Securing The Nation: Radicalism and Security in 1790s Britain

Radicalism and Security in 1790s Britain
By
Christopher John Gibbs

Thesis submitted for a Master of Arts by Research

University of York
Department of History

Submitted August 2013

Dedicated to the two most important women in my life: my mother,
who fostered and encouraged my passion for learning and adventure;
and my wife, whose love, guidance and support have made this work
both possible and enjoyable.

Abstract
In the midst of the age of enlightenment, revolution and political enfranchisement, the
English radical movement of the 1790s was an important mobiliser of lower class, liberal
and radical thought, education, association, complaint and support for socio-political
reform. However, the British government of William Pitt the Younger, operating in the
wake of the cataclysmic French Revolution, viewed this movement first with suspicion and
eventually outright hostility, and, perceiving in it a threat to the interests, institutions and
prosperity of both the ruling elite and the wider nation, sought the means to repress
radicalism and remove it from the active political sphere. My task in this thesis, in
contributing both to the fields of security studies and the socio-political history of 1790s
England, is to analyse how this was done by applying the recently conceived concept of
securitization, as constructed by the Copenhagen School, to the governments attempts to
identify and combat radicalism as a threat to national security. In doing so I seek to enrich
our understanding of how and why the government chose to utilise particular strategies,
actions and discourses in its ultimately successful attempts to securitize and temporarily
suppress radicalism, and to explore how these measures facilitated, shaped, improved,
enlarged and in turn were influenced by the means of security governance employed by the
state to monitor, investigate, prosecute, denigrate and repress radicalism and other
perceived threats to national security. Complimentary to this I explore the radical reaction
to the governments securitization, particularly the resulting enhanced and reshaped use of
the states security and surveillance services, and the effect this was believed to have on
British society, liberty, governance and values. Finally I aim to assess the utility of the
securitization framework as a tool for analysing historical and contemporary security
issues in a domestic state-based context.

This thesis is my own work containing, to the best of my knowledge and belief, no material
published or written by another person except as referred to in the text.

Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1
A Radical Awakening ................................................................................................................... 3
Aims and Means ........................................................................................................................... 4
Sources and Literature .................................................................................................................. 6
Chapter One The Securitization of Radicalism ....................................................................... 17
A Traitorous Conspiracy ............................................................................................................. 22
French Principles ........................................................................................................................ 47
Dont you know were at war? .................................................................................................... 53
Security Measures ....................................................................................................................... 56
Chapter Two Defending the State ............................................................................................ 59
Beginnings .................................................................................................................................. 59
A Change of Pace ....................................................................................................................... 65
Raising the Stakes ....................................................................................................................... 75
End Game ................................................................................................................................... 86
Chapter Three Defending the People ....................................................................................... 89
Justice, Liberty and the Constitution ........................................................................................... 91
Governance ............................................................................................................................... 100
Legislation ................................................................................................................................ 110
Morals, Values and Community ............................................................................................... 113
Public and Private Spaces ......................................................................................................... 121
Traditions and Character ........................................................................................................... 131
No Threat? ................................................................................................................................ 139
Fiction ....................................................................................................................................... 141
Government and Loyalist Responses ........................................................................................ 145
Chapter Four Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 151
Threat Identification ................................................................................................................. 151
Threat Response ....................................................................................................................... 160
Threat Reply ............................................................................................................................. 171
Threat Context .......................................................................................................................... 177
National (In)Security ................................................................................................................ 179
Bibliography................................................................................................................................ 182
Securing the Nation 1

Introduction
It is often in the name of cultural integrity, as well as social stability and national
security, that democratic reforms based on human rights are resisted by authoritarian
governments.
1
Aung San Suu Kyi, 1994
The desire for security is one of the most fundamental aspects of human nature, a need that
seeks fulfilment in all areas of life, be they personal, financial, social or political. As the
great political philosopher Thomas Hobbes wrote, the primary motivator for people to
forgo their complete independence and come together to form groups of mutual interest
under a governmental structure is nothing else but the security of a mans person, in his
life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it.
2
Complete individual
freedom is sacrificed in the interests of profiting from the collective strength, benefits and
security of the group. Any grouping together of people will involve politics, and as Dillon
argues all politics is in essence the politics of security an attempt to fulfil and maintain
the fundamental reason for coming together. This has remained a truism of government
throughout the ages, until, in our modern era, we beheld a world in which
security became the predicate upon which the architectonic political discourses of modernity were
constructed; upon which the vernacular architecture of modern political power, exemplified in the
State, was based; and from which the institutions and practices of modern (inter)national politics,
including modern democratic politics, ultimately seek to derive their grounding and foundational
legitimacy.
3

The first and foremost aim of any modern state government is to maintain national
security; defending the state from external enemies and preserving peace, order and
prosperity within. This is crucial to its right to rule and recognition as a legitimate member
of the international order. Yet it is axiomatic that maintaining national security will
inevitably involve infringement upon and potential threats to the individual security and
liberty of a states citizens. The need to uphold the law, detect security threats, maintain

1
Aung San Suu Kyi, Empowerment for a Culture of Peace and Development, in Freedom from Fear and other writings, New Ed.,
London, Penguin Books, 2010, p. 264. N.B. All spelling, grammar and punctuation in quotes utilised in this work has been retained as in
the original sources, uncorrected and unmarked.
2
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or, The Matter, Form, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, London, Andrew
Crooke, 1651, p. 66.
3
Michael Dillon, Politics of Security, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 12-13.

domestic harmony and garner the resources necessary to defend against potential external
enemies are all important duties of state. However they also carry inherent risks to the
individual and are liable to be misused and exploited in the interests of government and/or
a ruling elite. As Suu Kyi has stated, the necessity and importance of national security,
stability and integrity makes them eminently suitable devices for justifying actions that
threaten and infringe upon the very things they claim to protect. History abounds with
abuses of liberty, rights and security carried out by governments upon the pretext of
defending national security. Conflicts have inevitably arisen between the security needs of
state and citizen, nation and sub-group, national sovereignty and the global community.
Therefore security is a hotly debated topic, as people of all stripes seek to provide opinions
on securitys place and use in society.
These issues lie at the heart of this thesis. I aim here to explore debates over who is
responsible for security, what is to be secured, how it is be secured, what is to be
considered a likely and/or acceptable threat to security, how security issues are to be
identified and analysed, and what impact the response to such matters can have upon a
society and its citizens. Security remains a vital component of our daily lives, state policy
and international relations. As an oft-contested subjective entity that exists as much in the
realm of individual and collective consciousness as in reality, it is an important, vibrant
and rewarding area of research. While securities, threats and vulnerabilities can be
measured and assessed as concrete tangible elements, we can also study the manner in
which these elements are created, interpreted, debated, acquired, exchanged, relinquished,
addressed, attacked, guarded, and utilised in advancing particular arguments, aims, policies
and needs. A better understanding of the rhetoric and reasoning underpinning state security
policy, the methods employed in protecting and enforcing national security, and the impact
of these policies and methods upon society, is crucial in improving our ability to
understand, assess, critique and develop present and future security-related stratagems and
institutions and their impact upon individual security, rights, liberties and prosperity.
Examining historical aspects of security, be they cases in international relations or studies
of domestic security as undertaken here, is an effective means of achieving this.
As noted above, my focus in this thesis is on national security in a domestic context
on the means of maintaining the sovereignty, internal security, order and institutions of the
state against predominantly internal threats. While some aspects of domestic security
policy are relatively straightforward and generally accepted, others are heavily disputed,
and as such this is an area fraught with difficulty, competing interests, debate, ideology,

rhetoric, prejudice, repression and violence. In our modern state system the government is
in most cases responsible for deciding and implementing security policy. However, in most
states the rulers cannot act completely on their own initiative, but must persuade a
significant proportion of their people that their actions regarding security are necessary,
justified and effective. In particular, in responding to individual threats, they must
convince their audience that the threat identified is indeed correctly construed as a threat to
national security and thus worthy of a swift and comprehensive response. The Copenhagen
School has provided us with a means of examining the methods by which a particular actor
identifies a threat to security and proposes actions deemed necessary to ward against and
defeat that threat. This process is called securitization, and while it is only a recent
invention as a conceptual method of analysis, it is proposed here that it is highly useful in
exploring, understanding, critiquing and learning from historical security issues and
events.
4
My task here is to explore one particular securitization case that made in 1790s
Great Britain by the government of William Pitt the Younger against the political
movement and ideology of radicalism.
A Radical Awakening
In the wake of the American and especially the French Revolutions, there arose in Britain a
new form of political radicalism. Emerging in 1791, radical ideology combined the British
traditions of liberalism, Whiggism and constitutionalism with the Franco-American
principles of rights, equality, republicanism and democracy. Radicalism was primarily a
working and middle-class movement, politically active mostly in the form of public
associations, mass meetings, later small clandestine societies and the publication of a
staggering array of pamphlets, tracts, journals, newspapers, books and other works,
outlining grievances with the current state of British society and outlining ideas for
parliamentary, political, economic and social reform. As an off-shoot of sorts of liberalism,
radicals formed an uneasy alliance with liberal reformers and Foxite Whigs, who shared
some of their goals for reform but often balked at their more radical and far-reaching
proposals.

4
See Barry Buzan, Ole Wver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.
The American spelling of securitization and securitizing has been retained in this work in keeping with the spelling employed by the
creators of the concept.

Radicalism was the first mass political movement in Britain targeted at, composed of
and often led by working and lower-middle class people, spread throughout the country but
concentrated particularly in industrial and commercial hubs like London, Sheffield,
Manchester and Edinburgh. Their desire for reform and in some instances outright
revolution, coupled with their sympathy for and connections with like-minded associations
and political activists in France, Ireland and elsewhere, presented the Pitt government with
a unique issue to address, one made all the more pressing and hazardous by the ongoing
upheaval and violence in France, the state of war between that troubled country and
Britain, and increasing unrest in Ireland. McCann argues that the
French Revolution had demonstrated to the English ruling classes the precariousness of their
privilege, and the need to police attempts within Britain to mobilize non-propertied classes in
support of an extended franchise and parliamentary reform.
5

The government, fearing the outbreak of a similar revolution in Britain, soon decided that
radicalism represented an unacceptable risk to order and security, and set about pursuing
the means to stamp it out. The story of the 1790s is therefore one of a clash between the
interests of a ruling elite and a newly-politicised popular collective eager to enter and claim
a place in the political realm and ensure the implementation of the reforms believed
necessary to fulfil and protect their rights and liberties and improve their political
representation and access to economic and social prosperity. This clash must be viewed
and analysed as intrinsically linked with the wider struggle and conflict raging across
contemporary Europe and North America between the forces of aristocracy, tradition and
empire, and the new or revitalised concepts of democracy, popular sovereignty, natural
rights and independence.
6

Aims and Means
As discussed in the source review below, radicalism and the politics of 1790s Britain have
been extensively studied by scholars hailing from a wide range of backgrounds and
approaches. In particular, the governments repression of radicalism has been studied and

5
Andrew McCann, Cultural Politics in the 1790s: Literature, Radicalism and the Public Sphere, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan,
1999, p. 59.
6
See Albert Goodwin, The Friends of Liberty: the English democratic movement in the age of the French Revolution, London,
Hutchinson, 1979, passim; Jenny Graham, The Nation, The Law and The King: reform politics in England, 1789-1799, 2 vols., Oxford,
University Press of America, 2000, passim; J. Ann Hone, For the Cause of Truth: radicalism in London 1796-1821, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1982, pp. 11-133; E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, New Ed., Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1991, pp. 84-
203 & 515-42; Roger Wells, Insurrection: the British experience, 1795-1803, Gloucester, A. Sutton, 1983, passim.

assessed by Goodwin, Thompson, Barrell, Mori, Emsley, Hone, Wells and others.
7
In this
area debates have centred around the real aims, intentions and actions of the radicals and
their societies, and the nature, legitimacy and efficacy of the governments measures in
response to radicalism and related affairs in France and Ireland. I am primarily concerned
with the latter, and seek to offer a new perspective by considering and emphasising the
importance of security in understanding and analysing the governments actions and the
radical reaction to them. In such novel and intense circumstances, the Pitt governments
decision to securitize radicalism offers us a highly useful and interesting case study of a
successful securitization carried out by a states rulers against elements of their own
people. Pitt and his colleagues of course did not view their actions and policies as a
securitization, nor did they seek to follow a predetermined model. Nonetheless I contend
that deliberate attempts to make radicalism a security issue were a key component of
ministerial efforts to negate and supress it, and therefore I believe that applying the
securitization framework to this context will provide us with greater insight into the causes
and effects of the governments actions. To this end I will explore why the government
chose to utilise particular discourses, dispositives, technologies and concepts in shaping
and advancing its policies; ascertain why they were successful in this case; and consider
what elements may be of general application and assistance in attempting a securitizing
move. I will argue that the securitization of radicalism was an effective, congruous and
generally well-applied means of achieving the governments aims of eliminating active
radicalism and justifying policies and actions deemed necessary for maintaining order and
security. While it is not my intention to judge whether these actions and interpretations
were justified or meritorious, a deeper understanding of the reasoning and motivations
behind them will naturally be of assistance in debating this matter.
Additionally, I seek to shed new light on how this securitization facilitated and in turn
was developed by the states use of its security, surveillance and intelligence services,
drawing and exploring connections between policy, information, structure and operations.
In particular I will argue that securitization facilitated a restructuring, centralising and
expanding of the existing security and intelligence apparatus, and examine how and why
this occurred. To complement this I will document and assess a relatively unexplored area
of radical and liberal discourse the response to state surveillance and investigation,
particularly by means of spies and informers, and the alleged impact these operations

7
See the Sources and Literature review below for details on these works.

would have on British society and state-citizen relations. In focusing on just one aspect of
the ramifications and instruments of a securitization event, I hope through in-depth
analysis to demonstrate and explain, at least in part, the types of impact that instances of
securitization can have upon the institutions, operations and cultural norms of the society
in question, and on the capacity of the allegedly threatening party to respond to and
counteract the securitizing moves against it. Finally in the course of this study I aim to
explore and advocate the effectiveness of securitization as a model for understanding,
assessing and interpreting historical and contemporary security issues and responses in a
domestic state context.
As such, this thesis is divided into four chapters, dealing in turn with the following
topics:
- the securitization of radicalism in 1790s Britain
- the development of the states security and intelligence services and their deployment
against radicalism
- the radical and liberal response to and arguments against the governments
surveillance, investigation and repression of radical activities, and their alleged
impact upon society, particularly regarding the use of spies and informers
- a final chapter exploring my conclusions and the lessons to be drawn from these
discussions
The focus throughout is on affairs in England, this being the primary setting for both
government and radical activities, but events in and examples from Scotland and Ireland
are also referenced where they are of relevance and applicability to the English and/or
security context.
Sources & Literature
Primary
The UK National Archives contain a wide range of manuscript evidence relevant to the
topics of intelligence, security and the repression of radicalism. Particularly useful are the
Home Office, Privy Council and Treasury Solicitor papers. The Home Office
correspondence includes reports sent in by informers, magistrates, constables and post
masters, as well as instructions, advice and acknowledgements sent by Home Office

officials to these sources. The Scottish and Irish correspondence also contains letters from
informers and correspondence between Home Office and local officials on matters
pertaining to security and information collection. The Privy Council papers consist of
evidence, testimonies and documented examinations concerning cases for treason and
sedition investigated in the 1790s. Reports from spies and informers may also be found in
the Treasury Solicitors papers, which contain further evidence relating to the state trials,
including the briefs, plans and indictments of the prosecution in the trials of Thomas
Hardy, John Horne Tooke, Arthur OConnor, Edward Despard and others. Mention may
also be made of the Foreign Office papers, particularly those from Hamburg, which
provide additional insight into intelligence pertaining to domestic matters sent from
officials stationed abroad.
8

Two further sources of interest are the papers of William Wickham held in Winchester
and the published correspondence of the Viscount Castlereagh.
9
Wickham was heavily
involved in intelligence and security work throughout the 1790s and his papers provide
interesting insight into his methods and correspondence. Castlereagh served as Chief
Secretary for Ireland from 1798-1801 and his correspondence with Wickham and the
Home Office is useful in analysing the manner in which intelligence and security activities
were co-ordinated between England and Ireland during this period. In a similar vein the
Irish Rebellion Papers in Dublin, while not directly relevant to English affairs, contain
numerous reports and letters from informers, shedding considerable light on the manner
and quality of their operations and information. These papers can be used to both
complement and contrast the activities of their counterparts in England. The selected
papers of the London Corresponding Society (LCS), edited and published by Thale, also
contain a wealth of spy reports and a myriad of LCS documents.
10
These allow us to
further examine the nature and quality of the information sent to the government by its
spies, the activities of these informers within the society, and the manner in which the
LCS reacted to and attempted to deal with the threat and presence of spies in its midst. The
papers demonstrate that the activities and thinking of both the government and the radical
societies were heavily influenced by the words and actions of informers.

8
For a full list of the archival and manuscript sources used in this work, see the bibliography.
9
Richard Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of Londonderry,
vols. 1-2, ed. C. Vane, Marquess of Londonderry, London, Henry Colburn, 1848.
10
Mary Thale, ed., Selections From The Papers Of The London Corresponding Society, 1792-1799, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1983.

The recorded proceedings of the state trials and parliamentary debates of the 1790s
contain ample evidence on the securitization of radicalism. The reports of the secret
committees of both the Commons and the Lords on radicalism, sedition and treason were
key components of the governments securitizing move, heavily based on evidence
obtained from informers and other sources of information. The nature and content of the
reports demonstrates the manner in which the government sought to justify its actions in
the interests of national security and conduct the propaganda war against radicalism by
relying on and interpreting such evidence to its advantage. The debates in parliament
surrounding these reports, the trials and the bills intended to curb the perceived radical
threat likewise bear witness to the governments methods and arguments and the Foxite
oppositions response questioning the reliability and efficacy of the governments sources
and actions. The trials represent another securitization battleground, fought out between
the government and the radical/liberal defence, in which the issues of security, repression,
surveillance and spies often took centre stage.
11

Contemporary newspapers are another valuable source of information on the
securitization, repression and response to radicalism, the activities of spies and informers
and the manner in which these issues were perceived and debated by various shades of
political opinion. The majority of papers from the 1790s available in digital form were
published in London, and while this unfortunately narrows their scope as sources of news
and opinion, they nonetheless provide us with much useful material. Papers such as the
Morning Chronicle, Morning Post, The Times, The True Briton, Oracle, The Sun, St
Jamess Chronicle and The Star provide us with news reports of arrests, trials, politics,
parliamentary proceedings and investigations; opinion pieces and letters on the nature of
radicalism and the use of spies; and published extracts and poems commenting on these
topics. Newspapers therefore serve a dual function they provide us both with information
on historical events and a window into the opinions, perceptions, debates, prejudices and
beliefs that characterised the period.
The explosion in the publication of pamphlets, addresses, essays, reports, lectures,
speeches and cartoons in the early 1790s enables us to study in depth the contemporary
political and social debate on all manner of issues, not least of which are the topics of
security, sedition, surveillance, spies and informers. Radicals, liberals and loyalists were all

11
See T. B. & T. J. Howell, eds., A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings For High Treason and Other Crimes and
Misdemeanors From The Earliest Period To The Year 1783, With Notes and Other Illustrations, and Continued From The Year 1783 To
The Present Time (ST), vols. 22-28, London, Longman et al., 1817-20; The Parliamentary History of England, From The Earliest Period
To The Year 1803 (PH), vols. 28-35, London, Longman et al., 1816-19.

keen to propagate and argue their views and refute those they disagreed with. These topics
also feature in debates and arguments concerning a wide range of issues, from liberty and
rights to reform, justice, morality and foreign affairs. Their prevalence demonstrates their
importance and volatility in the period and provides us with several avenues from which to
analyse their impact upon 1790s English society. While it is unfortunate that government
repression significantly reduced the publication of pamphlets etc. post-1795, this
development is itself indicative of the impact of securitization, surveillance and repression
upon the radical movement. Elsewhere, memoirs and recollections provide a first-hand
look into the world of the 1790s. While their accuracy must be carefully questioned and
scrutinised, such sources nonetheless afford us a view into contemporary opinions, issues,
norms, morals and beliefs. Those of Francis Place, Hardy and John Binns detail the trials
and tribulations of radicalism, including the impact of spies, surveillance and investigation
upon their activities, while the recollections of the Irish spy Edward Newell provide us
with an insight into the character, methods and rationale of those employed in the infamous
trade, despite his notorious unreliability and lack of scruple. Another window into the
liberal/radical mind is provided by published correspondence, such as the letters of the
liberal young gentlemen William Pattisson, Thomas Amyot and Henry Crabb Robinson.
12

The realm of fiction, in particular novels published in the 1790s, provides us with a
different angle to approach the perception and impact of surveillance and spies during the
decade. William Godwins Caleb Williams, published in 1794, tells the tale of a servant
who suspects his master of a crime and decides to spy on him in order to confirm his
suspicions. Jane Austens Northanger Abbey, while not published until 1817, was most-
likely written in 1798-99. Spying, suspicion and supposedly hidden secrets form a key
theme of the novel. Finally the works of Charlotte Smith, including Desmond, The Old
Manor House, The Banished Man, Marchmont and The Young Philosopher, all published
in the 1790s, contain numerous references to spying, scandal and intrusions into private
life and conversation, demonstrating and exploring the importance of these topics at the
time.

12
John Binns, Recollections of the Life of John Binns: Twenty-Nine Years in Europe and Fifty-Three in the United States, Philadelphia,
Self-Published, 1854; Penelope J. Corfield and Chris Evans, eds., Youth and Revolution in the 1790s: letters of William Pattisson,
Thomas Amyot, and Henry Crabb Robinson, Far Thrupp, A. Sutton, 1996; Thomas Hardy, Memoir of Thomas Hardy, London, James
Ridgway, 1832, in David Vincent, ed., Testaments of Radicalism: Memoirs of Working Class Politicians 1790-1885, London, Europa
Publications Limited, 1977, pp. 30-102; Edward Newell, The Apostacy of Newell, Containing the Life and Confessions of that
Celebrated Informer, London, Self-Published, 1798; Francis Place, The Autobiography of Francis Place, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1972.

Together these sources provide us with a valuable insight into the means by which the
government carried out its securitizing move against radicalism, the operation of the states
security and intelligence services, the origins, quality and type of information solicited and
received by the government, and the manner in which that information was analysed and
used to construct and support the securitization and repression of radicalism. They also
demonstrate the manner in which the governments use of intelligence and surveillance
developed and changed as the 1790s progressed, and identify particular officials who were
heavily involved in these clandestine enterprises. Finally our sources allow us to discover
and examine both the radical and loyalist response to the states surveillance and security-
based initiatives.
Secondary
The history of 1790s Britain and Ireland may be found in a wide range of works, extending
from the general to the highly specialised. The role of 1790s domestic British politics in
the wider narratives of the French Revolution, the Enlightenment and the
Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars, and its connections both with earlier British political
debates and the later struggles for reform and change in the nineteenth century, have
ensured that this topic has received considerable attention from scholars of numerous
backgrounds. Many scholars have found this to be a rewarding and instructive era on
which to write, and in the last two centuries the history of the period has been approached
from a variety of angles, ranging from broad historical narratives to works exploring
particular political, social, military, legal, economic and clandestine aspects of this
tumultuous and important decade.
In considering the role and impact of domestic security and radical securitization in
these momentous events, some of the general histories of 1790s radicalism have been
particularly useful. Thompsons The Making of the English Working Class begins with an
analysis of the rise of the working-class radical organisations in the 1790s.
13
Thompson
documented the manner in which informers were used to penetrate and record the activities
of these organisations, particularly the LCS, and the governments response to what it
increasingly perceived as the radical menace. He also briefly assessed the nature and
motives of informers, their impact on the radical societies, and their utility to the

13
E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class.

government. Goodwins The Friends of Liberty offers a comprehensive survey of the
history of 1790s British radicalism, documenting in detail the growth and ideology of the
radical movement, the political and social debates, the reaction of the government, and the
denouement at the end of the decade as the government moved to definitively stamp out
the last embers of an increasingly desperate and dying struggle.
14
More recently, Grahams
The Nation, the Law and the King: reform politics in England, 1789-1799 has charted
similar waters in great detail. In the course of their narratives both works comment
extensively on the repression of radicalism, the role of spies and informers in surveillance,
arrests, trials and propaganda, and the manner in which their use and supposed profligacy
affected the actions, political debates and atmosphere of the period.
15
Wells Insurrection:
the British experience, 1795-1803 focuses on the insurrectionary challenges faced by the
government in Britain and Ireland in the wake of the suppression and downfall of the
popular reform movements in 1795.
16

A number of other publications may be cited that analyse the political and social climate
and events of the 1790s, the debates between government, loyalists, reformers and radicals,
and the manner in which the government and its agents permeated ever deeper into public
and private spheres of society. The place and role of security forms an integral part of these
discussions. Attention is drawn here to the works of Barrell, Black, Dozier, Ehrman,
Elliott, Evans, Goodrich, McCann, Mori, Royle, Stafford and Wagner.
17
Also noteworthy
is Habermas classic account of the bourgeois public sphere in The Structural
Transformation of the Public Sphere.
18
The effect of conservative and loyalist activities
and arguments upon public opinion has been examined in articles by Gilmartin, Ginter,
Mori and Philp.
19
Another particularly important work is Barrells Imagining the Kings

14
Goodwin.
15
Graham.
16
Wells.
17
John Barrell, The Spirit of Despotism: invasions of privacy in the 1790s, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006; Eugene Black, The
Association: British Extraparliamentary Political Organization 1769-1793, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963; Robert R.
Dozier, For King, Constitution and Country: The English Loyalists and the French Revolution, Lexington, University Press of
Kentucky, 1983; John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, 3 vols., London, Constable and Company Limited, 1983; Chris Evans, Debating the
Revolution: Britain in the 1790s, London, I. B. Tauris, 2006; Amanda Goodrich, Debating Englands Aristocracy in the 1790s:
Pamphlets, Polemics and Political Ideas, Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 2005; McCann; Jennifer Mori, William Pitt and the French
Revolution 1785-1795, Edinburgh, Keele University Press, 1997; Edward Royle and James Walvin, English Radicals and Reformers,
1760-1848, Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1982; William Stafford, Socialism, Radicalism and Nostalgia: social criticism in
Britain, 1775-1830, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987; Corinna Wagner, Domestic Invasions: John Thelwall and the
Exploitation of Privacy, in Steve Poole, ed., John Thelwall: Radical Romantic and Acquitted Felon, London, Pickering & Chatto, 2009.
18
Jrgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, English
Translation by Thomas Burger, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989.
19
Kevin Gilmartin, In the Theatre of Counterrevolution: Loyalist Association and Conservative Opinion in the 1790s, Journal of
British Studies, vol. 41, no. 3 (2002), pp. 291-328; Donald E. Ginter, The Loyalist Association Movement of 1792-93 and British Public
Opinion, The Historical Journal, vol. 9, no. 2 (1966), pp. 179-190; Jennifer Mori, Languages of Loyalism: Patriotism, Nationhood and
the State in the 1790s, English Historical Review, vol. cxviii, no. 475 (2003), pp. 33-58; ; Mark Philp, Vulgar Conservatism, 1792-3,
English Historical Review, vol. 110, no. 435 (1995), pp. 42-69.

Death, which comprehensively covers the treason trials of the early 1790s.
20
While his
primary aim was to demonstrate the manner in which the government attempted to
construct and utilise a new interpretation of treason, he also covered many other aspects of
the trials and associated proceedings in great depth. This included the governments
attempts to securitize radicalism, of which the trials formed a key part, and the use of
evidence from government spies and informers both in the witness box and in
parliamentary reports.
The British governments security and intelligence services and their use in response to
the radical threat have been most closely analysed by Durey, Wells, Emsley, Poole, Hone
and Bartlett. Arguments in this area tend to revolve around the effectiveness of the
governments information-gathering and investigative methods, the quality of its analysis,
the depth and accuracy of its knowledge, and the structure and motivations of the services
responsible for these tasks. Opinions on these matters are vital in determining whether one
views the governments actions as being either unduly repressive or justified. Emsleys
important article The home office and its sources of information and investigation 1791-
1801 was the first attempt to assess this topic in depth.
21
While he was successful in
identifying many informers and the manner in which their information was received by the
Home Office, he did not document the changes and improvements made by the
government to the structure and methods of the secret service during this time. In a series
of articles, Emsley and Poole have debated the nature and extent of the governments
repression and persecution of radicalism. Emsley provided detailed information and figures
on prosecutions and the effects of legislation, but Poole demonstrated that figures in
themselves may not be a reliable guide to government policy or the true state of affairs.
22

Hone pursued the matter further, carefully investigating the reliability of the governments
sources and the manner in which it analysed and interpreted information in order to
determine the reasoning and justifications for its actions in the struggle against London-
based radicalism.
23
In Insurrection Wells devoted a chapter to an analysis of the structure,
operations and growth of the British secret service during the 1790s, and his narrative of

20
John Barrell, Imagining the Kings Death: figurative treason, fantasies of regicide, 1793-1796, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2000.
21
Clive Emsley, The Home Office and its sources of information and investigation 1791-1801, The English Historical Review, vol. 94,
no. 372 (1979), pp. 532-561.
22
Clive Emsley, An Aspect of Pitts Terror: Prosecutions for Sedition during the 1790s, Social History, vol. 6, no. 2 (1981), pp. 155-
184, Repression, Terror and the Rule of Law in England during the Decade of the French Revolution, The English Historical Review,
vol. 100, no. 397 (1985), pp. 801-825; Steve Poole, Pitts Terror Reconsidered: Jacobinism and the Law in Two South-West Counties,
1791-1803, Southern History, vol. 17 (1995), pp. 65-87.
23
Hone.

the insurrectionary threats faced by the government contains a detailed analysis of the
security services at work.
Durey, in a number of articles and his ground-breaking book William Wickham, Master
Spy, charted the development of the British secret service and for the first time documented
the creation of the Inner Office in 1797-98 as the nerve centre of British intelligence.
24

Durey assessed the manner in which this office, under the leadership of Wickham,
acquired and analysed information and co-ordinated the surveillance of and actions against
suspected rebels in both Britain and Ireland from 1798-1803. Mention may also be made in
this regard of the work of Sparrow. While her primary focus was on the international
activities of British agents, particularly concerning France, her work also touches on the
domestic security role of the Alien Office and the important connections between domestic
and international intelligence.
25
Other works noteworthy for matters pertaining to
information collection include Nelsons The Home Office, 1782-1801, Higgs The
Information State in England and Ellis The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century.
26
The
role of the informer in eighteenth-century British criminal law and law enforcement has
been discussed in works by Hay, King, McLynn, Radzinowicz and Winslow.
27
On a more
general level Cobb has analysed the mentality, motivations and reliability of informers
both as sources of information and a means of law enforcement in The Police and the
People: French Popular Protest 1789-1820.
28

In the last 30 years the Irish dimension of the struggle between government security
services and radicals principally the United Irishmen (UI) has been well documented.
Two earlier works of note are Fitzpatricks Secret Service Under Pitt, published in 1892,
and Maddens The United Irishmen: Their Lives and Times, from 1842.
29
Fitzpatrick
documented the governments use of United Irish informers to foil the plans of the

24
Michael Durey, William Wickham, Master Spy: The Secret War Against the French Revolution, London, Pickering & Chatto, 2009.
See also Dureys William Maume: United Irishman and Informer in Two Hemispheres, Eighteenth-Century Ireland, vol. 18 (2003), pp.
118-140 & William Wickham, the Christ Church Connection and the Rise and Fall of the Security Service in Britain, 1793-1801,
English Historical Review, vol. cxxi, no. 492 (2006), pp. 714-745.
25
Elizabeth Sparrow, The Alien Office, 1792-1806, The Historical Journal, vol. 33, no. 2 (1990), pp. 361-184; Secret Service: British
agents in France, 1792-1815, Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 1999.
26
R. R. Nelson, The Home Office, 1782-1801, Durham, Duke University Press, 1969; Edward Higgs, The Information State in England:
The Central Collection of Information on Citizens since 1500, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; Kenneth Ellis, The Post Office in
the Eighteenth Century: a study in administrative history, London, Oxford University Press, 1969.
27
Douglas Hay, Poaching and the Game Laws on Cannock Chase, in Douglas Hay, ed., Albions Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in
Eighteenth-Century England, London, Allen Lane, 1975, pp. 189-253; Frank McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth-century
England, London, Routledge, 1989; Peter King, Crime, Justice, and Discretion in England, 1740-1820, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2000; Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750, 5 vols., London, Steven & Sons
Limited, 1948-1986; Cal Winslow, Sussex Smugglers, in Douglas Hay (ed.), Albions Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-
Century England, London, Allen Lane, 1975, pp. 119-66.
28
Richard Cobb, The Police and the People: French Popular Protest 1789-1820, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970.
29
W. J. Fitzpatrick, Secret Service Under Pitt, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1892; R. R. Madden, The United Irishmen, Their
Lives and Times, London, J. Madden & Co., 1842.

organisation and detain its leaders, and was the first to identify the important informer
Samuel Turner, while Maddens sweeping study was the first to tell the full tale of the UI,
their activities and the critical damage rendered upon their cause by informers. In more
recent times Elliott, Bartlett, Knox, Curtin and Weber have all contributed to our
understanding of Irish intelligence and security and the United Irishmen. Elliotts Partners
in Revolution: the United Irishmen and France is a masterful study of the connections
between the UI and the French government, and the manner in which Irish and French
agents attempted to solicit and co-ordinate French assistance of an Irish rebellion.
30
Elliott
demonstrated the manner in which the British and Irish governments tracked these
activities through the use of informers and agents and utilised the accumulated evidence to
secure the arrest and conviction of both Irish and British radicals. The work also stands as
a comprehensive history of the United Irishmen in its own right. Bartletts Revolutionary
Dublin, 1795-1801, in addition to publishing the letters of the informer Francis Higgins,
investigated and assessed the Irish governments use of numerous informers and other
sources of information in this period and Dublin Castles ability to analyse their copious
information and turn it into accurate and usable intelligence.
31
In On the Road to
Rebellion: the United Irishmen and Hamburg, 1796-1803, Weber focused on the UIs use
of Hamburg as a means of entering France and meeting with French government agents,
and the manner in which the British monitored these activities through their own agents
and informers.
32
Finally the works of Knox and Curtin on the affairs and plans of the
United Irishmen demonstrated the manner in which they were betrayed by supposed
friends and colleagues-turned-informers such as Leonard McNally and Newell.
33

In association with other more general histories of eighteenth-century Ireland and the
United Irish rebellion, these works afford us a detailed understanding of the crucial role
intelligence, agents, informers and security forces played in 1790s Ireland. They serve both
as examples and a means of contrast with the security and intelligence activities carried on
in Britain itself and the methods and mindsets of British spies. They also highlight the
international dimensions of the struggle, reinforcing the fact that the activities of English,
Scottish and Irish radicals cannot be viewed and analysed in isolation. In contrast Scottish

30
Marianne Elliott, Partners in Revolution: the United Irishmen and France, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982.
31
Thomas Bartlett, ed., Revolutionary Dublin, 1795-1801: The Letters of Francis Higgins to Dublin Castle, Dublin, Four Courts Press,
2004.
32
Paul Weber, On the Road to Rebellion: the United Irishmen and Hamburg, 1796-1803, Dublin, Four Courts Press, 1997.
33
Oliver Knox, Rebels and Informers: Stirrings of Irish Independence, New York, St. Martins Press, 1997; Nancy J. Curtin, The
United Irishmen: popular politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791-1798, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998.

radicalism has until recently received far less attention. The definitive account remains
Meikles informative but dated Scotland and the French Revolution, first published in
1912.
34
However scholars can now benefit from McFarlands Ireland and Scotland in the
Age of Revolution: planting the green bough, examining the links between Irish and
Scottish radicalism, and Harris The Scottish People and the French Revolution,
documenting 1790s popular political culture, the rise of radicalism, and the
government/loyalist response.
35
These works explore government security and surveillance
in Scotland and the important role of local radicalism significant and highly-relevant
counterparts to affairs south of the border.
The analytical framework of securitization was developed by Buzan, Wver and de
Wilde in Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Buzans earlier work People, States &
Fear is also very useful in examining aspects of domestic and national security in a state
context.
36
A method for analysing historical instances of securitization has recently been
proposed by de Graaf and Zwierlein in Historicizing Security Entering the Conspiracy
Dispositive.
37
Zwierlein has undertaken similar work in developing a new definition of
conspiracy theory useful for historical research in Security Politics and Conspiracy
Theories in the Emerging European State System (15th/16th c.). At this stage the
historical application of the securitization framework in a state context is in its infancy,
especially as applied to pre twentieth-century cases. Two early forays into this field may be
found in the works of de Graaf and Cubitt.
38
Finally, the practice of denunciation, being a
key component of conspiracy and securitizing discourses, has been explored in an
eighteenth-century context by Lucas in The Theory and Practice of Denunciation in the
French Revolution.
39

This thesis, in emphasising and discussing the importance and role of security in the
history of 1790s Britain, seeks to contribute both to the realm of security studies,
particularly in exploring the applicability and utility of the securitization model in domestic

34
Henry W. Meikle, Scotland and the French Revolution, New Ed., London, Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 1969.
35
E. W. McFarland, Ireland and Scotland in the Age of Revolution: planting the green bough, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press,
1994; Bob Harris, The Scottish People and the French Revolution, London, Pickering & Chatto, 2008.
36
Buzan, Wver and de Wilde; Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold
War Era, 2nd

Ed., Harlow, Pearson Education Limited, 1991.
37
Beatrice de Graaf and Cornel Zwierlein, Historicizing Security Entering the Conspiracy Dispositive, Historical Social Research,
vol. 38, no. 1 (2013), pp. 46-64.
38
Cornel Zwierlein, Security Politics and Conspiracy Theories in the Emerging European State System (15th/16th c.), Historical
Social Research, vol. 38, no. 1 (2013), pp. 65-95; Beatrice de Graaf, The Black International Conspiracy as Security Dispositive in the
Netherlands, 1880-1900, Historical Social Research, vol. 38, no. 1 (2013), pp. 142-165; Geoffrey Cubitt, Conspiracism, Secrecy and
Security in Restoration France: Denouncing the Jesuit Menace, Historical Social Research, vol. 38, no. 1 (2013), pp. 107-128.
39
Colin Lucas, The Theory and Practice of Denunciation in the French Revolution, in Sheila Fitzpatrick and Robert Gellately, eds.,
Accusatory Practices: Denunciation in Modern European History, 1789-1989, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1997.

and historical contexts, the political, social and psychological uses and impact of security,
and the operation of the Pitt governments security services; and to the fields of eighteenth
century studies and the socio-political history of England, in its attempts to expand our
understanding of 1790s politics, law enforcement, state administration, literature,
ideologies, beliefs and social relations.


Chapter One The Securitization of Radicalism
A conspiracy clearly proved need not be traced distinctly through all its branches and
ramifications; its existence, and the danger to the state from its nature, are sufficient to
justify the temporary suspension of that security for our liberty, which by law is our birth-
right.
40
The Earl of Carnarvon on the proposed suspension of habeas corpus, 22 May
1794
Securitization is the process, as identified and developed by Buzan, Wver and de Wilde
of the Copenhagen School, in which a securitizing actor performs a securitizing move/s by
identifying an existential threat/s to a referent object/s. The move will result in a successful
securitization if the alleged threat or threatening party (referred to as the referent subject)
is accepted as posing a legitimate threat to the survival of a referent object deemed worthy
of extraordinary protection by a significant proportion of the relevant audience, justifying
its priority status and the implementation of emergency measures against it that go above
and beyond the rules normally binding the securitizing actor. A referent object can be
physical, institutional or conceptual; essentially anything capable of being undermined,
damaged or destroyed by external agency. Buzan et al. describe securitization as the
intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have
substantial political effects.
41
It is a speech act, the subjective process of constructing a
shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a
threat.
42
The securitizing actor must construct a plausible narrative of object, threat,
priority and solution, understandable and acceptable to an audience who recognise the
authority of the actor to make and act upon such claims. Therefore A successful speech
act is a combination of language and society, carried out in suitable facilitating
conditions, that convinces the target audience of the priority and urgency of an existential
threat against a referent object holding general legitimacy as something that should
survive.
43
Securitization is thus a step above politicisation, in which an issue is made part
of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations that are debated

40
PH 31, col. 595.
41
Buzan, Wver and de Wilde, p. 25.
42
Ibid., p. 26.
43
Ibid., pp. 32, 25 & 31, emphasis in original.

and decided upon in an at least partially open forum.
44
By contrast, a securitized issue is
defined as one that requires emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal
bounds of political procedure, prioritised above the normal haggling of politics. The
securitizing actor has claimed for themselves a need for and a right to treat it by
extraordinary means in order to ensure the elimination of the threat and the survival of the
referent object.
45

The discourses, institutions, propositions and measures enacted by the securitizing actor
may be thought of as a security dispositive, created and utilised as a means of achieving a
successful securitization of and control over security issues. Foucault introduced the notion
of a dispositive as a way to grasp and analyze the ensemble of power relations at distinct
historical moments, without reducing them to a fully coherent or overarching structure.
46

De Graaf and Zwierlein argue that in the realm of security, the concept of a dispositive
makes it possible to identify and analyze the precise interplay of securitys administrative
practices, legal categorizations, cultural imaginations, and calculative technologies.
47
De
Graaf also notes that Security rests on the basis of certain images of danger, threat and
destruction that need to be communicated to the relevant audience in an effective and
persuasive manner.
48
A security dispositive is essentially a power play, enacted within and
utilising particular webs of knowledge, imagery and interrelations in order to attach a sense
of urgency, primacy, legitimacy and immediacy to a particular threat or situation. As
Cubitt states, it therefore reinforces the notions of urgency and response that are implicit
in the concept of securitization itself.
49
Furthermore, as de Graaf and Zwierlein explain, a
security dispositive provides a means of legitimising present action against an anticipated
future event by mobilizing governmental practices and expert knowledge and
implementing exceptional measures to define, securitize and eliminate a perceived threat.
In doing so the securitizing actor may utilise new and existing technologies of
imagination techniquesaimed at visualizing and representing the threat and new
modes of security governance.
50
We may seek to explore and determine how the use of
the former legitimises and shapes the latter.
51

44
Ibid., p. 23.
45
Ibid., pp. 24, 29 & 26.
46
De Graaf and Zwierlein, p. 51.
47
Ibid.
48
De Graaf, p. 162.
49
Cubitt, p. 110.
50
De Graaf and Zwierlein, pp. 52 & 59-60.
51
Ibid., pp. 46-64; Buzan, Wver and de Wilde, pp. 21-47 & 141-62; Cubitt, pp. 109-111; De Graaf, pp. 154-63.

In each securitizing move, one must identify the following elements: the referent object,
securitizing actor, referent subject, the terrain of the threat i.e. the areas in which the
threat is carried out (politics, war, economics etc.), the audience of the actor, and the means
by which the actor makes their securitizing move.
52
One may also identify and consider
functional actors parties apart from the securitizing actor who have an impact upon the
course and outcome of the securitizing move. The move will be followed by whatever
extraordinary measures are deemed necessary to defeat the existential threat. Buzan et al.
state that A successful securitization thus has three components (or steps): existential
threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules.
53

How did these elements and components manifest themselves in the securitization of
radicalism in 1790s Britain? Radicalism, both as an active political ideology and in the
form of radical societies such as the LCS and the Society for Constitutional Information
(SCI), was identified by the Pitt government as an existential threat to the sovereignty,
status and existence of the British king, parliament and constitution, by means of alleged
intentions and plans to carry out alternations to the composition and powers of parliament,
executive and monarch by force, potential violence and a usurpation of sovereignty. In
government eyes this constituted a political threat to what Buzan et al. describe as the
internal legitimacy of the state, which relates primarily to ideologies and other
constitutive ideas and issues defining the state in this case the sovereignty of parliament
and its right to govern in conjunction with the executive as a legitimate representative of
the British people of behalf of the ruling monarch.
54
Key institutions of the state, such as
the magistracy, judiciary and military, were also believed to be under threat from a rising
tide of radical violence, anarchy and power.
This securitizing move was performed by the government to convince parliament and
the British people of the need to use extreme and novel measures to eradicate the radical
threat and protect the political status quo. Tomline asserts that Pitt
perceived the formidable co-operation of internal and external enemies; but the former could not
be effectually resisted, except by open war, nor the latter without coercive acts of the legislature:

52
Buzan, Wver and de Wilde, pp. 35-42; Cubitt, p. 110.
53
54
Ibid., p. 144.

and he was persuaded, that neither of these expedients, exclusive to his own earnest wish not to
have recourse to them, would be approved, till their necessity was obvious and incontestable.
55

In the climate and context of the time the Prime Minister and his colleagues believed that
radicalism was dangerous, French republicanism intolerable and reform inadvisable.
However they could not act immediately or without justification, for as Mori states,
Public opinion was not a force the Pitt ministry could afford to ignore, and ministers
recognised that all government was based on consent.
56
They therefore set about
convincing the public and their fellow MPs of the need for war and repression, by
securitizing and linking the French and domestic threats as a diabolical menace to the
laws, liberties and constitution of Britain.
57
Loyalists and their associations played an
important role as functional actors assisting the government in constructing and carrying
out its securitizing move and exercising the measures deemed necessary to tackle the
radical threat, while liberal groups such as the Foxite Society of the Friends of the People
acted as a counterweight, championing the need for reform, supporting the right of radicals
to associate, debate, speak and publish, and fighting against the governments securitizing
move, security measures and repression. The press, sharply divided between loyalist and
radical firms sandwiching a more neutral assortment of papers, also played an active
political and ideological role, acting as a vehicle for the dissemination of government,
loyalist, liberal and radical news, ideas, works, opinions and propaganda. The securitizing
move was followed by a number of extraordinary actions the government used to monitor,
investigate and repress radicalism and remove the threat it was believed to pose to national
security. The nature of some of these measures and their effects on British society shall be
discussed below.
The government had to overcome a number of obstacles in order to make a successful
securitizing move. English radicalism had existed since at least the mid eighteenth century
and the age of John Wilkes, and one may perhaps trace it even further back in time.
Regardless of its origins, by the 1790s it had unquestionably existed for some time as a
legal and legitimate political and social ideology. Popular, religious and political dissent
also had strong traditions on English soil. Furthermore, the cause its leaders advanced most
strongly in public a moderate parliamentary reform had earlier been espoused by Pitt
himself and his colleague the Duke of Richmond, and was widely perceived as a legitimate

55
George Tomline, Memoirs of the Life of the Right Honorable William Pitt, 2nd Ed., Vol. 3, London, John Murray, 1821, p. 548.
56
Mori, Languages of Loyalism, p. 34.
57
Ibid., p. 35.

political argument that challenged particular details of the current state/government system
and policies rather than threatening the constitutional structure as a whole. Therefore, it
would require a concerted and systematic effort by the government in order to turn
radicalism into an intolerable existential threat to an independent referent object worthy of
especial protection in the eyes of public and parliamentary opinion.
58

Senior ministers and their supporters employed a number of means to facilitate their
securitizing move alleging that the desire for peaceful reform was a mere cover for a
secret radical conspiracy, in conjunction with French and later United Irish supporters, to
usurp state sovereignty by force; prosecuting radical leaders for crimes of treason and
sedition; hinting at the possibility of regicide, either by deliberate intention or as a causal
consequence of radical plans and ideas; identifying a new mass-based radicalism, distinct
from past movements, and equating it with French Jacobinism and a tendency to produce
the same tumults and destruction contemporaneously witnessed in France; pointing to the
inadvisability and disloyalty of fomenting domestic discontent in wartime; and classifying
radical sentiments as by definition seditious and incompatible with loyalty to the current
king and constitution. None of these techniques were in themselves new or revolutionary,
but the identification of a radical conspiracy as a new form of plot played a significant part
in distinguishing it from past actions and movements and in emphasising the seriousness,
novelty and extreme danger of the threat, necessitating original and innovative means to
combat it.
The securitization of radicalism did not occur quickly or instantaneously, but rather
grew and solidified over the course of the 1790s, marching in step with the perceived
nature of the threat and efforts to supress it, until any form of public or association
radicalism was effectively outlawed in 1799, with public opinion being largely either
supportive of or indifferent to its demise. Even though particular themes and tactics
persisted throughout the decade, the attempts to securitize and repress radicalism increased
at particular moments punctuated by occasional lulls in activity or backward steps, as
circumstances and policy dictated. Other (mostly loyalist) actors also suggested, dictated or
even proposed contrary securitizing tactics, sometimes resulting in muddles, confusion and
contradiction. While radicalism as a whole eventually came to be identified as an
existential threat, at different times certain components of radical activity were focused on
and given increased emphasis as being particularly hazardous to national security. The

58
Goodwin, pp. 32-98; Mori, William Pitt and the French Revolution 1785-1795, pp. 17-44; Royle and Walvin, pp. 13-47.

means employed by the government and its allies to securitize and combat radicalism were
therefore akin to tools from a tool kit, each being employed or redeployed at the moment
they were deemed likely to further and achieve the governments aims, with some proving
more effective than others. Let us now analyse in greater detail what they were.
A Traitorous Conspiracy
Conspiracy theories were exceedingly common in the late eighteenth century. Zwierlein
has defined a conspiracy theory as
a narrative of a possible past and present, often also containing elements of future predictions,
claiming to be the true representation of the past and present which is built from some commonly
accepted elementsand some elements that are not proven but possible and that bridge the gaps
of knowledge and understanding concerning a certain event or sequence of eventsA conspiracy
theory mostly has an explanatory, an appellative-affective and a denunciation function. The
explanatory power of the conspiracy theory depends on the belief of its recipients and users and is
usually strong only within the given community of values.
59

As a means of establishing causation and agency, such theories are well-suited to the
securitizing task of subjectively identifying, interpreting and denouncing a particular threat
within a defined political and social space. As Cubitt notes, discourses evoking them
[conspiracies] can articulate the ways in which security actors and security agencies view
the world around them.
60
De Graaf explores the means of applying these discourses to
threat identification, stating that while a subversive and hidden plot may be beyond
measurement and concrete description, it is not beyond imagination, and here the
technologies of imagination [come] in useful as means of rendering the imagined threat as
positively measurable and visible as possible. Conspiracy theories provide a familiar and
flexible framework with which to achieve such visualisation, facilitating the expansion of
the referent subject, referent object, and the rise of new modes of governance.
61
Barrell
has also written persuasively on the importance of imagination in 1790s political, legal and
literary discourses, and of its role in constructing the modern form of treason by means of
newfangled doctrines, the flights of figurative imagination, of wit and invention.
62

59
Zwierlein, pp. 72-73.
60
Cubitt, p. 111.
61
De Graaf, p. 162.
62
Barrell, Imagining the Kings Death, p. 343.

Furthermore, as de Graaf and Zwierlein point out, Conspiracy functions as a
legitimizing argument, serving and fuelling a larger, encompassing security regime and
being used as a political weapon by political entrepreneurs claiming to speak for a
threatened majority.
63
Yet it can also simultaneously delegitimise a target subject by
accusing it of harbouring or acting as a cover for a hidden group or plot with illicit
intentions. Conspiracy thinking can therefore serve to identify, describe, denounce and
delegitimise a subject in the eyes of a relevant audience. Lucas argues that in such
situations denunciation is harnessed as an instrument of state power.
64
Conspiracy theory
is therefore a highly effective means of interpreting a scenario in a manner that empowers
the actor and facilitates a securitizing move and the use of extraordinary measures against a
target threat. In our period Revolutionary France abounded with claims of plots,
conspiracies and counter-conspiracies, and claims of secret international or foreign
conspiracies were commonly cited as being responsible for all-manner of significant events
in Europe and North America. Wood has argued that the Enlightenment commitment to
reason, the certainty of cause and effect and the centrality of human agency often
manifested itself in attributing events to the concerted designs of willful individuals.
65

Wells posits that Secrecy, intrigue and conspiracy are the hallmarks of politics in the
[seventeen] nineties, and indeed Britons were far from immune from conspiracy paranoia,
especially when it came to fears over the presence and activities of foreigners, subversives
and Catholics.
66
Senior politicians like Pitt and his fellow ministers were equally prone to
belief in hidden plots, forces and agendas, especially if they conformed with their own
preconceived notions and perceptions. It is thus no surprise to find that the government
believed in a grand radical conspiracy, or that it was perceived as a suitable means of
securitizing radicalism and legitimating the use of extraordinary means to crush it.
67

Right from the beginnings of the popular radical societies in 1792, the government
suspected that they harboured republican and Jacobin principles and secretly targeted the
overthrow of the entire constitution. In April 1792 Henry Dundas alluded to the
Associations of Sheffield and Manchester, whose avowed object was nothing less than the
overthrow of the constitution, while in May 1793 Pitt argued that in some radical societies

63
De Graaf and Zwierlein, p. 55.
64
Lucas, p. 33.
65
Gordon S. Wood, Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century, The William and Mary
Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 3 (1982), p. 411.
66
Wells, p. 43.
67
Cubitt, pp. 109-111 & 124-25; De Graaf, pp. 142-45 & 154-63; De Graaf and Zwierlein, pp. 55-58; Evans, pp. 82-84; Wood, pp. 401-
441; Zwierlein, pp. 67-75.

French principles were inculcated as the true standard of political belief, and the example
of the French government proposed as a worthy object of imitation.
68
Lord Grenville
claimed that The hands of Government must be strengthened if the country is to be
saved, yet for the time being the government was content to rely on loyalism,
surveillance, deterrence and an active campaign against sedition, rather than target the
societies directly.
69

However, by spring 1794 the government and the Portland Whigs had become
convinced that radical efforts and principles had now been channelled into a detailed and
systematic conspiracy to subvert the constitution, claim all sovereignty and authority for
themselves, and reform the legislature and executive by force. The government and the
parliamentary secret committees appointed to investigate radical activities claimed that the
public radical platform of limited parliamentary reform in line with that outlined by the
Duke of Richmond in 1782 was a mask for this traitorous conspiracy, involving all the
major radical societies in Britain. Radicalism was turned from an extra-parliamentary and
loosely-organised political movement into a systematic and concerted plot to overthrow the
state; an existential threat with reform as a mask and liberals and moderates as its duped
and therefore delegitimised allies, incapable of acting without propagating (wittingly or
otherwise) the treasonous radical cause. The First Report from the Committee of Secrecy of
the House of Commons respecting Seditious Practices informed the Commons that the
radical societies had been uniformly and systematically pursuing a settled design, which
appears to your committee to tend to the subversion of the established constitution. This
constituted a traitorous conspiracy for the subversion of the established laws and
constitution, and the introduction of that system of anarchy and confusion which has fatally
prevailed in France. The conspiracy was every day more and more likely to affect the
internal peace and security of these kingdoms, and to require, in the most urgent manner,
the immediate and vigilant attention of parliament.
70
It was the intention of the societies
to supersede the House of Commons in its representative capacity, and to assume to itself
all the functions and powers of a national legislature by means of a convention formed for
the purpose of making their resolutions to be law.
71
A radical secret committee had been
formed to oversee this plan and organise the convention/s, resources and arms necessary to

68
PH 29, col. 1337; PH 30, col. 893.
69
The Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, ed., Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George the Third, Vol. 2, London, Hurst and
Blackett, 1853, Lord Grenville to The Marquis of Buckingham, 14 November 1792, p. 228.
70
PH 31, cols. 475-76 & 496.
71
Ibid., cols. 495 & 893.

carry it out, establishing a concert and communicationbetween different bodies of men
in different parts of the country in order to implement by force, the sudden execution of
these daring and desperate designs.
72

Lord Grenville was adamant that it could surely be no longer contended, that there did
not exist in this country a conspiracy, the object of which was, under the specious name of
a reform, to subvert its government, laws and religion.
73
Pitt argued that the pretext of
reform, under which they masked their purpose, was far from being the true object of their
intentions, which they had contemplated from the very outset. But Happily for this
country they had thrown off the mask just when the bulk of the nation unanimously were
uniting with government in vigilance and care for its protection.
74
The planned
convention was not to be a collection of radical representativesfor the accomplishment
of particular legal purposes, but to be the representatives of the whole body of the people
of England, and evidently to exercise legislative and judicial capacities, usurping the
power of parliament.
75
Edmund Burke darkly warned that
Parliamentary reform was the pretext for all the sedition that had been sown for many years in this
country. But the real object in viewwas nothing more nor less than the usurpation, and, in the
end, the plunder, of the state. This was parliamentary reform; and for this purpose, whole classes
of the working people of the country were to be jacobinized!
76

William Windham concurred, arguing that it was plain as the sun that the societies
declared support for reform was simply a mask for their real intention of a total
annihilation of all property, constitution, and religion.
77
The second report of the Lords
secret committee similarly declared that parliamentary reform, is a pretext that could
impose on none but the most credulous, ignorant, and unwary.
78
The implications of such
arguments were clear it was obvious to anyone who looked closely that the radicals
intended subversion, usurpation and the full implementation of French principles, and only
those who allowed themselves to be duped by the conspiracy, either from incompetence or
a secret support for the radical cause, could fail to see this.

72
Ibid., col. 893.
73
Ibid., col. 909.
74
Ibid., cols. 498 & 500.
75
Ibid., col. 502.
76
Ibid., cols. 518-19.
77
Ibid., col. 546.
78
Ibid., col. 894.

The conspiracy theorys adaptability and fear-factor maintained its usefulness as a
securitizing force throughout the 1790s. In May 1794 it was used to justify the arrest of
Hardy and his colleagues on a charge of treason for their part in planning the imminent
insurrection. Habeas corpus was suspended to facilitate their ongoing detainment and
investigation. Government MPs and alarmist Whigs lined up to support these measures and
their necessity for preserving national security. Pitt himself stated that there was not one
moment to be lost in arming the executive power with those additional means, which might
be sufficient effectually to stop the farther progress of the radical plans. Therefore it was
necessary to enact a temporary suspension of the Habeas Corpus laws. What point was
there in maintaining this particular part of the constitution, he argued, if the whole
constitution should otherwise be destroyed? The suspension
was more particularly called for now, when attempts were made to disseminate throughout the
realm, principles and means of action that might endanger the constitution, for the preservation of
which the law was made, and produce much more lamentable effects, and at last be remedied by
more dreadful means
79

Burke did not deny that Habeas Corpus was unquestionably one of our most invaluable
securities; but in times of great emergency, even that must be given up temporarily with a
view to the preservation of the whole.
80
James Watson similarly advocated that the threat
to the constitution necessitated that we should rather sacrifice a part for a time, than risk
the loss of the whole for ever.
81
George Canning thundered that extraordinary measures
required extraordinary powers for their suppression, while William Young argued that
we had to deal with men of dangerous and desperate characters. When Cicero suppressed
the conspiracy of Catiline, he was obliged to step beyond the strict letter of the law. It was
the duty of the House to do likewise.
82
Windham, finding every thing at stake, would if
necessary, give up any thing in order to protect us from the most dreadful of all
calamities, declaring that it was proper to meet such seditious projects with means
fully adequate to their suppression.
83

Later in the year Hardy, Horne Tooke and John Thelwall were tried for high treason.
The prosecutions, along with the many others for sedition and treason, were not only

79
Ibid., cols. 497 & 505.
80
Ibid., col. 520.
81
Ibid., col. 531.
82
Ibid., cols. 535 & 529.
83
Ibid., col. 547.

attempts to punish, detain and silence radical agitators, but were themselves aspects of the
governments securitizing move. The very sight of radical leaders in court was designed to
alert the public and produce the evidence as to the supposedly dangerous and criminal
plans and principles of radicalism, further justifying the need to combat it by extraordinary
measures. The Attorney-General John Scott claimed that the primary reason for
prosecuting the defendants for treason rather than a lesser charge was the great object of
satisfying the country and making them aware of their danger. For It appeared to me to
be more essential to securing the public safety that the whole of their transactions should
be published, than that any of these Individuals should be convicted.
84
Despite the
acquittal of all the accused, Pitt was convinced that the evidence produced at the trials
nonetheless proved the conspiracy
85
and
had a strong effect upon the public. When that immense mass of matter was laid open, and the
real designs of these societies developed, it served to open the eyes of the unwary, to check the
incautious, and to deter the timid.
86

John Bowles agreed, arguing that it was
the opinion of a very considerable part of the Nationthatthe Juries would have been fully
justified by the evidence, in returning a verdict of guiltySo satisfied were the public by the
evidence that a Conspiracy had been not only detected, but proved.
87

Pitt maintained that with this public support The circumstances of the time demanded that
a discretionary power should be given to ministers, to continue to pursue the conspiracy
and protect the public safety, for by a judicious use of such power the people would be
happily rescued from all the dangers that assailed them.
88

Furthermore, the continuing conspiracy was posited as necessitating the Two Acts of
1795, as it allowed the government to connect radical mass meetings with apparent
violence against the king (on 29 October 1795), subversion of the public towards rebellion,
and a new modern species of treason
89
, thus demonstrating the need to ban such
meetings, increase state power, surveillance and vigilance, and add a new form of treason

84
Lord Eldons Anecdote Book, ed. Anthony L. J. Lincoln and Robert L. McEwen, London, Stevens & Sons, 1960, p. 56, quoted in
Goodwin, p. 340.
85
For other opinions on the evidence produced at the trials, see below, pp. 37-39.
86
PH 32, col. 378.
87
John Bowles, A Third Letter To A British Merchant: Containing Reflections On The Foreign and Domestic Politics Of This Country,
Together With Strictures On The Conduct Of Opposition, 2nd Ed., London, T. N. Longman, 1797, p. 46, emphasis in original.
88
PH 31, cols. 1188-89.
89
See below p. 44.

to the statute books.
90
Pitt alleged that the minute habeas corpus was restored in June 1795,
all the plans of these [radical] societies revived and continued in a progressive state,
resulting in an attack upon his majesty that surely cannot have been committed without
hope of support from the radical societies.
91
Canning claimed that
there was an intimate connexion between the proceedings at Copenhagen-house [the last public
mass radical meeting], and the disgraceful outrage which followed. An attempt had been made
against the king, and a hand bill was circulated on the practice of king-killingIf the attack on
the sovereign immediately followed the circulation of such abominable doctrine, he did not see
how the connexion could be discredited.
92

A Narrative of the Insults Offered to the King argued that the attack had been inspired by
the machinations of foreign enemies combined with indigenous preparations to inflame
the public mind. Radical leaders, whose plans had been laid with a sagacity worthy of a
better cause, had taken advantage of
the distress of the moment, of the fever of the times, with a shrewd promptitude, that shews,
however despicable the common herd may be with respect to their abilities or importance, they
are in the hands of men who know well how to set their talents, such as they are, in motion, and
while they skulk secure, thrust them on to acts of treason and desperation.
93

The new republican treason, described by Scott as a design to traduce and subvert the
constitution and government of the country, allegedly found a fruitful breeding ground in
public meetings and the agitation of contempt for king, constitution and parliament,
necessitating new acts to halt its destructive progress and detain and punish those
involved.
94
William Pulteney warned against the dangers of inflammatory assemblies
where sedition was copiously dealt out to the multitude, leading them astray by their
ignorance and imbibing of insidious poison. The MP argued that If treason and
sedition were afloat, the current ought to be stopped; and if the laws already in force were

90
The so-called Two Acts', passed in December 1795, were the Treasonable and Seditious Practices Act (36 Geo.3 c.7) 1795 and the
Seditious Meetings Act (36 Geo.3 c.8) 1795. The former widened the scope of the law of treason such that it now encompassed not only
direct attempts against the life and reign of the king, but also any acts that may agitate or result in attempts either to restrain, coerce or
overawe the king or parliament; while the latter made it an offence to hold any meeting of more than fifty people for the discussion of
public grievances or the consideration of any address or petition without obtaining prior authorisation from a magistrate. See Goodwin,
pp. 387-88.
91
PH 32, col. 378.
92
Ibid., col. 301.
93
A Narrative of the Insults Offered to the King, On his Way to and from the House of Lords, On Thursday Last, London, J. Owen,
1795, pp. 13 & 11.
94
PH 32, col. 485.

inadequate, some regulation ought to be made to save every thing dear to Englishmen.
95

Windham strongly agreed, arguing that the country stood near a dreadful precipice,
necessitating ministers to exert a vigour beyond the law, as exercised in ordinary times
and under ordinary circumstances. Or perhaps the times rather required stronger laws,
and the exertion of more efficacious means to put those laws in execution.
96
Bowles also
claimed that new laws were necessary to ensure the preservation of our liberties and
repress that licentiousness, which is the greatest enemy to genuine and orderly freedom.
With such dangers lurking, the most unremitting watchfulness is necessary to prevent it
from bursting forth in a sudden explosion.
97
The True Briton likewise advocated
the adoption of decisive measures for the Suppression of those unlawful Meetings and Societies,
in which such disaffection originates, as the only effectual means of eradicating an evil, which
threatens the very existence of Civil Society.
It was imperative that the Magistracy...from the highest to the lowest, should be called
forth into immediate and effectual exertion to ensure the security of our Persons, our
Property, and of every thing valuable in Society by shutting up those infamous Schools
of Treason and Sedition who desire to corrupt the minds of the rising generation, so that
the torrent of their poisonous Principles may, as far as possible, be prevented from
extending its destructive rage.
98

Finally in 1798-99, in the wake of the United Irish Rebellion and the discovery of a
definite clandestine plot to instigate an insurrection on British soil, the conspiracy theory
was used to paint the United movement as being merely the latest radical attempt to secure
the aim they had sought since the beginning the entire overthrow of the British
constitutionand the erection of a democratic republic.
99
As Arthur Young had warned,
driving the radical movement underground had only made resistance a question of
prudence, though not of morality.
100
The conspiracy had simply changed form, not
substance. The Anti-Jacobin asserted that the verdict against James Coigly in May 1798
had settled for ever the question so long agitated between the opposite Political Parties in
this Country. For the condemnation of one man for conspiring against his Country, does

95
Ibid., col. 284.
96
97
Bowles, pp. 48-49.
98
True Briton (TB), 6 November 1795, emphasis in original.
99
PH 34, col. 613.
100
Arthur Young, An Enquiry Into The State Of The Public Mind Amongst The Lower Classes: And On The Means Of Turning It To The
Welfare Of The State, Dublin, J. Moore, 1798, p. 8, emphasis in original.

incontrovertibly establish the existence of the Conspiracy. In the loyalist mind, individual
guilt was proof of a wider conspiracy, while individual innocence merely bespoke a lack of
evidence against that one individual. The verdict demonstrated that parliament had been
justified in confiding extraordinary powers to the EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT of the
Country and showed that the EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT, in the active and
necessary use of those extraordinary powers was acting with the conviction, and the
support of the great mass of the People.
101
The case and associated evidence therefore
justified the governments earlier acts of repression and securitization and reinforced the
peoples support for its past and present actions, for as the Earl of Liverpool claimed it was
now undoubted that the measures of security which Parliament adopted to frustrate
[radical] designs, were loudly called for, by the atrocious and desperate attempts of the
most daring and flagitious traitors.
102

Via the evidence obtained from the Maidstone trial, British and Irish intelligence and
the Kilmainham treaty (see Chapter Two), British domestic radicalism was linked to
rebellion, violence and invasion in Ireland, clandestine and open French aggression, and
unified republican collusion.
103
The 1799 Report from the Committee of Secrecy of the
House of Commons informed parliament that
your committee have found the clearest proofs of a systematic design, long since adopted and
acted upon in France, in conjunction with domestic traitors, and pursued up to the present with
unabated perseverance, to overturn the laws, constitution, and government, and every existing
establishmentboth in Great Britain and Ireland, as well as to dissolve the connexion between
the two kingdoms, so necessary to the security and prosperity of bothThe most effectual engine
employed for this purpose, has been the institution of political societies, of a nature and
description before unknown in any country, and inconsistent with public tranquillity, and with the
existence of regular government.
The committee claimed that their information now completely unveiled the original and
settled designs and co-ordinated conspiracy of the radical societies, perpetuated since
their origins in 1791-92.
104
As Goodwin states, the report speciously

101
Anti-Jacobin, 28 May 1798, emphases in original.
102
Charles Jenkinson, Earl of Liverpool, State of the Country in the Autumn of 1798, 2nd Ed., London, J. Wright, 1798, p. 20.
103
See Durey, William Wickham, Master Spy, pp. 113-34; Elliott, Partners in Revolution, pp. 165-213; Goodwin, pp. 416-50; James
Quinn, The Kilmainham treaty of 1798, in Thomas Bartlett, David Dickson, Dire Keogh & Kevin Whelan, eds., 1798: A Bicentenary
Perspective, Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2003, pp. 423-36; Wells, pp. 110-77.
104
PH 34, cols. 579-80 & 585.

analysed the whole evolution of the radical movement in Britain since the early 1790s as if it had
always been the clandestine, treasonable and republican conspiracy that it only became on the eve
of its dissolution.
105

These claims were manifestly and knowingly false and without foundation, attributing the
later treasonable intentions of an extremist fringe to earlier plans and activities completely
devoid of such designs. Nonetheless they served their purpose, allowing the government to
extend the conspiracy in time and space and securitize radicalism as the vehicle for a single
ongoing grand design to subvert the British Isles and assist the French invasion of Britain
and/or Ireland, thus enabling it to secure parliamentary approval for a further prolongation
of the suspension of Habeas Corpus, and to suppress the British and Irish radical societies
out of hand.
106
Indeed, it was the committees
unanimous opinion, that the system of secret societies, the establishment of which has, in other
countries, uniformly preceded the aggression of France, and, by facilitating the progress of her
principles, has prepared the way for her arms, cannot be suffered to exist in these kingdoms,
compatibly with the safety of their government, and constitution, and with their security against
foreign force and domestic treason.
107

The effect of the report on public and parliamentary opinion was clearly at the forefront of
its composers minds, for one of the briefs attached to its supporting documentation notes
that The nature and extent of these extracts to be regulated by the manner in which the
committee is composed, and the greater or less degree of alarm that the Cabinet would
wish to create.
108
Wickham admitted to Castlereagh that the report was intended to
explain the state of things, in a manner that must draw the attention of the public as well to
a sense of the general danger as to the means of preventing it.
109

With the danger thereby identified and the report presented to the Commons, Pitt duly
proclaimed that it was now conclusively demonstrated that all the societies have but one
common end the subversion of the constitution, and the diffusion of the principles of
anarchy. Being involved in a contest for every consideration that is most valuable to us,
it was necessary for parliament to prevent the existence of those societies.
110
The Prime

105
Goodwin, p. 451.
106
Ibid.
107
PH 34, col. 614.
108
Heads of Evidence to be offered to a secret Committee, n.d. (1799), National Archives (NA), London, HO 100/101/121-22, quoted
in Wells, Insurrection, p. 42.
109
Castlereagh, Vol. 2, Wickham to Castlereagh, 20 March 1799, p. 216.
110
PH 34, col. 985.

Minister trusted that no-one would dispute the propriety of enforcing the measures of
salutary precaution, which have hitherto proved such powerful barriers against the
malignant, perfidious, and destructive spirit of conspiracy.
111
Scott argued that it was best
to dissolve the societies to prelude the recurrence of the mischief, and acts banning the
societies and re-suspending habeas corpus were swiftly passed.
112
Graham concludes that
the effect of the governments legislation and prosecutions in 1799, was, for a time at
least, to silence almost altogether the voice of political dissent.
113

The governments theory was a wonderfully malleable and effective tool for
securitizing radicalism. The secretive, deceptive and seemingly omnipotent nature of
conspiracies renders them conducive to a selective and creative interpretation of evidence,
events and uncertainties, allowing an actor to pander to prejudices and fears of hidden
forces and foreign interventions. While the government publicly avowed that the true
nature of the radicals plans was beyond all doubt, in 1794 senior ministers were privately
aware that they lacked conclusive evidence on key aspects of the supposed plot, including
the procurement of arms, the involvement of French agents, plans for revolution and
attacks on strategic locations, and details of the full intentions and designs of the
anticipated convention. The Commons secret committee of 1794 was forced to rely on
general sweeping statements of principles and intentions like the following, rather than
concrete evidence:
the evidence before them [the committee] gives them every reason to believe that these views [on
targeted attacks] have been deliberately entertained, and made the repeated subject of
conversation; and they cannot but consider them as strong indications of the principles and
intentions of the parties concerned, and of the nature of the measures which might have been
expected if they had proceeded
114

As Mori states, Although the Home Office had not discovered any documents linking the
British agents to French agents, the Secret Committee equated community of spirit with a
confederacy of purpose.
115

The claimed existence of a grand secret conspiracy allowed the government to paper
over these deficiencies, either by pointing to the certainty and inevitable direction of the

111
112
Ibid., col. 994.
113
Graham, Vol. 2, p. 866.
114
PH 31, col. 705.
115
Mori, William Pitt and the French Revolution 1785-1795, p. 241.

conspiracy and its principles as a whole, or by using the careful secrecy of radical
preparations as an excuse for the states inability to procure information on particular
aspects of their operations. After the treason trials, Scott maintained that he was
convinced that a conspiracy had existed, and did still exist, for the numbers concerned,
their characters and dispositions, were sufficient evidence, that there was a combination of
the most dangerous tendency. Surely any attempt to form an assemblystyling
themselves the representatives of the people, indicated the strongest symptoms of
insurrection, and a wish to supersede the existing government of the country.
116
After the
mass meetings and attack on the king of 1795, Thomas Powys made a similar assumption,
stating in the Commons that
the House had not, it was true, nor need it have, specific evidence of the treasonable designs of
the meetings. The notoriety alone was enough to justify the legislature in resorting to strong
regulations, to prevent the consequences that might arise from such inflammatory assemblies.
117

Whatever doubts they may have harboured in private, many loyalists were publicly
adamant that the nature and existence of the conspiracy was plain on the record of the
evidence presented at the treason trials. Bowles argued that such confirmation was
obtainable
not by attending to the impulse of vague suspicion, or to the suggestions of general alarm; not
even by listening merely to the fatherly admonition of a gracious and affecting Prince, or to the
wise and seasonable measures of a vigilant Legislature; but by pursuing a body of proof, regularly
brought forward in the face of day, and submitted to severest scrutiny of public examination.
118

There was no need for the government to dissemble, misdirect and speculate, reasoned
Bowles, when the proof was there for all to see.
As for secrecy, at Hardys trial Chief Justice Eyre, performing the prosecutions task for
them, informed the jury that though multitudes are made parties to these proceedings,
there is every reason in the world to believe, that but few are engaged in the depth of the
project, implying a commitment to secrecy that both pointed towards conspiracy and
explained the difficulty of proving it.
119
The 1799 Commons report explained that the
societies principle of secrecy, generally enforced by unlawful oathspeculiarly fits them

116
PH 31, col. 1170.
117
PH 32, col. 367.
118
TB, 10 January 1795.
119
ST 24, col. 1378.

for the most desperate enterprizes while at the same time providing an obvious tendency
to elude detectionand to defeat legal enquiry.
120

Loyalists could also allege the existence of the hidden hand of French Jacobins and
republicans that either directed, supported or inspired British radical operations, on the
mere premise that their interpretation of the conspiracy indicated this must be the case,
even though the supporting evidence was circumstantial at best. Pitt certainly believed in
this external assistance, for as Mori states in his view
The remarkable outward cohesion of the parliamentary reform movement during the 1790s could
only be put down to an external agency. The British public did not, thought Pitt, behave under
normal conditions with such determination and consistency. Radical unity could only be a product
of French aid.
121

This perception, that the lower orders were incapable of independent action or orderly
political activity without direction and assistance from some higher or foreign power, was
common in government and loyalist circles, forming a key aspect of the conspiracy theory
and securitizing move. Pitt described the societies as a jacobin army and alleged that
The conduct of the French, in all its circumstances, bore a peculiar application to this country; it
presented the fruits opening, in due season, the legitimate offspring of those trees, under the
specious pretext of liberty, planted against this country and its allies.
The societies were affiliated with the Jacobin clubs in France and employed for the
purpose of spreading Jacobin principles.
122

Furthermore, the presence of so many French migrs in England ostensibly fleeing the
Revolution was deeply suspected by loyalists as being a means for republicans to secretly
enter and operate in the country. In January 1793 The Times had praised the immediate
impact of the pending Aliens Act, noting that London was now cleared of hundreds of the
French vermin who came hither to breed rebellion and assassination.
123
In the Lords
Loughborough likewise praised the act for addressing the presence of foreigners who
came hither for the purpose of, and who were active in doing all they could to create

120
PH 34, col. 613.
121
Mori, William Pitt and the French Revolution 1785-1795, p. 262.
122
PH 31, col. 505; PH 30, col. 892.
123
The Times, 2 January 1793.

confusion.
124
The Home Office certainly viewed these aliens as a grave security threat,
necessitating urgent measures, with Sir Evan Nepean once commenting that
in the performance of this service some steps may be necessary to be taken not exactly justifiable
by Law, but it times like the present, when dangerous incendiaries are daily resorting to this
Country, avowedly with mischievous intentions, it is not necessary to be very nice.
125

The evidence of French collusion unearthed in 1798 was seized upon as proof that these
earlier insinuations and rumours had been correct, with the secret committee report of 1799
claiming that a frequent communication has been kept up the government of France, to
which they appear to look as their protector and ally.
126
This suited the governments own
perception and portrayal of radicalism as a dangerous and anarchical force with
international (particularly French) connections.
The conspiracy was therefore used to make the facts fit the government argument, rather
than the other way around. Barrell argues that the secret committees could interpret the
statements of the radical societies
as having only one possible purpose, as proving strongly and unequivocally a design to
overthrow the constitution, only because it had begun by assuming what it was appointed to
prove. The argument was back to front: the committee claimed to establish that the intentions of
the SCI were revolutionary on the grounds that the society had adopted the doctrines of Paine and
the French Convention; in fact it was arguing that because its intentions were revolutionary the
SCImust have adopted those doctrines. By starting from this assumption, the reports of the
Commons committee were imagining at least in part the conspiracy they claimed to have
discovered.
127

By viewing the societies plans, statements and intentions through the lens of the
conspiracy, the committees were assigning them an interpretation and composition that
naturally conformed to the matrix of the governments theory. This method was far from
impartial and accurate, but it certainly benefited the governments efforts to prove and
publicise the traitorous plot. It also allowed ministers to attribute a cohesiveness and unity
of purpose to the radical movement, allegedly from its very beginnings, which simply did

124
Lord Loughborough, Substance of the Speech of the Right Honourable Lord Loughborough in the House of Lords, on the third
reading of the Bill for establishing certain Regulations respecting Aliens, December 26, 1792, in Publications Printed by Order of the
Society For Preserving Liberty and Property Against Republicans and Levellers, No. 6, London, J. Downes, 1792, p. 15.
125
NA, HO 42/23, Nepean to Patrick McManus, n.d. (1792), quoted in Nelson, p. 124.
126
PH 34, col. 580.
127
Barrell, Imagining the Kings Death, p. 198.

not exist. By the end of the decade, the 1799 secret committee report went so far as to
assert that
The extent and uniformity of this systematic conspiracy, are equally striking. The formation and
structure of all these societies, in this country, in Ireland, and on the continent, are similar; their
views and principles are the same, as well as the means which they employ to extend their
influence. A continued intercourse and concert has been maintained from their first origin to the
present moment
128

In this way radicalism could be identified, targeted, denounced and securitized as one
comprehensive block, rather than having to allow that particular radicals, ideas, societies or
forms of radicalism may be more or less tolerable and reasonable.
Conspiracy thinking formed a key part of government attempts to distance 1790s
radicalism from earlier British antecedents, and to divorce it from the more acceptable and
debatable cause of reform. It could even turn radicalism into a tool with which to defeat the
real moderate reform movement, championed by the Foxite Whigs and their supporters, a
strategy viewed as advantageous to a government constantly seeking political mileage
against its opponents and regarding any parliamentary reform as inadvisable in the current
climate. The government could minimise its need to comprehensively consider and debate
popular grievances and political/state deficiencies by maximising the conspiratorial threat.
Reform was unwise simply because it was supported by and liable to unleash the forces of
disorder, violence and anarchy, while legitimate grievances were lost amidst the paranoia
and pontificating about radical threats. Pitt argued against implementing reform because it
was extremely unlikely that it would be possible to achieve a separation of the friends of
moderate reform and the determined enemies of the constitution. There was therefore a
grave danger of introducing an evil of much greater magnitude than that which we are
now desirous to repair, prompting him to question how far it is prudent to give an
opening for those principles which aim at nothing less than annihilation of the
constitution. He even claimed that although the Foxites proposed to guide the minds of
the people, they were in fact open and liable to the people guiding them. Moderates would
therefore be wise to check their wishes for the time being. If moderate reform was
unwise and liable to radical exploitation, then reform upon French principles, as was
advocated by some radicals, was a direct threat to the constitution the shortest way to
compass its utter destruction. Pitt opined that a reform would neither improve the lot of

128
PH 34, col. 580.

the people nor satisfy the radicals, for Those men who treat parliament as an usurpation,
and monarchy as an invasion of the rights of man, would not receive a reform which was
not the recognition of their right.
129

Young argued that the greatest danger to order was in fact the gentleman usher, your
modest reformer, who, meaning a great deal, asks a little, and knows how to make that
little much.
130
Windham warned the Foxites of the dangers of their supposed alliance with
the radical societies, whose views tended to nothing short of a total subversion of the
constitution, exclaiming that by the alliances they formed, they were far from being
certain that they were not fostering a young lion, which in the first moment of its power,
might employ its strength against themselves.
131
In such a climate safe reform was
impossible and its advocation by liberals ill-judged and destined to aid the forces of
disorder and anarchy. Some loyalists even argued that any form of proactive political
opposition was disloyal and dangerous at a time of national emergency, with
Loughborough advising that any actions calculated to diminish confidence in the
government would increase the danger with which the country was threatened. Rather it
was necessary for all parties to unite in their efforts to preserve our glorious Constitution
and bury and forget all former differences and disputes for such divisions were ill-
advised when the enemy were at the gate, and some of them within the citadel.
132

The government claimed that even if some radicals were moderate men who genuinely
supported legal reform, and regardless of whether a few individuals like Thomas Walker,
Hardy and Thelwall were acquitted of the charges against them, radicalism remained a
dangerous and intolerable threat unworthy of support because it propagated and harboured
a treasonous despicable plot greater than the sum or participation of any one part. The True
Briton attacked radical claims that the 1794 acquittals disproved the conspiracy, discerning
in them an intention to create a false sense of security into which the Jacobins wish to lull
the public, and thereby put them off their guard, the better to conceal the hidden design.
133

Scott, smarting from his defeats in the trials, told the Commons that it was by no means
necessary that any of the individuals accused of treason, should have been convicted, in
order to justify parliament in suspending habeas corpus. For that decision rested upon the
existence of a conspiracy, this being a subject upon which parliament was fully

129
PH 33, cols. 671 & 673-74; PH 30, col. 892.
130
Arthur Young, The Example of France a Warning to Britain, 3rd Ed., Bury St. Edmunds, J. Rackham, 1793, p. 148.
131
PH 29, cols. 1326-27.
132
Loughborough, pp. 15-16.
133
TB, 14 November 1794.

competent to decide for itself, as it had indeed done before the trials.
134
The loyalist
pamphlet Treason Triumphant Over Law and Constitution! advised the government that
The conspiracy being implicitly admitted, it is your immediate duty to prevent the profligate and
unprincipledfrom executing their horrid designs. The late acquittals have served only to inflame
their hopes and increase their presumption.
135

James Adair argued that from the written evidence alone it was impossible than any
individual could doubt of the existence of a treasonable conspiracy, an opinion shared by
many of his conservative colleagues. He even alleged that because the petty jury had
hesitated, in one of the trials, two hours before they delivered their verdict, they must also
have had no doubt of the existence of the conspiracy, deciding to acquit only because
they entertained a reasonable doubt regarding the involvement of each individual.
136

Bowles later declared that some of the jurors claimed to have misunderstood the law
regarding treason, and regretted passing verdicts that allowed the accused to escape the
punishment which they undoubtedly deserved.
137
The loyalist writer also castigated the
defence counsel Thomas Erskine for taking advantage of the unavoidable prolixity and
complication of the case, arising out of the nature and extent of the Conspiracy, which it
was necessary to unfold, and condemned him for attempting
to convince the Jury that a Conspiracy against the Monarchy had no real existence, although it
had been strictly investigated, and solemnly affirmed by both Houses of Parliamentand
although every man in the kingdom in his heart believes, that if the plans and designs which were
charged and proved to have constituted that Conspiracy had been effected, the Government would
have been instantly overthrown.
In Bowles eyes this attempt failed, for the trials were conclusively decisive as to the
existence of the Treasonable Conspiracy. The trials therefore, having established the
existence of the crime, in fact meant that the danger is encreased, and the necessity of
vigilance and precautionencreased also, for if the accused were innocent, the
acquittals proved that the criminals had eluded discovery; if guilty, that they eluded
justice.
138
He also argued that If, indeed, the existence of the Conspiracy depended upon

134
PH 31, cols. 1155-56.
135
Treason Triumphant Over Law and Constitution! Addressed to Both Houses of Parliament, London, J. Downes, 1795, p. 23.
136
PH 31, cols. 1181 & 1183.
137
Bowles, p. 46, emphasis in original.
138
TB, 15 November 1794, 10 & 22 January 1795.

Convictions, it has had the confirmation of that evidence in Scotland.
139
This was the
same argument used more accurately regarding Coiglys trial that one or more allegedly
relevant convictions proved the existence of the entire conspiracy.
The True Briton theorised that Hardy was probably acquitted because he was thought
to have been the instrument of others, a mere dupe, mouth-piece, and conduit pipe of
artful and designing men. Nonetheless it had been fully and substantially proved at the
trials that there existed a conspiracy to bring about a total destruction of the Monarchy, on
the ruins of which to erect a complete Democracy.
140
Adair maintained that rather than
being distracted or pacified by individual acquittals, which proved little, it was the duty of
the House, to prevent those who were conspiring, from bringing their evil intentions to
such mischievous maturity as might as might render our efforts to crush it ineffectual. He
also freely insulted and libelled Hardy in parliament, alleging that at his trial Erskine,
knowing the simplicity of Hardys nature did not choose to call him [to the witness stand],
because Hardy knew too much, while Windham notoriously described each defendant as
an acquitted felon and abused the jurors, claiming that they had been duped by the
devious conspirators, for plain and honest men are not always possessed of that strength
and search of understanding which is necessary to detect cunning and concerted fraud.
The Secretary at War argued that the acquittal of the defendants, although proof that there
was no legal evidence of their guilt in the opinion of the juries, by no means proved that
they were free from moral guilt. In his opinion the evidence established the direct
contrary and a bare and simple reading of the documents produced in evidence
confirmed the existence of the conspiracy and the need for ongoing vigilance and
emergency measures.
141

Conspiracists asserted that all incidents demonstrating a radical tendency towards force,
violence and rebellion the Watt conspiracy, the pop-gun plot, the Walker case, food and
crimping riots, the naval mutinies of 1797, the United Irish rebellion, even the penetration
of French agents into Ireland were part of the master plan to introduce anarchy and

139
Bowles, p. 46. For the Scottish sedition trials, see below pp. 65-66.
140
TB, 11 & 14 November 1794, emphases in original.
141
PH 31, cols. 1101, 1181-83, 1029 & 1083.

disorder into Britain and seize power.
142
In one example in August 1794, following
crimping riots in London, the police magistrate Patrick Colquhoun advised the Duke of
Portland that I have strong grounds to believe that these Riots have been incited by the
leaders of the Seditious Societies, whose views extend very far beyond the Recruiting
Houses. He believed the riots were initiated by the societies for the purpose of
introducing anarchy & confusion into the capital that they may with more ease carry into
execution these designs which they are hatching for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government. Nepean was informed that it is to be feared the mischief would extend
itself especially if there are evil disposed Persons ready to make use of the prejudices and
passions of the common People to serve their own Purposes.
143

However, while some individual members may well have joined in the riots, it is almost
certain that the radical societies actually played no organised or active role in either
instigating or exploiting them, for as Stevenson opines, there is little evidence to
substantiate the view that the riots were planned, either by the radical sections of the Whigs
or the radical societies.
144
This did not stop the loyalists from exploiting them for their
own purposes, once again raising the spectre of radical conspiracy to explain and
delegitimise popular agitation and grievance. St. Jamess Chronicle stated that
It was evidently apparent that the mob was led on by persons above the common rank, whose aim
it isto raise a general riot in the metropolisIt is greatly to be apprehended, that there exists a
scheme to raise mobs, and disturb the peace of the Metropolis.
The paper was in doubt as to who was behind this scheme, arguing that as some persons
in those mobs frequently cry out, Liberty Fraternity, and Peace with France, it is an easy
matter to conjecture by what party they are encouraged thus illegally to assemble.
145

Portland was likewise convinced of the radical involvement, and believed that the
punishment of the riot leaders would act as a salutary example to all Persons who are
unfortunately misled by the Instigations of Individuals who evidently aim at the destruction

142
See Barrell, Imagining the Kings Death, pp. 170-81, 252-84 & 445-503; Elliott, Partners in Revolution, pp. 124-240; Clive Emsley,
The London Insurrection of December 1792: Fact, Fiction, or Fantasy?, Journal of British Studies, vol. 17, no. 2 (1978), pp. 66-86;
Clive Emsley, The Pop-Gun Plot, 1794, in Michael T. Davis, ed., Radicalism and Revolution in Britain, 1775-1848, Houndmills,
Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000, pp. 56-68; Goodwin, passim; Frida Knight, The Strange Case of Thomas Walker: Ten Years in the Life of a
Manchester Radical, London, Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., 1957, pp. 122-65; Meikle, pp. 149-53; Mori, William Pitt and the French
Revolution 1785-1795, pp. 238-44; N. A. M. Rodger, Mutiny or subversion? Spithead and the Nore, in Thomas Bartlett, David
Dickson, Dire Keogh & Kevin Whelan, eds., 1798, pp. 549-64; John Stevenson, The London Crimp Riots of 1794, International
Review of Social History, vol. 16, no. 1, (1971), pp. 40-58; Wells, pp. 79-177.
143
NA, HO 42/33, fols.160-61, Colquhoun to Portland, 21 August 1794; fols. 234-35, Colquhoun to (Unknown), 22 August 1794; fols.
114-15, William Devaynez to Nepean, 20 August 1794.
144
Stevenson, p. 54.
145
St. Jamess Chronicle, 23 August 1794, emphasis in original.

of all order and Government.
146
In each of these cases, the ability to smear radicalism and
create suspicion was more important than actually proving radical guilt or the involvement
of conspirators, for alarms and insinuations were alone sufficient to reinforce the
governments case for ongoing investigations and the use of increased repressive powers
against the radical menace. The grand conspiracy magnified the power and reach of the
radical societies, explaining their involvement in so many different plots and events and
allowing each incident to reinforce and build the general alarm.
Yet for all the alarm it caused the conspiracy theory also held out hope that if the
government could just unmask the conspirators and bring them to justice, radicalism would
cease a pose a threat to peace and order. This was an important aspect of the securitization
process, as it gave the government the means to convince the public of its ability to tackle
and defeat the radical menace, as long as it was given the tools and support necessary to do
so. In December 1792 Loughborough expressed his desire that all the inhabitants of this
kingdom would join heart and hand in assisting the Executive Government to confront the
radical threat, for by such actions we should be safewithout it we might be ruined.
147

Later, after the arrests in May 1794, Grenville informed the Lords that while the
conspiracy was the more dangerous, because it was not the effusion of temporary
discontentbuta cool, deliberate, systematic plan to destroy the constitution of
England, it could yet be defeated if the government took such measures as might best
tend to defeat all such purposes, and to bring the authors and abettors of them to public
justice. By such efforts, the conspiracy was discovered in time, the plans of the
conspirators developed, and their intentions frustrated.
148
The 1799 secret committee
report glowingly praised the governments success in having
obtained early and accurate information of the chief designs and measures of the conspirators;
and the striking manner in which the most important particulars of the secret intelligence thus
procured, have, in a great variety of instances, been completely confirmed by events now
notorious to the world

146
NA, HO 43/16, Portland to Birmingham magistrates, 25 January 1795, quoted in Mori, William Pitt and the French Revolution
1785-1795, p. 244.
147
Loughborough, p. 15.
148
PH 31, cols. 909-910 & 912.

This information had availed the early and uniform defeat of all attempts to disturb the
public tranquillity of this kingdom, allowing the government to demonstrate both the
necessity and success of their measures to combat radicalism.
149

One the most important aspects of the conspiracy theory was its ability to link the
radical threat to suitable referent objects that the public could accept as independent of the
government itself and important enough to merit protection by extraordinary means. As
Buzan notes, If domestic threats are accepted as a national security problem, then the
government is provided with a powerful tool to legitimize the use of force against its
political opposition.
150
Pitt and his colleagues were in no doubt that their radical
opponents posed a threat both to their own grip on power and to the general preservation of
oligarchic government and its hold on British sovereignty. Buzan et al. state that
Sovereignty can be existentially threatened by anything that questions recognition,
legitimacy, or governing authority.
151
The radical reform arguments threatened all three,
as their refusal to recognise the current parliament and government as truly representative
of the people undermined their legitimacy and public recognition and therefore their
authority to govern. However while many of the elite viewed their and the nations
interests as virtually synonymous, the government realised that it could not claim such
naked self-interest as an acceptable referent object. This could potentially be sufficient in
persuading fellow MPs and elites who predominantly shared the governments interests,
backgrounds and prejudices, but suitable alternatives would be required to engage the
public as a whole and convince them that radicalism posed a threat to their interests and
security too; in other words that radicalism threatened national security, rather than just the
interests and preservation of the current ruling elite.
As such, the referent objects the conspiracy was alleged to threaten were initially
identified as the constitution and the sovereignty of parliament. The second report of the
Lords secret committee avowed the existence of a radical conspiracy aimed at subverting,
by their authority, the whole frame of the government, and the constitution of this realm,
its monarchy, its parliament, and its fundamental laws.
152
The conspirators ultimately
intended to form a republic.
153
Bowles claimed that the radicals were fighting to
sacrifice our sacred and venerable Constitution on the profane and ensanguined altars of

149
PH 34, col. 581.
150
Buzan, p. 105.
151
152
PH 31, col. 893.
153
PH 34, col. 600.

French Revolutionary freedom. He believed that even their stated aims of universal
suffrage and annual parliaments would be as fatal to the Constitution, and which are in
fact as incompatible with the existence of Monarchy, as the actual establishment of a
Republic.
154
Exactly what comprised the constitution was vague and unclear, but the
government and loyalists were convinced of its excellence (Bowles claimed it was in a
wonderful state of perfection
155
), liberality and key role in the nations happiness and
prosperity, and therefore were adamant that for the good of all it must be maintained
unaltered, or else risk a descent into anarchy and insurrection. Dundas decried those who
harboured a vicious desire of obtaining power by overturning the British constitution,
and of instilling into the minds of the people a hatred for our mild laws and happy
constitution, and a love for the anarchy and butchery of France.
156
Pitt argued that the
current constitution provided order, justice and decency, and the people of Englandare
sensible of the security which they enjoy for these blessings from the frame of our
excellent constitution; andare prepared to defend it against every attack.
157
This curious
mix of imprecision and sanctification made the constitution an ideal referent object. The
government and its allies could make broad statements that any attempt to alter even a part
of the constitution threatened the integrity and utility of the whole, as the True Briton did
in claiming that an attack upon one branch of the Legislature, if successful, is as likely to
destroy the whole Constitution as an attack upon another; and push the issue further by
alleging that radicals secretly wished to deliberately overthrow the entire constitution,
without being precise about how either threat would actually manifest itself in practice.
158

The sovereignty of parliament and its authority to represent the people were defined as
an indisputable and prosperous element of the constitution, secured by the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 and popular support. It was considered integral to the maintenance of
both the constitution and the monarchy, and any attempt to usurp or change it by force was
a threat to national security. As the True Briton argued: Destroy the legal representation
of the people in Parliament assembled, and the Kings power is at an end. The paper
insisted that any attempt to form a convention, as the radicals did, constituted an attempt to
usurp the functions of any branch of the Legislation.
159
Pitt claimed that in proposing a

154
Bowles, pp. 88 & 48.
155
156
PH 31, cols. 419-20.
157
PH 30, col. 896.
158
159
Ibid.

convention the societies intended to wrest from the parliament that power which the
people and the constitution had lodged in their hands. Radicals were therefore defying the
peoples will, and such plans required the adoption of the proper steps to check their
execution, and punish those who were so wicked as to devise them.
160

The radical threat was identified as a new and modern or Jacobin form of treason,
aimed at the constitution and its institutions rather than the king directly. Watson argued in
the Commons that conspirators on former occasions were unlike the present description,
men of character in other respects. Furthermore, their object was not like the present, to
overturn and annihilate all vestige of our constitution.
161
One pamphleteer warned against
the perils of the new Jacobin Treason, in which the Kings name is never mentioned, and
the only usurper is Universal Suffrage.
162
Windham claimed that There never had been a
period in the history of this country where such opinions were entertained, and it was self-
evident, that the progress of laws and of crimes must go hand in hand.
163
Bowles
described the radical conspiracy as a species entirely novel in these times, but infinitely
more subtle in its nature, more easy in its progress, and more extensively ruinous in its
tendency, than any of which former times has a conception. Such a conspiracy was the
most malignant and dangerous that ever invaded the security of this or of any other
Country. The current laws were inadequate to reach the evasion of modern artifice and
The source of all social security, the tenor of Justice, had failed the Constitution at the
moment of danger. The laws thus had to be rendered more effectual for the protection of
Government against the wily machinations of French Revolutionary Treason.
164
The
resulting new and extraordinary measures eventually including the Treasonable and
Seditious Practices Act, which allowed the government to secure for parliament and in
effect the executive itself the same protection afforded to the monarch.
However, while these objects remained on the table throughout the 1790s, as 1794
progressed and the debate about radicalism intensified, the government felt it necessary to
garner even further support for its securitizing move and to that end began to argue that the
very existence of the monarchy and the life and reign of the present king were in danger.
The secret committee of the Lords averred that the radical conspiracy, if allowed to reach
maturity, must have resulted not only in the total subversion of the constitution, but also

160
PH 31, cols. 502 & 504.
161
Ibid., col. 530.
162
Treason Triumphant Over Law and Constitution! Addressed to Both Houses of Parliament, p. 38.
163
PH 32, col. 298.
164
TB, 10 & 22 January 1795; Bowles, p. 48.

the destruction of his majestys person, family, and government, and the annihilation of
our laws and liberties.
165
The use of George III as a referent object allowed the
government to attach the radical threat to a tangible, popular and personable figure the
public could relate to and empathise with, rather than relying solely on the vaguer and
potentially disputed notions of sovereignty and constitution. One loyalist argued that when
attempting to sway the common people, To talk to them of the constitution is vain: they
can only respect the constitution in its true and representative emblem, the Kings
person.
166
The king was portrayed as representing and protecting the continuance of not
only all order and good government, but the very identity of Britain itself, such that any
threat to the life and reign of the king threatened both the existing government and the very
foundations of society, and vice versa. Eyre informed the grand jury of the treason trials
that should any man or group design to overthrow the whole government of the country,
to pull down and to subvert from its very foundations the British monarchy, this would
result in such a horrible ruin and devastation, which no King could survive.
167

After the riots in October 1795, during which Pitt claimed that a virtuous and beloved
sovereign had been attacked in the most criminal and outrageous manner, John Addington
stated that The atrocious attack on his majesty was not only an attack upon the king,
butit was an attack also upon the Lords and Commons, and was apparently the effect of
a dark, diabolical, and premeditated conspiracy.
168
An address to the king from the Lords
expressed its concern at the existence of persons so insensible of the happiness which all
your Majestys subjects derive from your Majestys just and mild government, while A
Narrative of the Insults Offered to the King argued that the king was a man whose
happiness, and the prosperity of his whole family is, by the just balance of our constitution,
so intimately connected with that of the people, that it is impossible to separate them.
169

Bowles claimed that The daring attack on his Majestys personwas the obvious and
natural consequence of the radical efforts to propagate the most seditious doctrines, and
to inflame the minds of the populace.
170
This supposed link between the attack and radical
agitation was particularly important in securing the necessary public and parliamentary

165
PH 31, col. 893.
166
British Library (BL), Add. MS 16922, fol. 139, quoted in Philp, p. 54.
167
Joseph Gurney, The Trial of Thomas Hardy for High Treason, Vol. 1, London, Self-Published, 1794, p. 7.
168
PH 32, col. 394.
169
PH 32, col. 154; A Narrative of the Insults Offered to the King, On his Way to and from the House of Lords, On Thursday Last, p.
13.
170
Bowles, p. 48.

support to pass and enforce the Seditious Meetings Act, a grievous blow to the radical
cause.
Finally, morality and property were also identified as referent objects threatened by
radicalism. By using morality, loyalists could emphasise the allegedly subversive and
corrupting nature of radicalism, and project it as a conspiracy not only against a particular
institution or idea but against the very fabric of society. William Hamilton Reid decried the
radical habit of ridiculing every thing before held sacred and making infidelity as
familiar as possible with the lower orders. He claimed that the whole system of domestic
economy seems reversed, with children left to stray and contract vicious habits, while
their parents engaged in fatal deviations from order and decency.
171
The second report
from the Lords committee of 1794 likewise condemned the radical avowal of those
doctrines which had led that convention to all those excesses which have proved so
destructive in France to the principles of social order, of religion, and of morality.
172
The
alleged threat to property on the other hand, that great bastion of British status and order,
described by Young as the principle of our constitution, was directed squarely at the
middle classes, pointing out that whatever sympathy they may have for radical ideas and
grievances, the threat to their hard won gains and possessions overawed any notion of
tolerance or reform.
173
One loyalist writer pleaded for the union of all ranks of property,
in defence of the Constitution. He argued that the popular reform movement must be
speedily crushed, or the liberty and property of Britons are no more.
174
William
Wilberforce argued that radical doctrines advocated a detestable and destructive
system;hostile to all property, to all personal security and domestic comfort, and
pointed out that it was not only the wealthy and the noble that became its victims.
175

Therefore both national and individual security were at stake and it was in the interests of
not only the elite but all property owners to support the governments moves to combat the
radical threat. In sum, the concepts of constitution, parliamentary sovereignty, monarchy,
morality and property were powerful and persuasive referent objects that allowed the
government to convince the public that radicalism constituted an existential and
unacceptable threat to the security and prosperity of the entire nation-state apparatus,
justifying and shaping both its securitizing moves and threat response.

171
William Hamilton Reid, The Rise and Dissolution of the Infidel Societies in this Metropolis, London, J. Hatchard, 1800, pp. 3 & 32.
172
PH 31, col. 888.
173
Young, The Example of France a Warning to Britain, p. 106.
174
Treason Triumphant Over Law and Constitution! Addressed to Both Houses of Parliament, pp. 7 & 9.
175
PH 31, col. 1018.

French Principles
British radicalism was described by the government as being indelibly attached to what
ministers described as French principles, being a volatile mix of republicanism,
Jacobinism, universal suffrage, revolution, natural rights, equality, sedition and a general
desire for anarchy and disorder. The publicly-avowed beliefs in Anglo-Saxon
constitutionalism, British liberties and limited parliamentary reform professed by many
radicals and societies were declared to be a mere cover for the far more comprehensive,
disruptive and dangerous ideology borrowed from France that really drove the radical
movement. This served a number of purposes in the securitization of radicalism.
Firstly, it allowed the government to paint radicalism as inherently incompatible with
limited reform, order and the maintenance of the current constitution and state structure,
and to separate it from earlier native forms of radicalism and dissent. French principles
were believed to be calculated towards the subversion and democratisation of the common
people, and were therefore liable to create a sense of grievance, rights-consciousness and a
loss of respect for the existing institutions of class, authority, constitution and commerce;
ultimately leading to sedition, disorder, social breakdown and insurrection. The 1794
Commons secret committee report stated that this was an important part of the radical
conspiracy, calculated with art and industry to subvert and corrupt the lower orders
and prepare them to be the instruments of the most dangerous and desperate designs. The
measures employed upon the public to inflame their minds, alienate them from the laws
and constitution of their country, and habituate them to principles of sedition and
rebellion had been deliberately prepared so as to connect it with the leading design of
the radical plot.
176
McCann argues that
Anti-Jacobin writers represented radical textual dissemination as a manipulative mode of
indoctrination that, by flattering the egos of hitherto disempowered subjects, ushered them to the
precipice of revolutionary violence.
177

This belief justified the prosecution and suppression of what Bowles once described as the
Gallic Republican Faction, banning their works and prosecuting those bold or careless
enough to speak seditious words and promote radical ideas.
178
Young warned this was
necessary to save the lower classes from themselves, against a tide of sedition presented

176
PH 31, col. 708.
177
McCann, p. 112.
178
Bowles, p. 45.

in a thousand forms to the attention of classes who are devoid of skill to disentangle
duplicity, unprepared with any antidote to repel such poison.
179

Furthermore, the government argued that the radical societies alleged adherence to the
principles of Thomas Paine, republicanism and the rights of man demonstrated that they
were actively dedicated to nothing less than a root and branch upheaval of the constitution.
In the Lords Loughborough argued that such principles were as inconsistent with all
established Governments as they were with the happiness of mankind.
180
At Hardys trial,
the Solicitor-General Sir John Mitford argued that they
are utterly inconsistent with monarchy; they are utterly inconsistent with a House of Lords, and
with many other parts of our establishment; and therefore, persons who attempt to procure the
establishment of these principles, as principles upon which the constitution and government of
this country ought to be founded,must be conceived, prima facie, to have within their view the
intent of destroying the existing government, of abolishing the House of Lords, and all the great
officers, ranks, and distinctions in this country; of abolishing also the House of Commons, as it is
now established, and of forming a constitution of government upon their own principles
181

The True Briton concurred, stating that those who have applauded Mr. PAINES Book,
and who have sent complimentary Addresses to the French Convention, cannot honestly
maintain that this was done only with a view to Parliamentary Reform.
182
Bowles argued
that the doctrines of the Rights of Man were inherently incompatible with those of the
constitution, being immediately subversive of its fundamental principles and in no way
conducive to limited reform. He concluded that A greater inconsistency could not surely
be charged upon a man, who, having fired a pistol at another mans head, should declare
that he only meant to improve his health, prolong his days, and to render them happy.
183

He was joined in this opinion by Young, who claimed that
while those Rights of Man, which have deluged France in blood, are openly professed as leading
principles in the improvement called for here, it may surely be admittedthat to give a little,
when a great deal is demanded, does not seem the way to quiet clamour

179
Young, An Enquiry Into The State Of The Public Mind Amongst The Lower Classes, p. 9.
180
181
ST 24, col. 1198.
182
TB, 17 November 1794, emphasis in original.
183
Ibid., 10 January 1795; Bowles, p. 47.

Any small concessions to satisfy the moderate would merely be made a vantage ground
for new demands.
184

In parliament, Robert Jenkinson offered the narrow perspective that the SCIs
endorsement of Paines Rights of Man alone demonstrated their desire to overthrow the
constitution, for this society must be allowed to have adopted the principles in that book,
by endeavouring to circulate it.
185
The first report from the Commons secret committee
argued the case more widely, stating that if one considered the radical approbationof
the doctrine of the Rights of Man, as stated in Paines publications, and the subsequent
approbation of the French system; and consider that these are the principles which the
promoters of a convention evidently make the foundation of all their proceedings, then
one could only conclude that the societies aimed at nothing less thana traitorous
conspiracy for the subversion of the established laws and constitution.
186
The Lords secret
committee likewise avowed that the radical societies adoption of the principles and
opinions of the French Convention and incessant exertions to propagate the same
doctrines here demonstrated their desire to carry out projects of the most desperate and
flagitious nature, respecting the members of both houses of parliament, and even the safety
of his majestys most sacred person.
187

Windham declared the societies to be infected to the bone with French principles, and
intent on the subversion of the British constitution.
188
Pitt concurred, stating that the
radical plans were clearly defined by
the modern doctrine of the rights of man;that monstrous doctrine, under which the weak and
ignorantwere attempted to be seduced to overturn government, law, property, security, religion,
order, and every thing valuable in this country
The Prime Minister informed the Commons that while the radical societies always took
care to connect the system of parliamentary reform with all those delusive doctrines upon
which was founded the newly-raised fabric of French freedom, they were inherently
incompatible, for anyone who
knew what Jacobins and Jacobin principles were,must see, in the pretences of reform in
parliament held out by these societies, the arrogant claims of the same class of men as those who

184
Young, The Example of France a Warning to Britain, p. 104.
185
PH 30, col. 204.
186
PH 31, col. 496.
187
188
Ibid., col. 1028.

lorded it in France, to trample upon the rich, and crush every description of men, women and
children
He also posited that if the
principle of individual suffrage be granted, and be carried to its utmost extent, it goes to subvert
the peerage, to depose the king, and, in fine, to extinguish every hereditary distinction, and every
privileged order, and to establish that system of equalizing anarchy announced in the code of
French legislation, and attested in the blood of the massacres at Paris.
189

This brings us to our next point the focus on French principles facilitated the
governments portrayal of recent and contemporary events in France as being indicative of
the desires and consequences of domestic radicalism. McCann argues that events in France
could be produced as an image of what lay hidden behind a political culture that, in
Britain at least, was tending towards constitutional avenues, not rebellion.
190
They
visualised and pointed to a penchant and desire for violence, revolution and anarchy lying
just below the surface of reformist respectability. The common use of the terms Jacobin
societies and Jacobinism in regards to British radicalism was designed to reinforce the
supposed similarity between radical and Jacobin ideology and to smear domestic
radicalism by conflating it with the horrors and fanaticism of French Jacobinism. Pitt
argued that those who have introduced into this island, Jacobin principles, Jacobin names,
and Jacobin acts, were the defenders of the French government and its aggravated
horrors.
191
Loughborough asserted that unrest and dissent required vigilant attention as
long as France remained in confusion, and any expectation could be formed that the
contagion might be communicated to Britain.
192

Windham argued that it was a fallacy to suppose, that whatever effect democratic
principles might have in France there was any chance of their being innocent in England.
Rather the freedom of our government gave the greater latitude for the introduction of
those new principles, increasing their destructive potential. Enough had already been seen
of their deleterious qualities to demonstrate the inadvisability of another experiment.
193

John Anstruther targeted the practice of associating specifically, claiming that to radical
clubs and meetingsFrance had owed all its miseries, while Dundas looked instead to

189
Ibid., cols. 498-99 & 503; PH 30, cols. 892-93 & 900-901.
190
McCann, p. 116.
191
PH 32, col. 583; PH 31, col. 503.
192
193
PH 31, cols. 547-48.

the plan for a convention, arguing that it has a direct tendency to introduce that system of
anarchy and confusion, with all their attendant evils, of which a neighbouring country has
afforded so fatal an example.
194
Chief Justice Eyre informed the Grand Jury in his charge
against Hardy and his co-accused that any
project to bring the people together in convention, in imitation of those national conventions
which we have heard of in France, in order to usurp the government of the countrywould be the
clearest high treason
195

As Pitt concluded, why were the radical societies so eager to bring about such a
convention? Because this, as they themselves stated, was the precise mode by which
France had effected her revolution.
196

The adoption of French principles also provided apparent substance to government and
loyalist claims and insinuations that domestic radicals were secretly in league with or even
directed by French republican agents and politicians. In the Commons Adair claimed that if
radicals secretly wished
to depose their king, to abolish monarchy, to annihilate the peers, and to establish in England a
representative government, on the broad basis of liberty and equality, as explained and practised
in France, it is not difficult to conceive that they might consider the cause of the French
convention as intimately blended with their own.
197

Burke believed some eighty thousand British citizens to be
pure Jacobins; utterly incapable of amendment; object of eternal vigilance; and when they break
out, of legal constraintThey desire a change; andIf they cannot have it by English cabal, they
will make no sort of scruple of having it by the cabal of France, into which already they are
virtually incorporated.
198

This common cause and association, reinforced by earlier open communications and
fraternisation between the leading societies, French republicans and the National
Convention
199
, surely hinted at continued collaboration with the enemy. Adair asked

194
PH 32, col. 327; PH 31, col. 541.
195
Gurney, The Trial of Thomas Hardy for High Treason, Vol. 1, pp. 11-12.
196
PH 31, col. 917.
197
PH 31, cols. 1108-1109.
198
Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Prospect of a Regicide Peace, in a Series of Letters, London, J. Owen, 1796, pp. 17-18.
199
This only occurred prior to the French declaration of war upon Britain on 1 Febuary 1793, after which all communication, or at least
that carried on by public means, abruptly ceased.

What had the Jacobin Club at Paris, what had the National Convention of France, to do with a
reform of the parliament of England? Yet these were the models whom our popular societies
chose to imitate, and these the allies with whom they were most eager to be connected.
200

Francis Saunderson claimed that the address to the National Convention, made by
several radical societies, was proof that French opinions were recommended uniformly
and artfully at the various clubs, and disseminated with the utmost industry, such
principles being subversive of our happy constitution and tending to its ruin.
201
The
resulting disaffection was believed to signify a willingness or even an earnest desire to
assist French clandestine and military efforts. At their trial in April 1794, Walker and his
co-accused were alleged to be disaffected to our sovereign lord the now king, and the
constitution and government of this kingdom, and as a result were conspiring to not only
overthrow the constitution and government of this kingdom but also to aid and assist
the Frenchin case such enemies should enter into and invade this kingdom in a warlike
and hostile manner.
202
Despite an inability to prove such accusations at the time, they still
damaged the reputation of radicalism and contributed to its securitization, all the more so
post the revelations and events of 1798, after which the Commons secret committee could
claim to have proven that the societies reliance on the assistance and co-operation of
France, by which they expect ultimately to effect their purposes, continues undiminished,
as it had done throughout the decade.
203

Indeed, particularly after 1798 the governments belief in a wider revolutionary and
republican movement held together by shared French principles and support allowed it to
draw connections between activities and agents across France, Britain and Ireland,
reinforcing the case for the existence of a dangerous and treasonous conspiracy against the
very foundations and primary interests of the British state. The Decree of Fraternity of
November 1792 had earlier stoked fears of such plots
204
, but the events of 1798 finally
brought them into the open. The United Irish rebellion prompted one loyalist to ask who
could doubt that the conduct and measures of the Conspirators in England will not be the

200
PH 31, col. 1107.
201
PH 30, col. 544.
202
ST 23, cols. 1062-63, 1071-72 & 1074-75.
203
PH 34, col. 613.
204
See below, p. 55.

same as those of Ireland? as they are both Agents in one design, carried on by common
Councils.
205
The 1799 Commons secret committee report argued
That the safety and tranquillity of these kingdoms have, at different periods from the year 1791 to
the present time, been brought into imminent hazard, by the traitorous plans and practices of
societies, acting upon the principles, and devoted to the views, of our inveterate foreign enemy.
These societies were devoted to the erection of a democratic republic, founded on the
ruins of all religion, and of all political and civil society, and framed after the model of
France.
206
French principles were believed to have guided and encouraged international
conspiracy and collaboration from Poland to Ireland. Canning claimed that Jacobin
principles had raged throughout Europe, andproduced such mighty mischief, that their
pernicious effects and culpability in fomenting radical plots could not be denied.
207
British
radicalism, as one arm of this grand republican movement, was captive, willingly or
otherwise, to the principles that drove it and incapable of more limited, independent and
reasonable designs. It was therefore nothing less than an intolerable existential threat to the
current constitution, and a dutiful and vigilant government had no choice but to wipe it out.
Dont you know were at war?
Britains state of war with France post-January 1793 was a crucial aspect of the
securitization of radicalism. The war naturally made national security and potential
weaknesses government priorities, as it sought to secure its goals and protect its interests in
a long-running battle with the French and their allies. Buzan states that Insecurity reflects
a combination of threats and vulnerabilities.
208
A state may possess particular
vulnerabilities on account of its location, geography, ethnic composition, political structure
and ideology, and internal (in)stability, but these will only cause insecurity if threats are
deemed to exist (or at least potentially exist) that may exploit these vulnerabilities to the
detriment of the state.
209
In our case, an internal fifth column, allied with French
republicans and/or Irish rebels, was viewed by the British government as a significant
vulnerability in the war with France and the efforts to suppress the Irish independence

205
An Address To The Nation, Showing The Necessity Of Forming An Armed Association, In Consequence Of The Conspiracy Of The
Republicans In Ireland To Subvert The Constitution, London, J. Sewell & J. Wright, 1797, p. 54.
206
PH 34, cols. 612-13.
207
PH 34, cols. 1469-70.
208
Buzan, p. 112.
209
Ibid., pp. 112-42; Buzan, Wver and de Wilde, pp. 150-54.

movement. Radicalism, in fulfilling this role as a potential force for destabilisation,
disorder, sedition, and waste of resources, not only posed a security threat in itself but also
represented a weakness capable of exploitation by French agents and soldiers. Loyalists
feared the horror of insurrection coupled with invasion, with one pamphlet-writer arguing
that each has its separate chance, and will produce the other. This left Britain in the
state of a wretch who kneels bound before the executioner, whose hand is upon his
scimitar, ready to unsheath it, while his death depends upon the turn up of a die, with two
bloody faces.
210

Pitt believed that Britain was particularly susceptible to the lure of French principles
and of particular interest to the National Convention,
if we were to judge from the exultation with which they had received from different societies in
England every address expressive of sedition and disloyalty, and from the eager desire which they
had testified to encourage and cherish the growth of such sentiments.
211

Jenkinson claimed in parliament that it was the intention of the French to kindle the flame
of civil war in this country, and indeed by the spread of radicalism and the assistance of
the societies they had got a great way towards making the lower order of society
discontented.
212
These fears were apparently justified by the United plots and uprisings of
1798, coupled with the heightened fears of French invasion, prompting the 1799 secret
committee report to advise that only if vigilance and precaution are maintained can the
nation look forward with confidence to the ultimate disappointment and defeat of the
projects which have been so long pursued by our foreign and domestic enemies.
213
Wells
states that The threat of invasion provided a favourable background when the government
took its case to parliament for further measures to repress radicalism and other potential
threats to national security.
214
Any dissent was viewed unfavourably as a sign of disloyalty
and potential French sympathies, with Young arguing that in a time when invasion
threatened, all must contribute heart and hand in the defence of every thing dear to human
nature.
215
This gave the government a largely free hand to set the agenda for what these

210
Republicans In Ireland To Subvert The Constitution, p. 90.
211
PH 30, col. 347.
212
PH 30, col. 205.
213
PH 34, col. 614.
214
Wells, p. 168.
215
Arthur Young, National Danger, and the Means of Safety, London, W. Richardson, 1797, p. 16.

contributions and sacrifices were to be, facilitating its measures to increase security as it
saw fit.
A war was also no time to discuss or pursue even limited reform, let alone more radical
notions of greater social, political and economic equality. In the Commons, Windham
argued that reform was too hazardous to contemplate at such a time, declaring that "This is
no occasion for an infusion of new blood, which, instead of being salutary, might prove
fatal and questioning whether one should seek to repair your house in the hurricane
season?
216
Canning likewise argued that reform was a proposition that ought not to be
agitated in times of tumult and storm.
217
Anstruther also claimed that the time to push for
reform was ill chosen, when the country was engaged in a war, and after attempts had
been made to agitate the minds of men by the propagation of principles incompatible with
the existence of any government.
218
Pitt concurred, asking If we are engaged in a war for
the purpose of defending ourselves against a foreign enemy, is this a reason why we should
hazard the consequences of any distraction at home?
219
Such arguments were persuasive
and instrumental in defeating the reform movement.
In turn, the presence of domestic radicalism and its alleged links with French
republicans were often used to justify continuing the war, such that alarm over one
reinforced the efforts against the other, and vice versa. French republicanism, being
inherently subversive, had to be defeated and removed from its homeland in order to bring
peace to Britain, Ireland and other nations which might be similarly afflicted. The much
feared and oft quoted Decree of Fraternity, passed by the French Convention in November
1792, offering fraternity and assistance to all people who wish to recover their liberty,
was declared by Pitt to be hostileto the human race and calculated every where to
sow the seeds of rebellion and civil contention, and to spread war from one end of Europe
to the other. Frances conduct militated against the dearest and most valuable interests of
this country.
220
Dundas stated that I should not like to see this Countryoverrun by the
Banditti who have lately held in their hands the only power that exists at present in
France. To this end he hoped to see the re-establishment of such a government in France
as wouldprotect other powers from a renewal of that spirit of restlessness and intrigue

216
PH 28, col. 467.
217
PH 31, col. 536.
218
PH 30, col. 889.
219
Ibid., col. 897.
220
Decree of Fraternity, National Convention, France, 19 November 1792, in Edward Baines, History of the wars of the French
revolution, Vol. 1, London, Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1818, p. 62; PH 30, cols. 347-48.

which has so often been fatal to the tranquillity of Europe.
221
Burke claimed that
republican France held out temptations the most seductive to the enlightened lower orders
of all countries, and furnished instruments for the overthrow of their government, while
Liverpool warned against the danger of her principles and extent of her designs.
222

Therefore, as Dudley Ryder concluded, When a nation like France was aggrandizing her
power, and threatening the subversion of every state, there certainly was a necessity for
raising the utmost strength to oppose her progress.
223
Only then could the government be
sure of its national and domestic security.
Security Measures
The securitization of radicalism enabled the government to enact a series of extraordinary
measures against it throughout the course of the 1790s. The suspension of habeas corpus
from May 1794 to June 1795, and again from April 1798 to March 1801, provided the
government with the time to investigate radical leaders in a thorough manner, and to bring
them to trial only once it had amassed as much helpful evidence as was deemed
possible.
224
The major prosecutions, while successful only in a few cases, nevertheless
served to harass, terrorise, eliminate and dissuade the radicals involved, and to frighten
many others from further participation in active radicalism. The second suspension also
abetted the governments new policy of preventive and dispersed detention, allowing the
government to indefinitely detain radicals (sometimes in distant locations) that it knew or
suspected were involved in treasonous and seditious plans but could not convict in open
court. This policy both nullified the radical threat and protected the sources of the secret
service. Furthermore, militia and volunteer units were increased and the ability of the army
to respond to disturbances and violent protests improved, while the security services were
also overhauled and put to extensive use, as we shall see in the next chapter. Young called
these actions no question of party, but a great measure of national security.
225

Legislation, in the form of the Aliens Act, the Two Acts, the Newspaper Publication Act
and the Combination Act, greatly contributed to the suppression of radicalism, increasingly

221
NA, HO 42/21, fol. 533, Dundas to T. Curry, 13 September 1792, quoted in Mori, William Pitt and the French Revolution 1785-
1795, p. 120; The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue Preserved at Dropmore, Vol. 2, Historical Manuscripts Commission, 1894-99, Dundas
to Sir J. Murray, 12 September 1792, p. 313, quoted in Mori, William Pitt and the French Revolution 1785-1795, p. 120.
222
PH 30, col. 384; Liverpool, p. 15.
223
PH 30, col. 1314.
224
Habeas Corpus Suspension Act (34 Geo.3 c.54) 1794; Habeas Corpus Suspension Act (38 Geo.3 c.36) 1798; Habeas Corpus
Suspension Act (39 Geo.3 c.15) 1799; Habeas Corpus Suspension Act (39 Geo.3 c.44) 1799.
225
Young, National Danger, and the Means of Safety, p. 12.

impinging upon civil society and restricting the right of radicals to associate, meet, speak,
raise grievances and ideas, publish and print, until at last all the societies were
comprehensively outlawed by the Unlawful Societies Act in 1799.
226
Trade unions and
workers groups were further collateral damage of the war on radicalism, banned because,
as Wells states, the government argued that the security of the nation could not permit any
associations of working men due to their perceived role as potential breeding grounds of
radicalism, dissent and disorder.
227
They therefore represented an inseparable element of
the existential radical threat and were outlawed at the same time as the radical societies,
allowing the government to minimise an important potential source of working-class
power and agitation.
The government and its loyalist supporters also waged an active propaganda and
pressure campaign against radicalism. Those who dared (or in some cases were merely
suspected) to utter and write radical sentiments or participate in radical activities were
often viciously persecuted, attacked, threatened, shunned and verbally abused, often while
local magistrates and constables looked the other way. It became increasingly impossible
to publicly express radical views without risking some form of recrimination. According to
loyalists, unity and patriotism were not just duties but active means of countering sedition,
and there is no doubt that in many cases fervent loyalists, often banded together in
associations and church and king mobs, acted entirely on their own initiative in harassing
and prosecuting suspected radicals for seditious words and libels, even sometimes in
situations where the government refused to endorse their actions or attempted
arraignments. As the True Briton somewhat prematurely declared in July 1794, The union
of all good men for the preservation of our Constitution, added to the energy of
Government, has tended to crush the spirit of Treason and Sedition that had begun to
manifest itself in the country.
228
Denouncement defined by Fitzpatrick and Gellately as
spontaneous communications from individual citizens to the statecontaining
accusations of wrongdoing by other citizens or officials and implicitly or explicitly calling
for punishment
229
and informing against suspected radicals were encouraged. Others
advocated the arrest of any suspected of seditious crimes, such as Spencer Perceval who

226
Aliens Act (33 Geo.3 c.4) 1793; Newspaper Publication Act (38 Geo.3 c.78) 1798; Combination Act (39 Geo.3 c.81) 1799;
Unlawful Societies Act (39 Geo.3 c.79) 1799.
227
Wells, p. 168.
228
TB, 15 July 1794.
229
Sheila Fitzpatrick and Robert Gellately, Introduction to the Practices of Denunciation in Modern European History, in Fitzpatrick
and Gellately, eds., Accusatory Practices: Denunciation in Modern European History, 1789-1989, p. 1.

claimed that wherever there be an actual breach of the peace, every private person who
sees the offence committed is, in aggravated cases, bound by the law, and in all cases
permitted to arrest the offender.
230
While these measures were often not directly
attributable to the government, they were symptomatic of the governments securitization
of radicalism and its efforts to suppress it.
The governments actions proved sufficient to defeat radicalism as a movement,
ideology and any form of treasonous plot and temporarily remove it from the active
political realm. Let us explore in greater detail how one important aspect of these measures
was implemented, shaped and utilised in identifying and confronting the radical threat
the states security services.

230
Spencer Perceval, The Duties and Powers of Public Officers and Private Persons with respect to Violations of the Public Peace,
London, 1792, p. 9, emphases in original.

Chapter Two Defending the State
(T)hese Farming societieshave been productive of far more good than harm, in as
much as they have turned the publick attention from Political to Domestic pursuits. Besides
their progress is well watched and we are minutely informed of every thing that passes
among them; so that on the least appearance of their assuming any thing like political
character or consequence we should be ready to meet and prevent the mischief, and we
have various & abundant means of doing so.
231
William Wickham to Henry Addington
on Irish security affairs, 3 January 1803
The securitization of radicalism had a significant effect on the states development and use
of its security and intelligence services. Such services are of course fundamental to any
attempt to identify, understand and combat threats to national security, and as such are an
ideal platform on which to assess the manner in which a securitization event can shape and
impact upon the institutions, activities and cultural norms of a society. As discussed in the
preceding chapter, the securitization of radicalism was a process that developed over the
course of the 1790s, as the government continued to monitor radical activities and tailored
its response accordingly, ultimately culminating in the decision to eradicate it altogether as
an active political force at the end of the decade. The steps taken against radicalism in
sequence may briefly be described as surveillance, prosecution, suppression, investigation,
obstruction and elimination. The work of a surveillance and investigative apparatus was
crucial to the governments actions and it is our task here to examine the manner in which
this apparatus was utilised, developed and centralised throughout the 1790s to serve the
shifting needs of the state and its securitizing moves. How did the securitization of
radicalism shape and enable security service use and development, and how in turn did
service operations facilitate securitization?
Beginnings
In the early 1790s information collection was carried out on a decidedly ad hoc and
irregular basis, as it had been for much of the eighteenth century. The Home Office,

231
Hampshire Record Office (HRO), Winchester, 38M49/1/45/1, Wickham to Addington, 3 January 1803.

presided over by Dundas from June 1791 to July 1794, was officially in charge of domestic
intelligence. The Office ran its own spies, responded to particular threats as they arose,
paid agents to procure particular information and sought to maintain ongoing
correspondence with numerous other sources of information. These included the new
police offices in London, established by the Middlesex Justices Act in 1792 on the model
of the original Bow Street office.
232
The police magistrates ran spies and gathered
information via their salaried constables. Bow Street enjoyed a special position as it stood
outside of the legislative apparatus, and its constables could thus be used in a more flexible
and expansive manner. In the counties local magistrates were primarily responsible for
information collection and dissemination and the preservation of order. On 21 May 1792
the king issued a proclamation against seditious writings, in which he commanded all
magistrates to make diligent inquiry in order to discover the authors and printers of such
wicked and seditious writings.
233
However without a proper police force or official
investigative personnel of any kind, local authorities were forced to rely on informers and
agents whom they could pay or otherwise persuade to provide them with information on
seditious practices and other matters of interest. Local officials enjoyed a large degree of
autonomy from the central state apparatus, and the manner in which magistrates, mayors,
solicitors and justices of the peace performed their tasks, and their zeal for investigating
radical activity, varied from place to place, being largely dependent on the character and
political allegiances of each official and local administration. Occasionally the Home
Office requested local magistrates to investigate particular matters, and at times sent their
own agents to assist. The authorities in Scotland were closely monitored by Dundas
himself. His nephew the Lord Advocate Robert Dundas ran his own spy network,
particularly targeting the radical groups in Edinburgh, while as elsewhere in the kingdom
excise officers and their numerous contacts provided another useful source of information.
The Post Office also played an active role in the collection of information. Local
postmasters were tasked with the collection and reporting of information on all manner of
topics and activities within their respective areas, though again their zeal and efficiency in
completing these functions varied from office to office. Reports were sent to the head
office in London for examination. As Ellis notes, the office also created intelligence by
opening, detaining, or copying correspondence, and sending interceptions to the

232
Middlesex Justices Act (33 Geo.3 c.53) 1792.
233
PH 29, col. 1477.

Secretaries of State.
234
Suspect individuals had their mail opened on Home Office orders,
while other articles drew the Post Offices attention due to their appearance or destination.
The LCS was aware of the Post Offices intelligence role, informing a fellow society in
Birmingham in June 1793 that The post we no ways rely on, as many of our letters have
already been intercepted.
235
Customs officials and military units were further sources of
information. The former were bolstered by the passing of the Aliens Act in 1793, which
increased their powers and responsibilities under a new hierarchy of superintendents
reporting to the Alien Office (a sub-branch of the Home Office), whilst amongst the armed
forces militia units in particular were of significant use in gathering information owing to
their close ties to local areas. The Alien Office, responsible for interviewing and
monitoring foreign immigrants, quickly became an important source of information,
solicited in particular from French migrs fleeing the Revolution. Charles Lullin, an early
member of the new office, recalled that the superintendents of aliens, including Wickham,
were assigned the task of regularising a branch of Policewhich, both in its permissive
and coercive attributions, had, up to that time, been nearly overlooked or neglected.
236

Wickham himself stated that it was his job to open some channels of Information by
which better intelligence might be obtained of their several views and proceedings, with
the intentthat the whole might be reduced to something like a regular system.
237
Fears
over the subversive influence of French agents, the ability of republicans to slip into the
country posing as legitimate migrs, and of connections between these agents and local
radicals, ensure that the Aliens Act was well-received as a necessary security measure in
an unstable climate.
It may thus be said that in the context of the eighteenth century the sources of
information at the Home Offices disposal were substantial. However, as Nelson points
out, Simply collecting the informationdoes not suffice to provide usable intelligence.
Someone must collate and analyze the raw information in order to turn it into usable
intelligence, reports and estimates.
238
Yet in Britain, while the basic principles of the
intelligence cycle were understood and recognised as important, prior to 1798 the tasks of
information collection, communication and analysis were neither centralised nor
systematised. The intelligence roles of the police, Post Office, Foreign Office, local

234
Ellis, p. 62.
235
PH 31, col. 820.
236
Hampshire Record Office (HRO), Winchester, 38M49/1/56/40, Charles Lullin, Life of Wickham.
237
NA, HO 1/2, Wickham to Thomas Brodrick, 5 September 1794, quoted in Nelson, p. 130.
238
Nelson, p. 86.

magistrates and customs officials were not fully integrated with the operations of the Home
Office. Furthermore, despite exhortations from the king himself to transmit to one of our
principal secretaries of state, due and full information, the communication of intelligence
from the provinces to the Home Office was erratic, Home Office staff numbers were small
and there is no record from this time of a comprehensive system for the collating, filing
and analysis of information.
239
Data obtained directly by Home Office officials and county
magistrates had to be sorted and analysed amongst the plethora of far less reliable
correspondence sent voluntarily by loyalists, local elites, opportunists and cranks of all
kinds. Yet the personnel available to carry out this mammoth task were so limited that at
one point in April 17930 a friend of Nepean the principle undersecretary of the Home
Office from 1782-1794 stated that I may without exaggeration say almost the whole
official business is now thrown upon his shoulders, and it is the astonishment of every
person how he holdsout.
240
While Nepean was considered by the Colonial Office
undersecretary William Knox to be intelligence, attentive and obliging, there was just
too much work for one man or even a few to carry out effectively.
241
Faced with these
disadvantages the Offices ability to turn information into useful intelligence was limited
and the governments capacity to monitor the nation was dependant largely on individual
initiative and insight and chance discoveries rather than any systematic approach.
242

Yet despite these drawbacks the Home Office was able to achieve a reasonably effective
collection and analysis of relevant information on working-class radicalism because the
importance of the LCS and its associated provincial organisations was quickly realised.
These were public organisations with open membership, easily infiltrated by informers.
The first known report from an informer within the LCS was written by George Lynam in
October 1792, though it is possible that spies were to be found within the ranks of the
society from an even earlier date. Initially their role was simply to inform the Home Office
on the proceedings, opinions and intentions of the new radical associations. Dundas stated
that
I most certainly thought it my dutyto have a constant lookout after the proceedings of the
societies, which I believed to be meditating mischief and sedition, & and that therefore I always

239
PH 29, col. 1477.
240
John Graves Simcoe, The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe, ed. E. A. Cruikshank, Vol. 1, Toronto, Ontario
Historical Society, 1923-31, Alexander Davison to John Graves Simcoe, 29 April 1793, p. 320, quoted in Nelson, p. 30.
241
William Knox, Extra Official State Papers, London, J. Debrett, 1789, p. 22.
242
Durey, William Wickham, Master Spy, pp. 23-46; Ellis, pp. 60-77; Emsley, The Home Office and its sources of information and
investigation 1791-1801, pp. 532-61; Harris, pp. 118-19; Nelson, pp. 28-31, 72-94 & 123-30; Sparrow, The Alien Office, 1792-1806,
pp. 361-67; Sparrow, Secret Service, pp. 7-26.

had, and always would take care to have persons amongst them to watch their plans & give me
immediate information of every design they had in hand.
243

By this means and the efforts of its magistrates the government gained a reliable picture of
the new radical societies, even if this knowledge did not always translate to understanding
or reassurance. Yet despite the concerns of the Home Secretary and others, until late 1793
the incoming reports did not suggest a need for anything other than ongoing surveillance,
and the government and its agents continued merely to observe. No significant alternation
to the states information-gathering and investigative capacity was yet deemed necessary.
Therefore in these early stages there is no evidence to suggest that spies were requested in
any way to play the part of an agent provocateur, nor to make special efforts to place
themselves in positions more conducive to the discovery of useful information or the
direction of proceedings.
244

While the central government remained largely passive, radicals nonetheless faced a
serious threat from loyalist magistrates, informers and associations, spurred on by the
kings May proclamation, the hope of reward and rising fears of seditious threats to the
maintenance of order and security. On 20 November 1792 the lawyer and public official
John Reeves founded the Association for Preserving Liberty and Property against
Republicans and Levellers. Branches of this and similar associations quickly sprung up
across the country. Apart from attacking suspected radicals and their businesses, disrupting
radical meetings, preventing the dissemination of radical literature, organising loyalist
marches and publishing pamphlets, the associations encouraged people to inform on
citizens who uttered or wrote seditious words. Informers were soon to be found in many
pubs, coffee-houses, taverns and radical meetings, and numerous prosecutions for sedition
were brought before the authorities, often with the active assistance of the associations.
Inns, where tongues were often loosened by drink, were a common place for the reporting
of sedition, while disputes between neighbours sometimes resulted in seditious words
which were duly passed on to the authorities.
Attempts to radicalise and seduce soldiers were a particularly dangerous affair, as these
were often reported and liable to result in severe punishment. In one case in July 1796
James Tally of Shepton Mallet was reported by the sergeant of the Fiftieth Foot for
attempting to subvert his soldiers. In 1797 the government passed legislation making such

243
NA, HO 42/21, fols. 508-11, Dundas to J. Noble, 12 September 1792, quoted in Mori, William Pitt and the French Revolution 1785-
1795, p. 182.
244
Goodwin, pp. 238 & 263-66; Mori, William Pitt and the French Revolution 1785-1795, pp. 119-30 & 180-85.

activities a capital offence. Churches were not immune either, especially the dissenting
congregations whose doctrines and allegiances were often associated in the minds of
loyalists with radicalism. In November 1792 witnesses informed against the dissenting
minister William Winterbotham for preaching two allegedly seditious sermons, while in
North Wales Lord Bulkeley reported to the Home Office that a local Methodist preacher
had descanted to a numerous auditory on the rights of man and some of the general
principles contained in Mr Paines book.
245
While Reeves initial society was disbanded
in June 1793, the fear of being reported to local magistrates by loyalist and patriotic
informers remained a constant threat to radicals throughout the 1790s.
While the agents and spies of these magistrates were one source of potential prosecution,
most of those charged with uttering seditious words or publishing low-grade printed libels
were reported by informers who had no direct connections with the government. As noted
above, increased vigilance and law enforcement were championed by many government
and loyalist advocates, and not a few responded to these calls. Some informers were strong
loyalists and members of loyalist associations who deliberately sought out examples of
sedition by frequenting public meeting places and bookshops. The London Packet of 13
January 1794 reports on a Warwickshire mayor who was lately visited by London
Informers, who were sent down to the place by the Crown and Anchor Society, to watch
for sedition.
246
The allegedly seditious song they investigated turned out to be devoid of
any such intent. In Sutton-in-Ashfield members of the local Reeves Society assaulted the
young radical Benjamin Ward and then had the audacity to successfully inform against him
for speaking seditious words.
Other informers simply chanced upon words to which they took offence and found
necessary to report to the authorities. Such was the case in two coffee-house altercations in
London involving John Frost, Dr. William Hodgson and Charles Pigott. Frost was involved
in a conversation with an acquaintance in a coffee-house public room which became
heated and drew in others who were outraged by Frosts comments in support of equality
and no king, while Hodgson and Pigott were seated in a box conducting a private
conversation on political matters which again was overheard by others. Frosts words were
reported to the authorities, while the proprietor of the New London Coffee House, a

245
NA, HO 42/22, fol. 102, Bulkeley to the Home Office, 10 October 1792, quoted in Hywel M. Davies, Loyalism in Wales, 1792-
1793, Welsh History Review, vol. 20, no. 4 (2001), pp. 705-706.
246
London Packet, 13 January 1794, emphases in original.

member of the Reeves Society, sent for a constable to arrest Hodgson and Pigott. The
witnesses of the words spoken by these accused all gave evidence in court, with one in
Frosts case allegedly having had the presence of mind to write down Frosts words even
as they were spoken. The decision to inform generally required a certain amount of
conviction and dedication as the informer was usually required to testify like this in court,
a time-consuming task not without risk of drawing the opprobrium of fellow citizens. The
two topics that appear to have most-angered people were words against the king and
statements in favour of France. The sense of outrage that drove people to inform can be
gauged by statements such as that made by the witness Paul Savignac at Frosts trial: I
stepped from the box, and asked him [Frost], how he dared to hold a doctrine of that kind
in a public coffee-room?
247
Both Frost and Hodgson were convicted.
The number of prosecutions for sedition in the 1790s is difficult to determine. Emsleys
figure of under 200 has been questioned by historians such as Poole, who has demonstrated
that only a careful investigation of the records of each county could give us a figure
anywhere near accurate. To this must be added the many cases which did not proceed to
trial but would still have resulted in hardship for the accused. Certainly the number of
cases declined as the decade progressed after the initial flurry in 1792-93, as loyalist
activism decreased and radicalism declined in the face of repression and invasion fears.
But ultimately the threat of being reported to and charged by the local authorities varied
from place to place depending on the strength of loyalism and the vigilance, beliefs and
allegiances of the magistrates in each area.
248

A Change of Pace
The loyalist persecution of radicalism, in most cases tacitly approved by the government,
initially reassured ministers that further direct action was unnecessary. However as 1793
progressed and radicalism experienced a resurgence in activity and popularity, the
government eventually deemed it necessary to intervene more directly in radical affairs and
attempt a securitizing move against them. Late 1793 therefore witnessed a change in
government policy. Amidst increasing concerns about the threat from French agents and
collaborators, the disbanded British Convention in Edinburgh in October-December 1793

247
ST 22, col. 485.
248
Barrell, The Spirit of Depotism, pp. 75-102; Black, pp. 233-74; Davies, pp. 687-716; Dozier, pp. 55-102; Emsley, An Aspect of
Pitts Terror, pp. 155-84, Emsley, Repression, Terror and the Rule of Law in England during the Decade of the French Revolution,
pp. 801-825; Gilmartin, pp. 291-328; Ginter, pp. 179-90; Philp, pp. 42-69; Poole, pp. 65-87.

(which was followed by the arrest, trial and conviction for sedition of three of the leading
participants the Scottish radical William Skirving and the LCS delegates Maurice
Margarot and Joseph Gerrald), proposals for a new convention in London in mid 1794 and
fears that the radical societies were intending to usurp parliaments authority and achieve
reform by force, the government began to act in a more aggressive manner. As ministers
began to suspect the existence of a radical plot, threatening to national security, the Home
Office moved beyond passively monitoring the radical societies and focusing the efforts of
new and existing spies on collecting information pertaining to allegedly treasonous
activities.
249
For example in April the LCS spy Edward Gosling disclosed that Wickham,
then serving as a police magistrate, had desired meto direct my attention particularly to
discover whether they were serious in their conversation and really intend to procure Arms
or had any secreted.
250
Reports from Gosling and other new spies such as John Groves
and John Taylor contained details of intentions and preparations to use force to achieve
reform and possibly even overthrow the monarchy. Gosling alleged that the prominent
radical John Baxter stated Is there one Man in the Society who believes a Parliamentary
Reform is all we want; no not one, for indeed a Revolution might be effected in a few
Hours.
251

The governments altered and increased use of spies and informers, attempting to
uncover evidence of a suspected conspiracy, produced mixed results. The accuracy of their
reports and the role played by spies themselves in directing the proceedings of the societies
is not easily assessed. Three things at least may be noted. Despite extensive searches clear
physical evidence of treasonable designs of the type alleged by some spies was not
forthcoming. Furthermore in 1794 the governments spies became far more active in the
affairs of the LCS and there is a marked difference in the tone and nature of the
information provided compared with that received in 1792-93. But whether this is due
more to the imaginations of the spies, the promptings of the Home Office, or a real rise in
extremism within the radical societies is the subject of ongoing debate. Finally the extent
to which the government truly believed the increasingly alarming information it received is
unknown. Wickham at least appears to have given it credence, informing the Home Office
in May that amongst the radical societies the intention to overturn the Government of the

249
As part of the ministerial reshuffle following the decision of the Portland Whigs to join the government, the Duke of Portland
himself became Home Secretary in July 1794, while Dundas was moved to the new position of Secretary of State for War. This had
important repercussions for the direction of Home Office policy and operations as Portland and his colleagues were generally even more
alarmed by and distrustful of radicalism than the Pittites.
250
NA, TS 11/965/3510A, quoted in Thale, p. 140.
251
Spy Goslings Information: 9 May 1794, NA, TS 11/954/3498, in Thale, p. 157.

Country is openly avowed.
252
Whatever its true motives, the Home Offices efforts
convinced the Cabinet that decisive action was needed. Sufficient evidence was obtained to
bring the radical leaders Hardy, Horne Tooke and Thelwall to trial on a charge of treason,
and to justify the arrest of several other prominent figures, while information from spies
also played a key role in the governments efforts to convince the public that the radical
societies were plotting a treasonous conspiracy to overthrow king, constitution and
parliament.
However the governments decision to place its own spies on the witness stand at the
trials in November-December 1794 proved a mistake. The defence counsels Erskine and
Vicary Gibbs skilfully attacked their character and credibility and attempted, with some
success, to paint the alleged conspiracy as a fabrication based purely on evidence from
untrustworthy spies. Erskine referred to the witness George Sanderson as good Mr. Spy
and argued that Groves has been guilty not only of a suppression of the truth, but he has
been guilty of direct perjury.
253
He summed up the crowns case by arguing that the
evidence obtained from natural sources was plain and innocent in meaning, and it was
only whenever a different complexion was to be given to it that the prosecution relied on
the medium of spies and informers, and of menof the most abandoned and profligate
characters.
254
The defences strategy and targeting of informers appears to have been
successful. Public contempt and distaste for the appearance of spies in court was
widespread. All three radicals were acquitted and the charges against the others dropped.
While it is impossible to know the reasoning behind the juries decisions, the governments
extreme reluctance to use spies as witnesses in all future state trials indicates that they at
least believed that such a practice had proved inadvisable and detrimental to the
prosecutions cases.
255

Earlier in the year informers had caused further problems for the government. In April
the Manchester-based radical and cotton-merchant Walker and some of his associates were
arrested and tried for conspiring to overthrow the constitution. The chief witness was the
labourer Thomas Dunn, who informed against Walker and accused him of conspiracy and

252
Substance of Several Informations on the Views and Proceedings of the Different Republican Meetings known by the Name of
Corresponding Societies, particularly those at the Eastern end of the Town and in the City: 6 May 1794, NA, TS 11/965/3510 A/2,
quoted in Durey, William Wickham, Master Spy, p. 43.
253
ST 24, cols. 709 & 1143.
254
ST 24, col. 959.
255
Barrell, Imagining the Kings Death, pp. 127-441; Durey, William Wickham, Master Spy, pp. 37-46; Ehrman, The Younger Pitt: the
reluctant transition, pp. 393-402; Goodwin, pp. 268-358; Graham, Vol. 2, pp. 539-639; Harris, pp. 75-123; McFarland, pp. 112-16;
Meikle, pp. 137-53; Mori, William Pitt and the French Revolution 1785-1795, pp. 191-96 & 237-47; E. P. Thompson, The Making of the
English Working Class, pp. 130-54.

the utterance of seditious words. Dunn had been arrested for distributing an anti-war
pamphlet and examined by the loyalist magistrate the Rev. John Griffith. Walkers
radicalism made him a firm enemy of the local loyalists, and the arrest of Dunn a known
acquaintance of Walker gave Griffith an opportunity to incriminate the merchant. Dunn
was enticed with alcohol and persuaded to testify against Walker. Despite reservations, the
government agreed that the trial should proceed. Dunns penchant for liquor, however, was
ultimately to work against the crown. A fortnight before the trial he tearfully confessed his
actions to Walker and some friends, and subsequently appeared in court drunk, having
popped down to a local pub during a break in proceedings. Farcical scenes ensued, with
Dunn in the witness stand swearing drunk or sober I will speak the truth. Despite Justice
Heaths intervention, querying I dont know how we can examine a man that is drunk,
Erskine continued his examination. Regarding Dunns confession to Walker he asked Did
you go down on your knees, and cry for ten minutes?, prompting the indignant reply
You may as well tell me that I am a woman.
256
Unsurprisingly Dunns accusations fell
apart under cross-examination and the testimony of more reliable witnesses, and following
Walkers acquittal he was tried and convicted for perjury. It subsequently emerged that two
other associates of Walker had been unsuccessfully coerced by Griffith and the loyalist
Manchester Association to testify against him.
In September Robert Watt and David Downie were tried for treason in Edinburgh. They
had been arrested in the preceding May following the discovery of sixteen pikeheads and
the details of a plot to disable government and seize the reins of power in Edinburgh. Both
were members of the radical Edinburgh Friends of the People, however it emerged that
Watt had previously acted as a government informer, reporting to Robert Dundas. At the
trial Watt claimed that his presence at the societys meetings was due solely to a desire to
inform on their plans. Downies defence counsel alleged that as an informer Watts gambit
had been creating imaginary plots, in order to give himself consequence and to obtain
money.
257
However Dundas swore that he had ceased employing Watt by late 1793, and
that the informer had been acting entirely on his own initiative in the treasonous plot. It
appears likely that the Lord Advocate was correct and Watt had indeed gone native,
although ultimately it is unknown whether Watts real intentions were to go through with
his plan or to betray his accomplices to the government. Whatever the truth it was widely

256
Joseph Gurney, The Whole Proceedings of the Trial of Indictment Against Thomas Walker of Manchester, Merchant, Samuel
Jackson, James Cheetham, Oliver Pearsal, Benjamin Booth, and Joseph Collier, Philadelphia, W. Woodward, 1794, pp. 90-91.
257
ST 24, col. 150.

believed amongst radicals that Watt had in fact been acting as an agent provocateur,
sacrificed by the government in the interests of raising public alarm against supposed
radical conspiracies. Certainly the prosecutions case was typically overblown and the
conspiracy far less dangerous than alleged. Nonetheless the evidence against the accused,
which this time consisted predominantly of written documentation and reliable witness
testimony, was convincing, and Watt and Downie were duly found guilty. After making a
questionable confession the former was hanged on 15 October.
Further troubles arose in September in London when the LCS member Thomas Upton
informed the government of an alleged plot by his fellow radicals Peter Lemaitre, George
Higgins and John Smith to assassinate the king by means of an airgun. The pop-gun plot
as it became known quickly proved to be a complete fabrication by Upton. As early as
October even the king was of the opinion that while any informer that comes voluntary
forward is not to be entirely neglected, yet that he must be looked at with a jealous eye, he
being most frequently actuated alone by the object of obtaining money.
258
Yet the
government pursued the matter with vigour for some time and arrested the supposed
conspirators and others who were subsequently drawn into the affair by the unscrupulous
informer. One of them, the physician Dr. Robert Crossfield, was eventually tried for
treason in May 1796, but was acquitted. Upton was not called as a witness, the reason
ostensibly being that he had died by drowning in February. This may not even have been
true, as there is evidence to suggest that the informer was alive some years after 1796. If so
the story of Uptons death can only have been the means by which the prosecution avoided
the necessity of using the notoriously unreliable watchmaker as a witness, the government
having learned from their experiences in 1794. The public fear and alarm caused by the
supposed plot was no doubt useful to the governments repression of radicalism, and this
may go further towards explaining the Privy Councils willingness to continue to entertain
Uptons vacillating evidence rather than any serious belief in his claims. Nonetheless
radical indignation was widespread and even for those who believed the official stories of
events, the sordid affairs of Walker, Watt and Upton did further damage to the
governments image and integrity.
259

However despite these embarrassments and failures in court, the governments actions
and use of spies still dealt crippling blows to the radical movement. Evidence from

258
George III, The Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 2, ed. A. Aspinall, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1963, George
III to Portland, 30 September 1794, p. 249.
259
Barrell, Imagining the Kings Death, pp. 170-81, 252-84 & 445-503; Emsley, The Pop-Gun Plot, 1794, pp. 56-68; Goodwin, pp.
334-37; Knight, pp. 122-65; Meikle, pp. 149-53.

informers, including the unidentified JB, was vital in securing the convictions of
Skirving, Margarot and Gerrald. While no conspiracy was proved in court, the
accumulated evidence allowed loyalists and MPs to affirm its existence and convince a
majority of the public of the danger, justifying the arrest of leading radicals and suspension
of habeas corpus. The arrests and trials caused significant financial, emotional and social
hardship, depriving the societies of important leaders and creating fear and disorder
amongst many members. The mere knowledge that spies were present also bred fear,
arguments, accusations, distrust and hesitancy. During the internal LCS trial of Groves on
the charge that he was a spy, William Metcalfe reported that The Committee was much
exasperated much abusive language passed and he would have been excluded the Society
at once, had not calmer heads intervened.
260
Groves had earlier argued that If a Citizen
made a Motion which seemed anyways spirited he was set down as a Spy, yet in other
instances If a Citizen sat in a Corner & said Nothing he was watching their proceedings
that he might the better report it. In these circumstances Citizens hardly knew how to
act.
261
Such scenes were obviously not conducive to furthering the societys interests.
The governments use of spies and informers and its methods of surveillance and
investigation in 1794 demonstrate both positive and negative aspects of security work and
its connection with government policy. The governments willingness to give credence to
information from spies allowed it to harass and demonise the radicals, but its failure to
conduct proper checks and willingness to persevere with persons of obviously dubious
character exposed it to public ridicule and defeat in the courts. However voluntary
informers could prove truly useful. Lynams information was generally sober and reliable
(although he became flustered at Hardys trial) and the Home Office could rely on
information like that provided by Robert Alderson in Norwich. Alderson informed the
Office that
Exaggerated communications are worse than no communications at allI shall therefore not
think it worthwhile to send you any but such as I can pledge myself for the liberal veracity of such
as appear to me to be deserving of the notice of government.
262

260
Report from spy Metcalfe: LCS Committee of Correspondence, 29 August 1794 [57], NA, TS 11/956/3501, in Thale, p. 216.
261
Report from spy Groves: LCS Division 2, 21 July 1794, NA, TS 11/965/3510A, in Thale, p. 201.
262
NA, HO 42/23, fol. 131, Alderson to Nepean, 16 December 1792, quoted in Emsley, The Home Office and its sources of
information and investigation 1791-1801, p. 541.

Most informers were not so meticulous. Voluntary information arrived at the desks of
Home Office officials and local magistrates in vast quantities, and was only followed up or
investigated by government agents when thought to be reliable and/or of especial interest.
In this manner the government attempted to maximise the productivity of its limited
resources and keep abreast of as many relevant matters within the kingdom as possible,
although at times it was still deceived by false or inaccurate reports. Attempts to coerce
questionable characters like Dunn into giving information often proved disastrous. By
contrast with these methods, the likes of Metcalfe, Groves and Gosling were agents
specifically infiltrated into the LCS and the SCI in order to report their activities and
potential sedition to the government. Metcalfe informed Portland that the Home Office
undersecretary Nepean had
requested that I would attend to the disaffected societies and endeavour to find out their intentions
and designs, that Government being acquainted therewith might have an opportunity of
frustrating any measures which they might have in agitation hostile to the Constitution
263

While these agents provided highly useful information and a means of prosecuting and
securitizing radical activities, their proclivity for becoming over-involved in the societies
operations and eagerness to please their handlers, combined with further lapses in
background checking, again exposed the government to failure in the courts and
accusations of provocation, deception and misunderstanding.
Nonetheless the evidence suggests that, aside from irregular cases like those involving
Upton, Dunn and Watt, the majority of the time the Home Office made a reasonable
attempt to secure reliable accurate information and gain a realistic perspective of the state
of the country. Conspiracy theories and securitization certainly influenced the manner in
which the government employed its spies and other resources, but still did not yet
precipitate a major chance in structure. In the absence of a regular police force or a large
bureaucracy the need to employ spies and agents to acquire and investigate information
was unavoidable. Where possible multiple sources were utilised, allowing information to
be cross-checked and tested for accuracy. Wickham once informed Castlereagh that some
intelligence he had received was most probably accurate because it came from several
different sources, with all these informations mutually confirming each other, though
derived from different channels, and from individuals wholly unconnected with, and

263
NA, HO 42/34, fols. 11-12, Metcalfe to Portland, 5 January 1795.

unacquainted with, each other.
264
In some cases specific lines of enquiry were followed, at
least in part to improve the relevance of the information obtained, and the government
made some active efforts to ensure that its agents were competent and reliable. The Home
Office retained a healthy scepticism and a realisation of the limitations of its sources.
Portland once asked a magistrate to contrive some means of ascertaining the correctness
of the information he received from a particular informer, for the current picture of good
order was not lightly to be questioned upon the Reports of those who may suppose their
importance to increase in proportion to the discoveries they may be supposed to make of
Plots and combinations.
265
Requests and reports received from provincial magistrates
were generally given as much consideration as time allowed. However against these
factors one must consider the fractured and limited resources at the governments disposal,
the significant potential for misunderstanding and misinterpretation, the manner in which
the governments prejudices affected its activities, the influence of political factors, and the
disputed extent and repercussions of the reliance placed on informers. These issues were
hotly debated by contemporaries and will be analysed further in the following chapter.
The backgrounds of spies and informers were legion. Quite a few, such as Groves,
Metcalfe and the Irishmen McNally, Francis Magan and Turner, were lawyers, and
McNally and Charles Stuart were also established playwrights. Frederick Nodder was a
noted botanic painter and George Orr a journalist and graduate of Trinity College, Dublin.
Some, such as Alderson, were respectable gentlemen. Many came from more humble
lower middle-class backgrounds. James Powell was a clerk and writer, Sanderson a
publican, Lynam an ironmonger, and the Irish spy Newell a miniature portrait painter.
Gosling and John Tunbridge were hairdressers, while John Moody was a warehouseman. A
few, such as Joseph Tankard, George Cartwright and George Munroe, were soldiers. In
Ireland the informers Michael Phillips and James McCarry were a friar and a priest
respectively, while their fellow countrymen Samuel Sproule and Nicholas Mageean were
farmers, contrasting with the merchant and business interests of Watt, Thomas Collins,
William Bird and Thomas Reynolds. The myriad of voluntary and anonymous informers
came from a wide-range of backgrounds and professions, from aristocrats to humble
artisans.

264
Castlereagh, Vol. 1, Wickham to Castlereagh, 8 June 1798, p. 217.
265
NA, HO 43/13, fols. 102-103, Portland to Ralph Fletcher, 14 July 1801.

Motives were equally diverse. Some spies claimed to inform out of principle and a
desire to serve king and country. Robert Holden informed the Home Office that
You know my Zeal in the Cause, and my Readiness to support GovernmentI shall at all times
be ready to inform Government of any Proceeding or Opinions of a dangerous Tendency,
conceiving it my Duty as a Member of that State in which I enjoy Protection, to contribute to its
Support
266

Another informer claimed that he was a friend to parliamentary Reform, but fearing
violence and unrest, he decided to turn informer, for he by no means approved of such
means being used to bring it about.
267
In Ireland some radicals like McNally who had
grown disenchanted or concerned by the intentions of their colleagues sought to prevent
further damage to the radical cause by advising the government on how to proceed, urging
moderation, and assisting them to nip the extremists plans in the bud. McNally advised
Dublin Castle that
I write to you with the free and uninfluenced mind of a friend, who wishes to represent every
thing that occurs to his observation with undisguised truth, considering that the only means by
which you can, with justice and propriety guide your judgment.
268

Other informers acted in the hope of securing promotion or reward. Not a few were in debt
and resorted to spying for financial gain. Agents like Metcalfe who perceived their
activities almost as a fully-fledged profession may be contrasted with casual informers who
often reported out of fear and misunderstanding. Some spies enjoyed the sense of
adventure, danger, influence and notoriety that came with their activities, while others like
McNally and Orr were turned by the government in exchange for their freedom from
imprisonment and prosecution. Finally some became informers due to a falling out with or
perceived slight from a fellow radical or neighbour. Powell turned to spying after a radical
colleague fled to the United States with his wife, while in April 1794 a Cambridgeshire
farmer reported his landlord for seditious words after an argument over rent.
The methods of information collection varied depending on the type of spy or informer.
The terms appear to have been used fairly interchangeably during the 1790s, but in modern
parlance Emsley notes that we may classify as spies those paid agents who were recruited

266
NA, HO 42/31, Holden to F. F. Foljambe, 1 June 1794, quoted in Emsley, The Home Office and its sources of information and
investigation 1791-1801, p. 541.
267
NA, HO 42/40, fols. 1-2, Duke of Richmond to Portland, 21 May 1797.
268
National Archives of Ireland (NAI), Dublin, Rebellion Papers 620/1/121/97, McNally to Edward Cooke, n.d. (1798).

by the authorities to join popular societies and to report on their activities, while the
informer, in contrast, volunteered his information.
269
Some informers simply reported talk
and gossip overheard in a local tavern. Others specifically frequented the known haunts of
radicals in the hope of obtaining information on their activities, while those who counted
radicals amongst their friends and acquaintances could entertain them or seek out their
company. In August 1797 the Irishman Thomas Boyle sought more money from Dublin
Castle for the expenses he incurred in cultivating the company of United Irishmen,
advising that
My keeping a Decent appearanceevery day in the week increases much my outlaying as the
people I associate with for Information, their company could not be got into if I did not do soI
never neglect sitting at all their meetings and paying my Expenses with spirit.
270

Agents sent on missions by the Home Office and local magistrates interviewed persons of
interest, tracked suspects and attended radical meetings. Some committed loyalists like
Reeves and John Gretton retained their own spies, whose information they duly passed on
to the government. However there does not appear to have been anyone in England quite
comparable with the notorious Irish newspaper editor Higgins, who ran his own personal
network of spies and sent regular reports to the Castle on all manner of radical activities.
Higgins boasted that
From the numbers that I hold intercourse with and who frequently call, I receive intelligence of
every transaction going forward in the city [Dublin], and of the meetings holding for the most
wicked purposes.
271

Informers like Collins and Tunbridge who were already members of the societies could
simply report what transpired at their meetings and discussions, while other sources,
particularly those like Gosling and Nodder who joined a group specifically to spy on it,
went further by actively seeking out information on specific topics or obtaining positions
of greater access and influence. Some of these spies certainly strayed dangerously close to
themselves provoking the sedition they reported. Powell appears to have covered his
potentially suspicious zeal for radical action by posing as over-excitable and simple.
Thelwall was aware of his unguarded divulgence of information to the Privy Council prior
to the trials of 1794 but put it down solely to unguarded simplicity, while Place later

269
Emsley, The Home Office and its sources of information and investigation 1791-1801, p. 539.
270
NAI, Rebellion Papers 620/18/3, Boyle to Cooke, 2 August 1797.
271
Bartlett, ed., Revolutionary Dublin, 1795-1801, Higgins to Cooke, 23 April 1797, p. 147.

wrote that There was no absurdity no sort of proceeding among them [the LCS] that
Powell did not eagerly go into nothing which any villainous spy could suggest that he
would not adopt. Nonetheless he concluded that his friend was honest, but silly.
272

Finally we may mention the agents abroad like Turner, who insinuated their way into the
confidence of resident and passing radicals and took advantage of their role in facilitating
radical plans and communications by betraying them to the government.
273

Raising the stakes
As 1795 dawned the governments gains from the preceding year were not immediately
apparent. In parliament Pitts ministers became embroiled in a vigorous and spiteful debate
about the outcome of the treason trials and the ongoing place of radicalism in society. Most
of the governments best spies had been exposed at the trials and it would take time for
new ones to be found, while ministers remained undecided on how to proceed in their
dealings with radicalism. In January the now former spy Metcalfe made an unsuccessful
attempt to hire the assistant secretary of the LCS Joseph Burks as an informer. Burks
claimed that Metcalfe
offered to introduce me to Mr. Ford, at the Duke of Portlands Office, Whitehall;that if I would
accept the offer, I should have fifty guineas prompt payment, and one guinea regularly for each
weekly report.
274

However Burks indignantly refused the offer and it was not until July that the government
found a truly valuable new source of information in the person of Powell, sometime acting
president of the LCS and member of both the Executive and General Committees.
While the government hesitated the radical societies managed to regroup and achieve a
significant increase in membership, influence and activity, despite ongoing internal
divisions and fears about spies, such that by the end of the year it was decided that the
strength of the societies was becoming too great a concern to tolerate any longer

272
Cecil Thelwall, The Life of John Thelwall, Vol. 1, London, John Macrone, 1837, p. 248; Place, pp. 179-80.
273
Thomas Bartlett, Informers, Informants and Information: The secret history of the 1790s re-considered, in Thomas Bartlett, David
Dickson, Dire Keogh & Kevin Whelan, eds., 1798, pp. 406-22; Thomas Bartlett, The Life and Opinions of Leonard MacNally (1752-
1820): Playwright, Barrister, United Irishman, and Informer, in Hiram Morgan, ed., Information, Media and Power through the Ages,
Dublin, University College Dublin Press, 2001, pp. 113-36; Bartlett, ed., Revolutionary Dublin, 1795-1801, pp. 13-68; Cobb, pp. 5-13;
Durey, William Maume, pp. 121-36; Durey, William Wickham, Master Spy, pp. 127-32; Elliott, Partners in Revolution, passim;
Emsley, The Home Office and its sources of information and investigation 1791-1801, pp. 532-61; Hone, pp. 41-82; Nelson, pp. 95-
122; Bernard Porter, Plots and Paranoia: A history of political espionage in Britain, 1790-1988, London, Unwin 1989, pp. 29-35; E. P.
Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, pp. 529-39; Wells, pp. 28-43.
274
Joseph Burks, Letter to the Telegraph, 14 January 1795, in Richard Lee, Oppression!!! The Appeal of Captain Perry, to the People of
England, London, British Tree of Liberty, 1795, p. 15, emphases in original. See also Thale, p. 241.

unchallenged. The October attack on the king provided the government with a pretext for
introducing the Two Acts. It was anticipated that the Acts would increase the power and
prevalence of spies and informers, as the scope for reporting on treasonous and seditious
practices had been considerably widened. However in practice the Two Acts were rarely
used, and the fear alone of informers and serious punishment sufficed to quickly remove
radicalism from the public sphere and dramatically reduce the size and importance of the
societies. Spies dogged the efforts of the LCS to rekindle enthusiasm for the radical cause
both in London and the counties and kept the government well-appraised of their activities.
Thelwall finally abandoned his lectures after continued harassment, and the LCS members
Binns and John Gale Jones were arrested and tried for sedition whilst attempting to
reanimate radicalism in Birmingham. Word of their impending mission was passed to the
Home Office by Powell, and spies reported on their meetings in Birmingham prior to their
arrest by local magistrates. However in court the evidence of the crowns witnesses was
disputed by those of the defence. Binns was acquitted and Jones, while convicted, was not
sentenced.
275

1796 and most of 1797 passed with the government embroiled in debates over the war,
Irish affairs, subsistence and taxation, while radical leaders reconsidered their position.
However as 1797 progressed it gradually witnessed a significant change of approach by
both the government and the radicals. Thwarted in its attempts to achieve reform by legal
and peaceable means, the radical cause fell into the hands of extremists, United Irishmen
and republicans who supported a forceful overthrow of the government. In response the
Home Office reorganised its intelligence services to confront the new situation. The
presence of clandestine societies with international links and insurrectionary intentions
convinced the government of the need for change, and although the details of this
restructuring were kept secret, ministers trusted that its noticeable effects upon society, in
terms of increased surveillance, repression and central intervention in local affairs, would
be accepted by a majority of the populace as being in the interests of national security.
Historians such as Nelson, Emsley and Baxter and Donnelly have argued that there was
no centralised state system of surveillance and investigation at any point in the 1790s, with
Nelson arguing that The great variation in the value of the reports of the spies reflects the
absence of any concerted system, while Baxter and Donnelly claimed that the Home

275
Ehrman, The Younger Pitt: the reluctant transition, pp. 450-60; Goodwin, pp. 359-415; Graham, Vol. 2, pp. 641-741; Hone, pp. 11-
40; Mori, William Pitt and the French Revolution 1785-1795, pp. 248-63; E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class,
pp. 149-63; Wells, pp. 44-47.

Office was quite deficient in the area of information retrieval. There was no cross-
reference system and therefore the Home Office was often incapable of ascertaining the
reliability of reports sent to it.
276
This viewed has been convincingly challenged by
scholars such as Wells, Sparrow and Durey, who have demonstrated the existence and
importance of the centralised secret service of the late 1790s. The hub of the overhauled
service was the newly constituted Inner Office, placed under the leadership of the
spymaster Wickham, recently returned from a failed mission in Switzerland. This new
body was a department of the Alien Office, chosen because, as Wickham stated, not only
was it already experienced in matters of intelligence, investigation and surveillance, but it
also had the Chief and Singular meritthat from its very nature, no other Office could
ever know any thing of what was passing there, unless instructed from the Fountain
Head.
277
It was therefore ideally suited to secret service activities.
Under Wickham the Inner Office quietly became a genuine secret service headquarters,
with centralised responsibility for all intelligence and domestic security matters. Durey
argues that the available evidence demonstrates Wickhams awareness of the importance
of the intelligence cycle and the need for careful and effective planning, collection,
analysis and production.
278
Under his leadership intelligence from many different domestic
and foreign sources was sent to the Inner Office, where it was closely analysed by
Wickham and his small team of specialists and integrated into the Offices wider picture of
the current security situation. Wickham described the new structure as a System of
Preventitive Police, conducive to a policy of pre-emptive strikes against threats and plots,
and claimed that
without bustle, noise or anything that can attract Public Attention, Government possess here the
most powerful means of Observation and Informationthat was ever placed in the hands of a
Free Government
279

Each member of the small staff was placed in charge of a different aspect of the Offices
work. Lullin recalled that Wickham quickly set about
regularizing & apportioning the various branches of correspondence to different individuals
according to their respective abilities & aptitude & no doubt the service derived considerable

276
Nelson, p. 101; J. L. Baxter and F. K. Donnelly, The Revolutionary Underground in the West Riding: Myth or Reality?, Past &
Present, Vol. 64 (1974), p. 126.
277
BL, Pelham Papers Add. MS 33107, fols. 1-4, Wickham to Portland, 3 January 1801, quoted in Nelson, p. 130.
278
Durey, William Wickham, Master Spy, p. 109.
279
BL, Add. MS 33107, f. 3, Wickham to Portland, 3 January 1801, quoted in Wells, p. 30.

advantage from this arrangementThe organising this new establishment & setting to work its
various & intricate branches, in addition to his usual daily & important occupations at the Home
Office, called for Mr. Wickhams indefatigable exertions.
280

In order to improve the collation and analysis of the vast quantities of information
received at the Inner Office, Wickham created a comprehensive filing and record
system, a part of which has survived in the Irish Rebellion Papers (see Figure 2.1).
281

This is a register entitled 'Book of Informations', sub-titled the 'Book of Suspects'. As
Durey describes it, the register
contains several hundred names of suspects, in rough alphabetical order, with dates, names or
initials of informants, and relevant information. There are cross-linkages between individual
names, based on a letter/number code.
282

The Irish Chancellor Lord Redesdale described the register as
an alphabetical list of all the persons against whom informations have been made, the nature of
the information, when given, and by whom, so that no character of that description may be
unknown to Government.
283

These registers allowed the Office staff to quickly locate and place information on suspects
in the official secret books. In order to be truly effective this system required
comprehensive information-gathering capabilities. Nelson notes that In ordinary times
little correspondence passed between the Home Office and the officials in the counties and
provincial cities.
284
However, with the flow of correspondence having already increased
early in the decade, the Home Office now redoubled its requests to county magistrates to
send all information of interest to London, and in turn instructed them on specific matters
or where necessary sent a trusted agent or officer to provide assistance. Financial aid was
given to those working in particularly troublesome areas. The instructing of magistrates
was of course not a new practice,
285
but it was now placed on a more systematic and
regular footing. As Durey argues, this employment of the existing authorities within the

280
HRO, 38M49/1/56/40, Charles Lullin, Life of Wickham.
281
NAI, Rebellion Papers 620/1/216, Book of Informations.
282
283
Devon Record Office 152M/C1803/OZ80, Redesdale to Henry Addington, 11 August 1803, quoted in Durey, William Wickham,
Master Spy, p. 109.
284
Nelson, p. 102.
285
To give one example, in September 1792 Dundas warned the mayor of Bristol of the dangers posed by the new radical societies,
stating that It isextremely desirable that their Proceedings should be carefully attended to. NA, HO 13/9, Dundas to John Noble, 12
September 1792, quoted in Nelson, p. 105.

Inner Office system was both an efficient use of resources and a check on the potential
power of the security service.
286

Figure 2.1 The Book of Informations
In the capital itself two of Wickhams primary allies were Francis Freeling, resident-
surveyor of the Post Office responsible for the opening and inspection of mail, and Richard
Ford, magistrate of the Bow Street Police Office. Freeling worked closely with Wickham
on the regular Post Office tasks of opening suspect mail and compiling postmaster
intelligence reports. The Inner, Post and Foreign Offices contained a number of experts in
the arts of intelligence work, from cyphers and secret inks to the breaking of codes, as
demonstrated in some examples below drawn from the papers of the spy James Talbot (see
Figure 2.2).
287
Ford took much of the responsibility for conducting investigations and
examining suspects and also ran his own network of spies and runners whose information,
like that sourced from the other London police offices, was passed on to the Inner Office.
Bow Street was a critical element of the security network, joining the Home Office in

286
Durey, William Wickham, the Christ Church Connection and the Rise and Fall of the Security Service in Britain, 1793-1801, p.
741.
287
Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Talbot b. 27-29, (Unknown) to John Jervis, 21 January 1797, other documents of unknown
provenance.

instructing county officials and conducting wide-ranging investigations. As a 1798
Commons select committee reported, This is the Office with which the County
Magistrates correspond, from which arises much Business for the Magistrates, Clerks, and
Officers.
288
The Inner Office also worked closely with the authorities in Dublin Castle,
receiving all useful and relevant information and advising the Castle on intelligence and
matters pertaining to Irish affairs. At this time the undersecretary Edward Cooke also
began to reorganise and improve Irish intelligence. Bartlett argues that from mid-1797 on,
there was a purposefulness about the Castles intelligence-gathering that is striking.
289

With notable success Cooke sought to promote a more systematic and productive analysis
of intelligence, and his targeting of information on particular United Irish leaders and
agents was critical to operations on both islands.

288
Account of Business and Duties of the Police Offices and of the Bow-street Office in 1798, Parliamentary Papers (1810), Vol. 4,
pp. 375, 460-61 & 472, in Radzinowicz, Vol. 2, p. 508.
289
Bartlett, Informers, Informants and Information, in Thomas Bartlett, David Dickson, Dire Keogh & Kevin Whelan, eds., 1798, p.
421.

Figure 2.2 Cyphers and Secret Inks
In this manner Britain developed an effective secret service operating an international
intelligence system aimed at ensuring domestic security and protecting British interests

against threats planned and developed by participants acting in multiple countries.
Suspects, clandestine societies and agitated areas were targeted, monitored and
investigated as necessary. With domestic spies continuing to ply their trade against radical
groups in Britain and United Irishmen across the sea, greater collaboration between
English, Scottish, Irish, French and German intelligence officers meant that their
information could now be used in conjunction with intelligence from foreign sources to
track plans and connections between Irish, French and British radicals, carry out counter-
intelligence operations, and trail suspected radical activists even as they travelled from
country to country.
Procedures to ensure the good character and utility of spies were improved, and a more
careful analysis and cross-checking of information received allowed the Home Office to
boost its ability to determine its veracity and context. Wickham insisted that all potential
new spies were first given a trial period, and where possible sought a personal interview to
establish their credentials, while Portland warned magistrates that although good informers
were very useful and necessary and very praiseworthy, they were sometimes led astray
even by very good motives and by a very laudable zeal, and must therefore be listened to
with a caution to which the occupation in which they employ themselves cannot
improperly subject them.
290
Where possible informers recruited from within the radical
societies were preferred over self-appointed spies and infiltration agents of the type used in
1794. When this was not achievable reliable volunteers were sought to obtain information.
In one case in April 1799 Wickham asked a local employer, whose employees were
involved in a radicalised workers society, to find a suitable person who could be induced
to become a Member of the Societyand engage him to take such steps as he shall think
most likely to give him a knowledge of the members, views, and constitution of this
Society.
291
In many cases informers were given standardised payments for regular
trustworthy reports, avoiding many of the pitfalls arising from an over-eagerness to
impress. For this reason in one instance Portland advised a local magistrate to recruit
someone who, by some or other of the means usually employed for such purposes, may
be prevailed upon to disclose the purposes and proceedings of those who attend and take a
leading part in this society.
292
By contrast ad hoc funding based on the importance of the

290
NA, HO 43/13, fols. 102-103, Portland to Fletcher, 14 July 1801.
291
NA, HO 42/47, Wickham to Henry Thornton, 3 April 1799, quoted in Nelson, pp. 119-20.
292
NA, HO 43/10, fols. 469-71, Portland to the Earl of Warwick, 2 July 1798, quoted in Emsley, The Home Office and its sources of

information provided was generally avoided as it tended to encourage exaggeration and
invention.
293

This overhaul of the secret service continued apace even as a plan conceived by the
United societies in late 1797 required its urgent attention. The United Irishmen Coigly,
OConnor, John Allen and Arthur Leary, along with Binns, planned to go to Paris to
apprise the Directory of the new United movement and push for a French invasion of
Ireland and England in support of a combined radical uprising. The Inner Office was well-
informed on these activities. Powell and other spies kept the government informed of
affairs in London, while in Manchester a member of the Manchester Corresponding
Society named Robert Gray had turned informer and notified the proactive local magistrate
Thomas Bayley of renewed radical Anglo-Irish efforts in Lancashire, including a visit by
Coigly. Bayley reported this information to the Home Office, and conducted further
investigations under the instruction of Portland and Wickham. Additionally, attempts to
subvert the local militia were reported by Sergeant Tankard, who feigned interest in the
plans of the United Englishmen to gain their confidence.
In Hamburg, a hotbed of agent activity thanks to its position as a key port for travellers
moving between France and the British Isles, the United Irish turncoat Turner provided the
most important evidence of all. The Irish Lord Lieutenant Camden informed Portland that
Turner has it in his power to perform the most essential services at this moment to this
country, with the informer being able to supply detailed information on Coiglys mission
and other connections between France and the Isles.
294
Further intelligence was also
solicited from Ireland via Dublin Castle, where informers such as McNally and Mageean
kept the authorities abreast of plans for rebellion and the seeking of French assistance,
while the informant Higgins sent out spies to search for Coigly upon his return to Ireland in
January 1798. Wickham kept Cooke and Camden closely involved in proceedings, at one
point advising the former that in a transaction of this kind, the information collected in
one Country tends naturally to throw great light on that which is procured in the other.
295

Coigly was tracked in his travels to Dublin, Manchester and London by Bow Street
Runners, while other suspects were also monitored.

293
Durey, William Wickham, Master Spy, pp. 106-113 & 134-37; Durey, William Wickham, the Christ Church Connection and the
Rise and Fall of the Security Service in Britain, 1793-1801, pp. 714-17 & 728-42; Emsley, The Home Office and its sources of
information and investigation 1791-1801, pp. 532-61; Hone, pp. 59-82; Sparrow, The Alien Office, 1792-1806, pp. 373-75; Wells,
pp. 28-43.
294
NA, HO 100/75, fols. 138-40, Earl of Camden to Portland, 11 March 1798.
295
NA, HO 100/75, fols. 148-49, Wickham to Cooke, n.d. (1798).

Aware that Coigly and his associates were now heading for the south coast of England
en route to France, Bow Street arrested them at Margate on 28 February 1798. Further
arrests followed in April in London and Manchester, with many leading radicals being
detained and charged. In Britain those arrested at Margate were the only ones brought to
trial for high treason. Having seen the prejudicial effects of using spy evidence in past
trials, the government this time chose to maintain the cover of its spies and rely exclusively
on evidence obtained conventionally, despite protests from Dublin. This proved to be a
double-edged sword, for as Grenville noted the policy meant that it may not be possible to
bring such evidence of guilt as will suffice to convict them in the ordinary course of
law.
296
And indeed while the Inner Offices policy allowed it to retain its extremely useful
and important informers and removed a potential doubt from the minds of the jury, the
remaining evidence sufficed to convict Coigly alone.
This was on the whole another temporary public relations embarrassment for the
government, although mitigated by Coiglys conviction, but the long-term effects were far
more beneficial to its interests. OConnor and Binns were immediately re-arrested on fresh
charges, the former being shipped back to Ireland, while many other radicals remained
imprisoned without trial. The government resuspended habeas corpus in April. In its eyes
this was justified by the wealth of intelligence in its possession proving the existence of the
United conspiracy, and thirty-seven leading radicals were detained until March 1801.
Despite their inability to otherwise secure convictions, Wickham and Portland were
convinced that retaining the cover of their sources was of primary importance and ultimate
utility. In June 1798, upon apprehending further suspects, Wickham informed Castlereagh
that
It is evident, under the present circumstances, and with the evidence of the nature of that of which
Government here is at present in possession, strong and decisive as it is, that none of these
persons can be brought to trial without exposing secrets of the last importance to the State, the
revealing of which may implicate the safety of the two kingdoms.
297

Therefore it was determined that the best policy was one of preventative detention until
such time as radical extremism and invasion were no longer deemed significant threats to
British security. Trials were only sought when, in the words of the prosecutor Charles
Abbot at the trial of Colonel Despard, they could satisfactorily be pursued without

296
Castlereagh, Vol. 1, Grenville to (Unknown), 9 May 1798, p. 202.
297
Ibid., Wickham to Castlereagh, 8 June 1798, p. 218.

disclosing those sources of useful intelligence, which will remain unsuspected and
unimpaired, for the future security of the state.
298
This policy proved very successful.
Bereft of the majority of its leaders, fearful of imprisonment and prosecution, hindered by
repressive legislation and continually harassed by government agents and loyalists, the
underground radical movement was checked and reduced to little more than a whimper.
The keystone allowing the government to justify its harsh and arguably unconstitutional
measures came from Ireland. The leadership of the UI had been crushed by spies betraying
their identities, plans and whereabouts to the Castle, yet the rebellion still broke out.
Appalled by its violence, fearful for their lives and desperate to preserve some of the
tattered remnants of their organisation, in July-August 1798 the leaders of the UI
languishing in Dublins Kilmainham Gaol admitted to the Castle important details of their
plans and activities in the lead up to the rebellion. This included information on the UIs
links with the British United societies and the French Directory. Finally the government
had conclusive public proof of a multi-national conspiracy against the state, prompting and
permitting further repressive legislation. Irish connections and intelligence, facilitated by
the revamped secret service, thus proved the final downfall of the British radical societies.
The Dublin confessions also discredited the Foxites who had continued to support radicals
like OConnor and publicly testified as to their good character and intentions.
Having struck hard in the first half of 1798, the Inner Office ran an organised and
efficient secret service until the Peace of Amiens between Britain and Bonapartes France
in March 1802. Ongoing intelligence-gathering from its widespread domestic and
international sources, including the reliable new London-based operatives Tunbridge,
Moody and William Gent recruited from within the radical societies, allowed it to maintain
a vigilant surveillance of all radical and suspicious activities. Knowledge and accuracy
were the watchwords of the Office. As Hone argues
The surviving correspondence of the government with these regular informerssuggests that the
government neither sought nor received alarmist information, but valued the collection and
storage of intelligence, however humdrum.
299

With radicalism laid so low such measures were deemed sufficient and investigations
generally resulted in warnings and disruption rather than arrests. Only once, in March-

298
Joseph Gurney and William Brodie Gurney, The Trial of Edward Marcus Despard, Esquire. For High Treason, London, M. Gurney,
1803, pp. 44-45.
299
Hone, p. 65.

April 1799, were a large number of arrests carried out in London, following a running
surveillance of renewed Anglo-Irish plotting. Again the government could not obtain
sufficient concrete evidence to successfully prosecute those arrested, and therefore resorted
to its policy of detainment without trial. The government also continued to retain reliable
agents who could be sent to investigate matters of interest. In one case in August 1799 a
postmaster in Manchester put the Home Office in contact with an informer named William
Barlow, who forwarded reports of a dramatic increase in Anglo-Irish radical sentiment and
meetings in Lancashire, Yorkshire and Merseyside. Alarmed but somewhat sceptical, the
Home Office sent its reliable agents Orr and John Thompson north to investigate. They
found that Barlow was desperate for money and had been exaggerating and falsifying his
reports. His services were discontinued and the radicals left alone.
300

End Game
Oppressed by the authorities and prohibitive legislation, the radical cause appeared to have
all but died by the dawn of the new millennium. However the Peace of Amiens provided it
with a last window of opportunity. The vigilance of government, police and magistrates
relaxed and contact with some spies discontinued. The radicals detained without trial were
all finally released and the last years of the war proved deeply unpopular, encouraging
anti-government sentiment. In these more favourable conditions a number of radicals
regrouped, and it appears that a few extremists began to hatch new plans to forcefully
overthrow the government. Fortunately for the new Addington ministry the Home Office
and police still employed some spies and Ford retained his position as chief magistrate of
police. Through the informer Moody and sources such as the guardsman Thomas Windsor
who were actively involved in the conspiracy, Ford and his colleagues discovered the
existence of a plot apparently led by Colonel Despard to capture the Tower of London,
Bank of England and other important sites, thereby seizing control of London as the
prelude to a general uprising against the government.
Despard and a number of his associates were arrested on 16 November 1802. Once
again the government demonstrated its reluctance to reveal the identity of its most
important spies, and while Despard himself and six other conspirators were convicted and

300
Bartlett, ed., Revolutionary Dublin, 1795-1801, Higgins to Cooke, 12 January 1798, pp. 211-14; Durey, William Wickham, Master
Spy, pp. 113-34; Elliott, Partners in Revolution, pp. 165-240; Goodwin, pp. 416-50; Graham, Vol. 2, pp. 803-866; Hone, pp. 50-59;
Wells, pp. 110-77.

hanged for treason on the remaining evidence available, many others who were known to
be or suspected of involved in the plot escaped prosecution. Ford had maintained his usual
care and honesty in his investigations, informing Moody that I do not wish to be made
acquainted with any thingthat may tend to prejudice the state prisoners on their
approaching Trial, I do not think that would be fair.
301
He diligently guided his informer
in procuring relevant evidence; in one instance in June 1802 asking is there any idea of
attacking the Bastille [the hated Coldbath Fields Prison] Im told such a notion has been
started.
302
At one point in the case, Ford also advised Moody that
you are now on the right clue, which however I do not wish you to pursue unless with great
caution, for as you have hitherto not been much with that particular class [of radicals], your
activity among them now may give rise to various conjectures but I am sure that you will act
with prudence.
303

Such concern for and careful handling of his sources was integral to the magistrates
methods. However the government did not completely understand the full nature of the
conspirators plans. While it appears that the information received from long-standing
spies like Moody was accurate and carefully assessed, that produced by others was often
exaggerated and self-serving, particularly the testimony of Windsor whose involvement in
the plotting strikes uncomfortably close to that of an agent provocateur. Indeed in court the
defence counsel Joseph Gurney questioned whether any of the turned witnesses, who
have stood up today without confusionconfessing themselves parties to the most
detestable plan that was ever formedand at the same time asking credit from you, were
to be believed.
304

Nonetheless the crowns reliance on such testimonies proved sufficient to break the
radical conspiracy. Yet it must be noted that while Despard and the other defendants
involvement in the plot was proved by the evidence, it is strongly suspected that the true
masterminds remained hidden. Despards activities were part of a wider Anglo-Irish
conspiracy to reconstitute the United alliance and prepare for a combined uprising, the full
details of which were never discovered. However in the wake of the investigations and
trials the government were sufficiently content with the outcome of affairs and the
knowledge procured from its spies to return to a state of watchful vigilance. The radical

301
NA, PC 1/3117, fols. 59-60, Ford to Moody, 16 January 1803.
302
NA, PC 1/3117, Ford to Moody, June 1802.
303
NA, PC 1/3117, fols. 90-91, Ford to Moody, n.d. (1803).
304
Gurney and Gurney, p. 180.

impetus was checked again, no further plots materialised on English soil and the secret
service apparatus of 1798 gradually fell into complete disuse.
305
Changes in personnel and
procedure had also severely diminished information-gathering capabilities in Dublin. In
July 1803 Robert Emmets short-lived rebellion caught the Castle completely unawares,
but the attempt lacked organisation, strength and conviction. The preceding years of
government repression and spy infiltration had done their work too well and the last spark
of 1790s radicalism was quickly snuffed out.
306

In conclusion, the story of the government security services in 1790s Britain may briefly
be summarised as follows: the existing haphazard but diverse intelligence apparatus was
originally put to work monitoring the growth of radicalism in 1791-93, followed by a more
active role and an increased targeting of particular suspected societies, individuals and
activities in 1794, driven and facilitated by the securitization of the societies and the belief
in a treasonous conspiracy. The following three years witnessed a return to predominantly
passive watchfulness, occasionally pockmarked by sporadic investigations and
prosecutions and the hammer blow of the Two Acts. Late 1797 marked the watershed
moment of the secret service, as it was recalibrated, expanded and reorganised to uncover
and confront the new United and clandestine threat posed by increasingly desperate
radicals and improve its means of collection, analysis and action. 1798 brought the year of
conflict, as the government tracked and exposed treasonous plots, carried out arrests and
prosecutions, detained suspects and sought to deal with the shockwaves from the violence
and unrest in Ireland. In 1799-1802 the secret service was in its maturity, justified by its
thus-far successful response to the United threat and acting as an integrated surveillance
and security system relying primarily on knowledge, prevention and targeted
investigations. Finally 1802-03 saw the decline of the secret service apparatus and its last
successful fight against 1790s-era radicalism.
This deployment and restructuring of the security services, comprising the most active
and dangerous corollary of the governments securitization of radicalism, was naturally the
subject of intense radical scrutiny and critique, and we now turn to this response.

305
The reasons for this decline and disbandment will be discussed in Chapter Four.
306
Marianne Elliott, The Despard Conspiracy Reconsidered, Past & Present, Vol. 75 (1977), pp. 46-61; Elliott, Partners in
Revolution, pp. 243-322; Hone, pp. 86-117; E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, pp. 515-28; Wells, pp. 188-252.

Chapter Three Defending the People
The immediate object of government, is security.
The means employed by government, is restriction, an abridgement of individual
independence
Without independence men cannot become either wise, or useful, or happy.
Consequently, the most desirable state of mankind, is that which maintains general
security, with the smallest incroachment upon individual independence.
307
William
Godwin, 1793
Radicals feared, resented and disagreed with the governments deployment of its security
and intelligence services to monitor British society and investigate and repress radical
activities and sentiments. In particular they took aim at the use of spies and informers, as
they presented an easily identifiable and significant target historically despised by large
sections of the population. Spies, informers and constables, as the principle agents of state
surveillance, were a product both of the governments securitizing move against radicalism
and the efforts to eliminate the existential threat it was believed to pose. The radical
response to their employment, proliferation and activities was a key component of the
wider fight against government and loyalist securitization and repression, and as such
provides us with an insightful and interesting case study of the manner in which a referent
subject and their allies can attempt to counter a securitizing move and the means used to
enforce it. What discourses, arguments and tactics did the radicals employ, and how were
they used to discredit the governments securitization? What were the motives, traditions,
beliefs, literature, schools of thought and contemporary issues that animated, shaped and
influenced radical arguments?
As an issue relevant both to securitization and the push for reform, the radical
308
attack
on government surveillance and investigation was sustained and multi-faceted,
approaching the subject from a range of different angles and drawing on sources of

307
William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, and its Influence on Morals and Happiness, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1, London, G. G.
and J. Robinson, 1798, pp. xxiv-xxv.
308
For reasons of clarity and simplicity, in this chapter the words radical and radicalism, unless specifically stated otherwise, shall be
used as generic terms for all the diverse forms of radical, liberal, democratic and reformist thinkers and ideologies found in 1790s
England.

evidence as diverse as the Bible, the French political philosopher Baron Montesquieu and
the Anglo-Irish author and cleric Jonathan Swift. Many radical and liberal thinkers added
their voices to the debate, some of the more prominent being Thelwall, Erskine, Pigott,
Vicesimus Knox, Thomas Holcroft, Godwin, Daniel Isaac Eaton, Francis Plowden,
Richard Sheridan and Charles James Fox, and those two stalwarts of the radical press, the
Morning Chronicle and Morning Post. The radical reaction to spies and informers took
place not only in the public arena but also amongst themselves, as radical leaders discussed
and advocated the means necessary to successfully counteract government surveillance and
repression. Radicalism endured as a force throughout the 1790s, but the arguments over
this fiercely-contested topic reached their peak in 1794-95 the years of the major treason
trials and the final flourishing of public radicalism prior to the passing of the Two Acts in
December 1795. The major subjects of discussion rose and fell in response to particular
events and the fortunes of the radical cause, but some key themes remained consistent
throughout. We shall address these issues individually, exploring the arguments concerning
justice, liberty, good government, legislation, morality, space, class, traditions and
character. Additionally we will briefly enter the fictional realm, exploring the place, use
and analysis of spies, surveillance and security services in 1790s novels.
Generally speaking the government and its supporters were rarely drawn into the
theoretical debate on the broader issues of justice, morality and social conventions. They
preferred to construct their own narratives and focus on their chosen topics of security,
conspiracy, necessity, duty and defence of the constitution. This difference in approach,
coupled with the governments unwillingness to engage in public debate with radical
leaders, meant that the proponents of reform were often left to pursue their own arguments
and agenda, with each side advocating their case on its own terms rather than in direct
conversation with their opponents. Frustrated by the lack of progress on reform and their
inability to engage directly with the government, many radicals found an outlet for their
thoughts and passions in the prolific production of pamphlets, songs, poems, speeches and
letters; forms of media that were likewise utilised and sometimes even copied by their
loyalist counterparts. The scarcity of direct dialogue should not obscure from us the wide
scope of the debate and the interactions and arguments that did take place by means of
harangues in parliament, targeted newspaper articles, pamphlet wars and contested court
cases. Nonetheless the reticence of the government and the limitations of the eighteenth-
century media had a significant influence on radical perspectives and understanding. It
allowed guesswork and preconceptions to play an active part in their writings and rhetoric,

particularly on so secretive a topic as domestic surveillance and security. Let us take a
closer look at what they had to say.
Justice, Liberty and the Constitution
The radical attack on the securitization of radicalism proceeded on two fronts. Firstly, it
was argued that the governments policy was reactionary, short-sighted, deceptive,
repressive and unjust, driven by self-interest and a desire to maintain the position and
privileges of the ruling elite. Secondly, it was posited that the methods employed by the
government to maintain security were themselves likely to produce injustices,
misconceptions and infringements on civil liberties. This is our primary focus here. The
governments perceived use of spies and informers as its principle means of obtaining
information and evidence on radical and allegedly seditious activity was of grave concern.
Spies were not regarded as reliable witnesses. Not only was their information likely to be
inaccurate due to a lack of context and understanding or a poor memory, as was ably
demonstrated by Erskine at Hardys trial, it was also widely believed that many informers
would deliberately give false, prejudiced, exaggerated or misleading information, in the
hope of gaining increased rewards and further employment. This would compromise the
course of judicial proceedings, impinging the truth and increasing the possibility of the
judge or jury arriving at an incorrect and unjust verdict.
With the government believed to be deliberately targeting and securitizing radical
activity, radicals argued that such policies were likely to lead informers into emphasising,
exaggerating and constructing speech and activities that could be construed as seditious,
treasonous and threatening, and thus of increased interest and use to the government and
loyalist associations. At Hardys trial Erskine warned the jury about the potential hazards
of evidence presented by spies, noting that a person who
gives evidence against persons into whose confidence he has endeavoured to insinuate himself, is
to be heard and attended to with very great caution and reserve; his value rises according to the
importance of his testimony, he is a more or less valuable witness according as the acts which he
communicates to his employers are more or less criminal; he is interested therefore to enhance
them
309

309
ST 24, col. 1138.

As Cobb notes, for the informer to be successful, he needs to prove that he has access to
secrets that would otherwise be unknown to the authorities, and, in order to make money,
he needs to provide a great deal of information.
310
This lends itself to a doctoring and
selective interpreting of their information. Or as Godwin put it, the spy
undertakes to remember words, and he has an invincible bias upon his mind, inducing him to
construe them in a particular way, and insensibly to change them for words more definite and
injurious. His very income depends on the frequency of his tales, and he is paid in proportion as
the tales that he brings, whether true or false, tend to the destruction of the persons to whom they
relate.
311

At the trial of Coigly et al., the defence counsel Robert Dallas conceded that while spies
may be of some use in providing general information to the government, the LAW
demands credible witnesses.
312
Yet the character of spies and the nature of the role
precluded them from possessing such credibility, and they therefore should never be
utilised in court. Knox agreed, arguing that
a hired spy and informer will, by an easy transition, become a false witness, even in trials where
liberty and life are at stakeHis object is not truth or justice; but filthy lucre; and when he aspires
at great rewards, great must be his venture(N)othing but fear will restrain him, as a witness,
from overleaping the bounds of truth, justice and mercyNo man is safe, when such men are
countenanced by officers of state.
313

One radical work quoted Swifts observation that the informer naturally inflames every
word and circumstance, aggravates what is faulty, perverts what is good, and misrepresents
what is indifferent.
314

The questioning of spies in open court was believed to further compromise their already
doubtful truthfulness and integrity. A letter published in the Morning Chronicle argued that
I am of opinion that it should be a principle of jurisprudence, not to admit the evidence of a
SpyA known Spy is no Spy. It must therefore be apparent to a Jury, that he is swearing his last;

310
Cobb, The Police and the People, p. 5.
311
William Godwin, Considerations on Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitts Bills, Concerning Treasonable and Seditious Practices, and
Unlawful Assemblies, London, J. Johnson, 1795, p. 50.
312
ST 27, col. 215, emphasis in original.
313
Vicesimus Knox, The Spirit of Despotism, Reprint, Trenton, Wilson & Blackwell, 1802, pp. 136-37.
314
Jonathan Swift, Sermon on False Witness, in The Manual of Liberty: or Testimonies in Behalf of the Rights of Mankind, London, H.
D. Symonds, 1795, p. 171.

that he can have no object but to secure the favour of his employers, and consequently that he will
swear au plus fort.
315

Lord Stanhope was dismayed by having seen what I never hope any of us will see in an
English court, a certain set of Spies and Informersprocured to confound the best, the
most noble and respectable Juries.
316
These arguments appear to have met with rare
agreement from the government, for as noted in the preceding chapter spies were very
rarely to be found in open court after the debacles of 1794.
Even the harsh penalties for perjury were seen as little hindrance to the willingness of
spies to lie from the witness box. Holcroft described the spy as a man who must accuse,
or must demonstrate that his office is useless, a trained and hired perjurer.
317
Sheridan
lamented the damage done to justice and liberty by that most destructive of all weapons,
the perjured tongues of spies and informers, while Samuel Coleridge bewailed the
existence of hired spies and hungry informerswho have graduated in guilt and passed
through all degrees of serviceable iniquity from loss of memory to equivocation, and from
equivocation to perjury.
318
Worse still, it was argued that some spies acted as agents
provocateurs, advocating and/or encouraging extreme or seditious policies in order to
strengthen the governments case against the radical societies; or enticing individual
people towards seditious speech, enabling the informer to prosecute the entrapped speaker
and collect the reward arising from a successful conviction. Godwin described the spy as a
man that insinuates himself into your confidence in order to betray you. He pretends to be
uncommonly vehement and intemperate, that he may excite you to be the same.
319

Sheridan argued that When once a government encouraged spies and informers, it became
a part of their business to commit such forgeries and create such terror. The liberal MP
contended that by his very nature
The spy, in order to avoid suspicion, is obliged to assume an appearance of zeal and activity: he is
the first to disseminate the doctrines of sedition, or to countenance the designs of violence; he

315
Morning Chronicle (MC), 14 November 1794, emphases in original.
316
Morning Post (MP), 5 May 1795.
317
Thomas Holcroft, A Narrative of Facts, Relating to a Prosecution for High Treason; Including the Address to the Jury, Which the
Court refused to hear: With Letters to the Attorney General, Lord Chief Justice Eyre, Mr. Serjeant Adair, the Honourable Thomas
Erskine, and Vicary Gibbs, Esq. and the Defence The Author had prepared, if he had been brought to Trial, London, H. D. Symonds,
1795, p. 66.
318
PH 31, col. 1065; Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Plot Discovered; or An Address to the People, Against Ministerial Treason, Bristol,
1795, p. 12.
319
Godwin, Considerations on Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitts Bills, Concerning Treasonable and Seditious Practices, and Unlawful
Assemblies, p. 50.

deludes the weak by the speciousness of his arguments, and inflames the turbulent by the fury of
his zeal.
320

An extract from Charles Johnstones novel Chrysal, or the Adventures of a Guinea,
published by the Morning Post, explained these methods to the public, opining that the
informer insinuates
himself into a Society for the gains of Treachery. When he enters he finds a community without
criminality, he then leaves no methods unattempted, for the purpose of rendering that Society, in
some of its weaker partstainted with his own poisonous guilt, and thus he attains his endsby
the sale of the blood of those deluded people, whom the Spy and Informer himself primarily
seduced
321

Thelwall also blasted the governments tools of venality and corruption, exposing their
covert arts and secret machinations. He proclaimed to spies that
Yours is the palm of perjury: and how without this attribute should ye be fit tools for those who
are destroying liberty, at the time that they pretend to reverence the Constitution? Yours is the
palm of fraud and base hypocrisypretended patriotism with you, as with your masters, is the
engine with which you work out your own selfish and treacherous designs.
322

These claims formed an important part of the successful defences of Thelwall, Hardy and
Tooke in 1794, and almost certainly carried at least some weight with the juries.
Radicals also believed that the employment and prevalence of spies was likely to result
in an increase in investigations and prosecutions for alleged treason and sedition, initiated
by the state, loyalist associations and private individuals, motivated more by the corrupting
and unscrupulous pursuit of personal gain than any sense of justice or duty. Thelwall
lamented that
Perjured spies, men known to be inflamed with the utmost rancour and hatred against the parties,
were permitted to swear in courts of justice, from their loose recollectionsand, upon such

320
PH 32, cols. 366-67; PH 31, col. 1067.
321
MP, 19 November 1794.
322
John Thelwall, Peaceful Discussion, and not Tumultuary Violence the Means of Addressing National Grievances, London, J.
Thelwall, 1795, p. 4; John Thelwall, On the Importance of avoiding personal Factions and Divisions, among the Friends of Reform,
The Tribune No. XXIII, 1795, in John Thelwall, The Tribune, A Periodical Publication, Consisting Chiefly of the Political Lectures of J.
Thelwall, Vol. 2, London, Self-Published, 1795, p. 172.

evidence, men were condemned for indiscrete and idle words: words which, not being
deliberately spoken, ought to be consideredas perfectly innocent.
323

The Morning Post argued that as a result of the increase in accusations and willingness to
prosecute alleged offenders,
every wretch in the Country, who has, either through Malice or Envy, a dislike to his Neighbour,
will have now an opportunity of gratifying his malicious intentionsThose who have
commenced Spies and Informerswill crowd the Prisons with Innocent people, as long as the
Liberties of Englishmen are at the mercy of such debased and infamous Characters.
324

One radical work again quoted Swift, who had argued that such ignominious wretches let
their private passions intotheir clandestine informations, and often wreak their particular
spite or malice against the person whom they are set to watch.
325
Indeed informers were to
be found willing to report even the most trivial of utterances. The Morning Chronicle
recounted that one man was reported and detained in a tavern for exclaiming that Treason
was only Reason, with a T at the beginning of it.
326

Radicals argued that citizens could not be free to discuss their thoughts, opinions and
grievances in a society pervaded by spies and informers, especially if these thoughts had a
radical tendency. Abraham Jones described how
Spies had been introduced, not only into frequented haunts, but into the recesses of society:
conversation was proscribed, and opinion interdicted or dangerous, every Coffee-house had its
Informer, every family apprehended a Traitor in its own bosom.
327

People therefore had to be ever-weary and cautious in their speech, bearing, associations
and actions, or else live constantly under threat of being reported or prosecuted by an
informer who chanced upon or invented words or conduct deemed offensive or dangerous
and potentially open to prosecution. Erskine observed that liberty of thought and speech is
as necessary to preserve, as it was to form the British Constitution. Yet the power and
prevalence of spies and informers eradicated these liberties. For

323
Report on the State of Popular Opinion, and the Causes of the rapid Diffusion of Democratic Principles. Part the Second., The
Tribune No. XXV, in Thelwall, The Tribune, A Periodical Publication, Consisting Chiefly of the Political Lectures of J. Thelwall, Vol. 2,
p. 224.
324
MP, 30 May 1794.
325
Swift, Sermon on False Witness, in The Manual of Liberty: or Testimonies in Behalf of the Rights of Mankind, London, H. D.
Symonds, 1795, p. 171.
326
MC, 16 September 1794.
327
Abraham Jones, The State of the Country in the Month of November, 1794, London, J. Owen and B. Crosby, 1794, p. 18.

While such a host of menare combined to overwhelm the unhappy man who may venture to
utter a sentiment which a weak or biased understanding may torture into a seditious meaning,
liberty of thought, liberty of speech, liberty of publication, which may justly be called the
palladium of British liberty, cannot exist.
328

In court Erskine was even able to quote Burke on this topic, for the fervent enemy of
radicalism had once argued that under an administration that freely employed and
rewarded informers
the obnoxious people are slaves, not only to the government, but they live at the mercy of every
individual; they are at once the slaves of the whole community, and of every part of it; and the
worst and most unmerciful men are those on whom goodness must depend.
329

The government claimed to be defending the constitution, when in fact its own actions
were infringing upon and placing it at risk. Christopher Wyvill warned his fellow
Yorkshiremen that they were witnessing the implementation of
the system of a State Inquisition, begun by the employment of spies and informers, in every
corner of the kingdom; you have witnessed the growth of that system, in its natural consequences,
the most violent State prosecutions, and the most rigorous and unprecedented punishments
330

Thelwall lamented that The boasted freedom of Britons is no more, and every man of
intellect and virtue lies at the mercy of the pimps and lacqueys of courtiers and court
expectants.
331
The radical orator despaired at this calamity, for as Wagner notes, The free
exchange of ideas Thelwall envisaged became impossible in the environment of
surveillance that settled over Britain in the mid-1790s.
332

John Butler argued that spies and prohibitive legislation destroyed freedom of
expression, for by their actions the jaws of patriots are clinched-the pens of writers
cramped-the press muzzled-the mind of man fettered-literary genius curtailed-and liberty

328
Thomas Erskine, source not provided, quoted in Charles Pigott, Persecution. The Case of Charles Pigott: Contained in the Defence
He Had Prepared, and Which Would Have Been Delivered By Him on His Trial, if the Grand Jury Had Not Thrown Out the Bill
Preferred Against Him, London, D. I. Eaton, 1793, pp. 10-11.
329
ST 24, col. 959. Burkes original speech the Speech at Bristol Before the Election of 1780 may be found in Edmund Burke, The
Speeches of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke, ed. James Burke, Dublin, James Duffy, Sons & Co., 1853, p. 150.
330
Christopher Wyvill, The Address To the Worthy Freeholders of Yorkshire, 1795, in Graham, The Nation, The Law and The King,
Vol. 2, p. 933.
331
John Thelwall, The Moral Tendency of a System of Spies and Informers, and the Conduct to be Observed by the Friends of Liberty
During the Continuance of such a System, in John Thelwall, Political Lectures. Volume the FirstPart the first: containing the Lecture
on Spies and Informers, and the First Lecture on Prosecutions for Political Opinion, 4th Ed., London, Eaton and Smith, 1795, p. 6.
332
Wagner, p. 103.

scouted like a vagrant.
333
An anonymous cartoon from November 1795 entitled A Lockd
Jaw for John Bull (see Figure 3.1) depicted Butlers summation of the state of affairs, with
Pitt locking the jaw of the nation to prevent any further airing of grievances and political
ideas in public.
334
This was matched by Thelwalls belief that spies deprive us of the
intellectual intercourse which the heart of man must ever yearn for, while the Morning
Post reported that The Arts are almost put a stop to by the present system of Government
prosecutions, for few artists will venture on an historical subject, lest it may be
considered by some vile Spy as democratic.
335
The writing and publication of even
vaguely political pieces became an extremely hazardous business, with informers being
ever ready to report any potentially seditious content to the authorities. In a poem, Peter
Pindar described the actions of informers thus:
Prerogative, ye Gods! will soon look fierce,
Hunt with his hounds the shops for prints and verse
And find the likenesses of men on high
Make of the booksellers and bards a hash
Smell rank rebellion in a star or dash,
And bid the sneering culprit hang or fly.
336

Prosecutions often followed for those so reported to the authorities.

333
John Butler, The Political Fugitive: Being a Brief Discussion into the Modern System of British Politics; and the Unparalleled Rigor
of Political Persecution: Together With Several Miscellaneous Observations on the Abuses and Corruptions of the English Government,
New York, Thomas Greenleaf, 1794, p. 27.
334
A lockd jaw for John Bull, London, S. W. Fores, 1795, British Museum Image Collection.
335
Thelwall, The Moral Tendency of a System of Spies and Informers, and the Conduct to be Observed by the Friends of Liberty During
the Continuance of such a System, p. 10; MP, 23 October 1794.
336
Peter Pindar (John Wolcot), Ode To An Informer, in Peter Pindar, The Works of Peter Pindar, Esquire, Vol. 3, London, Wood,
Vernon, H. Walker and P. Bell, 1805, p. 563.

Figure 3.1 A lockd jaw for John Bull
Perceived violations of the Bill of Rights also came in for censure, with one writer
claiming that although the Bill of Rights authorizes people to meet for the purpose of
petitioning, on the report of one perfidious spy regarding a supposedly seditious meeting,
a magistrate can declare it to be illegal, and disperse the assembly.
337
Hodgson believed
that, in Barrells words, the unqualified right of free discussionwas guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, which were therefore violated by the interference and muzzling caused by
spies.
338
However, although Hodgsons principles are admirable, it requires a long stretch
of the imagination and legal interpretation to see how this could possibly be correct.

337
Cursory Remarks on the Convention Bill Now Pending in Parliament, London, J. Davenport, 1795, p. 18.
338
Barrell, The Spirit of Despotism, p. 90.

Nonetheless it is undoubtedly true that the threat of spies and prosecution frightened most
people out of any engagement with politics whatsoever. Securitization turned many
political and social issues into black and white matters of national security, with any
dissent from loyalist opinion deemed seditious or detrimental to the interests of the state.
Knox argued that as a result the people are terrified into a tame and silent acquiescence.
They learn to consider politics as a dangerous subject, not to be touched without hazard of
liberty or life.
339
Joseph Towers lamented that it was now considered unsafe in England,
once considered as a free country, to speak of kings or ministers of state, or to converse on
any political subjects.
340
Loyalist associations such as the Reeves Societies the one
seemingly legitimate outlet for political discussion and participation were feared and
castigated by radicals for their persecutions and narrow-mindedness, described by Knox as
a most dangerous conspiracy of sycophants against a free constitution, responsible for
undermining the fair fabric of liberty by their excessive encouragement of informers and
efforts to suppress and prosecute all radical thought.
341
Towers argued that they greatly
contributed to the stifling of political debate, by attempting to be judges of what was, and
what was not, seditious conversation and by preventing freedom of speech from being
enjoyed in inns, in taverns, in coffee-houses, in ale-houses.
342
An anonymous pamphlet
writer acidly described Reeves as Mr. Pitts recruiting serjeant, or crimp, for the purpose
of raising a royal regiment of spies, informers, traytors, and perjurors.
343

Inaccurate spy evidence also affected the reputations, livelihoods, health and financial
security of radical activists. To give just two examples, Walker suffered a significant loss
of business as a result of sustained loyalist harassment, while Hardy was left to lament the
persecution that resulted in the loss of his wife, and to express his shock that in a country
celebrated for its humanity and liberality, such conduct should still have been pursued.
344

Plowden deplored the manner in which fortune, character, reputation and life itself were
exposed to the sport, mercy and avarice of wretches detestable both to God and man.
345

Informers and the associations that encouraged and rewarded them were therefore a blight
on the free-born Englishman, incompatible with his ability to exercise his supposedly
inalienable rights and liberties.

339
Knox, p. 98.
340
Joseph Towers, Thoughts on National Insanity, London, J. Johnson, J. Debrett and J. Hamilton, 1797, p. 23.
341
Knox, pp. 137-38.
342
Towers, p. 23.
343
Cursory Remarks on the Convention Bill Now Pending in Parliament, p. 42.
344
Hardy, p. 64.
345
Francis Plowden, A Short History of the British Empire During the Year 1794, London, G. G. and J. Robinson, 1795, p. 118.

Governance
Radical opinion differed regarding the reasoning and process behind the governments
interpretation of the evidence garnered from its spies and informers. The Morning
Chronicle was undecided, noting that two conclusions were possible
either that Ministers, having correct information, joined in the supposed conspiracy to mislead the
Public; or that Ministers themselves were deceived, and that the employment of Spies is as little
to be relied upon, as an engine of government, as their evidence ought to be in a Court of
Justice.
346

The Morning Post believed the latter scenario, arguing that
If Government form their opinion of the People, as we apprehend they do, on the representation
of Spies and Informers, it is no wonder that the character of the Nation is libelled; and that harsh
measures are used by timid people, who dream of nothing but Sans Culottes and Hobgoblins.
347

The following year it also opined that we believe that Government has been made the
complete Dupe of these Fiends, as it actually thought a Conspiracy existed, such as these
wretches represented.
348
Sheridan agreed, averring that a minister who relied on informers
for information must be eternally the dupe of those vile spies, whose interest it is to
deceive him as well as to betray others.
349
Nonetheless the MP still laid the ultimate
responsibility for such delusions squarely at the feet of the Pitt ministry for having
employed such notoriously debased and unreliable instruments in the first place.
Pigott, however, was more directly critical of the government, favouring the first
scenario and arguing that the spy was a mere underling of government, send to watch over
the words and actions of innocent men, in order to falsely implicate them in seditious
crimes, so as to satisfy the bloody vengeance of an infernal minister.
350
Holcroft claimed
that the reports of spies were construed in such a way as to fit the treasonable model
[their] employers had provided, backed by Thelwalls assertion that when Ministers want
high Treason and can get no respectable evidence of its existence, they must hang up their

346
MC, 28 November 1794, emphasis in original.
347
MP, 28 December 1793.
348
Ibid., 8 November 1794.
349
PH 31, col. 1069.
350
Charles Pigott, A Political Dictionary: Explaining the True Meaning of Words, London, D. I. Eaton, 1795, p. 134.

men upon such testimony as they can procure.
351
The Irish MP Valentine Lawless
concurred, hinting that With a proper force of spies and detectivesit is not difficult to
manufacture treason.
352
One radical work quoted a passage from Swifts Gullivers
Travels, in which Gulliver visited the kingdom of Tribnia, a land full of informers and
accusers. It is noted that
The plots of that kingdom are usually the workmanship of those persons who desire to raise their
own characters of profound politicians; to restore new vigour to a crazy administration (and) to
stifle or divert general discontentsIt is first agreed, and settled among them, what suspected
persons shall be accused of a plot; then effectual care is taken to secure all their letters and papers,
and put the owners in chains.
353

The analogies with this particular interpretation of the governments actions and the role
played by its spies were obvious and striking.
On a less conspiratorial level, John Curwen blamed the government for implementing
the detestable system of spyism which produced such horrid consequences as the sorry
story of Watt.
354
Robinson believed that one must look to and critique the law enforcement
system itself and its operators, rather than simply blaming those who sought to profit by it,
asserting that the law, or at least the administration of it, is bad, which cannot be laudably
and honourably enforced by voluntary, and even mercenary informations.
355
These
radicals therefore believed that the government was wholly accountable for the actions of
its spies the bloodhounds of administration who could hunt the devoted patriot and
drag forth the secrets of his heart, and the levities of his imagination, and pervert them to
his destruction.
356
In sum, if the government was indeed misled, then securitization and
repression were genuine responses based on a faulty understanding, still contemptible for
their misguidedness and ignorance but more a result of fear and poor intelligence work
than a deliberate attempt at unwarranted repression. However if the government was in fact

351
Holcroft, A Narrative of Facts, Relating to a Prosecution for High Treason; Including the Address to the Jury, Which the Court
refused to hear: With Letters to the Attorney General, Lord Chief Justice Eyre, Mr. Serjeant Adair, the Honourable Thomas Erskine, and
Vicary Gibbs, Esq. and the Defence The Author had prepared, if he had been brought to Trial, p. 60; John Thelwall, Lecture on the
system of terror and persecution adopted by the present ministry, The Tribune No. XII, 1795, in Thelwall, The Tribune, A Periodical
Publication, Consisting Chiefly of the Political Lectures of J. Thelwall, Vol. 1, p. 270.
352
Valentine Brown Lawless, Baron Cloncurry, Personal Recollections of the Life and Times, with Extracts From the Correspondence,
of Valentine Lord Cloncurry, Dublin, James McGlashan, 1849, p. 62.
353
Jonathan Swift, Gullivers Travels, Part III, in The Manual of Liberty, p. 167.
354
PH 31, col. 1173.
355
Henry Crabb Robinson, On the Essential and Accidental Characteristics of Informers, The Cabinet: By a Society of Gentlemen,
Vol. 1, Norwich, 1795, pp. 281-86, in Corfield and Evans, eds., Youth and Revolution in the 1790s, p. 185.
356
Politics for the People: or, a Salmagundy for Swine, Vol. 2, no. 29, London, D. I. Eaton, 1795, p. 458; John Thelwall, The Natural
and Constitutional Right of Britons To Annual Parliaments, Universal Suffrage, and the Freedom of Popular Association: Being a
Vindication of the Motives and Political Conduct of John Thelwall, and of the London Corresponding Society, in General, London,
Symonds, Ridgeway, Eaton, Thelwall and Phillips, 1795, p. 80.

working from a preconceived agendum and employing its spies accordingly, then its
actions were a cynical and calculated ploy to obtain, create and twist the evidence
necessary to justify a pre-determined securitization.
All radicals could at least agree that the picture the government presented to the public
concerning radicalism and the societies was false or inaccurate on many counts. As
Thelwall argued, those who rely on spies for their information cannot possibly have a
correct understanding, as it is in the spys interest to deceive, because their salaries
depend upon keeping their employers in good humour.
357
Cobb argues that
an informer will often construct an elaborate plot where there is an open and probably harmless
association, that he will make machiavellian conspirators of simple and angry men, and that he
will scent daggers or pretend to scent daggers where there are kitchen knives and spoons. For
the informer, nothing can be quite what it seems
358

This tendency stems both from a desire to make their information more useful and
worthy of reward, and from the inherent nature of a profession dealing in secrecy and
deception. Such conspiracy paranoia certainly rubbed off strongly on the government.
Sheridan targeted Pitt directly, claiming that the minister had no communication with the
people of England except through the medium of spies and informers; therefore he is
unacquainted with the mode in which their sentiments are expressed, and cannot make
allowance for the language of toasts and resolutions adopted in an unguarded and convivial
hour.
359
Or as Eatons Politics for the People more whimsically put it, Signor Gulielmo
Pittachiowill produce his justly celebrated CURIOUS SPY GLASSES, which distort and
misrepresent all objects that are looked at through them.
360

Ultimately however, while conspiracy theories, the needs of securitization and a lack of
understanding undoubtedly played an important part in determining the governments
course of action, it was unclear to radicals whether ministers actually fully believed their
public narrative of events, or whether this was at least in part mere propaganda to terrify
the people and justify state repression. Was this a case of the tail wagging the dog, in
which incoming information was believed out of hand, or was the government in fact a
more shrewd analyst, wise to the wiles and potential pitfalls of its clandestine agents, and

357
the Continuance of such a System, p. 26.
358
Cobb, pp. 6-7.
359
PH 31, col. 1068.
360
Politics for the People, Vol. 2, no. 25, p. 388.

possibly even actively involved in deliberate attempts to falsely construct cases of treason
and sedition? As noted in the preceding chapter, the reality is difficult to determine, and
radicals continued to argue and discuss it amongst themselves without coming to any
definitive conclusion.
Yet whatever the exact truth, radicals were convinced that the governments use of such
secretive and underhand methods betrayed its elitism, draconian grip on power,
securitizing tendencies and lack of understanding of the real needs and grievances of the
people. It was widely asked what kind of government would employ such nefarious
characters as spies and informers? In the eyes of radical thinkers, the answer could only be
one that was despotic, debased, corrupt (an ever-present theme in eighteenth-century
liberal thought), callous of the damage they caused to liberty, morality, community and
individual citizens, and desperate to preserve power and protect the interests of the elite. In
May 1794 the Foxite Friends of the People argued against the governments policies,
stating that Practices of the most dangerous tendency have lately been pursued with
increased activity and boldness.
361
Politics for the People argued that Spies are the
principal agents of a government weak, restless, and mutinous.
362
The editor of Newells
memoirs left no doubt as to his thoughts on the topic:
A government conducted and supported by the agency of those heedless and miserable wretches
called spies and informers, is not only contemptible to foreign powers, and detestable to those
over whom it would rule; but by its very nature it undermines the obligations of religion, and the
restraints of conscience. It seeks only its own safety, whilst it disregards the means by which that
safety is secured.
363

The Morning Chronicle quoted Montesquieus statement that the usual practice of good
Princes is not to employ spies, and later opined that spies had never been resorted to in
former times as a State-engine but in the very worst of governments that of the tyrant, the
usurper, or the despot.
364
Knox expressed similar sentiments, claiming that A ministry
must be sadly corruptwhich can so far degrade itself as to require the assistance of the
vilest of the human race, for the use of spies argues an endeavor to govern in a manner
unauthorized by that constitution which the employers of spies and informers pretend to

361
Address of the Friends of the People, Freemasons Tavern, Saturday, May 31 1794, Wyvill Papers, Vol. V, pp. xiii-xvi, quoted in
362
363
Newell, p. v.
364
MC, 2 January 1795 & 23 January 1798.

protect.
365
Sheridan concurred, arguing in the Commons that the government which
avails itself of such support does not exist for the happiness of the people.
366
Any policies
that resorted to such tactics, including the moves to securitize radicalism, must surely be
being pursued heedless of the true interests of the nation.
The notorious character and activities of informers inevitably tainted their employers. In
criticising the matter in which the crown proceeded in the 1794 treason trials, young
Amyot wrote that
A more pitiful Set of Ragamuffins could not have been picked up in the Highways than that
which government has brought forward as witnesses on these trials. To be sure a Spy is a
Character despicable enough; no man of Conscience or Character would assume it.
367

A letter published in the Morning Chronicle was able to draw parallels between the
conduct of informers and senior politicians like Pitt and the Duke of Richmond in the
witness stand at these trials, noting the similarity between the perjured Informer, who
swears more than the truth, and his employer, who conceals the truth under flimsy veil of a
short memory.
368
Elsewhere a handbill published in Dublin described spies and informers
as the principal agents of corrupt Ministers, matched by the Morning Posts warning to
the government that the profligacy of aSpy, argues an equal corruption in your
Administration.
369
Finally Holcroft listed the names of Lynam, Groves, Alexander, and
Taylor, noting that their infamy was certainly on record for posterity, an everlasting
weight around the governments neck.
370
Such comments and connections tarnished the
governments efforts to securitize radicalism, and may have contributed to its decision
post-1794 to move its secret service activities well out of the public eye.
Radicals also rejected the governments arguments for the necessity of extraordinary
measures such as increased surveillance and employment of spies in order to preserve
peace and security. Knox argued that There are excellent laws, and there are magistrates
and officers dispersed all over the kingdom, who are bound to take cognizance of any
illegal and injurious practices, and to prevent them by a timely interference. These were

365
Knox, pp. 132 & 136.
366
PH 31, col. 1067.
367
Amyot to Pattisson, 9 December 1794, in Corfield and Evans, eds., Youth and Revolution in the 1790s, p. 104.
368
MC, 27 December 1794.
369
The Courier, 26 March 1795; MP, 12 December 1794.
370
Thomas Holcroft, A Letter to the Right Honourable William Windham, on the Intemperance and Dangerous Tendency of His Public
Conduct, London, H. D. Symonds, 1795, p. 35.

deemed sufficient to protect law and order and anything further was a sign of its contempt
for the entirety of the common people:
The employment of spies and informers is a virtual declaration of hostilities against the people. It argues
a want of confidence in them. It argues a fear and jealousy of them. It argues a desire to destroy them by
ambuscade.
371

Charles Grey argued against policies that would turn respectable magistrates into
informers. As a result A system of espionage was to take place by order of the crown. It
was as surprising as it was odious, that such a proclamation should issue from the
sovereign of a free people.
372
One anonymous pamphlet writer agreed, claimed that a
system of Espionage is every where established among usto watch the hours of unguarded
conviviality, and to pervert the honest effusions of the honest heart into sedition, conspiracy and
treason, by perjury, and the blackest means
373

Increased security and surveillance services were believed to be incompatible with British
freedoms, traditions and liberties. Godwin argued The eye of the tyrant is never closed,
and the surgeon John Stuart Taylor suggested that history teaches that those nations are
the most deficient in civil liberty, where the system of espionage has been most
prevalent.
374
Politics for the People argued that
Corruption had long been the chief spring of the English government. It has lately discovered
another spring, quite as honourable and beneficial as the first Espionage; that is, the trade of
spies and informers.
375

A people living exposed to such surveillance and espionage can enjoy neither freedom nor
security.
The debate over spies also formed part of the wider radical movement to increase the
transparency of the mechanisms of government and state administration. This was
borrowed from France where it was considered by the revolutionaries that absolute
transparency in the operations of the new constitutional monarchy and later the republic
was of paramount necessity. Evans states that the British radicals insisted that the exercise

371
Knox, pp. 135-36 & 132.
372
PH 29, col. 1483.
373
Cursory Remarks on Mr. Pitt s New Tax of Imposing a Guinea Per Head on Every Person Who Wears Hair-Powder, London, D. I.
Eaton, 1795, p. 18.
374
Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, and its Influence on Morals and Happiness, Vol. 2, p. 46; John Stuart Taylor, Spies
and Informers, The Cabinet, Vol. 1, p. 151.
375

of power should be a transparent process, one that could be understood and monitored by
citizens, thereby improving its accountability and liberality.
376
While private life was
arguably to be respected, a mans public and state conduct must be open to scrutiny; and
government reasoning, decision-making and policy should be public knowledge wherever
possible. The Morning Chronicle quoted Montesquieus observation that A Prince ought
to act towards his subjects with candour, frankness and confidence.
377
This was seen as
being the honourable and benevolent way to govern a state. However the Pitt governments
willingness to employ spies, surveillance and secret services flew square in the face of
these calls for greater transparency, and left it open to accusations that its actions were
despotic, alarmist and couched in hypocritical secrecy and obfuscation. In September 1794
the Morning Chronicle argued that the government was acting as if the conviction of the
former informer Watt amounts to complete proof of all the extravagant tales with which
the timid and the credulous were alarmed. The paper also claimed that Windham stated
some things are the more to be believed from the very circumstance that they cannot be
proved. It was thought that such Pythonesque nonsense stemmed from the paranoia within
parliament and the executive that radicalism was inherently dangerous and conspiratorial.
If this could not be proved then the radical societies simply must be hiding it, making it
even more likely that they were actively plotting something. The Chronicle aptly called
this ministerial logic.
378

Suspicion and alarm may serve where law and evidence fail, and the perceived
government policy to foster such commotion and act in secret was attacked by radicals on
the grounds that it was calculated to facilitate its unjust securitizing move, deceive the
public and allow it to wage war against both internal and external targets on its own terms,
violating the rights and liberties of the people and suppressing inconvenient truths with
tales of conspiracies and dark tidings. Politics for the People alleged that the government
had excited a sudden, but temporary commotion through the kingdom, caused for the
infamous and scandalous intention of raising alarms in mens minds that the State was in
imminent danger of being subverted, during which Ministers seized the opportunity as
being favourable to their knavish and infernal plans and struck forcefully against
radicalism and France while the people were in a kind of stupor, which did not evaporate

376
Evans, pp. 67-68.
377
MC, 2 January 1795.
378
MC, 30 September 1794, my emphasis.

till it was too late.
379
The Morning Post concurred, arguing that the alarm raised by spies
and government imaginary fears and empty delusions created an apathy amongst
many of the public towards the most dangerous infractions on the Constitutional Rights of
Britons.
380
The publics true sentiments were supressed, for the mass of the Public is
imposed upon by these corrupt Ministerial Hirelings, and the real voice of the People is
stifled merely to keep a set of men who have ruined the Kingdom, in their Places.
381
In a
similar vein, Richard Newtons cartoon A Bugaboo!!! of June 1792 (see Figure 3.2) listed
spies and informers amongst other tools used by Pitt to alarm the nation and increase
national security.
382

Figure 3.2 A Bugaboo!!!
Such alarm could also be used to divide the public and turn it against those blamed for
necessitating the alarm in the first place. Thelwall argued that

379
Politics for the People, Vol. 2, no. 27, pp. 428-29, emphasis in original.
380
MP, 1 March & 17 October 1794.
381
Ibid., 21 February 1795.
382
Richard Newton, A Bugaboo!!!, London, William Holland, 1792, British Museum Image Collection.

the wretchwho hires perjured spies and tumultuous assassins to breed confusionthat he may
charge that confusion upon those whom he has basely and insolently injured; such a man, by his
detestable arts, and sneaking tricks, proves that he knows himself to be a juggler, and that his
cause is as rotten as his heart is hollow.
383

Gale Jones posited that Ministers have been studiously endeavouring to disunite the
people at home, while in the Commons George Tierney argued that I see that
government are acting thus. Those whom they cannot prove to be guilty, they will punish
for their suspicion. To support this system, we must have a swarm of spies and
informers.
384
Sheridan pushed the case further, commenting that the government had
inaugurated a system which is calculated to engender suspicion, and to beget hostility; it
not only destroys all confidence between man and man, but between governors and
governed. Where it does not find sedition, it creates it.
385
Public opinion distorted in this
manner was channelled into loyalist associations, church and king mobs, and of course
spying and informing, for as Wagner states,
a once docile or impartial public may be convinced to identify political threat where previously it
had seen none. That same public may also be convinced that part of their civic duty was to eject
that threat from their midst.
386

As discussed in Chapter Two, threat awareness was heightened throughout Britain,
occasioning a dramatic rise in investigations, reports, prosecutions and persecutions of
suspected radical activity.
The pop-gun plot and the trials of Watt and Walker were all perceived by radicals as
instances of created or exaggerated treason and alarm. Plowden described Walkers
misfortunes as a serious and awful instance of the extreme mischief of encouraging spies
and informers, who must be generally composed of the most abandoned and profligate of
mankind!
387
Regarding the Watt affair, he argued that it was the intention of either the ex-
informer or the government to convert the matter into the wicked engine of criminating
and punishing those [radical] societies, to which it was the wish of many to bring home the

383
John Thelwall, The Second Lecture on the Causes of the present Dearness and Scarcity of Provisions, The Tribune No. XVII, 1795,
in Thelwall, The Tribune, A Periodical Publication, Consisting Chiefly of the Political Lectures of J. Thelwall, Vol. 2, p. 42.
384
John Gale Jones, Sketch of a Speech Delivered at the Westminster Forum, on the 9th, 16th, 23rd, and 30th December 1794, London,
Self-Published, 1795, p. 38; PH 34, col. 991.
385
PH 31, col. 1067.
386
Wagner, p. 103.
387
Plowden, pp. 117-18.

pretended guilt.
388
Many radicals agreed with Plowden, and while it was uncertain
whether the government had been actively involved in the plot, there was no doubt in
radical minds that a concerted attempt was made after its exposure to fraudulently link
Watts crimes with the activities of the LCS and SCI.
Smith and Higgins, who themselves suffered persecution as a result of Uptons fables,
believed that each case was part of a loosely co-ordinated attempt, in which informers were
heavily involved, to alarm the public and magnify the supposed threat posed by Hardy and
his colleagues. They argued that it was the governments intention, by means of spies and
informers, to destroy all publick confidence, and to introduce into this kingdom the worst
means of despotism.
389
Plowden recounted how
The sensation which the horror of this infernal conspiracy naturally produced upon the public
mind, was little calculated to disannex it from the late trials at Edinburgh, or the bills preferred
against of the same society to the Grand Jury
390

Some radicals believed that the whole pop-gun plot was a government fabrication from the
start, with one song positing that the plan was fabricatedto alarm the nation!
391
One
pamphlet argued that the man must have a thick skull, Who could not see it was meant for
to deceive poor Jack Bull. The author wondered how Uptons ludicrous plot could so
have alarmed the people, and warned that those that cry Stop thief are the rogues that
rob the nation.
392
Others may have conceded that some informers acted on their own
initiative in exploiting public and governmental alarm, but nonetheless believed that the
government was not slow to seize on their actions and allegations for ministerial ends.
Certainly at the very least it may be noted that even when it became obvious that Upton
was a fabricator, the government did little to publicly set the record straight and quell
public concern, and continued to pursue and string-out the matter when it had few
evidential grounds for doing so.
In radical eyes security services and spies therefore served as a means of repression and
the advancement of an unjust and unmerited securitization; achieved by restricting freedom

388
Ibid., p. 243.
389
John Smith and George Higgins, Assassination of the King! The Conspirators Exposed, or, An Account of the Apprehension,
Treatment in Prison, and Repeated Examinations Before the Privy Council, of John Smith and George Higgins, on a Charge of High
Treason, 2nd Ed., London, J. Smith, 1795, p. 3.
390
Plowden, p. 254.
391
State Tricks Developed. A New Song, no publication details, 1795, quoted in Barrell, Imagining the Kings Death, p. 485.
392
The Pop-Gun Plot Found Out; or, Ministers in the Dumps, no publication details, 1795, quoted in Barrell, Imagining the Kings
Death, p. 486, emphases in original.

of speech, debate and opinion, creating alarm, and encouraging betrayal, suspicion,
investigation and persecution of the affairs of others, and the giving of false testimony.
These measures assisted the government in shaping public opinion, exaggerating threats to
security, building successful prosecutions and justifying repressive actions and
extraordinary measures against supposedly dangerous and criminally-minded radical
societies and individuals. Securitization was not a legitimate response to a real threat but a
means of cultivating public and parliamentary support for policies designed to maintain
and benefit the current political and social order.
Legislation
Legislation increasing the powers of state surveillance and intervention, and the
employment or reward of informers, was roundly condemned by radical thinkers. The Two
Acts provoked the most debate and alarm, particular the Seditious Meetings Act. One
commentator pondered How any discussion can take place with that freedom which the
constitution so fully grants to the subject, in the presence of a horrid spy or spieslet
common sensedetermine.
393
Erskine noted that any spywith half-a-crown in his
pocket, might go, and, by uttering seditious expressions, afford his paymaster the power of
putting an end to all discussion, and to the meeting.
394
It was proposed that both acts
would lead to a horrid occurrence, namely an increase in
the number of spies and informersthey will then swarm like locusts; they will become such
dangerous pests of society, by plot-hunting, praying for sedition, listening to hear some
wordthat may tempt to stir up contempt for a minister
395

All liberties would lie at the mercy of what Godwin called a national militia of spies and
informers, threatened by their willingness to commit perjury and impute twisted meanings
for the sake of reward.
396
In parliament Fox argued that the acts granted unprecedented and
unconstitutional powers to the government, for under their provisions and By the infamy
of spies and informers, both he and his countrymen were exposed to the indignation of the
court party.
397
The suspensions of habeas corpus also raised the ire of many radicals,

393
394
PH 32, col. 317.
395
396
Assemblies, p. 48.
397
PH 32, col. 517.

perceived as another component of the governments insistence on operating in a secretive
and atypical manner to subvert and suppress the traditional rights of Englishmen. It was
also observed that it would increase the threat posed by spies, as those denounced by such
miscreants would have reduced access to justice. One pamphlet writer argued that
However necessary the Suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act may have been, certain it is,
that low Cunning and Malevolence have endeavoured to turn it to the most infamous
purposes, and the Courier claimed that the suspension left the people at the mercy of the
Ministers and their Spies and Informers.
398

The Hair Powder Tax passed in 1795, whose enforcement relied heavily on informers,
was another source of fears over an increase in their prevalence and immorality, with one
pamphlet warning that So numerous are the spies and informers of todaythat they will
avail themselves of every opportunity to add to the misfortunes of each unhappy
individual.
399
Pindar composed a poem on the subject, foretelling the ability of informers
to exploit the new tax:
In fancy now I mark the frequent race;
I see th Informer polls of powder chase!
On this, on that, a Footman, Maid of mop,
Fierce as the tiger from his ambush, pop;
Now in his cruel clutches, sharp and strong,
To Bow-street drag his powderd prey along
400

Another pamphlet criticised such an extension of the powers of informers in the wake of
the notorious treason trials, arguing against the governments use of that dangerous
engine to public and private peace, the effects of which in the late trials for treason we all
of us have so much deprecated and deplored.
401
Even the staunchly conservative Times
was sceptical of the new measures utility, arguing that If Gentlemen would more
frequently appeal from convictions obtained by Common Informers, they would not only
redress themselves, but render essential service to the Public.
402
The tax was responsible
for one the very rare instances of violence against an informer in the 1790s, when the
husband of the intended victim assaulted the informer and declared that he should be

398
Serious Consequences Attending the Suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, London, Smith, 1794, p. 4; The Courier, 2 January 1795.
399
A Letter to the Deputy Manager of a Theatre-Royal, London, on His Lately Acquired Notoriety, in Contriving and Arranging the
Hair Powder Act, Commonly Called the Poll Tax, London, Allen and West, 1795, p. 29.
400
Peter Pindar (John Wolcot), Hair Powder: A Plaintive Epistle to Mr. Pitt, London, Charles Smith, 1795, p. 5.
401
Cursory Remarks on Mr. Pitts New Tax of Imposing a Guinea Per Head on Every Person Who Wears Hair-Powder, p. 16.
402
The Times, 31 October 1800.

pumped. The husband and a friend then dragged him to the pump, and with the
assistance of others, kept pouring water upon him for a quarter of an hourHis clothes
were all torn; and when they let him go, he missed his money.
403
No charges were laid
against the perpetrators. Clearly the role of a common informer was still a dangerous
business, viewed unfavourably by the majority of society.
The new income tax introduced in 1797 also raised fears over the greater empowerment
of informers, with Benjamin Kingsbury arguing that It will be impossible to obtain a
knowledge of individual income without calling into existence, and affording a most
extensive field of operations to, this odious class of beings. This would be most
unwelcome as it was well-known that It is clearly for their interest, and for that of their
employers, to overstep the bounds of truth, resulting in the exercise of tyranny of
injustice.
404
Finally, excise and regulation laws were recognised as another potential
breeding ground for informers. The LCS criticised the laws and their enforcement by spies
as equally repugnant to the professed principles of the constitution, and most extensive in
their oppression.
405
Daniel Stuart wondered
What can be more vexatious than that the Stamp Office should keep in its pay Informers, who,
before they will be such, must have lost all sense of shame or honestyWhat can be more
vexatious or destructive of Freedom, than that one of these reptiles may go into a tradesmans
shop, purchase a pair of gloves, and by quirk or perjuryfine the vender in ten guineas, half of
which goes to himself?
406

Holcroft joined in the condemnation, avowing that the informers on excise violations were
men stigmatized and obnoxious to community. Yet the law
allows them a poor stipend, and commits to them a dangerous and tempting trust. It stimulates
them to break their oaths, rob their employer, forfeit their character, and in every respect render
themselves the contempt of society.
407

403
Evening Mail, 15 January 1798.
404
Benjamin Kingsbury, An Address to the People of Great Britain, on the Subject of Mr. Pitts Proposed Tax on Income, London,
1798, pp. 14-15.
405
The Report of the Committee of Constitution, of the London Corresponding Society, London, Thomas Spence, 1794, p. 3.
406
Daniel Stuart, Peace and Reform, Against War and Corruption, 4th Ed., London, J. Ridgway, 1795, p. 62.
407
Vicary Gibbs, Esq. and the Defence The Author had prepared, if he had been brought to Trial, p. 63.

Even the London police magistrate Colquhoun was wary of using informers in such
matters, instead pointing the way towards a more professional system of law enforcement
carried out by police and inspectors. He argued that informers should not be used because,
independent of the invidious nature of the office, experience has shown that the public good never
enters into the consideration of persons of this description, who look merely to their own
emolument, frequently holding up the penalties as a rod by which money is privately extorted,
and the parties laid under contribution, for the purpose of allowing them to continue in the
practice of these abuses
408

These examples demonstrate the general dislike and distrust of informers both criminal and
political amongst at least the more liberal sectors of society, enhanced by the fear and
contempt arising in the wake of the treason and sedition trials of the first half of the 1790s
and their increased intertwining with issues of security.
Morals, Values and Community
Morality, be it social, political or religious, never lay far from the consciousness of late
eighteenth-century British society, even if it had not reached the all-encompassing
importance of the era of Victorian values. Undoubtedly it formed an important part of the
debate over surveillance and security. We have already seen how loyalists attempted to
appropriate morality as a referent object threatened by radical activity. Yet just like the
constitution, radicals countered that it was in fact the governments own actions that
threatened and corrupted the morals of society, particularly through the employment and
encouragement given to spies and informers. The profession of informer was one of the
most despised if begrudgingly tolerated in Georgian England, regardless of their area of
operations. Many radicals were convinced that the incentives given by the government to
such characters debased and corrupted both the individuals and the communities in which
they operated, and they were not slow to make their outrage known, or to use them as a
means of attacking government policies.
Informers were believed to be base and dishonest characters, devoid of integrity,
betrayers of trust and confidence, pariahs of the community who put financial and personal
gain before all notions of decency and fellow-feeling. Most were believed to be driven by
the base motives of money, rewards and malice, rather than any interest in fighting crime

408
Patrick Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis, London, H. Fry, 1796, pp. 206-207.

and preserving order. Their rewards came only at the expense of others, often as a result of
a willingness to lie about, deceive and betray their fellow citizens. A small sample of the
numerous references to the poor character and morals of spies and informers will suffice to
demonstrate the depth of the contempt in which they were held. In the radical press they
were variously described as an infamous race; despicable charactersheld in universal
detestation; miscreants; villains; wretches from the very lowest order of society;
debased and infamous; reptiles; degraded and corrupt; detestable; ill-bred; and
odious.
409

In the courts the spy was described by defence counsel Dallas as a man fallen so low as
to lose all scrupulous feeling, and
If it be in the pursuit of blood that he is employed, he will have so many vices to practise, that it is
utterly incredible he should preserve the feeling to arrest him in any part of the career leading to
murder, when that should become necessary to his views.
410

As noted above, at Hardys trial Erskine quoted Burke on informers. Burke described the
informer as a feverish being, tainted with the gaol distemper of a contagious servitude, to
keep him above ground, an animated mass of putrefaction, corrupted himself, and
corrupting all about him.
411
Erskine himself castigated Groves as a dishonest man and a
miscreant, and brought up discreditable instances from Goslings past during which he
had lived under a different name, been involved in a murky business concerning a tenant, a
death and a beneficial will, and possibly taken part in an illegal trade in naval stores.
412

Other spies also served as easy targets on account of notable defects in their character,
background and evidence. Upton was described in Politics for the People as an
incendiary, next a horse-stealer, then the contriver and bespeaker of an instrument for
compassing the death of the King, a plot described by Plowden as a malicious and artful
fabrication.
413
John Taylor was convicted of bigamy, prompting the Morning Post to ask
what credit is due to the testimony of one who must have falsified himself at the Altar of
God.
414
Watt fared even worse, with the Post opining that the people looking on him as a
Vile Spy of Government, did not issue as much as a sigh of Compassion at his

409
MC, 27 July 1798; MP, 22 December 1794, 18 January 1793, 13 December 1793, 9 May 1794, 30 May 1794, 9 October 1794, 24
November 1794, 29 November 1794; Tomahawk, 11 November 1795; The Sun, 28 November 1794.
410
ST 27, col. 215.
411
ST 24, col. 959.
412
Ibid., cols. 1143 & 719-29.
413
Politics for the People, Vol. 2, no. 18, p. 282; Plowden, p. 254.
414
MP, 2 October 1794.

Execution.
415
The fallen spy was also the subject of an anonymous 97-page character
assassination entitled The Life & Character of Robert Watt, in which he was accused,
amongst other things, of preparing to spill the blood of thousands, in order to satiate his
avaricious soul, with the plunder of the Banks and public Offices.
416

Spies were not spared in parliament either. Fox stated that of such characters there
were no words in the English language which could sufficiently mark his contempt and
detestation, while Joseph Jekyll lamented the existence of a villainous horde of spies,
informers, and perjured witnesses.
417
Radical speeches, pamphlets and books also abound
with such invective, which apparently had few limits. Coleridge called spies perjured
conspirators against the lives and liberties of the people, matched by Stuarts description
of them as men who have lost all sense of shame and honesty; who must have abandoned
all hopes of ever being respectable in society.
418
Holcroft described informers as men
stigmatized and obnoxious to community, while Kingsbury stated that the character of a
spy is at variance with every manly and honourable feeling; and should ever be
reprobated and abhorred by those who aspire to the praise of open hearted integrity.
419

Knox called them the vilest of the human race, exhibiting extreme profligacy of
conduct, and a total destitution of moral and religious principle.
420
Finally Thelwall
queried
what must be the depravity of that wretch, who prowls from place to place, from lurking hole to
lurking holeto overhear and betray the conversation in which the honest and unsuspecting part
of his fellow creatures may occasionally indulge their feelings.
421

As noted above, radicals also attacked the encouragement and incentives given to
informers by the government and loyalist associations, arguing that this would tempt
people into acts of dishonesty, perjury, deceit, voyeurism, greed, covetousness and
betrayal, and teach them that vice could be worthy of reward by the state and its agents.

415
Ibid., 22 October 1794.
416
The Life and Character of Robert Watt; Who Was Executed For High Treason, At Edinburgh, the 15th October, 1794, Edinburgh, A.
Shirrefs, 1795, p. 32.
417
PH 32, cols. 374 & 511.
418
Coleridge, p. 6; Stuart, p. 62.
419
Vicary Gibbs, Esq. and the Defence The Author had prepared, if he had been brought to Trial, p. 63; Kingsbury, p. 14.
420
Knox, p. 133.
421

Ousby states that Loyalty to the profession of spying involved disloyalty in the actual
social relationships which form the basis of society. There was an
incompatibility between the spys loyalty to his employer and to the social group of which he is a
sworn and trusted member. The defence of national security in this case apparently involved an
assault upon social ethics.
422

At Hardys trial, Erskine railed against the manner in which Lynam and his fellow spies
betrayed the trust and friendship of their fellow LCS members, exploiting and damaging
the social bonds that unite fellow citizens. Erskine argued that Lynam took his notes
bona fide as a delegate, and yet bona fide as an informer;what a happy combination of fidelity!
faithful to serve, and faithful to betray!correct to record for the business of the society, and
correct to dissolve and to punish it!
423

These arguments were picked up by other radicals. An anonymous letter published in the
Morning Chronicle argued that spies and informers corrupt the source of social intimacy
and confidence, vitiate every noble and generous sentiment of the human heart, taint the
purity of moral evidence, and promote the growth of perjury by royal bounties, while
another in the Morning Post claimed that spies were responsible for atrocities the most
barefaced and dangerous that ever disgraced or threatened the annihilation of all
Society.
424
Holcroft expresses similar sentiments, noting that spies and informers are a
poison which envenoms the whole state of social existence, infuses itself to every heart,
and there broods suspicion, hatred, perjury, and rancour only fit for fiends.
425
Even
upstanding citizens were tarnished by the presence and actions of spies, for as Godwin
argued It is impossible that I should continually associate with knaves, without losing
something of the unsullied lustre of my virtue.
426

Knox argued that the government was failing its moral responsibility to the people,
noting that when ministers
patronize such miscreants as spies and informers, they certainly corrupt the public morals, by
leading the people, over whom their examples must always have great influence, to believe, that

422
Ian Ousby, My servant Caleb: Godwins Caleb Williams and the political trials of the 1790s, University of Toronto Quarterly,
vol. 44, no. 1 (1974), p. 50.
423
ST 24, cols. 962-63.
424
MC, 18 December 1794; MP, 9 October 1794.
425
Vicary Gibbs, Esq. and the Defence The Author had prepared, if he had been brought to Trial, p. 62.
426
Assemblies, p. 51.

treachery, perjury, and murder are crimes of a venial natureThey teach one of the most
corrupting maxims; for they teach, That when ends eagerly desired by knaves in power are to be
accomplished, the means must be pursued, however base and dishonest.
427

Thelwall agreed, strongly advocating the case against the state use of spies:
It is one of the curses of the infernal system of these associators, that it has a direct tendency to
debauch the morals of the community, and destroy every principle that can secure to man the
advantages of social union; to introduceevery species of moral depredation false accusation,
perjury and subornation of perjury; and, in short, every abominable vice which treachery can
devise, and malignity carry into execution.
The orator was not about to let the government or Reeves Societies plead ignorance over
the vices of their tools either, arguing that
We must look to the consequences of measuresand it was their duty, as the grand movers of the
infernal engine thus set to workto consider, before the experiment was adopted, what were the
mischiefs to the morals and happiness of society, which were likely to be effected by its
operations?
Thelwall posited that any reasoned man would have realised that such operations could
only have resulted in an anarchy of morals, for if the principles of morality are once
overthrown, nothing like political security can possibly be expected in any state.
428
A few
years later Robert Southey came to the same conclusion, arguing that Government do not
seem to be aware, that when they offer premiums for treachery, they are corrupting the
morals of the people, and thereby weakening their own security.
429
The mechanisms that
minister and loyalist used to securitize and repress radicalism would thus result in the very
thing they were trying to avoid a collapse in political and social security.
It was also argued that even laws designed to improve morals, such as the proposed Bill
for the better Observation of Sunday tabled in 1795, could in fact be damaging to public
morality if they propagated the spread of informers. Lord William Russell argued that the
bill would give extensive exertion to the infamous talents of a set of men who have given
much alarm and vexation to the people in modern times, and a wide scopewould
thereby be afforded to them for the abominable exercise of private pique and personal

427
Knox, p. 135.
428
the Continuance of such a System, pp. 19 & 21-22, emphases in original.
429
Robert Southey, Letters from England, London, The Cresset Press, 1951, p. 92.

malevolence.
430
In this at least the opposition gained a small triumph, for the law was not
passed.
Radicals claimed that the governments policies and measures were not only immoral
but dangerous and liable to tear at the very fabric that held communities and common
decency together, sacrificing collective for national security. Communities grow and
survive upon shared values, order, trust and support of one another, bound by ties of kin,
friendship, loyalty and mutual understanding. The actions of informers are predominantly
anathema to these fundamental aspects of community, setting an individual against their
fellow citizens, creating conflict, and threatening to sever and corrupt existing ties and
values.
431
For as Victor Navasky wrote many years later,
the role of the informer [is] to pollute the public well, to poison social life in general, to destroy
the very possibility of community; for the informer operates on the principle of betrayal and a
community survives on the principle of trust.
432

Yet in the 1790s the government appeared quite happy to utilise such potentially
destructive measures in the fight against sedition and radicalism. This could have
significant repercussions. Warner and Ivis argue that
An intervention that rewards informers creates enormous stresses within the community that it
targets, forcing each of its members to choose among three possible careers or alliances: solidarity
with the larger community, collaboration with other informers, and membership in neither
groupFrom one community three are created, and for the moment each is weaker than its
parent.
433

The presence of informers obliges community members to react and choose sides, turning
communities and even families into divisive battlegrounds. In the 1790s it was argued that
the support afforded to spies by government and loyalist groups had tipped the balance in
the spies favour. In the words of a letter-writer to the Morning Chronicle, the employment
of government spies armed one portion of the community to beat down the other.
434

Many radicals and careless individuals could certainly bear witness to the truth of this
statement, despite warnings about the dangers inherent in the governments policies. As

430
PH 31, col. 1433.
431
Jessica Warner and Frank Ivis, Informers and Their Social Networks in Eighteenth-Century London: A Comparison of Two
Communities, Social Science History, vol. 25, no. 4 (2001), pp. 563-64 & 580-82.
432
Victor Navasky, Naming Names, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1991, p. 347.
433
Warner and Ivis, Informers and Their Social Networks in Eighteenth-Century London, p. 563.
434
MC, 9 January 1795.

early as 1792 Fox argued that the increasing focus on surveillance and informing would
set father against father, brother against brother, and neighbour against neighbour. He
was astonished that in this way you [the government] expect to maintain the peace and
tranquillity of the country!
435
The Hair Powder Tax was also attacked on the grounds that
it would potentially oblige the master of a family to become an informer against his own
children and servants.
436
Godwin believed that the prevalence of spies and informers
turned the whole nation into two classes of hypocrites: hypocrites, who hold out a false
appearance, the better to ensnare; and hypocrites, who hold out a false appearance, that
they may not be ensnared.
437
John Stuart Taylor pressed the case vigorously, stating that
Well and truly has it been observed, that for society to exist in peace, they must have one
common connexion of interest, one universal tie of happiness. Yet the informer is
opposed to this interest, for they cannot contribute to honour and prosperity; nor can this
reptile claim kindred with any part of the communitythe virtuous citizen will regard him
with detestation, the vicious citizen with fear.
438
Thelwall likewise believed that the spy
system was tearing asunder the ties and moral obligations between man and man, and
setting neighbour against neighbour and friend against friend, for purposes of political
treachery.
439

The preservation and strengthening of community ties and tranquillity were
fundamental to the radical push for reform, for as Hodgson argued,
citizens instructed in their rights, and rendered capable of defending them, would never suffer a
set of wretched and cowardly miscreants [informers] to usurp an authority over them not
warranted by their nature, nor conducive to the felicity and repose of the people
440

Enlightenment and enfranchisement were therefore believed to be as destructive of spies as
they were of so many other abuses of power. However radicals would need to see the first
realised before they could achieve the second, and this was not to occur in the face of the
states repression and steadfast refusal to instigate reform.
It was also claimed by some radicals, particularly dissenting ministers, that the acts of
spying and informing were unchristian and contrary to the teachings of Jesus and the Bible.

435
PH 32, col. 21.
436
Oracle and Public Advertiser, 24 June 1795.
437
Assemblies, p. 51.
438
Taylor, Spies and Informers, p. 150.
439
the Continuance of such a System, p. 22, emphasis in original.
440
William Hodgson, The Commonwealth of Reason, London, H. D. Symonds, 1795, p. 99.

In March 1793 the Morning Post published an extract from Swifts well-known sermon
On False Witness from 1715, in which the Dean argued that
Whosoever beareth witness against his neighbour, out of a principle of malice and revengesuch
a man is a false witness in the sight of God, although what he says be true; because the motive or
cause is evil, not to serve his prince or country, but to gratify his own resentmentsI number
among false witnesses all those who makes a trade of being informers in hope of favour and
reward; and to this end employ their time, either by listening in public placescorrupting mens
servantsor thrusting themselves into companyfastening a thousand falsehoods and scandal
upon a whole party, on purpose to provoke such an answer as they may turn to an accusation.
441

Such a race of people was ungodly and unworthy of encouragement and employment by
a noble government. Interestingly Swift condemns many of the same methods of and
motivations for informing as the radicals decried some 80 years later. Perhaps for this
reason and the level of respect accorded his literary and religious achievements, his
comments on spies were widely quoted by 1790s radicals such as John Stuart Taylor,
whose article on the topic in The Cabinet opened with Swifts description of informers as
the most accursed, and prostitute, and abandoned race, that God ever permitted to plague
mankind.
442

In 1795 the Baptist minister Mark Wilks also referenced Swift in a sermon preached and
published to help pay the expenses of the defendants in the 1794 treason trials. Wilks
pointed to passages in Matthew 22 and Luke 20, in which it is written of Jesus that the
chief priests and teachers watched him and sent forth spies which should feign themselves
just men, that they might take hold of his words, that so they might deliver him unto the
power and authority of the governour.
443
Having been foiled in their plans to entrap Jesus,
these spies were later to be found declaring falsehoods against him. These most
degenerate of human beings had been partly responsible for the crucifixion of the Messiah
himself.
444
The minister drew clear parallels between this conduct and that allegedly
carried out by the likes of Groves and Dunn, and disparaged such spies for carrying out the
worst and most sinful of crimes hypocrisy, deceit, lying and temptation. Wilks thundered
that

441
MP, 13 March 1793.
442
Jonathan Swift, The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, Volume 8, page not provided, quoted in Taylor, Spies and Informers, p. 149.
443
Luke 20:20, quoted in Mark Wilks, Athaliah; or the Tocsin Sounded By Modern Alarmists, Norwich, J. March, 1795, pp. 47-48.
444
Wilks, p. 47.

Facts tells us, spies are devils! and reason tells us, if there be a God that judgeth in the earth, these
court emissaries, these base hirelings, who sell themselves to work wickedness, may expect
judgment without mercy, as their certain doom!
445

In the Commons Sheridan also ventured into religious territory, arguing that the
government spy system
resembles in its operations the conduct of the father of all spies and informers, the devil, who
introduced himself into Paradise not only to inform his own Pandemonium of the state of that
region, but to deceive and betray the inhabitants.
446

Sheridan was fortunate to enjoy the protection of parliamentary privilege, for church
ministers could not make such arguments without risk, even when couched in Christian
doctrine, as Winterbotham and others discovered to their detriment.
Public and Private Spaces
The increase in spies and informers and government agents was believed to presage
unwanted and harmful changes to the existing concepts of public and private space, and the
intrusion of national and local government forces into what had previously been considered
private space, protected and free from outside interference. The spy debate formed part of
wider discussions in eighteenth-century England regarding the definition and status of
public and private spheres, battles for control and position in the public sphere, and
concerns over the increasing invasion of the private sphere by state, politics and media.
Government surveillance and intervention increasingly infringed upon and consumed
the public sphere over the course of the 1790s. McCann argues that the Two Acts in
particular attempted to effectively dismantle the infrastructures of the public sphere
freedom of speech, of the press and of association.
447
Public spaces, from taverns to
coffee-houses to market squares, became a primary target for informers. Radicals of all
stripes voiced fears over the unwelcome intrusion of spies into these spaces, eavesdropping
on and interfering in meetings, personal conversations, free discussions, intimate moments
shared with friends and relations and statements made in relaxed and convivial company. It
was argued that frightened citizens would no longer dare to freely speak their minds for
fear of being reported by informers, while the consumption of alcohol would pose another

445
Ibid., p. 59.
446
PH 31, col. 1067.
447
McCann, p. 66.

threat on account of its notorious loosening of the tongue and faculties. Inns and coffee-
houses would suffer from a constrained atmosphere and possible loss of trade, while, as the
lawyer Felix Vaughan observed, good citizens ought to look around and carefully
monitor their speech even amongst friends or in their own home lest there be a spy, or an
informerwithin hearing.
448
Godwin asserted that they spy watches your unguarded
moments, he plies you with wine, that he may excite you to speak without restraint.
449

One radical pondered
What liquor can flow to inspire hilarity, promote mental relaxation, expand the heart, and elevate
the soul by friendly communications, in the presence of concealed spies, informers, and perjurers;
every little society must disperseand the publican be reduced to the dismal visitation of having
no customers, but gentlemen billetted by the constable.
For alas Had not every advantage been taken of words spoken in a drunken frolic, by the
testimony of hired spies and informers, and numbers prosecuted to infinite damage and
ruin?
450

Indeed radical opinions had increasingly been viewed by many of the public and state
authorities as outrageous, unwelcome and potentially criminal; liable to find the speaker
hauled before a local magistrate on an often flimsy or trumped up charge of sedition.
Holcroft perceptively summed up the lamentable state of affairs:
Every county assize and quarter sessions condemned some poor ignorant enthusiast to
imprisonment, for follies at which infancy and idiotism scarcely could have taken fright; and men
of respectable characters and honest intentions, in the fury of their new-born zeal, thought it a
heroical act of duty to watch the conduct of their very intimates, excite them to utter what have
been opprobriously called seditious and treasonable words, and afterwards to turn informers
against the intemperance they had provoked.
Those suspect citizens who failed to fall into the informers traps were often insulted
and turned, nay frequently kicked, out of tap-rooms, coffee-houses, and public places.
451

Knox complained that our coffee-houses, taverns, and places of public amusement
were filled with betrayers

448
ST 22, col. 933.
449
Assemblies, p. 50.
450
Cursory Remarks on the Convention Bill Now Pending in Parliament, pp. 85-86 & 16.
451
Vicary Gibbs, Esq. and the Defence The Author had prepared, if he had been brought to Trial, pp. 8-9.

who mixed with the guests, in order to recommend themselves to government, by reporting the
free language that might escape in the hour of unreserved confidence; when the heart is opened by
friendship, and the tongue loosened by wine.
The spy would pick up on some incautious comment and ensure that it was carried to
the agent of despotism, who, like the tiger, thirsting for human blood, lies watching for his
prey in the covert of obscurity.
452
Pigott raged against the owner of the tavern in which he
was arrested for speaking seditious words, a person who
lays aside the functions of a landlord, to take up the infamy of a SPY and INFORMER;
maliciously attends to words, utteredwhen we must be necessarily off our guard, and when, if
he had possessed one grain of humanity in his dispositionmust have felt it his indispensible
dutyto have warned us that our language was loud and offensive,insteadsuffers usto
give full scope to our career, swears to particular toasts which were drank, and then brings them
forward as matter of criminal accusation against us, THUS CONVERTING HIS COFFEE-
HOUSE INTO AN INQUISITION, HIMSELF THE GRAND INQUISITOR.
453

Citizens were no longer safe in such establishments and conditions, and McCann
concludes that for radicals
the extent to which existing modes of pubic interaction and opinion formation were seen as
complicit with popular violence, mass indoctrination and forms of government-sponsored
repression encouraged a paranoid retreat from the public sphere and a corresponding valorization
of private space as the site of uncoerced communality and the ideal speech community.
454

However they were to find little more comfort in the private realm than they had
experienced in the public.
McCann notes that in the eighteenth century the private was transformed into a
sentimentalized tableau that stabilized a specific mythology of rational, harmonious
communal existence.
455
This understanding of a protected and wholesome private space
where citizens could speak and mingle free from public intrusion shaped the radical
understanding and critique of the states alleged infringement upon this sanctified realm.
Radicals argued that private life would be compromised and infringed upon as a result of
the new emphasis on surveillance, destroying the customs and conventions that

452
Knox, pp. 134 & 54.
453
Pigott, Persecution. The Case of Charles Pigott, pp. 8-9.
454
McCann, p. 61.
455
Ibid., p. 62.

traditionally protected a citizens private affairs from unsolicited observation, and instead
encouraging and sanctioning the intrusion of outsiders and the betrayal of confidences. The
threat posed directly by the potential presence of spies and informers was not the only
cause of concern. The perceived rise of a culture and atmosphere geared towards
watchfulness, suspicion and spying, demonstrated by the wealth of stories and articles
abounding from the period regarding spy scares, suspicious behaviour and the activities of
informers, was also criticised as being an inevitable and undesirable result of the
governments policies and the issuing of edicts such as the kings Proclamation against
Seditious Writings. Curwen argued against the proclamation, condemning the
recommendation given to magistrates and justices to become spies and informers, and their
having it in their power, from caprice, or any other base motive, to oppress and subject to
punishment innocent men.
456
Yet while Thelwall believed that The police is organized
into a complete system Espionage, and spies and informers are marshalled and stationed in
every district, government and loyalist agents were not the only threat. It was now also
the case that in every class and situation of society are to be found daring banditti who
actupon the maxim promulgated from the treasury bench, eager to pry into the private
affairs of fellow citizens.
457
Indeed Thelwall himself was not safe from local informers
even when he semi-retired to rural Wales.
Burke, again quoted by Erskine, had argued that in such conditions
The seeds of destruction are sown in civil intercourse and in social habitudes. The blood of
wholesome kindred is infected. The tables and beds are surrounded with snares. All the means
given by Providence to make life safe and comfortable, are perverted into instruments of terror
and torment.
458

Erskine himself spoke of the misery and disgrace of society when it existed under the
lash of informers, running before the law, and hunting men through the privacies of
domestic life.
459
Thelwall argued that it was the role of the authorities to maintain the
tranquillity and security of private life, for the magistrate should protect every man in the

456
PH 29, col. 1491.
457
John Thelwall, An Appeal to Popular Opinion, Against Kidnapping & Murder; Including a Narrative of the Late Atrocious
Proceedings, at Yarmouth, London, J. S. Jordan, 1796, p. 5.
458
ST 24, col. 959.
459
ST 22, col. 502.

enjoyment of his lawful privileges. Yet instead the state now chose to order, permit and
reward violations and intrusions upon the private, so that our persons have no security.
460

As Barrell explains, the loyalist associations were believed to be the chief instruments
of these breaches of domestic quiet, for they constituted a usurpation of the powers of
government, undertaken with the governments full consent, even connivance.
461

Speaking from his own personal experience, Thelwall complained that My hours of
conviviality have been attended by spies and sycophants,my private chambers haunted
by the familiar spirits of an infernal Inquisition. He lamented that
even our own houses and our own tables furnish no longer a sanctuary and an altar where it is safe
to offer the free incense of friendly conversationIn short, every key hole is an informer, and
every cupboard ought to be searched before you unbosom the painful story of your wrongs
462

Erskine also argued fervently against the loyalist stimulation of spies to stab domestic
peace, to watch for the innocent in the hours devoted to convivial happiness, and to disturb
the sweet repose of private life, so as to punish opinions delivered even in the private
intercourses of domestic life, while Pigott bewailed that
there now exists an associationformed for the express purpose of encouraging and rewarding
these miscreants [informers],who annoy us in every quarter, who usurp a controul over our
very amusements and conversations, however innocent or rational they may be, who debauch the
fidelity of our servants, and prying into the inmost secrets and actions of families and of
individuals, striking at every thing most dear in society, at the expense of honesty, good faith,
hospitality, and domestic quiet, are only anxiousto display their venal and malignant zeal
463

A particularly important issue was the perceived threat spies posed to mutual trust and
expectations of confidentiality and intimacy between friends, family and colleagues.
Regarding our period, Habermas has argued that

460
Thelwall, An Appeal to Popular Opinion, Against Kidnapping & Murder; Including a Narrative of the Late Atrocious Proceedings,
at Yarmouth, pp. 38 & 40.
461
462
Thelwall, The Natural and Constitutional Right of Britons To Annual Parliaments, Universal Suffrage, and the Freedom of Popular
Association, p. 79; Thelwall, The Moral Tendency of a System of Spies and Informers, and the Conduct to be Observed by the Friends of
Liberty During the Continuance of such a System, p. 6.
463
Thomas Erskine, Declaration of the Friends of the Liberty of the Press; Assembled at the Crown and Anchor Tavern, Saturday,
January 19, 1793, 2nd Ed., London, J. Ridgway, 1793, pp. 10 & 4; Pigott, Persecution. The Case of Charles Pigott, p. 10.

In the intimate sphere of the conjugal family privatized individuals viewed themselves as
independent even from the private sphere of their economic activity as persons capable of
entering into purely human relations with one another.
464

The apparent infringement of this convention was repeatedly raised by radical orators and
writers, for the ability to be able to trust and talk candidly with their fellows was
paramount to their plans to achieve political reform. Richard Lee asked:
shall Englishmen, grown jealous of each other, dread to express their sense of wrongs, even to
their closest intimates, from an apprehension thattheir friend they may find a spy, set to watch
over them for the worst of purposes?
Such a society was worse than savage nature, a scene of prostituted humanity.
465
John
Cartwright also queried must Englishmen now, instead of the blessing of social and manly
intercourse, have the curse of spies and betrayers, and false accusers?
466

One radical writer argued that due to the increase in anonymous accusations and reports,
the pleasing confidence of friendship and the domestic enjoyments of life, were poisoned
by the introduction of a general system of suspicion and distrust.
467
Thelwall agreed,
arguing that this system destroyed confidence in our communications with each other, and
especially in that intercourse of mind which is the source of all our comforts and
improvements.
468
Godwin asked what confidence can there be, when men are
surrounded by spies and informers? Citizens were forced to wonder whether my friend
or my brother be not a man, whose trade is accusation, and who will one day cause me to
be transported or hanged.
469
Such confidence was vital to the continuance of frank and
intellectual discussion and the preservation of trust, honesty and security in relationships,
yet it appeared that the government and its loyalist allies cared little about such issues and
their culpability in perpetuating them.
One notable bone of contention regarding space was the coffee-house. These were
believed to be places where people of all ranks could discuss a wide variety of issues,
including politics, for it was assumed that, as Barrell notes, the participants in coffee-

464
Habermas, p. 48.
465
Richard Lee, Bill of Rights, the Birth-Right of Englishmen: A Short Account of That Statute, With Observations Thereon;
Recommended to the Consideration of the People of England, at the Alarming Period of 1795, London, Tree of Liberty, 1795, p. 5.
466
John Cartwright, The Commonwealth in Danger; with an Introduction, London, J. Johnson, 1795, p. clv.
467
Considerations on the French War, in which the Circumstances Leading to it, its Object, and the Resources of Britain For Carrying
it on, are examined, in a Letter, to the Rt. Honble. William Pitt, London, D. I. Eaton, 1794, p. 16.
468
469
Assemblies, p. 51.

house conversation agreed that the space of conversation was a private space.
470

Therefore even though the house was open to all and thus a public space, the conversations
held within were, as Habermas states, Included in the private realm, for it was a public
sphere constituted by private people.
471
Yet, as Barrell argues, and as Frost and Hodgson
discovered to their cost, the alarm about sedition in the early 1790s meant that now for
many the duty to divulge what was spoken in coffee houses must have seemed greater
than the duty to respect the private terms of conversation.
472
At Frosts trial, Erskine
argued that coffee-house conversation remained a private space, and therefore the words
spoken as mere opinions or thoughts must not be reported as the objects of criminal
justice, because the happiness and security of social life, which are the very end and object
of all law and justice, forbid the communication of them. Only criminal intention, and
not indecent levities or even grave opinions unconnected with conduct, are to be
exposed to the magistrate; only then does the public duty call for the violation of the
private.
473
Others also maintained a belief in the existence of a private sphere within a
public space, such as that afforded by the boxes often to be found in coffee-houses.
Hodgsons companion Pigott questioned whether
toasts, or words, passing aloud between two-friends in a public coffee-house, at a table where
they were seated by themselvesought to be cognizable [i.e. not merely overheard but
deliberately listened to and recorded] by the other persons in the room, to not one of whom were
they addressed in any sense whatsoever?
474

Informers had no right to eavesdrop on, intervene in and report such conversations, as this
constituted a breach of manners, decency and convention.
Scott, acting for the crown in Frosts case, vehemently disagreed. While he concurred
with Erskine that private confidences should be respected, he argued that a coffee-house is
definitively a public space in its entirety, and therefore Frost was not entitled to the
protection that belongs to the confidences of private life.
475
Under this interpretation, the
informer was simply doing their duty in reporting a seditious and unlawful intention made
manifest in a public space. Areas of privacy within a public space simply did not exist. The

470
471
Habermas, p. 30.
472
473
ST 22, col. 502.
474
Pigott, Persecution. The Case of Charles Pigott, p. 17.
475
ST 22, col. 511.

jury appears to have agreed with Scott, and to one degree or another coffee-houses and
taverns remained the active hunting grounds of informers throughout the 1790s.
476

In the bigger picture what radicals were fighting against was a politicising and
securitising of areas previously held to be private and beyond the limits of state and public
intrusion. As Barrell argues, the loyalist and government intrusion into the private affairs
of radicals, ostensibly for reasons of security and order, combined with the inevitable
radical response, moved the reform debate into Activities and spaces which had
previously been thought to be private, in the sense not just that they were outside politics,
but were, by general agreement, positively insulated from it.
477
Radicals believed that the
corruption inherent in the public sphere and eighteenth-century politics must be prevented
as much as possible from entering into and damaging private affairs. However the
governments actions in increasing surveillance and investigation did just the opposite,
replacing frankness with caution, honesty with deception, trust with suspicion, unity with
division, and neighbourly concern with fretful surveillance. Knox posited that such
activities teach men to carry the profligacy of public characters and conduct into the
sequestered walks of private lifeThey destroy at once the confidential comforts and the
most valuable virtues of private life.
478
For Knox this struck at the heart of his dismay
over the growth of the state, whose pernicious influence only grew in proportion to its
rising power. As Guest states, he argued forcibly against allowing the corruption in high
politics, of which the use of spies and informers is a clear sign, from seeping irresistibly
into the fabric of private life, rotting and perverting relations between men and women.
479

State profligacy contrasted sharply with private morality, and the integrity of the latter
must be protected at all costs. Mass participation in politics did not grant the government a
reciprocal pass into family homes and local gatherings.
480

On a related front, gentlemen Whigs like Fox and Erskine argued that the targeting of
sedition would place masters at risk from their own servants, and allow members of the
lower orders of society to prey upon the conversations of their betters. Fox feared that, in
the current hysteria surrounding sedition, The servant who stood behind his chair, if
wicked enough, might betray him, and, seduced by those in power, might give information

476
Barrell, The Spirit of Despotism, pp. 75-102.
477
Ibid., p. 4.
478
Knox, The Spirit of Despotism, p. 135.
479
Harriet Guest, Suspicious Minds: Spies and Surveillance in Charlotte Smiths Novels of the 1790s, in Peter de Bolla, Nigel Leask
and David Simpson, eds., Land, Nation and Culture, 1740-1840: Thinking the Republic of Taste, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.
171.
480
Ibid., pp. 169-73 & 185; Barrell, The Spirit of Despotism, pp. 1-13; Wagner, Domestic Invasions, pp. 95-106.

which would endanger both his liberty and his life. The MP recalled the 1792 sedition
case of Thomas Muir, in which the radicals maid-servant Anne Fisher, violating the
confidence reposed in every servant by a master, gave evidence in court against him,
drawn from statements made in the privacy of his own home.
481
Muir himself was outraged
and contemptuous at being testified against by domestics, who could hardly approach
your presence even in their menial duties, who, (if the expression may be used) to the
members of a family are almost unknown.
482
Such cases prompted Lee to ask
shall the system of spies and informers be to complete in this once-favoured isle of liberty, that
the servant, who attends at his masters table, may transport him or his guests to Botany Bay, for
some unguarded expression that may have fallen in their moments of conviviality?
483

Whigs, like many radicals, were disturbed by the shifts in the definition and protection of
private space, although their primary concern was the manner in which these shifts
appeared to expose aspects of their lives that were once considered sacrosanct into the
public sphere. At Frosts trial, Erskine spoke of the spirit of a gentleman being violated
by low-life coffee-house politicians who lack the honour or the sense to make the due
distinctions between those statements and conversations that should be reported on, and
those that should remain free from such interference.
484

These arguments, starkly premised on inequality and class, are perhaps not so surprising
coming from even a liberal aristocrat like Erskine, whose desire for reform did not conflict
with a belief that gentlemen were still entitled to respect for their standing, nor indeed from
Pigott, who despite his own frequent attacks on the aristocracy, was still mortified as a
gentleman at being informed against by the lower classes. This occurrence must be
considered in the context of the eighteenth-century push towards opening the private
affairs of public figures to scrutiny and judgment, a trend resisted more by Whigs than
conservatives. As Barrell notes, the liberal gentlemens concern regarding freedom of
speech is almost entirely with the prospect of losing the protection hitherto guaranteed to
them by the code of a gentleman; or their private conversations becoming the object of
public notice.
485
Their championing of this right was therefore clouded by their own
prejudices and fears of censure. Indeed it is difficult to disagree with Barrells assessment

481
PH 32, col. 517.
482
An Account of the Trial of Thomas Muir, Esq., Younger, of Huntershill, Edinburgh, J. Robertson, n.d., pp. 112-13, quoted in Barrell,
The Spirit of Despotism, p. 101.
483
Lee, Bill of Rights, the Birth-Right of Englishmen, p. 4.
484
ST 22, cols. 502 & 506.
485

that in defending freedom of speech they could only operate within the conservative and
elitist paradigm of their opponents, for they found it so hard to express, except in terms of
class difference, the right of an lite not to be overheard by their social inferiors and
dependants.
486

It is perhaps more intriguing, however, to find similar arguments being voiced by the
sons of merchants and artisans like Thelwall and Holcroft. Thelwall alleged that the very
domestic who eats our bread stands open-mouthed behind our chairs to catch and betray
the conversation of our unguarded moments, while Holcroft argued that by the arts of
government and loyalist agents servants are bribed to betray their masters.
487
It might be
that these radical writers simply did not realise or were untroubled by the inherent
inequality and deferment to status present in their arguments after all, most prominent
radicals were neither levellers nor communists. But concerns over the honesty and
character of servants and other lower-class members of society seem to contradict the
general radical belief in the innate goodness and ability of the people, regardless of rank
or station. Perhaps this can be explained by the expediency of the immediate argument
trumping wider considerations and ideologies, an occurrence not uncommon in the often
heady atmosphere of the 1790s. Or, as is possibly more likely, radicals may have believed
that securitization and the resultant degeneration of the lower orders caused by the
encouragement of spies and informers was responsible for corrupting good citizens and
turning even the lowest classes into the unwitting tools of the elite. Godwin for one made
such a claim, stating that My very footman from behind my chair may be enticed by the
ten guineas, so liberally proffered by the new [loyalist] Associations, to betray me, and
thus procure to himself the accursed wages of despotism.
488
The Morning Post also
claimed that the associations had done more to debauch the morals of the lower order,
than any illegal or vile institution that has ever been established.
489
These were indeed
compelling arguments, firmly ensconced within radical concerns over morality, corruption,
state penetration and deception, and reminiscent of numerous other historical instances
where cause and effect have been deliberately or unwittingly confused by those in power.

486
Ibid., p. 102.
487
the Continuance of such a System, p. 6; Holcroft, A Narrative of Facts, Relating to a Prosecution for High Treason; Including the
Address to the Jury, Which the Court refused to hear: With Letters to the Attorney General, Lord Chief Justice Eyre, Mr. Serjeant Adair,
the Honourable Thomas Erskine, and Vicary Gibbs, Esq. and the Defence The Author had prepared, if he had been brought to Trial, p.
61.
488
MC, 26 March 1793.
489
MP, 10 April 1794.

Perhaps above all they stand as an example of the nuances, depth and differences present in
and between liberal and radical thought.
Traditions and Character
Part of the radical case against the governments use of spies, informers and increased
police forces was the quintessentially British argument that the encouragement and use of
such personnel was foreign to the national character and to traditional methods of law
enforcement, state intervention and the preservation of order. Such means may be
employed on the Continent or by oriental despots but they had no place in contemporary
Britain. The government would not have wholly disagreed with this position, since the
very act of securitization precipitated the use of extraordinary and novel measures,
however unlike the radicals they maintained that their actions still possessed solid
foundations in traditional British legal or executive precedents or were otherwise justified
by the circumstances of the radical threat.
History provided radical thinkers with useful lessons on the damage caused by state
surveillance and spies, with cases being cited from the late Roman Empire, ancien regime
France and even Stuart Britain. Knox for one noted the example of the pretended Popish
plot, with all its villainous circumstances, in the reign of Charles the Second.
490
Godwin
on the other hand argued that the use of spies was better known in France before its late
revolution, while Eatons Politics for the People stated that French informers
were frequently employed in a criminal curiosity, rather than in what strictly regarded the public
utility; all their discoveries, so artfully procured, frequently produced nothing more than a false
light, which deceived the magistrate.
These vagabonds infested society and destroyed open conversation and expression: O!
how distracting to the generous soul, who saw the monsters of his country smile while they
preyed upon it.
491
The Morning Post noted that Louis XIVs desire to know all that passed
in Paris invested great power with the Inquisitorial Police, and created spies and
informers; the dark reports made by the Lieutenant of the Policebecame dangerous
accusations.
492
At his 1794 trial for seditious practices Margarot seized on these

490
Knox, p. 132.
491
Assemblies, p. 31; Politics for the People, Vol. 1, no. 10, pp. 136-37.
492
MP, 14 August 1793.

arguments as a means to defend the British Convention and radical societies against those
who denigrated their supposed adoption of French forms and language. He countered that
the government had itself borrowed from France every article of the French Police, Spies,
and Informers, describing the latter as French things as well as French words.
493
The
history and current affairs of France were a fiercely-contested and highly influential
component of the radical-loyalist debate, and this was certainly no less true in the realm of
spies.
Looking further into the past an article published in the Morning Chronicle in August
1793 warned that the oppression of the government and the encouragement given to
informers played a key role in the downfall of the late Roman Empire.
494
The Morning
Post also argued that in the late empire
so corrupt and degenerate had the people become, that to be an informer was one of the most
profitable trades carried on. The most patriotic and virtuous citizens were attacked; and it became
at last almost impossible to live beneath a Government, under which the most detestable race of
spies was not only endured, but openly protected, and publicly rewarded.
495

This theme was picked up by other radical thinkers. Thelwall, in lamenting the fate of the
Franco-Irish agent William Jackson, stated that during the decline of the Roman empire,
when spies and informers were publicly patronized, poisoning and assassination were also
exceedingly common, while Knox quoted the Roman philosopher and writer Seneca the
Younger, who opined that
Under Tiberius Caesar, the rage of accusing or informing was so common, as to harass the
peaceful Citizens more than a civil war. The words of drunken men and the unguarded jokes of
the thoughtless, were taken down, and handed to the Emperor.
496

Knox himself noted that in the decline of Roman virtue; we read that spies and informers
were considered as necessary functions of government; that they became favorites at court,
and were encouraged by rewards.
497
Another radical work quoted Tacitus, who stated that
during the reign of informers under Tiberius,

493
William Ramsey, The Trial of Maurice Margarot, Before the High Court of Justiciary, At Edinburgh, On the 13th and 14th of
January, 1794, on an Indictment for Seditious Practices, London, M. Margarot, LCS, J. Ridgway, H. D. Symonds, W. Ramsey, J.
Marsom and J. Robertson, 1794, p. 130.
494
MC, 26 August 1793.
495
MP, 17 October 1798.
496
Thelwall, Lecture on the system of terror and persecution adopted by the present ministry, pp. 272-73; Seneca the Younger, De
Beneficiis, Book III, quoted in Knox, p. 131.
497
Knox, p. 131.

Men were afraid of knowing each other; society was at a pause; relations, friends, and strangers,
stood at gaze; no public meeting, no private confidence; things inanimate had ears, and roofs and
walls were deemed informers.
498

These learned men were steeped in the classics, and had surely also read Edward
Gibbons recently published six-volume magnum opus The History of the Decline and Fall
of the Roman Empire, in which he wrote of the prevalence and destructive nature of spies
in those times, in one instance describing the copious use of official spies who
were encouraged, by favour and reward, anxiously to watch the progress of every treasonable
designTheir careless or criminal violation of truth and justice was covered by the consecrated
mask of zeal; and they might securely aim their poisoned arrows at the breast either of the guilty
or the innocent, who had provoked their resentment, or refused to purchase their silence.
499

The parallels between these examples and the current state of affairs in Britain as perceived
by the radicals was obvious, and they served both to warn fellow citizens of the fate that
might befall them should the governments actions continue unopposed and as a broadside
against the Cabinet for choosing to exercise the disastrous methods of tyrants past. As
Thelwall argued, the old French system is a very great object of attachment among our
present Ministers; and they have been anxious to imitateall its practices.
500
They also
provided ominous portents of what could happen should a state become consumed with
protecting the security and position of the elite at the expense of individual liberty and the
common good.
Yet troubled Scottish monarchs and recent developments aside Britain was believed to
be a country blessed with a relative freedom from such state interference in the affairs of
its citizens, and radicals desired it to remain that way. In the 1790s the creation of a large
fully-professional police force was still over three decades away, and outside of London
local magistrates could rely only on a few unpaid constables. Even the police forces in
London as described in Chapter Two were small and thus limited in their ability to patrol
such a large city.
501
Nonetheless these forces and the increased use of constables in the
provinces drew the ire of the radicals, who viewed their presence as an unwarranted and

498
Tacitus, Annals, Book IV, quoted in The Manual of Liberty, p. 174.
499
Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. 1, New York, J. & J. Harper, 1831, p. 356.
500
John Thelwall, Report on the State of Popular Opinion, and the Causes of the rapid Diffusion of Democratic Principles. Part the
Third. The Tribune No. XXVI, in Thelwall, The Tribune, A Periodical Publication, Consisting Chiefly of the Political Lectures of J.
Thelwall, Vol. 2, p. 248.
501
See Clive Emsley, The English Police: A Political and Social History, 2nd Ed., London, Longman, 1996, pp. 8-64; John Tobias,
Crime and Police in England, 1700-1900, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1979, pp. 25-56 & 74-116.

potentially corrupt intrusion on civil liberties. Thelwall argued that the police were another
French appropriation, created under pretence of keeping the peace, but in reality, I
believe, for the express purpose of organizing the system of spies and informers.
502
Actual
instances of discontentment with police conduct are rare, although Holcroft describes how
he once had to deal with an officer, who was not a Kings messenger, but of a lower and
more illiterate order, lying to his face and then to the Privy Council about his presence at
LCS meetings and an attempt to free his fellow radical William Sharp from home
imprisonment.
503
However this may be contrasted with those like Place who spoke well of
Ford, and the professional conduct displayed on a number of occasions by Bow Street
Runners.
504

The history of informers in England is more problematic. Their use as a means of law
enforcement had been enshrined in statutes since at least the fourteenth century, and their
existence in society and use in enforcing a wide range of laws have until recently been
fluctuating but ever-present features of English life throughout the centuries. Indeed
common informers were to officially remain part of English law enforcement until 1951,
when an act was passed abolishing all remaining rights of informers to bring prosecutions
in pursuit of reward. However informers have never been popular, and the occupation was
widely viewed as being one fit only for those devoid of integrity, status and good
character. This was particularly true when informers targeted laws or regulations that
found little favour with the people, such as the notorious Gin Acts of the 1730s.
Communities, industries and criminal networks frequently closed ranks against them,
defying all attempts to penetrate their ranks and ostracising, assaulting or even murdering
those who dared to try. Warner and Ivis describe instances in 1730s London in which
informers were dragged along the streets or were forced to march in a procession, and
one in which an informer was set upon an Asswhilst others beat and pelted him, leading
him up and down Bond-street.
505
In February 1748 Daniel Chater was murdered by West
Sussex smugglers after providing evidence against them to the local Customs officers,
while in 1771 the informer Daniel Clark suffered the same fate at the hands of Spitalfields

502
Thelwall, Report on the State of Popular Opinion, and the Causes of the rapid Diffusion of Democratic Principles. Part the Third.,
p. 249.
503
Vicary Gibbs, Esq. and the Defence The Author had prepared, if he had been brought to Trial, p. 93, and see pp. 92-95.
504
Place, pp. 182-83; Wells, passim.
505
Jessica Warner and Frank Ivis, Damn You, You Informing Bitch. Vox Populi and the Unmaking of the Gin Act of 1736, Journal
of Social History, vol. 33, no. 2 (1999), p. 310; The London Daily Post, and General Advertiser, 5 August 1738, quoted in Warner and
Ivis, Damn You, You Informing Bitch., p. 310.

weavers. One of the offenders claimed that Clark had been thirsting after their Blood not
thro any motive of Justice but mearly for Reward. The crime was thus justified and it
was claimed that
We are now satisfied having put an End to the existence of that Monster in human Shape, the fear
of whom kept several families in a starving Condition by keeping them from their principal
Support thro the Apprehension of being Informed against.
506

Despite these failings, generally even amongst radicals it was believed that informers
were sometimes necessary to enforce the law, especially when directed against violent
criminals. Colquhoun, despite his admission that many dissolute characters have taken up
this trade, seldom with a view to benefit the public, nonetheless maintained that common
informers were indispensably necessary to the execution of the laws.
507
While often
unpopular, the role of thief-taker was carried out successfully and in a semi-professional
capacity by some enterprising individuals, and common informers remained an ongoing
feature of English society. It was the political informer and the politicising of informers
that were the main targets of radical wrath. The distinction between government or loyalist
spies and common informers allowed the radicals to describe the former as distinctly un-
English, despite their prevalence during previous episodes of unrest such as the Jacobite
rebellions. The political informer was viewed as an even more unwelcome and illiberal
innovation than their common colleague, a product of securitization prone to bias,
unscrupulous behaviour, increased intrusiveness and a penchant for swearing whatever
magistrates or ministers wanted them to, whether explicitly or by inference. For as Fox
noted such spies were often blind dupes of the folly, or unconscious instruments of the
wicked policy of ministers.
508
They therefore represented a dramatically increased threat
to liberty, security, opinion, freedom and justice.
The traditional role of the common informer also came in for censure, however, often as
collateral damage of the general abhorrence and fear generated by spies and informers in
this period, but also because radicals could use the long-standing contempt directed their
way to tar all spies with the same brush. They could also point to numerous past examples
where informers and even Bow Street officers had strayed from or used their position as
law-enforcers to become law-breakers. Direct references in the surviving literature are rare,

506
London Gazette, 11136 and 11138, April 1771, quoted in E. P. Thompson, The Crime of Anonymity, in Douglas Hay, ed., Albions
Fatal Tree, p. 271.
507
Patrick Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Functions and Duties of a Constable, London, W. Bulmer & Co., 1803, p. 57, quoted in
Radzinowicz, Vol. 2, p. 153.
508
PH 32, col. 375.

but orators could perhaps draw upon the notorious cases of the master thief-taker and
criminal Jonathan Wild, the antics and fit-ups of the MacDaniel gang (two of whom were
eventually stoned to death by an angry crowd), and the trade in Tyburn Tickets. It was thus
argued that the pitfalls of informing were such that it was best avoided wherever possible,
whatever the motives that led people to undertake it.
509

In parliament Fox was willing to concede that there were some useful and meritorious
spies those who chanced upon or discovered important information which they duly
passed on unaltered to the state while one letter-writer to the Morning Chronicle
proposed that they be employed only in a manner that fostered an interest in the truth and
exactness of the information they give.
510
Robinson speculated that in a country
where law is the actual manifestation of the general will, and where the executive power is but the
instrument to fulfil and to accomplish it;- there the profession of a public informer would be
honourable and useful
Yet he recoiled with utmost abhorrence from the man who gains a vile subsistence by
catching at the indiscreet but zealous and well-meant effusions of a reforming fellow-
citizen; by torturing every hasty expression into sedition or treason.
511
Informers had no
business reporting and censoring the opinions and political activities of others. Fox also
castigated those spies who insinuated themselves into the confidence of those whom they
wished to betray; regarding such characters there were no words in the English language
which could sufficiently mark his contempt and detestation.
512
For liberals like Fox and
Robinson, the issue lay not with the basic role of the informer, but rather with manner in
which they were used and encouraged by the current government and legislation. They
therefore believed that a change in the latter would improve the respectability and utility of
the former, removing the informer from the political and securitized realms, reducing the
incentive to exaggerate and deceive and making the task more attractive to a better class of
citizens.
513

509
Hay, pp. 198-200; McLynn, pp. 21-31; Porter, pp. 35-40; Radzinowicz, Vol. 2, pp. 138-61; John Styles, Our traitorous money
makers: the Yorkshire coiners and the law, 1760-83, in John Brewer and John Styles, eds., An Ungovernable People: The English and
their law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1983, pp. 215-21; Thompson, The
Crime of Anonymity, pp. 270-71; Warner and Ivis, Damn You, You Informing Bitch., pp. 299-321; Warner and Ivis, Informers
and Their Social Networks in Eighteenth-Century London, pp. 563-82; Winslow, pp. 136-46.
510
PH 32, col. 374; MC, 14 November 1794.
511
Robinson, p. 184, emphases in original.
512
PH 32, col. 374.
513
Robinson, pp. 184-86.

In radical minds the correct role of state surveillance and law enforcement was to
protect society from legitimate criminal threats to life, security and property, operating
primarily in a reactive rather than proactive capacity. While some central state involvement
was conceded as necessary, radicals believed that competent local magistrates, assisted by
a minimal number of agents and constables, should retain their long-standing role as the
primary means of enforcing law and order. Centralised nation-wide surveillance and law
enforcement institutions were rejected, as were any increase in or reshaping of the use of
spies and informers, and had radicals been aware of the secret service system of the late
1790s they would almost certainly have condemned it as a draconian, unnecessary and un-
British affront to rights, liberty and privacy, incompatible with the limited liberal state they
championed. It was not that national security was unimportant, but rather that the
securitization of radicalism was regarded as a false or phony pretext for an unfounded and
self-aggrandising increasing in the size, structures and scope of the security forces at the
states disposal.
It was also contended by some radicals that the activities carried out by informers
secretly watching others, invading privacy, breaking social norms and ranks, betraying
confidences, reporting and twisting the words of others were alien and reprehensible to
the British character, with its supposed grounding in notions of honesty, privacy, respect
for rank, decency, confidentiality, frankness and candour. In the House of Lords in May
1794 the Duke of Bedford railed against the Reeves societies who bred and fostered
swarms of spies and informers, an action that
was so opposite to the genuine system of British government, so detestable to the frank hearts and
candid minds of Englishmen, so destructive of the openness, generosity, truth, and freedom of the
national character, that it was a measure of most atrocious impolicy.
514

A letter written by Godwin to the Morning Chronicle argued that as a youth the author had
been taught that In England there are neither spies nor informers, for they were not
compatible with British liberty and values. Thelwall questioned whether the system of
spies was a practice congenial with the open character of Britons?
515
During the trial of
Thomas Briellat his defence counsel Felix Vaughan lamented that

514
PH 31, col. 667.
515
MC, 1 February 1793; Thelwall, Report on the State of Popular Opinion, and the Causes of the rapid Diffusion of Democratic
Principles. Part the Third., p. 248.

We live in timeswhen men seem to think they recommend themselves, and to suppose it the
genteelest thing in life to call down others for their unguarded expressions, and to dignify the
character of an Englishman with that of a spy and an informer.
Vaughan also asserted to the jury that by finding against Briellat You will have said there
shall be an end to all that honest communication which Englishmen in the frankness of
their hearts hold one with another.
516
In Ireland too, during the trial of Peter Finerty for a
seditious libel regarding informers in 1797, the defendant protested against his treatment
by the Irish government and questioned what sort of solicitude these men entertain for the
dignity of the Irish character, or the honor of the government, who thus endeavour to stain
it by the multiplication of informers, when so many instances of profligacy had appeared
amongst that class?
517

The English publics distaste for informers certainly made itself apparent to many who
dared to take on the role, even if the response to informing was not as severe as that which
occurred in Ireland, were a numbered of actual or suspected informers were assaulted or
even murdered. As noted in the previous chapter, some informers claimed to act out of a
sense of duty and concern about the rise of radicalism, including those like Holden who
would operate without any Recompense, on the condition that he
must decline entering into any Engagements to give more minute or personal Informationas I
should not like to risque the odium which would necessarily attend a Discovery; to say nothing of
the unpleasantness of such a Task.
518

However good motives and service to the nation mattered little to those who viewed
informing with wholesale contempt. Lynam appears to have been one of the more accurate
and honest of the LCS spies, yet even he reported that My name is wrote as a Spye every
night in Wallbrook, I have been personaly threatened by a person of the Societys at
Aldgate, and yesterday received a threatening letter from another quarter.
519
A local
informer in Chichester asked the authorities to maintain his anonymity, for should he be
discovered he was apprehensive that He should be exposed to personal Danger or have
His House burnt down.
520
Other spies reported similar threats to and concerns for their

516
ST 22, cols. 930 & 933.
517
ST 26, col. 1010.
518
NA, HO 42/31, Holden to F. F. Foljambe, 1 June 1794, quoted in Emsley, The Home Office and its sources of information and
investigation 1791-1801, p. 541.
519
NA, TS 11/957/3502(1), Lynam to Joseph White, 14 November 1794, quoted in Emsley, The Home Office and its sources of
520
NA, HO 42/40, fols, 1-2, Richmond to Portland, 21 May 1797.

person and property, and Grays house was once attacked in Manchester. However while
the fate of many outed informers is unknown, it appears that none actually came to serious
physical harm. The instances of mob and gang violence that occurred against informers
earlier in the eighteenth century do not appear to have been repeated. Whatever the
government believed of them, the vast majority of radicals were too decent and civilised to
countenance such conduct, preferring to simply expel informers from their ranks and, in
true radical society form, record their names in writing for posterity as traitors.
Nonetheless known informers were sometimes scorned, despised and insulted by the
wider public. Knox thought the best means of combatting their evil was by shuning as
pestilences every description of spies and informers, while following Hardys trial the
Morning Post recorded that members of the public, upon seeing some of the testifying
informers, shrunk from the contaminating touch of these Monsters, and their blood
recoiled with horror, while they looked with disgust on animals, that are a reproach and
disgrace to human nature.
521
Some spies may have shared Lynams fate. His brother
Francis reported that Georges
reputation and character were destroyed and his businessannihilated and he never after such
exposure received an order of any description[He] was deserted by his friends and relations and
frequently insulted in the streets which so preyed upon his mind that both he and his wifes days
were thereby shortened.
522

Both husband and wife died in 1796, less than two years after the treason trials. For
informers at least, it was probably just as well that the government changed its policy on
using spies as witnesses after the negative experiences of 1794, allowing operatives like
Turner and Moody to work without fear of public exposure.
No Threat?
While most radicals were extremely wary of spies and critical of their use by government
and loyalist associations, some took a more positive or constructive view of their
prevalence and empowerment. It was argued that their presence in the LCS and other
radical societies meant that the government was fully aware of their activities and must
know that they were, in the words of one pamphlet writer, peaceable, innocent, and

521
Knox, p. 138; MP, 6 November 1794.
522
NA, HO 42/67, John Sargent to John King, enclosing application of Francis Lynam, 12 May 1803, quoted in Emsley, The Home
Office and its sources of information and investigation 1791-1801, p. 547.

constitutional, whatever ministers said publicly.
523
Lemaitre wondered What can spies
possibly discover in the Corresponding Societies? We have announced to the world the
whole object and design of our meetings.
524
Therefore some radical orators welcomed the
possible presence of spies at their meetings, for these informers could report to government
the true character and aims of the societies. Thelwall for one was convinced of the legality
of my doctrines, and on one occasion he invited his audience to investigate with the most
scrupulous exactness every opinion and sentiment you have heard, to ensure their
accuracy and legality.
525
He also considered it beneficial to the radical cause if the
government saw fit to listen in to his lectures and publish his words in committee reports.
He professed to feel no fear of informers, confident in the righteousness and justice of his
cause. He challenging them to
Come then from your lurking corners, ye tools of perjured treacheryye spies, ye dark assassins,
ye venal associators for the most detestable purposes!...ye shall not daunt the soul that virtue
fortifies nor prevent the free discussion of those truths which conscience tells us are important for
man to know.
526

Others argued, as Sheridan did in December 1795, that despite their best efforts not
one of the hired spies of ministers could prove a single fact in any shape resembling plot or
conspiracy, although every effort of power, artifice, and corruption had been exerted.
527

Not a single conviction for treason had been made or conspiracy proven (prior to the late
1790s), demonstrating the groundlessness of the governments fears and securitizing
moves. Erskine used the same tactic at Hardys trial, noting that although the government
had spies upon all their proceedings, yet not a single expression was to be found
connecting the defendants with any intent to use force.
528
Sadly for the radicals these
attempts at positivity failed in the face of the governments relentless efforts to securitize
and crush radicalism, in which spies and surveillance continued to play active and effective
parts.

523
Letter to the Right Hon. Henry Dundass, Secretary of State for the Home Department, London, James Ridgway, 1792, p. 5.
524
Peter Lemaitre, High Treason!! Narrative of the Arrest, Examinations before the Privy Council, and Imprisonment of P. T. Lemaitre,
Accused of Being a Party in the Pop-Gun Plot, or, a Pretended Plot to Kill the King!, London, P. T. Lemaitre, 1795, p. 57.
525
John Thelwall, The Terrors and Violence of Alarmists, an impolitic confession of the injustice and absurdity of their System, The
Tribune No. XXIX, in Thelwall, The Tribune, A Periodical Publication, Consisting Chiefly of the Political Lectures of J. Thelwall, Vol.
2, p. 302; John Thelwall, The Address of J. Thelwall to the Audience at closing his Lectures for the Season, The Tribune No. XV, in
Thelwall, The Tribune, A Periodical Publication, Consisting Chiefly of the Political Lectures of J. Thelwall, Vol. 1, p. 335.
526
527
PH 32, col. 665.
528
ST 24, cols. 1150-51.

Fiction
Spies and surveillance became a common theme of 1790s novels, particularly in gothic
literature. These works naturally reflect and comment upon the issues and nature of the
society in which they were written, and it is no surprise to find that the atmosphere of
suspicion, insecurity and watchfulness that pervaded the decade made its way into their
plots, settings and conversations, nor to find that such turbulent themes were easily
interwoven into the gothic style. In Godwins Things as They Are; or, The Adventures of
Caleb Williams, the protagonist Caleb Williams plays a duel role, symbolic both of the
informer and of the oppression and surveillance perpetrated by the elite against radicalism
and dissent. The novel powerfully explicates the contemporary nature of justice and
surveillance in England. As James Thompson notes, the political climate of the 1790s
created a climate of fear and suspicion which Godwin recreates in his novel.
529
This
volatile environment witnessed a protracted struggle for command of the public sphere, a
conflict drawn out in Caleb Williams, for as McCann argues, At a fundamental level the
novel is based on the opposition between undistorted communication and the invasiveness
of state authority. It demystified and explained the rapidly consolidating juridical and
ideological structures intent on the disorganization of critical facilities in the name of
private property and national security to wit, the use of securitizing moves to persuade
the public of the righteousness and necessity of the governments policies.
530
The novel
also explores the potential consequences of snooping into private affairs and the severe
difficulties confronting those who chose to turn informer. Ousby argues that it reflects not
only the general hostility to spying but also the fear of the spy in its acutest form the
informer found in ones own house, tavern or social circle.
531

Williams is a servant who begins to suspect his master, the gentleman Falkland, of
committing a murder. He decides to investigate further, driven by a sense of danger,
excitement, and the allure of the forbidden and mysterious. He exclaims To be a spy upon
Mr. Falkland! That there was danger in the employment, served to give an alluring

529
James Thompson, Surveillance in William Godwins Caleb Williams, in Kenneth W. Graham, ed., Gothic Fictions:
Prohibition/Transgression, New York, AMS Press, 1989, p. 178.
530
McCann, pp. 75 & 81.
531
Ousby, My servant Caleb, p. 51.

pungency to the choice.
532
Williams confirms his suspicions, but is then hunted and
persecuted by Falkland and his agents who wish to silence him. He informs us that
I have been a mark for the vigilance of tyranny, and I could not escape. My fairest prospects have
been blasted. My enemy has shown himself inaccessible to entreaties, and untired in persecution.
My fame, as well as my happiness, has become his victimI have not deserved this treatment.
533

Falklands power and watchful eye appears almost omnipotent Did his power reach
through all space, and his eye penetrate every concealment?
534
The novel also touches on
the class issues raised by Fox, Erskine and Muir, scrutinising the right of the servant to spy
on his betters. Falkland is furious when he perceives that his own domestic is watching
him, telling Williams that You set yourself as a spy upon my actions. But bitterly shall
you repent your insolence. Do you think you shall watch my privacies with impunity?
535

Ousby posits that, just like the LCS spies, Williams dual role is morally unsustainable: A
combination of faithful service and efficient surveillance is impossible, for spying
everywhere requires of Caleb a violation of the duties involved in his assigned social
role.
536

Nonetheless Williams is eventually able to bring his accusation before a magistrate, and
Falkland publicly confesses his crime. Yet this outcome only creates feelings of remorse
and sorrow in Williams over the damage done to Falklands health and reputation and the
desperate and forceful manner in which his informing has forced him to act. He wishes
that there was a better and more magnanimous remedy to the evils under which I
groaned, but is unable to find one.
537
The former servant also regrets his failure to gain an
understanding of the reasoning and grievances behind Falklands crime before fleeing; and
the way in which circumstances and the justice system have broken the bonds of trust and
confidence between master and servant and turned them into enemies engaged in a life and
death struggle. In seeking to ensure both personal and communal security by bringing
Falkland to justice, Williams has in fact destabilised both.
Further similarities with contemporary radical arguments abound. At one point,
Williams confesses that he has fallen into the conspiratorial mindset that was believed to

532
William Godwin, Things as They Are; or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams, New Ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, p.
104.
533
Ibid., p. 3.
534
Ibid., p. 233.
535
Ibid., p. 7.
536
Ousby, My servant Caleb, p. 52.
537
Godwin, Things as They Are; or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams, p. 297.

commonly infect ministers and informers alike. Having witnessed Falklands occasional
bouts of anger and loss of control, he admits that these were too frequently interpreted
into grounds of suspicion, though I might with more with equal probability and more
liberality have ascribed them to the cruel mortifications he had encountered.
538
He also
seeks to provoke his master into making a confession, becoming, as Ousby notes,
increasingly adroit at insinuating conversations designed to form him into self-
betrayal.
539
Godwins tale demonstrates the power of the elite to persecute the lower
classes and explores the corruption inherent in state and society. It also tells of the
breakdown of morality, trust and privacy caused by the existence of and reliance on agents
and informers, and documents the rise of a destructive culture of surveillance, secrecy and
suspicion, underpinned by the supposed needs of national security.
540
As Thompson
argues, the novel dramatizes the real source of terror in the industrial age of discipline and
surveillance: the penetration of state apparatus into the everyday lives of individuals.
541

The perceived culture of secrecy and suspicion is also a key aspect of Jane Austens
first novel Northanger Abbey, written in 1798-99. The protagonist Catherine Morland, who
has a taste for the mysterious and exotic, encounters locked rooms in the house of a general
with whom she is staying, and puzzled by this and the generals apparent lack of grief over
the death of his wife some nine years earlier, wrongly suspects that he may have murdered
or imprisoned her. Catherines curiosity compels her to explore further, but she is quickly
disabused of these notions by the generals son Henry, who explains that the family had no
better way of dealing with their grief than of simply shutting away the rooms belonging to
his mother. Catherines suspicion and flights of fancy had led her astray, hinting at dark
atrocities and murky conspiracies and potentially damaging her relations with her friends,
when in fact the reality was innocent and straightforward. Henry asks Catherine to
consider the dreadful nature of the suspicions you have entertainedRemember the country and
the age in which we liveConsult your own understanding, your own sense of the probable, your
own observation of what is passing around youDoes our education prepare us for such
atrocities?
542

538
Ibid., p. 106.
539
Ian Ousby, Bloodhounds of Heaven: The Detective in English Fiction from Godwin to Doyle, Cambridge, Harvard University Press,
1976, p. 31.
540
Ibid., pp. 20-42; McCann, pp. 71-82; Ousby, My servant Caleb, pp. 47-54; James Thompson, pp.173-92.
541
James Thompson, p. 192.
542
Jane Austen, Northanger Abbey, New Ed., London, Penguin Books, 2003, p. 186.

Radicals may well have asked the government to consider the same issues. The prevalence
of neighbourhood surveillance is also apparent, with Henry asking whether such a crime
could be
perpetrated without being known, in a country like this, where social and literary intercourse is on
such a footing; where every man is surrounded by a neighbourhood of voluntary spies, and where
roads and newspapers lay everything open?
543

Being a member of the gentry, Henry is not troubled by such surveillance but rather
believes it to be necessary in preserving law and order.
By contrast Charlotte Smiths novels of the 1790s, including Desmond, The Old Manor
House, The Banished Man, Marchmont and The Young Philosopher, explore a somewhat
darker perspective of the issues of surveillance, security and espionage. As Guest notes,
these works are riddled with suspicionsof spies and informers, covert observers and
reporters on the actions of others.
544
Some of the featured spies are political and
ministerial agents, while others are servants and gossips simply aiming to gain some sort of
leverage or intriguing tittle-tattle. Guest argues that
Their prevalence is a sign of the extent to which notions of spying and surveillance are
understood to have become part of the fabric of a complex society in which actions are no longer
transparent, in which suspicion and misrepresentation are perceived to be necessary to social
interaction, or its evasion.
545

This is suggestive of the decline in trust, mutual confidence and candour caused by fears
about informers and betrayals and the construction of a conspiratorial and securitized
mindset. People had found it necessary to dissemble, deceive and hide their true feelings
rather than risk being reported to the authorities. The knock-on effect was an increase in
suspicion and prying as loyalists and scandal-seekers attempted to pierce the veil of
secrecy thrown up by cautious radicals and outsiders. Guest concludes that the
ubiquity of spiesfigures a degree of social fragmentation, disaffection and alienation, which
only those perceived to be involved to intense domestic intimacies or secret and probably
malevolent conspiracies seem able to counteract
546

543
Ibid.
544
Guest, p. 172.
545
Ibid.
546
Ibid.

In this interpretation fears over conspiracies and the creation of social conditions
conducive to their spread are the by-products of the very measures that the state has
implemented to uncover and wipe them out. Securitization, the use of spies and an
encouragement of surveillance have created a breakdown in society and a fracture in
community relations, damaging morality and social cohesion (as radicals suggested) and
creating grievances that actually encourage an increased involvement in political affairs
and clandestine activities.
Once again, the public penetration of the private is a key theme in Smiths novels. As
Guest states, they explore the way that private life is disfigured by forms of surveillance
and persecution that mark the pervasive influence of public corruption.
547
Honest folk are
persecuted and exploited by the agents of lawyers and constables; people who act contrary
to accepted social conventions and beliefs are placed under intrusive surveillance and
scrutiny; gossip and scandal damages reputations; and malicious conspiracies target
individuals considered suspect or alien to conservative sectors of society. In The Young
Philosopher the heroine Medora complains that in England there is always something
which embitters our delight Politics, and lawsuits, and old ladies finding out that we are a
people of bad character, and gossips repeating the malignant nonsense of other gossips.
548

Surveillance thus perpetuates a divisive means of social control and order. In the context of
the 1790s these were themes both familiar and insightful.
549

Government and Loyalist Responses
Public comments by government members and loyalists on spies, informers and security
services were rare. This was probably due to two main reasons. Firstly, the governments
use of spies was predominantly pragmatic and based on their utility and ability to perform
tasks that were deemed to be both necessary and incapable of being undertaken by other
means. The pitfalls of using spies were generally recognised and they were often viewed
with distaste even by senior ministers, yet expediency trumped these concerns. Therefore
the state had little incentive to engage in debates on issues of community, character and
privacy, especially as these were viewed as secondary and expendable to their primary goal
of maintaining security and order. The government preferred to talk about evidence rather

547
Ibid., p. 175.
548
Charlotte Smith, The Young Philosopher: A Novel, Vol. 2, London, T. Cadell, Jun. and W. Davies, 1798, p. 263.
549
Guest, pp. 169-85.

than sources and emphasised the need for employing the means necessary to protect the
existing state system and expose threats to the peace and prosperity of the nation.
Secondly, security and surveillance are by nature secretive and the protection of sources,
correspondence, evidence, personnel, systems and organisations is vital to their successful
operation. As such it is no surprise that public statements on these matters were kept to a
minimum, particularly after 1795 when the security services began to centralise and
professionalise to a considerably higher degree.
Nonetheless the government and loyalist associations were required to provide some
public justification for their methods of preserving security, and debates on spies and
informers also allowed them occasional opportunities to score points against their radical
opponents. One loyalist pamphlet defended the governments use of spies, arguing that
The profession of a spy, like that of a thief-taker, is indispensably necessary at times like
the present. The author queried why people should discredit informers, simply because
they may be employed by Government, as watchmen to go the rounds, and detect every
incendiary that is attempting to set fire to the Constitution?
550
The Times argued that
informers were necessary to preserve law and order, asking What is to become of the
safety of the Public if there were no Informers against a rebel, a thief, a house-breaker, a
highwayman, an incendiary or a murderer?
551
In parliament Lord Grenville agreed,
arguing that
There certainly were several laws, and particularly those for raising revenue, which could not be
carried into effect without the assistance of informers, who were on that account actually
necessary, in as much as the public services could not be performed without them
552

The Sun also argued that although Informers are justly odious to liberal minds, there
were occasions when their testimony is necessary for justice, as long as it was received
with all the caution that our humane laws require.
553

Attempts were also made to defend the character and duty of informers. St. Jamess
Chronicle asked Which is the most honourable character An Informer, a Traitor, or a
Libeller?
554
In the same vein an anonymous pamphlet argued that if we compare the
public virtues of a spy, with those of the reforming Jacobin, the former is surely a much

550
551
The Times, 29 November 1794.
552
Ibid., 20 December 1800.
553
The Sun, 28 November 1794.
554
St. Jamess Chronicle, 9 December 1794.

more worthy character than the latter. The one acts the hypocrite to preserve, and the other
to destroy, the Constitution. For while the spy nobly discovers these secret enemies of
the country, the other must be acknowledged to be this very enemy; and therefore, the
Reformer has as great an antipathy to the spy, as the felon has to the thief-taker.
555

Informing was therefore a stern and honourable duty, necessary to the maintenance of
national security. Years later, amidst the spy scandals of 1817, Castlereagh attempted to
recommend the character of
spies and informers, to the respect and gratitude of the country and the House [of Lords]; he
lamented the prejudice entertained against this species of patriotic service, as hindering gentlemen
from resorting to it as a liberal and honourable profession.
556

Bishop Watson, while conceding that The Character of an Informer is, to injury others for
his own benefit, nonetheless felt that in the right circumstances it was a noble design
and a Christian Duty, albeit sometimes incidental, to rescue others from vice.
557
The
Society for the Suppression of Vice likewise argued that to drag guilt from its lurking
holes, in order to bring it to condign punishment, is one of the greatest benefits that any
man can confer on society. While it was desirable that all informers followed John
Wesleys advice to Beware that your intention be not stained, with any regard either to
profit or praise, nonetheless even those informers who acted in the interests of personal
gain were necessary, for without them the laws would often be a dead letter. Thus their
usefulness, nay, their absolute necessity, should, at least, shelter them from reproach.
558

Spies were therefore not a threat to morality and community values, but quite the
opposite, for they defended and upheld the laws protecting society from crime and
exploitation and kept the insidious corruption of radical principles out of harms way. The
True Briton was even convinced that the true source of spy-induced contamination was
France. It queried
Is there a man in this Country, of even the humblest profession, who does not known that the
French have had a succession of Spies and Incendiaries in England, Ireland, and Scotland, during

555
556
MC, 30 June 1817.
557
Richard Watson, A Sermon, Preached Before the Society for the Suppression of Vice in the Parish Church of St George, Hanover
Square, on Thursday May 3, 1804, no publication details, 1804, pp. 13-15, quoted in Radzinowicz, Vol. 3, p. 178.
558
An Address to the Public from the Society for the Suppression of Vice, no publication details, 1804, pp. 80-81, quoted in
Radzinowicz, Vol. 3, pp. 177-78; John Wesley, The Works of John Wesley, Vol. 4, no publication details, 1771, p. 110, quoted in
Radzinowicz, Vol. 3, p. 178.

the last three years, for the horrible purpose of seducing the lower orders of the People, not only
to revolt against Government, but to cut each others throats?
559

This was a deeply-held and influential fear amongst government and loyalists, that
interestingly was founded on many of the same concerns as those voiced by radicals, albeit
attributed to sharply different causes. However at least as regards England and Scotland it
was almost entirely false. As for privacy, Barrell notes that loyalists argued that the radical
fears over this matter stemmed solely from a concern to prevent the surveillance of
private lives that could not bear such scrutiny.
560
As one wag observed, radicals feared
only a disturbance of the sweet repose of private life upon the bosom of our DOXIES.
561

Privacy was therefore not considered by loyalists to be a serious concern unduly threatened
by the needs of security.
A different approach to justifying the use of spies was suggested by St. Jamess
Chronicle, which wondered what fear honest men can have, that their proceedings should
be truely related in the face of the world? If the views of an Assembly are legal and truely
patriotick, no Spy or Informer could exist among them. If they are not, the man who, from
principle, warns Government of their danger, deserves an honourable, and not an
ignominious or disgraceful, appellation.
562
This line of reasoning was ironically somewhat
akin to that advocated by the Jacobins in France citizens who upheld the law and
maintained respect for king, state and constitution would have nothing to fear from any
increase in surveillance or prosecution of sedition. Only those with something to hide or a
malicious intent need be concerned. The state was not seeking to trouble the lives of good
citizens or to unduly interfere in their private affairs. Indeed it was quite the opposite
informing and law enforcement were unfortunate but necessary duties and a critical part of
the governments efforts to stamp out threats to the liberty and happiness of the people. As
such, loyalists viewed the radical outcry over spies and informers as suspicious and
suggestive of their complicity in seditious crimes and desperation to avoid justified
securitization. The True Briton complained that amongst radicals, every watchful friend
of the public tranquillity is held forth as an interested Spy or hired Informer; and the
Oracle and Public Advertiser exclaimed What a wild yell is kept up among the seditious
about spies and informers! We rationally despise the office, without which, however, no

559
TB, 1 February 1793.
560
561
An Address to the Public, From the Friends of Freedom, London, T. Wilkins, 1793, p. 11.
562
St. Jamess Chronicle, 30 October 1794.

treason could be detected previously to its effects.
563
Scott wilily observed that spies
were always more calumniated in proportion as they spoke truth.
564
By this logic radicals
could not win, for they either implicated themselves by protesting against spies, or allowed
the government a free hand in continuing its surveillance and investigations by remaining
silent.
Efforts were also made to defend the accuracy, impartiality and credibility of evidence
provided by spies. At Hardys trial, Mitford noted that if they gave evidence that was not
contradicted by others, even though this may easily have been done, then whatever
reflections may be thrown uponspies, or any other persons, you must believe that
[evidence] to be true.
565
In the Commons Scott continued this argument, stating that he
had even specifically told the jury that they were not to give credit to persons standing in
that predicament [spies], unless in points in which they were confirmed, or were not
contradicted, by other witnesses. He posited that the evidence given by spies spoke to
facts which happened every week in public societies; and if they had mis-stated facts, there
were hundreds of persons who might have contradicted them. But, during all those trials,
that was not the case in a single instance. He later argued that Ministers would not be
justified in not taking measures of safety on the evidence of such men.
566
In the True
Briton Bowles castigated the incessant outcry against Spies and Informers, which was
painted as an ineffective distraction, while St. Jamess Chronicle also rhetorically queried
whether one word of the evidence, given against the persons tryed for High Treason, by
those who are branded with the name of Spies, [was] contradicted?
567
The crown
prosecutors therefore believed that the evidence presented was most probably reliable, and
not to be disregarded merely on account of its origins. As we have seen, Erskine flatly
rejected these assertions, and in at least a few instances demonstrated concrete
contradictions between the evidence of spies and that of other witnesses.
568

While loyalists minimised or justified the use of spies in England, in the interests of
political gain and propaganda they were not slow to point out the prevalence and
debasement of spies in republican France and tempestuous Ireland. They argued that this
demonstrated the disorder and immorality prevailing in the former, while the latter

563
TB, 31 January 1793; Oracle and Public Advertiser, 27 September 1794, emphases in original.
564
PH 34, col. 120.
565
ST 24, col. 1243.
566
PH 31, cols. 1156-57; PH 34, col. 120.
567
TB, 10 January 1795; St. Jamess Chronicle, 9 December 1794, emphasis in original.
568
See ST 24, cols. 960-63 & 1137-45.

reinforced the belief in the perfidiousness and weakness inherent in the Irish character. In
October 1793 the London Evening Post reported that In the present state of things in
France, the Spy, the Informer, the Assassin, are numbered among the best and most
virtuous of patriots; innocence and integrity are the daily victims of treachery and
fanaticism.
569
The Oracle and Public Advertiser argued that the ADMIRERS of
FRANCE and FRENCH PRACTICES are not the men to declaim against the employment
of spies TREACHERY there is the only duty of social life, which they reward with
honours and office.
570
Bourbon Spain also came in for criticism and contrast, with St.
Jamess Chronicle boasting that for the maintenance of its government 50,000 common
spies, or informers, are absolutely requisite! Thank God! such an abominable policy is
totally unknown in England, where mankind is in the enjoyment of rational Liberty.
571

In short, spying and informing in other countries was a sign of disunity and debasement
(heedless of the fact that the existence of so many informers in Ireland was largely due to
the efforts of the British administration), whereas in England it was a task which when
carried out at all was firmly ensconced in the virtues of duty, order and patriotism. The
difference lay in the argument that in Britain radicalism and sedition were intolerable
threats to the security and happiness of ones own country. Therefore acts of spying and
informing were not a sign of corruption and betrayal but rather the patriotic duty of loyal
and upstanding citizens committed to the preservation of the current constitution. On this
topic St. Jamess Chronicle utilised the words of one of the radicals own heroes, quoting a
statement of George Washington that
it is far better that the artful approaches to insurrection should be checked by the vigilant and duly
administered patriotism of our Fellow-Citizens, than that the evil should encrease until it becomes
necessary to crush it by the strength of their arm.
572

Such vigilance was a worthy British virtue and an indispensable means of protecting the
liberty and security of the nation from enemies who wished its destruction.

569
London Evening Post, 5 October 1793.
570
Oracle and Public Advertiser, 27 September 1794, emphases in original.
571
St. Jamess Chronicle, 26 September 1793.
572
Ibid., 3 March 1795.

Chapter Four - Conclusions
(T)his society have beheld with rising indignation, proportioned to the enormity of the
evil, the late rapid advances of despotism in Britain; the invasion of public security; the
contempt of popular opinion; and the violation of all those provisions of the constitution
intended to protect the people against the encroachments of power and prerogative.
573

The London Corresponding Society, 11 April 1794
Radical attempts to counteract their securitization and repression at the hands of
government and loyalist forces were ultimately unsuccessful, both in the individual
battlegrounds such as the security services explored above, and in the overall struggle to
maintain radicalism as an active political agent and achieve long-desired political, social
and economic reform. In our concluding chapter, I will attempt to answer five questions:
Why did the Pitt governments securitizing move against radicalism succeed? How
effective is the securitization framework as a means of analysing historical domestic
security issues? What was the impact of the governments security measures upon British
society, security service practices and the course of radicalism? What lessons can be learnt
from the radical response to their securitization? How should we view the securitization,
surveillance and repression of radicalism within the context of the broader political, social
and military history of the period? In addressing these questions, it is hoped that we may
increase our understanding of the factors that effect and facilitate securitization, and the
impact that a resultant engagement and reconfiguration of the states security apparatus can
have upon the target existential threat and the society in which the security threat/response
dynamic is carried out. We will also consider the effectiveness and limitations of the
governments developing security services, and finally ponder some final thoughts on the
nature and study of security and its place in the history of the 1790s.
Threat Identification
What conditions, factors, knowledge and actions are necessary or favourable in allowing
an actor (generally a government) to make a successful securitizing move against a

573
PH 31, col. 491.

domestic political threat? Firstly, the actor must be able to construct a plausible narrative
identifying, describing and interpreting the threat and the actions, beliefs, intentions and
resources of the referent subject in a manner that affirms the existential nature of the threat
and the need for emergency measures to counter it. As seen in our case, conspiracy theory
is one highly useful way of achieving this, as is a systematic attack on the ideology and
principles of the target in such a way as to portray its very existence as inherently and/or
deliberately calculated to threaten the referent object. There are other means that may be
equally serviceable in constructing a narrative, such as an alleged intention to initiate civil
war or collusion with foreign enemies, but the methods utilised by Pitts government were
particularly well-suited to the terrain, context and nature of the threat. The Europe-wide
prevalence of conspiracy theories, as a means of explaining historical and contemporary
events, identifying the plans and intentions of particular groups, and denouncing particular
threats, was cunningly exploited by the government. As discussed in Chapter One, the
radical conspiracy theory served a number of purposes and facilitated a range of tactics
aimed at turning radicalism into an insidious existential threat in the public mind. Like the
governments alarmism about invasion, disorder and French subversion, the propagation of
a conspiracy theory effectively (and cynically) tapped into a popular mindset, in this case
one highly receptive to notions of secrecy, guiding forces, hidden agendas and definitive
expositions.
Indeed the belief in the utility of conspiracism as a denouncing, (de)legitimising and
explaining agent was so strong that one of the primary counter-arguments deployed by
liberals and radicals against government repression and conspiracy theories was to allege a
conspiracy theory of their own a ministerial plot to increase the power of the executive
and justify repression, opposition to reform and the continuance of the war by means of the
securitization of radicalism as an existential threat in league with France. It was claimed
that the government was aware that no such threat existed, but set out to convince the
public and parliament otherwise by a concerted web of lies, deception, deliberate
misinterpretation, alarmism, loyalist agitation and invented evidence. This argument
gained considerable traction, but amongst a majority of the public it seems to have been
either disbelieved or considered of minor importance relative to the need to combat the
apparent radical threat.
While conspiracy theories and fears of hidden forces are powerful securitizing agents in
their own right, they have a far greater impact on the audience if they are attached to
particular persons. This is the second point that a threat should ideally be attributable to

particular persons or at least a particular group or organisation. While the identified and/or
prosecuted persons may not be considered as the ultimate leaders of a plot or conspiracy,
they nonetheless serve as a useful reference point and object of denigration for the relevant
audience. They also demonstrate the actors ability to counter the threat, while if necessary
allowing a simultaneous belief in continuing conspiratorial powers behind the scenes. As
Cubitt argues,
Conspiracist discourseoscillates between a preoccupation with exposure of individual
guiltand the interpretive mapping of sinister patterns in history and current affairs, in which
emphasis is placed on the deceptiveness of surface appearances and the binary character of a
reality shaped by the confrontations of good and evil
574

Identifying and combating the face of a threat allows an actor to pose as a proactive
champion against the forces of evil and destruction. It therefore follows that those so
identified are generally chosen on the basis of their accessibility, tangibility, status, poor
reputation and character in the eyes of the audience, and the ability of the securitising actor
to prove, remove and punish their involvement in threatening activity. In the early 1790s
the London-based LCS and SCI were singled-out by the government as the leaders of the
treasonous radical conspiracy, supported by a myriad of societies in other areas, while later
in the decade the various United groups were identified as being responsible for a
clandestine plot. In the case of the former, their size, organisation, notoriety, status,
guiding principles, composition and novelty made them ideal targets as an identifiable
front for the radical threat, while the latter were presented as the domestic arm of an
international conspiracy, and a vindication of earlier warnings.
Individual leaders were also effective as representatives of the radical threat, especially
well-known figures like Paine, Horne Tooke, Thelwall and OConnor, although more
obscure individuals like Hardy and Coigly were also serviceable if solid evidence of their
guilt could be brought against them. The failure of most of the major treason trials
damaged the governments credibility, but nonetheless the evidence presented against the
societies and United groups by means of their proxies in court and prison reinforced their
role as a supposed manifestation and embodiment of the alleged conspiratorial forces
hostile to British interests.

574
Cubitt, p. 111.

Thirdly, it is extremely useful if the target threat can be linked to support for and/or
from a disliked or hostile foreign actor. Alleged connections with a major power such as
the Soviet Union or an international terrorist organisation have ably filled this role in
recent times. In our case, government and loyalist attempts to allege radical collusion with
French republicans bore much fruit in convincing the public of the subversive and
destructive nature of radicalism. The descent of the French Revolution into terror, violence
and chaos, coupled with the declaration of war between Britain and France in February
1793, were significant blows to the radical cause, and key components of the governments
securitizing strategy against it. The Terror both robbed radicalism of one of its primary
ideological bases and sources of support and became a dead weight around its neck,
allowing the government to paint radical principles as not just ill-advised and unstable but
inevitably liable to produce disorder, destruction, anarchy and violence. Without these
events, it is unlikely that the government could have succeeded in presenting radicalism as
an existential threat requiring an emergency response, nor in maintaining the securitization
and repression of radicalism for so many years. Public and parliamentary resistance to
increase executive power and intrusiveness would presumably have been stronger in the
absence of paranoia about invasion and subversion and patriotism inflamed by traditional
Francophobia and desire to defeat the enemy and advance British interests. Instead, many
liberals and radicals were trapped between their belief in reform and the need for national
defence. The reformer Benjamin Flower summed this up in May 1798 when he wrote that
It is very difficult to say how an honest man, who wishes well to his Country, and who
abhors despotism in all its forms, ought to act.
575
Later links with Ireland were also highly
effective in this regard. The United Irish Rebellion, the uncovering of a treasonous United
plot, the Kilmainham confessions and deep-seated prejudices against the Irish further
contributed to the sense of alarm and insecurity in the later years of the 1790s. The
government gained considerable and conclusive mileage in securitizing radicalism through
the United debacle and the retrospective historicising it facilitated, so much so that this
final aspect of the securitizing move was followed in short order by the complete
demonisation of radicalism in the public mind, the abandonment by liberals and Foxites of
any short-term hope for reform and the radical cause, and the final elimination of
radicalism as an active political force for the time being.

575
Cambridge Intelligencer, 28 April 1798, quoted in Graham, Vol. 2, p. 855.

Fifth-column paranoia has been a common feature of many securitizing moves against
domestic threats, often successful because it magnifies the subjects potential resources and
scope for action and plays on popular prejudices, divisions and fears, particularly when
used in conjunction with conspiracy theories. Indeed such concerns and insecurities are
vital components of an environment conducive to successful securitization. As we have
observed, the Pitt government cleverly utilised anti-French, anti-Irish and loyalist
sentiment, widespread conservatism, divisions of class and ideology and fears concerning
war, disorder and revolutionary upheaval to isolate radicalism and create alarm and
prejudice against its actions, principles and ongoing existence. However the alarmism
fostered by such agitation and propaganda can also pose a risk and two-edged sword,
having the potential to increase unrest, panic, disorientation and public rioting. The actor
must thus make a risk assessment, determining whether the advantages accruing from
alarmism outweigh the potential tumults that may ensue. Fortunately for the government in
our case, while alarmism probably did contribute to the sporadic disturbances occurring
predominantly in the first half of the 1790s, this was more than counterbalanced by the
effectiveness of such alarm in garnering support for government policies and by the states
ability to quell the occasional disorder.
An actor also needs to be able to identify a suitable referent object. Unless it has
recourse to excessive force or can claim an overwhelming right to rule, a government that
is unable to sufficiently disassociate its own interests from those of a suitable independent
object is unlikely to achieve its desired securitization, for it will almost inevitably be
conceived as a political, factional or party act rather than one in the national interest. The
object must be deemed worthy of special protection, which in a domestic context generally
implies an ideal or institution perceived as necessary for the ongoing survival of the state.
Buzan notes that in any strong state, its
ideas and institutions are inseparably intertwined. The idea of democracy or communism is
useless without the institutions to put it into operation, just as the institutions would be pointless,
and maybe even impossible, without the idea to give them definition and purpose. This
interdependence means that institutions and organizing ideologies tend to stand or fall together in
the context of any particular state
576

In our study, the government wisely used the ideas embodied in the constitution
parliamentary sovereignty, limited monarchy and liberalism and intertwined them with

576
Buzan, p. 86.

the physical institutions of king, parliament and the magistracy as referent objects
threatened by radicalism. The liberal constitutional idea of the state was welded to specific
institutions, such that the one could not survive without the other. An attack on either
represented an attack on the whole, and therefore posed a threat to the very foundations of
the state. This was crucial in taking the radical threat beyond the realm of the merely
political and turning it into a matter of national security, interpreting it as an attack not on
the interests of the ruling elite but rather on those of the whole British nation-state and its
people. Anarchy, insurrection and civil war were a threat to the security of all, with one
loyalist pamphlet writer noting that an insurrection, if successful, must be equally fatal to
the security and life of every Defender of Order and real Liberty.
577
Such arguments made
the radical threat relevant and immediate to the governments target audience, helping to
persuade them of the need to defeat it.
Fifthly, the availability of independent civil support will greatly assist a government
actor. Such support, be it loyalist, patriotic, nationalist, ideological or self-interested,
allows the actor to claim substantial backing for their cause, and provides a means of
presenting additional arguments in its favour and placing pressure on people believed to be
associated with or supportive of the threatening party. Without it, the actor must almost
single-handedly convince the whole of its audience from scratch, a decidedly more
difficult task that also probably robs it of the chance to play on societal divisions and
tensions. In 1790s Britain, loyalist and government-paid writers, papers and associations
played a vital and active role in supporting, reinforcing and at times leading the
securitization and repression of radicalism. Loyalism was not merely an instrument of the
government, for as Mori states it was an empowering movement that gave its followers a
public presence and political voice with which to criticize the polity they sought to
defend.
578
Nonetheless, in matters of security loyalists were powerful if occasionally
troublesome allies, whose agitations and publications strengthened and at times initiated
securitizing arguments against radicalism, allowed the government to claim widespread
public support for its policies, and provided it with what Rea has described as a popular
organisation which could pursue the aims of the Ministry without bearing the burden of
responsibility which was constitutionally attached to formal organs of administration.
579

577
Republicans In Ireland To Subvert The Constitution, p. 25.
578
579
R. R. Rea, The Liberty of the Press as an Issue in English Politics, 1792-1793, The Historian, vol. 24 (1961), p. 29, quoted in

Loyalists were free to make or anticipate claims and moves that lacked the evidentiary
basis or relative freedom from controversy necessary for the government to make them
directly. As early as 1792 Pitt argued that the foundation of the loyalist associations would
create the Impression and Effect of Numbers on our side, while Loughborough stated
that they were highly meritorious, as tending to strengthen the hands of Government, and
by keeping men upon their guard to prevent the insidious designs of their enemies.
580

While loyalists sometimes thus led the way in suggesting securitizing moves and measures,
and occasionally advocated measures even more repressive than the government was
willing to consider, on the whole its role was more supportive than initiative, and many
loyalist writers had strong government connections. The securitization of radicalism was
predominantly a top-down affair. Nonetheless, without this groundswell of active civil
support it is unlikely that the governments moves would have been successful.
This brings us to the next point communication and technologies of imagination. An
obviously vital component of any securitizing move is the ability to communicate with and
persuade the relevant audience in the domestic context generally politicians, officials and
the common people, and occasionally particular business, class and group interests of the
existence of an existential threat. After all, as Buzan et al. point out, Successful
securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech
act: Does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value?
581

Even in the modern era of mass communication and media this is not a simple task, as the
actor must engage with the audience in a manner and medium both engaging and
persuasive. In our case, the government appealed primarily to parliament and the bourgeois
public sphere as defined by Habermas that sphere of private people come together as a
public for the purposes of ration-critical public debate and the forming of public
opinion but also made efforts to persuade the lower classes by means of cheap
pamphlets, newspapers and sermons.
582
It cultivated the public and parliamentary
imagination both in the mediums and methods it used to communicate its arguments,
emphasising the scale, novelty, subversiveness, foreignness and above all immediacy of
the radical threat. Graham argues that in the counter-offensive launched by the
government in the winter of 1792-3, the role of propaganda was a crucial factor in rallying

580
Pitt to Dundas, 25 November 1792, Clements Library, Pitt Papers, quoted in Graham, Vol. 2, p. 880; Loughborough, p. 14.
581
582
Habermas, pp. 27-28.

loyalist opinion and establishing their influence.
583
Mori likewise states that Unofficial
routes through which public compliance with official initiatives could be sought were of
great use to the governors of a decentralized state, and indeed the governments own
efforts were strongly backed by subsidised and loyalist writers and newspapers, who
produced scores of pamphlets, articles, cartoons and opinion pieces aimed at both the
educated and uneducated in support of the governments securitizing move.
584
Together
they ensured that the securitizing message was clearly articulated and widely disseminated.
Finally the securitizing actor must claim and demonstrate an ability to combat and
defeat the existential threat. Failure to do so will result in a loss of confidence in the actor
and their arguments, and a rise in fear, tension and alarm potentially leading to riots,
violence, disorder, economic slump and a loss of respect for authority. On the other hand,
success will contribute to approval of the securitizing move and recognition of the need to
support the actor in its struggle to overcome the threat. As Evans states, Pitts government
argued that The defence of good order required that conspiracy be unmasked and
claimed that if granted the necessary extraordinary powers and support, it could indeed do
so and stem the tide of radical plots and principles.
585
It then backed up this claim with a
succession of actions demonstrating its commitment and ability to fight the radical menace
with the forces placed at its disposal. This willingness to act allowed the government to
claim that emergency measures and whole-hearted support were indeed necessary to
maintain security, reinforcing its ability and proactivity, the gravity of the threat, and the
feeling of involvement experienced by politicians and public alike.
In conclusion the governments securitizing move against radicalism, upgrading it
from a political movement to an existential threat to national security, succeeded because it
constructed a plausible threat narrative that successfully played on popular fears, concerns,
beliefs and prejudices; its effort was sustained, multi-faceted and ably supported by loyalist
works, papers and associations; it identified suitable referent objects deemed worthy of
protection and preservation; it was carried out in conditions conducive to fear, alarm and
insecurity; and because, despite a frequent lack of solid evidence, the government was able
to gather sufficient information, make accusations and interpret statements, intentions and
events in such a way as to at least cast significant doubts, suspicion and unease in the
public mind over the potential threat posed by radicalism. Despite occasional setbacks and

583
584
585
Evans, p. 83.

mistakes, the securitization and elimination of radicalism was carried out with the requisite
force, intelligence, conviction and at times restraint commensurate with public opinion,
British political and social traditions, and tolerance for infringements on individual
securities and liberties to make it consistently and conclusively acceptable and
successful.
The concept of securitization was initially constructed primarily as a model for the
study of security in international relations. However as I hope this and other emerging
studies have demonstrated, it also provides the tools and flexibility necessary to undertake
an insightful and systematic analysis of domestic securitization events. Complications in
applying the model are more likely to arise from utilising it in too rigid a fashion, rather
than any inherent flaws in the model itself. However if a significant flaw does exist, at least
in a domestic context, it may be the models insistence that a securitizing move is only
made when the actor is attempting to identify a threat as being instantly existential. The
reality is often not so clear cut, and the fact that a state actor is grappling with a perceived
threat to security and using it to justify particular measures and policies should still warrant
classification and examination as a securitization event, even if the threat is either not yet
identified as existential or the state not yet committed to completely eliminating it by any
means necessary. A securitization event can be a single effort, such as the identification of
another country as an existential threat in anticipation of a war, but more often it is a
process that develops over time and only gradually comes to the point of portraying a
referent subject as an existential threat that must be eliminated, as is the case in our study.
This flaw does not invalidate the entire model, nor need it detract from its effectiveness as
a model of analysis in domestic contexts.
It is here that the security dispositive, as described by de Graaf and Zwierlein, becomes
particularly useful. Rather than attempting to chart a concrete and instrumentalist chain of
moves and developments culminating in a complete securitization event, the securitization
model becomes a conceptual tool kit in which the development and change ofsecurity
dispositives can be analysed over time.
586
The concepts of actor, object, subject, speech-
act, securitizing move and the placing an issue on an elevated and distinct plane are all
relevant and useful in studying and understanding government security policy and actions,
even if they do not occur in a linear and systematic fashion or result in a zero-sum
outcome. A narrative of events or of a particular discourse may still be discerned and

586
De Graaf and Zwierlein, Historicizing Security Entering the Conspiracy Dispositive, p. 53.

described, but it need not be continuous or cohesive, as was the case with the treasonous
conspiracy theory. The identification and attempted elimination of an existential threat
therefore becomes just one possible but still important component of a governments
efforts to maintain national security and defend whatever it deems worthy of protection. In
our case, the government was in fact consistently seeking for a way to eliminate or at least
marginalise radicalism as an active political force from 1794-1799. However as discussed
in Chapter One the manner in which it attempted to justify its actions and combat the threat
changed over time in response to circumstances, the shifting nature of the threat and the
presence of other relevant factors such as the course of the war with France. Nonetheless,
an analysis of the dispositive surrounding these actions, carefully utilising the tools
provided by the securitization framework, still allows us to meaningfully examine and
interpret them not as preordained or isolated steps but as parts of an ongoing and uncertain
struggle to understand and confront a potential security threat increasingly viewed as
existential. I therefore believe that the securitization framework and security dispositive
have a useful and analytical role not only in security studies, but also in a wide range of
other fields, be they political, social, cultural, economic or military.
Threat Response
The securitization of radicalism justified an increase in security measures and surveillance,
allowing the government to ramp up its operations without incurring significant public or
political hostility. While it did not directly facilitate the centralisation and systematisation
of the late 1790s, alongside the war with France it provided the conditions, inspiration and
tools necessary for their implementation in secret. This expansion and reorganisation of the
states security services was an important landmark in the history of British security and
intelligence and a vital component of the surveillance, repression and elimination of the
radical movement. At the start of the decade, the ad hoc, scattered and divided approach to
intelligence and security was surprisingly effective, given the circumstances. In the
absence of a large bureaucracy, a strong central government or a specialised intelligence
department, the methods available to and adopted by the Home Office, London police and
county magistrates were limited but not without their merits. They demonstrate the value
of proactive local officials in touch with the affairs and concerns of their people, the
usefulness of accurate informers paid regularly, the benefits accruing from even a small
police force if handled well, the profuseness of the post as a source of information, and the

ability of only a handful of dedicated bureaucrats to make some sense out of a vast mass of
information. However, the lack of co-ordination and coercive power meant that the
government was over-reliant on individual magistrates and officials, some of whom
performed better than others. With no centralised intelligence analysis and an excessive
dependence on often unreliable spies and informers, the government was often unable to
determine fact from fiction, or to build an impartial and active assessment of the state of
the country and the status of potential threats to security. Instead, the picture of radicalism
the government constructed, while correct in many of the details, was tainted by inaccurate
information, fear, prejudice, guesswork and lack of understanding, resulting in a
composition that was flawed, biased and made to fit a particular narrative rather than being
allowed to speak for itself. This suited the governments securitizing move as regards the
accusations and evidence against radicalism, but limited its ability to actually counter the
radical threat, undertake successful prosecutions and maintain national security.
By contrast the creation of the Inner Office system demonstrates the significant
advantages accruing from even a limited centralisation of intelligence and security
services; improving the quality of both the sources and content of incoming information,
facilitating the development of a relatively specialised, impartial and ongoing intelligence
analysis, and forging an ability to create strategic assessments, monitor suspects and
respond to threats manifesting across multiple regions and borders. It also reduced the
divide between foreign and domestic intelligence, allowing a more accurate and integrated
assessment of any links between internal and external agents. By the latter part of the
1790s, the security services under Wickham, Ford, Portland and their colleagues were
operating with an unprecedented degree of organisation, centralisation, efficiency and
professionalism. Sparrow has described it as an expanding foreign and home secret
service, creating a complete system of surveillance for suspects, whether British or
foreign, while Wells has opined that the regularity and the efficiency of the secret
service are striking.
587
The intelligence and security weapons at the governments disposal
at the start of the decade were far from negligible, but their overhaul recognised and
responded to the need to confront a new type of threat, one that was international in scope
and driven by predominantly middle and working class societies bound by a shared
ideology.

587
Sparrow, The Alien Office, 1792-1806, pp. 362-63; Wells, Insurrection, p. 41.

Despite being weighed down by the baggage of prejudice, county independence, sparse
resources and a minimal police force, the revolutionised intelligence and security apparatus
highlights the difference between ad hoc unco-ordinated information collection as
necessitated by circumstances, and an ongoing security service operating a concerted
policy of surveillance, analysis and threat response. Durey argues that this period
witnessed the emergence of a functioning intelligence nerve centre within the Alien
Office that was increasingly proactive rather than reactive, with the revamped service
combining a general level of surveillance with a specific targeting of particular threats and
hotspots in order to achieve their timely elimination and public disparagement.
588
The
government was now able to gather intelligence that was of equal utility both in
securitizing and combating radicalism. The British arm of the United threat was carefully
monitored, investigated and broken up with a minimum of fuss under the direction of a
small group of semi-professional Home Office and police officials. The government over-
reached in putting OConnor and Binns on trial in 1798, and was shameless in its twisted
use of intelligence for the purposes of securitization, vindication and propaganda, but
otherwise it allowed the Inner Office to get on with its job, enabling it to avoid
unnecessary scandal and the pitfalls of recent years. It maintained a useful network of
trustworthy agents and informers and a competent grip on security matters and radical
threats until its disbandment in 1802-03. The identification of radicalism as an existential
threat had made these innovations, unthinkable at the start of the decade, both necessary
and acceptable.
However with the (albeit brief) coming of peace in 1802, the Addington government
saw no further need for such a centralised system, despite Wickhams pleas that it could
adapt itself at once to a State of Peaceand to all opinions and prejudices which a Free
People jealous of its Liberties may be supposed fairly and rightly to entertain.
589
Nelson
notes that Eighteenth-century statesmen envisioned the central government as interfering
in local affairs in the natural order of things only when emergencies so demanded, and in
1802-03, with the radical emergency seemingly dispelled, the system it spawned was
scaled back and central interference in local affairs minimalised.
590
The small London
police were retained, but it was to be another half-century before policing became a
country-wide affair, and there was no place for an ongoing semi-independent domestic

588
589
BL, Add. MS 33107, f. 3, Wickham to Portland, 3 January 1801, quoted in Wells, p. 30.
590
Nelson, p. 113.

secret service. In this case, securitization did not result in a permanent change to either the
structure or mentality of security governance, but rather facilitated predominantly
temporary measures to address a particular threat. As in other aspects of the repression of
radicalism, there were limitations on how far the government was prepared to go, both
publicly and in secret, in restructuring its security and administrative systems. It was
willing to increase and diversify its traditional sources of investigation and law
enforcement spies, police, agents and militia in order to monitor, investigate and harass
a particular group of the population, and to implement a proactive central secret service
headquarters with improved means of collection, analysis and direction, but the actual
administrative apparatus of magistrates and officials remained unchanged. The Pitt
government evidently felt it either unnecessary, unwise or impossible (due to public
opinion or available resources) to do anything further, and the majority of the primary
innovations were scrapped by Addingtons ministry. However the disbandment of the key
components of the centralised service and failure to document their structure and methods
meant that much of the specialist knowledge and experience acquired during its brief
existence was lost and forgotten. While some institutional memory and knowledge was
most likely retained and complemented for a time by the knowledge of direct participants,
on the whole the Alien Office system proved a short-term experiment whose major
innovations were not implemented again for over a century. Nonetheless it deserves a
distinguished place in the history of British intelligence and security, for as Sparrow states
it was the first comprehensive British secret service in the modern sense, paving the way
for later nineteenth and twentieth-century intelligence operations.
591

The security services had profound and important impacts on British society and the
course of radicalism. Thompson has even claimed that a convincing history of English
Jacobinism and popular Radicalism could be written solely in terms of the impact of
espionage upon the movement.
592
Paranoia about spies provoked disagreement, discord
and fear in the radical societies, damaging the ability of individual radicals and collective
societies to work together. It also played a role in dictating radical policy, reinforcing their
belief in the efficacy of transparency, documentation and publication, contributing to the
caution and hesitancy of the societies post the trials and new legislation of 1794-95, and
leading them towards the more secretive and oath-based United groups of 1797-99. By

591
Sparrow, The Alien Office, 1792-1806, p. 362.
592
E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, p. 539.

1796 securitization and repression had made it virtually impossible for radicals to meet and
act publicly, speak and publish freely, or entertain any realistic hopes of achieving reforms
in the short-term, while many had been scared away from active radicalism by the fear or
experience of persecution, trial and imprisonment. Extremists, republicans and United
Irishmen came to dominate the radical movement, as moderates largely abandoned the
cause as a result of financial and personal hardship and/or disillusionment. For those few
still committed, many felt that they had no option left but to move underground and form a
clandestine conspiracy to achieve their aims by force and/or stealth. Goodwin argues that
government repression had
rendered the public activities of even law-abiding radical societies increasingly difficult and had
put a premium upon clandestine organization in the case of those who had been converted to
republicanism.
593

Thomis and Holt concur, stating that Only when prosecutions and new legislation
inhibited and intimidated the open reform agitation did a minority of diehard reformers go
underground to plan the very revolts that the government had feared.
594
In effect, the
governments repressive actions led the radicals towards the very secrecy, extremism and
conspiracy that ministers were convinced had been fundamental components of active
radicalism since its origins in 1791-92. Coupled with growing discontent and desperation,
Irish insurrection and French assistance, this was a dangerous plot, although the
government possessed the intelligence sources, systems and force necessary to unmask and
defeat it.
The United movement was therefore at least in part of the governments own making,
although of course they neither understood nor publicised it as such. However as discussed
above it must also be remembered that the governments repressive measures, alarmist
propaganda and open accusations of conspiracy also played an important role in achieving
a successful securitizing move against radicalism, justifying further repression and
allowing the government to reinterpret history and events to their own advantage. The
significant damage done to the radical cause by such initiatives, combined with the
governments ability to deal with whatever remaining threats the radicals posed in a fairly
comfortable manner, despite occasion scares and panics, perhaps indicates that the benefits
of suppressing and even provoking radicalism considerably outweighed the risks.

593
Goodwin, p. 416.
594
Malcolm I. Thomis and Peter Holt, Threats of Revolution in Britain, 1789-1848, Houndmills, Macmillan, 1977, p. 17.

The real societal impact of the governments securitization of radicalism and
employment of its security services is difficult to judge. Radical rhetoric about invasions of
privacy, the degradation of morality, family and social breakdown and corrupted justice
was passionate and in most cases spoken out of a genuine belief that surveillance, spies and
informers posed a grave threat to such cherished and important institutions, but this does
not necessarily mean that the reality matched the words. Further research would be
required to determine whether the governments actions and the prevalence of spies really
did result in significant changes to moral values and norms, family harmony, respect for
privacy, social behaviour and expectations of trust and confidence.
595
However some
comments at least can be made on one important area the unprecedented state penetration
of and interaction with society and its impact on notions of public and private space, law
enforcement and security.
Of course by the 1790s state surveillance and spying already had a long history in
England, and the recent Jacobite era in particular witnessed the operation of an
international spy network and the extensive use of domestic spies and informers. There are
definite similarities between these operations and those of the 1790s. Agents in Europe
were used to report information relevant to domestic affairs, just as Turner and Powell did
in later years. In England, suspected Jacobite sympathisers were watched and spied upon,
while in Scotland government officials such as Lord Milton and Duncan Forbes ran agent
networks and information-gathering operations in the vast Highlands, similar to those run
by the Dundases in our period. The government remained ever vigilant to the threat of
Jacobite plots and potential unrest and rioting potentially attributable to or exploited by
clandestine Jacobites. The effectiveness of government intelligence operations ebbed and
flowed but certainly on the whole improved over the course of the era. Douglas argues that
before the rise of Sir Robert Walpole to the effective role of Prime Minister,
spyingremained as inexpert and underdeveloped as it had been the day James II left England.
Money ruled, and intelligence gathering was rotten with money grubbers who cared little about
which cause they supportedso long as they were well rewarded for their work.
However Walpole worked hard to establish a reasonable level of co-ordination and
accuracy in his intelligence system, allowing him to build up an impressive espionage
machine, that worked hard for him throughout Europe and intercepted mail inside the

595
Barrells The Spirit of Despotism is a good starting point in exploring these issues, but there is much more that could be investigated.

country and between Britain and the Continent.
596
The impact of these spies and
informers upon society was sometimes similar too. In Scotland, communities were hard hit
by government espionage. Douglas writes that The new Highlands that emerged in the
aftermath of Culloden became a place of distrust and betrayal; indeed this was a time
when trust, so long a deeply held article of faith in the Highland character, was
undermined.
597
Betrayals, deals and money-grabbing were common, spies flourished, and
communities became suspicious of outsiders and even friends and kin in an atmosphere of
government persecution and division. While England did not witness such devastation, fear
of spies and secret plots still made many citizens weary in their speech and public
associations.
598

However there are also important differences between the two eras. Unlike radicalism
(despite attempts to construe it as such), active support for the Stuarts was undoubtedly
treason, at least by the strict letter of the law, regardless of the Pretenders claims of their
right to rule. The majority of suspected Jacobites who drew government attention and
surveillance were aristocrats, be they English lords and gentlemen or Scottish clan chiefs
and their relatives. Lower class people acted as spies and sources of information, but were
rarely targeted themselves as persons of interest. By contrast most radicals were working
or middle class and came from all walks of life. Radicalism was also an active political
cause of a kind Jacobitism could never have hoped to be, and as such prior to 1797
represented both a public and clandestine target. Furthermore, while radicalism was more
prevalent in some areas than others London, Sheffield, Manchester, Edinburgh etc.
there were not such marked differences in its nature and strength as had existed in
Jacobitism between English and Scotland, or even between the Highlands and Lowlands of
the latter. Finally, while ideology played a part in defining the Jacobite cause, in the form
of Catholicism, the divine right of kings and possibly even Toryism, it played a more
significant role in radicalism, uniting many of all classes in Britain, Ireland and France
who shared common ideas and beliefs, and an allegiance to a particular ideal rather than a
family.
This all had important repercussions for government intelligence and security in the
1790s. Early in the decade the methods of information collection remained largely

596
Hugh Douglas, Jacobite Spy Wars: Moles, Rogues and Treachery, Thrupp, Sutton Publishing, 1999, pp. 28-29 & 32.
597
Ibid., p. 186.
598
Ibid., passim; Paul S. Fritz, The Anti-Jacobite Intelligence System of the English Ministers, 1715-1745, The Historical Journal,
vol. 16, no. 2 (1973), pp. 265-89.

unchanged. The emerging difference from past practice in these early years instead lay in
the nature of the target threat and the impact this had on the sources and methods of
information collection. Government surveillance, beefed up by an increase in spies, the
new London police and encouragements to local magistrates to redouble their vigilance,
was focused for the first time on an ostensibly legal mass movement strongly suspected of
harbouring illegal intentions, treasonous plots and seditious individuals. Popular
associations on the scale witnessed in some cities, and the abstract ideology they
supported, were a new phenomenon. For the first time radicalism also brought the working
classes to the attention of the government not merely as an agitated and/or manipulated
mob but as fully-fledged political actors in their own right, despite ongoing suspicions
among many MPs that the real conspiracy leaders were secretly liberal aristocrats or
foreign agents. While these suspicions were often ill-founded, real and suspected links with
France and Ireland did require close attention, and an awareness of connections not only
with foreign governments but also like-minded associations and their representatives.
Durey argues that the Inner Office was created to respond to an increasingly complex
intelligence situation, in which the sources of information were expanding quickly and
increasingly had an international dimension and the major issues increasingly became
fused, as the security threat was recognized as stemming primarily from the existence of a
wider Irish dimension and connections between organisations across north-western
Europe.
599

The need to monitor such large sections of the community, to deploy spies and
informers against both public meetings and private committees, and to inspect links
between domestic and foreign bodies, inspired in the government and local officials
unprecedented levels of interest in the daily affairs of the common people and public
associations. The government faced what Hone describes as a tangle of problems, arising
from the strong traditions of local autonomy and weak central administration. The Home
Office made strenuous efforts to confront these issues at least in part by developing a
more effective centralized civil control, supported by co-ordinated intelligence
work.
600
Initially this change in approach, increasing central control and widening the net
of information-collection into new levels and sectors of society, coupled with the targeting
of a movement as a whole rather than particular individuals or cabals (as demonstrated by

599
Durey, William Wickham, Master Spy, pp. 106 & 108.
600
Hone, pp. 66-67 & 74.

the fact that the trials of Paine, Eaton, Hardy, Horne Tooke and others were more about the
principles and groups they propagated and represented than any individual actions), was
not initially recognised as a definitive change in the running of the states security and
intelligence apparatus. Yet it played neatly into the governments securitization and
repression of radicalism and laid the foundations for the innovatory centralised and
systematised secret service created by Wickham and his little band of colleagues in 1797-
98, turning the ad hoc accumulation of sources and agents both domestic and foreign into
an organised security and intelligence system operated by a small central hub.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the increase in state surveillance and oppression and the
resultant impetuous given to state and self-appointed informers and agents to delve into
and interfere with the public and private realms were new and deeply disturbing
developments for many radicals and liberals. Radicals were initially optimistic that the
widening public sphere and growing influence of public opinion would significantly
benefit their cause. Habermas argues that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
importance of public opinion had reached such heights that
the publics involvement in the critical debate of political issues had become organized to such an
extent that in the role of a permanent critical commentator it had definitively broken the
exclusiveness of Parliament and evolved into the officially designated discussion partner of the
delegate.
601

However while this assessment may have been somewhat close to the truth at the
beginning of the 1790s, in the short-term it was not to last or prove as permanent as
Habermas claimed. Public opinion was certainly a powerful force in the early part of the
decade, ignored by MPs at their peril. Yet although the bourgeois public sphere, inhabited
by Foxite Whigs and gentlemen reformers, initially remained relatively open to public
debate, within reason, the entry of the lower classes into the public realm and the
construction of public opinion, creating what may be termed as a popular sphere, was
eventually deemed unacceptable by the government and its supporters. No sooner had the
public sphere opened to radical and working class discourses and activities, in the form of
printed works, public and association meetings, lectures and informal debates, than it
rapidly began to contract again. As the decade progressed it swiftly became a dangerous
space for the dissemination of radical opinions and arguments, inhabited by increasing

601
Habermas, p. 66.

numbers of spies and informers ever-ready to report, twist, exaggerate or fabricate
information of interest to the authorities.
Radicals quickly learned that the public arena was in fact not a place for the free
dissemination and discussion of ideas, but rather one in which some ideas were more
acceptable than others, and in which there loomed an ever-present threat of being harassed
and persecuted by loyalist groups and state officials and reported, correctly or otherwise,
for sedition, illegal association and other crimes. Even liberal debate was increasingly
stifled and shut down by the threat of sedition laws, censorship, guilt by association with
radicalism and the general atmosphere of repression and intransigence. Public opinion,
both as a by-product of rational-critical debate and the general mood of the populace,
remained a factor in late-1790s politics, and ministers continued to be wary of maintaining
public support for their policies and actions. However it had lost much of the dynamism
and expressiveness it possessed at the beginning of the decade, and to the extent it did exist
such opinion had become more a by-product of loyalist and government propaganda,
alarmism and war rhetoric, described by McCann as a form of administered
consciousness
602
, than any genuine manifestation of public concerns and open debate.
603

Worse still in radical eyes, privately-held opinions, whether given in conversations in
public places or in the truly private setting of the home or closed meeting, were now fair
game for informers to eavesdrop on and report to the authorities, who could choose to act
if they felt such opinions to be seditious or otherwise illegal. This invasion of the private
was not directly sanctioned or advocated by the government, but it was given tacit
approval and encouragement by the governments willingness to reward and act on
relevant information however obtained, and by statements emphasising the need to hunt
and persecute radicalism wherever it may be found. Barrell states that it was believed
among radicals that The fence which had once divided private from public space had been
removed, and space traditionally regarded as private was redefined as public as soon as it
was used for the discussion of public affairs.
604
While some examples do exist, such as
those of Walker and Muir, the true prevalence of spies and surveillance in the private
domain cannot be determined, although it may be said that the radical fears were most
probably disproportionate with the reality. Nonetheless these fears were genuine and in
themselves likely to be damaging to personal relations. They also accord with the broader

602
McCann, p. 61.
603
Ibid., pp. 59-144; Habermas, pp. 27-67.
604

politicisation of the private in the 1790s described by Barrell in The Spirit of Despotism, in
which almost any space or topic could become the subject of political conflict, even those
that might seem too trivial, too quotidian, too far removed from politics to be susceptible to
being politicized.
605
Securitization was simply an extra impetus for this opening of the
private realm, for the tavern corner, work space, dinner table and even the cottage hearth
were now considered the potential breeding grounds of sedition, conspiracy and other
threats to national security, thus becoming legitimate and necessary places for surveillance
and investigation.
Centralised security and intelligence services also resulted in changes to state-society
relations, for although it did not significantly alter the daily activities and responsibilities
of local magistrates, the communication of greater quantities of information to a single
office and instructions flowing in the opposite direction increased the states knowledge of
the affairs of its citizens and its direct involvement in their lives, be it in the form of spies
passing on information, informers denouncing seditious words and publications, or Bow
Street Runners and state officials sent to conduct investigations and co-ordinate operations.
Despite what Wells describes as a lack of constitutional clarity and legality surrounding
the growth of the intelligence system, increased surveillance, repressive legislation,
prosecution, and the practice of pre-emptive and preventive security made it more likely
that citizens, particularly if involved in political and/or public affairs, would come to the
attention of agents of the state, particularly in the towns, cities and known trouble spots.
606

This was particularly the case in London, where, as Nelson notes,
The mounting fear of radicals, the control over the public offices in the metropolis, [and] the use
of spyinghad drawn the [Home Office] Secretary of State into a more direct part in the process
of preserving order in London than had ever before been the case.
607

The increased interest in domestic surveillance extended to the king himself. In 1799
Wickham expressed his great surprize that he met with the king for three quarters of an
hour, and the greater part of the questions and observations turned upon the Home
Office.
608
The security system of the 1790s represented a new if temporary layer of
contact and interaction between state and citizen (even though the latter was largely
unaware of its existence), one that presaged but didnt directly lead to later developments

605
Ibid., p. 15 & passim. See also James Thompson, pp. 173-92.
606
Wells, p. 41.
607
Nelson, p. 122.
608
BL, Add. MS 59011, fols. 150-51, Wickham to Grenville, n.d. (1799), quoted in Wells, p. 31.

in state security and information collection and demonstrated the advantages accruing to
government from such innovations.
609

Threat Reply
Radical writers and orators certainly gained notable mileage for their cause from their
fierce attack on the governments security services and use of spies. Radicals claimed that
all the supposedly incriminating evidence against them, accumulated by the government
and presented in various trials, publications and parliamentary reports, came from corrupt
spies and informers whose testimony was either biased or outright false. In parliament
William Lambton left no doubt as to his opinion on the veracity of information procured
from spies, arguing that in the 1794 treason trials the evidence given before the grand jury
was ex-parte evidence, most probably the evidence of spies and informers, who afterwards
committed perjury at the trial.
610
Such evidence was wholly unreliable and solely
responsible for any taint of guilt on the accused. This was backed by Erskine, who argued
that
the evidence for the prosecutionwas chiefly supportedby spies and mercenary informers of
the most profligate description, and even with their infamous aidsnothing like treasonable
intention was brought to any of the prisoners.
611

Radicals also alleged that the majority of the more extreme statements and propositions
made at their meetings came from agents provocateurs, either planted by the government
or acting on their own initiative to incriminate the societies. Thelwall railed against those
who fabricate plots of violence, and project impracticable crimes, in order to saddle them
upon those friends of liberty who abhor alike both you and your abominations, while
Pigott claimed that they preyed on innocent men, in order to excite them to intemperate
expressions, and then to inform on them, bring them into a prejudiced court before a loyal
jury, and, if possible, swear away their lives.
612

The effect of these arguments on public opinion is impossible to determine, but it was
certainly well-tailored to popular prejudices against spies and a belief in their almost

609
For details on the eighteenth-century British states use of surveillance and local administration to obtain information on its citizens,
of which the needs of security are both a part and a shaping force, see Higgs, The Information State in England, pp. 10-19 & 28-63.
610
PH 31, col. 1148.
611
Ibid., col. 1179.
612
Thelwall, Peaceful Discussion, and not Tumultuary Violence the Means of Addressing National Grievances, p. 4; Pigott, A Political
Dictionary, p. 134.

inherent mendacity. It also allowed radicals to dodge uncomfortable questions about some
of the more dubious and provocative statements and plans made or suggested by particular
society members, and to write off the governments conspiracy theory as existing entirely
in the minds of its own spies. Radical claims of government secrecy, duplicity, alarmism,
persecution and invasiveness must certainly have had some effect on public opinion and
mistrust of the state. As McCann notes, radical orators argued that government surveillance
and securitizing were founded on the principle that it was not radicalism per se that was the
sole threat to security, but the common people themselves who posed dangerous and
anarchic threats to national security and stability. The security services were therefore a
means of protecting the governing elite and the institution of property, not the interests,
rights and institutions of the nation as a whole.
613
These attacks would have persuaded at
least some of the public to doubt the advisability and necessity of the governments
actions, and may even have contributed towards convincing people of the need for reform.
The embarrassment caused to the government by spies and informers in 1794 increased
public sympathy for radicalism and contributed to its brief revival in 1795, before the
introduction of the Two Acts at the end of the year.
However it is important to note that while many radical arguments about the corruption
of justice, extension of state power and degradation of communities by immoral spies and
invasive magistrates contained a lot of truth; on some issues it was clear to many that their
arguments were exaggerated, inaccurate or disingenuous. Despite radical claims to the
contrary, not all the governments sources were spies, nor was all evidence from spies and
informers inaccurate or deceptive. The government was not as biased and incompetent in
their collection and analysis of information and evidence as some radicals believed. As
Thompson argues, It was in the interests of magistrates to obtain accurate information.
They disliked being sent on fools errands after non-existent depots of arms, or wasting
their time in pursuit of tavern demagogues.
614
Senior ministers were indeed deeply
suspicious of radicalism and increasingly came to the conclusion that it was best to
eradicate it altogether as an active movement. However while this definitely coloured and
prejudiced their approach to the surveillance, investigation and prosecution of the societies
and later the clandestine United groups, it does not mean that they were deliberately intent
on securing false and incriminating evidence by any means necessary, or that their

613
McCann, pp. 95 & 97.
614

perceptions of radicalism were entirely without foundation. Attempting to build a solid
case for treason from the available evidence is not the same thing as constructing one
prima facie. Nor were they incompetent or callous in their methods of information
collection and analysis. High-grade intelligence was vital in allowing the government to
make correct decisions, and Durey states that the Inner Office in particular functioned as a
repository and analytical centre for strategic information, to assist in formulating policy
and to help to answer major political questions, such as the prospects of rebellion in
Ireland, and the existence of conspiratorial links between Ireland, Britain and France.
615

The Home Office was aware of the need to treat the information it received with caution
and an understanding of the context and nature of its sources. For the most part it sought
out sources that were reliable and trustworthy, and as we have seen attempts were made
throughout the decade to improve the collection and analysis of information. Nonetheless it
is inevitable that the governments extensive reliance on and projected expectations of
spies and informers shaped its perceptions and beliefs on the nature of radicalism and the
state of the country, and it is undoubtedly true that at times the government simply sought
or interpreted evidence to suit its own paranoia, preconceptions and agenda, rather than
allowing the information to speak for itself. While the government did not deliberately
employ perjurers, liars and agents provocateurs, on some occasions it failed to look closely
at the actions of its spies, accepting and trumpeting their favourable evidence on almost
face value and disregarding proper caution and analysis. It is also true that on occasion the
government knowingly misled the public and parliament about radicalism, above and
beyond its securitizing spin, perhaps most notably in the secret committee report of 1799.
Ultimately though it appears that the governments use of spies was primarily pragmatic
it was deemed necessary to monitor and investigate radical activity and the employment
of spies and informers was seen as the best and principal means of achieving this,
regardless of the drawbacks that such methods entailed. Sedition and treason were soon
suspected amongst the societies and evidence sought to confirm and prove that this belief
was correct. Hone sums this up by stating that

615

The government had certain assumptions and relied on its particular channels of authentic
information. Results had been obtained by probing in certain directions, and these tended to
determine future investigations.
616

Taken as a whole this tallies with some aspects of the radical discourses on the
governments handling of spies and security, but clearly differs on others. This is to be
expected in an environment of mutual mistrust and government persecution, where radicals
could not ascertain the reality of the inner workings of government but only surmise based
on what they saw, perceived and experienced. Indeed the lack of accountability and
transparency played in favour of the securitization of radicalism, as it hampered radical
efforts to refute government claims and persuasively argue against their methods.
It was also difficult for the radicals to prove some of the alleged long-term effects of the
governments security actions, or to convince the public of the dangers they posed without
contemporary evidence to support the warnings. Certainly at least in the short-term, spies
and informers did not threaten and damage morality, community and social relations to the
extent claimed by some radicals thinkers. Any public expression of radicalism was a risk,
as were even private conversations in public places, as numerous incidents in coffee-
houses and taverns attest to. This in itself was undoubtedly a blight on liberty, however
with only a few exceptions it did not extend to the truly private realms of family and
intimate social circles. Therefore radicals were often stretching their arguments into areas
where they lacked supporting evidence, and as most neutral citizens were untroubled by
the supposed menace of spies and surveillance and their long-term effects they found no
reason in them to stand up for the radical cause. In contrast, in a time of war and
uncertainty the government could paint radicalism as an immediate and existential threat,
and present copious evidence to support the need for decisive action. It was of
comparatively little consequence that most of that evidence was speculative, scattered and
unreliable, or that the methods of obtaining it were liable to produce some relatively minor
inconveniences, be they in the present or the future. Quantity, woven into a compelling
narrative of imminent chaos, more than made up for a lack of quality.
The radical arguments, either on spies or any other matter, ultimately failed to convince
the public of the need to reject the governments securitizing move and support the radical
cause, or to dissuade the government from continuing its securitizing moves and measures.
It is argued here that in order for a referent subject to successfully counter a securitizing

616
Hone, p. 82.

move in a domestic context, they must be able to prove either that their cause is irresistible
that it should be permitted and/or implemented regardless of the risks involved or that
they do not pose a threat commensurate with that alleged by the securitizing actor, and as
such the extraordinary and repressive actions proposed by the actor constitute a risk of
damage to society, state, liberty and security unjustified by the hazards posed by the threat
itself in other words, that the ends do not justify the means. Radicalism failed both in
selling the case for urgent reform and in countering the governments claims that it posed
an existential threat necessitating extraordinary measures to eliminate it.
Viewed as a whole, the radicals arguments against the states security services may
perhaps be best understood as a form of counter-securitization, often employing the same
language and techniques as their opponents to define the governments institutions and
actions as an inquisition against free thought and action posing grave and unwarranted
threats to the referent objects of justice, privacy, liberty, community, morality, tradition,
social relations and individual and collective security. However, as in other areas, radicals
lost the battle over security. Undoubtedly the governments suspension and severe
curtailment of a number of protections and liberties in the interests of national security did
indeed constitute a loss of freedom and individual security. As Buzan notes,
While the state provides some security to the individual, it can only do so by imposing
threatsAlthough they are powerfully balanced by the domestic and external security which the
state provides, these threats, and therefore the contradiction between individual and national
security, are unavoidable.
617

In 1790s Britain, individuals, particularly those of radical leanings, were exposed to a
greater risk of arrest and indefinite imprisonment, personal and financial loss, threats to
their health and well-being, increased surveillance and breaches of privacy. They had
reduced recourse to assistance from the law, the authorities and supportive organisations
should they find their security infringed upon, and the institutions of justice, community
and morality were all to some degree compromised by the states actions.
Yet the lack of open dissent in the late 1790s suggests that the majority of the British
people tolerated these infringements and negative impacts, either because they accepted the
governments securitizing argument that national security was at grave risk from
radicalism, and, thus being apathetical or opposed to the radical cause, believed that the

617
Buzan, p. 50.

governments measures were appropriate to the circumstances, being genuinely and for the
most part accurately targeted only at those who threatened the interests and security of the
state; or because they felt themselves to be too cowered, powerless or insufficiently
concerned to oppose the governments actions. Supporters could argue that while the
overhauled security services did expand the states ability to monitor and investigate all its
citizens, it also increased the accuracy and reliability of its intelligence, making it more
likely that the correct suspects were targeted and prosecuted successfully. Any collateral
damage was therefore tolerable a justified imposition on individual security to contain a
specific threat and ensure collective survival and prosperity, rather than the radical
depiction of a general assault on individual rights and liberties and an aggrandisement of
state power under the phony pretext of national security. Furthermore, many people
evidently either accepted the governments argument that the eventual lapse of radicalism
into dangerous revolutionary underground cells was a product of radical ambitions rather
than state repression, or acknowledged the need to contain the new threat regardless of its
provenance. Therefore throughout the 1790s the elite either supported the government or
remained neutral in the face of war and security scares; while a majority of the middle
classes were convinced that the security provided by the military and repressive efforts of
the government to their current financial, material and political possessions outweighed
any concurrent loss of personal security and liberty. Even the working classes were divided
on the key issues, a fact bearing out the strength of the governments position.
In sum, a strongly-backed securitizing move against a grand existential threat to
national security, requiring concerted action to defeat it, triumphed over a counter-
argument denying the existence of such a threat and condemning the impact and
implications of the actors actions as unjustified and unacceptable. Given the governments
sound use and exploitation of the advantages identified earlier in this chapter, it is little
wonder that despite occasional hiccups over failed trials and embarrassing revelations it
was ultimately successful in its securitizing move against radicalism. In such adverse
conditions, radicals lacked a sufficient platform to match the governments reach and
influence over their target audience the British public and parliamentarians. This was
especially true post-1795, for by that stage ongoing prosecutions, persecution and
legislative reforms had crippled their ability to engage and persuade the public, and this
surely contributed to the decline of radicalism and the increasing strength and success of
the governments move. In classifying radicalism as an existential threat securitization
robbed it of a legitimate place in the national political debate, ensuring that the radical

arguments advancing their cause and combating the governments actions were either
disregarded or dismissed.
Threat Context
The securitization, repression and defeat of British radicalism had a profound effect on the
wider history of the period, particularly in regards to the fate of France, Ireland and of
course Britain itself. The presence of native Britons with supposed links to and support
from France contributed to British enmity towards the Republic and the desire of Pitt and
his fellow ministers to continue the fight against it. The later confirmation of connections
between France, Britain and Ireland allowed the government to intensify its war rhetoric
and tighten its grip on affairs in troubled Ireland. The lessons learned and benefits gained
via the governments concerted approach to security and intelligence across the British
Isles contributed to the push towards the union of Britain and Ireland in 1801. Centralised
intelligence and security services also assisted the war effort, improving Britains military
and political intelligence on French and European affairs and assisting it to foil French
efforts to subvert Britain and Ireland from within. Conversely, hopes of support from
Britain and France contributed to the United Irish decision to move towards rebellion and
co-ordinated risings across the Isles, while the presence of seemingly pro-French
sympathisers in Britain helped to maintain French interest in a cross-channel invasion and
plans to stir up Anglo-Irish discontent and insurrection.
The securitization and temporary elimination of radicalism as an active political force
significantly strengthened the governments position and arguably ensured a level of
stability, order, government support, patriotism and debatably even prosperity that was
extremely difficult to accomplish in an age of great upheaval, change and violence;
although achieved at the expense of individual rights and liberties and any short-term hope
of political, social and economic reform. It also provided the government with additional
resources with which to combat both internal and external threats. Graham argues that the
governments policies, driven by the securitization of radicalism, inaugurated a period of
persecution and manipulation of law at the local and national level whichhad its closest
precedent, as many contemporaries remarked, in the reign of the Stuarts.
618
Conversely
radicalism had only a minimal constructive effect on government policy, and Foxites and

618

other liberals were unable to significantly impact upon government and parliamentary
decision-making in an atmosphere of such widespread hostility to any form of liberal
change or anything tainted with suspected connections to radicalism, republicanism and
France. Nonetheless radical and liberal discourses greatly contributed to the liveliness and
quality of debate in political and civil society, especially in the first half of the 1790s
before government repression all but removed it from the public sphere. The activities,
aims and principles of both liberal and radical leaders and societies were remembered and
cherished in many places, allowing them to flourish again and re-enter the political realm
in the last years of the Napoleonic Wars. Thompson argues that the working classes in
particular did not forget the lessons and empowerment of radicalism, with its emphasis on
self-education andthe rational criticism of political and religious institutions
conducted by working people combining to promote their own interests.
619
For as Thelwall
stated, Whatever presses men togetheris favourable to the diffusion of knowledge, and
ultimately promotive of human liberty.
620

It is impossible to say what may have happened had radicalism been allowed a
relatively free existence and political platform, but it is certain that at least for the elite, the
governments actions were vital in prohibiting any chance of a revolution or major reform
and in maintaining their position and interests. Preserving the status quo certainly didnt
directly assist the many people struggling with poverty, repression and disenfranchisement,
but it did maintain law and order and a platform for the government to advance and protect
British interests at home and abroad as best as it was able. This undoubtedly had a mostly
positive economic effect benefiting most citizens in at least some capacity, especially the
elite, land-owners, industrialists, merchants and businessmen. The securitization of
radicalism took reform completely out of the public and political arena, albeit temporarily,
and simplified contemporary politics into a largely monotone realm where one was either
for or against the government. By the late-1790s, loyalist and patriotic sentiments were
almost the only legitimate and acceptable form of public political expression, leaving
people with the choice either to join the loyal chorus or abstain completely from public
political affairs and restrict any such activity to the privacy of their own home or a trusted
group of friends or colleagues.

619
620
John Thelwall, The Rights of Nature, Against the Usurpations of Establishments, London, H. D. Symonds, 1796, p. 21.

In the realm of political theory the most significant long-term effect of this outcome was
that Britain rejected and turned away from the abstract notions of natural rights, equality
and popular sovereignty championed by the likes of Paine, Rousseau and French
republicans, and advocated for a time by at least some active British radicals. While these
principles never left the debate entirely, and indeed became prominent again particularly in
the twentieth century, the defeat of 1790s radicalism meant that Britains political
institutions and eventual reforms remained predominantly grounded in British
constitutionalism, traditional and civic liberties and the legacy of the Glorious Revolution.
Britain chose to forge its own gradual and limited path of reform rather than the more
comprehensive rights-based roots-and-all approach first practised in France and later other
parts of Europe and indeed the world. It is of course arguable that this was more or less
what most radicals had wanted anyway, albeit in a more timely fashion, but nonetheless the
governments resistance guaranteed that republicanism did not enter the corridors of power
whether by design or momentum, and that reform would not occur at a time believed to be
unsuitable for rocking the boat.
621

National (In)Security
Security individual, collective and national is an ever-present factor of state and
society. As an inter-subjective entity, it is as potent in the realm of perception and
imagination as it is in tangible reality, making it an ideal means of political justification.
Securitization is an act of labelling, empowering and othering, designed to influence and
define peoples beliefs, perceptions and collective consciousness, identify particular groups
and ideologies as intolerable, increase state power and sanction acts of repression,
violence, surveillance, restriction and ostracism. As such, it is both powerful and
potentially dangerous, used as much to coerce and oppress as to protect. With such
significant contemporary and future consequences, the study of security from both
empirical and theoretical perspectives is a vital and important area of research and analysis.
In contributing to this pool of knowledge and analysis, this study has sought to
demonstrate that the securitization model and security dispositive are important and highly
useful means of examining and understanding not only contemporary international security

621
See Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1962; Simon Maccoby, English
Radicalism, 1786-1832: From Paine to Cobbett, London, Allen and Unwin, 1955; Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European
Politics, 1763-1848, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994.

events and issues but also historical and domestic ones, allowing us to explore how and
why historical actors have identified, imagined and created threats to security and used
these threats to justify and shape particular actions and policies. This both enriches our
understanding of the past and ability to analyse, interpret and critique the present.
In the 1790s Pitts government was convinced that democratic reform was untimely. In
the unsettled circumstances of the time it was not content to address radicalism as merely a
political or ideological issue. Instead it portrayed radicalism as an existential threat to
national security, devoid of legitimacy and unworthy of a place in active political and civil
society. However the government, while far from democratic, was not authoritarian, and it
existed in an age and society in which public opinion, particularly that of the upper and
middle classes, was an important factor in permitting and shaping the implementation of
government policies. Therefore, the securitization of radicalism and the resultant measures
to repress it required securitizing moves to convince both public and parliament of their
necessity and efficacy. Applying the securitization model to this dispositive has allowed us
to unpack and analyse the various components of these moves, and to understand why the
government successfully chose security as a key platform for ostracising and confronting
radicalism, and why it utilised particular arguments and discourses in projecting its
interpretation of the radical threat and the objects it was necessary to defend. It also reveals
the intimate links between this securitization and the reshaping of the states security
services, explaining the significant but limited and ultimately temporary changes to their
mentality, structure and methods, and the importance of these measures in identifying and
defeating threats to security.
Finally the radical response to these measures opens a new window into radical
ideology and discourse, particularly regarding the contested grounds of security and state-
citizen relations. For radicals, state measures to protect and enforce national security
gravely weakened individual and collective security, and contesting these measures
required efforts to convince the public that the realities of these infringements on security
and liberty outweighed imagined threats to national security. However the government
won both this argument and the struggle for political supremacy, and it is perhaps fitting to
close with the observation that this was a victory achieved as much by word as by deed. As
radicals learned to their cost, spoken security is the foundation for action, and it is in the
discourses of security dispositives that notions of threat, safety, reverence and response are
created, argued, disseminated and initiated. In this regard, no less than their political

legacy, the story of the 1790s radicals and their government and loyalist opponents
continues to hold valuable lessons for us today.


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