Submitted by: Dinesh MR (13141) Submitted to: Prof. NR Govinda Sharma
Case Description Carbonated soft drinks (CSDs) are popular drinks constituting very attractive and profitable business for more than a century. This business is capital intensive and was and still dominated for long period by few giants who had patent rights and who gained very high brand recognition over the years. The competition between Coca Cola and Pepsi was very aggressive and caused the industry profitability to fluctuate up and down. The rivalry in this industry was fatal for small concentrate producers as well as small bottlers and lead to merging and acquisitions that left the industry controlled by big players of huge firms. Since the year 2000, the industry is facing a big challenge with the increase in the popularity of the non-CSD drinks especially with the multiple warnings issued by the health organizations against the carbonated soft drinks. With huge market size in US and worldwide, with few giants existing in the market for more than a century mainly Coca and Pepsi controlled more than 70% total of market share and constituted a duopoly market in this industry, with low product price, with perfect setup of the business, with vertical integration pattern and with the huge marketing campaigns that created strong brand names with high customer loyalty.
Analysis through Porters Five Forces Model
Barriers to Entry Barriers to entering the CSD industry began almost as soon as the industry itself, as courts barred imitations and counterfeit versions of Coca-Cola such as Coca-Kola, Koca-Nola, and Cold-Cola, under trademark infringement. In 1916, courts barred 153 of these imitations, demonstrating the prevalence of the desire to enter the CSD industry, as well as the extreme difficulty to do so. This barrier to entry allowed Coca-Cola to dominate and almost single- handedly develop the CSD industry, and almost excluded Pepsi-Cola from the industry, until Pepsi-Cola won the 1941 trademark infringement suit that Coca-Cola had filed against it. The second significant barrier to entry was brand loyalty, created largely by Robert Woodruff who began leading Coca-Cola in 1923. Woodruffs goal was to place a Coke in arms reach of desire, so he pushed for new channels through which to make Coke available, including open-
top coolers in grocery stores, automatic fountain dispensers, and vending machines. Woodruff coupled this mass availability of Coke with an advertising campaign that emphasized the role of Coke in a consumers life, the combination of which developed brand loyalty through increasing both the availability of and the desire for Coke. Woodruff further developed brand loyalty, increasing the barrier to entering the CSD industry, through associating Coke with the United States military during World War II, promising that every man in uniform gets a bottle of Coca- Cola for five cents wherever he is and whatever it costs the company. The third significant historical barrier to entering the CSD industry was the successful vertical integration of nationwide franchise bottling networks of Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola, beginning in 1980. Coca-Cola recognized that most of the family-owned bottlers that it used no longer had the resources to remain competitive in the industry and began buying up the poorly-managed bottlers, reinvigorating them with capital, and selling them to better-performing bottlers. In 1985 Coca-Cola bought two of its largest bottlers for $2.4 billion and in 1986 created an independent bottling subsidiary called Coca-Cola Enterprises, which allowed the company to consolidate its territories into larger geographic regions, placed it in a better position to negotiation with suppliers and retailers, and merged redundancy. In the late 1980s, Pepsi-Cola followed Coca- Colas lead, first attempting to operate its bottlers for a decade before shifting to a bottling subsidiary, Pepsi Bottling Group, which went public in 1999. By 2009 Coca-Cola Enterprises handled about 75% of Coca-Colas North American bottle and can volume and Pepsi Bottling Group produced 56% of PepsiCos total volume. Further, this vertical integration created the additional barrier to entry of increased dependence on the Pepsi and Coke bottling networks for product distribution. Franchise agreements since 1987 had allowed bottlers to handle non- competing brands of other concentrate producers, but this consolidation of bottling networks limited the flexibility of bottlers to handle alternative brands, and thus heightened the barriers to entering the CSD industry. The final barrier to entry was economies of scale. Large bottling and canning production facilities can cost hundreds of millions of dollars, so the established production lines of major brands like Coca-Cola and PepsiCo allowed them to continuously introduce new products within their brands, as well as new container types in which to sell them. In the 1980s Coke introduced 11 new products including Caffeine-Free Coke in 1983 and Cherry Coke two years later and Pepsi followed suit and introduced 13 new products during the same period.
Buyer Power The buyers in the CSD industry are the various retail outlets for CSDs, including supermarkets, fountain outlets, vending machines, mass merchandisers, convenience stores, gas stations, and other outlets. Overall, there is a moderate amount of buyer power in this industry, because the buyers have significant power because they determine the shelf space and visibility of the industrys products, but their power is also limited by the significant sales of CSDs of $12 billion annually, or about 4% of total store sales in the U.S. Buyer power is also limited by the fact that CSDs are a big traffic draw for many of these outlets
Supplier Power Supplier power is low for this industry because the factors of production for both the concentrate aspect of the industry and the bottling aspect of the industry are basic commodities like caramel coloring, natural flavors, and caffeine for concentrate and packaging and sweeteners for bottling, none of which require specialized suppliers. Further, Coke and Pepsi are among the metal can industrys largest customers, and it is often the case that two or three can manufacturers compete for a single contract with the companies, giving Coke and Pepsi a large advantage, and therefore creating a situation of low supplier power. This lowers expenses and therefore increases profits for CSD producers. Substitutes Historically, the threat of substitutes to the CSD industry has been low to moderate. There are many substitutes, including alcoholic beverages, coffee and tea, sports drinks, and several other beverages, as well as non-cola CSDs such as lemon/lime and root beer, but the availability and variety of CSDs make the CSD industry nearly impervious to this threat. Since 1970, beer and milk have both remained around 20 to 25 gallons per capita, coffee has significantly declined in per capita consumption, from 35.7 gallons in 1970 to 15.8 gallons in 2009, and tap water/hybrids/all others has decreased from 68 gallons per capita in 1970 to 31.8 in 2009. Contrarily, the U.S. consumption of CSDs in gallons per capita has increased steadily from 22.7 in 1970 to 53 in 2000, and has only trended slightly downward since, dropping to 46 gallons per capita in 2009. The percentage of CSD consumption as a share of total beverage consumption has followed a similar trend, beginning at 12.4% in 1970 and peaking at 29% in 2000, and has
also only dipped slightly to 25.2% in 2009. This data suggests that even though several alternative beverage options exist, consumers do not view them as substitutes to CSDs, lessening the threat of substitutes and allowing the industry to remain profitable. Finally, the threat of substitutes is low because the CSD industry has already introduced several products, such as diet versions and flavor variations of classic products, creating its own substitutes for those classic products and absorbing the subsequent profits. Rivals Rivalry is extremely high in the CSD industry and has been a contributing factor to the profitability of the industry. The two primary CSD companies, Coke and Pepsi, have been engaged in cola wars for over a century, which has led to innovation in the industry ranging from new lines of products and vertical integration to marketing campaigns and novel packaging. Additionally, several rivals exist beyond Coke and Pepsi, including Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, which has seen a significant increase in U.S. soft drink market share by volume, from 11% in 1970 to 16.4% in 2009, as well as emerging private labels and generic labels, specifically at discount retailer locations such as Wal-Mart and Target. High rivalry has driven innovation and led to the historical profitability of the CSD industry.
ECONOMICS OF THE CONCENTRATE BUSINESS VS BOTTLING BUSINESS
IMPACT ON THE INDUSTRY PROFITS: Although the competition between Coke and Pepsi had started since the very early years of the 20th century; it became intense by the year 1950 and reached its peak to become a real war by the year 1980. Coke was the leader in the market with considerable market share much higher than Pepsi, so Pepsi was the leader of the competition with little response from Coke at the beginning. This war had affected the industry profits for both concentrator producers and bottlers while the effect of bottlers was much higher. The concentrate producers were always able to increase their profits by increasing the concentrate price while the bottlers especially the small size had to suffer from the war dramatically by decreasing their profits. The war forced bottlers to increasing their advertising and packaging proliferation, giving discounts for shelf space, injecting high capital for adaptation of plants with new products. The move and counter move relationship between Coke and Pepsi compelled each company to take steps to remain competitive. Following Pepsis entrance into the fast food industry with the Taco Bell, KFC, and Pizza Hut acquisition, Coca-Cola managed to convince market competitors such as Burger King to switch to their product. Coke retention of Burger King and McDonalds would be significant since each represented tremendous sales accounts. This battle over the control of retail channels directly contributed to profit margins in the bottling industry and spurred each company to take appropriate steps to not only retain market share but expand, as demonstrated by Quiznos and Subways switch to Pepsi and Coke, respectively. The growth and expansion put a squeeze on other smaller concentrate producers and the profits of the industry can be characterized by the shuffling of brands. While profits were increasing, other brands were pushed aside. Phillip Morris entered the market in 1978 with the acquisition of Seven-Up only to incur substantial losses and eventually leave the industry in 1985. Furthermore, as both companies sought to acquire market share and revenue, the rivalry induced a greater degree of innovative practices to branch out in the market, create lower prices, and packaging. In addition to its flagship cola brand, Coca-Cola added Fanta (1960), Sprite (1961), and Tab (1964). Pepsi, quickly responding, developed Teem (1960), Mountain Dew, and Diet Pepsi (1964). Perhaps the most influential of these additions was Diet Coke (1982) the nations third largest CSD. The flood of new brands took up shelf space and made entrance by other competitors very difficult.
The industry was monopolized by two companies. The new flavor introductions were accompanied non-returnable glass bottles and 12-ounce metal cans. In addition, both Pepsi and Coca-Cola would also try their hand in the non-CSD market. Product innovation, though, was closely followed by changes within the relationships between bottlers and concentrate producers. Coke, in response to eroding market share and successful Pepsi marketing campaign (Pepsi Challenge), began restructuring contracts with bottlers to obtain greater flexibility in pricing concentrate and syrups. Finally, as the cola wars truly began to increase in competitiveness, Coca-Cola in 1980 found a lower priced substitute for sugar in high fructose corn syrup. A move emulated by Pepsi, both of these companies would reap benefits from the shift in ingredients. Again, the unsubtle shifts in each of these corporations strategies were in direct response to each other and in the process, made both innovative and in some cases as a result, more efficient.
RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. Integrate horizontally by diversifying their offering portfolio into non-CSD products. This can be done either by acquisition, merging or by internal inventions
2. Large Investment on R&D to developing their CSD products to meet the healthy requirements issued by the health organizations and to eliminate or at least reduce the bad side effects of these products
3. Give more attention to overseas huge markets in Asia and Africa emerging economies like India and China where per-capita consumption is still very small comparing to US market
4. Build on their global high brand recognition, low rivalry force and their high economics of scale to gain huge market share of the non-CSDs consumers as they already did with the CSDs consumers base.
5. Investing more on marketing campaigns and on social activities to acknowledge consumers by their new healthier products of both CSDs and non-CSD
6. CPs has to Helping bottlers to achieve higher profit margins by reducing their concentrate prices and inject capital investment to modernize the bottlers plants, to adapting the new product lines or CPs have to continue the strategy they started by integrating vertically into bottling. Despite diminishing demand for CSDs, there is no doubt that Coke and Pepsi can sustain their profits if they respond appropriately to the challenges disrupting their industry. The barriers to entry in the beverage industry remain high, reducing the likelihood that a rival firm could easily upset the industrys duopolistic structure. Though consumer preferences have shifted, Coke and Pepsi have advantages over potential rivals that put them in the best position to adjust to the changes. Their brand equity, established infrastructures, economies of scale, and relationships with suppliers and distributors will allow them to maintain dominance. To continue to be as profitable as they have been historically, Coke and Pepsi must enter emerging markets, bolster consumption of CSDs in existing international markets, and continue to introduce increasingly popular non-CSDs domestically. Coke and Pepsi must continue to reduce their dependence on the domestic market by expanding into new markets in Asia and Eastern Europe. The firms should take advantage of lowered trade barriers and use their marketing prowess to establish footholds in these regions as early as possible. Coke, which already has a strong international presence, has an early advantage in these markets because during World War II, the United States government helped to set up 64 bottling plants overseas to supply American soldiers with Coca-Cola. Because Coke already has established facilities and potential consumers with knowledge of the brand in some European and Asian countries, the entrance into nearby emerging markets is eased. Coke can test the waters in these markets by shipping product from existing factories before expending the capital to build new bottling plants in these countries. Pepsi currently derives nearly 50% of its sales from the domestic market. It will have to be particularly focused on its overseas development given the flattening of domestic demand. Pepsi should start to strengthen the value of the brand abroad with marketing efforts like the sponsorship of important local events. China and India warrant particular attention from both companies because of their growing middle classes. Coke and Pepsi should focus on introducing both existing products and new products tailored to the specific preferences of consumers in each area. In China, for example, Coke has introduced Sprite Tea while Pepsi has developed products using Chinese herbs to appeal to local taste. In addition, the retail value of juice in China is expected to grow 94% over
the next year. This can be an opportunity for both companies to establish themselves as leading tea producers in the country, a form of diversification that can help them to weather the changes in the domestic market. Efforts should also be made to increase consumption of CSDs in countries where Coke and Pepsi already sell their products. The marketing campaigns that drove the extraordinary success of the companies domestically can be adjusted and replicated in new markets that have not been as affected by rising health concerns that have disrupted the U.S. market. Some of Pepsis top international CSD markets are Asia, Middle East, and Africa. A campaign tailored to the people of these regions that focuses on CSD products as lifestyle enhancements as Coca-Colas early U.S. advertising did, could increase international CSD consumption to offset some of the domestic decrease in consumption. In North American markets where demand for CSDs has flattened, there has been a corresponding increase in the consumption of other types of beverages. Sports drinks, ready-to- drink teas, and energy drinks have become more popular over the past decade while the consumption of CSDs has decreased. Coke and Pepsi should continue to introduce non-CSD products and shift their marketing campaigns to focus on their companies as beverage producers rather than as makers of carbonated products. This should not be a challenge for either company. Both firms are known for their product innovation, a factor which allowed them to garner and maintain profitability despite shifts in consumer preferences away from their flagship products and toward non-colas and diet CSDs in the 1960s. Both Coke and Pepsi are already leading producers of several of the non-CSD megabrands including the three highest volume non- CSDs Gatorade, Aquafina, and Dasani. The acquisition of other firms has been central to the non-CSD diversification of both brands. Coke and Pepsi should continue to acquire potential rivals before they have the scale and brand power to be true threats. In addition to the growth in the consumption of non-CSD products, there has been a substantial increase in consumption of diet CSDs. In 1999, diet sodas made up about 24% of the CSD market. A decade later, these drinks captured nearly 30% of the market. The successful launch of Coca-Cola Zero, which has experienced continued growth since its introduction in 2005, also suggests that the diet market has not been expended. Coke and Pepsi can maintain some of their profitability by introducing more diet CSD brands to remain in line with consumer trends.
Overall, despite the flattening of domestic demand for CSDs and the growing popularity of non- CSDs, Coke and Pepsi will be able to maintain their profits by focusing on their international markets and expansion and by continuing to develop new products tailored to consumer preferences and aligned with contemporary trends.