
are receiving, not even the file as stored can account for integration because its ;ust
registering the pixels as bytes.
Still, ! would argue that when the camera simplifies the image in a =92 file it is doing a
similar work to what the visual cortex does with images that later on presents back to the
thalamus.
"The internet though experiment$
The internet contains all the information put in it in one place, virtual as it might be, the
global network is that place, but even if all the information is easily accessible through
algorithms %T19!9 for instance+ that still is only interrelation, not integration.
As Tonini explains only the maximum level of integrations allows the experience to
become one thing and, as a conse.uence, we cannot be conscious of how the information
is processed in the different modules of the brain.
A cognitiveconsciousness loop
The strange loop that ,. -ofstadter describes could be very well formed by a physical
structure where sensory information pass through the thalamus, is then processed by the
cortex and sent back to the thalamus where together with other sensory information and
thoughts, becomes integrated thus closing the loop resulting moreover in further actions
on the environment that are observed by the individual as feedback information that
enters again the information processing#integration loop.
The luxury of self#representation would come, not from the representational capabilities
of the cerebral cortex but from the fact that the representation, the colors that the cortex
attributes to the different light wavelengths , the symbols that give meaning to our
thoughts and the thoughts themselves are being felt, seen and heard by the thalamus
where they, as symbols, become real to our mind.
>ualia, like colors, are then ;ust symbols containing a great amount of information in the
simplest possible way for the thalamus to be able to integrate the information into a
concrete experience. The colors that we see in a map of the world might have nothing to
do with reality but help us to differentiate one country from another. As we know the
colors themselves are not real, but they were useful for ours ancestors survival.
Since the information as it is received by the thalamus from the sensory inputs is already
processed at the beginning of the loop to detect dangerous signals or highly emotional
stimuli one can say that it is seeing the image for the second time when it comes back
processed by the cortex, as highly enriched sensorial information a, somehow, augmented
reality. As with 2oogle glass doctors can add meaning to the sight of a patient by
receiving the medical data, we see the
reality together with its interpretation and that is what we are conscious of.
The conse.uence of such physical loop is that we are capable of contemplating the work
of our minds, in a certain way as if the thalamus was a homunculus with very limited
cognitive capabilities, not those of a person but those of a reptile. The thalamus would be
then a sauronculus, unable to interpret anything by itself but counting with a great set of
supercomputers, loaded with the finest software to present back the conclusions of the
computations in easy to understand maps of the world %images with shapes and colors+ or
an evolution of abstract thoughts and symbols that one can hear as if sound was
reverberating inside the cranium and while those cortical sounds and images enter again
the cognitive loop they can be further re#processed.
As ,. -ofstadter describes in "! am a strange loop$ in electronic systems that reproduce
live images or sounds like camcorders or microphones if one approaches the receiver to
the reproducer, as pointing the camcorder to the T& screen or approaching the
microphone to the speaker, the image captured becomes enclosed in itself to the infinitum
and the sound emitted elevates its pitch to the speakers maximum capacity.
?ne could expect something similar happening in the brain as the Thalamus resends the
perceived from the cortex information to the cortex. !t might go back to the thalamus and
again to the cortex with a similar effect to that observed in the described electronic
apparatuses but brain structures have many neuronal inhibitory connections that should
be able to stop the information circling forever, creating a reverberation that would be
only noise to the brain.
The cortex cannot be where information integration takes place
The key condition of the !nformation !ntegration theory is that the information, once
integrated cannot be separated in different parts. !n the camera experiment, each
photodiode was receiving a pixel of light and the camera registered that pixel in certain
memory positions, thats all. The fact that we see a picture once those pixels presented in
a screen is not thanks to the camera integrating the pixels in an image but to our own
visual system seeing all the points as one image.
The modularity of the cortex means that, although its work is synchronized by the
thalamus, the different experiences are taking place separately, coordination doesnt make
the experience a uni.ue integrated experience.
The sauronculus a non infinitely recursive proposition
As, it is well known the homunculus, as proposed involved an observer inside our brain,
what in itself implied the existence of another observer inside the previous, and so on.
The saurunculus hypothesis states that there is a very primitive observer, the thalamus,
that is too primitive to process by itself the information that the cortex is receiving but
keeps many of the original perception capacities. Thanks to its capabilities it can see, hear
and feel what in a very simplified way the cortex modules send back to it.
!f there had to be proposed an observer inside the thalamus, following the model
proposed, it would have to something that represents a comparable step back in evolution
as it is from mammalian brain to reptilian. y personal bet for that would be the pineal
gland but, even if this or another good candidate was found, it would be difficult to give
one step further back in evolution to find an observer of the observer.
The conscious loop evolution from the reptilian to the mamal brain
The difference between how the reptile perceives things and mammals, concretely
humans is the loop of information.
A reptile is genetically programmed to survive and reproduce, it has a very limited
capacity of learning but its brain does not have room for reflection.
The information enters the reptilian brain through its senses, it is processed and elicits a
reation or not and it is stored either temporarily or for good, depending on the importance
of the success. The information integration happens ;ust because it is simultaneously
received and processed without delay.
The reptilian brain does not reflect on what is observed. @hat is learnt is kept in memory
for the modification of further automatic responses. 1onsciousness is ;ust awareness of
the surroundings and basic calculation of the best immediate action courses to maximize
the survival and reproduction possibilities.
A person does all that but there is a secon circuit of information. The path from the
thalamic system to the cortex and back.
The cortex doesnAt perceive directly the sesnations. !t perceives what the thalamus B
reptilian relies with an accent on what attention is focused in.
The cortex can, further manipulate, through learning, up to a certain point, the fast
reactions to stimuli that the thalamic system manages..
The Limbic system capabilities without a cortex. The hydranencephaly cases.
3;orn erker explains in "1onsciousness without a cerebral corex5 A challenge for
neuroscience and medicine$%())8+ the cases that he had been studying around the globe
of childred that have survived to a devastating brain condition.
!n hydranencephaly, during the fetal development the whole forebrain is resorbed and its
place is filled by cerebrospinal fluid. Some parts of the cortex can survive the condition
but, as autopsies have shown they are usually non functional.
The children present symptoms that can be treated and they can live up to a few decades,
not as vegetables like one would expect. The children are responsive to their
surroundings and bond emotionally to familiars or environmental situations. They play
with toys and interact with their parents in mutually learnt ways.
@hat the hydranencephaly patients demonstrate is that the limbic system alone can be
enough to substain the life of a person that is able to see, hear and, minimally understand
what is perceiving as well as responding to the environment. That completely obliterates
the belief that the thalamus is only a rely station from the senses to the cortex. !t isthough
hard to believe that those capabilities contribute in some way to the intelligent behavior
of a person, unless, that system is relying on more complicated computing capabilities to
elaborate the behavior. -ydranencephaly patients teach us the level of intelligence and
interaction capabilities of the sauronculus inside the brain.
Attention might be how the thalamus keeps a strong grip on cortex functioning.
"All neocortical areas receive inputs from and pro;ect back to the thalamus. !t is often
said that the corticothalamic pro;ections are organized in a way that reciprocates the
spatial distribution of thalamocortical pathways$ %artin ,eschCnes et al, 3rain 'esearch
'eviews, *66D+
2eral . Edelmann and =oseph A. 2ally proposed %Frontiers in !. 0euroscience, ()*7+
that the sending and reentring neural activity from thalamus to cortex generates an
oscillation of electrostatic fields that might be critical for transformation of neural activity
that thanks to synaptic plasticity results in the spatiotemporal integration of patterns of
neural network activity.
Guri 3. Saalmann and Sabine Hastner %0euron. ()** =ul
(DI/*%(+5()6#(7+ explain the f'! studies performed on
human showed that the Jateral 2eniculate 0ucelus
%J20+ increases their response level to attended stimuli
while decreasing it for unattended stimuli. A series of
experiments with cats showed that J20 neurons also
switch the respond mode to tonic, thus allowing
"thalamic neurons to be more faithful to their retinal
input, reliably transmitting information from retinal
afferents to the cortex, for more detailed information
processing$
Another part of the thalamus with a proven influence in what the visual system pays
attention to is the thalamic reticular nucleus %T'0+, as Guri, 3 et al %()**+ report when
visual and auditory stimuli were simultaneously presented to monkeys, the spike rate of
neurons in the visual sector of the T'0 increased when the monkeys directed attention to
the visual stimulus relative to when they attended to the auditory stimulus.
J. @ard %()**, 1onsciousness and 1ongnition (), K8K#KD8+ proposes a thalamic dynamic
core hypothesis in which "!t is the idea that the contents of consciousness are the results
of cortical computations, not the computations themselves$. !n his theory mentions that
in the thalamus is represented a central, convergent, compact "miniature$ map of the
cortex. That, for J. @ard is where conscious awareness arises. 3ut as he remarks not all
what is perceived by the retinas becomes conscious because "1onsciousness appears to
be up#to#date only for the parts of the sensory array that are
currently in attention$
Attention, moreover can be directed to more than one stimuli, for instance to the inner
cortex simulations while keeping track of reality. As an example who anybody with some
driving experience will know, when one is driving and sees a strange behavior in other
nearby car, a simulation of possible abnormal behaviors will run in our mind, that we will
feel like a background film with changing scenes while we keep looking at the road and,
specially to the suspicious driver.
There seems to be an attention cognitive field where more than one perception can find
its place but, that field being limited it will be usually filled mostly by one perception
while other or others will ;ust have a minimal share of the field ;ust to keep track on the
rest of the world.
Abnormal visual perception. The syndromes that conform the osetta stone of
consciousness
!n order to give a better ground to my proposal than ;ust pure speculation ! will suggest
also that there are two well known, overly strange neurological phenomena that are
perfect candidates to become a prove for the proposed theory. The first is blindsight, the
second the 1harless#3onnet syndrome.
3lindsight is a rare phenomenon in which individuals with damage to their striate cortex #
the center for the control of vision in the brain # retain the ability to discriminate unseen
stimuli in their clinically blind visual field when forced#choice procedures are used
Although blindsighted individuals deny any awareness of visual perception in their blind
visual field %or the blind regions of their impaired visual field+, their ability to process and
act on visual input presented to the blind field seems to remain relatively intact.
These patients know that they are blind and they donAt understand how they can guess
what ob;ect is presented to them, where and in which direction is moving. 3asically they
are not conscious of seing but they do, at least to some extent while they are sure to be
absolotely blind. The conse.uence is that, in order to consciously seeing the cerebral
cortex is necessary, but one can see without being conscious of it.
As 3;orn erker %())8+ explains there might be a way to improve that condition by
surgery. -e describes how a cat whose cortical visual areas had been removed in one
hemisphere showed clear signs of blindness in half of the visual field, but when the
contrallateral superior cuniculis was removed or a small cut severed some of the fibers in
the collicular commissure, the visual capacities of the cat were cured.
3y the sauronculus hypothesis what would be expectable in this case is that the thalamus
has taken complete control of the body for whatever stimuli presenting in the part of the
visual field that the cortex cannot perceive, but that the cat doesnt know of what is
driving him to go for or avoid something that it is not conscious to be seeing.
1harles 3onnet syndrome %13S+ is a condition that causes patients with visual loss to
have complex visual hallucinations. 13S predominantly affects people with visual
impairments due to old age or damage to the eyes or optic pathways.
This syndrome and other kind of hallucinations prove that it is possible to see without the
eyes sending and ade.uate input, or any at all, therefore conscious perception is created
in the cortex and it can eventually happen without sensory input, as a dream,
hallucination or illusion.
!onclussion and further implications of the sauronculus theory
1onsciousness arouses from a big brain looking into a small brain. The big brain is the
wise person in us, the rational, e.uilibrated but slow person that needs the cocodrile
inside us, the thalamic system, a wild animal that has to be tamed, but that we desperately
need because at the end of the day it is the emotions that we feel what makes us human
and because only the sauronculus inside us can react without thinking if it speed is
needed.
The limited capabilities of the limbic system to process the information received by the
thalamus could also explain the strangeness and predictability of the effects of many
cortical lesions as the effect of a hurried integration of the information received by the
very limited in computability capabilities thalamus into a non#contradictory whole.
The saurunculus theory could also explain the nature of dreams. The simulator role of
the cortex, constantly analyzing the sensed world goes to any extreme to fill the gaps
untolerable to the thalamus, as the 1harles 3onnes syndrome shows. @hen sleeping all
the world becomes an information gap what forces the cortex to run simulations based on
its own memories and fill that total lack of sensory information in the most creative
possible ways.