CHAVEZ vs PEA

FACTS: Government signed a contract with CDCP to reclaim certain

foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay which also included the
construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP
obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of
the total reclaimed land.

Pres. Marcos created and tasked PEA to reclaim land, including foreshore
and submerged areas and to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any
and all kinds of lands. By virtue of PD No. 1085, he transferred to PEA the
lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay.

Then President Aquino issued Special Patent granting and transferring to
PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under MCCRR Project. Subsequently,
the Register of Deeds of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Titles in
the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
Freedom Islands.

PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands through negotiation without public bidding. The JVA also
required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas
surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan. The BOD of PEA and Pres. Ramos approved the JVA.

Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams. As a
result joint investigation was conducted and found out that JVA is illegal
for alienating reclaimed lands which is land of public domain.

Pres. Ramos created a task force to investigate the legality of JVA, which
tasked force upheld the legality of JVA contrary to conclusions reached by
Senate committees. Inquirer and Today published reports that there were
on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued
by then President Fidel V. Ramos.

Chavez, petitioner as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order contending that:

a. government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of
the reclaimed lands to AMARI

b. praying public disclosure of terms of any negotiation pursuant to
right of people to information on matters of public concern.

c. assailing also the sale of PEA to AMARI of lands of the public
domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public
domain to private corporations.

PEA and AMARI signed the Amended JVA and the office of the Pres.
approved under the administration of then Pres. Estrada approved the
Amended JVA.


Due to the approval of the Amended JVA petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be
declared null and void.
ISSUES:

I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE
MOOT AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;

II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE
THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;

III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;

IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;

V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES
OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL
AGREEMENT;

VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS,
RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; AND

VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE
OF WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY
DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

HELD: First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the
petition are moot and academic because of subsequent events.

We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and
its approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and
divest the Court of its jurisdiction.

PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer
to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds
necessarily includes preventing its implementation.

Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent
the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the
Constitution.

Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot,
the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues
raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and
the public.

The instant petition is a case of first impression.

There is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised
in this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to
AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands.

Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to
observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts.

Principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving
factual questions.

The instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental
importance to the public.

The Court can resolve this case without
determining any factual issue related to the case.

Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies.

We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply in the instant case.

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply
when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question.

The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to
acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban
prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private
corporations.

Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit

Since the instant petition brought by a citizen involves the
enforcement of constitutional rights - to information and to the
equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental
public importance.

The petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes
official information on on-going negotiations before a final
agreement.

Section 7 Art. III and Section 28 Art. II of the Constitution seek to
promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to
exercise effectively other constitutional rights.

The court distinguish between information the law on public bidding
requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional
right to information requires PEA to release to the public.

Govt Auditing Code requires public bidding on matters relating to
the disposition of property of PEA.

So PEA must on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose
to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property.

If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA
this information at any time during the bidding process.

Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals
being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not
immediately accessible under the right to information.

However, once the committee makes its official recommendation,
there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government.

From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any
citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such
definite proposition.

The right to information, however, does not extend to matters
recognized as privileged information.

Since there is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by
petitioner is privileged information, we rule, therefore, that the
constitutional right to information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final contract.

Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer
to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the
Constitution.

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged
areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine.

Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged
to the party undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issued
the necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land
to the State.

Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 provides that property of public
dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to
property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth.

Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889, a not self-executing provision;
declare that property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to
public use or to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the
private property of the State upon declaration of the executive and passing
of a law by the legislative.

Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all
lands reclaimed by the government. It also vests in the government
control and disposition of foreshore lands.

Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the government only if
these lands were no longer needed for public purpose and mandated
public bidding in the lease of government reclaimed lands.

This act made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike
other public lands which the government could sell to private parties;
these reclaimed lands were available only for lease to private parties.



This act did not repeal the provision of Spanish Law of Waters
allowing private parties to reclaim parts of the sea with governments
permission and such reclaimed lands remained private lands.

Act No. 2874 the Public Land Act authorized the Governor-General to
"classify lands of the public domain, to "declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession and also limited alienable or disposable lands
only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified.

This act categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public
domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and
not otherwise.

Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui
generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain that the government could not sell to private parties.

Under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to private parties, unless the
legislature passed a law allowing their sale.
49


It did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea
pursuant to Spanish Law of Waters and lands reclaimed from the sea
by private parties with government permission remained private
lands.

The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and corporations from
acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain
that were classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws.

The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain was
only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could therefore
remove such prohibition.

But the legislature did not repeal Act 2874 but continued the long
established State policy of retaining for the government title and
ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain.

Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
readopted the prohibition in 1935 Constitution of sale of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain.
All these lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other
non-agricultural purposes.

The government could sell to private parties only those lands for non-
agricultural purposes not classified as government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain.

This act states that disposable lands of the public domain intended
for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes
other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the provisions
of this chapter and not otherwise."

Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to
private parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands
of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing
such sale.

One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA
No. 141 exempted government units and entities from the maximum
area of public lands that could be acquired from the State.

These government units and entities should not just turn around and
sell these lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or
statutory limitations.

In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain, CA
No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases
or sales.

CA No. 141 did not repeal Spanish Law of Waters provision allowing
private parties to reclaim portions of the sea with government
permission. However, this time the reclaimed is not automatically a
private land.

It could become private land only after being classified as
alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to
disposition.

The Civil Code of 1950 the government must formally declare that the
property of public dominion is no longer needed for public use or public
service, before the same could be classified as patrimonial property of the
State.

It also included as property of public dominion those properties
without being for public use, are intended for public service or the
"development of the national wealth."

Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State, even if
not employed for public use or public service, if developed to
enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of public
dominion.

1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources
except agricultural lands of the public domain.

Under 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable
lands of the public domain only through lease.
Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands of the public
domain, and private corporations became absolutely barred from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of alienable lands of the
public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only
to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of
the public domain.

PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority

The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain did not apply to PEA
since it was then, and until today, a fully owned government
corporation.

PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold lands of the public
domain" even "in excess of the area permitted to private
corporations by statute." Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands,
as well as title to lands of the public domain.

In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged
alienable lands of the public domain, there must be legislative
authority empowering PEA to sell these lands in view of CA 141.

Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease
its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain.

Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to
the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain.

Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private
individuals.

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution
banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain.

Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only
through lease.

As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the
lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.

The constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable
lands of the public domain.

Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the
maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily
set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An
individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow
him.

The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84
hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and
the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of
Manila Bay.

Under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of
367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name in line
of 70-30% of total net usable area.

To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the
unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint venture PEA's statutory authority,
rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas in
Manila Bay.

The Threshold Issue

The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can
acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed
foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2
and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the
foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands
of the public domain and consequently "owned by the State."

As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated,"
unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain.

The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these
inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain.

Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of
the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of
PEA.

CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and
classified.

There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying
these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession and must not been reserved for some
public or quasi-public use.

PD No. 1085 authorized the issuance of special land patents for lands
reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila
Bay coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special
patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official
proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain.

The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified
parties.

The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands
into alienable or disposable lands open to disposition is necessary
because PEA is tasked under its charter to undertake public services
that require the use of lands of the public domain.

Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held by
the PEA would actually be needed for public use or service since
many of the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute
essential public services.

Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable
or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these
lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA
remain inalienable lands of the public domain.

PEA must observe the provisions of CA No. 141 requiring public
auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from holding a public
auction.
For the Special Patent issued to PEA expressly acknowledge that the
provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by
law.

Executive Order No. 654 which authorizes PEA "to determine the kind
and manner of payment in contracts it entered into for reclamation
does not exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction.

No. 1445, the Government Auditing Code required sale of valuable
government property through public bidding.

It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is
allowed, in which case the Commission on Audit must approve the
selling price.

At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid
for PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the
public domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at the
auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

The failure of public bidding conducted on December 10, 1991, by
PEA involving only 407.84 hectares is not a valid justification for a
negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly
auctioned.

Besides, the failure of public bidding happened more than three years
before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The
economic situation in the country had greatly improved during the
intervening period.

The Ban on Private corporations or associations holding alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease is clear and absolute.

A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical
reclamation of a government project, cannot acquire reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional ban.

Thus whatever repayment Scheme in the contract entered by PEA if
the contractor or developer is a private corporation like AMARI can
only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed lands to
avoid a direct collision with the Constitution.

The issuance of special patent and certificate of title to PEA does
convert the FREEDOM ISLAND into private land contrary to what
defendants contended.

Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely
evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized
modes of acquiring ownership.

Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the
registrant had prior to the registration.


The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens
system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands.

Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be registered
under the Torrens System without losing their character as public
lands.

Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in CA
No. 141 that the land "shall not be alienated, encumbered or
otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress."

The need for legislative authority prevents the registered land of the
public domain from becoming private land that can be disposed of to
qualified private parties.

Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact
remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to "cause the issuance
and delivery of the certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land Share
in the name of AMARI.

This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which provides that private corporations "shall not hold
such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease.

The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void
ab initio.

Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the
issue of whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the
government.

Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is
no necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier
of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters