1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
BERSAMIN, J .:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both
assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of
Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated
in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence
their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square
meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than
30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.
1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as
surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of
249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No.
20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.
2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for
land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
2

Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),
4
the CA
declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession
prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR
certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanans period of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs
decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit
5
(Naguit)
remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard,
Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and
disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out
that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for
registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a
mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and
declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
6
to support their argument
that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable
land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that
the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the
application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified
as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to
establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the
part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
3

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as
alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the
State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,
7
Menguito v. Republic
8
and Republic
v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,
9
they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable
opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest
had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that
consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the
application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for
almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable
by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the
application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the
interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It
reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different
classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,
10
may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.
11
Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b)
belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
12
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of
the patrimonial property of the State.
13
Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country
from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,
14
all lands of the
public domain belong to the State.
15
This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown
to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.
17

Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
4

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,
18
lands of the
public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.
19
Section 10,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically,
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing
land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral,
but added national parks.
20
Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses
to which they may be devoted.
21
The identification of lands according to their legal classification is
done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.
22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public
domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of
the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
Code,
23
without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.
24
A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification,
25
and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.
26
If, however, public
land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public
land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion
must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.
27
Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and
not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
5

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the
land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
x x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise
classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of
Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant
must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree,
28
to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession
and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands
of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have
been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable
as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or
reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
6

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any
possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It
observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere
judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent
be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should
best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession
and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of
June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law
as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as
agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title is
derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the
character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.
29
In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.
30
It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute
the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which
prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants possession
and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant,
but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in
order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.
31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to
unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation
thereof for the number of years prescribed by law
32
will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear
in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when
Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)
33
in order to liberalize stringent requirements
and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly
residential lands, subject to area limitations.
34

7

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such
land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
35
As such, prescription can now run against the
State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of
the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership
are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises,
36
and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the
land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private
property.
37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer
intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from
the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or
lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the
modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is
a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that
property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying
the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered
ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as
no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's
Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
8

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
I submitted my vote joining the Separate
Opinion of Justice Brion
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
In the Result: See Separate Opinion
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERLATA
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
See separate concurring and dissenting opinion
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 16-17.
9

2
Id. at 37-38.
3
Id. at 87.
4
G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183.
5
G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 442.
6
G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477.
7
G.R. No. 135527, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 716.
8
G.R. No. 134308, December 14, 2000, 348 SCRA 128.
9
Supra note 6.
10
Article 415(1), Civil Code.
11
Article 419, Civil Code.
12
Article 420, Civil Code.
13
Article 421, Civil Code.
14
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6,
2000, 347 SCRA 128, 165.
15
Section 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
16
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-71285, November 5, 1987, 155 SCRA
412, 419.
17
Republic v. Lao, G.R. No. 150413, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 291, 298.
18
1935 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
19
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phil. 461, 468 (1947). 20 Section 3 of Article
XII, 1987 Constitution states:
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be
further classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations
or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire
not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
10

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development,
and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by
law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held,
or leased and the conditions therefor.
21
Id.
22
See Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed., pp. 1188-1189.
23
Article 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons,
either individually or collectively. (345a)
24
Director of Forestry v. Villareal, G.R. No. 32266, February 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 598, 608-
609.
25
Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, No. L-27873, November 29, 1983, 126
SCRA 69, 75.
26
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, No. L-58867, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 689, 692.
27
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127060, November 19, 2002, 392 SCRA 190, 201.
28
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
x x x x
29
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-73002, December 29, 1986, 146
SCRA 509, 518. See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee in Manila Electric
Company v. Judge Castro-Bartolome, No. L-49623, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 799, 813.
30
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-73002, December 29, 1986, 146
SCRA 509, 521.
31
Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, 428 (1925); Santos v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 90380, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 550, 560; Cruz v. Navarro, No. L-27644,
November 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 109, 115.
32
x x x WHEREAS, it has always been the policy of the State to hasten the settlement,
adjudication and quieting of titles to unregistered lands including alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain in favor of qualified Filipino citizens who have acquired inchoate,
imperfect and incomplete titles thereto by reason of their open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious occupation and cultivation thereof under bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership
for a number of years prescribed by law; x x x (Presidential Decree 1073)
11

33
An Act Authorizing the Issuance of Free Patents to Residential Lands (Approved on March
9, 2010).
34
Republic Act No. 10023 reduces the period of eligibility for titling from 30 years to 10 years
of untitled public alienable and disposable lands which have been zoned as residential; and
enables the applicant to apply with the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources having jurisdiction over the
parcel subject of the application, provided the land subject of the application should not
exceed 200 square meters if it is in a highly urbanized city, 500 meters in other cities, 750
meters in first-class and second-class municipalities, and 1,000 meters in third-class
municipalities.
35
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
x x x x
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
36
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75042, November 29, 1988, 168 SCRA
165, 174.
37
Dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee in Manila Electric Company v. Castro-Bartolome,
supra,
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION


REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,



- versus -



CARLOS R. VEGA, MARCOS R.


G. R. No. 177790


Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
12

VEGA, ROGELIO R. VEGA,
LUBIN R. VEGA, HEIRS OF
GLORIA R. VEGA,
NAMELY: FRACISCO L. YAP,
MA. WINONA Y. RODRIGUEZ,
MA. WENDELYN V. YAP and
FRANCISCO V. YAP, JR.,
Respondents,

ROMEA G. BUHAY-OCAMPO,
FRANCISCO G. BUHAY, ARCELI
G. BUHAY-RODRIGUEZ,
ORLANDO G. BUHAY, SOLEDAD
G. BUHAY-VASQUEZ, LOIDA G.
BUHAY-SENADOSA, FLORENDO
G. BUHAY, OSCAR G. BUHAY,
ERLYN BUHAY-GINORGA,
EVELYN BUHAY-GRANETA, and
EMILIE BUHAY-DALLAS,
Respondents-Intervenors.



Promulgated:

January 17, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

13

D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J .:
This is a Rule 45 Petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner
Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), questioning the
Decision of the Court of Appeals,
[1]
which affirmed a lower courts grant of an
application for original registration of title covering a parcel of land located in Los
Baos, Laguna.
The facts of the case as culled from the records of the trial court and the
appellate court are straightforward and without much contention from the parties.
On 26 May 1995, respondents Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R.
Vega, Lubin R. Vega and Heirs of Gloria R. Vega namely, Francisco L. Yap,
Ma. Winona Y. Rodriguez, Ma. Wendelyn V. Yap and Francisco V. Yap, Jr.
(respondents Vegas) filed an application for registration of title. The application
covered a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6191, Cadastre 450 of Los Baos,
Laguna, with a total area of six thousand nine hundred two (6,902) square meters
(the subject land). The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 103-95-C
and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92.
Respondents Vegas alleged that they inherited the subject land from their
mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who in turn inherited it from her father,
Lorenzo Revilleza. Their mothers siblings (two brothers and a sister) died
intestate, all without leaving any offspring.
On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition to respondents
Vegas application for registration on the ground,inter alia, that the subject land or
portions thereof were lands of the public domain and, as such, not subject to
private appropriation.

During the trial court hearing on the application for registration, respondents
Vegas presented several exhibits in compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements, as well as witnesses to prove respondents Vegas ownership,
occupation and possession of the land subject of the registration. Significant was
the testimony of Mr. Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special Investigator of the Community
14

Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baos, Laguna,
under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). He attested
to having conducted an inspection of the subject land
[2]
and identified the
corresponding Report dated 13 January 1997, which he had submitted to the
Regional Executive Director, Region IV. The report stated that the area subject of
the investigation was entirely within the alienable and disposable zone, and that
there was no public land application filed for the same land by the applicant or by
any other person.
[3]

During the trial, respondents-intervenors Romea G. Buhay-Ocampo,
Francisco G. Buhay, Arceli G. Buhay-Rodriguez, Orlando G. Buhay, Soledad G.
Buhay-Vasquez, Loida G. Buhay-Senadosa, Florendo G. Buhay, Oscar G. Buhay,
Erlyn Buhay-Ginorga, Evelyn Buhay-Grantea and Emilie Buhay-Dallas
(respondents-intervenors Buhays) entered their appearance and moved to intervene
in respondents Vegas application for registration.
[4]
Respondents-intervenors
Buhays claimed a portion of the subject land consisting of eight hundred twenty-
six (826) square meters, purportedly sold by respondents Vegas mother (Maria
Revilleza Vda. de Vega) to the formers predecessors-in-interest - the sisters
Gabriela Gilvero and Isabel Gilverio - by virtue of a Bilihan ng Isang Bahagi ng
Lupang Katihan dated 14 January 1951.
[5]
They likewise formally offered in
evidence Subdivision Plan Csd-04-024336-D, which indicated the portion of the
subject land, which they claimed was sold to their predecessors-in-interest.
[6]

In a Decision dated 18 November 2003, the trial court granted respondents
Vegas application and directed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the
corresponding decree of registration in the name of respondents Vegas and
respondents-intervenors Buhays predecessors, in proportion to their claims over
the subject land.
Petitioner Republic appealed the Decision of the trial court, arguing that
respondents Vegas failed to prove that the subject land was alienable and
disposable, since the testimony of Mr. Gonzales did not contain the date when the
land was declared as such. Unpersuaded by petitioner Republics arguments, the
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the earlier Decision of the trial court. Aggrieved
by the ruling, petitioner filed the instant Rule 45 Petition with this Court.
15

Respondents Vegas, who are joined by respondents-intervenors Buhays
(collectively, respondents), raise procedural issues concerning the filing of the
instant Petition, which the Court shall resolve first. Briefly, respondents found, in
the instant Petition, procedural deficiencies that ought to warrant its outright
dismissal. These deficiencies are as follows: (a) petitioner Republic failed to
include the pertinent portions of the record that would support its arguments under
Rule 45, Section 4 (d) of the Rules of Court, specifically the Appellees Brief of
respondents Vegas in the appellate proceedings; and (b) it raised questions of fact,
which are beyond the purview of a Rule 45 Petition.
[7]

The Court is not persuaded by respondents arguments concerning the
purported defects of the Petition.
First, petitioner Republics failure to attach a copy of respondents Vegas
Appellees Brief to the instant Petition is not a fatal mistake, which merits the
immediate dismissal of a Rule 45 Petition. The requirement that a petition for
review on certiorari should be accompanied by such material portions of the
record as would support the petition is left to the discretion of the party filing the
petition.
[8]
Except for the duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment
sought to be appealed from,
[9]
there are no other records from the court a quo that
must perforce be attached before the Court can take cognizance of a Rule 45
petition.
Respondents cannot fault petitioner Republic for excluding pleadings,
documents or records in the lower court, which to their mind would assist this
Court in deciding whether the Decision appealed from is sound. Petitioner
Republic is left to its own estimation of the case in deciding which records would
support its Petition and should thus be attached thereto. In any event, respondents
are not prevented from attaching to their pleadings pertinent portions of the records
that they deem necessary for the Courts evaluation of the case, as was done by
respondents Vegas in this case when they attached their Appellees Brief to their
Comment. In the end, it is the Court, in finally resolving the merits of the suit that
will ultimately decide whether the material portions of the records attached are
sufficient to support the Petition.
Second, the Petition raises a question of law, and not a question of fact.
Petitioner Republic simply takes issue against the conclusions made by the trial
and the appellate courts regarding the nature and character of the subject parcel of
land, based on the evidence presented. When petitioner asks for a review of the
16

decisions made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving
into their probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support the legal
conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.
In New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.) Inc. v. Fermina S. Abad and Rafael
Susan,
[10]
the Court reiterated the distinction between a question of law and a
question of fact in this wise:

We reiterate the distinction between a question of law and a question of
fact. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of
fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts
or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole, and the probability of the situation. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Republic is not calling for an examination of the probative value
or truthfulness of the evidence presented, specifically the testimony of Mr.
Gonzales. It, however, questions whether the evidence on record is sufficient to
support the lower courts conclusion that the subject land is alienable and
disposable. Otherwise stated, considering the evidence presented by respondents
Vegas in the proceedings below, were the trial and the appellate courts justified
under the law and jurisprudence in their findings on the nature and character of the
subject land? Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of law, which calls for a
resolution of what is the correct and applicable law to a given set of facts.
Going now to the substantial merits, petitioner Republic places before the
Court the question of whether, based on the evidence on record, respondents Vegas
have sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Was
it erroneous for the Court of Appeals to have affirmed the trial courts grant of
registration applied for by respondents Vegas over the subject land? We find no
reversible error on the part of either the trial court or the Court of Appeals.

Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, provides for the instances when a person may file for an application for
registration of title over a parcel of land:
17


Section 14. Who May Apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. x x x.


Thus, pursuant to the afore-quoted provision of law, applicants for
registration of title must prove the following: (1) that the subject land forms part
of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or
earlier.
[11]
Section 14 (1) of the law requires that the property sought to be
registered is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration is filed.
[12]

Raising no issue with respect to respondents Vegas open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land in the present Petition, the
Court will limit its focus on the first requisite: specifically, whether it has
sufficiently been demonstrated that the subject land is alienable and disposable.
Unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable,
occupation of the same in the concept of an owner - no matter how long -cannot
ripen into ownership and result in a title; public lands not shown to have been
classified as alienable and disposable lands remain part of the inalienable domain
and cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
[13]

Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed; they call
for proof.
[14]
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of
the government, such as any of the following: a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; other administrative actions; investigation reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigator; or a legislative act or statute.
[15]
The applicant may also secure
18

a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and
disposable.
[16]

Previously, a certification from the DENR that a lot was alienable and
disposable was sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the property
and enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence.
[17]

However, in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,
[18]
the Supreme Court
overturned the grant by the lower courts of an original application for registration
over a parcel of land in Batangas and ruled that a CENRO certification
is not enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable:

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a
land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove
that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of
the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications
presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable
and disposable. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, as it now stands, aside from a CENRO certification, an application for
original registration of title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records in order to establish that the land
indeed is alienable and disposable.
[19]

To comply with the first requisite for an application for original registration
of title under the Property Registration Decree, respondents Vegas should have
submitted a CENRO certification and a certified true copy of the original
classification by the DENR Secretary that the land is alienable and disposable,
together with their application. However, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
respondents Vegas failed to submit a CENRO certification -- much less an original
classification by the DENR Secretary -- to prove that the land is classified as
19

alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
[20]
If the stringent rule imposed
in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., is to be followed, the absence of these twin
certifications justifies a denial of an application for registration. Significantly,
however, the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., was
issued after the decisions of the trial court
[21]
and the appellate court
[22]
in this case.
Recently, however, in Republic v. Serrano,
[23]
the Court affirmed the
findings of the trial and the appellate courts that the parcel of land subject of
registration was alienable and disposable. The Court held that a DENR Regional
Technical Directors certification, which is annotated on the subdivision plan
submitted in evidence, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal
requirement:
While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally
attest to the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for,the
Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as
annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita,
constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly
indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and
disposable area as early as July 18, 1925.

The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any
evidence to the contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or
registered by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest
respondents' applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot
are inalienable. There being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced,
the benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor of
respondents. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is alienable
and disposable are a certification from the CENRO or Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) and a certified true copy of the DENRs
original classification of the land. The Court, however, has nonetheless recognized
and affirmed applications for land registration on other substantial and convincing
evidence duly presented without any opposition from the LRA or the DENR on the
ground of substantial compliance.
Applying these precedents, the Court finds that despite the absence of a
certification by the CENRO and a certified true copy of the original classification
by the DENR Secretary, there has been substantial compliance with the
20

requirement to show that the subject land is indeed alienable and disposable based
on the evidence on record.
First, respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of the CENRO
who testified that the subject land is alienable and disposable, and who identified
his written report on his inspection of the subject land.
In the Report,
[24]
Mr. Gonzales attested under oath that (1) the area is
entirely within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project
No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on 31 December 1925;
[25]
(2) the land has
never been forfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes; (3) the
land is not within a previously patented/decreed/titled property;
[26]
(4) there are no
public land application/s filed by the applicant for the same land;
[27]
and (5) the
land is residential/commercial.
[28]
That Mr. Gonzales appeared and testified before
an open court only added to the reliability of the Report, which classified the
subject land as alienable and disposable public land. The Court affirms the Court
of Appeals conclusion that Mr. Gonzales testimony and written report under oath
constituted substantial evidence to support their claim as to the nature of the
subject land.
Second, Subdivision Plan Csd-04-02433-6, formally offered as evidence by
respondents-intervenors Buhays,
[29]
expressly indicates that the land is alienable
and disposable. Similar to Republic v. Serrano, Mr. Samson G. de Leon, the
officer-in-charge of the Office of the Assistant Regional Executive Director for
Operations of the DENR, approved the said subdivision plan, which was annotated
with the following proviso: [T]his survey is inside alienable and disposable area
as per Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on Dec. 31, 1925. Notably,
Mr. De Leons annotation pertaining to the identification of the land as alienable
and disposable coincides with the investigation report of Mr. Gonzales.
Finally, upon being informed of respondents Vegas application for original
registration, the LRA never raised the issue that the land subject of registration was
not alienable and disposable. In the Supplementary Report submitted during the
trial court proceedings,
[30]
the LRA did not interpose any objection to the
application on the basis of the nature of the land. It simply noted that the subject
subdivision plan (Psu-51460) had also been applied for in Case No. 1469, GLRO
Record No. 32505, but that there was no decree of registration issued therefor.
Thus, the LRA recommended that should the instant case be given due course, the
21

application in Case No. 1469, GLRO Record No. 32505 with respect to plan Psu-
51460 be dismissed. In addition, not only did the government fail to cross-
examine Mr. Gonzales, it likewise chose not to present any countervailing
evidence to support its opposition. In contrast to the other cases brought before this
Court,
[31]
no opposition was raised by any interested government body, aside from
the pro forma opposition filed by the OSG.
The onus in proving that the land is alienable and disposable still remains
with the applicant in an original registration proceeding; and the government, in
opposing the purported nature of the land, need not adduce evidence to prove
otherwise.
[32]
In this case though, there was no effective opposition, except the pro
forma opposition of the OSG, to contradict the applicants claim as to the character
of the public land as alienable and disposable. The absence of any effective
opposition from the government, when coupled with respondents other pieces of
evidence on record persuades this Court to rule in favor of respondents.
In the instant Petition, petitioner Republic also assails the failure of Mr.
Gonzales to testify as to when the land was declared as alienable and disposable.
Indeed, his testimony in open court is bereft of any detail as to when the land was
classified as alienable and disposable public land, as well as the date when he
conducted the investigation. However, these matters could have been dealt with
extensively during cross-examination, which petitioner Republic waived because
of its repeated absences and failure to present counter evidence.
[33]
In any event, the
Report, as well as the Subdivision Plan, readily reveals that the subject land was
certified as alienable and disposable as early as 31 December 1925 and was even
classified as residential and commercial in nature.
Thus, the Court finds that the evidence presented by respondents Vegas,
coupled with the absence of any countervailing evidence by petitioner Republic,
substantially establishes that the land applied for is alienable and disposable and is
the subject of original registration proceedings under the Property Registration
Decree. There was no reversible error on the part of either the trial court or the
appellate court in granting the registration.
Respondents-intervenors Buhays title to that portion of the subject land is
likewise affirmed, considering that the joint claim of respondents-intervenors
Buhays over the land draws its life from the same title of respondents Vegas, who
22

in turn failed to effectively oppose the claimed sale of that portion of the land to
the formers predecessors-in-interest.
It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance
applies pro hac vice. It does not in any way detract from our rulings in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc., and similar cases which impose a strict requirement to
prove that the public land is alienable and disposable, especially in this case when
the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals were rendered prior to
these rulings.
[34]
To establish that the land subject of the application is alienable
and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all applications for original
registration under the Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a
CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original
classification made by the DENR Secretary.
As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based
solely on the evidence presented on record - may approve the application, pro hac
vice, on the ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a
positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an
absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only
apply to applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior
to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated 30 April 2007 and the trial courts Decision
dated 18 November 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.





MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice




WE CONCUR:
23





CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson



ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice



MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice


A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the Opinion of the
Courts Division.


CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division


C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.


24



RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice



[1]
Rollo at 28-40.
[2]
TSN, 24 July 2000, at 5-6.
[3]
Exhibit CC (Report dated 13 January 1997), Regional Trial Court records at 125.
[4]
Motion for Intervention dated 14 August 1998 and Opposition dated 14 April 1998 (Exhibits 7 and 8),
Regional Trial Court records, at 158-170.
[5]
Exhibit 1, Regional Trial Court records, at 167-168.
[6]
Exhibit 5, Regional Trial Court records, at 418.
[7]
Comment dated 03 September 2007, rollo at 44-55.
[8]
Rule 45, Sec. 4 (d) of the Rules of Court.
[9]
The petition shall (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the
judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of
plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the petition; (Rule 45, Sec. 1 [d]
of the Rules of Court)
[10]
G.R. No. 161818, 20 August 2008, 562 SCRA 503.
[11]
Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172102, 02 July 2010; Lim v. Republic, G.R.
Nos. 158630 & 162047, 04 September 2009, 598 SCRA 247; Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, G.R. No. 159589, 23
December 2008, 575 SCRA 51; Llanes v. Republic, G.R. No. 177947, 27 November 2008, 572 SCRA 258; Republic
v. Diloy, G.R. No. 174633, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 413; Ong v. Republic, G.R. No. 175746, 12 March 2008,
548 SCRA 160; Republic v. Lao, G.R. No. 150413, 01 July 2003, 405 SCRA 291.
[12]
Republic v. Diloy, G.R. No. 174633, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 413; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
144057, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.
[13]
Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, G.R. No. 159589, 23 December 2008, 575 SCRA 51; Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, G.R. Nos. 167707 & 173775, 08 October, 2008, 568
SCRA 164.
[14]
Republic v. Naguiat, G.R. No. 134209, 24 January 2006, 479 SCRA 585, citing Director of Lands v. Funtilar,
142 SCRA 57 (1986).
[15]
Republic v. Candymaker, Inc., G.R. No. 163766, 22 June 2006, 492 SCRA 272, citing Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 440 Phil. 697, 710-711 (2002); Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 177797, 04 December 2008, 573 SCRA
89; Buenaventura v. Pascual, G.R. No. 168819, 27 November 2008, 572 SCRA 143; Republic v. Muoz, G.R. No.
151910, 15 October 2007, 536 SCRA 108.
[16]
Republic v. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, 26 September 2006, 503 SCRA 91; Zarate v. Director of
Lands, G.R. No. 131501, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 322.
[17]
Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 177797, 04 December 2008, 573 SCRA 89; Spouses Recto v. Republic, G.R.
No. 160421, 04 October 2004, 440 SCRA 79.
[18]
G.R. No. 154953, 26 June 2008, 555 SCRA 477.
[19]
See Republic v. Heirs of Fabio, supra note 11; Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation, G.R. No.
172102, 02 July 2010; Republic v. Roche, G.R. No. 175846, 06 July 2010.
[20]
CA Decision, at 12; rollo at 39.
[21]
RTC Decision dated 18 November 2003.
[22]
CA Decision dated 30 April 2007; rollo at 28-40.
[23]
G.R. No. 183063, 24 February 2010.
[24]
Exhibit CC, Regional Trial Court records, at 125.
[25]
Exhibit CC-1, id.
25

[26]
Exhibit CC-2, id.
[27]
Exhibit CC-3, id.
[28]
Exhibit CC-4, id.
[29]
Exhibit 5, Regional Trial Court records at 418.
[30]
Exhibit AA, Regional Trial Court records at 107-108.
[31]
In Republic v. Roche, G.R. No. 175846, 06 July 2010, the Laguna Lake Development Authority also opposed
Roche's application on the ground that, based on technical descriptions, her land was located below the reglamentary
lake elevation of 12.50 meters and, therefore, may be deemed part of the Laguna Lake bed under Section 41 of
Republic Act No. 4850. InRepublic v. Hanover, supra note 19, the Republic was represented by the OSG and the
DENR in opposing the application for registration.
[32]
Republic v. Roche, G.R. No. 175846, 06 July 2010.
[33]
Decision dated 18 November 2003, Regional Trial Court records at 442-443.
[34]
As earlier stated, the RTC and CA Rulings were promulgated before Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154953 June 26, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review
1
assailing the 21 August 2002 Decision
2
of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 16 December 1999
Decision
3
of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land
Registration Case No. T-635.
The Antecedent Facts
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties,
Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion of the
consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre. The land, with an area of 564,007 square
meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999.
The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue,
Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794,
4
and in the 18 October 1999 issue of Peoples Journal
Taliba,
5
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was also
posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas,
26

Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the land.
6
All adjoining owners and all government
agencies and offices concerned were notified of the initial hearing.
7

On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was no oppositor
other than the Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the Republic of the Philippines represented by
the Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order
8
of General
Default against the whole world except as against petitioner.
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) appeared as oppositor.
The trial court gave Carandang until 29 November 1999 within which to file his written
opposition.
9
Carandang failed to file his written opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings.
In an Order
10
dated 13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated the Order of General Default.
During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent presented three
witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Torres), respondents Operations Manager and its authorized
representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista (Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.
The testimonies of respondents witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had
peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since
1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On
27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his
children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of
land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was
adjudicated to one of Antonios children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting).
11
On 8 August 1997, Porting
sold the land to respondent.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.
The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of land
provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or more.
The trial court ruled that the facts showed that respondents predecessors-in-interest possessed the
land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession converted the land to
private property.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court
hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741, situated in Barangay of San Bartolome, Municipality of
Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of and in
the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws with principal office at 19
th
Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de
Roxas, Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be
issued.
27

SO ORDERED.
12

Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in
granting the application for registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of possession and occupation as required by
law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general in nature.
Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses should have been
presented to corroborate Evangelistas testimony.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial courts Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelistas knowledge of the possession and occupation of the
land stemmed not only from the fact that he worked there for three years but also because he and
Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On Evangelistas failure to mention the name of his
uncle who continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista should not
be faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle when he testified. The Court of Appeals also ruled
that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunatos relation to Kabesang Puroy, but
this did not affect Evangelistas statement that Fortunato took over the possession and cultivation of
the land after Kabesang Puroys death. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the events regarding
the acquisition and disposition of the land became public knowledge because San Bartolome was a
small community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner
failed to cite any law requiring the corroboration of the sole witness testimony.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he was only testifying
on the fact that he had caused the filing of the application for registration and that respondent
acquired the land from Porting.
Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals Decision. Petitioner raises the
following grounds in its Memorandum:
The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title to applicant corporation
despite the following:
1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or
earlier; and
2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land.
13

The Issues
The issues may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945
or earlier; and
28

3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land
Act.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Respondent Failed to Prove
that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land forms part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent failed to
prove that the land is no longer part of the public domain.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably
belong to the State.
14
The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.
15

In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,
16
certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116
square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land
Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second certification
17
in the form
of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest
Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an
alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925
per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20,
18
dated 30 May 1988,
delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of
1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land
classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38,
19
dated 19 April 1990,
amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the
CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the
authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50
hectares.
20
In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot
10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot
10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond
the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue
certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public
infrastructure projects; and
29

4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas
for public infrastructure projects; and
5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public
infrastructure projects.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent.
The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to
testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as
proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible
in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as
follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO
is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring
30

public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official
publication
21
of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the
fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class
of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications
do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such
as entries made by the Civil Registrar
22
in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ships
logbook.
23
The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original
official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of
public documents.
24
The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus
have no probative value.
25
Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot
10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such
government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein.
26
Such
government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second
sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due
execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness
does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein.
27
Here, Torres, a private individual and
respondents representative, identified the certifications but the government officials who issued the
certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be
given probative value.
28
The contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was
incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the certifications.
29
Torres did not prepare the
certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any
verification survey whether the land falls within the area classified by the DENR Secretary as
alienable and disposable.
Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became alienable and
disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land
became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print
plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the
Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925,
the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and the
metes and bounds of the land described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature and
classification of the land involved."
30
It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on
the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is
not sufficient proof of the lands classification.
31
However, respondent should have at least presented
proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer
31

II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the
technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineers
certification were faithful reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not
explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why
the date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the other certifications submitted by
respondent.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Petitioner alleges that the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was
misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelistas statement that the possession of respondents
predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world
was a general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of possession of title. Petitioner alleges
that respondent failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly,
continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and disposable.
We agree with petitioner.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945. Yet,
Evangelista only worked on the land for three years. Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot
near Kabesang Puroys land. The Court of Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelistas
knowledge of Kabesang Puroys possession of the land stemmed "not only from the fact that he had
worked thereat but more so that they were practically neighbors."
32
The Court of Appeals observed:
In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult
to understand that people in the said community knows each and everyone. And, because of
such familiarity with each other, news or events regarding the acquisition or disposition for
that matter, of a vast tract of land spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event
became of public knowledge to them.
33

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted that
he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather
unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not also know the relationship between
Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelistas testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial
court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one of
Antonios children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelistas testimony.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness
needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelistas uncorroborated testimony
insufficient to prove that respondents predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in
the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres as
sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondents acquisition of the land.
While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land was
hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership.
34
Respondent did not
present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the
claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the
realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or
possession of the land only in that year.
32

Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of
the public domain in this case.
We agree with petitioner.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by
law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and
subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the
size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and
the conditions therefor.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
35
the Court traced the law on
disposition of lands of the public domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition
against private corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the
alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Under the
1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer
allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the
prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
36
The Court explained in Chavez:
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the
1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands
of the public domain only through lease. x x x x
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have
simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could
acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could
acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973
Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the
name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the
farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs
would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This
would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one
generation to the next.
33

In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public
domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area
of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more
alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would
allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the
public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of
only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This
constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent
is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an
ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this
constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals.
This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.
37

In Director of Lands v. IAC,
38
the Court allowed the land registration proceeding filed by Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with an area of 481,390 square meters,
or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that
case was whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the proceeding was instituted
after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations or associations
from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The
Court ruled that the land was already private land when Acme acquired it from its owners in
1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations
could acquire public agricultural lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire
not more than 144 hectares.
39

In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of
alienable land for the period prescribed by law created the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period,ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases
to be public land and becomes private property. The Court ruled:
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of
public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of
an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "x x
x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x." No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth
be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not
confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would
not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion
already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete.
x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of (30 years
under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse
or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed
34

facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was
acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there
being at the time no prohibition against said corporations holding or owning private land. x x
x.
40
(Emphasis supplied)
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the "land x x x was
already private property at the time it was acquired x x x by Acme." In this case, respondent
acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has
not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for
30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land
was not yet private property.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of alienable and
disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the land when its transferor had already a
vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse
possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12 June 1945. Thus,
in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,
41
the Court declared:
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land in question
had already been converted to private ownership through acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the latter purchased them in 1979. All that was
needed was the confirmation of the titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-interest
of TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973
Constitution against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except
through lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to them for they were
no longer alienable lands of the public domain but private property.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for
land registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private land by
operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed.
The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the
statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such acquisitive
prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of
the public domain.
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under the doctrine
in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 9176
42
(RA 9176) further amended the Public Land Act
43
and
extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete
titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time,
not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this
Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does
not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time
designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-five of this Act shall
apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section
35

shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said persons from acting under this
Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.
Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be
treated as having been filed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only acquire not more
than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of
an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since
respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area of 44.4007 hectares is
contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot
have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of
course, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had
already become private land by operation of law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove
that any portion of the land was already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting in
1997.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas,
Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the application for registration filed by
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
36

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes
1
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
Rollo, pp. 63-70. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with Associate
Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring.
3
Id. at 56-61. Penned by Judge Flordelis Ozaeta Navarro.
4
Records, p. 78.
5
Id. at 81.
6
Id. at 66.
7
Id. at 69.
8
Id. at 99.
9
Id. at 101.
10
Id. at 111.
11
Also referred to as Forting.
12
Rollo, pp. 60-61.
13
Id. at 173-174.
14
Republic v. Naguiat, G.R. No. 134209, 24 January 2006, 479 SCRA 585.
15
Id.
16
Records, p. 143. Signed by CENR Officer Pancrasio M. Alcantara.
17
Id. at 91. Signed by Wilfredo M. Ria.
18
Delineation of Regulatory Functions and Authorities.
19
Revised Regulations on the Delineation of Functions and Delineation of Authorities.
20
On 2 June 1998, DAO No. 98-24 was issued, adopting a DENR Manual of Approvals
delegating authorities and delineating functions in the DENR Central and Field Offices. DAO
No. 98-24 superseded DAO Nos. 38 and 38-A and all inconsistent orders and circulars
37

involving delegated authority. DAO No. 98-24 is silent on the authority to issue certificates of
land classification status, whether for areas below 50 hectares or for lands covering over 50
hectares. The CENRO certification in this case was issued prior to the adoption of the DENR
Manual of Approvals.
21
Salic v. Comelec, 469 Phil. 775 (2004).
22
Article 410, Civil Code.
23
Haverton Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC, 220 Phil. 356 (1985).
24
Delfin v. Billones, G.R. No. 146550, 17 March 2006, 485 SCRA 38.
25
Ambayec v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162780, 21 June 2005, 460 SCRA 537.
26
Supra note 23.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
People v. Patamama, 321 Phil. 193 (1995).
30
Rollo, p. 152.
31
Menguito v. Republic, 401 Phil. 274 (2000).
32
Rollo, p. 67.
33
Id. at 68.
34
Ganila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150755, 28 June 2005, 461 SCRA 435.
35
433 Phil. 506 (2002).
36
Id.
37
Id. at 557-559.
38
230 Phil. 590 (1986).
39
Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provides: "No private corporation or
association may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand
and twenty four hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess
of one hundred and forty four hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and twenty
four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing,
not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or
association."
40
230 Phil. 590, 602 and 605 (1986).
38

41
G.R. No. 88233, 4 October 1991, 202 SCRA 493.
42
Approved on 13 November 2002. An earlier law, Republic Act No. 6940, had extended the
period up to 31 December 2000 under the same conditions.
43
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
Tuesday, May 1, 2012
Serrano vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 96 SCRA 96 , No. L-30511, February 14, 1980
Posted by Alchemy Business Center and Marketing Consultancy at 9:57 PM Labels: 1980, 96 SCRA 96,
Civil Law Review, February 14, No. L-30511, Serrano vs. Central Bank of the Philippines

Serrano vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 96 SCRA 96 , No. L-30511, February 14, 1980

G.R. No. L-30511 February 14, 1980
MANUEL M. SERRANO, petitioner,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES; OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA; EMERITO M. RAMOS, SUSANA B.
RAMOS, EMERITO B. RAMOS, JR., JOSEFA RAMOS DELA RAMA, HORACIO DELA RAMA, ANTONIO B.
RAMOS, FILOMENA RAMOS LEDESMA, RODOLFO LEDESMA, VICTORIA RAMOS TANJUATCO, and TEOFILO
TANJUATCO, respondents.
Rene Diokno for petitioner.
F.E. Evangelista & Glecerio T. Orsolino for respondent Central Bank of the Philippines.
Feliciano C. Tumale, Pacifico T. Torres and Antonio B. Periquet for respondent Overseas Bank of Manila.
Josefina G. Salonga for all other respondents.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
Petition for mandamus and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, that seeks the establishment of
joint and solidary liability to the amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos, with interest, against
respondent Central Bank of the Philippines and Overseas Bank of Manila and its stockholders, on the
alleged failure of the Overseas Bank of Manila to return the time deposits made by petitioner and
assigned to him, on the ground that respondent Central Bank failed in its duty to exercise strict
39

supervision over respondent Overseas Bank of Manila to protect depositors and the general public. 1
Petitioner also prays that both respondent banks be ordered to execute the proper and necessary
documents to constitute all properties fisted in Annex "7" of the Answer of respondent Central Bank of
the Philippines in G.R. No. L-29352, entitled "Emerita M. Ramos, et al vs. Central Bank of the
Philippines," into a trust fund in favor of petitioner and all other depositors of respondent Overseas
Bank of Manila. It is also prayed that the respondents be prohibited permanently from honoring,
implementing, or doing any act predicated upon the validity or efficacy of the deeds of mortgage,
assignment. and/or conveyance or transfer of whatever nature of the properties listed in Annex "7" of
the Answer of respondent Central Bank in G.R. No. 29352. 2
A sought for ex-parte preliminary injunction against both respondent banks was not given by this Court.
Undisputed pertinent facts are:
On October 13, 1966 and December 12, 1966, petitioner made a time deposit, for one year with 6%
interest, of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) with the respondent Overseas Bank of
Manila. 3 Concepcion Maneja also made a time deposit, for one year with 6-% interest, on March 6,
1967, of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the same respondent Overseas Bank of
Manila. 4
On August 31, 1968, Concepcion Maneja, married to Felixberto M. Serrano, assigned and conveyed to
petitioner Manuel M. Serrano, her time deposit of P200,000.00 with respondent Overseas Bank of
Manila. 5
Notwithstanding series of demands for encashment of the aforementioned time deposits from the
respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, dating from December 6, 1967 up to March 4, 1968, not a single
one of the time deposit certificates was honored by respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. 6
Respondent Central Bank admits that it is charged with the duty of administering the banking system of
the Republic and it exercises supervision over all doing business in the Philippines, but denies the
petitioner's allegation that the Central Bank has the duty to exercise a most rigid and stringent
supervision of banks, implying that respondent Central Bank has to watch every move or activity of all
banks, including respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. Respondent Central Bank claims that as of March
12, 1965, the Overseas Bank of Manila, while operating, was only on a limited degree of banking
operations since the Monetary Board decided in its Resolution No. 322, dated March 12, 1965, to
prohibit the Overseas Bank of Manila from making new loans and investments in view of its chronic
reserve deficiencies against its deposit liabilities. This limited operation of respondent Overseas Bank of
Manila continued up to 1968. 7
Respondent Central Bank also denied that it is guarantor of the permanent solvency of any banking
institution as claimed by petitioner. It claims that neither the law nor sound banking supervision
requires respondent Central Bank to advertise or represent to the public any remedial measures it may
impose upon chronic delinquent banks as such action may inevitably result to panic or bank "runs". In
40

the years 1966-1967, there were no findings to declare the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as
insolvent. 8
Respondent Central Bank likewise denied that a constructive trust was created in favor of petitioner and
his predecessor in interest Concepcion Maneja when their time deposits were made in 1966 and 1967
with the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as during that time the latter was not an insolvent bank
and its operation as a banking institution was being salvaged by the respondent Central Bank. 9
Respondent Central Bank avers no knowledge of petitioner's claim that the properties given by
respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as additional collaterals to respondent Central Bank of the
Philippines for the former's overdrafts and emergency loans were acquired through the use of
depositors' money, including that of the petitioner and Concepcion Maneja. 10
In G.R. No. L-29362, entitled "Emerita M. Ramos, et al. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines," a case was
filed by the petitioner Ramos, wherein respondent Overseas Bank of Manila sought to prevent
respondent Central Bank from closing, declaring the former insolvent, and liquidating its assets.
Petitioner Manuel Serrano in this case, filed on September 6, 1968, a motion to intervene in G.R. No. L-
29352, on the ground that Serrano had a real and legal interest as depositor of the Overseas Bank of
Manila in the matter in litigation in that case. Respondent Central Bank in G.R. No. L-29352 opposed
petitioner Manuel Serrano's motion to intervene in that case, on the ground that his claim as depositor
of the Overseas Bank of Manila should properly be ventilated in the Court of First Instance, and if this
Court were to allow Serrano to intervene as depositor in G.R. No. L-29352, thousands of other
depositors would follow and thus cause an avalanche of cases in this Court. In the resolution dated
October 4, 1968, this Court denied Serrano's, motion to intervene. The contents of said motion to
intervene are substantially the same as those of the present petition. 11
This Court rendered decision in G.R. No. L-29352 on October 4, 1971, which became final and executory
on March 3, 1972, favorable to the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, with the dispositive portion to
wit:
WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for in the petition are hereby granted and respondent Central Bank's
resolution Nos. 1263, 1290 and 1333 (that prohibit the Overseas Bank of Manila to participate in
clearing, direct the suspension of its operation, and ordering the liquidation of said bank) are hereby
annulled and set aside; and said respondent Central Bank of the Philippines is directed to comply with its
obligations under the Voting Trust Agreement, and to desist from taking action in violation therefor.
Costs against respondent Central Bank of the Philippines. 12
Because of the above decision, petitioner in this case filed a motion for judgment in this case, praying
for a decision on the merits, adjudging respondent Central Bank jointly and severally liable with
respondent Overseas Bank of Manila to the petitioner for the P350,000 time deposit made with the
latter bank, with all interests due therein; and declaring all assets assigned or mortgaged by the
respondents Overseas Bank of Manila and the Ramos groups in favor of the Central Bank as trust funds
for the benefit of petitioner and other depositors. 13
41

By the very nature of the claims and causes of action against respondents, they in reality are recovery of
time deposits plus interest from respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, and recovery of damages against
respondent Central Bank for its alleged failure to strictly supervise the acts of the other respondent Bank
and protect the interests of its depositors by virtue of the constructive trust created when respondent
Central Bank required the other respondent to increase its collaterals for its overdrafts said emergency
loans, said collaterals allegedly acquired through the use of depositors money. These claims shoud be
ventilated in the Court of First Instance of proper jurisdiction as We already pointed out when this Court
denied petitioner's motion to intervene in G.R. No. L-29352. Claims of these nature are not proper in
actions for mandamus and prohibition as there is no shown clear abuse of discretion by the Central Bank
in its exercise of supervision over the other respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, and if there was,
petitioner here is not the proper party to raise that question, but rather the Overseas Bank of Manila, as
it did in G.R. No. L-29352. Neither is there anything to prohibit in this case, since the questioned acts of
the respondent Central Bank (the acts of dissolving and liquidating the Overseas Bank of Manila), which
petitioner here intends to use as his basis for claims of damages against respondent Central Bank, had
been accomplished a long time ago.
Furthermore, both parties overlooked one fundamental principle in the nature of bank deposits when
the petitioner claimed that there should be created a constructive trust in his favor when the
respondent Overseas Bank of Manila increased its collaterals in favor of respondent Central Bank for the
former's overdrafts and emergency loans, since these collaterals were acquired by the use of depositors'
money.
Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits. They are really loans because they earn interest. All
kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be treated as loans and are to be
covered by the law on loans. 14 Current and savings deposit are loans to a bank because it can use the
same. The petitioner here in making time deposits that earn interests with respondent Overseas Bank of
Manila was in reality a creditor of the respondent Bank and not a depositor. The respondent Bank was in
turn a debtor of petitioner. Failure of he respondent Bank to honor the time deposit is failure to pay s
obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from depositary's failure to return the subject
matter of the deposit
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Antonio, Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Barredo (Chairman) J., concur in the judgment on the of the concurring opinion of Justice Aquino.



42

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:
The petitioner prayed that the Central Bank be ordered to pay his time deposits of P350,000, plus
interests, which he could not recover from the distressed Overseas Bank of Manila, and to declare all
the assets assigned or mortgaged by that bank and the Ramos group to the Central Bank as trust
properties for the benefit of the petitioner and other depositors.
The petitioner has no causes of action agianst the Central Bank to obtain those reliefs. They cannot be
granted in petitioner's instant original actions in this Court for mandamus and prohibition. It is not the
Central Bank's ministerial duty to pay petitioner's time deposits or to hold the mortgaged properties in
trust for the depositors of the Overseas Bank of Manila. The petitioner has no cause of action for
prohibition, a remedy usually available against any tribunal, board, corporation or person exercising
judicial or ministerial functions.
Since the Overseas Bank of Manila was found to be insolvent and the Superintendent of Banks was
ordered to take over its assets preparatory to its liquidation under section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 (p.
197, Rollo, Manifestation of September 19, 1973), petitioner's remedy is to file his claim in the
liquidating proceeding (Central Bank vs. Morfe, L-38427, March 12, 1975, 63 SCRA 114; Hernandez vs.
Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., L-29791, January 10, 1978, 81 SCRA 75).


Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The petitioner prayed that the Central Bank be ordered to pay his time deposits of P350,000, plus
interests, which he could not recover from the distressed Overseas Bank of Manila, and to declare all
the assets assigned or mortgaged by that bank and the Ramos group to the Central Bank as trust
properties for the benefit of the petitioner and other depositors.
The petitioner has no causes of action agianst the Central Bank to obtain those reliefs. They cannot be
granted in petitioner's instant original actions in this Court for mandamus and prohibition. It is not the
Central Bank's ministerial duty to pay petitioner's time deposits or to hold the mortgaged properties in
trust for the depositors of the Overseas Bank of Manila. The petitioner has no cause of action for
prohibition, a remedy usually available against any tribunal, board, corporation or person exercising
judicial or ministerial functions.
Since the Overseas Bank of Manila was found to be insolvent and the Superintendent of Banks was
ordered to take over its assets preparatory to its liquidation under section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 (p.
43

197, Rollo, Manifestation of September 19, 1973), petitioner's remedy is to file his claim in the
liquidating proceeding (Central Bank vs. Morfe, L-38427, March 12, 1975, 63 SCRA 114; Hernandez vs.
Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., L-29791, January 10, 1978, 81 SCRA 75).
Footnotes
1 pp. 1-10, rollo.
2 p. 10, Id.
3 pp. 12-13, Id.
4 pp. 12-13, Id.
5 p. 14, Id.
6 p. 15, Id.
7 pp- 18-19, Id.
8 pp, 19-20, Id.
9 pp- 22-24, Id.
10 pp. 24-25, Id.
11 pp. 26-27, Id.
12 p. 193, Id.
13 pp. 183-187, Id.
14 Art. 1980, Civil Code, Gullas vs. Phil. National Bank, 62 Phil. 519